Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Militare, Problemi militari

Russia. I siluri Khishchnik e VA-111 Shkval. Serie minacce alle portaerei.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-16.

 2017-07-31__Siluro__Russo__ 1516090282365511054

Si resta sempre sorpresi su come riescano i russi ad impiegare in modo così produttivo un bilancio militare che ufficialmente si attesterebbe attorno ai 65 miliardi di dollari americani.

I russi dispongono di una marina sufficiente per svolgere compiti locoregionali, senza attuali ambizioni globali. Una flotta di tale impostazione strategica abbisogna sicuramente di armi offensive, ma soprattutto di quelle difensive: sistemi contraerei ed anti-missile, sistemi missilistici anti-nave e, ovviamente siluri efficienti.

Loro obiettivo conclamato è il dominio dei mari limitrofi la Russia, ossia impedire ad altre marine militari di potersi avvicinare pericolosamente alle loro coste.

Alla fine del secolo scorso l’allora Unione Sovietica aveva messo in linea il siluro VA-111 Shkval, prodotto militare altamente innovativo: poteva infatti navigare ad una velocità di circa 90 km/h al momento del lancio, raggiungendo in breve i 370 km/h. Se è vero che essendo molto rumoroso era altrettanto facilmente individuabile, la sua stessa velocità gli avrebbe assicurato alte probabilità di colpire e distruggere l’obiettivo.

Cerchiamo di comprendere, per quello che è dato di sapere, come funziona un simile marchingegno e di razionalizzare le conseguenze tattiche e strategiche.

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Supercavitazione.

«La supercavitazione è una tecnica che permette di utilizzare gli effetti dell’ordinaria cavitazione per creare una bolla di gas all’interno di un liquido, permettendo ad un oggetto di viaggiare ad altissima velocità all’interno del liquido stesso, rimanendo però completamente avvolto dalla bolla di gas. La bolla riduce drasticamente la resistenza dell’oggetto, permettendogli di raggiungere velocità impossibili da ottenere con una normale tecnica di navigazione. Occorre considerare che la resistenza incontrata da un oggetto in un gas è molto inferiore a quella riscontrata in un liquido.

Quando in un liquido la pressione statica è minore della relativa tensione di vapore, avviene una transizione di fase e il liquido passa in fase gassosa sotto forma di bolle. Questo fenomeno è detto cavitazione. In genere la cavitazione è dannosa e da evitare nelle applicazioni fluidodinamiche: genera rumore, diminuzione di efficienza degli oggetti coinvolti ed erosione delle superfici a contatto.

La supercavitazione è utilizzata da alcuni siluri superveloci. Un siluro a supercavitazione è progettato per generare appositamente queste bolle di gas: l’estremità anteriore del siluro ha forma piatta con bordi sagomati. Quando l’oggetto raggiunge la velocità dell’ordine di 45 m/s, l’estremità piatta deflette l’acqua, che, incontrando a valle dell’estremità una pressione inferiore alla sua tensione di vapore, passa in fase gassosa dando origine ad una bolla di gas attorno alla punta del siluro. Aumentando ulteriormente la velocità ed iniettando gas di altra origine è possibile far crescere la bolla gassosa fino a ricoprire l’intero siluro.» [Fonte]

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VA-111 Shkval

«Il VA-111 Shkval (in russo: шквал, “groppo”) è un siluro russo. Grazie all’utilizzo del fenomeno della supercavitazione può raggiungere delle velocità estremamente elevate (370 km/h). A causa di ciò la velocità e il rumore generato impongono un funzionamento più simile alla palla di fucile, che a quello di un siluro tradizionale e la portata è relativamente ridotta (tra i 7 e i 13 chilometri secondo le versioni).

La modalità di costruzione di tali armi rimane uno dei segreti più gelosamente custoditi dell’industria bellica russa, ma nel caso dello Shkval è noto che il siluro invia una parte dei gas che fuoriescono dai suoi ugelli di scarico in direzione del suo muso, cosa che permette di mantenere il siluro in una bolla di gas stabile di forma adeguata che lo separa dall’acqua circostante (supercavitazione). Il naso del proiettile è relativamente piatto e il corpo dell’arma possiede numerose alette destinate a stabilizzarlo.

Non esiste siluro occidentale paragonabile.» [Fonte]

È entrato in servizio nei primi anni del novanta: supporta testate convenzionali oppure nucleari.

 

Khishchnik

Questo nuovo tipo di siluro a razzo dovrebbe essere un consistente miglioramento tecnico rispetto al VA-111 Shkval.

The National Interest titola in questa maniera:

Russia Has a Crazy Fast Torpedo That Seems Unstoppable

«Khishchnik may also be significantly faster than the 1970s Shkval. Very high speeds underwater are certainly possible. A US Navy lab succeeded in firing an underwater projectile at an incredible 1500 meters per second, and the Chinese have talked about supersonic underwater vehicles, though there is no evidence they have achieved this.

Very little information is being released on Khishchnik apart from the fact that it is being developed by Elektropribor, a design bureau which makes instruments for ships and subs as well as aviation components. Its existence was revealed in documents uncovered by Russian defense blog BMPD which revealed that the company had been working on Khishchnik since 2013 and that launch tests were expected in 2016 as part of a contract worth 3 billion roubles ($53m). There have been no official comments or announcements.

Other companies may also be working on the project. In 2016, Boris Obnosov, CEO of Russian company Tactical Missiles Corp, mentioned work in this area to Rambler News Service.

“Take for instance the well-known unique Shkval underwater missile. We are working on upgrading it heavily.”

The ‘heavily upgraded’ Shkval seems likely to be the Khishchnik.

Shkval has been upgraded several times previously, with improvements in range and guidance. A new name suggests a more significant upgrade. An export version of the Shkval, the Shkval-E was produced in 1999. There would be a big market for an unstoppable, carrier-killing torpedo.»

L’attuale tecnologia arriverebbe quindi a supportare velocità subacquee di 1,500 metri al secondo, ossia 5,400 km/h.

Da quanto sembrerebbe di poter capire, il Khishchnik potrebbe raggiungere la velocità di poco meno di 800 km/h con una portata utile di 30 – 50 kilometri. La testa generatrice del bubble sarebbe orientabile, consentendo quindi cambiamenti di rotta. Sembrerebbe anche verosimile che il sistema di guida sia stato migliorato afferendogli capacità di auto indirizzamento sull’obiettivo.

Considerazioni.

Stati Uniti e forze navali Nato non hanno sviluppato un simile sistema d’arma per il semplice motivo che, almeno al momento, le loro flotte militari non sono contrastate da forze navali degne di quel nome. In ogni caso, all’occorrenza, l’Occidente ha a disposizione tutte le tecnologie necessarie.

Opposta è invece la situazione sia della Russia sia della Cina, che solo del tutto recentemente inizia a sviluppare l’esigenza di flotte militari di altura.

Questi due stati hanno come preoccupazione principale le portaerei americane, che vorrebbero poter tenere più lontane possibile dalle loro coste e dalle loro basi navali. In questa ottica il VA-111 Shkval ed adesso il Khishchnik,  sono armi che le portaerei non possono ignorare. Se è vero che le portaerei navigano ben protette da flotte di difesa e rifornimento, è altrettanto vero che nel rapporto prestazioni / costo una portaerei vale quasi venti miliardi, tenendo conto dell’armamento di bordo, mentre un siluro Khishchnik costa circa 50 milioni.

Accanto a questa tipologia di siluri, russi e cinesi hanno sviluppato una vasta gamma di missili ipersonici a bassa quota anti – nave.

«La Russia ha iniziato la sperimentazione dei nuovi ipersonici da crociera anti-nave Zircon, come ha riportato giovedì Sputnik News citando RIA Novosti. I missili da crociera dovrebbero essere in grado di raggiungere cinque o sei volte la velocità del suono (Mach 5 o Mach 6), ha aggiunto il rapporto. ….

I moderni missili anti-nave russi, come gli Onyx, possono raggiungere velocità fino a 2,6 Mach (circa 750 metri al secondo). Il missile da crociera Kalibr viaggia ad una velocità di 0,9 Mach, ma mentre si avvicina al bersaglio la sua velocità di punta può arrivare fino a 2,9 Mach. ….

la portata del missile è probabile che sia di circa 400 chilometri.» [International Business Times]

In conclusione, anche se nessuno intende sottovalutare le capacità difensive delle navi militari della Nato ed americane in modo particolare, anche se li riteniamo essere troppo allarmistici, ben comprendiamo i titoli recentemente comparsi sulla stampa.

Il missile cinese CM-302 è la migliore arma antinave al mondo?

«Il missile supersonico CM-302 è in grado di colpire anche bersagli terrestri. ….

la Cina non possiede missili antinave simili ai russi P-1000 “Basalt” e P-700 “Granit”. Il P-700 da solo è grande come un piccolo aereo, con una massa di 7 tonnellate e colpisce il suo bersaglio ad una velocità Mach 2 e inoltre ha un proprio sistema di guida computerizzato dotato di contromisure EW (Electronic Warfare). Questi missili possono essere lanciati in salve, e durante il volo sono capaci di comunicare tra loro per coordinare l’attacco contemporaneamente su diversi bersagli. Il P-1000 può essere equipaggiato con una testata nucleare. Questi missili sono stati modernizzati più volte, possono essere lanciati dalle coste e sono stati progettati per colpire una portaerei a più di 700km di distanza.»

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La Russia rilancia la corsa al missile antiportaerei

Le nuove portaerei degli USA, ‘cimiteri galleggianti’ da 15 miliardi di dollari?


The Economist. 2017-01-19. A new Russian weapon may give it an underwater advantage

The principle of supercavitation continues to intrigue torpedo designers.

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WHEN introduced 40 years ago, the Soviet Shkval (“Squall”) torpedo was hailed as an “aircraft-carrier killer” because its speed, more than 370kph (200 knots), was four times that of any American rival. The claim was premature. Problems with its design meant Shkval turned out to be less threatening than hoped (or, from a NATO point of view, less dangerous than feared), even though it is still made and deployed. But supercavitation, the principle upon which its speed depends, has continued to intrigue torpedo designers. Now, noises coming out of the Soviet Union’s successor, Russia, are leading some in the West to worry that the country’s engineers have cracked it.

Life in a bubble

Bubbles of vapour (ie, cavities) form in water wherever there is low pressure, such as on the trailing edges of propeller blades. For engineers, this is usually a problem. In the case of propellers, the cavities erode the blades’ substance. Shkval’s designers, however, sought, by amplifying the phenomenon, to make use of it. They gave their weapon a blunt nose fitted with a flat disc (pictured above) that creates a circular trailing edge as the torpedo moves forward. They also gave it a rocket motor to accelerate it to a speed fast enough for that edge to create a cavity consisting of a single, giant bubble which envelopes the entire torpedo except for the steering fins.

The result is that most of the torpedo experiences no hydrodynamic drag, greatly enhancing its potential velocity. To take advantage of this it is propelled, when the booster rocket runs out of oomph, by a hydrojet—a motor fuelled by a material, such as magnesium, that will burn in water.

Shkval’s problems are threefold. First, it has a short range—around 15km compared with around 50km for America’s principal submarine-launched torpedo, the Mk 48. Second, the hydrojet is noisy, so opponents can hear the weapon coming. Third, it cannot track its target. Most torpedoes use sonar to home in on the ship they are intended to sink. Because Shkval travels inside a bubble, any sonar needs to be mounted on the cavitation disc, which is too small for the purpose. In addition, returning sonar pings would be drowned out by the hydrojet’s noise. As a consequence, Shkval’s only guidance is an autopilot which steers it towards the place where its target was located at the moment of launch, in the hope that the target has not moved.

These deficiencies have not stopped Western countries trying to build supercavitating torpedoes of their own. Diehl, a German firm, announced a programme for such a weapon, Barracuda, in 2004. In 2006 General Dynamics, a big American firm, was commissioned to look into the matter (though its brief did not include the word “torpedo”, referring only to an “undersea transport”) by the country’s Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency.

The firms’ engineers tried to overcome the guidance problem by developing a new type of cavitator. Rather than a flat disc, General Dynamics’ design had a curved surface, increasing the area available for sonar reception. In addition the sonar’s transmitters, mounted on the torpedo’s steering fins, were separate from the receiver, and the interference caused by engine noise was reduced by special filters. In the end, though, these efforts ran into the sand. Barracuda was never completed. General Dynamics’ project was shelved after a year. American naval research into supercavitation in general ended in 2012, though which particular problems proved insurmountable has never been revealed.

Russia, though, has not given up on the idea. In October 2016 plans emerged for a new supercavitating torpedo, Khishchnik (“Predator”). Few details have been released, except that the work is being carried out by Elektropribor, a design bureau specialising in high-precision systems for submarines. Combining a General Dynamics-style sonar with a better motor could, however, result in a weapon that the world’s navies would truly have to fear.

