Cina apre il suo mercato dei bond agli stranieri. Un mercato da 15 trilioni Usd.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-30.

«The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) have just issued the draft version of the “PBOC, CSRC and SAFE Public Announcement Concerning Arrangements in Relation to Offshore Institutional Investors Investing in the Chinese Bond Market” (中国人民银行中国证监会国家外汇管理局关于境外机构投资者投资中国债券市场有关事宜的公告（征求意见稿）)»

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Mentre l’occidente si trastulla con i piani verdi e quelli di budget settennale, peraltro non ancora approvati da oltre un anno e mezzo, per non parlare dei fantomatici human right, con un trafiletto di tre righe la Cina si appresta a distruggere alla radice il sistema economico occidentale.

Sarà una vera e propria guerra mondiale, anche se, almeno per il momento, non ancora combattuta con le armi.

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«China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization transformed the global economic order»

«Yet even as China became the factory to the world, its financial system remained a closed shop, with strict controls on the flow of money in and out»

«Now the admission of foreign investors into China’s $15 trillion bond market—cemented this year when the country rounded out its inclusion in all three of the top global indexes—may just mark the big bang equivalent to WTO entry»

«Global pension funds, starved for yield in a low-growth world, will now have access to safe government debt that pays more than 3%.»

«The Chinese could join their government, which has long been a major buyer of overseas assets such as Treasuries, as a powerful source of funding»

«China will turn from an exporter of goods to an exporter of capital, with significant consequences, of course, for the world»

«The euro’s 1999 introduction sowed the seeds for the region’s debt crisis a decade later»

«Chinese Savers Go Global»

«Sustained inflows of foreign capital could make Beijing comfortable about loosening the controls that have bottled up domestic money in China for so long»

«That would let loose a wave of Chinese savings on the world—Jen estimates there’s as much as $5 trillion of pent-up Chinese demand for investments outside China»

«global investors generally have had to buy proxy assets such as the Australian dollar, commodities, or a small range of Hong Kong-listed Chinese shares. China’s bond market opening gives them direct exposure»

«Columbia Threadneedle in New York, which had $476 billion under management in October and has been stepping into the China market recently»

«China’s central government bonds are now included, or on a phased path to inclusion, in the three key international bond indexes that investors use as benchmarks compiled by FTSE Russell, JPMorgan Chase, and Bloomberg Barclays (part of Bloomberg LP, the owner of Bloomberg Markets). About $5.3 trillion in assets tracks these indexes»

«China’s bond yields look more like those of emerging markets—in the FTSE World Government Bond Index benchmark they will be second highest after Mexico’s—yet investors will probably view them as developed-market securities»

«China will see about $770 billion more in the next five»

«We have a huge overhang of JGBs and European bonds—and a lot of that is dead weight»

«China and the U.S.—sometimes referred to as the G2—both competing for savings, “either the rest of the world has to step up savings to finance G2’s shortfalls, or G2 will have to adjust themselves»

«Foreign institutions can be a source of fresh blood that can introduce innovative and mature ways of doing business to the local market, which has long been dominated by Chinese banks and brokerages»

«Unintended Consequences»

«Foreign investors stick primarily to buying bonds sold by the central government and three state-owned lenders known as policy banks that are closely associated with government objectives»

«The authorities may end up with domestic investors who are being crowded out of the government bond market»

«By pushing down yields on the risk-free assets, these foreign inflows may be forcing the Chinese investors even further out the credit curve»

«Top-grade corporate bonds yielded about 70 basis points, or 0.70 percentage point, more than China’s government bonds in late October»

«The more open the market is, the more difficult it will be for Chinese policymakers to maintain their grip on interest and exchange rates»

«China wants and needs overseas capital to fund its growth and promote the global use of its currency, which remains a bit player in international transactions»

«Its giant labor force made goods more affordable around the world, improving the lives of millions»

«But it also hollowed out manufacturing towns from Michigan to northern England, imposing social costs with political consequences that are still playing out»

«Similarly, the coming shift of trillions of dollars of capital across borders seems likely to create winners and losers around the globe»

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In una succinta sintesi.

– La Cina ha aperto agli stranieri il proprio mercato dei bond, stimabile a circa 15 trilioni di Usd

– È un mercato che rende anche il 3.5%, contro i tassi negativi in occidente

– Per la legge di azione di massa, nei tempi necessari, affluiranno dall’occidente in Cina liquidità stimabili tra i cinque ed i sette trilioni di dollari

– Come esito finale, la Cina finanzierà i propri piani egemoni mondiali proprio utilizzando le finanze che l’occidente sta scacciando dalla sua enclave sempre più misera ed ininfluente.

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China Opens Its Bond Market—With Unknown Consequences for World.

The nation’s entry into the World Trade Organization rocked global commerce. The financial markets could be next.

China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization transformed the global economic order. Yet even as China became the factory to the world, its financial system remained a closed shop, with strict controls on the flow of money in and out. For years there’s been talk of a “two-way opening,” but slow progress. Now the admission of foreign investors into China’s $15 trillion bond market—cemented this year when the country rounded out its inclusion in all three of the top global indexes—may just mark the big bang equivalent to WTO entry.

Global pension funds, starved for yield in a low-growth world, will now have access to safe government debt that pays more than 3%. And if officials deliver on their pledges to open up, reinforced in the Communist leadership’s 2021-25 five-year plan outlined in October, Chinese investors may soon find it a lot easier to snap up shares in Apple, Starbucks, or Tesla—not just their phones, cappuccinos, and cars. The Chinese could join their government, which has long been a major buyer of overseas assets such as Treasuries, as a powerful source of funding.

“China will turn from an exporter of goods to an exporter of capital, with significant consequences, of course, for the world,” says Stephen Jen, who runs Eurizon SLJ Capital, a hedge fund and advisory firm in London.

But what will the consequences be? Major changes to the financial system in the past have produced some unfortunate results. The euro’s 1999 introduction sowed the seeds for the region’s debt crisis a decade later. A wave of overseas savings that poured into the U.S. during the 2000s helped trigger the mortgage boom that catastrophically burst in 2007‑08. Bloomberg Markets gathered views on how the opening might affect the future of global finance in the years ahead. Here are some of the themes that emerged.

Chinese Savers Go Global

Jen, who started his career at Morgan Stanley covering the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the foreign exchange market, sees China’s capital market opening as the biggest structural change to international finance since the launch of the euro.

Sustained inflows of foreign capital could make Beijing comfortable about loosening the controls that have bottled up domestic money in China for so long. Indeed, it would probably have to; otherwise the yuan would strengthen, eroding the country’s export competitiveness. That would let loose a wave of Chinese savings on the world—Jen estimates there’s as much as $5 trillion of pent-up Chinese demand for investments outside China. That could resemble the petrodollars that flowed from oil-exporting countries in the 1970s, which ended up financing a huge, and tragically unsustainable, borrowing spree by Latin American nations.

“Outflows will probably be offset by the inflows for a few more years,” Jen says of China. Petrodollar-like net outflows might take a few more years to materialize, “but that is definitely a scenario we will need to deal with,” he says.

A Slice of the Action

To gain exposure to China’s rapid economic expansion, global investors generally have had to buy proxy assets such as the Australian dollar, commodities, or a small range of Hong Kong-listed Chinese shares. China’s bond market opening gives them direct exposure. It also provides an alternative to Japanese government bonds and other low- or negative-yielding sovereign debt, says Ed Al-Hussainy, a senior analyst for global rates at Columbia Threadneedle in New York, which had $476 billion under management in October and has been stepping into the China market recently.

