Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

USA. 2021Q2. Pil +6.5%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-31.

2021-07-30__ Usa PCE 001

Si notino due elementi.

– Il pil è aumentato di una percentuale quasi eguale a quella del PCE, ossia il 6.4%. L’aumento del Pil è virtualmente eguale alla inflazione stimata con il PCE,

– Il valore del Pil è artatamente gonfiato, contabilizzando come prodotti da lavoro i sussidi assistenziali.

* * *

«Disposable personal income decreased $1.42 trillion, or 26.1 percent»

«Real disposable personal income decreased 30.6 percent»

«personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income—was 10.9 percent in the second quarter, compared with 20.8 percent in the first quarter»

Questi macro dati sembrerebbero essere ben poco entusiasmanti.

* * * * * * *


Bureau of Economic Analysis. Gross Domestic Product, Second Quarter 2021 (Advance Estimate) and Annual Update

                         Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 6.5 percent in the second quarter of 2021 (table 1), according to the “advance” estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the first quarter, real GDP increased 6.3 percent (revised).

The GDP estimate released today is based on source data that are incomplete or subject to further revision by the source agency (see “Source Data for the Advance Estimate” on page 3). The “second” estimate for the second quarter, based on more complete data, will be released on August 26, 2021.

The increase in real GDP in the second quarter reflected increases in personal consumption expenditures (PCE), nonresidential fixed investment, exports, and state and local government spending that were partly offset by decreases in private inventory investment, residential fixed investment, and federal government spending. Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, increased (table 2).

The increase in PCE reflected increases in services (led by food services and accommodations) and goods (led by “other” nondurable goods, notably pharmaceutical products). The increase in nonresidential fixed investment reflected increases in equipment (led by transportation equipment) and intellectual property products (led by research and development). The increase in exports reflected an increase in goods (led by nonautomotive capital goods) and services (led by travel). The decrease in private inventory investment was led by a decrease in retail trade inventories. The decrease in federal government spending primarily reflected a decrease in nondefense spending on intermediate goods and services In the second quarter, nondefense services decreased as the processing and administration of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan applications by banks on behalf of the federal government declined.

Current‑dollar GDP increased 13.0 percent at an annual rate, or $684.4 billion, in the second quarter to a level of $22.72 trillion. In the first quarter, current-dollar GDP increased 10.9 percent, or $560.6 billion (revised, tables 1 and 3). More information on the source data that underlie the estimates is available in the Key Source Data and      Assumptions file on BEA’s website.

                         The price index for gross domestic purchases increased 5.7 percent in the second quarter, compared with an increase of 3.9 percent (revised) in the first quarter (table 4). The PCE price index increased 6.4 percent, compared with an increase of 3.8 percent (revised). Excluding food and energy prices, the PCE price index increased 6.1 percent, compared with an increase of 2.7 percent (revised).

                         Personal Income

                         Current-dollar personal income decreased $1.32 trillion in the second quarter, or 22.0 percent, in contrast to an increase of $2.33 trillion (revised), or 56.8 percent, in the first quarter. The decrease  primarily reflected a decrease in government social benefits related to pandemic relief programs, notably the decrease in direct economic impact payments to households established by the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act and the American Rescue Plan Act (table 8). Additional information on factors impacting personal income can be found in Effects of Selected Federal Pandemic Response Programs on Personal Income.

                         Disposable personal income decreased $1.42 trillion, or 26.1 percent, in the second quarter, in contrast to an increase of $2.27 trillion, or 63.7 percent (revised), in the first quarter. Real disposable personal income decreased 30.6 percent, in contrast to an increase of 57.6 percent.

                         Personal outlays increased $680.8 billion, after increasing $538.8 billion. The increase in outlays was led by an increase in PCE for services.

                         Personal saving was $1.97 trillion in the second quarter, compared with $4.07 trillion (revised) in the first quarter.  The personal saving rate—personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income—was 10.9 percent in the second quarter, compared with 20.8 percent in the first quarter.

                         Source Data for the Advance Estimate

Information on the key source data and assumptions used in the advance estimate is provided in a Technical Note that is posted with the news release on BEA’s website. A detailed Key Source Data and Assumptions file is also posted for each release. For information on updates to GDP, see the “Additional Information” section that follows.

                         Annual Update of the National Economic Accounts

Today’s release also reflects the Annual Update of the National Income and Product Accounts; the updated Industry Economic Accounts will be released on September 30, 2021, along with the third estimate of GDP for the second quarter of 2021. The timespan of the update is the first quarter of 1999 through the first quarter of 2021 and resulted in revisions to GDP, GDI, and their major components. The reference year remains 2012. More information on the 2021 Annual Update is included in the May Survey of Current Business article, GDP and the Economy.
For the period of economic expansion from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019, real GDP increased at an annual rate of 2.3 percent, the same as previously published. For the period of economic contraction from the fourth quarter of 2019 through the second quarter of 2020, real GDP decreased at an annual rate of 19.2 percent, also the same as previously published. For the period of economic expansion from the second quarter of 2020 through the first quarter of 2021, real GDP increased at an annual rate of 14.1 percent, an upward revision of 0.1 percentage point from the previously published estimate.

With today’s release, most NIPA tables are available through BEA’s Interactive Data application on the BEA website (www.bea.gov). See Information on Updates to the National Economic Accounts for the complete table release schedule and a summary of results through 2020, which includes a discussion of methodology changes. A table showing the major current‑dollar revisions and their sources for each component of GDP, national income, and personal income is also provided. The August 2021 Survey of Current Business will contain an article describing the update in more detail.

Updates for the First Quarter of 2021

For the first quarter of 2021, real GDP is estimated to have increased 6.3 percent (table 1), 0.1 percentage point less than previously published. The revision primarily reflected downward revisions to federal government spending, state and local government spending, and exports that were partly offset by an upward revision to nonresidential fixed investment.

Real GDI is now estimated to have increased 6.3 percent in the first quarter (table 1); in the previously published estimates, first-quarter GDI was estimated to have increased 7.6 percent. The leading contributor to the downward revision was compensation, based primarily on new first-quarter wage and salary estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.

The price index for gross domestic purchases is now estimated to have increased 3.9 percent in the first quarter, 0.1 percentage point lower than previously published (table 4). The PCE price index increased 3.8 percent, 0.1 percentage point higher than previously published. Excluding food and energy prices, the PCE price index increased 2.7 percent, 0.2 percentage point higher than previously published.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Economia e Produzione Industriale

Germania. Giugno21. Prezzi alla Importazione +12.9% anno su anno. – Merkeldämmerung.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-31.