Such a motor is possible, according to Georgiy Savchenko of the Institute of Hydromechanics at Ukraine’s National Academy of Sciences. His supercavitation-research group estimates that with the right fuel (perhaps lithium, which packs more energy per kilogram than magnesium) a new torpedo could have ten times the range of Shkval. It would still be noisy, but, added to its speed, such a combination of range and tracking ability would make it hard to evade. Moreover, there is no theoretical reason why Khishchnik should not travel quite a lot faster than Shkval does. In laboratory tests, supercavitating projectiles have clocked more than 5,000kph.

Kanyon diabolo

The supercavitating design being developed for Khishchnik might also feed into the Kanyon project, a giant nuclear-powered torpedo with a nuclear warhead that is intended to attack coastal targets. In what was either a deliberate leak or a piece of disinformation, this project was revealed to the world in 2015 during a televised meeting between Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, and senior officers of the country’s armed forces. The camera, looking over one of these officers’ shoulders, gave a picture of plans for the putative device, annotated with helpful information such as “speed of travel—185kph”.

The leaked design did not appear to use supercavitation—but if Kanyon is genuine, then thoughts of adding it cannot have escaped its designers. Even if Kanyon is smoke and mirrors, though, Khishchnik seems real enough. Perhaps, this time, aircraft-carrier skippers should be worried.


Navy Recognition. 2017-01-16. Russia developing Khishchnik high-speed torpedo to replace VA-111 Shkval supercavitating torpedo.

The Elektropribor Design Bureau in Saratov is developing a high-speed torpedo dubbed Khishchnik (Russian for ‘raptor’) and designed to replace the Shkval, expert Vladimir Tuchkov writes in an article with the Svobodnaya Pressa online news agency. The blog of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) has reported that Elektropribor is soon to complete the development of a sophisticated high-speed torpedo. The weapon is designed for replacing the famous Shkval capable of accelerating to 200 knots under water. CAST learnt about that when Elektropribor applied for participating in the 2015 Aircraft Maker of the Year Competition held by the Union of Aviation Industrialists of Russia (UAIR).

Two applications have been submitted, with one of them dedicated to “the execution of the state defense order for developing components of advanced underwater vehicles.” The application continues: “Since 2013, the company has been developing and manufacturing prototypes and testing a component of the underwater missile embodying advanced boundary layer control principles.”

The weapon in question is the Khishchnik, of which very little is known due to the program being very hush-hush.
The torpedo is under development by the company developing components for military planes, and the weapon has been submitted for the competition to be held by UAIR. The thing is, the type of weapons is called rocket-assisted torpedo, and Elektropribor is developing electrical units for its rocket motor and the control systems.

The NII-24 Research Institute (now the Region State Research and Production Company, a subsidiary of Tactical Missiles Corp.) kicked off Shkval’s development in 1960. The requirements specification called for a torpedo with a cruising speed of 200 knots and a range of 20 km for launch via the standard 533-mm torpedo tube.  

The first prototype was made as soon as 1964. The same year, it launched its tests at Lake Issyk-Kul followed by tests in the Black Sea near the city of Feodosiya. The tests failed. The designers developed one model after another that kept on failing to meet the stringent requirements specification. It is the sixth prototype that passed the tests and was cleared for full-rate production. The torpedo entered the Soviet Navy’s inventory in 1977.

Its high speed resulted from cavitation. Research into this field was started by a TsAGI affiliate in the Soviet Union in the late ‘40s. In the late ‘50s, the scientists came up with a harmonious theory of cavitation movement and issued recommendations for applying its principles to high-speed underwater vehicle development. Cavitation boils down to an object (a torpedo in this case) moving inside an air bubble, overcoming the drag caused by the air, rather than by water. A combined-cycle gas turbine unit in the nose section creates the air bubble enveloping the torpedo.

The weapon is propelled by a jet from its solid-propellant rocket motor, rather than by a screw or a waterjet. The Shkval’s power plant is two-stage. First, the solid-propellant motor accelerates the torpedo to the cavitation speed. Then, the sustainer – an underwater ramjet – kicks in.

The development of the underwater ramjet proved to be as difficult as that of the cavitation generator. It is radically different to the ones used in planes and rockets. It uses seawater as actuating medium and oxidizer, while hydroreactive metals are its fuel.

The speed requirement was met, but the range proved to be a mere 13 km. The torpedo’s launch depth was 30 m, and the weapon dashed to its target at 6 m below the surface. Initially, its warhead was nuclear and had a yield of 150 kilotons. The torpedo weighed 2,700 kg and measured 8,200 mm long.

While having a huge speed, the torpedo lacked a seeker. There were two reasons for that. First, maneuvering worth mentioning is impossible at such a speed, because the air bubble will disintegrate. Second, the torpedo is very noisy and it vibrates, which will make the seeker hear nothing but the motor.

Naturally, the heading of the enemy ship subject to sinking as well as its speed and other factors is taken into consideration prior to the Shkval’s launch, i.e. a lead is allowed for, but it is short, because the Shkval covers 13 km inside 130 s – a bit more than 2 min. The torpedo’s baseline model carried a 150-kt nuclear warhead. It was replaced with a high-explosive one weighing about 250 kg, when the time came to slash the nuclear stockpiles. However, the launch of the torpedo exposed the submarine, for the Shkval’s wake gave its position away lock, stock and barrel. The torpedo’s short range was fraught with another problem: to attack an aircraft carrier or other major combatant, the submarine had to enter its antisubmarine coverage area, which reduced its own chances for survival. In other words, although the designers produced high technical characteristics, the weapon proved to be of little use in practical terms. The Shkval was removed from the inventory.

Designers in two more countries echoed the ideas embodied in the Shkval. In 2005, Germany announced the development of the Barracuda supercavitating torpedo with a speed of 400 km/h, and, two years ago, the Iranian chief of naval operations mentioned a torpedo travelling at 320 km/h. However, these are not weapons ready for combat, rather prototypes undergoing the trials.

The Khishchnik is not a version of the Shkval. Serious money has been set aside for its development. The two contractors alone – Elektropribor and the SEPO-ZEM plant in Saratov – co-pursuing the Khishchnik-M program have received more than 1.5 billion rubles ($25 million).

Therefore, it is possible that the torpedo will have a seeker and be able to maneuver and its range and stealth will increase, expert Vladimir Tuchkov writes in the article on the Svobodnaya Pressa news website.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica Militare

Russia arma la Turkia con i sistemi S-400. Trattative per gli S-500.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-14.

2017-08-16__Russia arma la Turkia con i sistemi S-400. 2017-03-17__s-400

Avevamo già fornito questa notizia il 17 marzo di questo anno:

Russia fornirebbe alla Turkia sistemi S-400 extra Nato.

Bene. Adesso la Russia li ha forniti e sono in corso trattative per forniture anche di sistemi S-500.

«L’S-400 Triumph (in cirillico С-400 Триумф, nome in codice NATO SA-21 Growler) e precedentemente identificato come s-300-PMU 3, è un sistema d’arma antiaereo di nuova generazione sviluppato dall’azienda del settore difesa russa NPO Almaz, prodotto da MKB Fakel, azienda di stato russa con sede a Khimki e esportato da Rosoboronexport.

Sarebbe un sistema d’arma molto superiore alla precedente serie S-300 ed in sue versioni per l’export è stato esportato in Cina; nel novembre 2014 Mosca e Pechino hanno firmato un accordo da 3 miliardi di dollari per la fornitura di sei battaglioni del sistema antiaereo/antimissile S-400 che permetteranno di rafforzare in modo significativo la difesa aerea della Cina. Inoltre in India è stato formalizzato l’interessamento che dovrebbe portare all’ordine di acquisto ufficiale di 12 sistemi durante una visita del primo ministro indiano in Russia nel dicembre 2015

L’S-400 è stato progettato come sistema d’arma capace di intercettare e colpire aerei da guerra e missili da crociera e balistici che volano ad una velocità da 0 a 4,8 km/s (17.000 km/h). Il sistema può individuare fino a 36 (80 nelle nuove versioni) obiettivi contemporaneamente in un raggio che va da 30 a 400 km (quest’ultima distanza con il missile 40N6 con compiti ABM e anti AWACS) in base al tipo di missile utilizzato.

Il sistema è composto nella sua versione per l’esercito russo (almeno fino al 2010) dal posto comando 55K6E e dal radar 91N6E di acquisizione, gestiti con il sistema di gestione del combattimento 30K6E. Il posto comando è affiancato in genere da 6 complessi 98Zh6E ognuno comprendente un radar 92N6E di ingaggio e da un numero variante di TEL 5P85SE2/5P85TE2, armati con 4 missili 48N6E2/E3; a complemento di tutto ciò un sistema di supporto logistico 30Ts6E comprendente stivaggio dei missili ed equipaggiamenti di manutenzione.» [Fonte]

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S-500: Russia’s Super Weapon That Could Kill the B-2, F-22, or F-35

«The new weapon—which will form the upper tier of Russia’s layered integrated air defense system—is expected to be able to engage targets at altitudes of about 125 miles—or 660,000 feet. That means that S-500 will be able to engage targets such as incoming ballistic missiles in space at ranges as great as 400 miles. The first regiment of S-500 will be deployed to protect Moscow and central Russia.

The S-500 is expected to able to detect and simultaneously attack up to ten ballistic missile warheads flying at speeds of twenty-three thousand feet per second. It is also reportedly being designed to use hit-to-kill interceptors—a design with similarities to Lockheed Martin’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.

Like all modern Russian air defense systems, the S-500 is expected to be highly mobile and will use a network of radars for targeting over vast distances. The missile system is expected to use the 91N6A(M) battle management radar, a modified 96L6-TsP acquisition radar, as well as the new 76T6 multi mode engagement and 77T6 ABM engagement radars»

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Ragionando in estrema sintesi.

– La Turkia occupa il fronte europeo meridionale del continente e dello schieramento Nato.

– La Turkia governa lo Stretto dei Dardanelli, tramite il quale passa anche il traffico marittimo diretto non solo in Russia, ma anche in Ukraina, Romania e Bulgaria.

– «La Turchia è uno dei cinque stati membri della NATO che fanno parte della politica di condivisione nucleare dell’alleanza, assieme a Belgio, Germania, Italia e Paesi Bassi. Un totale di 90 bombe nucleari B61 sono ospitate presso la base aerea di Adana, di cui 40 sono assegnate per l’uso da parte dell’aviazione turca.» [Fonte]

   In altri termini, la Turkia non è uno stato qualunque all’interno della Nato.

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Negli ultimi due anni la Turkia ha subito severi sommovimenti che hanno esitato in posizioni robuste del governo centrale. Una cosa è quanto riportano i media liberal occidentali ed una ben differente è la realtà dei fatti.

La Germania, guidata dalla Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel, ha raffreddato i rapporto con la Turkia fino a quasi annullarli, in nome dei principi valoriali che essa Cancelliera nutre e del così detto ‘buon governo’. La Germania ha coinvolto nel suo modo di vedere e sentire tutta l’Unione Europea, annullando così l’iter di adesione della Turkia all’Unione Europea.

Le conseguenze si sono immediatamente riflesse su posizione e ruolo della Turkia nella Nato. Al momento sarebbe lecito domandarsi se la Nato esista ancora.

«Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that the agreements involving the sale of Almaz-Antey S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have been “inked.”»

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«Earlier in July, Bloomberg reported that Ankara agreed to a $2.5 billion U.S. deal with Moscow for four S-400 systems, of which two would be produced in Turkey»

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«The Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf utilizes four anti-air missiles: 40N6 (400 km), 48N6 (250 km), 9M96E2 (120 km) and 9M96E (40 km). Collectively, these missiles position the S-400 as a multi-layered system capable of engaging targets at long-range and short-range as well as high-altitude and low-altitude»

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«the agreement has deepened concern that Turkey is drifting away from its longstanding alliance in NATO, which it joined during the security bloc’s first enlargement in 1952»

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«The S-400 deal “is a clear sign that Turkey is disappointed in the US and Europe,”»

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«But it is not compatible with NATO systems, nor would it be subject to the same NATO limits on deployment, meaning that Ankara could set it up in places like the Armenian border or Aegean coast»

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«Turkey’s relationship with other NATO members has been strained, in part because of the ongoing war in neighboring Syria — sentiment that appears to have intensified after the attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July 2016»

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«On Sunday, Erdogan accused the EU of “messing us about,” citing the bloc’s broken promises over issues like visa deals and Syrian migrants. “We will sort things out for ourselves,” he said. “There’s no other option.”»

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«The S-400 system would “close Turkish skies,” to Western aircraft»

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La politica estera perseguita da Frau Merkel nei confronti dei paesi del Visegrad, del Medio Oriente ed adesso della Turkia resta semplicemente inspiegabile.

L’unica spiegazione che renderebbe plausibili i suoi comportamenti sarebbe al limite della fantapolitica: Frau Merkel ci ricorda sempre di più Kim Philby.