“The demand is off the charts for anything liquid with a little bit of pickup in yield over Treasuries,” he says. “People are willing to pay up for liquidity, and that’s the key thing that’s improving in the Chinese onshore market. So inevitably we’ll be pushed in that direction.”

China’s central government bonds are now included, or on a phased path to inclusion, in the three key international bond indexes that investors use as benchmarks compiled by FTSE Russell, JPMorgan Chase, and Bloomberg Barclays (part of Bloomberg LP, the owner of Bloomberg Markets). About $5.3 trillion in assets tracks these indexes, according to estimates from Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Passive index-tracking funds will need to buy Chinese bonds to match the benchmarks. Some active managers, concerned about transaction costs, may steer clear; others are likely to overweight China because of the attractive yields.

Flow on Effect

China’s bond yields look more like those of emerging markets—in the FTSE World Government Bond Index benchmark they will be second highest after Mexico’s—yet investors will probably view them as developed-market securities, Goldman analysts say. After pulling in $230 billion from foreign investors to its fixed-income market in the past five years, China will see about $770 billion more in the next five, Goldman analysts including Kenneth Ho estimated in October.

Market players don’t expect the resulting shifts in asset allocation to increase bond yields much elsewhere—but the money will need to come from somewhere. Overseas investors held almost 13% of Japanese government bonds and more than 30% of Treasuries at the end of June. About one-quarter of euro region government bonds are held by investors outside the currency union, according to estimates from Commerzbank AG.

“We have a huge overhang of JGBs and European bonds—and a lot of that is dead weight,” says Columbia Threadneedle’s Al-Hussainy.

Competitor for Capital

Washington, in particular, could find itself competing with Beijing for overseas capital. China’s current account is barely positive relative to the size of its economy, even with its large trade surpluses with the U.S. It runs vast deficits in the trade of services, and some economists predict it will in the future run current-account deficits. If that happens, China would need to pull in money from abroad, just as the U.S. has for decades.

“China could enter structural current-account deficits, which will force it to open the market and import capital from abroad,” says Aidan Yao, a senior economist at AXA Investment Managers in Hong Kong who previously worked for the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. With China and the U.S.—sometimes referred to as the G2—both competing for savings, “either the rest of the world has to step up savings to finance G2’s shortfalls, or G2 will have to adjust themselves,” Yao says.

Competition could be all the fiercer if Washington expands on moves in 2020 to reduce Chinese borrowers’ access to American capital. Lawmakers from the Republican and Democratic parties have both proposed rules that would make it tougher for China’s companies to issue stock in the U.S., for example.

“The harder the U.S. tries to isolate China, the more efforts China should make in opening up,” says Yao Wei, chief China economist at Société Générale SA in Paris. “Allowing in more foreign investments will further deepen China’s integration into global financial markets, which will make decoupling more difficult.”

Better Credit Allocation and Transparency

Chinese regulators hope that opening their bond market will improve how credit gets allocated. The nation’s Communist leadership has sought to transition the economy to a more market-based system in which investors and credit analysts price funding for different borrowers according to their risk. Policymakers hope that will stem the buildup of stressed and defaulting loans, reduce excess capacity, and result in more productive investment.

That helps explain why the People’s Bank of China and other regulators worked so hard to win acceptance into the benchmark bond indexes. That approval required addressing a wide variety of complaints about the local market, such as the excessive paperwork required from foreigners and the slow pace of trade completion. Regulators also provided more hedging options, and the government boosted the size of individual bonds to increase their liquidity. After a messy 2015 yuan devaluation, the PBOC has also tried to reassure overseas investors by conducting exchange rate management with greater transparency and stability.

The Chinese Communist Party’s five-year plan, outlined in October, recommitted to opening up. Han Wenxiu, a senior official involved in drafting the plan, said at a briefing that “China will see the scale of foreign trade, foreign capital utilization, and outbound investment continue to expand.” PBOC Governor Yi Gang has also highlighted the value of financial opening, saying it improves efficiency and aids higher-quality economic development.

“Foreign institutions can be a source of fresh blood that can introduce innovative and mature ways of doing business to the local market, which has long been dominated by Chinese banks and brokerages,” says Becky Liu, head of China macro strategy at Standard Chartered Plc.

Unintended Consequences

There’s always a risk that things won’t go as planned. For instance, what if, instead of disciplining the Chinese fixed-income market, the opening gave China’s riskiest borrowers even cheaper credit?

Here’s how that might happen: Foreign investors stick primarily to buying bonds sold by the central government and three state-owned lenders known as policy banks that are closely associated with government objectives. As of mid-2020, overseas managers held 8.5% of central government bonds, up from just 2.4% in February 2016. By contrast, their share of corporate bonds, at 0.7%, was barely changed from 0.6%, Goldman analysts estimated.

“The authorities may end up with domestic investors who are being crowded out of the government bond market,” says Michael Spencer, chief Asia-Pacific economist at Deutsche Bank AG in Hong Kong. “By pushing down yields on the risk-free assets, these foreign inflows may be forcing the Chinese investors even further out the credit curve. So if you think they are not very good to begin with in pricing credit, then these inflows actually may be making that problem worse.”

Spreads across China’s domestic corporate debt market are less differentiated than in the U.S. bond market. Top-grade corporate bonds yielded about 70 basis points, or 0.70 percentage point, more than China’s government bonds in late October. High-yield securities had rates 329 basis points higher, according to the ChinaBond platform. By contrast, investment-grade U.S. corporate spreads were at 123 basis points over Treasuries and junk bonds had a 488 basis-point premium.

Losing Control

The more open the market is, the more difficult it will be for Chinese policymakers to maintain their grip on interest and exchange rates. Moves that drive up yields—such as monetary tightening to control inflation—could spur a wave of inflows that sends the currency climbing, making exports less competitive. Similarly, measures that undermine the confidence of overseas investors could prompt a destabilizing exodus.

China’s policymakers are cautious and patient. That helps explain why they kept the financial system cordoned off even as they opened the economy in myriad other ways starting in the late 1970s. They welcomed investment in manufacturing, but portfolio inflows were another matter. After all, emerging-market crises in the 1980s and 1990s showcased the danger of “hot money” that can quickly exit a country, causing wrenching financial turmoil.

“With an open financial market with easier inflow and outflow, the Chinese government and central bank will have to be more cautious managing those funding costs and interest rates,” says Lu Ting, chief China economist at Nomura Holdings Inc. in Hong Kong. “And of course, it will make it more challenging to manage the exchange rate.”

China might need to reestablish controls and limits if the financial market opening spurs excessive volatility. Authorities in recent years have managed swings in the currency by introducing or removing curbs on the foreign exchange market. So while China’s policymaking elite seemingly agree on the benefits of opening, the process is likely to be a stop-start one.

Pros Outnumber Cons

China wants and needs overseas capital to fund its growth and promote the global use of its currency, which remains a bit player in international transactions. The country’s growth rate has steadily decelerated in recent years, even before the pandemic, and the era of outsize current-account surpluses is over. With an aging and shrinking labor force, China risks falling into the “middle-income trap”—stagnating before it reaches rich-world levels of development. Improved financial transparency, a diverse funding mix, and more productive investment will be key to ensuring that doesn’t happen.

