A statue is pictured next to the logo of Germany’s Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt, Germany September 30, 2016. REUTERS/Kai Pfaffenbach/File Photo
I comportamenti irrazionali esitano invariabilmente in dolorosi insuccessi.
E l’esperienza storica insegna come ogni intervento politico sul sistema bancario ne denaturi la specificità e ne eroda la consistenza, anche fino al fallimento.
Se è ragionevole che lo stato dia leggi e regolamenti semplici e chiari anche per il settore bancario, altrettanto chiaro dovrebbe essere il fatto che tali interventi debbano prendere atto della realtà dei fatti: le concezioni politiche ed economiche utopiche sono la miglior ricetta verso il fallimento.
Le banche vivono imprestando denaro a chi poi renda il ricevuto e nel frattempo paghi interessi: il prestito politico diventa in breve un credito in sofferenza e tassi di interesse artificiosamente nulli o, peggio, negativi, impediscono alla banca di sopravvivere.
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La orgogliosa Germania ha visto uscire dal novero delle principali banche mondiali Deutsche Bank, la cui proprietà non è più peraltro tedesca. Ma senza un sistema bancario a livello mondiale è del tutto impossibile sostenere una politica con ambizioni mondiali né, tanto meno, illudersi di poter nutrire ‘valori’ che si vorrebbero imporre a tutto il mondo. Già ci si è occupati di Deutsche Bank.
«the biggest 25 private banks managed $13.3 trillion for clients with at least $1 million in assets, representing 63.2 percent of the market»
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«The biggest gainer on the list was China Merchants Bank, which rose five rungs to 15th. Bank of China also entered the list, in 24th place»
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«Deutsche Bank dropped out of the world’s top 15 private banks in 2016»
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«Private banking assets at Deutsche Bank fell 28 percent in dollar terms to $227 billion at the end of 2016»
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«The demand rocked confidence in Deutsche Bank and triggered billions of dollars in withdrawals by clients. The bank eventually settled for $7.2 billion.»
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«Operating income in the industry was virtually flat as private banks faced up to low and negative interest rates as well as an increasing preference by wealthy clients for passive investments»
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Le banche di interesse mondiale gestiscono 13.3 trilioni di dollari loro affidati da clienti almeno milionari: questa quota rappresenta il 62% del mercato. Sono clienti estremamente mobili, che non tollerano perdite: o li soddisfi oppure semplicemente se ne vanno. E su scala mondiale trovano pur sempre opzioni loro favorevoli.
La Germania paga un severo scotto all’aver pensato ed agito in modo ideologico, utopico.
– La prima calamitosa utopia è quella che l’Eurozona sia finanziariamente omogenea. Ciò è falso: tipicamente i paesi mediterranei hanno esigenze opposte a quelle dei paesi del nord. Nessuna banca centrale può soddisfare simultaneamente esigenze discordanti.
– La seconda utopia è che la Germania possa essere egemone. Per essere grande, la Germania avrebbe dovuto rinunciare ad essere immensa. Nei fatti, ed il mercato lo dimostra ampiamente, il suo sistema finanziario è semplicemente troppo limitato per poter sostenere le ambizioni dell’ideologia valoriale di Frau Merkel. Non sussiste mercato finanziario che non affondi le sue radici in un solidissimo comparto produttivo. Se è vero che la Svizzera abbia un florido sistema bancario senza una rilevante produzione industriale, è altrettanto vero che non abbia ambizioni egemoniche.
– La terza utopia consiste nell’aver optato per una politica economica di earning e tassi negativi nel tentativo di poter contenere gli effetti di debiti pubblici oramai ingestibili. È stato un tentativo disperato di mantenere in vita una Eurozona morta e defunta, non senza la malizia di poter ricattare gli stati fortemente indebitati ai propri voleri, imponendo loro i così detti ‘valori’ di Frau Merkel, non da ultima la politica migratoria.