«Angela crebbe in campagna, a 80 km a nord di Berlino, nella Repubblica Democratica Tedesca socialista. Winifred Engelhardt, ex membro anziano dell’Unione Cristiano Democratica asserisce in un libro che la capacità della famiglia di viaggiare tranquillamente dalla Germania Est alla Germania Ovest, come anche il loro possesso di due automobili, porta alla conclusione che il padre di Merkel avesse relazioni con il regime comunista, in quanto tali libertà per un pastore cristiano e la sua famiglia sarebbero state impossibili nella RDT.

Come molti giovani, Angela Merkel fu membro del movimento giovanile socialista Libera Gioventù Tedesca. In seguito, divenne membro dell’amministrazione del distretto e segretaria dell'”Agitprop” (agitazione e propaganda) presso l’Accademia delle Scienze di tale organizzazione. 

Angela Merkel compì gli studi a Templin e all’Università di Lipsia, dove studiò fisica dal 1973 al 1978. Operò e studiò in seguito all’Istituto Centrale per la Chimica fisica dell’Accademia delle Scienze a Berlino-Adlershof dal 1978 al 1990. Angela Merkel parla correttamente il russo.» [Fonte]

Agitprop è l’acronimo di отдел агитации и пропаганды (otdel agitatsii i propagandy), ossia Dipartimento per l’agitazione e la propaganda, organo del comitato centrale e regionale del Partito comunista dell’Unione sovietica il quale fu in seguito rinominato «Dipartimento ideologico». Per esservi ammesso si doveva essere comunisti di fede comprovata, vagliati a dovere dall’allora Kgb.


Quwa. 2017-07-25. Erdogan announces that S-400 deal is “inked”

Speaking to fellow Justice and Development Party (AKP) lawmakers on July 25, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that the agreements involving the sale of Almaz-Antey S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems have been “inked.”

“We have now taken steps with Russia about this issue. Deals have been inked. In God’s will, we will see S-400 missiles in our country and precede the process with joint production,” Erdogan said to the AKP.

Earlier in July, Bloomberg reported that Ankara agreed to a $2.5 billion U.S. deal with Moscow for four S-400 systems, of which two would be produced in Turkey. Prior to that Russian officials stated that the deal was nearing completion, with the two sides still negotiating on financing.

On July 14, Aselsan, Roketsan and Eurosam – a French-Italian consortium responsible for developing and producing the MBDA S-400 SAMP/T (Surface-to-Air Missile Platform/Terrain) SAM system – signed a deal to collaborate to develop Turkey’s homegrown long-range SAM system.

Erdogan’s recent statements confirm that the S-400 and Turkey-Eurosam programs are parallel initiatives, with the S-400 being sought for near-term procurement.

Following the collapse of its deal with Beijing for HQ-9s, the Turkish Undersecretariat of Defence Industries (SSM) commissioned Aselsan and Roketsan to manage the development of a domestic long-range SAM while the SSK and Turkish Ministry of Defence began talks with overseas vendors.

In November, the head of the SSM Dr. İsmail Demir stated (via the Daily Sabah) that it would “take five to seven years to conclude the [domestic SAM] project.”

The Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf utilizes four anti-air missiles: 40N6 (400 km), 48N6 (250 km), 9M96E2 (120 km) and 9M96E (40 km). Collectively, these missiles position the S-400 as a multi-layered system capable of engaging targets at long-range and short-range as well as high-altitude and low-altitude.

Turkey is poised to be the third S-400 customer following China and India, which have ordered their S-400 systems in 2015 and 2016, respectively.


Business Insider. 2017-07-17. Turkey has agreed to buy Russia’s advanced missile-defense system, leaving NATO wondering what’s next

Turkey reached an agreement with Russia to purchase the latter’s most sophisticated missile-defense system, the S-400, a senior Turkish military official told Bloomberg last week.

Under the $2.5 billion agreement Ankara would receive two batteries of the antiaircraft missile from Moscow within the coming year and then produce two more batteries in Turkey.

At the beginning of June, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow was ready to deliver the missile system, and a Russian military-industry official said an agreement on technical details had been reached in mid-June.

Turkey stepped up efforts to acquire its own missile-defense system after the US, Germany, and the Netherlands — all NATO members — decided at the end of 2015 not to renew their Patriot-missile deployments in southern Turkey. Spanish and Italian missile batteries remain in the country, but those systems are linked to the NATO air-defense system.

The deal has not been finalized and could still fall through, as has happened before — under pressure from the US, Turkey scrapped plans to buy missiles from a Chinese state-run company that had been sanctioned for allegedly selling missiles to Iran. (Ankara has also sought out alternative missile systems from the US and France.)

But the agreement has deepened concern that Turkey is drifting away from its longstanding alliance in NATO, which it joined during the security bloc’s first enlargement in 1952.

The S-400 deal “is a clear sign that Turkey is disappointed in the US and Europe,” Konstantin Makienko, an analyst at Moscow-based think tank the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, told Bloomberg. “But until the advance is paid and the assembly begins, we can’t be sure of anything.”

“The problem is, how do you interoperate in the NATO system with Russians? They’ll never interoperate,” US Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters on Friday. “We’ll have to see — does it go through? Do they actually employ it? Do they employ it only in one area? All that kind of stuff. But you know, we’ll have to take a look at it.”

The S-400 system can detect and target manned and unmanned aircraft and missiles and hit targets up to 250 miles away. But it is not compatible with NATO systems, nor would it be subject to the same NATO limits on deployment, meaning that Ankara could set it up in places like the Armenian border or Aegean coast.

A Turkish official also told Bloomberg that the S-400s delivered to the country would not have friend-or-foe identification systems, making them deployable against any target.

While Russia is unlikely to supply Turkey with its most up-to-date missile system, the deal would give Ankara a leg up on its goal to build defense-industry capacity — which may stem in part from Western reticence to exchange advanced technology with Turkey.

The licensing agreement allowing Turkey to produce S-400 batteries domestically would save it some of the billions needed to create a new industry, Makienko told Bloomberg.

“Either way, this is in line with Turkey’s massive weapons modernization drive that saw the emergence of new land, air and sea-based systems for domestic use and export,” Center for Naval Analyses researcher Sam Bendett told The National Interest.

Turkey has also discussed a missile-system purchase with a Italian-French joint venture, and agreements with Russia may be a means to gain leverage in those negotiations.

The deal may also serve political purposes.

Turkey’s relationship with other NATO members has been strained, in part because of the ongoing war in neighboring Syria — sentiment that appears to have intensified after the attempted coup against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July 2016.

Turkish officials were reportedly disappointed in NATO countries’ response to the coup, and Erdogan’s crackdown in the months since has been criticized by members of the security bloc. Ties with Germany are especially strained, and Berlin is currently redeploying its troops and equipment from a base in southern Turkey to positions elsewhere.

It may also be Turkey’s way of spurning the EU, the political and economic bloc that has in the past recognized Ankara as a candidate for membership. Foundering accession talks were scrapped by the EU in late 2016, amid Erdogan’s post-coup-attempt crackdown.

On Sunday, Erdogan accused the EU of “messing us about,” citing the bloc’s broken promises over issues like visa deals and Syrian migrants. “We will sort things out for ourselves,” he said. “There’s no other option.”

Turkish officials have said more than once that dealings with Russia shouldn’t be seen as a search for an alternative to either the EU or NATO. But observers in Russia described it as a significant development

The S-400 system would “close Turkish skies,” to Western aircraft in particular, Makienko, the Moscow-based analyst, told Russian news site Vzglyad, according to Russian state-owned outlet Sputnik. “If the Turks really purchase Russia’s missile defense systems, it will be a tectonic shift, a game-changer in the arms market,” he said.

The National Interest. 2017-07-13. This NATO Member Might Purchase Russia’s Mighty S-400 Air Defense System

NATO member Turkey has reportedly reached a preliminary agreement with Moscow to purchase Russia’s fearsome S-400 air and missile defense system.

The agreement is not final, but the deal—if it goes through—could be yet another indication that Ankara is starting to shift its alignment towards the Kremlin.

Further, the agreement might also be a signal from Ankara aimed at the European Union. The EU, in previous years, had recognized Turkey as a candidate for membership into that bloc, but the 28-member union voted to suspend already moribund accession talks with Turkey on Nov. 24, 2016, in the wake of a series of purges that followed a July 15, 2016 coup attempt to overthrow Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

“Politically, Turkey may be sending a strong message to the EU,” Center for Naval Analyses researcher Sam Bendett told The National Interest.

However, while the deal would be significant if it were finalized, Turkey had previously reached a preliminary deal with China to purchase Beijing’s potent HQ-9 air defense system in September 2013. However, Ankara scrapped the deal in November 2015 under pressure from Washington and other NATO allies.

“I think it is too early to say anything. In 2013 there was a similar preliminary decision by Turkey to buy Chinese HQ-9 systems but that failed to materialize,” Vasily Kashin, a senior fellow at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, told The National Interest.

However, this time around, given the tensions between Ankara and Washington over the later’s support for Kurdish rebels in Syria combined with the Europeans’ distaste for Erdoğan’s increasingly autocratic rule, the chances of a deal being finalized are looking more promising.

“The deal may still fall through at the very end, but it’s starting to look like it may actually go through,” Bendett said.

Ankara certainly needs modern air defense systems and hopes to gain the technology to build its own similar systems. Thus, a final deal will likely hinge on the degree of technology transfer Moscow is willing to afford Turkey.

According to Bloomberg—which broke the story—the Russians will supply two S-400 batteries and allow Ankara to license build two additional systems, but the exact details have yet to be worked out. Thus far, the Russians have not offered official comment on reports of the deal, which could be worth more than $2.5 billion.

But while the Russians seem willing to sell Turkey some of their most advanced air defense weapons, Moscow is not likely to part with all of its secrets. Turkey will likely receive a less capable export version of the S-400.

“The S-400 comes in a number of configurations, and besides, we expect to have the S-500 in the coming years,” Kashin said.

“Turkey is an increasingly important partner, although a difficult one.”

Bendett agreed that Turkey is not likely to receive the most capable version of the S-400.

“A modern military should have modern air defenses – that is what Turkey is striving for as it fields new systems,” Bendett said.

“But it’s likely that the Russians will not sell the latest S-400 version to the Turks, or sell it with certain caveats. Either way, this is in line with Turkey’s massive weapons modernization drive that saw the emergence of new land, air and sea-based systems for domestic use and export.”

The Turkish purchase could be beneficial for the United States and its NATO allies if the deal is finalized and Ankara remains oriented towards the West. Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 would afford NATO a valuable up close look at the system’s operational capabilities and limitations—and devise a means to neutralize it. Even a degraded export version of the S-400 would provide the West with insights on how to defeat Russia’s latest air defenses.

But a finalized deal might also mean that Turkey meant to forge its own path, one that is more oriented towards the Kremlin. And that is not likely to be received as good news here in Washington.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Militare, Geopolitica Mondiale

L’Asean denuncia la militarizzazione cinese del Mare del Sud della Cina.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-10.

2017-08-08__Asean__001 454998

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, right, talks with Australia Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, left, at the start of the 7th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and its dialogue partners as part of the 50th ASEAN Ministerial Meetings in Manila, Philippines, on Monday.


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Le esondazioni si prevengono costruendo argini degni di tal nome. Una volta che il fiume è straripato, non resta altro da fare che aspettare che le acque si ritirino, e quindi ricostruire quanto distrutto. Sempre poi che ciò sia possibile.

Per far ciò serve avere una chiara visione dell’attuale, in questo caso di un fiume che potrebbe esondare, ed una altrettanto chiara visione del futuro: si tratta infatti di privarsi oggi di una certa quale quota di risorse disponibili per costruire gli argini che proteggeranno nel futuro.

Bene: questa visione è latitata nell’ultimo decennio in tutto l’Occidente ed in molti paesi del sud – est asiatico. Lamentarsi oggi non ha alcun senso: il latte è stato versato.

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Per capire meglio la situazione, guardiamo con attenzione la fotografia. Il Ministro Wang Yi incontra Mrs Julie Bishop. Ma chi sono veramente, al di là della carica?

«Wang Yi  is a Chinese diplomat and politician. He formerly served as China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Ambassador to Japan, and Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office. As of March 2013, he is the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China. ….

After graduating from high school in September 1969, he was sent to Northeast China. He subsequently served in the Northeast Construction Army Corps in Heilongjiang Province for eight years ….

was enrolled in the department of Asian and African Languages of Beijing International Studies University (BISU). He studied the Japanese language at the institution, graduating in February 1982 with a bachelor’s degree. ….

From August 1997 to February 1998, Wang was a visiting scholar at the Institute of Foreign Relations of Georgetown University in the United States. ….

From September 1999, Wang studied international relations at China Foreign Affairs University and obtained a master’s degree. In February 2001» [Fonte]

Ricapitolando. Mr Wang Yi  ha alle spalle una formazione culturale di tutto rilievo, come attestano i titoli accademici conseguiti. Parla fluentemente giapponese ed inglese per essere vissuto in tali nazioni, più altre lingue asiatiche minori. Ha vissuto lunghi periodi all’estero. Ha un curriculum dedicato alla politica estera di tutto rilievo. In altri termini: è uno che conosce il proprio mestiere.