For the rest of the world, China’s financial integration will bring unpredictable change, just as the country’s entry into the global trading system did. Its giant labor force made goods more affordable around the world, improving the lives of millions. But it also hollowed out manufacturing towns from Michigan to northern England, imposing social costs with political consequences that are still playing out. Similarly, the coming shift of trillions of dollars of capital across borders seems likely to create winners and losers around the globe.

Bankitalia. Audizione Manovra Economica 2021-2023.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-30.

Banca d’Italia. Eugenio Gaiotti in audizione preliminare all’esame della manovra economica per il triennio 2021-2023.

Eugenio Gaiotti, Capo del Dipartimento Economia e statistica della Banca d’Italia, tiene oggi [24 novembre] l’audizione preliminare all’esame manovra economica relativa al bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 2021 e al bilancio pluriennale per il triennio 2021-2023, davanti alle Commissioni riunite V della Camera dei Deputati (Bilancio, Tesoro e Programmazione) e 5° del Senato della Repubblica (Programmazione economica e bilancio).

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Audizione preliminare all’esame della manovra economica per il triennio 2021-2023.

La lettura approfondita sarebbe auspicabile per meglio comprendere la situazione attuale.

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La lettura dell’allegato conto economico lascia molte perplessità. Sembrerebbe essere un po’ troppo ottimista.

– Che il Gettito addizionale maggiore crescita economica sia 11.231 miliardi nel 2021, 27.924 nel 2022 e 20.500 nel 2023 sembrerebbe essere un desiderio piuttosto che una concreta possibilità

– Che le Variazione dell’indebitamento netto (G=F-E) siano 24.635 miliardi nel 2021, 11.992 nel 2022 e -3.468 nel 2023 sembrerebbero anche essere un buon auspicio piuttosto che una concreta possibilità.

US Supreme Court. Il quesito del Census. Questione di vita o di morte politica.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-30.

«If you then ask whether that same Russian should be allowed to be a candidate for Congress, you would receive the same adamant answer. And if you ask whether that Russian should be able to vote in federal elections, including congressional elections, the answer would still be a resounding “no.”»

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Sul Blog della Supreme Court è comparso uno studio, alquanto di parte ma valido, sul problema del Census. Se si consente agli immigrati clandestini illegali di essere quotati dal Census e di votare alle elezioni perchè presenti sul territorio, perché allora non conteggiare e far votare anche i diplomatici russi o cinesi, i quali sono anche essi presenti sul territorio?

Gli premettiamo tuttavia un estratto da un post precedente, a nostro particolare avviso, chiarificatore di questa intricata vicenda. La loro lettura integrale sarebbe auspicabile, per poter parlare con cognizione di causa sull’argomento.

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Symposium: Trump’s census policy is both fundamentally fair and legally sound.

«In Trump v. New York, the Supreme Court should be looking only at the constitutional and statutory issues: whether President Donald Trump was within his legal authority to direct that noncitizens in the country illegally be excluded from the population used for congressional apportionment. The policy issue is very important, of course. What the president did was fundamentally fair. And, under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Franklin v. Massachusetts, Trump was also within his legal authority to do so.

First on the policy issue and the question of fairness. For the past four years, the political arena has been filled with claims of Russian “interference” in our elections. Special Counsel Robert Mueller actually indicted a number of Russians for involvement in those efforts. If you were to ask members of the public if they believe that any one of the indicted Russians should be allowed to make a political donation to a federal candidate — be it Trump or someone running for Congress – if he were here illegally, I have no doubt they would uniformly say “no.”

If you then ask whether that same Russian should be allowed to be a candidate for Congress, you would receive the same adamant answer. And if you ask whether that Russian should be able to vote in federal elections, including congressional elections, the answer would still be a resounding “no.”

So why would the state of New York or any of the other Democratic-controlled state and local governments who are challenging the president’s action argue that Russians (and other noncitizens) who are not here legally should be included in the population used to apportion the political power of the House of Representatives? Only one reason: to distort the House and give states with large illegal immigrant populations more members of Congress (and more political influence) than they are entitled to receive according to their citizen population. This gives states an incentive to obstruct federal immigration law in order to boost the number of illegal immigrants residing in those states.

The three-judge district court that granted summary judgment to New York and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Commerce Department, the Census Bureau and all other government agencies from implementing Trump’s July 21, 2020 memorandum got it legally wrong, too, and misapplied the Franklin decision.

Under Section 2 of the 14th Amendment, “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State.” The secretary of commerce is given the statutory authority under 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) to conduct the census “in such format and content as he may determine” and then send a report to the president.

Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a), the president is directed to send Congress “a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State” as determined by the decennial census and “the number of Representatives to which each state would be entitled … by the method known as the method of equal proportions.” Trump’s July 21 memorandum specifically instructed the secretary to exclude noncitizens who are in the country illegally from the base population number for apportionment purposes “to the maximum extent feasible and consistent with the discretion delegated to the executive branch.”»

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Symposium: Depoliticizing the census through administrative process.

The census saga continues. This time, however, the Trump administration is more truthful about its motivations. It wants to count immigrants who are in the country without authorization, not — it turns out — to enforce the Voting Rights Act, but rather to influence the reapportionment of legislative seats. Specifically, the government has issued a presidential memorandum to exclude these immigrants from the apportionment base, the state population counts used for reallocation. The case now before the Supreme Court raises important jurisdictional, statutory and constitutional arguments against the memorandum. By focusing only on the statutory claims, I will argue for an interpretation that subjects census-related policy decisions to more robust administrative process. Doing so, I hope, will help mitigate the extent to which the census is a means of political entrenchment.

The Census Act provides that the commerce secretary “shall … take a decennial census of population” in “such form and content as he may determine.” The act then requires the secretary to report to the president, for reapportionment purposes, a “tabulation of total population by States” based on the decennial census. The Reapportionment Act, in turn, specifies that the president “shall transmit” to Congress a “statement showing the whole number of persons in each State … as ascertained under the … decennial census of the population” using the “method of equal proportions.” Note that the relevant statutes explicitly delegate certain tasks to the commerce secretary, as opposed to the president. These tasks include taking the census, tabulating population counts by state, and then, of course, preparing the required report.

Under this scheme, the president’s interpretive authority over responsibilities explicitly delegated to the secretary is arguably supervisory, not directive. That is, the secretary is empowered to make his own legal determinations in which the president’s views are important to consider, but not necessarily determinative. Congress intended this understanding, it could be argued, as evidenced in its choice of statutory delegate: here, the secretary, not the president. Unsurprisingly, the government disagrees, arguing that presidential authority here is directive, that President Donald Trump makes the “ultimate” policy judgments — even before the secretary has concluded his statutory duties, as is the case here. The government contends that the president’s authority is directive after he receives the report, so there is no reason it should not be beforehand as well.

One basis for skepticism on this front, however, is that the president’s discretion is likely extremely limited after he receives the report from the Commerce Department. This is because the Reapportionment Act provides the president with only 10 days to determine the “whole number of persons in each State” under the decennial census. Such a short time period suggests that Congress intended that any presidential changes at this point would be more akin to corrections, rather than the kind of fundamental policy changes President Trump seeks here.

The government also grounds its view in Franklin v. Massachusetts, which implicated the same statutes, but in a dispute over how to apportion military personnel stationed overseas. Franklin referred to both the president’s “supervisory” and “direct[ory]” authority without acknowledging their difference or import. One reason may have been the view that the distinction is merely academic: Politically-appointed agency heads removable at will are likely to fall in line with the president in practice. Another explanation may be due to the opinion’s hasty drafting and inadequate briefing. Moreover, in Franklin, as in this case, there was no indication that the commerce secretary and the president were in disagreement. If they were, then the difference between supervisory and directive authority would matter even more at the margins.

