Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Finanza e Sistema Bancario

Mercati asiatici nei triboli.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela

2018-02-09.


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Asia stock markets drop sharply after US falls

Major Asian markets suffered sharp losses on Friday, following another day of steep falls on Wall Street.

In a volatile week for global investors, Japan’s Nikkei 225 index slid 2.8%, while China’s Shanghai Composite slumped by 4.1%.

Earlier, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by more than 1,000 points for the second time this week.

Sell-offs around the world have been pinned partly on concerns over higher interest rates.

Elsewhere in Asia on Friday, Hong Kong’s Hang Seng pulled back 3.7%, while South Korea’s Kospi index traded down 1.6% and Australia’s S&P/ASX 200 eased 0.8%.

Those losses came as little surprise, with moves in major US markets providing the cue for global investors.

What has driven the Dow’s surge?

Why Asia markets follow Wall Street’s lead

On Thursday, the Dow Jones ended 4.2% lower at 23,860, the S&P 500 closed down 3.8%, while the Nasdaq sank 3.9%. European exchanges also headed south on Thursday.

What about China?

China was the worst performer in Asia on Friday – on track for its worst day in nearly two years – as losses deepened from declines seen earlier this week.

Chinese stock markets tend to be volatile and are dominated by retail investors, rather than big institutions like many other major markets.

But falls in China can spark nervousness around the world over sentiment in the world’s second largest economy.

As well as the broader sell-off, analysts said stocks in China were weighed down by people selling ahead of the Lunar New Year holiday.

This is a common trend as the need for cash grows during this period – a time when Chinese companies typically pay bonuses and people also traditionally exchange cash and gifts during the period.

Why are markets falling?

This global sell-off began last week after a solid US jobs report fuelled expectations that the Federal Reserve would need to raise interest rates faster than expected because of the strength of the economy.

That concern has prompted the pull-back from stocks.

On Thursday, the Bank of England seemed to offer support for that view.

The bank left interest rates at 0.5% at its meeting, but said a strengthening economy meant interest rates were likely to rise sooner than the markets were expecting.

Also worrying investors was a government budget proposal announced by US lawmakers, which raises spending caps and could fan inflation.

Bond yields in the US have also risen in recent weeks, typically a signal of higher rates.

Higher interest rates push up borrowing costs for companies and individuals, which can hurt corporate profits and curb economic activity.

At the same time, higher interest rates can make investment alternatives to stocks, such as bonds, more attractive.

Will markets fall further?

The uptick in volatility comes as investors react to the shifting conditions. And more turbulence could be on the way.

“The return of volatility after two relatively calm days supports the idea there are further losses to come in the days and weeks ahead,” said CMC Markets analyst Michael McCarthy.

The chaotic week on global markets also comes as several markets around the world sit on, or near record highs.

Analysts have said for months that financial markets were due a correction, after a long period of rising prices.

Thursday’s declines mean the Dow and S&P 500 have now fallen by more than 10% from the record highs set in January, a threshold analysts call a correction.

Fidelity International’s chief investment officer for Japan, Takashi Maruyama, said the “massive volatility” was a reaction to the rapid rise on the Japanese market since last year.

He added the sell-off presented a opportunity to buy shares at more “reasonable” prices.

 

Annunci
Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Unione Europea

La battaglia del cash. ‘Sorry, cash only.’ Il pianto dei liberal.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-02-08.

Cash 001

Da tempo è in corso una guerra al cash.

Si dice che l’uso del cash sia appannaggio dei malavitosi, che tutti i movimenti debbano essere tracciabili, e così via. Lo stato dovrebbe avere sempre sotto controllo tutto ciò che i sudditi cercano di fare: per il loro bene, sia ben chiaro.

Adesso il buon Bloomberg pubblica un articolo dal titolo molto significativo:

Germany Is Still Obsessed With Cash

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«The national disdain for plastic has become a proxy for profound concerns about trust, privacy and the role of the state ….

For Germans, more than for the citizens of virtually any other Western economy, “money” still means, above all, physical cash ….

Cash is still the means of payment in some 80 percent of point-of-sale transactions, compared with only 45 percent—and falling fast—next door in the Netherlands ….

mild suggestions in 2016 that it might be restricted in certain circumstances in Germany ignited passionate protest from almost every point on the political spectrum.»

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Questa accorata domanda potrebbe però essere tranquillamente rovesciata.

«Perché liberal e socialisti odiano il cash»?

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Se per i liberal usare il cash è qualcosa di peggio di un peccato mortale, per tutti gli altri il volerne limitare l’uso è gesto di tirannide, di dittatura, di violazione dei diritti fondamentali della persona umana.

Non c’è scritto da nessuna parte che liberal e socialisti abbiano ragione: e si direbbe che quanto ad elezioni gli Elettori diano loro torno in grande maggioranza.

«“Cash, to me, is an important public good by which you measure the transparency and legal order of a society, and also the respect for the individual and the private sphere,” says Max Otte, an economist in Cologne who leads Save Our Cash, a national campaign that opposes measures to restrict the use of physical currency. “ ‘Why do Germans like cash?’ is the wrong question,” he adds. Instead, Otte asks, “Why have others shifted to a cashless society so quickly?”»

Già.

«Why have others shifted to a cashless society so quickly?»

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La risposta alla fine è semplice.

È impossibile costituire uno stato tirannico senza avere il controllo su tutti i movimenti di denaro. E questo è l’obiettivo dei liberal.

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Questo articolo di Bloomberg è il piagnucoloso lamento di liberal e socialisti ideologici che sono stati estromessi dal potere perché gli Elettori non li votano più.

Essi sono esterrefatti, sbigottiti, increduli:

“siamo la perfezione assoluta, il culmine dell’evoluzione,

e la gente ingrata non ci vota?”


Bloomberg. 2018-02-06. Germany Is Still Obsessed With Cash

The national disdain for plastic has become a proxy for profound concerns about trust, privacy and the role of the state.

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The building that might be the spiritual heart of the German economy is a 30-minute walk from Frankfurt’s towering financial district, down a five-lane road lined with squat apartment blocks of exquisite ordinariness.

Located in an annex of the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, the Money Museum is a sprawling homage to the virtues of sound monetary management, a 10,800-square-foot series of carefully curated displays about the history of currency, the evils of inflation, and the inevitability that policymakers must occasionally make enemies to contain it. On one wall, a looping feed of an impeccably dressed male teller explains gravely why banks must be careful not to lend too much. On another, visitors are invited to try their hand at a curious video game, set to a Mario Kart-style electronic soundtrack, in which the goal is to keep a rolling €1 coin upright while dodging villains that include real estate appreciation, oil shocks, and spiraling food costs. Lose your balance, and the caroming coin flips dejectedly onto one side, felled by a failure to maintain, of course, price stability.

The game may be a crude metaphor for the complexities of central banking, but it does speak to an important truth. For Germans, more than for the citizens of virtually any other Western economy, “money” still means, above all, physical cash. The average German wallet contains 103 physical euros, the European Central Bank estimated in November, more than three times the figure in France. Cash is still the means of payment in some 80 percent of point-of-sale transactions, compared with only 45 percent—and falling fast—next door in the Netherlands. Using cash is a habit deeply resistant to regulatory intervention; mild suggestions in 2016 that it might be restricted in certain circumstances in Germany ignited passionate protest from almost every point on the political spectrum.

In a world that for most of us is moving inexorably toward electronic payments for almost everything, Europe’s largest economy remains a remarkable holdout, still dominated by a form of commerce that’s existed for millennia. It’s an odd distinction for a country that’s in most respects on the economic vanguard and a rebuttal to any assumption that, all other things being equal, the most advanced economies are generally less cash-­dependent.

Yet for many Germans, the convenience of electronic payment is beside the point. Rather, the use of cash has, to a surprising extent, become a proxy for profound concerns about trust, privacy, and the role of the state. Whereas in most countries the choice of how to organize purchases is basically a question of utility, in Germany it’s freighted with much deeper connotations. “Cash, to me, is an important public good by which you measure the transparency and legal order of a society, and also the respect for the individual and the private sphere,” says Max Otte, an economist in Cologne who leads Save Our Cash, a national campaign that opposes measures to restrict the use of physical currency. “ ‘Why do Germans like cash?’ is the wrong question,” he adds. Instead, Otte asks, “Why have others shifted to a cashless society so quickly?”

The short answer: It varies. Even as the electronic payment landscape explodes into a multiplicity of new options, whether prepaid debit cards, novel services such as Apple Pay, or the peer-to-peer transfer platform Venmo, countries are adopting them at sharply divergent rates. Germany’s co-champion in resisting electronic payments may be Japan, where the equivalent of more than $7,000 in bank notes and coins is in circulation for every inhabitant—more than four times the volume in South Korea or the U.K. A small clutch of tech-savvy northern European countries, led by Sweden and the Netherlands, are on their way to becoming effectively cashless societies. In Sweden, central bank statistics show, the number of ATMs plunged 17 percent from 2012 to 2016, while the Dutch use contactless payments for 10 percent of all retail transactions, by far the highest proportion in the euro area, according to the ECB. With the exception of Austria, the other European Union countries that share Germany’s reliance on notes and coins are concentrated in the bloc’s far poorer eastern and southern tiers.