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«Julie Isabel Bishop (born 17 July 1956) is an Australian politician, serving as the Minister for Foreign Affairs since 2013, and the Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party since 2007. ….

She was educated at St Peter’s Collegiate Girls’ School and later at the University of Adelaide, where she studied law, graduating in 1978 ….

she attended Harvard Business School for eight weeks to complete an Advanced Management Program for Senior Managers ….

Bishop was appointed Minister for Ageing in 2003. She was later promoted to Minister for Education, Science and Training and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women’s Issues» [Fonte]

Mrs Bishop parla unicamente inglese, non ha mai vissuto nei paesi del sud – est asiatico, ha un curriculum accademico scarno, non si era mai interessata di problemi di politica estera, ignora totalmente quelli militari. È diventata ministro degli esteri per il solo merito di essere nata femmina. Un po’ pochino per superare una selezione meritocratica e per poter parlare alla pari con Mr Wang Yi.

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Il confronto tra Mr Wang Yi  e Mrs Julie Bishop è il miglior modo per comprendere perché la Cina adesso domini in modo totale il Mare Cinese del Sud.

«China claims nearly all of the sea, through which $5 trillion in annual shipping trade passes and which is believed to sit atop vast oil and gas deposits»

Se l’Asean affida a Mrs Bishop le trattative per un problema da cinque trilioni di dollari dimostra in modo lampante la propria incompetenza.

*

Non solo.

«The United States, Australia and Japan on Monday denounced Beijing’s island-building and militarization of the South China Sea, in contrast to the increasingly tepid response from Southeast Asian nations over the festering issue.»

Le Filippine sono il grande assente, eppure hanno una posizione altamente strategica.

«The Philippines had been one of the most vocal critics of China and filed a case before a UN-backed tribunal.

But after the election of President Rodrigo Duterte last year, Manila has played down the verdict in favor of pursuing warmer ties with Beijing, a move that led to offers of billions of dollars in investments or aid from China»

Ma le sentenze dei tribunali trovano valore solo ed esclusivamente se hanno un supporto politico: senza valgono come la carta straccia.

Stati Uniti ed Asean si sono giocati l’amicizia delle Filippine nel tentativo utopico di voler loro imporre le proprie concezioni ideologiche, mentre la Cina ha guardato con spietato realismo la cartina geografica.

L’Occidente liberal e femminista si sta avviando mestamente sul viale del tramonto: si sta suicidando. Senza meritocrazia le società implodono.


Saudi Gazette. 2017-08-08. US, allies denounce Beijing’s militarization of S. China Sea

MANILA — The United States, Australia and Japan on Monday denounced Beijing’s island-building and militarization of the South China Sea, in contrast to the increasingly tepid response from Southeast Asian nations over the festering issue.
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China claims nearly all of the sea, through which $5 trillion in annual shipping trade passes and which is believed to sit atop vast oil and gas deposits.

Its sweeping claims overlap with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei — all members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc — as well as Taiwan.

But in recent years Beijing has managed to weaken regional resistance by courting some ASEAN members.

On Sunday Beijing scored a coup when ASEAN ministers issued a diluted statement on the dispute and agreed to Beijing’s terms on talks during a security forum which the bloc is hosting in Manila.

China insists that a much-delayed code of conduct between it and ASEAN members over the disputed sea must not be legally binding, a demand to which Southeast Asian countries have so far acquiesced.

But in a joint statement after their foreign ministers met on the sidelines of the same gathering, the US, Japan and Australia delivered a noticeably sterner rebuke to Beijing.

Criticizing ongoing “land reclamation, construction of outposts, militarization of disputed features” in the disputed sea, the trio said any code of conduct must be “legally binding, meaningful and effective,” a demand noticeably absent from the ASEAN statement.

The three nations also called on China and the Philippines to respect last year’s international arbitration ruling which dismissed much of Beijing’s claim in the sea.

The Philippines had been one of the most vocal critics of China and filed a case before a UN-backed tribunal.

But after the election of President Rodrigo Duterte last year, Manila has played down the verdict in favor of pursuing warmer ties with Beijing, a move that led to offers of billions of dollars in investments or aid from China.

Critics of China have accused it of assiduously dividing ASEAN, which operates on a consensus basis, with strong-arm

 tactics and checkbook diplomacy, enticing smaller countries in the bloc such as Cambodia and Laos to support it.

Vietnam, which had been pushing for stronger language in Manila, has been largely left to fend for itself since Duterte’s China rapprochement.

The US, Australia and Japan oppose Beijing building giant artificial islands that could be used as military bases, fearing it will eventually establish de facto control over the waters.

China insists the three countries should stay out of what it says are purely bilateral disputes with its neighbors.

On Sunday Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned any interference from “outside parties” could jeopardize negotiations over the code of conduct.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Militare

Cina. Nuova superpotenza atomica. Prima non c’era, ora c’è.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-04.

2017-05-14__Obor__170514164356-xi-jinping-vladimir-putin-belt-and-road-forum-0514-exlarge-169

Il termine “superpotenza” non ha una definizione universalmente accettata, anche se si tratta più di sfumature che di motivazioni sostanziali.

Treccani definisce come “superpotenza

«nazione che, per potenziale economico, sviluppo tecnologico e armamento, ha una particolare influenza in campo internazionale e un forte peso sugli eventi mondiali»

Se il potenziale economico è di grande importanza nel connotare una superpotenza, indubbiamente il peso maggiore gravita sulle capacità militari.

Molto spesso si assume che la capacità di produrre bombe termonucleari sia sinonimo di potenza atomica: ciò è solo parzialmente vero.

Se è ovvio che la disponibilità di bombe termonucleari è di fondamentale importanza, è altrettanto vero che senza vettori efficienti a portata globale le armi atomiche sarebbero del tutto inutili: ciò che conta è la reale capacità di distruggere eventuali obiettivi nemici in qualunque parte del mondo essi siano situati.

Questa capacità è ottenuta con l’uso di basi di lancio mobili per ridurne la possibilità di localizzazione e neutralizzazione: missili quindi lanciabili da motrici terrestri, da aerei, da sommergibili. Come si vede, il tutto richiede un insieme di conoscenze e di tecnologie allo stato dell’arte.

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È interessante il modo con cui il Center for Strategic & International Studies porge la notizia:

«On July 30, Chinese president Xi Jinping presided over a large military parade celebrating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China unveiled its new DF-31AG ICBM. The DF-31AG is an upgrade to the DF-31A missile that was introduced in 2009. The DF-31AG was mounted on an all-terrain vehicle, demonstrating better mobility. The missile possesses a longer range, and carries multiple warheads. The DF-31A only carries a single warhead. While the DF-31AG shows improved survivability and longer range, China has yet to release details of the missile.

Unlike previous displays held in Beijing, this was held at Zhurihe base in Inner Mongolia. More than 100 planes flew overhead, and nearly 600 different types of weaponry were on display, including the J-20 stealth fighter, DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles, and DF-31AG ballistic missile.»

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Molte le novità tecniche, alcune esplicite ed altre implicite.

– Il sistema DF-31AG Icbm è un prodotto allo stato dell’arte per mobilità, gittata, e capacità di gestire testate multiple. In altri termini, la Cina ha adesso un sistema di lancio terrestre che la annovera nel club delle superpotenze atomiche.

– Non potendo sfilare per intuibili motivi, la Cina ha anche sviluppato una nuova tipologia si sottomarini atomici della classe 093, in grado di lanciare sia missili Icbm, sia missili anti-nave Yj-18, sia infine missili da crociera a lungo raggio DF-10.

– Il Csis annovera solo da qualche tempo negli armamenti strategici i missili anti-nave, in questo caso i DF-21D. Questo è un missile di medio raggio a testata atomica, usabile come missile antinave. Sembrerebbe essere alquanto datato, ma corrono voci che la Cina stia sviluppando un qualcosa di simile ai sistemi anti – nave russi P-800 Onyx, P-1000 Basalt oppure i Bastion, denominandoli CM-302. Sono considerati essere armi strategiche perché potenzialmente in grado di affondare le portaerei.

* * * * * * *

Tuttavia le maggiori novità sembrerebbero essere insiste nella scelta della base in cui tenere la sfilata, Zhurihe, e nel discorso tenuto da Mr Xi.

«The world is not peaceful»

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«Today we are closer than any other period in history to the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and we need more than any period in history to build a strong people’s military»

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«Wherever the party points, march there»

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Il fatto che la Cina sia prepotentemente entrata nel novero delle superpotenze è evento critico dopo oltre settanta anni di oligopolio americano e russo.

La politica strategica mondiale non è più pensabile in termini di accordi russo-americani, ed anche gli accordi solamente bilaterali sembrerebbero essere destinati all’oblio. Non solo: i rapporti sino-russi sono molto migliori di quelli con gli americani.

Solo che, a differenza della Russia, la Cina nutre grandi ambizioni marittime, per il momento ancora vagamente inespresse, ma destinate a realizzarsi. Si pensi soltanto alla costruzione delle isole artificiali nel Mare Cinese del Sud, isole che hanno conferito alla Cina il predominio assoluto locoregionale. Tutte le proteste del mondo occidentale sono restate lettera morta.

Si voglia o meno, è cambiata un’era. L’epoca in cui l’Occidente poteva fare e disfare a proprio piacere il mondo è terminata e, si direbbe, in modo definitivo.

In questo contesto l’Unione Europea è semplicemente esclusa dalla geopolitica militare mondiale.

Eppure la somma delle spese militari degli stati afferenti l’Unione è quasi doppia di quella cinese e cinque volte tanto di quella russa. Ma a fronte di simile livello di spesa, la forza militare europea è virtualmente nulla: di conseguenza, l’Unione non può pretendere di fare politica mondiale.


The Wall Street Journal. 2017-07-30. China Parades New Missile in Warning to Rivals Abroad—and at Home

Military display is latest effort by President Xi Jinping to improve standing as party leadership shuffle looms.

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BEIJING—China unveiled a new, more mobile intercontinental ballistic missile at a parade of advanced weaponry and combat troops, in President Xi Jinping’s latest display of military—and political—muscle.

State television showed at least 16 DF-31AG missiles in Sunday’s parade at the Zhurihe combat-training base in northern China, marking the 90th anniversary of the founding of the force that is now known as the People’s Liberation Army.

The DF-31AG is mounted on an all-terrain vehicle so it is harder to track and can be fired from multiple locations, and it could have a longer range than the older DF-31A, which was also displayed and is carried by a vehicle designed mainly for roads, military experts say.

Mr. Xi, wearing combat fatigues and a peaked cap, inspected the troops from an open-top military vehicle before the parade, which featured tanks, helicopters, stealth jet fighters and some 12,000 personnel.

“The world is not peaceful,” Mr. Xi in a speech afterward that invoked his signature political idea of a “China Dream” to build the country into a global economic and military power. “Today we are closer than any other period in history to the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and we need more than any period in history to build a strong people’s military.”

Mr. Xi also ordered troops to obey the Communist Party leadership, saying: “Wherever the party points, march there.”

It is the first time a parade has been held to mark the anniversary since 1949, according to state media, and is the latest in a series of moves that analysts say are designed to boost Mr. Xi’s political standing in the run-up to a reshuffle of the party’s leadership this year.

The parade also came amid escalating military tensions in the region, with North Korea accelerating its nuclear-weapons program since January through a series of tests, including the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile Friday.

U.S. President Donald Trump has warned repeatedly that he is weighing military action to halt North Korea’s nuclear program, and in recent weeks has become increasingly critical of China, accusing them of failing to rein in Pyongyang. The U.S. Air Force flew two B-1B bombers over the Korean Peninsula on Saturday in direct response to North Korea’s latest missile test.

“I am very disappointed in China. Our foolish past leaders have allowed them to make hundreds of billions of dollars a year in trade, yet they do NOTHING for us with North Korea, just talk,” Mr. Trump wrote in a pair of posts on his Twitter account. “We will no longer allow this to continue. China could easily solve this problem!”

China’s parade would have been planned months in advance, analysts said, and wasn’t a direct response to Pyongyang or Washington, but it demonstrated Mr. Xi’s efforts to build a military that can respond to external challenges—including on the Korean Peninsula.

Last year, the Chinese leader launched sweeping military reforms—including cutting 300,000 troops—that are designed to overhaul Soviet-modeled command structures and better prepare the armed forces for combat, at home and abroad if needed.

The PLA is training for scenarios that include a conflict over the disputed South China Sea, a blockade of China’s oil supplies through the Indian Ocean, and operations to protect its citizens and investments in Africa and the Middle East.

Mr. Xi has also sought to assert his authority over the PLA through an anticorruption campaign that ensnared several current and retired generals, and by assuming the new title of “commander-in-chief” last year.