Considering the distinction is nevertheless still important when, as here, the secretary has yet to complete the tabulations and issue his report to the president. In this period, experts within the Census Bureau often push back against White House direction. The agency has also historically engaged in a robust administrative process during which intra-executive branch deliberations may be more contested. Indeed, in 2018, the Census Bureau determined that apportionment should occur by reference to an individual’s ‘‘usual residence.’’ It promulgated this view through notice-and-comment rulemaking (the “Residence Rule”), during which the agency considered almost 78,000 comments. One of those comments “expressed concern” about “including undocumented people in the population counts” because they could not vote. Nevertheless, the agency declared that “[f]oreign citizens” would be counted and apportioned according to where they were living and sleeping most of the time. The agency confirmed in subsequent guidance that “undocumented residents” would be included.

It is natural to wonder why the Census Bureau engaged in such rulemaking despite Franklin’s holding that the agency’s apportionment-related actions were not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. The APA, after all, is the statute that requires public notice and comment as well as non-arbitrary decision-making. One possibility could be a suggestion made by Justice John Paul Stevens’ Franklin concurrence that the secretary’s eventual census report to the president could be subject to the APA as long as litigants “join[ed] their apportionment challenges to other census-related claims” — for example, with respect to any federal and state funding decisions implicated by the census report. So the agency, in other words, may still have felt bound by the APA, especially if it never contemplated producing two separate sets of census figures for funding and apportionment purposes, as it likely did not.

In the case at hand, the challengers’ position before the court appears to be that Trump’s memorandum alters the decennial census itself — that is, the census numbers that would impact funding decisions as well as apportionment. The administration disagrees about the extent to which this is true; hopefully oral arguments will clarify. The point for now is that if Trump’s directive would indeed impact funding decisions under separate statutes, there is a good argument that the resulting census report should be subject to the APA. It will be “final,” at least with respect to those funding decisions. And it will be issued by an agency head, not the president himself (whom Franklin and subsequent cases have deemed not an “agency” under the APA).

If that is right, one intriguing implication may be that the Residence Rule is appropriately characterized as a legislative rule. Changing it to say that people who lack lawful immigration status are no longer included in total population counts would require another round of notice-and-comment under the APA — as long as those counts would also have non-apportionment-related legal impacts. That policy change, in other words, could not be made by presidential memorandum alone.

So to take a step back: the Census and Reapportionment Acts should be read to delineate distinct roles for the president before and after the commerce secretary has issued his statutory report. Beforehand, the president has only supervisory authority over the secretary’s taking of the census and tabulating population counts by state. On the facts here, that authority should have been exercised in the context of the Census Bureau’s rulemaking process and taking of the census. Given that the Residence Rule has yet to be repealed, the policy of counting all residents for the purpose of apportionment is still binding. Any report from the commerce secretary that departs from that policy now may be subject to the APA as long as non-apportionment-related legal impacts result.

After the secretary has issued the statutory report, the dynamics and optics change. In Franklin’s words, the president can “reform” the census, but must do so within 10 days. Any direction he gives the secretary at that point must necessarily be limited in scope, both as a matter of statutory interpretation as well as practicality. The recent news that the Census Bureau may have to delay its report beyond the Trump administration further highlights the separate roles of the commerce secretary and president under the relevant statutes. (The prospect may also bear on the question of this case’s ripeness). For all these reasons, the memorandum’s broad invocation of presidential discretion under the Reapportionment Act is misplaced.

In the final analysis, there is much to be gained from subjecting the census to administrative processes that can check the inevitable temptation of presidents to aid their own political parties through reapportionment. Taming these impulses was the point of the Census and Reapportionment Acts. Such processes can occur during internal executive branch deliberations involving agency officials, including those from the expert Census Bureau, subject only to supervisory presidential authority. They can also transpire through more familiar notice-and-comment rulemaking subject to arbitrariness review. Administrative procedure is hardly a panacea. But, in the context of a decennial census with Electoral College implications, it may go a long way toward relegitimizing an electoral contest desperately in need of it.

Francia. Decine di migliaia in piazza contro la ‘legge sulla sicurezza globale’.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-29.

Quasi tutte le dittature si propongono come l’unica forza in grado di preservare l’ordine, e per far ciò innanzitutto aboliscono le libertà individuali. L’oligarchia trionfa sulla massa asservendola.

Nulla di strano quindi che Mr Macron abbia emanato la ‘legge sulla sicurezza globale’ ergendosi de facto quale nuovo egemone francese.

La risposta della piazza è stata impressionante: non si dica che erano quattro gatti spelacchiati.

«Una folla impressionante che si è radunata sull’onda dell’emozione per il pestaggio di Michel Zecler, produttore musicale aggredito da quattro poliziotti che lo hanno riempito di calci, pugni e manganellate insultandolo al grido di «sporco negro»»

«Nel loro rapporto gli agenti hanno riferito che l’uomo si era ribellato al controllo e li aveva aggrediti cercando di strappare loro le armi di servizio»

«Le immagini delle videocamere di sorveglianza e del video girato da un vicino, che con la nuova legge sarebbero proibite, hanno dimostrato che i poliziotti mentivano»

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Francia, manifestazione a Parigi e in altre città: in decine di migliaia contro lo stop ai filmati della polizia in servizio.

Disordini alla Marcia per le libertà di Parigi, dove la polizia ha lanciato lacrimogeni all’arrivo del corteo alla Bastiglia. Quarantasei arresti.

PARIGI Decine di migliaia di persone hanno sfilato a Parigi, nonostante il lockdown, per protestare contro le violenze della polizia e chiedere il ritiro della «legge sulla sicurezza globale» che all’articolo 24 vieta di filmare poliziotti e gendarmi in azione e di diffondere poi i video «con intenzioni malevole».  

Una folla impressionante che si è radunata sull’onda dell’emozione per il pestaggio di Michel Zecler, produttore musicale aggredito da quattro poliziotti che lo hanno riempito di calci, pugni e manganellate insultandolo al grido di «sporco negro». Nel loro rapporto gli agenti hanno riferito che l’uomo si era ribellato al controllo e li aveva aggrediti cercando di strappare loro le armi di servizio. Le immagini delle videocamere di sorveglianza e del video girato da un vicino, che con la nuova legge sarebbero proibite, hanno dimostrato che i poliziotti mentivano. Gli incidenti Dopo il raduno in place de la République, nera di folla, i manifestanti hanno marciato verso la Bastiglia.

A qualche centinaio di metri dalla piazza sono scoppiati gli incidenti, con cassonetti della spazzatura incendiati e un furgone rovesciato, mentre i manifestanti erigevano le barricate. Gli agenti hanno sparato le granate lacrimogene mentre un gruppo di giovani vestiti di nero e con le bandiere del movimento “antifa” scandivano lo slogan — in italiano — «Siamo tutti antifascisti». Quarantasei persone sono state arrestate.