The U.S. lies somewhere in the middle, because of its size, fragmented banking system, and the relatively high percentage of residents who don’t have payment cards. A little less than half of U.S. payments, with a bias toward smaller transactions, are made in cash, researchers from several central banks estimated in 2016. Payment behavior in the land of Apple, Google, and Facebook continues to exhibit an unusual analog quirk: the relatively wide use and acceptance of paper checks, something many younger European consumers have never seen.

And then there are a few truly strange outliers such as Zimbabwe, where a critical shortage of U.S. dollars, which the country adopted as its quasi-official currency in 2009 to combat the hyperinflation of its own dollar, has driven explosive adoption of mobile payment services. The most popular, EcoCash, boasts more than 7 million customers, or about half the population. It’s helping to keep commerce flowing in a country where using an ATM can mean waiting in line all day.

India and China are both driving hard toward a cashless future, for different reasons. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government is trying, with mixed success, to implement a slate of policies to move transactions to electronic formats, in theory to squeeze out black-market commerce. In China, the push comes from innovative companies such as Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. and Tencent Holdings Ltd., whose mobile-wallet services are wildly popular.

Needless to say, none of these novel methods is widely accepted in Germany.

When the original members of the euro zone—Germany, France, and nine other EU states—set out in the 1990s to design the common currency, one question needed to be resolved quickly: What denominations of bank notes would replace the kaleidoscope of guilders, francs, deutsche marks, and pesetas then in use? In line with the U.S. dollar, it was obvious €5, €10, €20, and €50 notes would be necessary. The upper limit was harder to define. The Federal Reserve had retired its $1,000 bill in 1969, leaving the largest unit of American currency at $100, an early example of the long-lived global trend away from very high-­denomination bills.

Germany’s Bundesbank, however, had different ideas. West Germany began issuing 1,000-mark bills in 1964, and they soon became a popular tool for holding the savings being generated by the Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle, that transformed the postwar state. German officials concluded, as former ECB Chief Economist Otmar Issing explains, that a €500 bill would create psychological continuity with the mark, which was to be retired at an exchange rate pegged at a little less than 2 marks to the euro. After all, since having a single currency meant asking the citizens of Europe’s strongest economy to give up a monetary system that was a symbol of their prosperity, winning their confidence was deemed crucial.

Other euro zone countries objected, as did U.S. officials, including then-Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, who said providing such a large-denomination note in what was certain to be a widely respected currency would aid only money launderers, gangsters, terrorists, and tax evaders. (One million dollars in $100 bills weighs about 22 pounds; €1 million in €500 paper, less than 5 pounds—the difference between toting one’s drug-deal proceeds in, say, a chunky folder or in a suitcase.) But the Bundesbank prevailed, and the €500 note—subsequently nicknamed “the bin Laden” for the rarity of sighting one outside a mattress or safe—entered circulation along with its smaller cousins on Jan. 1, 2002.

The euro eliminated national currencies, but it didn’t eliminate national central banks, instead incorporating them as, in effect, provincial administrations in a broader monetary authority known as the Eurosystem. One of its ongoing responsibilities is to gauge national demand for notes, based largely on the volumes of commercial bank withdrawals and deposits, and to print them accordingly. In this respect the Bundesbank is the clear European leader. Since the introduction of physical euros in 2002, it has issued more of them than the rest of its peers combined; more than half the roughly €1.1 trillion in physical notes in use in 2016 originated in Germany. German issuance is a big part of the reason that the total volume of cash in the euro area continues to expand, despite the proliferation of electronic payment options. Cash currently in circulation is equivalent to about 10 percent of the euro zone’s gross domestic product, according to Deutsche Bank AG, double the proportion in 2003.

Issing, the former ECB economist, accounts for this demand by making reference to an oft-repeated German maxim: “Cash is printed freedom”—offering the ability to transact with autonomy and anonymity in a country with good historical reasons to value both. Under the Nazis, he points out, the use of foreign currency was heavily restricted.

Today’s German policymakers agree that there’s just something different about their compatriots’ attitude to cash. “German citizens value cash very highly, and that’s quite simply a fact,” Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann said in 2016. The central bank, he said, “sees its role in assisting and supporting the general public in using those payment methods which they wish to use,” rather than in placing its thumb on the scale in favor of any one mode. Many German businesses, however, haven’t always shared that goal, especially if the payment method a consumer wishes to use happens to be electronic. The ubiquitous supermarket chain Aldi and German branches of Ikea began accepting credit cards only in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Tens of thousands of restaurants, small shops, and service providers, from big cities to rural villages, are still cash-only.

It might be tempting to view the German attachment to cash as a relatively harmless cultural oddity—like, say, Japanese companies’ ongoing love affair with fax machines—but a growing number of academic economists argue that it has serious undesirable consequences. Because so many transactions don’t enter electronic records, “it’s easier to avoid tax in Germany than in the U.S.,” says Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff, whose 2016 book, The Curse of Cash, argued for the abolition of large bills to, among other benefits, make it more difficult to conduct business under the table. “People all over the world buy apartments in cash, and it’s not because they don’t know how to use a bank, believe me,” Rogoff says.

He and others make an additional, key argument against cash: Limiting its availability removes one of the main obstacles to negative interest rates. Once the largely theoretical preserve of economics textbooks, sub-zero rates have become a more mainstream monetary policy tool since the 2008 global financial crisis as policymakers seek to press consumers and companies to spend their money rather than save it. Although the euro area—along with Sweden and Denmark, which are not part of the euro zone—currently employs negative interest rates, the true “zero lower bound,” economists say, lies some distance below zero, at the point where the cost of keeping large amounts of physical cash—in safes, armored trucks, and so on—is lower than the haircut that those same funds would be subject to in a bank account. Remove the option of cash, and deeply negative rates, kept in place for a long time, become far more practical, opening entirely new frontiers in monetary policy.

Presenting an easier path to negative interest rates as a benefit does not, to say the least, go over well in much of Germany, which is a net creditor to a large chunk of the euro zone. Using negative rates to drive higher inflation “is just another way to make us pay for the debts of others,” says Klaus-Peter Willsch, a member of parliament for Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union party. Cash, Willsch says, “gives you independence from people making monetary policy.”

Restricting every citizen’s use of cash to make life harder for a small number of crooks “is like using a cannon to shoot little birds”

In early February 2016, the German finance ministry unveiled a proposal that in most countries would be uncontroversial: imposing an upward cap of €5,000 on cash transactions. Elsewhere in Europe the concept is familiar. In France, payments larger than €1,000 may not legally be made in cash in most situations; in Italy the limit is €3,000. A related proposal, which the ECB later adopted, suggested phasing out the €500 note.

The reaction was ferocious. The tabloid newspaper Bild, which has a daily circulation of almost 1.8 million and enormous influence over the nation’s political agenda, introduced a “Hands Off Our Cash” campaign on its front page. Weidmann had to hurriedly intervene to make clear that cash in general was going nowhere. And politicians of all stripes objected, with no one making more of the issue than the Alternative for Germany, or AfD, a nationalist anti-immigration party that’s Germany’s answer to Britain’s UKIP. The AfD made “protecting” cash a significant plank in its 2017 election campaign, in which its better-than-­expected result seriously complicated Merkel’s efforts to form a stable ruling coalition. It’s not hard to see why: For a party such as the AfD, taking a position as a defender of traditional habits and against policies that could be associated vaguely with the desires of powerful outsiders was an opportunity too obvious to ignore.

“We are currently seeing the gradual abolition of cash,” Frauke Petry, a chemist-turned-politician who led the AfD until late last year, says on the sidelines of “The Day of Cash,” a November conference in Berlin organized by the national association of cash-handling companies. Such a development, she argues, would be toxic to frugality, a much-admired virtue in a country where, as foreign observers of its financial habits rarely fail to point out, the word for debt, schuld, means, literally, guilt. This supposed abolition is occurring, she says, “not according to market rules but in a politically motivated way, to hide the mistakes made by governments in recent years.”

Among defenders of cash, a certain fever-swamp conviction that something like a conspiracy exists to eliminate it is not uncommon. As Otte, the Save Our Cash founder, puts it, “A very strong coalition of forces”—central banks, data-hungry technology companies, commercial lenders eager to avoid the expense of handling money—is “working for a cashless or almost cashless society.”

But the passion for cash is equally strong within political factions that are far more reconciled to modernity than the AfD. Konstantin von Notz is in most respects the picture of 21st century Germany. In a meeting at his Berlin office on a frigid November morning, the Green party legislator wears a crisp, open-neck blue shirt under a V-neck sweater and a trimly cut gray blazer, his light brown hair artfully disheveled. Perched on a ledge on one side of the room is a large, framed sketch of Wrapped Reichstag, the artist Christo’s 1995 shrouding of the nearby building that now houses the German legislature in flowing silvery fabric—a daring physical meditation on national shame, the impossibility of full atonement for Nazi crimes, and the hope nonetheless for rebirth.