In June, he inspected PLA troops stationed in Hong Kong in another move to boost his political stature ahead of this fall’s 19th Party Congress, where he’s expected to try to promote allies to the top leadership.

“By presiding over a landmark parade for a party-loyal PLA growing leaner and meaner by his orders, Xi shows that he is large and in charge in the run-up to the 19th Congress,” said Andrew Erickson, an expert on China’s military at the U.S. Naval War College. “Debuting publicly such a powerful, penetrating deterrent weapon as the DF-31AG ICBM seeks to demonstrate that China commands heightened respect abroad even as it maintains order at home—both central components of Xi’s China Dream.”

China hasn’t provided any details about the DF-31AG, but a model was displayed for the first time this month in an exhibition at Beijing’s Military Museum. Analysts say the missile’s design and name suggest it is an improved version of the DF-31A, but beyond its improved survivability and possibly longer range, it remains unclear what the enhancements are.

China has an estimated 75 to 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the solid-fueled DF-31A, which has a range of more than 7000 miles and can reach most locations in the continental U.S., according to the Pentagon.

Other equipment in the parade included five J-20 stealth jet fighters and several DF-21D antiship ballistic missiles, which experts say are designed to hit approaching U.S. aircraft carriers in a potential conflict.

Chinese state television said more than 40 percent of the equipment in the parade was being displayed for the first time, but didn’t provide details of every piece of new weaponry.

Troops in the parade came from the army, navy and air force but also from two new services created about 18 months ago—the rocket force, which controls conventional and nuclear missiles, and the strategic support force, which handles electronic warfare.

Electronic weaponry on display included equipment designed for electromagnetic countermeasures and aerial drones that can be used for radar-jamming, state television said, without providing details.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Militare

Usa. Per la prima volta le portaerei non coprono tutti i mari del globo.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-02.

USS Boxer joins South Korea US drill

Da un punto di vista militare il fatto che gli Stati Uniti non mantengano una portaerei, e relativa flotta di appoggio, in ogni parte del mondo sembrerebbe essere ininfluente sulle capacità belliche globali americane.

Il problema sembrerebbe essere più politico e di visibilità.

«a quick look at the latest positioning of US aircraft carriers, amphibious ready groups, and other navies around the globe shows a gaping hole in the region of the East or South China Sea, and even in proximity to Japan, a place where the US navy traditionally has maintained at least one carrier group»

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«In fact, according to Stratfor, the only active carrier group is USS Dwight D. Eisenhower CSG, conducting naval operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe»

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«The absence of a deployed U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, long seen as a symbol of American power projection, is noteworthy»

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«According to Fox, it is believed to be the first time since World War II that at least one U.S. aircraft carrier has not been deployed»

* * * * * * *

I tempi stanno cambiando, ed anche molto velocemente: spesso può essere anche un segnale minimo a far rendere conto di come stiano le cose nei fatti.

Se la Russia è una superpotenza atomica fin dalla fine della seconda guerra mondiale, Arabia Saudita ed India stanno iniziando a svolgere un importante ruolo locoregionale. La Cina invece sta lanciando molti segnali di sentirsi stretta nel ruolo regionale, e di ambire ad essere militarmente presente almeno nell’Oceano Pacifico ed in quello Indiano.

Se nessuno nega agli Stati Uniti un ruolo di primaria superpotenza atomica assieme alla Russia, la Cina dispone anche essa di un imponente arsenale nucleare e di efficienti vettori transcontinentali.

Se nessuno nega agli Stati Uniti un ruolo marittimo egemone, nessuno può di converso negare come la Cina stia allestendo un sistema navale più destinato a ruoli strategici che locoregionali. La Cina di fatto è già la terza superpotenza, assieme a Stati Uniti e Russia.

Si consideri infine come negli ultimi lustri siano stati sviluppati sistemi di missili anti – nave che al bassissimo costo di produzione associano una non indifferente capacità operativa. Le capacità difensive delle portaerei dovrebbe subire sostanziali miglioramenti: non sono più invulnerabili.

«il missile ipersonico 3M22 Tzirkon ha una velocità di Mach 6,2 (6500 km/h), un peso di 5 tonnellate e nella prima fase avrà un’autonomia di 400 km. Successivamente, aumentando il carico di carburante, il campo operativo del missile Tzirkon potrebbe raggiungere i 1000 km»

*

«missili antinave Kh-41 Moskit dalla gittata di 250 km e un velocità di Mach 3,2 (3587 km/h) furono schierati permanentemente sulla base aerea di Burevestnik, sull’isola di Iturup, nell’arcipelago delle Curili»

*

«Un missile che vola a 6000 km/h a bassa quota è molto difficile da intercettare, dato che tra il momento dell’individuazione sul radar e l’impatto sulla portaerei, i sistemi di difesa hanno solo un minuto per inquadrarlo e attivare le contromisure»

* * * * * * *

Un ultimo dato. Nel 2016 la Cina ha stanziato per spese militari dirette per 215 miliardi di dollari: una cifra enorme per ambizioni soltanto locoregionali.


 → Zero Hedge. 2017-07-25. For The First Time Since World War II, No US Carriers Are Deployed Anywhere In The World

Last weekend, when commenting on China’s public demonstration of its one and only aircraft carrier, which China then proceeded to sail in close proximity to Taiwan to make a clear diplomatic “statement”, we noted something tangentially troubling: ” a quick look at the latest positioning of US aircraft carriers, amphibious ready groups, and other navies around the globe shows a gaping hole in the region of the East or South China Sea, and even in proximity to Japan, a place where the US navy traditionally has maintained at least one carrier group.  In fact, according to Stratfor, the only active carrier group is USS Dwight D. Eisenhower CSG, conducting naval operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe.”

As it turned out, the Eisenhower carrier group was on its way back to dock in Norfolk, VA, which means that for the next several weeks, not only will there be no U.S. Navy aircraft carrier in the Middle East or the South China Sea, but as Fox News reports, “there will be no American aircraft carriers deployed at sea anywhere else in the world, despite a host of worldwide threats facing the United States.”

The absence of a deployed U.S. Navy aircraft carrier, long seen as a symbol of American power projection, is noteworthy. According to Fox, it is believed to be the first time since World War II that at least one U.S. aircraft carrier has not been deployed.

As it further reports, the carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and her strike group returned to Norfolk, Va., Friday following a seven-month deployment. The Ike launched hundreds of airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria from both the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. Two destroyers in the carrier’s strike group also saw combat. The USS Nitze and USS Mason were attacked in the Red Sea when allegedly Iranian-backed Houthi forces in Yemen launched cruise missiles, which were intercepted by the Mason. A retaliatory strike by the Nitze destroyed the radar installations in Yemen in October, even though in the meantime speculation emerged that the attack may have been coordinated by Saudi interests in an attempt to stage another “false flag” attack on US military assets.

The latest summary of US naval forces around the globe as of the last week of December is shown in the map below courtesy of Stratfor. As of this moment, the Eisenhower has crossed the Atlantic and is back at Norfolk base.

The Eisenhower’s replacement carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush, was delayed by more than six months in the shipyards and will not be able to replace the Ike well into 2017, according to Navy officials.

While there is no U.S. aircraft carrier in the Middle East right now, there is a large deck U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship, the LHD-8 Makin Island, with thousands of Marines on board as well as helicopters and some jets to respond to a crisis, according to officials.

Still, before it becomes the topic of a twitter rant by the President-elect and his opponents, the Navy told Fox News the U.S. military has other jets available to make up for the aircraft carrier gap in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. The Navy can also “surge” a carrier now in port to deploy if necessary.

“We are not going to discuss the timing of operational movements of carrier strike groups into and out of the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility,” said Capt. Terry Shannon, a U.S. Naval Forces Central Command spokesman, in a statement to Fox News. Centcom is tasked with control over all U.S. forces in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

It’s not the first time there was a carrier gap in the Middle East. Last fall, the U.S. Navy relied on a French aircraft carrier to fill the void when the USS Theodore Roosevelt returned home. At the time it was the first gap in carrier coverage in the Middle East since 2007.

Other factors contribute to the U.S. Navy not having an aircraft carrier deployed anywhere in the world right now. From 2011 to 2013, the Navy maintained two carriers in the Persian Gulf on the orders of Centcom’s then-commander, Gen. James Mattis, who is now President-elect Donald Trump’s pick for defense secretary, which likely means that the current carrier gap is temporary until Mattis takes his post after the Trump inauguration.

The congressionally mandated budget cuts known as sequestration have also been felt on the waterfront since 2011. After billions of dollars were cut from the Navy’s budget, ships such as the George H.W. Bush were forced to prolong their time in the shipyards, which had a ripple effect down the line. If the Bush had left the shipyard on time, she would have relieved the Ike in the Gulf or the Mediterranean, officials tell Fox News.

Fox News reproted that it recently flew out to the USS George H.W. Bush 40 miles off the coast of North Carolina to see the crew’s final tuneup. With jets landing every 60 seconds, the flight deck crew worked on getting the time between “traps” (landings) down to 40 seconds. Aboard the ship, 18- to 22-year-old men and women work 14 hour days on the flight deck, with little rest — all this before deploying and potentially dropping live rounds on ISIS.

“This is the military equivalent of spring training, because once we complete this at the end of December, then we’ll be going forward and it’ll be real forces that we’ll be going flying with and against,” said Rear Adm. Kenneth Whitesell, commander, Carrier Strike 2, interviewed on his perch above the four-acre flight deck known as “Vulture’s Row.”

In addition to fighting ISIS, the ship’s commanding officer says his crew will be ready to deal with a resurgent Russia or China if necessary.

“While we don’t have any emergent or pending conflicts with them, certainly, it is fair to say that we have divergent interests in many cases. and so we need to be prepared to understand how we will react to that if necessary,” said Capt. Will Pennington.  The Bush recently made history when on Aug. 8, 2014, a pair of F-18s from the carrier launched the first airstrikes against ISIS in northern Iraq. Now, two and a half years later, the ship is headed back to the fight against the Islamic State terror group.

“That doesn’t mean that three months or six months from now, that will be the priority for our country. So we have to be ready to execute anywhere, anytime, any mission,” said Capt. James McCall, commander of Air Wing 8, in charge of all of the aircraft on board.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Europea, Geopolitica Militare

Putin visita la Finlandia. Una savia Realpolitik.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-07-27.

Finlandia. Stemma Nazionale.

«In Finlandia vivono 5,4 milioni di persone ….

La Finlandia fece parte del Regno di Svezia dal XII secolo al 1809, quando divenne un granducato autonomo all’interno dell’Impero Russo fino alla rivoluzione del 1917. Il 6 dicembre di quell’anno la Finlandia ottenne l’indipendenza, seguita da una guerra civile terminata con la sconfitta dei “Rossi” filo-bolscevichi da parte dei filo-conservatori “Bianchi” sostenuti dall’Impero tedesco. Dopo un breve tentativo di stabilire una monarchia nel Paese, la Finlandia divenne una repubblica.

L’esperienza finlandese della Seconda guerra mondiale ha coinvolto tre conflitti separati: la Guerra d’inverno (1939-1940) e la Guerra di continuazione (1941-1944) contro l’Unione Sovietica, e la Guerra di Lapponia (1944-1945) contro la Germania nazista. Dopo la fine della guerra, la Finlandia ha aderito all’Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite (ONU) nel 1955, all’Organizzazione per la cooperazione e lo sviluppo economico (OCSE) nel 1969, all’Unione europea nel 1995 e alla zona Euro fin dal suo inizio nel 1999.» [Fonte]

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I problemi storici della Finlandia sono riassumibili in un’unica riga: confina ad est con la Russia ed ad ovest con la Svezia, due nazioni molto più agguerrite e potenti di lei. Nessuna di queste due nazioni, e dei blocchi che rappresentano, può permettere che la Finlandia transiti in modo definitivo nell’orbita militare strategica dell’altra.

Ciò compreso, risulta chiaro perché l’Urss non occupò la Finlandia alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale, pur avendola vinta sul campo, e perché la Finlandia non è stata incorporata nella Nato.

Durante l’epoca della guerra fredda invalse l’uso del termine ‘finlandizzazione‘ per connotare una politica estera ed interna attenta a non irritare le superpotenze, concedendo loro il concedibile in cambio della garanzia alla indipendenza ed al non coinvolgimento in eventuali operazioni belliche. Fu una Realpolitik grondante di sano buon senso, che concorse grandemente al mantenimento dello status quo mondiale.

Si come però il termine ‘finlandizzazione‘ sia anche stato usato in senso impropriamente denigrativo, attribuendogli un senso di succube sottomissione alieno alla realtà dei fatti.

Con la guerra civile ukraina e la successiva annessione della Krimea alla Russia, gli Stati Uniti e l’Unione Europea, capitanata dalla Germania di Frau Merkel, il settore geopolitico baltico ha subito una crescente militarizzazione, che ha esitato in un crescendo di tensioni. È anche stata ventilata la possibilità che la Finlandia entrasse a far parte della Nato.