2021-07-28__ Germania - Indice dei prezzi all'Importazione (Annuale) 001

In sintesi.

– Import prices +12.9% on the same month a year earlier

– In June 2021 energy imports were 88.5% more expensive than in June 2020

– natural gas with a plus of 150.0%

– crude oil with a plus of 81.8%

– The index of export prices increased by 5.0% in June 2021 compared with the corresponding month of the preceding year

* * * * * * *

Queste cifre non ammettono repliche.

Un aumento del +12.9% dei costi dei beni importati si ripercuote immediatamente sui prezzi al consumo.

Ma l’aumento del 150% del gas naturale e dell’81.8% del greggio sono causa efficiente dell’aumento dei costi di produzione e, quindi, della inflazione.

Questa è la eredità che la Merkel lascia alla Germania.

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Destatis. Import prices in June 2021: +12.9% on June 2020

Pressrelease #360 from 28 July 2021

Import prices, June 2021

+1.6% on the previous month

+12.9% on the same month a year earlier

Export prices, June 2021

+0.8% on the previous month

+5.0% on the same month a year earlier

* * *


WIESBADEN – As reported by the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), the index of import prices increased by 12.9% in June 2021 compared with the corresponding month of the preceding year. This has been the highest year-on-year-change since October 1981 (+13.6%). In May 2021 and in April 2021 the annual rates of change were +11.8% and +10.3%, respectively. From May 2021 to June 2021 the index rose by 1.6%.

                         High price increase mainly caused by the energy price development

In June 2021 energy imports were 88.5% more expensive than in June 2020. This high rate of annual change derives from the very low prices in June 2020. The largest influence on the year-on-year rate of energy price increase in June 2021 had natural gas with a plus of 150.0% and crude oil with a plus of 81.8%.

The index of import prices, excluding crude oil and mineral oil products, increased by 9.8% in June 2021 compared with June 2020 and in comparison with May 2021 it rose by 1.3%.

The index of export prices increased by 5.0% in June 2021 compared with the corresponding month of the preceding year. This has been the highest year-on-year-change since April 1982 (+5.6%). In May 2021 and in April 2021 the annual rates of change were +4.2% and +3.3%, respectively. From May 2021 to June 2021 the index rose by 0.8%.

Pubblicato in: Brasile

Brasile. Luglio21. Indice dei prezzi al consumo, CPI, +8.59% anno su anno.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-31.

2021-07-25__ Brasile 001

Il Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) ha rilasciato il Report sul CPI brasiliano.

2021-07-25__ Brasile 002

«The IPCA – Extended National Consumer Price Index – measures the change in the cost of living of families with an average income of 1 to 40 minimum wages. ….

Differences between IPCA-15 and IPCA lie in geographic coverage and data collection period, which, for the former, starts on the 16th of the preceding month. IPCA 15 is a type of IPCA preview. ….

IPCA – Complete survey

Sidra – Tables of Results

IBGE Explains – Inflation

IPCA Calculator

*

IPCA-15 – Complete survey

Sidra – Tables of Results

IBGE Explains – Inflation»

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Brazil’s Consumer Prixe Index rises 0.72% in July, highest for the month in 17 years

In 12 months, the IPCA-15 index has advanced 8.59%, against an accumulated high of 8.13% in June and more than double of the government’s target for this year of 3.75%.

Brazil’s official inflation forecast slowed down in July but still had the highest increase for the month since 2004, with electricity and gasoline keeping up the pressure on prices.

According to data released Friday by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the Broad National Consumer Price Index-15 (IPCA-15) rose 0.72% in July, after a high of 0.83% in the previous month.

In 12 months, the IPCA-15 index has advanced 8.59%, against an accumulated high of 8.13% in June and more than double of the government’s . . .

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Unione Europea. Maggio21. Prezzi della Produzione Industriale +7.6% sul maggio20

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-30.

2021-07-30__ Eurostat. Producer prices in industry, total - monthly data 001

Nonostante strenue manovre di maquillage contabile, alla fine vien fuori che nell’Unione Europea i Prezzi della Produzione Industriale sono a maggio il +7.6% sul maggio20.

Il momento è particolarmente critico.

Unione Europea. Recovery Plan bloccato. Nemmeno un cane vuol comprare i bond europei.

ECB. Weidmann e Wunsch votano contro la Lagarde sui tassi di interesse.

Bene.

Adesso la ECB è alle corde.

L’inflazione ha superato abbondantemente il limite previsto, ed un bel giorno dovrà bene iniziare il tapering.

Sarà un giorno di pianto e stridore di denti.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Germania. Luglio21. Consumer price index, CPI, +3.8% sul Luglio20.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-30.

2021-07-30__ Germania CPI 000

In sintesi.

– +3.8% on the same month a year earlier (provisional)

– +5.4% Goods

– +11.6% energy

– +4.3% Food

– Since January 2021, the VAT rates of nearly all goods and services have been back to their previous levels

2021-07-30__ Germania CPI 001

* * * * * * *

Germania. Giugno21. PPI, Prezzi alla Produzione +8.5% anno su anno. – Destatis.

«Energy prices as a whole increased by 16.9% compared to June 2020 and by 2.2 compared to May 2021 …. National CO2-pricing that has been introduced in January 2021 on several energy products also had a great impact on the price increase of energy …. natural gas sold to industrial consumers with an annual consumption of 116 300 MWh increased by 34.1% disregarding CO2-pricing, including CO2-pricing they rose by 45.6%.»

* * *                                         

Quando i costi per l’energia salgono del 16.9% e quelli per il gas naturale del 45.6%, più che inflazione non si genera. Se poi si tenesse conto degli interessi negativi, i Contribuenti tedeschi sembrerebbero essere stati torchiati anche oltre il limite di sopportazione.

* * *


Destatis. Inflation rate expected to be +3.8% in July 2021

Pressrelease #363 from 29 July 2021

Consumer price index, July 2021:

+3.8% on the same month a year earlier (provisional)

+0.9% on the previous month (provisional)

Harmonised index of consumer prices, July 2021:

+3.1% on the same month a year earlier (provisional)

+0.5% on the previous month (provisional)

* * *

WIESBADEN – The inflation rate in Germany, measured as the year-on-year change in the consumer price index, is expected to be +3.8% in July 2021. Based on the results available so far, the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) also reports that consumer prices are expected to rise by +0.9% on June 2021.