– La quarta utopia è che la politica possa governare finanza ed economia. È un cascame dell’ideologia comunista prima, socialista e liberal dopo. Se sicuramente sia vero che la politica abbia il potere di imporre un lungo periodo di tassi negativi, sarebbe altrettanto vero che alla fine dovrà ben constatarne come non abbia salvato nulla e nessuno, esitando solo nella distruzione totale del sistema. I clienti abbandonano in massa le banche che non possano oppure non sappiano far fruttare i propri capitali.
– La quinta utopia è di portata sul medio – lungo termine. Se i grandi capitali non disdegnano sicuramente il cogliere buone occasioni di guadagno immediato, la loro vocazione è nei fatti una allocazione di lungo termine, e tale è solo un impiego nel sistema produttivo. Ma valutata nel medio – lungo termine la situazione tedesca non solo è improduttiva, ma anche irredimibile a causa della crisi demografica che incombe: gi autoctoni sono in via di estinzione. Senza personale qualificato non esiste collettività e, quindi, il relativo sistema economico. E questo fatto è lucidamente presente agli occhi dei grandi investitori.
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Bene.
La Germania si avvia mestamente a celebrare il funerale di un sistema bancario una volta fiorente.
È stato assassinato da un’ideologia avulsa dalla realtà dei fatti.
ZURICH (Reuters) – Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE) dropped out of the world’s top 15 private banks in 2016, a year marked by negative headlines for Germany’s biggest lender, rankings by wealth management researcher Scorpio Partnership showed on Monday.
Private banking assets at Deutsche Bank fell 28 percent in dollar terms to $227 billion at the end of 2016, sending it tumbling five places to 16th in Scorpio’s rankings of the 25 biggest private banks in the world.
Deutsche Bank faced a rocky 2016 in which the U.S. Department of Justice wanted the bank to pay $14 billion for mis-selling toxic mortgage-backed securities before the 2007-2009 financial crisis.
The demand rocked confidence in Deutsche Bank and triggered billions of dollars in withdrawals by clients. The bank eventually settled for $7.2 billion.
Swiss bank UBS (UBSG.S) kept its place as the world’s biggest private bank with $2.06 trillion in assets under management, Scorpio found, followed by Bank of America (BAC.N), Morgan Stanley (MS.N) and Wells Fargo (WFC.N).
Switzerland’s Credit Suisse (CSGN.S), which has prioritized private banking under Chief Executive Tidjane Thiam, was overtaken by Royal Bank of Canada (RY.TO) and fell to sixth.
The biggest gainer on the list was China Merchants Bank (600036.SS), which rose five rungs to 15th. Bank of China also entered the list, in 24th place.
Overall, Scorpio found the biggest 25 private banks managed $13.3 trillion for clients with at least $1 million in assets, representing 63.2 percent of the market.
Operating income in the industry was virtually flat as private banks faced up to low and negative interest rates as well as an increasing preference by wealthy clients for passive investments.
«L’Occidente negli anni sessanta rendeva conto di più del 90% del pil mondiale, ma oggi arriva a stento a superare il 40%. Ed è anche fortemente diviso. Le forze che erano predominanti un tempo in Occidente, seguono il suo destino e quindi valgono sempre meno anche esse. Non che i Rothschild oppure i Rockefeller non contino più nulla: sono però severamente ridimensionati, relegati in secondo piano, rispetto al passato.»
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HBJ, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani
«He was the Prime Minister of Qatar from 3 April 2007 to 26 June 2013, and foreign minister from 11 January 1992 to 26 June 2013. … Jabr was a younger brother of Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani, the founding father of the modern Qatar» [Fonte]
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Negli ultimi anni Deutsche Bank è entrata nel novero delle banche chiacchierate e chiacchierabili.
«Qatari and allied investors are considering bolstering Deutsche Bank with fresh capital by taking a stake of 25 percent in Germany’s biggest lender»
«In June 2014, HBJ acquired 80% of Heritage Oil, which was listed as a London exploration and production company»
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«It was reported that HBJ bought Banque Internationale à Luxembourg and KBL European Private Bankers via Precision Capital, making one of the largest banking groups in Luxembourg»
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«Now, investors from Qatar, who already own some 10 percent of Deutsche Bank, are considering taking control»
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«A partner who explicitly supported Jain’s strategy of establishing the company as the last globally important European investment bank»
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«HBJ cousins are considering propping up the bank with a fresh capital infusion and purchasing a blocking stake of 25 percent together with other investors».