«The relationship is much more pragmatic with Finland, less problematic than with any other neighbor Russia would have in this part of the world»

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«Finns and Russians both find this relationship useful …. It’s a part of a long tradition»

*

«The military-political situation in the Baltic Sea is challenging and worrying …. The general situation is bad but the current dynamics are not as bad as they could be»

* * *

«Russia would respect Finland’s decision if it decided to join NATO, but would respond.» [Mr Putin]

*

«What do you think we will do in this situation? We moved our forces back, 1500 kilometres away – will we keep our forces there? How they assure the safety and independence of their own country is the Finns’ choice. Undoubtedly we appreciate Finland’s neutral status» [Mr Putin]

* * * * * * * *

La Bbc pubblica un titolo interessante:

How pragmatic Finland deals with its Russian neighbour

«The Finnish public, despite being alarmed for a time over Russian actions in Ukraine, now appear satisfied with the status quo»

Sufficit.


Nota Importante.

Nell’ultimo decennio le superpotenze sono riuscite a sviluppare missili ipersonici capaci di viaggiare a basse quote a velocità superiori ai 7,000 kilometri all’ora, più di cento kilometri al minuto primo.

Missili di tal tipo hanno una portata massima di circa 500 kilometri e non sembrerebbero essere intercettabili dai sistemi di difesa al momento disponibili.

È del tutto evidente come il loro posizionamento avanzato sia una minaccia concreta, anche perché non lascerebbero il tempo necessario per attivare le eventuali contromisure.

Russia. Schierati gli Iskander a Kalinigrad. Hanno svegliato l’orso che dormiva.

Russia. Sistemi S-400 al confine finlandese, altri S-300 in Siria.

Kaliningrad. Adesso il buco nero inizia a preoccupare la Nato.


Bloomberg. 2017-07-27. Putin Meets Finland’s President for a Steamboat Ride and Opera Diplomacy

– Russian president visits Finland for centenary celebrations

– The heads of state meet for the second time this year

*

After the stiff formality of the G-20 summit earlier this month, President Vladimir Putin is engaging in some more relaxed diplomacy with the west.

Russia’s leader will be in Finland on Thursday, celebrating the former duchy’s century of independence. Together with Finnish President Sauli Niinisto, Putin will hop on a steamboat built in 1893 for an hour-long lake cruise near the southern part of the border between the two countries. He’ll then head to a medieval castle, Olavinlinna, where the visiting Bolshoi Theater will perform Tchaikovsky’s Iolanta — the opera’s first airing in Finland in 100 years.

The western leader with whom Putin arguably gets on best will be the first head of state from the European Union to meet with the Russian president since the G-20 meeting in Hamburg.

Arkady Moshes, who heads a research program on Russia at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, says Putin is probably “more comfortable” talking to Finland, a non-NATO member of the EU, than to others. “The relationship is much more pragmatic with Finland, less problematic than with any other neighbor Russia would have in this part of the world,” he said by phone.

“Finns and Russians both find this relationship useful,” Moshes said. “It’s a part of a long tradition.”

Finnish media are speculating the two will discuss U.S.-Russia relations, after Putin’s first meeting with Donald Trump at the G-20. A weaker EU after Brexit, the region’s deepening defense cooperation and even tighter monetary union will probably also be raised. And Finland’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council puts climate change, in the age of Trump, on the agenda.

The talks take place as Russian and NATO military exercises in the Baltic Sea region intensify and as warships ply the waters off the coast of Finland and Sweden. Both NATO and Russia are building up their potential in the area, as decisions taken three years ago — when Putin annexed Crimea — are implemented.

“The military-political situation in the Baltic Sea is challenging and worrying,” Moshes said. “The general situation is bad but the current dynamics are not as bad as they could be,” he said.

The special relationship between the Finns and the Russians is rooted in one key factor. Finland, which shares a 1,300-kilometer (800-mile) border with Russia, has stayed out of NATO chiefly in deference to the government in Moscow (though the Finnish military is now fully compliant with equipment used by the alliance.) Leaders of the two countries are in touch with each other several times a year and lower-ranking officials are in contact much more often.

Last year, Putin told policy makers in Helsinki directly not to join the alliance. This time, the tone of talks is likely to more relaxed. “Psychologically, it will be easier for Putin to come to Finland, because it’s a celebration,” Moshes said.


Euronews. 2017-07-27. Putin warns Finland: Russia will respond if Helsinki joins NATO. [Video]

Vladimir Putin came to Finland with a handshake for his counterpart, President Salui Niinisto – and a warning that Moscow will respond if his host country joins NATO.

Finland and neighbouring Sweden have increased cooperation with the Western military alliance since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its backing for separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine.

This was Putin’s first visit to Finland since those crises erupted in 2014.

He said Russia would respect Finland’s decision if it decided to join NATO, but would respond.

“What do you think we will do in this situation? We moved our forces back, 1500 kilometres away – will we keep our forces there? How they assure the safety and independence of their own country is the Finns’ choice. Undoubtedly we appreciate Finland’s neutral status,” the Russian president said during a joint outdoor news conference.

The presidents’ meeting at Naantali comes amid increased Russian and NATO activity in the Baltic region. Finland is militarily neutral but interest in the possibility of joining the alliance has been rising.

The former Soviet Baltic states have called on NATO to step up air defences.

The Baltic Sea has been the arena for a series of close encounters between Russian and Western aircraft in recent months. The Russian and Finnish presidents agreed to draw up security measures to control flights in the area.

A NATO summit is due to take place in Warsaw in a week’s time.

Vladimir Putin added that Moscow would try to begin a dialogue with NATO.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Militare, Problemi militari

Russia. Armata T-14 monta l’Aps e spara proiettili nucleari.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-07-02.

2017-06-01__T14_001

«The Russian Company Uralvagonzavod is responsible for the design and development of the new Russian main battle tank MBT Armata T-14 for 2013 with the delivery of the first prototypes for 2015. The first reports indicate that the new Armata could be based on the Russian main battle tank T-95 Object 195 and the project tank “Black Eagle” which was presented to the public at the Omsk defence exhibition in 1999. The Armata will have more firepower than the latest generation of main battle tank T-90. The Armata will be fitted with a new unmanned remote weapon station turret. Russian experts believe that the appearance of the remotely controlled gun would eventually lead to the development of a fully robotic tank which could be deployed as part of a spearhead in the offensive. The T-14 Armata was unveiled for the first time to the public during the military parade in Moscow for the Victory Day, May 9, 2015. The Russia Defense Ministry said the field testing of the new MBT Armata was expected to start in 2014. The first deliveries of the tank to the Russian Armed Forces are scheduled for 2015. A total of 2,300 MBTs are expected to be supplied by 2020.

The T-14 Armata is equipped with an unmanned turret and all the crew is located at the front of the hull. The new unmanned remote turret of Arama T-14 would be equipped with new generation of 125mm 2A82-1M smoothbore gun with an automatic loader and 32 rounds ready to use. The main gun can fire also new laser-guided missile with a range from 7 to 12 km. The T-14 Armata carries a total of 45 rounds. According some Russian sources, the T-14 Armata could be armed in the future with a new 152mm cannon. The first scale model of the Armata unveiled in July 2012 showed that the vehicle has a secondary weapon that could be a 57mm grenade launcher mounted on the left of the turret, and a machine gun 12.7 mm mounted on the right side. During the victory day parade 2015, Russia has unveiled the new Armata and the main armament consists only of a new 125mm gun with no additional weapons on the side of the turret. Second armament of the T-14 Armata includes one remote weapon station mounted on the top rear of the turret armed with one 7.62mm mm machine gun.

Standard equipment of Armata T-14 includes probably day and night vision equipment, NBC system, front mounted dozer blade, fire detection and suppression system and a battle management system as modern Russian-made main battle tanks. The new Armata also have latest generation of active protection defensive aids suite. A computerized fire-control system is fitted to enable stationary and moving targets to be engaged with a very high first round hit probability. The T-14 Armata is equipped with the Active Protection System (APS) Afghanit which seems similar to the Israeli Trophy able to intercept and destroy incoming missiles and rockets. The system is designed to work against all types of anti-tank missiles and rockets, including handheld weapons such as rocket propelled grenades. The Afghanit APS includes four sets of 12 launch tubes, two at the rear left side of the turret, and one on each rear top side of the turret. At the base of each side of the turret are five large and fixed horizontally arrayed launch tubes covering the 120° frontal arc of the turret. This tubes could launched unguided projectiles with HE warhead to counter incoming anti-tank guided missiles or RPG (Rocket-Propelled Grenade). The Afghanit APS also includes two types of sensors mounted around the T-14’s turret. Two large sensors, believed to be electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR)-based laser warning receivers, are angularly mounted on the front of the turret providing 180° coverage, while four smaller sensors (covered but believed to be radars) are mounted around the turret providing 360° coverage. The T-14 Armata is fitted with a computerized fire control automatically calculates the fire control solution based on – lead angle measurement, bend of the gun measured by the muzzle reference system, velocity measurement from a wind sensor mounted on the roof of the turret. A dozer blade mounted under the nose of the tank is used for clearing obstacles and preparing fire positions. A 360° panoramic sight mounted at the front of the remote weapon station of the turret allows commanders and gunner to have all-round surveillance on the battlefield without being disturbed by turret motion. For close view, the T-14 is equipped with wide angle cameras mounted around a vehicle giving full 360° all-round vision on displays and situational awareness.» [Army Recognition]

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«The T-14 Armata is equipped with the Active Protection System (APS) Afghanit which seems similar to the Israeli Trophy able to intercept and destroy incoming missiles and rockets.»

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«The system is designed to work against all types of anti-tank missiles and rockets, including handheld weapons such as rocket propelled grenades.»

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«The Afghanit APS includes four sets of 12 launch tubes, two at the rear left side of the turret, and one on each rear top side of the turret.»

Russia. Riarmata la flotta baltica.

Russia. Costituito un nuovo corpo d’armata.

Russia to form 3 new divisions to counter NATO buildup.

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Se al momento sembrerebbero essere in servizio 500 carri armati Armata, a fine 2020 il loro numero dovrebbe essere di 2,300. Come peraltro gli americani, questo carro russo sembrerebbe essere in grado di utilizzare proiettili termobarici. Solo per dare numeri indicativi, la Germania ha in servizio poco meno di 400 Leopard 2, pochi di più della Grecia che ne ha 356: ma nel complesso questi carri sono vetusti e tenuti nello stato di manutenzione che la Grecia può attualmente permettersi. L’esercito italiano dispone di 200 carri armati Ariete, progettati negli anni ’80. Ferri vecchi.

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L’impressione generale è che l’esercito russo sia decisamente meglio armato e ben più numeroso di quelli europei considerati tutti assieme.

Al momento attuale ha un organico di 766,055 uomini in servizio attivo (220,000 ufficiali), oltre ai 2,485,000 uomini già addestrati tenuti di riserva. Grosso modo sei volte gli organici di tutti i paesi europei considerati assieme.

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Molti sono convinti che un conflitto in Europa non possa essere altro che fase iniziale di un confronto globale termonucleare. Questa ipotesi trova sicuramente un certo numero di sostenitori, ma sottostà all’assunzione che gli americani considerino il controllo militare dell’Europa talmente vitale per la loro sicurezza da sfidare la sorte di essere distrutti da una rappresaglia nucleare pur di difenderla. Ma sono invece in molti coloro che ritengono che questa ipotesi sia inconsistente. La conseguenza è che un confronto terrestre sembrerebbe essere la probabilità più verosimile.

Se poi si prendesse in considerazione un raffreddamento dei rapporti tra Stati Uniti ed Europa, questa ultima ipotesi di lavoro ne uscirebbe ulteriormente avvalorata.


Bbc. 2017-05-30. Should Russia’s new Armata T-14 tanks worry Nato?

A Russian innovation in armoured warfare has pushed Norway to replace many of its current anti-tank systems.

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Active protection systems (APS) are being built into Russia’s new Armata T-14 tank, posing a problem for a whole generation of anti-armour weapons, not least the US-supplied Javelin guided missile, used by the Norwegian Army.

The warning comes from Brig Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. He says this is a problem that most Nato countries have barely begun to grapple with.

APS threatens to make existing anti-tank weapons far less effective, and there is little real discussion of this among many Western militaries, he says.

Some countries are conducting research and trials to equip their own tanks with APS. “But they seem to miss the uncomfortable implications for their own anti-armour capabilities,” he says.

Norway is one of the first Nato countries to grasp this nettle. Its latest defence procurement plan envisages spending 200-350m kroner (£18.5-32.5m; $24-42m) on replacing its Javelin missiles, “to maintain the capacity to fight against heavy armoured vehicles”.

“There is a need for [an] anti-tank missile,” it says, “that can penetrate APS systems”.

 2017-06-01__T14_002

APS is the latest twist in the age-old battle between offence and defence in military technology.

At different periods one side has held the advantage over the other. The armoured knight once ruled supreme, but the widespread use of firearms put paid to the armour-clad nobility’s dominance.