The further increase of the inflation rate in July is caused, in particular, by a base effect: the value-added tax rates were temporarily reduced in July 2020 on account of the coronavirus crisis. Since January 2021, the VAT rates of nearly all goods and services have been back to their previous levels. It is very difficult to quantify the base effect precisely as there are other effects such as CO₂ pricing and the usual market developments. Arithmetically, the effect of the value-added tax reduction in July 2020 amounted to -1.6 percentage points.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo

Italia. Giugno21. Prezzi alla produzione dell’industria, PPI, +9.1% su giugno20.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-30.

2021-07-30__ Italia PPI 001

«L’Indice dei Prezzi al Produttore (PPI) è un indicatore inflazionistico che misura la variazione media dei prezzi di vendita ricevuto dai produttori nazionali di beni e servizi in Italia.

IL PPI misura la variazione di prezzo dal punto di vista del venditore.

Il PPI guarda tre aree di produzione: basata sull’industria, basata sulle commodities e basata sulle compagnie che compiono i processi di trasformazione.

Quando i produttori pagano di più per beni e servizi, che sono suscettibili a superare i maggiori costi per il consumatore, così il PPI è pensato per essere un indicatore importante di inflazione al consumo»

2021-07-30__ Italia PPI 002

* * * * * * *

Istat. Prezzi alla produzione dell’industria e delle costruzioni

A giugno 2021 i prezzi alla produzione dell’industria aumentano dell’1,4% su base mensile e del 9,1% su base annua.

Sul mercato interno i prezzi crescono dell’1,7% rispetto a maggio e dell’11,0% su base annua. Al netto del comparto energetico, i prezzi registrano un aumento meno marcato sia a livello congiunturale (+1,0%) sia a livello tendenziale (+5,2%).

Sul mercato estero i prezzi aumentano su base mensile dello 0,9% (+1,1% area euro, +0,8% area non euro) e registrano un incremento su base annua del 4,4% (+5,0% area euro, +4,0% area non euro).

Nel secondo trimestre 2021, rispetto al trimestre precedente, i prezzi alla produzione dell’industria crescono del 3,4%. La dinamica congiunturale è più sostenuta sul mercato interno (+3,7%) rispetto a quello estero (+2,2%).

A giugno 2021, con riferimento al comparto manifatturiero, si rilevano aumenti tendenziali per quasi tutti i settori; i più marcati riguardano coke e prodotti petroliferi raffinati (+30,3% mercato interno, +51,3% area non euro), metallurgia e fabbricazione di prodotti in metallo (+14,6% mercato interno, +20,4% area euro, +15,5% area non euro) e prodotti chimici (+9,3% mercato interno, +6,8% area euro). Le uniche flessioni, per altro di entità contenuta, interessano computer e prodotti di elettronica e ottica (-1,0% sul mercato interno), mezzi di trasporto e prodotti farmaceutici di base e preparati farmaceutici (rispettivamente, -0,6% e -0,1% per l’area non euro).

A giugno 2021 i prezzi alla produzione delle costruzioni per “Edifici residenziali e non residenziali” crescono dell’1,0% su base mensile e del 4,5% su base annua. I prezzi di “Strade e Ferrovie” aumentano dell’1,2% in termini congiunturali e del 4,0% in termini tendenziali.

* * *

                         Il commento.

A giugno, prosegue la forte crescita dei prezzi alla produzione dell’industria, diffusa a quasi tutti i settori e più sostenuta sul mercato interno. Su base annua, i prezzi si confermano in accelerazione (+9,1%, da +8,1% di maggio), spinti soprattutto dai marcati incrementi di energia e beni intermedi. Coke e prodotti petroliferi raffinati, metallurgia e fabbricazione dei prodotti in metallo e prodotti chimici sono i settori che forniscono i maggiori contributi alla crescita. Anche per le costruzioni, i prezzi alla produzione continuano a segnare aumenti congiunturali, con rialzi di entità simili per edifici e strade; per entrambi, la crescita tendenziale accelera ulteriormente.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Stati Uniti

Inflazione. Un fenomeno complesso. 35 parametri importanti per valutarla. – Bloomberg.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-29.

Andrà tutto bene 001

Bloomberg ammette che l’inflazione esiste e che sta crescendo, ma secondo il suo punto di vista non c’è proprio nulla da temere. Nulla di nulla.

L’articolo allegato è molto lungo e denso: ne estrarremo solo i punti più significativi, ma il commento verterà l’intero testo.

*

«Inflation is here — These 35 metrics tell you how much to worry»

«A year ago, the Covid-19 pandemic crushed prices in many parts of the U.S. economy. As expected, that has created inflation 12 months on as the economy reopens and rebounds»

«No one disputes that inflation has arrived. The question is where it’s heading»

«The most basic fact is that June’s “headline” consumer price index, including everything the government puts in its representative basket of products and services that Americans buy, stands at 5.4%, the highest in 30 years barring one month in the summer of 2008 when oil reached nearly $150 per barrel»

«Those numbers would seem to validate the doomsayers»

«Yet bond markets and economists take the opposite view»

«The bond market’s best estimate of the average inflation rate for the next 10 years»

«The yield curve — the extra yield that investors demand for 10-year bonds rather than 2-year bonds, which generally rises when people expect higher inflation — is now below 1%»

«Inflation is a complex phenomenon that grows from many places. These 35 key measures offer up a more nuanced picture of how markets are positioned»

«Distance from 10-year average, with one standard deviation providing the upper- and lower-end range for a “normal” score»

«Flashing alarmingly bright are the official data, as well as surveys of businesses and consumers»

«Resolution should come in two categories that remain finely balanced: prices and wages»

«the raw industrials index, which includes basic commodities that aren’t in the futures markets, continues to rise and is nearing its historic top from more than a decade ago»

«the pay of low-skilled workers is picking up and employers are complaining that they cannot fill jobs, which could imply wage inflation ahead»

«The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, the Core PCE deflator, is also at its highest level since 1992»

«But it will still be a relief if next month’s data can show a significant retreat in some of the sectors that were hit by extreme inflation.»

«The crucial measures for monetary policy are the official government measures of inflation, mostly published monthly»

«The Consumer Price Index (CPI) includes everything in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ basket.»