Dopo lo scandalo provocato dai video sul pestaggio a Michel Zecler, il presidente Macron ha scritto un lungo intervento su Facebook per prendere le distanze dai poliziotti responsabili assicurando che verranno licenziati e per rassicurare i cittadino che i valori della République saranno rispettati, anche e soprattutto dalle forze dell’ordine. Ma la confusione è grande tra le autorità, il ministro dell’Interno, Gérald Darmanin parla di «azioni inaccettabili» a proposito del pestaggio ma è accusato di avere finora protetto i troppi abusi della polizia, rifiutando di ammettere l’esistenza stessa del problema. Il primo ministro Jean Castex ha annunciato che l’articolo 24 verrà riesaminato e riscritto da una commissione indipendente, ma dopo le proteste della sua stessa maggioranza parlamentare ha rinunciato al progetto. La società francese è in francese, anche i campioni del mondo Kylian Mbappé e Antoine Griezmann hanno preso posizione contro le violenze e il razzismo della polizia.

Formosa. Gdp 2020Q3 +3.92% YoY, overseas shipments +11.2%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-29.

«Gross domestic product will likely expand 2.54% in 2020»

«Third-quarter GDP was revised higher to 3.92%»

«Taiwan’s overseas shipments grew 11.2% from a year earlier to a record monthly high of $32.2 billion in October»

«Much of Taiwan’s strong exports are being driven by stellar growth at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.»

«Taiwan raised its forecast for growth this year as stronger-than-expected international demand for technology products shielded the economy from the global slowdown fueled by Covid-19»

* * * * * * *

Questi macroindicatori sembrerebbero suggerire che Formosa abbia superato pienamente la crisi economica e produttiva dovuta alla epidemia da coronavirus.

Nota Tecnica e Politica.

La Huawei Technologies Co. è una società cinese impegnata nello sviluppo, produzione e commercializzazione di prodotti, di sistemi e di soluzioni di rete e telecomunicazioni: ha sede sociale a Shenzhen, Cina.

*

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Taiwan Raises 2020 GDP Forecast on Better-Than-Expected Exports. – Bloomberg.

Taiwan raised its forecast for growth this year as stronger-than-expected international demand for technology products shielded the economy from the global slowdown fueled by Covid-19.

– Gross domestic product will likely expand 2.54% in 2020, the statistics bureau said Friday, an increase of almost a percentage point over its most recent forecast of 1.56% made in August.

– Third-quarter GDP was revised higher to 3.92%, the fastest pace since the fourth quarter of 2016.

– Overseas shipments grew 11.2% from a year earlier.

                         Key Insights

– Initial signs are that the surge in exports is continuing in the fourth quarter. Taiwan’s overseas shipments grew 11.2% from a year earlier to a record monthly high of $32.2 billion in October. The delayed launch of Apple Inc.’s iPhone 12 helped boost last month’s exports, according to officials. The Ministry of Finance’s chief statistician forecast earlier this month that November exports will likely gain between 5% and 8% on year.

– The National Development Council’s Monitoring Indicator, an index of forward-looking economic signals, rose to 28 in October, its highest level since May 2018.

– Taiwan has seen industries initially affected by the coronavirus outbreak, such as traditional manufacturing and hospitality, rebound in recent months. Domestic demand has been bolstered by vouchers issued by the government in an effort to stimulate domestic consumption.

– The statistics bureau revised down its forecasts for 2021 GDP growth to 3.82% from 3.92% and 2021 exports to 4.59% from 6.6%.

– Much of Taiwan’s strong exports are being driven by stellar growth at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the island’s biggest company. The contract chipmaker’s revenue has risen more than 27% this year as of the end of October, helped by Huawei Technologies Co.’s hoarding of semiconductors before U.S. restrictions against sales to the company came into effect in September.

Italia. Svimez. Pil 2020 -9.6%, crolla l’occupazione femminile.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-29.

Svimez è uscita con un voluminoso report sulla situazione italiana de quale riportiamo un sintetico riassunto.

*

«Ogni mese di lockdown è «costato» quasi 48 miliardi di euro, il 3,1% del Pil italiano, oltre 37 dei quali «persi» al Centro-Nord (3,2% del Pil) e quasi 10 nel Mezzogiorno (2,8% del Pil)»

«per il Pil si tratta di -9% nel Mezzogiorno, -9,8% nelle regioni del Centro-Nord, -9,6% a livello italiano»

«Il Sud paga il conto innanzitutto in termini occupazionali con una riduzione nei primi tre trimestri del 2020 pari al 4,5%, il triplo rispetto al Centro-Nord: circa 280 mila posti di lavoro in meno»

«Rispetto al 2007, la riduzione è di quasi mezzo milione di posti»

«Risulta sempre più evidente il problema generazionale nel mercato del lavoro. Rispetto al 2008 l’occupazione giovanile si è ridotta di 573 mila unità nel Sud, a fronte di una crescita di 689 mila unità degli over 50»

«Nel Centro-Nord gli occupati under 35 si sono invece ridotti di 1,2 milioni di unità mentre gli over 50 sono cresciuti di 2,4 milioni»

«La Svimez mette con ancora maggior forza in risalto la questione femminile»

«gli effetti occupazionali del lockdown si sono scaricati proprio sulla componente femminile, occupata nei servizi con contratti precari»

«L’emergenza sanitaria ha cancellato nel secondo trimestre 2020, a livello nazionale, quasi l’80% dell’occupazione femminile creata tra il 2008 ed il 2019 riportando il tasso d’occupazione delle donne a poco più di un punto sopra i livelli del 2008»

«Anche se in calo dal culmine della doppia fase recessiva, la precarietà per le donne resta decisamente più elevata rispetto a quella del lavoro maschile soprattutto nelle regioni del Mezzogiorno»

«L’occupazione femminile in professioni cognitive altamente qualificate è calata tra il 2008 ed il 2019 di oltre 290 mila unità a livello nazionale (-7,1%), mentre negli altri Paesi europei è aumentata (+21,9% nell’Eu-15). Il calo nel Mezzogiorno è stato decisamente più accentuato (-16,2%)»

* * * * * * *

Il report tocca anche molti altri punti di interesse qui omessi.

Se in questo momento il governo mira a contenere il processo epidemico, il problema dell’occupazione giovanile e femminile, specie poi nel Meridione, si proietta a diventare quello più rilevante al momento della futura ripresa.

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Crolla il lavoro femminile al Sud: persi in tre mesi 171mila posti.

Per il Pil la Svimez prevede nel 2020 un calo del 9% nel Mezzogiorno, del 9,8% nelle regioni del Centro-Nord e del 9,6% a livello italiano.

Ogni mese di lockdown è «costato» quasi 48 miliardi di euro, il 3,1% del Pil italiano, oltre 37 dei quali «persi» al Centro-Nord (3,2% del Pil) e quasi 10 nel Mezzogiorno (2,8% del Pil). La stima della Svimez, l’associazione per lo sviluppo industriale del Mezzogiorno, è un buon punto di partenza per riassumere numeri, proiezioni e considerazioni contenute nel Rapporto annuale presentato martedì 24 novembre. Gli effetti della pandemia si tramutano in previsioni per il 2020 peggiori di quelle formulate dalla stessa Svimez a luglio: per il Pil si tratta di -9% nel Mezzogiorno, -9,8% nelle regioni del Centro-Nord, -9,6% a livello italiano. Significa per il Pil meridionale risultare a fine 2020 al di sotto del suo picco minimo del 2014 e inferiore di 15 punti percentuali rispetto al 2007 (il Centro-Nord di circa 7).