Since World War Two the tank, like the knight of old, has reigned supreme on the battlefield.

It is of course vulnerable to the main guns of other tanks. If you have a heavy enough shell and a gun firing at high-enough velocity you can punch through even the best armour.

But tanks are also vulnerable to other weapons systems, and that is what APS is designed to deal with.

2017-06-01__T14_003

Since World War Two a whole category of lighter, man-portable anti-tank weapons has been devised.

Since they have to be carried by the infantry they depend not upon velocity and mass to get through the tank’s armour, but on a chemical reaction. These warheads impact on the external armour and a metal core forms into a molten jet that pierces through.

Tank designers have tried to counter this in all sorts of ways, with reactive panels that explode outwards when hit; or by providing additional layers of spaced armour, to detonate the incoming round away from the tank itself.

APS takes a whole new approach. It is essentially an anti-missile system for tanks, with radars capable of tracking the incoming anti-tank missile, and projectiles that are launched to disrupt or destroy it.

Israel is among the leaders in this field and its Merkava tanks used it with some success during the last upsurge of fighting in Gaza.

The Israeli Trophy system is being evaluated by the Americans. Britain too is looking at such systems and the Dutch have recently decided to equip their infantry combat vehicles with another Israeli-developed system.

The fitting of APS to armoured vehicles is intended to counter a variety of weapons, ranging from the ubiquitous Russian/Chinese RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) to much more sophisticated guided anti-tank weapons like the Russian Kornet.

But Brig Barry at the IISS is pointing out that Russia’s APS technology raises questions about many of Nato’s anti-tank defences too. Norway is taking action – and he believes other Nato countries will have to do the same.


Asia Defence. 2017-04-17. Russia to Develop Nuclear Round for T-14 Main Battle Tank

Russia is purportedly mulling fitting its newest battle tank with a 152 millimeter gun capable of firing nuclear rounds.

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Russia’s deadliest tank, the third-generation T-14 main battle tank (MBT), an armored vehicle based on the “Armata” universal chassis system, might be getting even more deadly in the near future.

According to unconfirmed media reports, Russian defense contractor Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), the world’s largest tank maker, will not only upgrade later versions of the mysterious T-14 with a new 2A83 152 millimeter gun but also develop a nuclear tank shell for tactical use on the battlefield.

It is unclear whether a 152 millimeter sub-kiloton low-yield round is already under development. The use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield is not part of official Russian military doctrine. However, Russia has made important strides in low-fission, high-fusion, sub kiloton tactical nuclear technology in recent years.

Nevertheless, it is more than unlikely that Russia will arm the T-14 with nuclear shells given the short range of the MBTs gun. The current version of the T-14 is armed with the 2A82 125 millimeter smoothbore cannon, capable of firing high-powered munitions (10 shots a minute at an effective range of up to seven kilometers). The 2A83 152 millimeter gun would have a much lower rate of fire.

At the end, the Russian military would do better to arm the T-14 with depleted uranium shells rather than nuclear weapons in order to maximize the tank’s fire power on the tactical battlefield.

The Armata is the first new MBT developed by Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The tank is reportedly fitted with a new active protection system including a new generation of explosive reactive armor allegedly capable of fending off the world’s most advanced anti-tank gun shells and anti-tank missiles.

Furthermore, as I pointed out elsewhere (See: “Russia’s Military to Receive 100 New T-14 Armata Battle Tanks”), the T-14 will eventually be a completely automated combat vehicle, remotely controlled and  fitted with a unmanned turret. The T-14’s genuine combat capabilities are unknown, and will remain so until tested in actual combat. As of now, no T-14 MBT has been spotted in eastern Ukraine.

“The Armata universal chassis system is a platform for over a dozen different tracked vehicles, including a self-propelled artillery gun, an armored military engineering vehicle, and an armored personal carrier,” I explained elsewhere.  “70 percent of tracked armored vehicles of the Russian Ground Forces are slated to be replaced by vehicles based on the Armata universal chassis system.”

In 2016, Russia Ministry of Defense ordered a first batch of 100 T-14s and purportedly intends to procure up to 2,300 T-14s by 2025. It appears, however, that this is far beyond the financial and production capacity of Russia. According to some estimates,  Russia is only capable of building 120 new T-14s per year from 2018. There are currently around 20 T-14s prototypes operating with the Russian Ground Forces. It is unclear whether the tank has already entered serial production.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Militare, Medio Oriente

Israele. Il programma reclutamento estero dello Tzahal.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-06-18.

 Israel. 001

 

Israele occupa grosso modo quella che nell’antichità fu denominata Palestina. A tutto il 2015 aveva 8,345,000 abitanti, dei quali il 74.9% sono di ceppo e religione ebraica, il 20% di ceppo arabo e religione mussulmana, ed i restanti praticano religione cristiana o drusa.

Le sue forze militari, conosciute in ebraico con l’acronimo Tzahal (צה”ל), sono ritenute essere tra le meglio armate ed efficienti del Medio Oriente: hanno sostenuto vittoriosamente cinque conflitti. Ufficialmente consta di 176,500 unità attive, alle quali si dovrebbero assommare almeno 445,000 unità, mobilizzabili in poco meno di due giorni.

Ha un’industria bellica di prim’ordine a livello mondiale.

La leva è obbligatoria a 18 anni, con ferma di trentasei mesi per i maschi e venti per le femmine. Per gli arabo-israeliani il servizio militare è facoltativo, mentre gli ultraortodossi usualmente utilizzano la figura giuridica del rinvio, reiterandolo fino al termine dell’età per la chiamata in servizio. Problema questo non di poco conto, perché gli Haredi, talora denominati Cheredì, ammontano a circa 1.3 milioni di persone, ossia il 21% della popolazione residente ebraica.

Israele non ha aderito al Trattato di non proliferazione atomica e mai ha negato od affermato di poter disporre di testate nucleari. Da più parti si suggerisce che possa disporre di un centinaio o più testate atomiche.

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Da tempo Israele ha lanciato un programma di volontariato paramilitare, ed anche militare, rivolto agli ebrei residenti all’estero.


«Tsahal vous propose 5 différents programmes de volontariat:

  1. Sar’el

  2. Marva

  3. Mahal

  4. Garin Tsabar

  5. Le Programme “Atouda”»

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«1. Sar’El

Sar’El est un programme de volontariat de courte durée (pas plus trois semaines généralement). Il permet à ses participants de partager une expérience avec des volontaires venus du monde entier pour travailler bénévolement dans une base de l’armée israélienne. Tous les volontaires sont les bienvenus à partir de 16 ans. L’un des avantages est la proximité avec les soldats.

Tous les volontaires sont les bienvenus à partir de 16 ans.»

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«2. Marva

Marva est un programme de l’armée israélienne qui permet aux jeunes juifs de connaître et d’expérimenter la vie dans une base militaire et plus généralement la vie en Israël.

Ce programme dure entre 7 et 8 semaines, pendant lesquelles les participants changent de base chaque semaine. Ce programme accueille des gens du monde entier. Les cours sont délivrés en hébreu, ce qui permet une amélioration significative du niveau d’hébreu des inscrits.

Les participants ont entre 18 et 24 ans, et doivent avoir au moins l’un de leurs grands-parents de confession juive. Une connaissance des bases de l’hébreu est exigée (validation du niveau d’Oulpan Aleph, premier niveau). Marva requiert une certaine force physique et morale.»

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«4. Garin Tsabar

Un Garin Tsabar (hébreu : גרעין צבר, litt. graine de cactus) est un groupe de jeunes juifs sionistes qui viennent en Israël dans le but de servir dans Tsahal. À ceux qui souhaitent faire leur service militaire en Israël, mais qui sont effrayés par le fait de franchir ce cap seuls, le programme « Garin Tsabar » offre le soutien et la structure nécessaires.»

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«5. Le Programme “Atouda”

Le programme «Atouda Beth» (hébreu : עתודה ב) est un programme conçu pour les nouveaux immigrants qui souhaitent compléter des études universitaires avant d’effectuer leur service militaire. Au moment de l’enrôlement, après avoir présenté une lettre d’admission de l’institution dans laquelle il prévoit d’étudier, le participant peut poursuivre ses études universitaires.»

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Si noti come tutti i militari israeliani abbiano conseguito almeno un diploma superiore di studi, la laurea in una percentuale rilevante.

Il programma Sar’El è aperto a chiunque abbia più di sedici anni e sono corsi di breve durata. Consente di constatare di persona quale sia la reale situazione di Israele, le sue oggettive difficoltà, con il popolo reagisca al contesto in cui vive.  Se da una parte demitizza alcuni falsi miti, dall’altra fa toccare con mano il grande valore di avere una Fede ed una Patria da difendere.

Gli altri programmi integrano a differenti livelli.

Servire la Patria è obbligo etico e morale prima ancora che mandato giuridico.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Militare

Kaliningrad. Adesso il buco nero inizia a preoccupare la Nato.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-06-16.

2017-06-13__Iskander__001t

Sul problema della difesa del continente europeo abbiamo già parlato molteplici volte. Da ambedue le parti, Russia da una parte e Nato dall’altra, è in atto una escalation alla quale non sembrerebbe possibile vedere una fine.

Mar Baltico. Ancora tensioni tra Russia, Nato ed Unione Europea.

Russia. Schierati gli Iskander a Kalinigrad. Hanno svegliato l’orso che dormiva.

La Russia vuole essere rispettata. Un articolo della Bbc che fa pensare

Russia. Sistemi S-400 al confine finlandese, altri S-300 in Siria

Russia Aims Missiles At Europe? Moscow Bolsters Air Defense System In Baltic Region Near Poland

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Negli ultimi tempi i russi hanno preso anche altri provvedimenti.

Kaliningrad. Zeppo di missili atomici adesso anche black hole.

Il termine black hole, letteralmente buco nero, è usato in astrofisica per denominare delle realtà con una forza di gravità così elevata da impedirne la fuoriuscita di luce ed altre tipologie di radiazioni. In campo militare si applica a quelle zone ove siano state messe in atto tutte le contromisure elettroniche che impediscono a terzi di rilevarne le trasmissioni radio ed i segnali radar, inattivando o disturbando fortemente anche la ricognizione ottica satellitare.

Dovrebbe essere un’operazione strettamente legata a coprire operazioni militari attive: il suo uso in tempi non bellici era stato in passato limitato soltanto ad esercitazioni militari di breve durata.

Un suo uso prolungato lascia anche un forte sospetto.

Più una parte mantiene su di una zona il black hole, più si espone alla concreta possibilità che chiunque abbia le tecnologie adeguate possa carpirne i segreti, e quindi avere il tempo necessario per studiare contromisure. Questa considerazione renderebbe lecito pensare che il black hole messo in atto dai russi si avvalga di tecnologie da loro ritenute essere obsolete, riservandosi quelle più recenti per eventuali utilizzi bellici.

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Tra i numerosi problemi, alcuni sembrerebbero essere più pressanti di altri.

– Il trattato Inf eliminava i missili balistici a breve-media gittata, escludendo così la possibilità di annientamento nucleare senza preavviso. Orbene, i missili Iskander non rientrano nelle categorie allora elencate: il trattato Inf è così aggirato nella forma ma violato nella sostanza.

– I missili Iskander possono portare testate nucleari, raggiungendo Berlino e sfiorando Copenaghen e Stoccolma. Date le caratteristiche non balistiche le capacità d’intercettazione e difesa sono praticamente inesistenti.  

– La difesa anti-missile protegge da «piccoli» aggressori come Iran o Corea del Nord; non potrebbe fermare l’enorme arsenale russo.

– Tutte le realtà politiche e militari che ora gridano scandalizzate sembrerebbero essersi dimenticate che erano proprio loro a sostenere uno schieramento di missili Nato a breve-medio raggio in Ukraina. È impossibile imbastire una ragionevole trattativa partendo dal concetto dei due pesi e delle due misure.

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Per la prima volta da decenni adesso Berlino si sente minacciata direttamente: gli Iskander potrebbero raggiungere la capitale tedesca in meno di dieci minuti primi, polverizzandola prima ancora che abbiano potuto accorgersi di cosa sia accaduto.

Che gli americani fremano dal desiderio di imbastire una guerra atomica globale pur di difendere il paese di Frau Merkel sarebbe affermazione discutibile e tutta da verificare. Nessuno però si stupirebbe se gli Stati Uniti non movessero un mignolo per difendere questa Europa che è in disaccordo plateale quanto totale con l’attuale Amministrazione.

Il problema sembrerebbe quindi essere più europeo che americano oppure russo.

In questa ottica appare puerile la seguente affermazione:

«we Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands» [Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel – NYT]

Nota.

Ci si aspettano, inter alias, i soliti commenti che coprono di insulti i russi. Li leggeremo pazienti, sperando che non passino i limiti del buon senso.

Poi, dopo che ci si è sfogati, si dovrà ben prendere atto che i russi non se ne sono curati per nulla, che restano saldamente a Kaliningrad e che dispongono di missili Iskander.