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«Qatari and allied investors are considering bolstering Deutsche Bank with fresh capital by taking a stake of 25 percent in Germany’s biggest lender»
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«Nel mirino della Bce c’è la Deutsche Bank: tre dei suoi azionisti, uno cinese e due del Qatar, avrebbero ormai grande influenza sul colosso del credito tedesco e allarmano i supervisori di Francoforte. A rivelarlo è il quotidiano tedesco Sueddeutsche Zeitung, in un articolo dal titolo «Da dove vengono i soldi», pubblicato nell’edizione di lunedì. Il giornale riferisce che la cinese Hna, un agglomerato industriale della provincia del sud di Hainan, la cui proprietà «non è trasparente», ha aumentato in primavera la sua quota di partecipazione nella banca tedesca al 9,9% e che quote altrettanto alte sono detenute da due sceicchi della famiglia regnante del Qatar. Un Paese sospettato, come noto, di sostenere determinati gruppi terroristici, ricorda il giornale.» [Fonte]
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Usualmente l’Ecb avvia accertamenti quando una persona fisica o giuridica passa il 10% dell’azionariato. Ma molti fanno osservare che il 9.9% non differisce poi molto dal 10%. Inoltre, diversi azionisti intimamente collegati possono alla fine condizionare ed anche pesantemente l’attività bancaria.
Alcune considerazioni.
– Deutsche Bank è una banca con sede in Germania, ma di fatto a governo straniero. Con tutte le conseguenze.
– Il Qatar è un paese molto chiacchierato: sono in molti a ritenerlo il collettore dei fondi destinati a fomentare la guerriglia nel Medio oriente. Che poi detti fondi siano stati raccolti tra una congerie di stati, alcuni dei quali insospettabili, è tutto un altro paio di maniche.
– Circa gli altri investitori, l’azionariato che li sottende e ben poco chiaro: bene fa quindi l’Ecb ad indagare.
– Ci si domanda soltanto per quale motivo Ecb si sia attivata soltanto adesso.
FRANKFURT (Reuters) – Europe’s top banking regulator, the European Central Bank (ECB), is considering carrying out a special assessment of Deutsche Bank’s (DBKGn.DE) two largest shareholders, a German paper reported on Sunday, citing regulatory sources.
The ECB may launch so-called ownership control procedures to scrutinize both the Qatari royal family and China’s HNA (0521.HK), which each own just under 10 percent of the shares of Germany’s flagship lender, Sueddeutsche Zeitung reported in a prereleased version of its Monday edition.
The ECB and Deutsche Bank declined to comment.
The aim of a such an assessment is to establish whether an investor is trustworthy and financially sound, where the money used for the investment came from, and whether the investor engages in any criminal dealings such as money laundering or terrorist financing.
Normally it is only carried out if a shareholder holds more than 10 percent.
The ECB is, however, for the first time considering using a possible exemption to the rule, which it can activate if it establishes that both Qatar and HNA exert significant influence on the bank despite owning a stake of less than 10 percent, the paper said.
Qatar, which has been a Deutsche Bank shareholder since 2014, and HNA, which acquired its stake this year, have each been granted a Deutsche Bank board seat.
Due to the generally low number of shareholders showing up at annual general meetings the two investors can factually block important decisions.
“It looks like both will be treated as if they held more than 10 percent,” a source told the paper, which also reported that HNA’s investment in Deutsche Bank shares prompted the ECB’s move.
Last week, Germany became the first European Union country to tighten its rules on foreign corporate takeovers, following a series of Chinese deals giving access to Western technology and expertise.
FRANKFURT (Reuters) – Europe’s top banking regulator, the European Central Bank (ECB), is considering carrying out a review of Deutsche Bank’s (DBKGn.DE) two largest shareholders, a regulatory source said on Monday.
The ECB may launch so-called ownership-control procedures to scrutinize Qatar’s royal family and China’s HNA (0521.HK), which each owns just under 10 percent of Germany’s flagship lender.