When it comes to money, however, von Notz’s attitudes are decidedly more traditional. He strenuously opposed the effort to limit cash transactions, in part because making purchases with cash, he says “is one of the last unsurveilled things” a citizen can do. That makes it an essential outlet of anonymity in a country where, “because of the two very harsh experiences with dictatorships, people have a broken understanding and relationship to government.” Privacy in Germany is a serious matter. Google ceased taking Street View images of German cities in 2011 after public complaints. In the limited areas where it does have coverage, the company gives German homeowners the option to blur out their properties, which many of them do.

The argument that restricting cash is essential to curbing criminality doesn’t convince von Notz. It’s not as if criminals need cash to make illicit transactions, he says, with alternative options ranging from complex corporate structures such as those revealed in the Panama Papers to cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, of which Germans are enthusiastic users. Restricting every citizen’s use of cash to make life harder for a small number of crooks, in von Notz’s view, “is like using a cannon to shoot little birds.”

The flight from Berlin to Stockholm takes a little more than an hour. From the perspective of how people organize their financial life, it may as well be a journey into another universe. Sweden is closer to being a cashless society than virtually any country on the planet. Fewer than 20 percent of retail transactions involve Swedish krona coins or notes, and the majority of bank branches no longer handle cash—a boon to lenders that would rather not worry about the expenses of security and cash distribution in a large, sparsely populated country.

The move to a virtually cashless financial system hasn’t been without drawbacks: Credit card fraud is rising, and groups that represent the elderly have complained that the process is moving too quickly for some older people to adapt. But at this point it’s probably unstoppable. Although the Riksbank, Sweden’s central bank, insists cash will remain available and in production for the foreseeable future, it’s not at all outlandish to speculate that the day it turns off the printing presses for good will come sooner rather than later.

“I think I haven’t been to an ATM for a year and a half,” says Bengt Nilervall, a payment expert. The decline has become self-­reinforcing. As the volumes of cash in use slide, the costs charged to retailers for handling and transporting it are rising. For most Swedish businesses, the transaction costs of cash total about 2 percent or 3 percent of the amount concerned, Nilervall says, compared with less than 1 percent for cards. A rising number of retail establishments are actually refusing to accept cash—restaurants and bars operated by the Scandic hotel chain among the most prominent. (There were questions initially about the legality of such bans, but as long as businesses tell customers upfront, they appear to be on safe ground, says Bjorn Segendorf, a Riksbank policy adviser.)

Swedes’ embrace of digital payments has been accelerated by high levels of trust—in their leaders and in one another. Asked in a 2013 EU survey to rank their trust in their fellow citizens on a scale of 1 to 10, Swedes answered on average 6.9, compared with 5.5 in Germany and 5.0 in France. Asked the same question about their political system, the mean result in Sweden was 5.6, outstripping Germany at 4.9 and France at a mere 3.0. “Maybe we’re kind of naive,” Nilervall says. “We trust the government, we trust the authorities, we trust the banks. And that’s why we are where we are.”

Take the example of online shopping. When a Swedish consumer makes a web purchase, she has the option of skipping the tedious business of filling in an address and payment details by simply entering her social security number. Everything else is prepopulated, and an invoice can be sent by email for settlement via Klarna AB, a Stockholm-based electronic payment service. That such a system could catch on in the more privacy-minded U.K., U.S., or Germany is hard to imagine. Yet in Sweden—a country that stayed neutral through both world wars and which has been consistently democratic since 1909—the idea of giving the government potentially complete knowledge of one’s financial affairs just doesn’t seem very dangerous.

The battle to bring German attitudes about cash into convergence with the rest of the Western world is being waged, in part, from an attractive 19th century office block in Berlin’s hip Mitte district. The German offices of SumUp, an electronic payment company that provides low-cost, wireless card terminals, are straight out of startup central casting. A multinational group of twentysomethings in jeans and hoodies is clacking away at keyboards in a long, attractively messy open-plan office with hardwood floors and tall casement windows, through which light streams in from Friedrichstrasse, central Berlin’s main drag. In an adjacent meeting room, a bulletin board is packed with yellow Post-its bearing handwritten ideas and scraps of customer feedback: “Paying cash is a habit.” “I recommended SU to a doctor. … He was happy and recommended it back.”

SumUp’s co-founder, Marc-Alexander Christ, a Frankfurt native in a stylish black turtleneck and round glasses, is convinced Germans are on their way to giving up their cash fixation. “People do realize that you need a [credit card] terminal, especially in the big cities, where tourists just don’t expect to need cash anymore,” he says. The company is finding success in some surprising places, such as “a couple of thousand” German Tupperware sellers who’ve switched from cash to SumUp devices, finding they can sell far more of the containers to their friends as a result. And unlike in other countries where SumUp operates, in which the need for merchants to take cards is self-evident, in Germany the company is emphasizing the utility of its point-of-sale software, which helps retailers track and analyze purchases, with the card reader as a sort of add-on. He declines to provide country-specific figures, but Christ says SumUp’s growth in Germany is brisk, thanks in large part to generational change. “It’s definitely moving in the right direction, because I can tell you my mother never uses cards, and my brother always uses cards,” he says.

Yet even in the heart of Germany’s most dynamic and inter­nationally oriented city, there’s a long way to go. Leaving my meeting with Christ at almost 2 p.m., I crossed the street toward a row of storefronts in search of lunch. Dada Falafel, a hipster-inflected Middle Eastern spot, seemed to be the most popular option, a multicultural queue of elegantly dressed young Berliners spilling onto the sidewalk outside. I neared the counter, stated my order, and reached instinctively for my American Express. No such luck. “Sorry, cash only.”

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Senza categoria

Vix sparato a 37.32, +115.60%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-02-06.

2018-02-06__Vix__001

«Il Vix (Cboe Volatility index) è l’indice che misura la volatilità (la “velocità”) implicita (futura nei 30 giorni successivi) delle variazioni di prezzo delle principali 500 azioni quotate alla Borsa di Neew York, quelle dell’indice S&P 500. Il Vix è un paniere ponderato di opzioni, sia call (acquisto) sia put (vendita). Se il mercato è stabile, il premio delle opzioni rimane basso. Se la volatilità implicita aumenta, allora anche i premi crescono, facendo così salire l’indice. Di norma quando l’S&P500 scende il Vix dovrebbe salire, mentre, quando l’indice azionario sale, il Vix dovrebbe scendere.» [Sole 24 Ore]

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Ci si prepari quindi ad assistere a rivolgimenti e scossoni.

Una grande quantità di titoli azionari, ed anche titoli di stato, sono sopravalutati. Adesso tutti sono stati avvisati. E chiaramente.

Pubblicato in: Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Unione Europea

Deutsche Bank AG. Un nuovo buco da 2.2 mld. -6.29%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-02-02.

2018-02-02__DB__001

Il 5 gennaio le azioni Deutsche Bank erano quotate 16.338 ed oggi, al momento di scrivere l’articolo, sono quotate 13.89: un calo del -6.29%.

Come d’abitudine, il Financial Times non ha coperto con copyright il relativo articolo: da un po’ di tempo infatti riporta in chiaro le notizie infauste per la Germania.

«Deutsche Bank AG on Friday reported a €2.2 billion ($2.7 billion) net loss for the fourth quarter and its third consecutive full-year loss»

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«We are not cutting costs fast enough, …. Deutsche Bank’s cost culture has to improve»

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«After two-and-a-half years of cost cutting, the jury is still out if the current management can really execute its plans»

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Deutsche Bank. Asset azionario e terrorismo. I proprietari.

Deutsche Bank. Il Qatar mira al 25%. HBJ

Germania. Predicare bene e razzolare male. Il caso Deutsche Bank.

Deutsche Bank tumbles down private bank rankings after tough 2016

Deutsche Bank fined by regulators over money laundering claims

Germania. Deutsche Bank esclusa dal novero delle banche mondiali.

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Sarebbe opportuno prendere atto di alcune realtà: per taluni eventi lieti, per altri tetri.

– Deutsche Bank AG è stata acquisita da capitale straniero. Sarebbe davvero ingenuo pensare che la nuova proprietà faccia gli interessi della Germania.

– A nessuno fa comodo che la Germania abbia banche di interesse mondiale: infatti Deutsche Bank AG non è più annoverata in tal novero.

– Deutsche Bank AG ha una capitalizzazione di 28.27 mld e Commerzbank di 16.393: si pensi che una banchetta come Banca Intesa San Paolo ha una capitalizzazione di 52.22 miliardi. Ubs capitalizza 74.641 miliardi, Morgan Stanley 100.521 mld. Conclusione: le banche tedesche sono pur sempre banche di tutto rispetto, ma non sono più di interesse internazionale.

– Senza almeno una banca di interesse internazionale è semplicemente impossibile poter fare politica estera: verrebbe meno il supporto finanziario.

– La dirigenza è restata in gran parte tedesca, ma non è detto che ciò duri nel tempo.

– Il Management Board è allo stato del’arte liberal. Ha due femmine in quote rosa: Mrs Kim Hammonds e Mrs Sylvie Matherat. Diciamo che si son visti manager più efficienti.