Allora si potrà iniziare a costruire un discorso serio, di Realpolitik, sia con i russi, sia anche con gli americani.


La Stampa. 2017-06-11. Minaccia nel cuore dell’Europa, Putin punta i missili su Berlino

Il presidente schiera nell’enclave di Kaliningrad i vettori Iskander. L’ex generale Usa Rutherford: «Violazione gratuita dei trattati del 1987».

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Scacciato dal Trattato sulle forze nucleari intermedie (Inf) del 1987, lo spettro dei missili torna nel cuore dell’Europa. La Russia schiera S 400, Iskander e Topom M a Kaliningrad, l’enclave russa incuneata fra Lituania e Polonia. Possono portare testate nucleari. Gli Iskander possono raggiungere Berlino e sfiorare Copenaghen e Stoccolma. Date le caratteristiche non balistiche le capacità d’intercettazione e difesa sono praticamente inesistenti.  

Sullo spiegamento Washington e la Nato hanno pochi dubbi. Le capitali europee non ne parlano ma lo sanno bene. Mosca del resto non lo nega. Al contrario ne fa parte integrante della propria strategia militare in Europa.  

Il generale John Rutherford Allen non ha peli sulla lingua: «La Nato e i suoi membri hanno motivo di preoccuparsi di questa violazione gratuita del Trattato Inf. La Nato dovrà prendere in considerazione misure per difendersi da questa nuova minaccia russa». Ex capo della coalizione internazionale anti-Isis, ora dirige uno studio sull’adattamento dell’Alleanza Atlantica agli scenari contemporanei di sicurezza, cui partecipa anche l’ex ministro della Difesa, ammiraglio Giampaolo Di Paola. Le sfide sono molte, dalla guerra informatica ai flussi migratori. Il rapporto finale uscirà a fine anno, ma l’analisi di questo strappo russo è chiara: la Russia ha identificato un tallone d’Achille della Nato nell’incapacità di saldare l’indivisibilità della sicurezza alla deterrenza nucleare.

I missili di Kaliningrad non possono essere considerati una risposta alle misure della Nato. È la versione russa; sul piano militare è risibile. Missili e testate atomiche, da una parte, e quattro battaglioni dall’altra, sono incommensurabili. Intanto Mosca aveva messo in cantiere lo spiegamento da prima. Ma soprattutto per numeri, mezzi e minime infrastrutture, la «Enhanced Forward Presence» serve soprattutto a scoraggiare; non potrebbe difendere contro la massiccia superiorità convenzionale russa.  

Si può sostenere che i missili di Kaliningrad siano un deterrente che garantisce a Mosca il corridoio di sicurezza verso il Baltico. Nessuno lo minaccia: non esistono piani o esercitazioni offensive Nato contro Kaliningrad. Tuttavia si trova nel mezzo della Nato e dell’Ue e nella percezione russa di sicurezza, insofferente della contiguità territoriale, Kaliningrad è a rischio per definizione. 

Ma questo non basterebbe a mettere in discussione un architrave di sicurezza in Europa. Firmato da Mikhail Gorbaciov e Ronald Reagan in epilogo di Guerra Fredda, il Trattato Inf fu il primo grande passo verso la riduzione degli armamenti nucleari e convenzionali. Eliminare i missili a breve-media gittata (furono fisicamente distrutti) significava escludere la possibilità di annientamento nucleare senza preavviso. Lo spiegamento di Kaliningrad è un passo indietro di quarant’anni. Costringerebbe anche la Nato a rivedere la propria dottrina di deterrenza nucleare. 

Da Kim Jong-un ci aspettiamo l’irresponsabilità. Non da Vladimir Putin. Il presidente russo ha l’abilità di far perdere l’equilibrio agli avversari con mosse a sorpresa, spesso alzando la posta in gioco. Crimea e Siria sono esempi da manuale. A Kaliningrad gioca però d’azzardo con giocattoli pericolosi. Sta inoltre conducendo la Russia sul sentiero dell’inaffidabilità, delle favole di hacker russi «patriottici», della violazione dei patti e delle carte truccate, dalla geopolitica allo sport. Non stupisce la mezza comprensione per la decisione di Trump di ritirarsi dall’accordo di Parigi sui cambiamenti climatici: solidarietà fra chi non si sente legato dal rispetto dei patti. 

Lo strappo all’Inf rende la deterrenza ancor più indispensabile. Secondo Victoria Nuland, ambasciatrice alla Nato di George W. Bush, Assistant Secretary per l’Europa di Obama, «lo spiegamento di missili russi a Kaliningrad rende più imperativo per la Nato riaffermare l’impegno alla difesa collettiva e all’articolo 5 del Trattato di Washington». 

Si rafforza anche la necessità di confrontare Mosca in un dialogo serrato. Recentemente, un ex-ufficiale dell’Fsb (già Kgb) mi diceva: «alla Russia, non basta un accordo sull’Ucraina; occorre un’intesa più ampia, che comprenda la difesa anti-missile», da sempre – è del 1983 il discorso di Reagan sulle «guerre stellari» – spina nel fianco di Mosca.  

Nell’ottica russa, i missili di Kaliningrad aggirano le difese anti-missilistiche della Nato e salvaguardano così la parità nucleare strategica con gli Usa. Per Washington e per l’Alleanza, la difesa anti-missile protegge da «piccoli» aggressori come Iran o Corea del Nord; non potrebbe fermare l’enorme arsenale russo. Mosca resta però tenacemente abbarbicata al mito della parità; non vuole trovarsi con una capacità in meno. È ora che le due parti parlino seriamente, prima di avvitarsi in una nuova, pericolosa, imprevedibile escalation. 

Pubblicato in: Economia e Produzione Industriale, Geopolitica Militare

Russia. ‘Penicillin’. Un nuovo sistema anti-artiglieria.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-06-01.

2017-05-25__Penicillin__31113_658020_large

Non si sta parlando dell’antibiotico.

Qui introduciamo alcuni elementi di base relativi ai radar di contro-batteria.

«A counter-battery radar (alternatively weapon tracking radar) is a radar system that detects artillery projectiles fired by one or more guns, howitzers, mortars or rocket launchers and, from their trajectories, locates the position on the ground of the weapon that fired it. Such radars are a subclass of the wider class of target acquisition radars.

Early counter-battery radars were generally used against mortars, who’s lofted trajectories were highly symmetrical and allowed easy calculation of the launcher’s location. Starting in the 1970s, digital computers with improved calculation capabilities allowed more complex trajectories of long-range artillery to also be determined. Normally these radars would be attached to friendly artillery units or their support units, allowing them to quickly arrange counter-battery fire.

With the aid of modern communications systems, the information from a single radar can be rapidly disseminated over long distances. This allows the radar to notify multiple batteries as well as provide early warning to the friendly targets.

Modern counter-battery radar can locate hostile batteries up to about 50 km away depending on the radar’s capabilities and the terrain and weather. Some counter-battery radars can also be used to track the fire of friendly artillery and calculate corrections to adjust its fire onto a particular place, but this is usually a secondary mission objective» [Fonte]

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I russi avevano già in uso lo Zoopark-1M, ma questi aveva caratteristiche scarne, specie se comparato ad analoghi complessi occidentali.

«In 1986 France, Germany and UK agreed the ‘List of Military Requirements’ for a new counter-battery radar. The distinguishing feature was that instead of just locating individual guns, etc., the radar was able to locate many simultaneously and group them into batteries with a centre point, dimensions and attitude of the long axis of the battery. This radar eventually reached service as Euro-ART’s COunter Battery RAdar (COBRA) AESA system. 29 COBRA systems were produced and delivered in a roll-out which was completed in Aug. 2007 (12 to Germany – out of which two were re-sold to Turkey, 10 to France and 7 to the UK). Three additional systems were ordered in Feb. 2009 by the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces. Simultaneous with the development of COBRA, Norway and Sweden developed a smaller, more mobile counter-battery radar known as ARTHUR. It was taken into service in 1999 and is today used by 7 NATO countries and The Republic Of South Korea. New versions of ARTHUR have twice the accuracy of the original.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a new need for a small counter-mortar radar for use in forward operating bases, providing 360 degree coverage and requiring a minimal crew. In another back to the future step it has also proved possible to add counter-battery software to battlefield airspace surveillance radars.»  [Fonte]

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Ma una cosa è combattere dei terroristi più o meno organizzati, ed una completamente differente affrontare un esercito più o meno equivalente.

Nel momento stesso in cui entri in funzione, il radar diventa immediatamente localizzabile e, di conseguenza, un bersaglio facilmente distruggibile.

Altrettanto ingenuo sarebbe pensare che il nemico non si ingegni di disturbare le comunicazioni, con ogni tipo di contromisura elettronica.

Infine, sarebbe davvero da sprovvidi intercettare un tiro civetta, sparato apposta per poter identificare le posizioni delle contro-batterie.

Un problema tecnico è infine costituito dal fatto che l’impulso radar è tipicamente conico con un’apertura attorno ai 25 gradi. Non facile individuare i proiettili.

A quanto sarebbe dato di sapere, il sistema ‘penicillin’ abbinerebbe radar e sistemi ottici, lavorando quindi con contro-batterie automatizzate, senza serventi.

«”Penicillin” is able to pinpoint the location of enemy artillery less than five seconds after firing.

The holding company “Ruselectronics” has announced that the advanced artillery reconnaissance system ‘Penicillin’ would go into production in less than two years’ time, with state trials expected to wrap up soon. The new system is able to pinpoint the location of enemy artillery less than five seconds after firing.

In a press release “Ruselectronics” confirmed that mass production of the new artillery reconnaissance system would begin in early 2019. The St. Petersburg-based Vector Research Institute, part of the company, is tasked with developing the system.

“Penicillin” can detect the firing positions of enemy artillery, mortars, MLRS (multiple launch rocket systems), anti-aircraft and tactical missiles, and adjust artillery fire.

During this “Penicillin” works at safe distances away from the enemy, and can operate in automatic mode, without a human operator. This allows for precise artillery reconnaissance without risking the lives of army personnel.

The mobile system is mounted aboard a Kamaz-6350 chassis. It operates in a combat radius up to 25 km wide. The system consists of the 1B75 electro-optical module, which works in the infrared and visible spectrum using imagining cameras placed on a telescopic boom, and several ground-installed 1B76 sound and seismic receivers. ‘Penicillin’ works at any time day or night. » [Defence Aerospace]

Ci si pone una semplicissima domanda.

I russi spendono circa 60 miliardi all’anno per le forze armate e sembrerebbero essere armati fino ai denti. Gli sttai afferenti l’Unione Europea ne spensono circa cinque volta tanto ed hanno eserciti molto carenti. Qulacosa non torna nei conti.


Pravda. 2017-05-23. Russia works on powerful ‘Penicillin’ pill for enemy guns.

Russia is working on the final stage of official tests for Penicillin complex. It does not go about medicine at all. Penicillin is a sound-thermal complex of artillery reconnaissance, capable of greatly reducing the time of detection and neutralization of enemy artillery weapons.

The serial production of the complex is scheduled for January 2019, a message from the press service of RosElectronica, the maker of the complex, said.

The complex operates at a safe distance from the enemy. This is a very significant factor under the conditions of military operations, because it allows to sharply reduce risks for servicemen on the front line. In addition, the Penicillin complex is capable of operating in a fully automatic mode. The complex is intended for reconnaissance of firing positions of artillery weapons, mortars, rocket launchers and launch positions of anti-aircraft and tactical missiles while making fire adjustments for artillery systems, developers note.

The complex performs combat missions on a strip of territory up to 25 kilometers wide. It consists of several sound receivers installed on the ground surface, as well as an optoelectronic unit. The system receives and processes acoustic signals from shots (explosions) and provides information about the site of the shell explosion, accuracy of the strike and coordinates of the weapon.  The time for obtaining coordinates for a single target does not exceed five seconds. The range of radio communication with external communicants may reach 40 kilometers.

Presently, the Russian army uses Zoopark-1 radar reconnaissance system for firing control. The system was passed into service in 2007. In 2013, Almaz-Antei  defense concern introduced the upgraded Zoopark-1M complex. The complex is capable of conducting reconnaissance activities and control mortar firing positions (up to 22 kilometers in control mode), guns (up to 20 kilometers), MLRS (up to 35 kilometers) and tactical missiles (up to 45 kilometers).

Of course, the name of the complex attracts attention. In catalogs of Russian weapons, one may come across most bizarre names for military equipment:  stretcher “Inspiration”, sub-caliber projectile “Mummy,” six-grenade revolver grenade launcher “Gnome”, surface-launched torpedo “Racoon”, anti-tank mine “Tick”, tactical free-fall bomb with a special head unit of up to 40 Kilotons “Natasha”, silent automatic-grenade launcher complex “Canary,” complexes of artillery armament “Carnation”, “Acacia”, “Tulip”, “Hyacinth”, “Peony”, “Chrysanthemum” and so on.