«The Producer Price Index (PPI) measures prices paid by producers for making goods»

«Core CPI excludes fuel and food prices, which are more variable than most and, to an extent, beyond the reach of monetary policy»

«The Trimmed Mean CPI is another measure of “core” inflation in which the biggest outliers in both directions are excluded»

«Finally, the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) Deflator, which is compiled as part of the calculations for GDP, is the measure most closely watched by the Fed»

«It takes into account an even broader range of prices and is based on surveys of businesses rather than consumers»

«Collecting inflation numbers is a massive statistical endeavor»

«Many claim that the basket of goods in the CPI is biased in some way but this is a tad unfair»

«→→ Housing prices are immensely important and can have knock-on effects on wage demands and other prices ←←»

«College tuition has long inflated far faster than the rest of the economy, so we look at it in isolation»

«Medicinal drugs are a hot-button issue where rising prices would hurt the neediest»

* * * * * * *

Si concorda pienamente con Bloomberg che il fenomeno inflattivo sia molto complesso e non esprimibile con un unico parametro, anche se il Producer Price Index (PPI) ed il Consumer Price Index (CPI) siano soddisfacenti per quanti desiderino seguire quanto accade, senza addentrarsi in analisi del sistema economico.

Un aspetto da tener sempre presente è che il CPI dipende strettamente dal paniere di riferimento, che, per esempio, nei pesi occidentali, non tiene conto dei costi legati alla casa, sia di acquisto, sia di affitto, sia di manutenzione ordinaria o straordinaria. Eppure questa voce incide severamente sui bilanci casalinghi. Nei paesi europei, poi, vi compaiono beni da tempo non più acquistati.

A nostro sommesso parere, la pandemia avrebbe influito ben poco sul processo inflattivo, checché ne dicano economisti e media.

Negli ultimi tempi i costi estrattivi sono aumentati vertiginosamente. Un esempio per tutti, il carbone.

Carbone. Dai 46.9$ per tonnellata a settembre agli attuali 148.6$.

I prezzi delle materie prime sono quasi raddoppiati nel volgere di un anno ed i paesi produttori tendono a vendere il loro estratto quasi solamente a paesi amici.

Su questa variabile le banche centrali sono impotenti, e saremmo propensi a considerarla concausa primaria della inflazione. Sempre a nostro sommesso parere, la pandemia ha influito ben poco.

*


Inflation Is Here — These 35 Metrics Tell You How Much to Worry

A year ago, the Covid-19 pandemic crushed prices in many parts of the U.S. economy. As expected, that has created inflation 12 months on as the economy reopens and rebounds. Now the market seems to believe that a resurgence of the pandemic will rein in inflation before it grows out of control. No one disputes that inflation has arrived. The question is where it’s heading.

The most basic fact is that June’s “headline” consumer price index, including everything the government puts in its representative basket of products and services that Americans buy, stands at 5.4%, the highest in 30 years barring one month in the summer of 2008 when oil reached nearly $150 per barrel. Exclude food and fuel, always variable, and inflation still comes in at 4.5% — its highest in three decades by far. Even if the most extreme movers both up and down are stripped out, inflation stands at 2.9%, its worst since 1992 (barring a few months of very expensive oil). Those numbers would seem to validate the doomsayers.

Yet bond markets and economists take the opposite view. They see inflation not only coming under control but eventually falling to levels lower than before the pandemic hit. The bond market’s best estimate of the average inflation rate for the next 10 years stands at 2.3%, which is roughly where it’s been for four months even as other numbers have gotten worse. The yield curve — the extra yield that investors demand for 10-year bonds rather than 2-year bonds, which generally rises when people expect higher inflation — is now below 1%. That’s less than its average for the last decade, a period when inflation hasn’t been a problem. Indeed, it’s no higher than it was in February.

Either market players remain confident that the Federal Reserve can keep rising prices under control, or they’re worried the economy won’t keep growing fast enough to push inflation numbers higher. Those concerns are definitely increasing as the delta variant shows its ability to slow economic reopening.

Our dashboard of indicators aims to add clarity to this debate. Inflation is a complex phenomenon that grows from many places. These 35 key measures offer up a more nuanced picture of how markets are positioned, what the official data say and what consumers and businesses are discounting. Numbers are current as of Monday, July 19 and will be updated weekly.

                         Authers’ Indicators

*Distance from 10-year average, with one standard deviation providing the upper- and lower-end range for a “normal” score. A Z-score equal to 0 represents an average value.

Flashing alarmingly bright are the official data, as well as surveys of businesses and consumers. The latest survey by the National Federation of Independent Business, of prices paid by small companies, is at a level it last reached all the way back in the first quarter of 1981. Yet showing no concern at all are market indicators and Bloomberg’s surveys of expert economists’ predictions. Both are below their averages for the last decade.

Resolution should come in two categories that remain finely balanced: prices and wages. These factors drove inflation higher in the 1970s and could do so again. Prices of futures for oil, agriculture and metals have all given up ground after rising very sharply from last year’s lows. But the raw industrials index, which includes basic commodities that aren’t in the futures markets, continues to rise and is nearing its historic top from more than a decade ago.

Meanwhile, although wage growth remains well within its recent ranges, the pay of low-skilled workers is picking up and employers are complaining that they cannot fill jobs, which could imply wage inflation ahead. The decisive factor could be if a new pandemic-related downturn weakens demand, as well as the hand of labor, again. That would be bad news, but at least it would avert an extended bout of inflation.

                         Official Measures Are Still Rising

June’s inflation data delivered a third nasty shock in succession. The Fed’s preferred measure of inflation, the Core PCE deflator, is also at its highest level since 1992. Meanwhile, headline inflation (including fuel and food) is at 5% for the first time since the oil price spike of 2008. Producer price inflation is also high. These are sudden moves and the more muted rise in the “trimmed mean” measure, which excludes goods that have suffered the most extreme changes in price, suggests that it is indeed mainly a transitory effect from the pandemic. But it will still be a relief if next month’s data can show a significant retreat in some of the sectors that were hit by extreme inflation.

                         Why these indicators?

The crucial measures for monetary policy are the official government measures of inflation, mostly published monthly. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) includes everything in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ basket. The Producer Price Index (PPI) measures prices paid by producers for making goods. Core CPI excludes fuel and food prices, which are more variable than most and, to an extent, beyond the reach of monetary policy. The Trimmed Mean CPI is another measure of “core” inflation in which the biggest outliers in both directions are excluded, with the average taken of the rest; this can compensate for the fact that prices in many products are “lumpy” and can in practice only be raised once or twice a year. Finally, the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) Deflator, which is compiled as part of the calculations for GDP, is the measure most closely watched by the Fed. It takes into account an even broader range of prices and is based on surveys of businesses rather than consumers.