– Avere la tessera di iscrizione alla Spd non è sinonimo di saper dirigere una banca.

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Molti clienti di Deutsche Bank AG da un certo quale tempo non dormono più sonni particolarmente tranquilli.


The Wall Street Journal. 2018-02-02. Deutsche Bank Posts Big Loss on Weak Trading, U.S. Tax Charge

German lender suffers double-digit revenue declines in all three of its business units.

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FRANKFURT—Deutsche Bank AG on Friday reported a €2.2 billion ($2.7 billion) net loss for the fourth quarter and its third consecutive full-year loss, sending its shares sharply lower.

The German lender was hit by a €1.4 billion charge tied to the U.S. tax overhaul and suffered double-digit revenue declines in all three of its business units last quarter.

Financial Times. 2018-02-02. Deutsche Bank to miss cost-cutting target for 2018

Germany’s biggest lender reports third consecutive annual loss and poor fourth quarter

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Deutsche Bank on Friday reported a third consecutive annual loss, a worse fourth quarter than expected and said it would miss its cost-cutting target for 2018, sending the lender’s shares down sharply in early trading. James von Moltke, chief financial officer, told analysts that the bank would step up efforts to increase profitability. “We are not cutting costs fast enough,” he said. “Deutsche Bank’s cost culture has to improve.” Shares in Germany’s biggest lender dropped by as much as 6 per cent in early trading after the group said it was trying to lower its total adjusted costs in 2018 to €23bn, compared with the previous target of €22bn. “After two-and-a-half years of cost cutting, the jury is still out if the current management can really execute its plans,” commented a London-based analyst. Mr von Moltke said business disposals that were supposed to reduce costs by €900m have been delayed or suspended. In 2017, total adjusted costs stood at €23.8bn, missing analyst expectations by €400m. One factor that drove up costs in the last three months of 2017 was the decision to pay out higher bonuses than in the previous year. The bank did not yet disclose the size of its bonus pool in detail but said variable pay would account for less than 20 per cent of total payroll costs of €12.2bn. The increase in bonuses inflated costs in the investment bank by 7 per cent in the last quarter of 2017. John Cryan, chief executive, said the higher bonuses were a “one-off investment” necessary “to secure our franchise and to strengthen our position in key sectors”. He added: “In the coming years, these kind of bonus payments will only be justified if the bank performs correspondingly.” Mr Cryan did not specify which performance level was needed to pay out bonuses in 2018. Ingo Speich, asset manager at Union investment, a fund manager in Frankfurt, said that “if Deutsche Bank is paying bonuses to its employees, shareholders must not be left out in the cold with regard to the dividend”. On average, analysts are expecting a payout of 11 cents for 2017. The bank’s management on Friday gave no specific guidance on the 2017 dividend.

Fourth-quarter performance at the investment banking division, which accounts for more than half of overall revenues, was at the low end of analyst expectations. At €2.7bn, revenues were 16 per cent lower than a year ago and 13 per cent below forecasts. The unit reported a fourth-quarter loss before income tax of €733m, more than two-thirds higher than a year ago. Revenues in fixed income and currencies trading fell 29 per cent year on year, and combined FIC and FIC-related financing were a fifth lower. The five largest US investment banks reported an average drop in trading revenues of 19 per cent, according to data by Autonomous Research. “Markets were half moribund at the end of last year,” Mr Cryan told analysts on Friday. In a statement, the lender pointed to “low volatility, low institutional client activity and difficult trading conditions in certain areas”. Moody’s analyst Peter Nerby noted that while low capital markets activity caused the drop in revenue, “it may also be contributing to some rethinking of strategy by management — as they attempt to gauge which downturns in activity are structural as opposed to merely cyclical”. Overall, the bank reported a pre-tax loss of €1.3bn for the final quarter of 2017. The loss was about half that reported a year ago but more than €100m deeper than the most pessimistic analyst forecast in a company-compiled poll. On average, the 16 analysts surveyed by the company had expected a pre-tax loss of €478m for the fourth quarter. Citigroup analysts pointed out that not all analysts updated their forecasts after Deutsche’s profit warning on January 5, but another London-based analyst argued that the lender “missed consensus expectations for the fifth month in a row. There is a pattern here.” Deutsche’s core tier one capital ratio stood at 14 per cent at the year end, compared with 13.8 per cent three months earlier. “We have made progress but we are not yet satisfied with our results,” said Mr Cryan in a statement. For the full year, Deutsche reported a net loss of €500m, the third annual loss in a row. It was triggered by a €1.4bn non-cash charge caused by US tax reforms that dented the value of deferred tax assets in the US.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Unione Europea

Paesi dell’est e crisi politico ed economica europea.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-01-22.

Europa 002

L’Occidente sta attraversando una crisi politica ed identitaria di entità tale da non trovare riscontro nella storia dei decenni recenti: si dovrebbe risalire agli anni venti del secolo scorso per trovare una situazione ragionevolmente analoga.

Negli Stati Uniti il passaggio da un’amministrazione democratica a quella repubblicana appare essere quanto mai sofferto.

In Europa grandi stati quali la Spagna, l’Olanda, la Germania e, forse, tra poco anche l’Italia, si trovano nella condizione di avere governi minoritari, instabili, frutto più di necessaria convivenza che di chiaro indirizzo politico condiviso.

In questo ambito, anche i paesi dell’est europeo stanno passando i loro triboli.

Ma ai turmoil politici corrispondono ovviamente altrettante turbolenze economiche.

«In many investors’ eyes, political events in central and eastern Europe fall into the usual political noise category, while changes in larger emerging markets can mean a watershed moment for the economy, …. Investors may see the European Union as the ultimate backstop to negative political developments.»

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«For long-term investors, broader developments in economical, political and social areas are more important …. Financial market participants have strong confidence in the long-term political agenda of CEE, as it’s still better-established and more diversified than many other emerging-market regions.»

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«Political risk is alive and kicking in eastern Europe, but investors couldn’t care less»

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«The region’s currencies and bonds continue to outperform peers, helped by the European Central Bank’s asset purchases in the euro area and the fastest economic growth in six years»

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«Eastern European economies probably grew by 3.7 percent last year, the fastest pace since 2011»

* * * * * * * *

Problema davvero complesso, senza soluzione unica.

Né si sottovaluti la crisi demografica. Sarebbe impossibile progettare impianti industriali che richiedano mano d’opera numerosa in paesi che si stanno spopolando. I dati demografici sono un freno totale ai progetti industriali di lungo termine.

Germania. Metà Dax-30 è in mano straniera. – Handelsblatt.

Germania. La demografia che stritola. Mancano tre milioni di lavoratori. – Vbw.

Germania. Realtà geografica, non più umana, politica ed economica.

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Da un punto di vista pratico potrebbe essere utile distinguere abbastanza nettamente due differenti tipologie di investimenti.

Gli investimenti di medio termine sono al momento vivibili in termini ambivalenti. Da una parte si constata quanto possano essere remunerativi, dall’altra ci si rende conto di quanto la instabilità politica possa generare bruschi cambiamenti del contesto operativo. Sta quindi all’operatore la valutazione del rapporto prestazioni / costi e dei relativi rischi connessi.

Gli investimenti sul lungo termine sono invece al momento poco turbati da tutti questi sobbollimenti. La opinione diffusa è che in una qualche maniera proprietà e redditività saranno tutelate in modo ragionevole.

Ma alla ragionevolezza delle previsioni dovrebbe sempre far riscontro l’uso di una sana prudenza.


Bloomberg. 2018-01-18. Investors Are Ignoring Big Risk Signals in Eastern Europe

– Traders look past politics in Poland, Czech Republic, Romania

– ECB stimulus, growth have helped countries outperform peers

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Political risk is alive and kicking in eastern Europe, but investors couldn’t care less.

Currencies from the zloty to the koruna and the forint are all strengthening, ignoring political risk and turmoil. Poland is being threatened by unprecedented political and possibly economic sanctions by the European Union for eroding the rule of law, while the Czech Republic’s billionaire leader has failed to form a majority government and Romania’s ruling party just ousted its third prime minister in about a year.

The region’s currencies and bonds continue to outperform peers, helped by the European Central Bank’s asset purchases in the euro area and the fastest economic growth in six years. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary boast the best-performing emerging-market currencies since the beginning of 2017, while volatility is waning. Their stock indexes have also hit multi-year highs in the last 12 months.

“There’s still ample global liquidity and search for yields,” said Viktor Szabo, a money manager who helps oversee $15 billion in emerging-market debt at Aberdeen Standard Investments in London. “External demand from the EU is strong, EU flows are coming in, domestic consumption is strong across the board, inflation is not a major problem, at least in central banks’ view. What’s not to like? The music is on, so investors have to dance.”

Eastern European economies probably grew by 3.7 percent last year, the fastest pace since 2011, according to a weighted average of country forecasts in a Bloomberg survey. That growth has been helped by investments funded by billions of euros in development aid from the EU, which most regional countries joined in the previous decade.