“That the ECB is investigating or considering to investigate the shareholdings is indeed accurate,” said the person, speaking on condition of anonymity because the person was not authorised to speak publicly about a review that is ongoing.
News of the possible review was first reported by the Sueddeutsche Zeitung on Sunday.
The ECB, Deutsche Bank and HNA declined to comment. A spokesman for the office of Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani in Qatar was not immediately available to comment.
The German finance ministry said it had taken notice of reports of the possible review but declined further comment.
The motivation for a review remains unclear. Generally such an assessment aims to establish whether an investor is trustworthy and financially sound, determine the source of investment funds and find out whether an investor engages in any criminal dealings such as money-laundering or terrorism financing.
“The approval process aims to ensure that only suitable shareholders enter the banking system in order to prevent any disruptions to the smooth functioning of the banking system,” the ECB’s website says.
Normally, the review takes place once a holding reaches 10 percent of shares or voting rights. But it may also take place if there is “significant influence over the management of the bank”, the ECB’s website says.
Both Qatar and HNA have been granted a seat on the Deutsche Bank board.
HNA, which has been on a global shopping spree in past years, began acquiring its Deutsche stake this year in multiple steps, saying the bank’s shares were “substantially undervalued and are an attractive investment”, according to an SEC filing.
The purchase was financed by UBS and the holding is in a special fund managed by the Austrian asset manager C-Quadrat. Quadrat chief Alexander Schuetz sits on the Deutsche Bank board.
A spokesman for C-Quadrat said the asset manager was unaware of any possible review by the ECB.
Qatar’s royal family built up its stake first in 2014 during a capital increase. Lawyer Stefan Simon represents Qatar on the board.
Qatar is under political and economic pressure, with neighbors including Saudi Arabia accusing it of terror financing and cosying up to Iran, a nation other Gulf Arab states have long viewed with suspicion.
Deutsche Bank sees the HNA and Qatari stakes as a vote of confidence that should encourage other investors, big and small.
In May, German regulator BaFin welcomed the HNA investment. “We believe it is fundamentally positive that capital is being invested in German banks. This of course includes foreign capital and of course Chinese capital,” BaFin President Felix Hufeld said at the time.
A negative outcome of a review could result in the ECB prohibiting the shareholder from exercising its voting rights.
The process underway does not indicate any wrongdoing, though it does come at an awkward time for Germany’s largest lender.
Deutsche Bank is grappling with a strategic turnaround, an uncertain global economy and the impact of Britain’s departure from the European Union.
In addition, the bank is recovering from multiple legal battles and has paid billions in fines and settlements for cases ranging from its role in marketing of U.S. mortgage-backed securities to a so-called “mirror trading” scheme that could be used for money laundering.
Now that light is at the end of the tunnel on the legal front, scrutiny of Deutsche Bank’s customers and investors is casting an additional shadow in the bank’s reputation.
Recently, some Democratic members of the U.S. Congress have renewed efforts to find possible links between banks such as Deutsche Bank, U.S. President Donald Trump and Russia, as they look for evidence of collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia in the 2016 U.S. election campaign.
Deutsche Bank is one of Trump’s largest lenders, according to regulatory filings, but the bank has declined Democrats’ demands to provide records of its client, citing privacy concerns. Trump and the Kremlin have denied any collusion in the election.
Fino a tanto che Mr Krugman si dedicava alla ricerca sperimentale era un mediocre ricercatore con talora buoni spunti. Poi divenne il consulente economico dei liberals democratici, gli fu conferito e Premio Nobel per l’Economia, precorrendo così quelli per la Pace conferiti a Mr Al Gore e poi a Mr Obama: un milione al mese di onorario.
Il suo impegno era semplice: l’establishment liberal decideva il programma economico e Mr Krugman avrebbe dovuto ammantarlo teoricamente. Mr Krugman fu per i liberals democratici quello che Mr Hans F.K. Günther fu per i nazionalsocialisti.