                         Sanity Returns to Some Sectors

There is deepening concern over shelter inflation, the single biggest component of the CPI index, which is now up to 2.3% and will likely rise further as higher house prices pull up rents in their wake. This will be particularly closely watched. But the most extreme transitory effects of the pandemic are otherwise beginning to ease. Car rental prices, for example, are now “only” 88% higher than they were 12 months ago, having previously topped 100%. Several sectors which suffered a deflationary blow from the pandemic are still not seeing prices recover. Recreation inflation is still negative. And — heaven be praised — college-tuition inflation remains close to its lowest since records began in 1979, although it did tick up slightly in June. It is still just about possible to sustain an optimistic narrative that the pandemic caused extraordinary inflation in some pockets of the economy but might have brought sanity to others where prices had grown prohibitive.

                         Why these indicators?

Collecting inflation numbers is a massive statistical endeavor. Many claim that the basket of goods in the CPI is biased in some way but this is a tad unfair, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides a breakdown of inflation for all the categories it follows. Housing prices are immensely important and can have knock-on effects on wage demands and other prices. College tuition has long inflated far faster than the rest of the economy, so we look at it in isolation. Two sectors (car rentals and recreation) were hard-hit by the pandemic and can be expected to enjoy sharp-but-transitory rebounds. Medicinal drugs are a hot-button issue where rising prices would hurt the neediest.

                         The Bond Market Is No Longer Worried

The bond market, where traders make their most precise predictions of inflation, has been in flux all year. Four months ago, 5-year breakevens topped 2.75%, virtually matching their high during the 2008 oil price spike. Since then they have dropped below 2.4%, although the latest data returned them to 2.6% — higher than they were at any point between 2010 and 2020. Meanwhile, expectations for the years from 2026 to 2031 have fallen to 2.16%, suggesting confidence that the Fed will be able to rein in inflation over the next five years. The heat map is based on the 20-day moving average of the breakevens, to avoid being too affected by day-to-day movements, which have been violent in the last few weeks. Nobody is positioned for the Fed to lose control of inflation anytime soon, nor for Germany or Japan to snap out of their disinflationary malaise.

Why these indicators?

Every day the market is revising its working estimates of inflation and the bond market gives us precise estimates, through the gap between yields on fixed and inflation-linked bonds. Central banks watch breakevens very closely, as they are driven by experts with real money at stake. In the U.S., we follow projections for average inflation over the next five years and (through the 5-year/5-year breakeven) the five years after that. The wider the gap between 2-year and 10-year bond yields (known as the yield curve), the higher inflation is expected to be. Finally, deflationary psychology has ravaged Germany for years and Japan for decades; we look at expectations for them over the next 10 years.

                         Businesses Still Sounding the Alarm

These numbers offer perhaps the greatest support for the case that inflation is a near and present danger. All are way above their ranges for the last decade. The small business survey shows inflation expectations at their highest in four decades, while the Institute for Supply Management numbers are at post-2008 highs and still rising in the latest number produced at the beginning of July — although the survey for the services sector did show a slight decline. Consumer expectations have also risen very sharply, to their highest since the commodity price spike before the financial crisis, with the latest Conference Board survey reaching a fresh high for this cycle. This could be transitory but, if so, the numbers need to come down soon.

                         Why these indicators?

If consumers expect higher prices in the surveys conducted by the University of Michigan and the Conference Board, this will be reflected in higher demand now and in higher wage demands, both of which will tend to press inflation upwards. The National Federation of Independent Business survey of the proportion of small-business executives bracing for higher prices and the Institute for Supply Management supply managers’ survey of the prices that larger businesses say they are paying have both proved to be great leading indicators in the past. In all cases, these numbers can prove to be self-fulfilling prophecies, which is why they are monitored so closely.

                         No Clear Picture From Commodity Prices

Rising commodity prices represent exactly the kind of inflation that can attack living standards. But, given the economic collapse a year ago and the rush by speculators to get a leveraged play on the rebound, they don’t give firm evidence of inflation that is more than transitory. Metals prices are about 6% below their May peak, while energy prices have also dropped by about 6% as the OPEC+ cartel tries to sort out its problems; it’s not at all clear the latter are locked into an inflationary expansion. One increasingly ominous warning sign comes from the Commodities Research Board raw industrials index, which covers basic commodities that aren’t in the futures market. In theory, these prices should be driven by supply-and-demand dynamics in the real world, not by ebbs and flows of emotion in the markets. The index has gained more than 50% in a year and is nearing an all-time high.

                         Why these indicators?

Inflation shows up first in the price of raw materials and futures markets capture those changes by the second. Bloomberg futures indexes for industrial metals, agricultural commodities and energy thus provide a good real-time indicator of inflationary pressures. Earlier this year, lumber futures were gripped by a huge price spike; this has now reversed as sawmills increased production, but needed to be monitored as lumber was central to early arguments that inflation was returning. The Commodities Research Board’s RIND index covers raw materials such as burlap, tallow and lard that are not tied to futures. If the futures indexes are being driven by speculation rather than genuine inflationary pressure, you would expect to see this index lagging them; the reverse is the case at present.

                         Low-Skilled Wages Are Picking Up

Wage inflation is a crucial driver of inflation and, from the official data, it appears to be under control despite a number of factors that would normally drive salaries and wages upwards. Most measures of wage inflation are running below their average for the last five years, with the Atlanta Fed putting overall wage growth at 3.2%. Yet, job vacancies are at an all-time record, while small businesses complain that they have never found it harder to recruit workers. This suggests a problem with skill mismatches coming out of the recession. At the same time, while average hourly earnings have been quite variable over the last few months, the latest number shows them increasing at the fastest rate since 2009. The ongoing wage tracker kept by the Atlanta Fed shows that wage inflation for low-skilled workers has reached 3.6%, close to its highest since the global financial crisis. The National Federation of Independent Business finds the highest proportion of its members raising pay since they started asking the question in 1984.

Why these indicators?

Higher wages raise costs for companies, which they want to pass on to customers. They also put more money in the pockets of consumers. Although often much to be desired, wage inflation is thus a direct driver of price inflation. Average hourly earnings can be affected by composition — they rose early during the pandemic, for instance, because layoffs disproportionately hit the low-paid — so we include both weekly and hourly figures. The Atlanta Fed produces a handy “nowcast” survey of wage trends for both high- and low-skilled workers, while the National Federation of Independent Business survey tracks how many small businesses are raising rather than cutting pay. This figure hit a record high just before the pandemic and has nearly returned to the same level.