Policy Support

While it spars with Brussels, Poland’s governing Law and Justice party looked to appeal to investors when it last month appointed former Economy Minister and bank chief Mateusz Morawiecki as premier. Hungary’s cabinet is feuding with billionaire financier George Soros as it ramps up an anti-immigrant campaign heading into elections in April, with Prime Minister Viktor Orban holding a firm lead in polls. In Bulgaria, which this month took over the EU’s rotating six-month presidency, Prime Minister Boyko Borissov is facing a no-confidence motion that has almost no chance of passing but could be a source of humiliation.

“In many investors’ eyes, political events in central and eastern Europe fall into the usual political noise category, while changes in larger emerging markets can mean a watershed moment for the economy,” said Magdalena Polan, a global emerging-market economist at Legal & General Group Plc in London. “Investors may see the European Union as the ultimate backstop to negative political developments.”

Central banks have also been supportive of assets. The Czech Republic was one of the first to tighten policy in Europe to curb accelerating inflation on the back of rising consumption and wages. The region’s local-currency bonds outperformed the 11 percent return on an index of emerging-market notes.

Polish policy makers have kept interest rates on hold for almost three years, while Hungary’s record current-account surplus has allowed investors to see bond gains without suffering from currency depreciation, as the central bank pushes ahead with unconventional easing. That contrasts with the situation further east in Turkey, which has been forced to tighten policy to counter a lira being sold off on political risk and a deteriorating current account.

“For long-term investors, broader developments in economical, political and social areas are more important,” said Jetro Siekkinen, who helps oversee $2.5 billion in emerging-market debt as head of portfolio management at Aktia Asset Management in Helsinki. “Financial market participants have strong confidence in the long-term political agenda of CEE, as it’s still better-established and more diversified than many other emerging-market regions.”

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Finanza e Sistema Bancario

Russia e Venezuela usufruirebbero delle valute virtuali.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-01-04.

Banche Caveau 004

Il mercato delle valute virtuali sia allarga ogni giorno che passa, nonostante abbia dimostrato una volatilità impressionante. Molta gente ha riposto in esse la propria fiducia, unitamente ad un compulsivo desiderio di guadagno.

Ma adesso che il mercato è uscito dalla sua infanzia, ecco affacciarsi le banche centrali.

«Russian and Venezuelan officials are hoping virtual currencies can help their countries make an end run around American sanctions»

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«Both governments, with ambitions to create state-sponsored cryptocurrencies, are looking to take advantage of the promise that Bitcoin introduced to the world financial system: a new kind of money and financial infrastructure, outside the control of any central authority, particularly the United States»

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«The Russian and Venezuelan plans may sound outlandish, even in the financial Wild West of Bitcoin and its online competitors»

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«But they underscore how the rise of virtual currencies is pushing governments around the world to rethink the most basic elements of their own currencies and financial infrastructure»

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«In Russia, officials under President Vladimir V. Putin have floated the idea of a Bitcoin-like crypto ruble»

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«When it comes to state-sensitive types of activities, this instrument suits us very well»

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«The Russian minister of communications, Nikolai Nikiforov, said in October that a crypto ruble would be designed quite differently from Bitcoin, with no need for the mining process through which Bitcoins are released into the world.

Such a currency would make it easier for the government to track and tax transactions, which is an advantage that other countries have spoken about as well»

* * * * * * *

Lo schema, ridotto all’osso, sarebbe semplicissimo.

Si fa un debito in valuta virtuale e lo si tramuta immediatamente in valuta solida.

Poi il resto lo si vedrà.

A morire ed a pagare c’è sempre tempo.

Nota.

Il 24 febbraio 1637 scoppiò la bolla dei tulipani.

Prima la gente era disposta a pagare cifre folli in oro od in argento, pur di potersene mettere qualcuno in più in cassaforte. Dopo il 1637 vi fu un fiorire di ricette su come fare la zuppa di tulipani.

Il fatto che a pensare alle valute virtuali sia il Venezuela indurrebbe ad avere pensieri non belli su tutta la faccenda.

Ma il fatto che i russi stiano meditando metterebbe in campo una nazione con enormi scorte energetiche:

«conceptual study shows that blockchain technology can be adapted to meet the current needs and requirements of the financial system …. The prototype works.»

Già. Ma se il prototipo è già al lavoro, ciò significa che la Russia è già impegnata nelle valute virtuali, graziosamente finanziate dall’Occidente.


The New York Times. 2018-01-04. Russia and Venezuela’s Plan to Sidestep Sanctions: Virtual Currencies

SAN FRANCISCO — Russian and Venezuelan officials are hoping virtual currencies can help their countries make an end run around American sanctions.

Both governments, with ambitions to create state-sponsored cryptocurrencies, are looking to take advantage of the promise that Bitcoin introduced to the world financial system: a new kind of money and financial infrastructure, outside the control of any central authority, particularly the United States.

The Russian and Venezuelan plans may sound outlandish, even in the financial Wild West of Bitcoin and its online competitors. But they underscore how the rise of virtual currencies is pushing governments around the world to rethink the most basic elements of their own currencies and financial infrastructure.

What has seemed like a fringe concept is starting to gain some level of acceptance in global finance. Several of the largest central banks in the world, including the Bank of England and the People’s Bank of China, have said they are looking at using the technology introduced by Bitcoin to track and issue their own digital currencies.

In Venezuela, the idea has come from the top. President Nicolás Maduro laid out a plan last month to create a homegrown digital currency known as the Petro, which would be similar to Bitcoin but backed by the government’s oil and natural resources.

In Russia, officials under President Vladimir V. Putin have floated the idea of a Bitcoin-like crypto ruble.

“When it comes to state-sensitive types of activities, this instrument suits us very well,” one of Mr. Putin’s aides, Sergei Glazyev, said last month in a conversation about the crypto ruble, according to several Russian news outlets. “We can settle payments with our business partners all over the world regardless of sanctions.”

Economists and virtual currency experts have given Venezuela’s Petro and the crypto ruble from Russia low probabilities of working in the way the governments seem to anticipate. That’s because Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are decentralized systems with no one in charge, while the Russian and Venezuelan plans would give the leaders of both countries a measure of control over the new currencies.

That runs counter to some of the most basic concepts of virtual currency.

All Bitcoin transactions are recorded on a ledger known as the blockchain, which is maintained by many independent computers. The system was designed that way explicitly to avoid central banks and large financial institutions. Just as email allowed messages to move around without going through a central postal service, the computer network maintaining Bitcoin records allows money to move around without going through any central authority.

That would provide a good way to get around sanctions, which are usually enforced through regulatory and banking disclosure rules.

But some central bankers have said that issuing their own currencies on some sort of blockchain could make it easier for citizens to use the money without going through intermediaries like banks and credit card companies. It could also make the records more resistant to tampering and hacking.

In a speech last year, a member of the German central bank’s executive board, Carl-Ludwig Thiele, said the bank’s “conceptual study shows that blockchain technology can be adapted to meet the current needs and requirements of the financial system.”

“The prototype works,” he added.

These projects, though, have been slow to move from prototype to working systems, and many officials and programmers have pointed to many technical hurdles that still need to be overcome.

None of that has stopped Venezuela from moving forward quickly with its effort to create a digital asset that the government can control.

Mr. Maduro introduced the idea on Dec. 3 in his regular Sunday television program. He said he had been monitoring so-called cryptocurrencies and had put in place plans to create the Petro, which would be backed by the country’s gold, oil, gas and diamond reserves.

“To overcome the financial blockade, this will allow us to move toward new forms of international financing,” he said.

Since then, the government has created an office of the cryptocurrency superintendent and appointed officials to run the operation.

The Petros are set to live on a blockchain like the one Bitcoin uses, but will derive their value from the government’s natural resources.

The link between Petros and natural resources could be similar to the backing that gold provided for most international currencies a century ago. The backing might counteract the sort of hyperinflation that the real Venezuelan currency, the bolívar, has experienced in recent years because of the government’s unbridled expansion of the money supply.

The boldness of the Petro plan is in proportion to Venezuela’s desperate economic condition, which has officials looking for anything that could help.

“The country is in a social crisis,” said José Ángel Álvarez, the head of a national association, Asonacrip, that has been working with the government on the Petro. “How do we manage to build trust? Open technology, clear rules that meet the attributes of the cryptocoin: decentralization, for example.”

Mr. Álvarez said he anticipated that the first oil will be sold for Petros in the first half of 2018.

But the link between the currency and the government’s oil holdings is likely to make it unattractive to investors, given the lack of confidence that investors have shown in Mr. Maduros’s government.

There is a measure of irony in the government’s interest in cryptocurrencies. Over the last few years, Venezuelans have shown a growing interest in virtual currencies as a means of escaping Mr. Maduro’s government.

An online marketplace known as LocalBitcoins has connected Venezuelans looking to buy Bitcoin and get their money out of the bolívar, which has steadily lost value because of hyperinflation. This year, the number of transactions in Venezuela on LocalBitcoins has risen tenfold, according to Chainalysis, a data analysis firm.

The Venezuelan government has not been nearly as welcoming of this type of virtual currency activity.

Randy Brito, the founder of the Facebook group Bitcoin Venezuela, said that in December he identified between 10 and 20 cases where people in Venezuela appeared to have been arrested for their Bitcoin activities — more than double the cases he had seen in the year up until now.