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Aveva una straordinaria necessità di consenso, come se il numero dei supporter avesse vicariato la solidità scientifica di una affermazione: suo fu il colpo geniale delle Consensus Conference. Formate nella loro interezza da liberals, queste applaudivano alla unanimità le teorie esposte da Mr Krugman, e questa unanimità era a sua volta assunta come prova granitica della loro intrinseca coerenza. Al resto pensavano poi i media del partito.
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Le maggiori testate giornalistiche, The New York Times in testa, ma anche più modestamente il Sole 24 Ore, si contendevano i suoi scritti con assegni da capogiro.
Con tutti i media in mano ai liberals a nessuno era mai venuto in mente l’idea di andare a controllare quanto si fossero avverate le previsioni fatte da Mr Krugman.
Il premio Nobel per l’Economia dovrebbe però essere conferito a chi fosse in grado di trovare una sua previsione che poi si fosse avverata. Ne basterebbe una soltanto.
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Circa il Venezuela Mr Krugman ne profetava ogni due mesi l’imminente default, che però non si è verificato nel corso degli ultimi ventun anni della sua attività di divulgatore economico.
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Sia ben chiaro: nessuno si stupirebbe se il Venezuela di oggi fallisse, ma ventun anni consecutivi di queste previsione rendono Mr Krugman inattendibile. Possibile, probabili, sicuramente, ma pur sempre inverosimili.
Il prognostico che Tizio deve morire non è un prognostico: tutti dobbiamo morire. Un prognostico è vero se si attua nel tempo previsto, non dopo venti anni.
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Molto più modestamente atteniamoci ai fatti empirici, verificabili.
Di oggi l’ultimo evento, che riportiamo ringraziando l’Amministratore della persona giuridica che ha acconsentito a lasciar pubblicare l’acclusa nota di accredito cedole, cancellati ovviamente tutti i riferimenti.
Il titolo in esame fu comprato nel 2009 a seguito del seguente suggerimento: “Se Mr Krugman dice che il Venezuela deve fallire a giorni, ebbene, allora si comprino i suoi titoli che saranno guadagni assicurati“
Da allora ad oggi ha reso il 22% circa rispetto l’investito, ogni anno che Dio ha mandato. Se anche oggi il Venezuela scomparisse domani, nessuno avrebbe di che lamentarsi.
Morale. Leggere sempre con grande attenzione trattatistica ed articoli degli economisti liberal, e quindi fare esattamente l’opposto: con ottime probabilità si azzeccano buoni affari.
Nota.
Come si constata, questa nota di accredito è stata emessa da una banca tedesca. La cedolare secca ammonta al 25%, ma quanto rimasto dovrebbe essere ascritto nella denuncia dei redditi.
«ICB of China diventa a fine 2016 la più grande banca del mondo con attivi per 3.297 miliardi di euro, scalzando JP Morgan Chase che scivola in seconda posizione (3.178 miliardi).»
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«Delle prime sei, quattro banche sono cinesi, due statunitensi, la settima è giapponese (Mitsubishi)»
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«Lo studio analizza risultati economici e struttura patrimoniale dei 66 maggiori gruppi bancari internazionali: ventotto hanno sede in Europa, quattordici in Giappone e altri quattordici negli Stati Uniti. La Cina, cui è dedicato un apposito focus, è presente con le sue dieci maggiori banche»
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«Dal 2009 la cinese Industrial Bank è cresciuta più di tutti (+357%), ma tutte le cinesi hanno almeno raddoppiato la dimensione»
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«Solo la statunitense Capital One tiene il passo con loro (+110%).»
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«La britannica HSBC in ottava posizione è la prima banca europea (2.352 miliardi attivi) e precede la francese BNP Paribas ( 2.341). UniCredit resta 24esima (879 miliardi, -7,5%), Intesa SP perde una posizione al 35esimo (766 miliardi, +16%).»
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Partendo virtualmente dal nulla, in meno di 27 anni la Cina è riuscita a piazzare quattro sue banche nel novero delle prime dieci a livello mondiale. Negli ultimi otto anni la Industrial Bank è cresciuta del +357%.
Sono molte le ragioni di un simile successo, che non trova riscontro negli annali della storia economica. Qui si vorrebbe sottolinearne solo alcuni.