                         Economists More Worried About Deflation

Broadly, the consensus is that the Fed, like other central banks, will get what it wants. The Fed is forecasting Core PCE (personal consumption expenditure) of 3% for this year but expects it to decline to 2% in 2023; in other words, it will be transitory. The experts are less anxious for now and think it will reach 2.5% this year and decline in the two following years — more or less perfect for the Fed, which is prepared to let inflation “run hot.” German inflation, after a bobble this year, is expected to fall back to 1.7% in 2023; there’s no sign of a new reflationary cycle there or in Japan, or even China. Whatever markets say, the experts are still more worried about deflation.

Why these indicators?

The forecasts by economic experts greatly impact government planning and policy, and also affect decisions by companies. Bloomberg’s survey offers as good an estimate as we’re going to get of “received expert wisdom” and also shows the spread of opinion into the future.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

IMF. Aumento delle materie prime e delle spese per la casa spingono l’inflazione.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-29.

Andrà tutto bene 001

«More persistent supply disruptions and sharply rising housing prices are some of the factors that could lead to persistently high inflation.»

«IMF warns that inflation could prove to be persistent and central banks may need to act»

«Higher prices increase the chances that central banks will start to curb their ultra-accommodative monetary policies, such as a tapering of market-friendly stimulus like asset purchases»

«if the U.S. were to provide more fiscal support then this could increase inflationary pressures even further and lead to a hike in interest rates earlier-than-expected»

«The International Monetary Fund warned Tuesday that there’s a risk inflation will prove to be more than just transitory, pushing central banks to take pre-emptive action»

«The issue is currently dividing the investment community, which has been busy contemplating whether a recent surge in consumer prices is here to stay»

«In the U.S., the consumer price index came in at 5.4% in June»

«For the most part, the Washington-based institution sees these price pressures as transitory»

«There is however a risk that transitory pressures could become more persistent and central banks may need to take preemptive action»

«Speaking earlier this month, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said the jobs market was “still a ways off” from where the central bank would like to see it before it reduces stimulus»

«Global recovery is ‘not assured’»

«The recovery, however, is not assured even in countries where infections are currently very low»

* * * * * * *

Lo International Monetary Fund prende atto di una inflazioni persistente ed in crescita, sostenuta dagli aumenti dei costi delle materie prime e da quelli per la casa.

Alla fine si è smesso di incolpare il Covid-19 quale causa di ogni male.

Il tapering, così osteggiato dagli investitori di assalto, sta avvicinandosi a grandi passi.

Allora sì che si vedrà la Harris-Biden Administration rosolarsi alla fiamma viva dei suoi insuccessi economici.

Quanto accaduto in Texas dovrebbe dare da pensare.

* * * * * * *



IMF warns that inflation could prove to be persistent and central banks may need to act

– Higher prices increase the chances that central banks will start to curb their ultra-accommodative monetary policies, such as a tapering of market-friendly stimulus like asset purchases.

– The IMF had already pointed out that if the U.S. were to provide more fiscal support then this could increase inflationary pressures even further and lead to a hike in interest rates earlier-than-expected.

– The IMF on Tuesday kept its global growth forecast at 6% for 2021, but it revised its expectations for 2022.

*

The International Monetary Fund warned Tuesday that there’s a risk inflation will prove to be more than just transitory, pushing central banks to take pre-emptive action.

The issue is currently dividing the investment community, which has been busy contemplating whether a recent surge in consumer prices is here to stay. In the U.S., the consumer price index came in at 5.4% in June — the fastest pace in almost 13 years. In the U.K., the inflation rate reached 2.5% in June — the highest level since August 2018 and above the Bank of England’s target of 2%.

For the most part, the Washington-based institution sees these price pressures as transitory. “Inflation is expected to return to its pre-pandemic ranges in most countries in 2022,” the Fund said in its latest World Economic Outlook update released Tuesday.

However, it warned that “uncertainty remains high.”

“There is however a risk that transitory pressures could become more persistent and central banks may need to take preemptive action,” the IMF said.

Higher prices increase the chances that central banks will start to curb their ultra-accommodative monetary policies, such as a tapering of market-friendly stimulus like asset purchases.

Speaking earlier this month, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said the jobs market was “still a ways off” from where the central bank would like to see it before it reduces stimulus. He added that inflation would “likely remain elevated in coming months before moderating.”

The IMF had already pointed out earlier this month that if the U.S. were to provide more fiscal support then this could increase inflationary pressures even further and lead to a hike in interest rates earlier-than-expected.

IMF Chief Economist Gita Gopinath said in a blogpost Tuesday that “more persistent supply disruptions and sharply rising housing prices are some of the factors that could lead to persistently high inflation.”

She also warned that “inflation is expected to remain elevated into 2022 in some emerging market and developing economies, related in part to continued food price pressures and currency depreciations.”

Global recovery is ‘not assured’

The IMF on Tuesday kept its global growth forecast at 6% for 2021, but it revised its expectations for 2022.

Instead of a gross domestic product rate of 4.4%, as predicted in April; the Fund now sees a growth rate of 4.9% next year.

“The 0.5 percentage point upgrade for 2022 derives largely from the forecast upgrade for advanced economies, particularly the United States, reflecting the anticipated legislation of additional fiscal support in the second half of 2021 and improved health metrics more broadly across the group,” the IMF said.

However, the outlook is dependent on the coronavirus vaccination campaigns. 

According to Our World in Data, 13.81% of the global population is fully vaccinated against Covid-19 and 13.46% are partially inoculated. This shows the stark difference between advanced and developing economies.

In the U.K. and Canada, more than 54% of all citizens are fully vaccinated. In South Africa, that number drops to 3.9% and in Egypt to 1.57%.

“Vaccine access has emerged as the principal fault line along which the global recovery splits into two blocs: those that can look forward to further normalization of activity later this year (almost all advanced economies) and those that will still face resurgent infections and rising COVID death tolls,” the Fund said.

“The recovery, however, is not assured even in countries where infections are currently very low so long as the virus circulates elsewhere,” the IMF warned.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Ideologia liberal, Stati Uniti

Multinazionali rigettano la politica estera della Harris-Biden Administration.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-29.