Le perdite nel mercato del lavoro

Il Sud paga il conto innanzitutto in termini occupazionali con una riduzione nei primi tre trimestri del 2020 pari al 4,5%, il triplo rispetto al Centro-Nord: circa 280 mila posti di lavoro in meno. Rispetto al 2007, la riduzione è di quasi mezzo milione di posti. L’analisi si sofferma in particolare su un’area potenziale di quasi 2 milioni di soggetti esclusi dalle tutele: lavoratori irregolari o precari e giovani che si stanno affacciando sul mercato del lavoro senza speranza di potervi entrare. E solo una parte potrebbe essere coperta dal reddito di cittadinanza.

L’occupazione dei giovani

Risulta sempre più evidente il problema generazionale nel mercato del lavoro. Rispetto al 2008 l’occupazione giovanile si è ridotta di 573 mila unità nel Sud, a fronte di una crescita di 689 mila unità degli over 50. Nel Centro-Nord gli occupati under 35 si sono invece ridotti di 1,2 milioni di unità mentre gli over 50 sono cresciuti di 2,4 milioni.

L’occupazione delle donne

La Svimez mette con ancora maggior forza in risalto la questione femminile. La tesi è che, contrariamente alla precedente crisi economica (prevalentemente «industriale»), gli effetti occupazionali del lockdown si sono scaricati proprio sulla componente femminile, occupata nei servizi con contratti precari. L’emergenza sanitaria ha cancellato nel secondo trimestre 2020, a livello nazionale, quasi l’80% dell’occupazione femminile creata tra il 2008 ed il 2019 riportando il tasso d’occupazione delle donne a poco più di un punto sopra i livelli del 2008. Nelle regioni meridionali l’occupazione femminile persa nel periodo considerato è quasi il doppio di quella creata negli undici anni precedenti (–171 mila unità a fronte di +89 mila tra il 2008 ed il 2019) con il tasso di occupazione rimasto poco al di sopra dei livelli del 2008 (31,7% nel secondo trimestre 2020 a fronte del 31,3%) solo per effetto del calo demografico. Il calo in termini di unità è del 7,3% rispetto allo stesso periodo dell’anno prima, al Centro-Nord con 299mila unità è stato invece del 3,9%. E la moderata ripresa del trimestre estivo, secondo Svimez, ha migliorato solo marginalmente la situazione.

La precarietà del lavoro femminile

Anche se in calo dal culmine della doppia fase recessiva, la precarietà per le donne resta decisamente più elevata rispetto a quella del lavoro maschile soprattutto nelle regioni del Mezzogiorno. «Quasi un quarto delle donne dipendenti a termine nel Mezzogiorno – osserva l’associazione – ha quel lavoro da almeno cinque anni ad evidenziare le scarse probabilità di trasformazione in posizioni permanenti a fronte del 13-14% delle dipendenti del Centro-Nord». E sono più diffuse le basse retribuzioni: a livello nazionale «l’11,5% delle dipendenti ha una retribuzione oraria inferiore ai due terzi di quella mediana a fronte del 7,9% degli uomini. Ancora più elevato è il gap nel Mezzogiorno dove circa un quinto delle donne si trova in tale condizione a fronte del 14% degli uomini».

Spicca un ulteriore dato, con evidenze anche nazionali. L’occupazione femminile in professioni cognitive altamente qualificate è calata tra il 2008 ed il 2019 di oltre 290 mila unità a livello nazionale (-7,1%), mentre negli altri Paesi europei è aumentata (+21,9% nell’Eu-15). Il calo nel Mezzogiorno è stato decisamente più accentuato (-16,2%) rispetto al Centro-Nord (-4%).

Il divario dei diritti di cittadinanza

Un ulteriore capitolo del rapporto ripercorre considerazioni e numeri approfonditi dal direttore della Svimez, Luca Bianchi, nel libro «Divario di cittadinanza» scritto con Antonio Fraschilla (edizioni Rubettino). Ci sono dati sulla spesa sanitaria corrente pro capite, che fanno definire dalla Svimez il Sud «una zona rossa già prima della pandemia», e statistiche molto chiare sui divari scolastici. La percentuale di tempo pieno nella scuola primaria è al Sud del 16%, al Centro-Nord del 46,1% per una media italiana del 35,4%. Ed è evidente l’importanza dell’ambito familiare: al Sud i ragazzi tra 6 e 17 anni che vivono in famiglie in cui non sono disponibili dispostivi informatici sono il 19% contro il 12,2% medio italiano e la percentuale sale al 34% se in famiglia nessuno dei genitori è andato oltre la scuola dell’obbligo.

Legge di bilancio: gli effetti sull’economia

La Svimez prevede una ripresa del 2021 segnata dal riaprirsi di un forte differenziale Nord/Sud: 4,7% contro 1,6%. Il dato incorpora anche gli effetti della legge di bilancio per il 2021 il cui impatto è stimato in +0,4% al Sud e +0,2% nel Centro-Nord. Nel 2022 l’impatto passerebbe a + 1,1% al Sud contro il +0,3% nel Centro-Nord. Per il Mezzogiorno la spinta deriverebbe essenzialmente dalla decontribuzione al 30% per il lavoro dipendente (16 miliardi nel triennio), dal credito imposta per gli investimenti rifinanziato con 1 miliardo annuo per il 2021 e il 2022 e dall’incremento degli investimenti della politica di coesione nazionale nel 2022 (circa 5 miliardi di euro).

La spesa dei fondi e le priorità

Emerge, e non è una sorpresa, il ritardo italiano nella spesa dei fondi europei. Ad agosto i pagamenti rispetto a oltre 50 miliardi di finanziamenti 2014-2020 erano al 39,2%. Per la Svimez l’accelerazione nell’uso delle risorse della programmazione passata e di quella che riguarda il 2021-2027 dovrà essere coerente con gli indirizza di spesa dei 209 miliardi dell’iniziativa Next Generation Eu. Per quest’ultima, l’associazione presieduta da Adriano Giannola, propone due indirizzi prioritari per il Mezzogiorno: «Un percorso sostenibile di perequazione che consenta di superare la pratica della “spesa storica”» e un progetto di politica industriale – il Quadrilatero Napoli-Bari- Taranto-Gioia Tauro da estendersi alla Sicilia – per l’interconnessione tra le zone economiche speciali, a partire dal completamento della Napoli-Bari.

L’impatto dei fondi «Next Generation Eu»

L’associazione ha infine provato a stimare l’impatto della spesa dei fondi del programma Next Generation Eu, limitandosi alla quota dei contributi a fondo perduto, sulla base di tre diversi scenari di allocazione al Sud. Si calcola un impatto nazionale sul Pil reale attorno al 4% (valore cumulato in un quadriennio) se si conferma l’attuale trend, cioè circa il 22,5% di spesa in conto capitale ordinaria della pubblica amministrazione al Sud. In virtù della forte interdipendenza economica tra le due macroaree del Paese, si salirebbe al 4,38% di crescita, invece, applicando la clausola del 34% minimo di spesa, che oggi la legge in realtà prevede solo per gli investimenti ordinari in conto capitale (mentre il piano europeo rientrerebbe in spesa “straordinaria”). In quest’ultimo caso, il Mezzogiorno aumenterebbe la sua crescita dal 2,75% al 5,5% e il Centro-Nord passerebbe da 1,3 a 1,2%.