– Il personale bancario cinese è selezionato con criteri meritocratici davvero molto rigidi tra una popolazione studentesca a sua volta sottoposta ad uno stretto vaglio meritocratico. Ma se essere assunti da una banca cinese è difficile, molto difficile, ancor di più è il rimanervi.
Coloro che non sanno mantenere i ritmi e non raggiungono il livello prestazioni / costo richiesti sono eliminati in modo quasi automatico. La politica si intromette, ma in punta di piedi, solo ai massimi livelli, ma con grande circospezione.
– Con un cost-income ratio del 35,5% nel 2015, quasi 29 punti percentuali in meno del valore medio delle banche di riferimento, è facile prevedere a breve-medio termine una netta prevalenza del sistema bancario cinese.
«Ha poi contribuito al risultato, in modo determinante, la bassa incidenza dei costi operativi, con un cost-income ratio del 35,5% nel 2015, quasi 29 punti percentuali in meno del valore medio delle banche della triade. Lo scostamento risulta particolarmente evidente nella componente costo del lavoro, pari al 16,9% dei ricavi, contro il 33,8% ed il 36,3% rispettivamente delle banche degli Stati Uniti ed europee. Il costo del lavoro per dipendente delle banche cinesi risulta peraltro in forte crescita: +ll% in media all’anno dai 2006 al 2015, mentre il numero degli occupati è aumentato del 35% circa.»
MILANO (Reuters) – ICB of China diventa a fine 2016 la più grande banca del mondo con attivi per 3.297 miliardi di euro, scalzando JP Morgan Chase che scivola in seconda posizione (3.178 miliardi). Delle prime sei, quattro banche sono cinesi, due statunitensi, la settima è giapponese (Mitsubishi).
Il sorpasso è sancito dall’aggiornamento annuale dell’indagine sulle principali Banche Internazionali dell’Area studi Mediobanca, presentato oggi.
Lo studio analizza risultati economici e struttura patrimoniale dei 66 maggiori gruppi bancari internazionali: ventotto hanno sede in Europa, quattordici in Giappone e altri quattordici negli Stati Uniti. La Cina, cui è dedicato un apposito focus, è presente con le sue dieci maggiori banche.
Dal 2009 la cinese Industrial Bank è cresciuta più di tutti (+357%), ma tutte le cinesi hanno almeno raddoppiato la dimensione. Solo la statunitense Capital One tiene il passo con loro (+110%).
La britannica HSBC in ottava posizione è la prima banca europea (2.352 miliardi attivi) e precede la francese BNP Paribas ( 2.341). UniCredit resta 24esima (879 miliardi, -7,5%), Intesa SP perde una posizione al 35esimo (766 miliardi, +16%).
Lo studio presenta anche alcuni dati del primo trimestre 2017: l’Europa è più dinamica degli Usa per ricavi (+4,1% che si confronta con +3,9%) e risultato netto (+19,7% vs +11,4%).
Tornando al 2016, i ricavi della banche Usa sono cresciuti dell’1,7%, in Europa sono calati del 6,2%. Le banche europee hanno ceduto margine d’interesse (-5,3% vs +3,8% in Usa)e commissioni (-6% vs -2,6%) e non si sono risollevate neanche con il trading (-14% vs +14%).
Giocoforza il contenimento dei costi operativi (-2,8% in Europa e -0,4% in USA), anche perché le rettifiche su crediti continuano a essere consistenti (+10,8% Europa, +22,1% in Usa). Il risultato corrente si contrae di quasi il 25% in Europa e cresce del 2% negli Usa, quello netto cade del 32% in Europa (5 istituti su 21 in perdita) e migliora del 23,6% negli Usa.
Le banche europee hanno maggiori costi operativi di quelle Usa (cost/income a 68,9% rispetto 61%) e maggiori svalutazioni dei crediti. Sono meno redditizie con un roe a 2,8% da 9,4%, fanno meno raccolta con depositi (43,5% del totale attivo vs 49,4%) e più con obbligazioni (13,6% vs 9,2%).
Le banche Ue hanno però migliori ratio regolamentari (total capital ratio: 18,7% vs 15,1%).