In most cases, buying any sort of foreign currency is illegal in Venezuela. That prevents residents from sending all of their money out of the country.

Mr. Brito, who left Venezuela in 2004 and now lives in Spain, said everyone in his group was aware of how the government was punishing its citizens for doing the same thing that the government was trying to do within the broader financial system.

“The irony is in front of us,” he said. “They have been blockaded by the U.S., just like they blockade their own people from operating.”

The Russian government has also not looked kindly upon its citizens’ use of Bitcoin and other virtual currencies. While the government’s policies have remained opaque, officials with the Russian Central Bank have talked about blocking the access of people inside the country to virtual currency websites, and Mr. Putin has pointed out the many potential illegal uses of the technology.

“First and foremost, this is an opportunity for laundering illegal gains, tax evasion and even financing of terrorism, not to mention the proliferation of scams to which ordinary people can fall victim,” he said in October.

But Mr. Putin has indicated that he is open to potential uses of the technology that would be under his control. In June, he had a much publicized conversation with Vitalik Buterin, the creator of one of the largest virtual currency networks, Ethereum. Mr. Buterin was raised in Canada and has dual Russian and Canadian citizenship.

A number of officials with the central bank and the Ministry of Communication have dropped hints about the creation of some sort of crypto ruble.

The efforts in Russia are much less urgent than those in Venezuela because the Russian economy is doing much better. But leaders there have been looking widely for any way to push back against American sanctions.

The Russian minister of communications, Nikolai Nikiforov, said in October that a crypto ruble would be designed quite differently from Bitcoin, with no need for the mining process through which Bitcoins are released into the world.

Such a currency would make it easier for the government to track and tax transactions, which is an advantage that other countries have spoken about as well.

The authorities in the United States have long been aware that virtual currencies might be used to evade sanctions. David S. Cohen, a Treasury official focused on terrorism and financial intelligence, said in 2014 that the American authorities were not seeing any widespread efforts to get around sanctions with virtual currencies.

But, he said at the time, “these are adaptable actors who are drawn to ungoverned spaces and so may increasingly look to this technology as an attractive way to transfer value.”

Pubblicato in: Finanza e Sistema Bancario

Italia. Massoneria, PD e Banche in sofferenza. Palazzo Albergotti.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-11-16.

Palazzo_Albergotti_esterno

Il 5 gennaio 1882 i massoni fondarono l’allora «Banca Mutua Popolare Aretina», che in seguito prese nome di Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio.

«Finché Banca Etruria era presieduta e gestita dal nostro fratello Elio Faralli, vale a dire fino al 2004, era considerata un istituto in crescita… poi quelli che la ereditarono, che erano bischeri e non massoni, l’hanno portata alla crisi».

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«l’ex direttore del «Corriere della sera» Ferruccio de Bortoli …. nel libro «Poteri forti (o quasi)» ipotizza un ruolo della massoneria nel crollo della banca di Arezzo.»

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«E’ bufera ai vertici della Massoneria italiana»

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«Al Gran Maestro Stefano Bisi è giunta infatti una lettera che lo invita a dimettersi. La missiva sarebbe stata inviata dal Gran Tesoriere del Grande Oriente d’Italia (Goi) Giovanni Esposito, in pratica il “ministro delle finanze” dell’organizzazione»

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«Carissimo Venerabilissimo Gran Maestro …. con vivo rammarico e grande preoccupazione ho appreso della richiesta di rinvio a giudizio formulata nei tuoi confronti. Con sgomento poi constato che Ti si addebita una ipotesi di reato che appare lesiva della sensibilità sociale, particolarmente invisa alla pubblica opinione, e che inoltre colloca i fatti nell’ambito di uno dei più grandi scandali della Repubblica negli ultimi decenni …. dimettiti»

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«Di quale autorevolezza …. potresTi ora avvalerti per sospendere un Fratello che venga inquisito anche per gravi reati? (…) Purtroppo finora abbiamo lasciato trascorrere del tempo (…) Ma oggi la presunzione di innocenza non Ti può né ci può appagare, a fronte della fin troppo facile prevedibilità delle conseguenze che la Nostra Istituzione dovrà ulteriormente subire, oltre a quelle che già paga, se non interverrà la sola determinazione che la Tua saggezza non può non vedere come inevitabile: dimettiti, anche nel Tuo interesse»

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«Ti si addebita una ipotesi di reato che appare lesiva della sensibilità sociale, particolarmente invisa alla pubblica opinione. Dimettiti, anche nel Tuo interesse»

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Da quando è stata istituita il 24 giugno 1717 la massoneria reclama le dimissioni di quanti siano inquisiti. Ciò contrasta con l’asserita innocenza dell’inquisito prima, eventualmente imputato dopo, fino a sentenza cassata.

D’altra parte, reclamare le dimissioni all’atto della notifica di un avviso di reato è tipico di chi governa l’emissione di tali provvedimenti, specie poi se gli iter giudiziari si svolgano in tempi geologici.

È un efficientissimo strumento di killeraggio dei nemici politici, ed anche di quelli personali.

Massoneria e partiti politici a lei vicini se ne sono serviti alla grande.

Sempre che la pratica non sia provvidenzialmente archiviata dopo una decina di anni, sicuramente la Magistratura saprà fare luce su quanto accaduto nella Banca Popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio, se non altro per documentazione storica.

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Notiamo solo un elemento.

Il Grande Oriente d’Italia si è spezzato in due fazioni: da quanto si constata esse si odiano a vicenda e nulla trascurano per assassinarsi.

E nella loro bega è stato trascinato buona parte del sistema bancario nazionale.


Ansa. 2017-11-03. I massoni liguri sono 950 divisi in 43 logge

Dopo il successo per l’open day dello scorso fine settimana, introdotto dal Gran Maestro del Grande Oriente d’Italia Stefano Bisi, la Casa Massonica di via La Spezia 7 a Genova tornerà ad aprirsi ai cittadinio sabato 4 e domenica 5 novembre dalle 10 alle 17. “Numeri oltre ogni aspettativa, un successo che ha superato le nostre previsioni”, sottolinea Carlo Alberto Melani, presidente del Collegio regionale del Goi. Il vertice della massoneria in Liguria ha anche dato i numeri: “I massoni in Liguria sono 950 divisi in 43 logge, di cui 380 a Genova in 16 logge. Abbiamo registrato un’affluenza straordinaria di persone che sono venute per vedere, capire, farsi un’opinione contro i luoghi comuni.

Abbiamo fatto visitare la nostra sede a tanti curiosi”. Nel fine settimana, nella casa massonica di via La Spezia, sarà protagonista anche la mostra sui tarocchi del pittore Carlo Piterà.



Il Tempo. 2017-05-13. Bisi: “Con i massoni Banca Etruria andava bene. Poi sono arrivati i politici”

Finché Banca Etruria era presieduta e gestita dal nostro fratello Elio Faralli, vale a dire fino al 2004, era considerata un istituto in crescita… poi quelli che la ereditarono, che erano bischeri e non massoni, l’hanno portata alla crisi». Stefano Bisi, Gran Maestro del Grande Oriente d’Italia, risponde così alle parole dell’ex direttore del «Corriere della sera» Ferruccio de Bortoli che nel libro «Poteri forti (o quasi)» ipotizza un ruolo della massoneria nel crollo della banca di Arezzo. Che peraltro proprio dai massoni fu fondata nel lontano 5 gennaio 1882 quando si chiamava «Banca Mutua Popolare Aretina».

[Testo riportato parzialmente causa copyright]


T News. 2017-05-13. Lo scandalo Mps investe i vertici della Massoneria: “Venerabilissimo Gran Maestro dimettiti”. La lettera

“Ti si addebita una ipotesi di reato che appare lesiva della sensibilità sociale, particolarmente invisa alla pubblica opinione. Dimettiti, anche nel Tuo interesse”

*

E’ bufera ai vertici della Massoneria italiana. Al Gran Maestro Stefano Bisi è giunta infatti una lettera che lo invita a dimettersi. La missiva sarebbe stata inviata dal Gran Tesoriere del Grande Oriente d’Italia (Goi) Giovanni Esposito, in pratica il “ministro delle finanze” dell’organizzazione. Secondo quanto riporta Gianni Barbaceto sul Fatto Quotidiano, dietro la perentoria richiesta ci sarebbe la vicenda della sponsorizzazione della Mens Sana Basket da parte del Montepaschi di Siena.

Per quella questione Bisi “è imputato di ricettazione. Accusato di aver ricevuto prima del 2013, per almeno 24 mesi, una sorta di stipendio aggiuntivo mensile di 5mila euro pagato in nero da Ferdinando Minucci, il presidente della società sportiva” ai tempi della sponsorizzazione da parte della Banca senese. Il sodalizio aveva dettato legge nella pallacanestro nostrana vincendo di tutto per una decina d’anni, poi “era decaduta contestualmente al MPS che l’aveva sostenuta dal 2000 al 2014”.