L’ipotesi di spendere al Sud fino al 50%

Svimez analizza anche un teorico riparto al 50%: in questo caso la crescita nazionale del Pil sarebbe del 4,32% mentre l’aumento annuo di produttività nel settore industriale sarebbe dell’1,33% anziché dell’1,29%. Per quanto riguarda la famosa clausola del 34%, tuttavia, la stessa Svimez sembra considerare il rischio che resti sulla carta segnalando «i ritardi nella predisposizione dei decreti attuativi di tale norma».

Italia. Ultimo sondaggio Swg. Lega di Salvini e Pd di Nicola Zingaretti crescono.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-28.

A nostro sommesso avviso, le variazioni riportate giacciono all’interno della fascia dell’errore di acquisizione.

Per quanto riguarda invece i trend nel tempo, anche questi sembrerebbero essersi stabilizzati.

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Sondaggi, Lega di Salvini e Pd di Nicola Zingaretti crescono.

La Lega di Salvini torna a salire nei sondaggi: il Carroccio guadagna lo 0,3% secondo le rilevazioni Swg per il  Tg La7 di Enrico Mentana e passa al 23,3%. Ancora meglio il Pd: per il Partito Democratico di Zingaretti quasi mezzo punto in più in una settimana (+0,4%) e così i Dem tornano sopra il 20% (al 20,3%).

SONDAGGI, FRATELLI D’ITALIA DI GIORGIA MELONI SCENDE. M5S SI AVVICINA

Male Fratelli d’Italia nei sondaggi Swg. Il partito di Giorgia Meloni lascia lo -0,5% in sette giorni: Fdi scende al 16,2% e vede avvicinarsi il Movimento 5 Stelle che prende lo 0,3% e va al 15,6%.

SONDAGGI, FORZA ITALIA AL 6,4%. SINISTRA, AZIONE E ITALIA VIVA…

Forza Italia? Per Silvio Berlusconi sondaggi con il segno più: Fi va al 6,4% (rispetto al 6,2% della scorsa settimana. A seguire ecco la Sinistra che va al 3,7% (+0,1%) e in scia Azione di Calenda (3,6% con +0,2%). Scende invece Italia Viva che perde lo 0,3% e passa al 2,9%. Ancora più giù c’è +Europa (-0,4% e sono ora al 2%) che viene raggiunta dai Verdi (2% con +0,2% negli ultimi sette giorni). Chiude la classifica Cambiamo all’1,1% (-0,2%.

Malta e Cipro. L’Unione Europea contesta i ‘Golden Passports’.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-28.

Il problema dovrebbe essere già noto.

Cyprus risks EU legal threat over selling ‘Golden Passports’

Cyprus blocking EU sanctions on Belarus

Time to end EU golden visas for corrupt elites

Golden EU passports more risky than indicated

*

«’Golden Passports’: Malta takes 67 days to respond to EU»

«Two dozen letters have been exchanged between the European Commission and Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta over their controversial ‘Golden Passport’ schemes, by which rich foreigners can gain EU citizenship for large sums of money»

«The letters – sent over the past 12 months – offer a fresh insight into how the European Commission is trying to clamp down on a scheme it says violates EU rules»

«It also shows how slow some of the states are to respond to the inquiries – with Malta taking 67 days to respond to the commission’s first letter, followed by 42 days for Cyprus»

«The issue has recently landed Cyprus and Malta with the possibility of facing the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg over the passport sales, which critics say attract people with criminal backgrounds»

«The media network published 1,400 leaked documents showing how Cyprus allowed fugitives to obtain Cypriot – and thus EU – citizenship»

«Bulgaria was to first launch its scheme in 2005, offering people citizenship in exchange for a €1m investment»

«The commission says the schemes undermine the integrity of the status of EU citizenship and free movement»

* * * * * * *

La legislazione di quasi tutti gli stati prevede la naturalizzazione degli stranieri che da tempo vivono sul loro territorio, con un lavoro stabile. Sono procedure di norma lunghe e poco agevoli.

Nell’Unione Europea, come peraltro in taluni altri stati extra Unione, Cipro, Malta e Bulgaria prevedono anche una naturalizzazione lampo per persone abbienti.

Se la Bulgaria prevede questa procedura per quanti abbiano investito sul territorio cifre consistenti, sia Malta sia Cipro sono molto più disinvolte: basta pagare e ci si ritrova in mano un passaporto ufficiale, che consente di girare a piace all’interno dell’Unione Europea.

Se è vero che di norma quelli che ricorrono a questa agevolazione sono dei galantuomini, sarebbe altrettanto vero che in taluni casi il denaro contante abbia fatto chiudere tutti o due occhi.

In questo frangente, l’Unione Europea non sa quali pesci prendere: formalmente nulla è illegale.

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‘Golden Passports’: Malta takes 67 days to respond to EU.

Two dozen letters have been exchanged between the European Commission and Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta over their controversial ‘Golden Passport’ schemes, by which rich foreigners can gain EU citizenship for large sums of money.

The letters – sent over the past 12 months – offer a fresh insight into how the European Commission is trying to clamp down on a scheme it says violates EU rules.

It also shows how slow some of the states are to respond to the inquiries – with Malta taking 67 days to respond to the commission’s first letter, followed by 42 days for Cyprus.

For its part, Bulgaria sent a letter in October 2019 to the European Commission, which responded a month letter.

Six were exchanged with Bulgaria and nine each with Cyprus and Malta, spanning October 2019 to October 2020.

The issue has recently landed Cyprus and Malta with the possibility of facing the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg over the passport sales, which critics say attract people with criminal backgrounds.

An Al Jazeera investigation last month revealed senior Cypriot officials discussing ways to provide citizenship to a convicted criminal.

The media network published 1,400 leaked documents showing how Cyprus allowed fugitives to obtain Cypriot – and thus EU – citizenship.

Of the three, Bulgaria was to first launch its scheme in 2005, offering people citizenship in exchange for a €1m investment.

That citizenship then entitles them to live and work anywhere in the European Union, in moves that create potential security risks.

Asked to release the letters for closer inspection, the European Commission refused, citing jurisprudence.

“The exchanges with Bulgaria are of a strictly bilateral nature as they involve only the commission and the member state concerned,” it said, in response to a freedom of information request.

It made similar arguments for Malta and Cyprus, stressing there was no overriding public interest for their disclosure given the previously-launched infringement procedures.

The commission says the schemes undermine the integrity of the status of EU citizenship and free movement.

It also allows people, who had no links to the European Union prior to sometimes paying out millions of euros for the passports, the right to vote.

The commission is also worried about EU candidate countries, as well as the United Kingdom, using similar schemes that offer special access to the EU for prospective future clients.

The UK is no longer a member of the European Union.

Justice commissioner Didier Reynders in October said the schemes were still being used in such countries to attract investors through their privileged partnership agreements, or various accession bids with the EU.

California. US House. David Valadao (Rep) vince il seggio e scalza TJ Cox (Dem).

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-28.

«David Goncalves Valadao, (born April 14, 1977) is an American politician who served as the U.S. Representative for California’s 21st congressional district from 2013 to 2019. Before that, he served one term in the California State Assembly, representing the 30th district. He is a member of the Republican Party. Valadao is running for his former U.S. House seat in the 2020 election. He defeated TJ Cox in a rematch in 2020. Valadao, along with Michelle Steel and Young Kim, thus became the joint-first Republican congressional candidates to unseat an incumbent House Democrat in California since 1994.» [Fonte]

*

Secondo l’Ufficio Elettorale dello Stato della California Mr David Goncalves Valadao avrebbe conseguito 85,373 voti (50.5%) contro gli 83,619 (49.5%) di Mr T.J. Cox.