Guardando alle maggiori banche italiane, i crediti dubbi sono al 6,7% degli impieghi, quasi quattro volte la media europea (1,8%), anche se in riduzione (8,8% nel 2014 e 8,3% nel 2015). Fra le altre peculiarità, presentano elevate esposizioni al debito sovrano, che rappresenta il 17,1% del totale attivo (9,7% la media europea).
Cerchiamo innanzitutto di definire al meglio i termini usati.
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Quantitative easing (QE).
«Con alleggerimento o allentamento quantitativo, o anche facilitazione quantitativa, sovente con la locuzione inglese quantitative easing (o QE), si designa una delle modalità con cui avviene la creazione di moneta a debito da parte di una banca centrale e la sua iniezione, con operazioni di mercato aperto, nel sistema finanziario ed economico. ….
Il quantitative easing è uno strumento in grado di assicurare la permanenza dell’inflazione al di sopra di una certo valore-obiettivo. Il rischio di questa politica monetaria è il fatto che si riveli più efficace del previsto contro la deflazione nel lungo termine, portando ad un eccesso di inflazione a causa dell’aumento dell’offerta di moneta ….
I passi fondamentali per la realizzazione di un allentamento quantitativo dell’economia sono:
– l’emissione di nuova moneta da parte della banca centrale di riferimento (la BCE nel caso europeo);
– l’immissione della nuova moneta sul mercato tramite l’acquisto di titoli (titoli di stato, titoli finanziari, titoli tossici);
– il conseguente aumento del prezzo dei titoli e riduzione del loro rendimento;
– nei casi in cui il rendimento dei titoli pubblici è agganciato a quello dei tassi d’interesse bancari questo produce un abbattimento degli interessi bancari che in ultima istanza permette la riduzione nel medio periodo dei mutui, dei debiti delle famiglie verso le banche e di altri tipi di scoperto finanziario» [Fonte]
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Tapering.
«Tapering is the reverse policy of quantitative easing (QE). It is when the government stops following the policy of quantitative easing (QE) gradually. For instance, at the present moment, the US government is buying $85 billion worth assets on a monthly basis. If the US government were to drop the asset purchases from $85 billion to $60 billion the next month, that would amount to quantitative easing (QE) tapering» [Fonte]
Il tapering di conseguenza altro non è che l’operazione inversa del QE. La banca centrale riduce gradualmente gli acquisti di titoli di stato e di titoli tossici. Le conseguenze sono opposte a quelle ottenute con il QE: le quotazioni dei titoli scendono ed i tassi di interesse salgono. Salgono sia gli interessi dovuti sui bond, sia quelli praticati dalle banche.
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«Qualcosa sta davvero cambiando sul fronte obbligazionario e lo conferma la seduta di ieri in cui si sono visti molti tassi fissi perdere non poco sul secondario. La pressione ribassista sulle quotazioni del Bund a dieci anni, il cui rendimento è salito quasi allo 0,57%, con una variazione costante nel corso della giornata, ha inevitabilmente coinvolto tutti gli altri governativi e corporate in euro. La parte di curva però più in tensione è stata quella sui 5-7 anni. I mercati scontano così la riduzione del QE e la fine graduale degli stimoli di politica monetaria da parte della Banca centrale europea, eccedendo forse nel contraccolpo. …. I numeri sono inesorabili e lasciano intendere come i mercati stiano ormai scontando un cambio di strategia da parte della Bce …. Molto esposti al movimento ribassista i titoli aziendali e bancari con maggiore sensibilità al rialzo dei tassi.» [Fonte]
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Conseguenze sulla gente comune.
In primo luogo si dovrebbe dire, per quanto oltremodo impopolare, è che la crisi del 2009 non sarebbe scoppiata se gli stati occidentali non avessero avuto debiti sovrani eccedenti le loro capacità gestionali: fossero stati società private sarebbero falliti. Senza ricordarsi questo, tutto resterebbe semplicemente incomprensibile.