La lettera

Il contenuto della lettera inviata da Esposito a Bisi è tranchant, nonostante i toni di circostanza: “Carissimo Venerabilissimo Gran Maestro – si legge nel testo pubblicato dal Fattocon vivo rammarico e grande preoccupazione ho appreso della richiesta di rinvio a giudizio formulata nei tuoi confronti. Con sgomento poi constato che Ti si addebita una ipotesi di reato che appare lesiva della sensibilità sociale, particolarmente invisa alla pubblica opinione, e che inoltre colloca i fatti nell’ambito di uno dei più grandi scandali della Repubblica negli ultimi decenni”. Il tutto si conclude con l’esortazione “dimettiti”.

(Il Gran Tesoriere Giovanni Esposito)

Logge divise

Bisi è Gran Maestro del Grande Oriente dal 2014 ed è vice direttore del Corriere di Siena. La richiesta di rinvio a giudizio nei suoi confronti ha spaccato in pratica le logge. Da una parte c’è chi vorrebbe che appendesse il prestigioso grembiulino al chiodo e dall’altra chi raccoglie firme per esprimergli solidarietà. Per il Gran Tesoriere la permanenza del Gran Maestro in carica sarebbe imbarazzante. “Di quale autorevolezza – incalza Esposito – potresTi ora avvalerti per sospendere un Fratello che venga inquisito anche per gravi reati? (…) Purtroppo finora abbiamo lasciato trascorrere del tempo (…) Ma oggi la presunzione di innocenza non Ti può né ci può appagare, a fronte della fin troppo facile prevedibilità delle conseguenze che la Nostra Istituzione dovrà ulteriormente subire, oltre a quelle che già paga, se non interverrà la sola determinazione che la Tua saggezza non può non vedere come inevitabile: dimettiti, anche nel Tuo interesse”.

(Stefano Bisi, Gran Maestro Goi)

Un documento di solidarietà a Bisi

Dopo aver ribadito al Fatto Quotidiano di essere “estraneo ai fatti contestati” e di “non volersi dimettere”, Bisi dice di “ricevere espressioni di sostegno dai Fratelli di tutta Italia”, in un momento storico in cui il Goi “raggiunge il massimo degli iscritti”, circa 23mila. Bisi sostiene inoltre che “Esposito è completamente isolato”. Anche perché “un documento di totale solidarietà al Gran Maestro è stato sottoscritto dagli altri sei membri della Giunta” massonica. La dimostrazione che Stefano Bisi avrebbe ancora ottimi rapporti all’interno delle logge.

I rapporti del Gran Maestro

Stando a quanto si legge in un altro articolo del Fatto del 4 aprile 2016 Bisi avrebbe coltivato “relazioni molto intense” anche tra i politici, soprattutto tra quelli toscani di centrosinistra. “Per esempio con il presidente della Regione Enrico Rossi, e soprattutto con Luca Lotti, il più stretto collaboratore di Matteo Renzi e padrino politico del sindaco di Siena il renzianissimo Bruno Valentini”.

Ad avviso del quotidiano “da tali nuovi intrecci tra Massoneria e politica gli anti Bisi trarrebbero motivi di sospetto e starebbero ragionando sull’eventualità di una scissione” nel Grande Oriente. Un po’ come nel 1993, quando “il gran divorzio” portò alla nascita di una nuova Obbedienza alternativa, la Gran Loggia Regolare d’Italia.

In quell’occasione lo scisma fu dovuto alle vicende degli “intrecci tra politica e Loggia P2 e a quelle del Banco Ambrosiano di Roberto Calvi”. Insomma, un brutto precedente.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Finanza e Sistema Bancario

Debito pubblico mondiale vale 215,000 miliardi, il 325% del Pil globale.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-11-12.

Biancaneve e la Strega

Sono molti gli autori che hanno contribuito a costruire la scienza economica.

Scienza perché basata su osservazioni oggettive e ripetibili, controllabili, ed interpretate con teorie governate dalla logica, ossia senza incorrere in contraddizioni, né con i fatti né interne.

Cambiando i fatti, si cambiano le teorie: non esistono teorie assolute, non esiste una verità scientifica assoluta, non esistono teorie scientifiche che durino eternamente.

Poi la politica si impossessò rattamente dell’economia e nacque la così detta economia politica. Il nume tutelare fu il buon Hegel, quando affermò con sussiego:

«se i fatti smentiscono la teoria, tanto peggio per i fatti».

Gli ultimi settanta anni sono stati caratterizzati da una soffocante teoria del debito: il debito è bello, il debito stimola l’economia, i debiti sono come inesistenti, di debito si può vivere all’infinito, e così via.

Tutte teorie assurdamente strampalate, stravaganti, ma difese con le unghie e con i denti dal potere politico che ci viveva sopra alla grande: chi non le avesse sostenute non sarebbe mai andato in cattedra di economia. Se non universitario, sarebbe stato immediatamente linciato da una folla urlante di utili, come si potrebbe dire?

Bene.

Adesso il capolinea inizia a delinearsi.

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«il debito pubblico mondiale è oggi pari a 215mila miliardi (il 325% del Pil globale), di cui 70 (quindi un terzo) accumulato negli ultimi 10 anni»

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«Il debito globale è cresciuto, principalmente sulla scorta degli stimoli anti-ciclici sia automatici che discrezionali, che avevano l’obiettivo di stabilizzare l’economia mondiale dopo la grande crisi finanziaria »

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«La domanda è se ci sono in questo momento i germi di una nuova crisi finanziaria globale, tale da mettere in ginocchio la ripresa economica e le prospettive di crescita delle future generazioni»


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«non c’è da dormire sonni tranquilli»

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«1) una buona fetta del debito globale è oggi detenuta dalle banche centrali

2) allo stesso tempo le regole sull’impacchettamento dei prestiti in titoli derivati

3)  le politiche di tassi bassi»

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«A patto che le banche centrali non siano costrette ad alzare i tassi molto rapidamente: in questo caso il castello del debito (per larga parte a tasso variabile) potrebbe crollare.»


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«mercato obbligazionario che è passato da un valore di 44mila miliardi a 49mila miliardi.»

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«Da poche settimane però qualcosa è cambiato»

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«Il Bund tedesco è tornato in area 0,5%, il Treasury Usa al 2,3%, il BTp italiano a 2,2%. I Gilt britannici si sono impennati di 35 punti base dall’1% all’1,35% e così via, senza eccezioni di sorta»


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A 10 anni dalla crisi subprime il debito globale esploso a 215mila miliardi. Si rischia l’effetto supernova?

I dati sono incontrovertibili. Oggi il mondo può dire di aver messo alle spalle l’ultima grande crisi finanziaria (bolla dei derivati subprime scoppiata negli Usa del 2007) ma il prezzo da pagare è stato quello di veder crescere nel frattempo il debito globale (sia pubblico che privato) di 70mila miliardi. Si tratta di una cifra enorme. Per intenderci, come metro di paragone basta ricordare che la capitalizzazione globale delle Borse ammonta a 72mila miliardi di dollari. Oppure che ogni anno il mondo genera un Pil di 77mila miliardi.

Sta difatti che il debito pubblico mondiale è oggi pari a 215mila miliardi (il 325% del Pil globale), di cui 70 (quindi un terzo) accumulato negli ultimi 10 anni. A questo punto è evidente che il mondo avrebbe tecnicamente meno munizioni per reggere l’onda d’urto di un nuovo grave shock finanziario.

«Il debito globale è cresciuto, principalmente sulla scorta degli stimoli anti-ciclici sia automatici che discrezionali, che avevano l’obiettivo di stabilizzare l’economia mondiale dopo la grande crisi finanziaria – spiega Francis Scotland, director of global macro research di Brandywine Global (Gruppo Legg Mason) -. Nel mondo sviluppato, le politiche fiscali sono tendenzialmente finalizzate a sostenere i consumi e ridurre la disoccupazione nei momenti di recessione. Così, quando l’economia globale è crollata nel 2009, i deficit di budget si sono gonfiati ed il tasso di crescita del debito pubblico ha avuto un’impennata. In senso letterale, l’economia mondiale per gran parte degli ultimi nove anni si è poggiata sulla finanza pubblica. Non possiamo sapere cosa sarebbe accaduto se il debito non fosse cresciuto, ma probabilmente ha evitato o perlomeno rinviato un’altra grande depressione».

Inoltre, sono state adottate molte misure discrezionali per supportare gli stimoli alla crescita. «Per esempio – prosegue Scotland – gli Stati Uniti hanno emesso debito per ricapitalizzare il loro sistema finanziario. Tuttavia, è la Cina il Paese in cui il credito è cresciuto in maniera più evidente. Nel 2009 il governo di Pechino ha aumentato il debito e la spesa di 4 triliardi di renminbi (pari a 586 miliardi di dollari statunitensi), vale a dire più del 10 per cento del Pil cinese. Questa massiccia iniezione di liquidità nell’economia cinese faceva parte del pacchetto di stimolo coordinato dal G20 per stabilizzare la crescita globale».

La domanda è se ci sono in questo momento i germi di una nuova crisi finanziaria globale, tale da mettere in ginocchio la ripresa economica e le prospettive di crescita delle future generazioni.