Lutero. 95 Tesi 001

«A bipartisan Congressional panel blasted U.S.-based corporate sponsors of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics on Tuesday, including Coca-Cola, Visa Inc. and Airbnb, accusing them of putting profits ahead of accusations of genocide in China»

«Republican Congressman Chris Smith told the Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing that the sponsors needed to reconcile their “ostensible commitment to human rights” with subsidizing an Olympics where the host country is “actively committing human rights abuses”»

«All of them declined to opine, or said they had no responsibility over site selection»

«We do not make decisions on these host locations. We support and follow the athletes wherever they compete»

«When asked about the U.S. government determination that China was committing a genocide against Uyghurs and other Muslims minority groups, only Steve Rodgers, executive vice president and general counsel for Intel, said he believed it»

«I’ve read the State Department report. I’ve studied it, and I believe its conclusions»

«Other executives said they respected the U.S. government’s conclusions, but would not weigh in on the matter»

«China denies wrongdoing, saying it has set up vocational training centers to combat extremism»

«Obviously, every one of you, with the exception on occasion of Mr. Rodgers, was sent here with orders not to say anything that could offend the Chinese Communist Party»

«Democratic Representative Tom Malinowski rebuked Airbnb’s head of Olympics and Paralympics partnership David Holyoke for not being more outspoken about criticism toward the Chinese government that it has prevented Uyghurs and Tibetans from obtaining passports and identification cards»

«→→ In China we are required to follow local laws and regulations ←←»

«You’re just completely absolving yourself of responsibility for being complicit in abject discrimination»

«Malinowski noted that Coca-Cola was willing to wade into U.S. politics and condemn voting rights restrictions in its home state of Georgia, but would not criticize China’s government»

«→→ You are afraid of them in a way that you are not afraid of critics in the United States ←←»

«it was “absolutely clear” that the company refused to criticize Beijing for fear it would harm its profits in China.»

* * * * * * *

Nel 2022 si dovrebbero tenere in Cina le Olimpiadi Invernali, Beijing Winter Olympics.

Questa è una ghiotta occasione per le multinazionali che le sponsorizzano per aumentare la propria visibilità ed anche per migliorare la propria penetrazione nel promettente mercato cinese.

Ma per poter operare in Cina, e continuare a farlo, le multinazionale devono obbedire alle leggi locali.

«→→ In China we are required to follow local laws and regulations ←←»

Queste multinazionali sono in netta opposizione alla politica estera dell’attuale Harris-Biden Administration, la quale giornalmente condanna la Cina per presunte violazioni degli human rights, intendendo per essi ciò che prescrive l’ideologia liberal. Secondo i congressisti, le multinazionali avrebbero dovuto boicottare le Beijing Winter Olympics, cosa questa dalla quale se ne guardano più che bene.

L’eterogenesi dei fini è quasi sempre implacabile.

Biden attacca nuovamente la Cina e questa replica al vetriolo.

Cina. Un j’accuse ferocemente e brutalmente rude, e vero, contro gli Stati Uniti.

«China would not accept the United States taking a “superior” position in the relationship»

Bene.

Questo comportamento è causa efficiente di una sempre più evidente frattura tra la Harris-Biden Administration ed il mondo del lavoro e dell’industria, sottominando la concordia e coerenza nazionale: l’industria rinnega infatti questa crociata ideologica e si comporta così in modo autonomo.

Ma midterm si sta avvicinando, e le elargizioni dell’industria sarebbero fondamentali per il partito democratico.

*


‘Pathetic and disgraceful’: U.S. lawmakers blast Coca-Cola, Visa and others over Beijing Olympics

WASHINGTON, July 27 (Reuters) – A bipartisan Congressional panel blasted U.S.-based corporate sponsors of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics on Tuesday, including Coca-Cola, Visa Inc. and Airbnb, accusing them of putting profits ahead of accusations of genocide in China.

Republican Congressman Chris Smith told the Congressional-Executive Commission on China hearing that the sponsors needed to reconcile their “ostensible commitment to human rights” with subsidizing an Olympics where the host country is “actively committing human rights abuses”.

Smith asked each of the executives at the hearing – from Airbnb, Coca-Cola, Intel, Visa Inc and Procter & Gamble – whether the games should be relocated or postponed due to concerns over human rights violations. All of them declined to opine, or said they had no responsibility over site selection.

“We do not make decisions on these host locations. We support and follow the athletes wherever they compete,” Coca-Cola’s global vice president for human rights Paul Lalli said.

When asked about the U.S. government determination that China was committing a genocide against Uyghurs and other Muslims minority groups, only Steve Rodgers, executive vice president and general counsel for Intel, said he believed it.

“I’ve read the State Department report. I’ve studied it, and I believe its conclusions,” Rodgers said, drawing praise from Republican Senator Tom Cotton for his “straight answer.”

Other executives said they respected the U.S. government’s conclusions, but would not weigh in on the matter.

The executives represent the five U.S. companies that have sponsorship commitments running through the Beijing Games under the official Olympic Partner (TOP) Program.

Rights groups, researchers, former residents and some Western lawmakers and officials say Chinese authorities have facilitated forced labor by detaining around a million Uyghurs and other primarily Muslim minorities in camps since 2016.

President Joe Biden’s administration agreed with a determination by the former Trump administration that the detention camps and other abuses amounted to genocide.

China denies wrongdoing, saying it has set up vocational training centers to combat extremism. The Chinese Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to an emailed request for comment.

“Obviously, every one of you, with the exception on occasion of Mr. Rodgers, was sent here with orders not to say anything that could offend the Chinese Communist Party,” Cotton said, calling testimony at the hearing “pathetic and disgraceful”.

Democratic Representative Tom Malinowski rebuked Airbnb’s head of Olympics and Paralympics partnership David Holyoke for not being more outspoken about criticism toward the Chinese government that it has prevented Uyghurs and Tibetans from obtaining passports and identification cards that would allow them to travel freely and register at hotels.

“In China we are required to follow local laws and regulations,” Holyoke said, adding that “human rights are core to our values.”

“You’re just completely absolving yourself of responsibility for being complicit in abject discrimination,” Malinowski said.

Asked repeatedly by Malinowski if Coca-Cola would specifically condemn any Chinese government abuses against Uyghurs, Lalli said without mentioning China: “We respect all human rights.”

Malinowski noted that Coca-Cola was willing to wade into U.S. politics and condemn voting rights restrictions in its home state of Georgia, but would not criticize China’s government.

“You are afraid of them in a way that you are not afraid of critics in the United States. I think that’s shameful,” Malinowski told Lalli, adding that it was “absolutely clear” that the company refused to criticize Beijing for fear it would harm its profits in China.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Unione Europea. Recovery Plan bloccato. Nemmeno un cane vuol comprare i bond europei.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-28.

denaro-in-fuga-001

Eppure l’Unione Europea è guidata da tre, sedicenti, femmine: Lagarde, von der Leyen e Merkel, ossia il culmine dell’evoluzione, celebrato ed osannato da ogni liberal di retta dottrina.