Al momento attuale i liberal democratici avrebbero 222 seggi, quando la soglia di maggioranza è superiore ai 218.

I commenti a risultati ufficiali definitivi.

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David Valadao Wins House Race in California; Republican Pickup.

Republican David Valadao won the House race in California’s 21st Congressional District, the Associated Press projected, beating Democratic Representative T.J. Cox.

The race was a rematch between Valadao and Cox, who defeated the California Republican in 2018. The Central Valley district had previously voted for Valadao, a dairy farmer, in three straight congressional races.

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Republican David Valadao flips California seat, defeating incumbent TJ Cox in US House

27 November 2020, 19:33

Republican David Valadao flips California seat, defeating incumbent TJ Cox in US House.

CNN. Un senato a guida repubblicana andrebbe bene per Biden.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-27.

Questo è un articolo che non ci si sarebbe aspettati di leggerlo sulla Cnn.

*

«Why a Republican-led Senate might not be *such* a bad thing for Joe Biden»

«Conventional wisdom suggests that the best-case scenario for President-elect Joe Biden is for Democrats to sweep the two Senate runoffs in Georgia in January, wins that would hand Democrats control of both sides of the US Capitol, not to mention the White House»

«There’s no question that a Democratic Senate majority would make it easier for Biden to select a Cabinet that he really wants as opposed to one he thinks can secure the few Republican votes necessary to be confirmed if the GOP holds onto their majority»

«But dream scenarios almost always remain just that — even when a party controls all the levers of power»

«Biden is the epitome of a pragmatic centrist, and a guy who likes to find a way to make deals — even if it requires giving something to Republicans in order to get something for his side»

«The Democratic party is fractured between centrist and liberals»

«Just eight days removed from a disappointing election which will see them lose seats, House Democrats have rapidly turned into a circular firing squad»

«Virginia Rep. Abigail Spanberger denounced her liberal colleagues on a phone call last week. “We need to not ever use the words ‘socialist’ or ‘socialism’ ever again,”»

«While he could try to go his own way — in terms of Cabinet picks and his first-term agenda — he would face opposition from the liberal left at every turn»

«And while Biden’s primary win over several more liberal options does suggest the pragmatic center of the Democratic Party remains vital, there is little doubt that the passion (and donor dollars) are primarily located on the ideological left»

«While liberals might hate that, they’d struggle to deny the obvious political reality»

* * * * * * *

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Stando ai risultati preliminari non ufficiali, Mr Biden sembrerebbe aver vinto la Presidenza ma non sarebbe riuscito a conquistare il senato.

Senza il controllo del senato sarebbe impossibile confermare le nomine presidenziali ed eventuali trattati internazionali.

A ciò si aggiunga che, con le cinquantanove nomine di giudici nelle corti di appello federali eseguite negli ultimi quattro anni, il partito repubblicano è in tali sedi quasi in equilibrio con la componente liberal, anche nel 9^th Circuito.

Ma adesso i giudici federali di appello repubblicani possono contare su di una Suprema Corte anche essa a maggioranza repubblicana, motivo questo di grande apprensione nel partito democratico.

A questo punto si deve aspettare che evolva la situazione, ma da molti punti di vista sembrerebbe emergere una presidenza azzoppata.

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Why a Republican-led Senate might not be *such* a bad thing for Joe Biden.

(CNN)Conventional wisdom suggests that the best-case scenario for President-elect Joe Biden is for Democrats to sweep the two Senate runoffs in Georgia in January, wins that would hand Democrats control of both sides of the US Capitol, not to mention the White House.

Conventional wisdom, though, isn’t always right — especially when dealing with raw political calculations.

Look. There’s no question that a Democratic Senate majority would make it easier for Biden to select a Cabinet that he really wants as opposed to one he thinks can secure the few Republican votes necessary to be confirmed if the GOP holds onto their majority. And that unified control, of the legislative and executive branches at least, creates the possibility of two years of Democrats’ putting forward their dream legislation on everything from health care to taxes to immigration.

But dream scenarios almost always remain just that — even when a party controls all the levers of power. Consider what we know about Biden and the current state of the Democratic Party in Congress:

Biden ran (and won) on a promise of a return to “normal” politics.

“I just think there is a way, and the thing that will fundamentally change things is with Donald Trump out of the White House,” Biden said back in May 2019. “Not a joke. You will see an epiphany occur among many of my Republican friends.” His entire message — especially in the general election — was that Republican elected officials were fundamentally good people who he could work with if elected president, not mindless drones following President Donald Trump down a dead-end road.

Biden’s record in Congress (and as VP) is as a deal-maker.

Biden is the epitome of a pragmatic centrist, and a guy who likes to find a way to make deals — even if it requires giving something to Republicans in order to get something for his side. (Biden clearly relished his work with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell to avert the debt ceiling crisis of 2011 and the fiscal cliff of 2013.) In a town hall just weeks before the 2020 election, Biden said this of his plans if he won:

“What I will be doing as — if I’m elected president, the first thing — and not a joke, and you can ask, if they’d tell you, your dad’s old friends on the Republican side. I’m going to pick up the phone and call them and say, ‘Let’s get together. We’ve got to figure out how we’re going to move forward here.’ Because there are so many things we really do agree on.”

The Democratic party is fractured between centrist and liberals.

Just eight days removed from a disappointing election which will see them lose seats, House Democrats have rapidly turned into a circular firing squad. Virginia Rep. Abigail Spanberger denounced her liberal colleagues on a phone call last week. “We need to not ever use the words ‘socialist’ or ‘socialism’ ever again,” she said. “Because while people think it doesn’t matter, it does matter. And we lost good members because of it.” Which drew an immediate rebuke from New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the caucus’ most prominent, liberal voice.

“You can’t just tell the Black, Brown, & youth organizers riding in to save us every election to be quiet or not have their reps champion them when they need us,” AOC tweeted. “Or wonder why they don’t show up for midterms when they’re scolded for existing. Esp when they’re delivering victories.”

Now, given all of that, think about Biden’s challenge if Democrats manage to win back Senate control in Georgia early next year.

He will be constantly pressured by liberals — particularly in the House — to push programs like the “Green New Deal,” “Medicare for All” and all sorts of other progressive wish list items. (Biden, of course, has already made clear he doesn’t support those massive liberal initiatives.) And he will also be pushed to pick liberal favorites for top Cabinet posts — like Elizabeth Warren at Treasury or Bernie Sanders at Labor.

It would be a massive headache for Biden. While he could try to go his own way — in terms of Cabinet picks and his first-term agenda — he would face opposition from the liberal left at every turn. And while Biden’s primary win over several more liberal options does suggest the pragmatic center of the Democratic Party remains vital, there is little doubt that the passion (and donor dollars) are primarily located on the ideological left.

Now, consider the alternative. Biden is president while his old friend McConnell is Senate majority leader. (In 2016, as Biden was leaving his role as vice president, McConnell described Biden as “a real friend … a trusted partner. … We’re all going to miss you.”) Biden can credibly make the case that there is no point in pushing through certain legislation in the House because it will be DOA in the Senate. While liberals might hate that, they’d struggle to deny the obvious political reality.

Which would leave Biden in the role he not only campaigned on but spent decades in the Senate (and as vice president) perfecting: Cutting deals on major issues facing the country that might not make everyone happy, but which move the ball slightly closer to a goal.

You tell me: Which scenario sounds more appealing to the Biden that we know?