C’è chi se lo chiede con insistenza negli Stati Uniti dove a marzo il livello dell’indebitamento delle carte di credito revolving ha raggiunto gli stessi livelli d’allarme del 2008, superando quota 1.000 miliardi di dollari.

La soglia critica dei 1.000 miliardi è stata recentemente superata anche nella categoria dei prestiti per l’auto, un indice molto seguito dagli investitori dato che molto sensibile alla categoria subprime (secondo alcune statistiche circa un terzo dei prestiti auto di Capital One Financial, uno dei big del settore, sarebbe destinato alla categoria subprime).

Così come è stata superata anche nell’universo dei prestiti per studenti. L’indebitamento in quest’area ha oltrepassato i 1.300 miliardi, ed è praticamente raddoppiato in otto anni.

Quindi non c’è da dormire sonni tranquilli. Anche se va detto che al momento dagli Usa il rischio di una subprime 2.0 è ancora lontano. Se consideriamo infatti il livello di indebitamento medio delle famiglie in rapporto all’andamento crescente del Pil, notiamo che negli ultimi anni è calato al 72% del Pil.

Ci sono altri tre fattori che disinnescano le paure di una nuova supernova: 1) una buona fetta del debito globale è oggi detenuta dalle banche centrali (basti pensare che negli ultimi 8 anni solo la Federal Reserve e la Bce hanno pompato sul sistema liquidità aggiuntiva acquistando titoli di debito per un controvalore superiore agli 8mila miliardi); 2) allo stesso tempo le regole sull’impacchettamento dei prestiti in titoli derivati (la vera causa della crisi subprime) sono più stringenti; 3) così come va detto che le politiche di tassi bassi (quando non azzerati) delle banche centrali hanno spinto molte società ad aumentare l’emissione di debito obbligazionario (talvolta paradossalmente finalizzato a operazioni di buy-back, riacquisto di azioni proprie).

Quindi, c’è sì da stare all’erta per seguire l’evolversi della faccenda del debito ma allo stesso tempo non sembra che ci siano le premesse per avere paura. A patto che le banche centrali non siano costrette ad alzare i tassi molto rapidamente (scenario tuttavia remoto). In questo caso il castello del debito (per larga parte a tasso variabile) potrebbe crollare.


Bond, ecco la nuova onda del “reflation trade”. Quanto durerà?

A settembre il valore globale dei bond è diminuito di 600 milioni di dollari. I rendimenti dei principali titoli di Stato sono risaliti. Gli investitori sono pronti a catalogare questo movimento come “reflation trade”. Non è la prima volta che i mercati imboccano questa strada. Recentemente è già accaduto lo scorso novembre. Dopo la vittoria di Trump i rendimenti dei bond si sono impennati e il mercato globale dei bond ha perso fino all’ultimo Natale qualcosa come 3mila miliardi di dollari.

A dare la scossa allora è stata l’elezione di Donald Trump che in campagna elettorale ha promesso una “fenomenale” riduzione fiscale per le imprese. Una riforma teoricamente inflazionistica nella misura in cui gonfia gli utili delle aziende e, a cascata, potrebbe impattare positivamente anche su salari e consumi.

Il “reflation trade” – che per certi versi ripristina la storica correlazione inversa tra azioni e bond dato che, mentre i secondi vengono venduti e di conseguenza i rendimenti salgono andando ad incorporare nuove stime inflative, le azioni vengono acquistate proprio sulla scommessa di maggiori utili aziendali – si è però sgonfiato a inizio anno quando gli investitori hanno compreso le difficoltà di Trump a mantenere le sue promesse. Il banco di prova è stato il flop sull’abolizione della riforma sanitaria tanto caro al suo predecessore Barack Obama. Da inizio anno i rendimenti dei bond sono tornati a scendere, di pari passo alle stime di inflazione. Quindi sono tornati gli acquisti sul mercato obbligazionario che è passato da un valore di 44mila miliardi a 49mila miliardi.

Da poche settimane però qualcosa è cambiato. Come visto sopra sono tornate e vendite sui bond e i tassi si sono riposizionati un po’ più in alto. Il Bund tedesco è tornato in area 0,5%, il Treasury Usa al 2,3%, il BTp italiano a 2,2%. I Gilt britannici si sono impennati di 35 punti base dall’1% all’1,35% e così via, senza eccezioni di sorta.

Stiamo parlando di tassi a lungo termine (titoli a 10 anni) e quindi la politica monetaria in questo territorio impatta meno. Se osserviamo il Treasury a 2 anni è più che normale che il rendimento sia passato in pochi giorni dall’1,2% all’1,46%, proprio dopo le parole del governatore della Fed Janet Yellen che ha confermato di voler alzare i tassi a dicembre, scenario prima non prezzato dalle classi di investimento.

Ma il fatto che stiano salendo anche i titoli della parte lunga della curva indica che gli investitori sono tornati a puntare un nuovo “cheap” su uno scenario da “reflation trade”. E ancora una volta qui c’entra Trump. In questa settimana infatti il presidente ha presentato al Congresso la proposta di riforma fiscale. È certamente meno aggressiva rispetto alla precedente (che puntava a una riduzione dell’aliquota fino al 12,5%) perché l’intento di abbassare l’aliquota sugli utili al 20%, ma certo sarebbe comunque significativa.

Ecco perché i bond sono tornati sulle montagne russe. La “fenomenale” (o quasi) riforma fiscale promessa da Trump è tornata nell’agenda setting finanziaria. A differenza di 10 mesi fa però i mercati dovrebbero essere meno aggressivi nella puntata e quindi il “reflation trade” potrebbe durare meno del precedente (durato 3 mesi) ed essere comunque meno violento. Perché tra il dire e il fare c’è di mezzo il partito democratico Usa che potrebbe, così come ha fatto quattro volte per la riforma sanitaria, ergere un nuovo muro anti-Trump.

 

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Unione Europea

Banca Leonardo. Altro regalo fatto ai francesi.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela

2017-11-07.

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Banca Leonardo è la principale banca di investimento italiana.

«Banca Leonardo nasce a Milano nell’ottobre 1999.

Nell’aprile 2006, un gruppo di primari investitori europei coordinati da Gerardo Braggiotti acquista e ricapitalizza Banca Leonardo, con l’obiettivo di creare la prima banca d’investimento privata e indipendente in Italia e diventare leader nei mercati di riferimento attraverso sistemi evoluti di consulenza, approccio individuale differenziante e di lungo termine, servizi a elevato valore aggiunto, professionalità e competenza.

Oggi, anche a seguito di importanti investimenti e operazioni di finanza straordinaria finalizzate al rafforzamento del core business, Banca Leonardo è focalizzata sul Wealth Management, direttamente e tramite le proprie controllate, in Italia e Svizzera.

L’internazionalità della compagine azionaria, l’assenza di soci di estrazione bancaria e una gestione fortemente manageriale sono caratteristiche che rafforzano l’indipendenza operativa di Banca Leonardo, garantita anche da un team di professionisti di comprovata esperienza e professionalità.»

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Board of Directors.

– Chairman: Gerardo Braggiotti

– CEO and GM: Claudio Moro

– Director: Miguel Abello Gamazo

– Director: Gian Giacomo Attolico Trivulzio

– Director: Enrico Vellano

– Director: Francesco Orsi

– Director: Gilles Samyn

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Main Shareholders. (fino al 2017-11-06)

– Swilux (Frère Group) – 18,3%

– Eurazeo – 18,3%

– Exor – 16,5%

– G.B.H. – 9,9%

– Torreal – 4,6%

– Allianz – 2,8%

– Italmobiliare – 2,8%

– Micheli Associati – 2,8%

– Is.Co. – 2,6%

– Edizione – 1,8%

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Questo potrebbe anche non essere l’ultimo regalo che il partito democratico fa ai suoi antichi patroni, che tanto hanno beneficiato la sua dirigenza.

In fondo, la gratitudine altro non è che l’attesa di ulteriori benefici.

Poi, alla fine, in primavera si potrà bene andare alle elezioni.


Sole 24 Ore. 2017-11-07. Banca Leonardo acquisita dai francesi di Indosuez Wealth Management

Banca Leonardo viene acquisita da Indosuez Wealth Management. La società del gruppo Credit Agricole, specializzata nel wealth management globale, ha annunciato di aver rilevato una quota di maggioranza della banca italiana attraverso un accordo fra la sua controllata CA Indosuez Wealth (Europe) e i principali azionisti di Banca Leonardo, vale a dire GBH, Exor, Eurazeo, Swilux e Torreal. Il pacchetto di azioni che passa di mano è pari al 67,67% di Banca Leonardo.

CA Indosuez Wealth (Europe) offrirà agli altri azionisti della società italiana di rilevare le loro azioni allo stesso prezzo e condizioni, in modo da arrivare a controllare il 100% della banca. L’operazione dovrà ottenere l’approvazione dalle competenti autorità e dovrebbe essere perfezionata nel corso del primo semestre del 2018. L’impatto della transazione sul Cet1 ratio di Credit Agricole CA e del gruppo Credit Agricole sara’ inferiore a 5 punti base, precisa al nota.