Tradotto in parole comprensibili, il Recovery Plan avrebbe dovuto essere finanziato tramite la emissioni di bond europei, ossia contraendo un altro prestito, ma nemmeno un cane rognoso e senza denti li vuole acquistare. Questa è la verità che nessun media osa dire.

Niente soldi: tutto fermo.

Il resto sono vane parole senza senso.

Il Green Deal “Fit-for-55” giace come una medusa bolsa sulla battigia, in attesa di spirare per morte naturale.

L’elefantiasico progetto delle gigafactory per le auto entrerà nei trattati di psichiatria come esempio di delirio coatto collettivo.

Gli stati si sono spartiti il nulla.

Solo la inflazione cresce rigogliosa.

* * * * * * *


Sorpresa, l’Ue rimanda le decisioni per trovare i soldi del Recovery plan

I 750 miliardi di euro del Recovery plan, almeno nelle “sovvenzioni” da 338 miliardi di euro, dovevano essere finanziati in parte da nuove “risorse proprie”, tra cui la web tax sui giganti digitali e la tassa CO2 alle frontiere.

Il calendario prevedeva che a metà luglio ci fossero proposte approvate in Commissione europea, per poi procedere nel loro iter, che avrebbe dovuto concludersi entro il 2022. Invece, in conferenza stampa il 19 luglio, la Commissione europea ha comunicato di rinviare tutto il pacchetto all’autunno.

D’altra parte, l’agenda di luglio è già stata pesantina. L’approvazione del pacchetto legislativo del Green Deal “Fit-for-55” del 14 luglio è passata con un voto difficile a maggioranza nella Commissione europea. Il pacchetto è studiato, articolato e ambizioso ma capace di sollevare forti critiche e da più parti, dalle industrie automobilistiche ad alcuni Stati, che devono affrontare gigantesche riconversioni (le gigafactory per le auto, il carbone in diversi Paesi dell’est) o politici, per i settori sociali che possono rispondere con la protesta politica ai cambiamenti in corso, come si era visto per i costi energetici-ambientali all’origine delle proteste dei gilet gialli

Dopo il Fit-for-55 la Commissione avrebbe dovuto approvare anche un pacchetto sulle risorse proprie. Si ricorderà il passo di marcia con cui sono state approvate le ratifiche dei parlamenti nazionali sul Recovery e sulle risorse proprie, che si erano concluse il 27 maggio. La corsa contro il tempo serviva per poter chiedere soldi al mercato ma anche per le decisioni di luglio.

Per quanto riguarda la web tax, la frenata è dovuta principalmente al contesto internazionale. Il 16 marzo 2021, i ministri in formato Ecofin, avevano stabilito che la web tax europea sarebbe rimasta distinta dalla tassazione discussa in ambito Ocse, e avevano scritto il calendario delle azioni successive. Il Consiglio europeo del 25 marzo aveva ricollegato i due percorsi e detto che avrebbe adottato la propria web tax se l’Ocse non avesse fatto progressi al riguardo entro la metà del 2021. Così proprio l’accordo al G20 a Venezia del 9 luglio sulla minimum tax del 15% – così ben accolto dai media – ha sostanzialmente spento lo slancio europeo sulla propria web tax.

Da parte statunitense si è fatto ben capire che non sarebbe stato il caso di tassare due volte i giganti del web, anche se per la verità la tassa europea, così come disegnata il 16 marzo dai ministri dell’economia, andava avanti nella convinzione che quella globale o dell’Ocse non sarebbe mai arrivata. In ogni caso, la segretaria al Tesoro statunitense, Janet Yellen, ha ottenuto un rinvio di principio durante il suo incontro con i ministri Ecofin del 12 luglio a Bruxelles.

Poi c’è la tassa CO2 alle frontiere (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism), che è stata approvata come proposta legislativa in Commissione il 14 luglio all’interno del Fit-for-55. Essa compenserebbe alla dogana il vantaggio commerciale di merci estere prodotte con standard di contrasto al cambiamento climatico inferiori a quelli europei. È un modo per autofinanziarsi ma anche di sollecitare i partner commerciali dell’UE all’attuazione all’Accordo di Parigi sul clima del 2015. Tuttavia, a parte la Russia e la Cina, anche gli Stati Uniti riconoscono che le loro politiche sulla decarbonizzazione sono in ritardo su quelle europee. Si accenna a possibili contromisure e dazi, con i danni corrispondenti per l’Europa. È una partita che dovrebbe quindi coinvolgere l’Organizzazione mondiale del commercio (WTO/OMC).

Inoltre, ci sono frizioni anche tra gli Stati membri: i Paesi frugali (Austria, Danimarca, paesi Bassi e Svezia) tentennavano sulle risorse proprie, fonte di possibili sprechi. Per alcuni Stati, tali risorse sono sia un vantaggio perché sollevano di un po’ il carico dai bilanci nazionali, sia una preoccupazione perché riducono il potere statale su quel denaro, per quanto limitato. La Germania rimane preoccupata sulle esportazioni, in caso di dazi di Paesi terzi contrariati. E così tra web tax e tassa CO2 alle frontiere, il 19 luglio la Commissione ha deciso di “rinviare all’autunno”.

Bisogna ricostruire calendario e approccio politico, vedere come evolve la minimum tax del G20. L’Ue si aspettava un paio di miliardi all’anno dalla web tax, e 9 miliardi all’anno dalla tassa CO2 alle frontiere.

L’Europa, dovrà iniziare a rimborsare il debito dei 750 miliardi di euro dal 2028 e fino al 2058. La parte prestiti da 385,5 mld verrà dagli Stati membri interessati, la parte sovvenzioni da 338 mld dal bilancio comunitario. Vi è sempre l’ambizione di rendere operative le nuove imposizioni dall’inizio del 2023, così da alimentare il proprio bilancio e dunque il rimborso del Recovery Plan. A Bruxelles, alcuni consideravano già poco realistico il calendario di approvazione entro il 2022, considerati gli interessi in gioco.

Viceversa, un po’ a spauracchio, si dice che altrimenti si dovrà chiedere agli Stati membri di finanziare il prestito per la parte sovvenzioni. Politicamente già suona molto male: alcuni Paesi prendono centinaia di miliardi, mentre il ricarico avverrebbe in base al Pil, con Stati che dunque ne finanzierebbero altri senza averlo di fatto approvato.