In secondo luogo i tempi necessari al tapering saranno ragionevolmente lunghi. Le banche centrali non hanno nessuna intenzione di generare brusche rotture. Non ci si aspetti quindi eventi drammatici, ma ci si prepari ad un lento quanto inevitabile bradisismo delle quotazioni e degli interessi. Se questo è un bene, può però generare nei non addetti ai lavori la falsa speranza che il processo di tapering non esista.
In terzo luogo si deve prendere atto che i governi europei non hanno utilizzati i tempi del QE per ridurre il debito pubblico, approfittando dei bassi tassi di interesse. Solo la Germania è stata lungimirante da questo punto di vista. Le conseguenze saranno quasi sicuramente devastanti: senza easing e con alti tassi di interesse la riduzione dei debiti sovrani risulterà essere quasi impossibile. Di qui severe condizioni di instabilità e necessità di agire non più in modo graduale ma con provvedimenti che saranno molto, ma molto dolorosi.
In quarto luogo, se in passato era conveniente avere debiti, per esempio dei mutui, in futuro essi potrebbero diventare n peso insopportabile. Né ci si faccia illusioni di sorta. Anche contratti che apparentemente fossero inattaccabili con rigide clausole sugli interessi potrebbe alla fine essere ridefiniti ope legis. Ripetiamo: non ci si illuda che l’aumento dei tassi non morda anche il micro investitore.
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Due ultime considerazioni.
L’Occidente è in una situazione davvero molto delicata. Le banche centrali hanno iniettato nel sistema masse monetarie gigantesche mantenendo artificialmente interessi vicini o sotto lo zero. Gli effetti sono stati modesti per il semplice motivo che il denaro non girava: i sistemi economici produttivi erano, e lo sono tuttora, paralizzati da un coacervo di leggi e regolamenti che rendevano improduttivi gli investimenti. Se però, quasi per paradosso, l’economia dovesse riprendersi, ad una maggiore circolazione del denaro corrisponderebbe una sempre crescente inflazione. L’inflazione diventerebbe il modo più semplice ed efficiente per bruciare il denaro generato in eccesso.
Il tutto è fortemente aggravato dal fatto che mentre i sistemi finanziari ed economici occidentali sono severamente malati, il resto del mondo sta molto meglio dell’Occidente: questo non significa che stiano bene, stanno solo meglio di noi. Di conseguenza, l’Occidente dovrà suo malgrado tener conto di un mondo politico ed economico totalmente mutato.
Historically, scientists have conducted experiments not knowing how they would turn out. From Galileo testing theories on gravity to Isaac Newton separating light into its component colors. More recently Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen experimented with quantitative easing (QE). Since then, economists and market participants have argued about how QE and the ballooning of Fed balance sheet has and will affect the economy and financial markets.
Recently, as telegraphed to the markets, the Fed raised the Fed Funds target rate by 25 basis points to a range of 1% to 1.25% while reaffirming its expectations for ongoing rate hikes this year and into 2018 and 2019 despite recently weaker than anticipated inflation data. The minimal change to the Fed’s forward rate expectations, slightly higher GDP growth estimates, a lower projected unemployment rate and most importantly the transitory verbiage describing the recent weakness in inflationary data was a modestly hawkish surprise to the financial markets. This in turn caused short maturity interest rates to rise substantially more than longer maturity interest rates. Additionally the Fed provided an outline for their plan regarding the tools, pace and timing for reducing the size of their balance sheet.
QE’s Impact on the Economy and Asset Valuation
Intending to work through the portfolio balance channel, QE and the Fed’s purchases of securities in the market has equated to a Fed balance sheet expansion of approximately $3.7 trillion dollars through the purchasing of U.S. Treasuries and agency mortgage backed securities or MBS. The expectation being Fed purchases would lower Treasury and mortgage interest rates thereby easing financial conditions, making it easier for individuals and companies to borrow, all things equal. In addition, these actions were intended to incentivize investors to diversify their portfolio outside of U.S. Treasuries and agency MBS given the shrinking free float of those assets as well as the less compelling valuations versus other assets such as corporate bonds and equities. In theory this would push corporate spreads tighter, U.S. equity prices higher, boost consumer wealth, increase confidence, and spur spending which in a virtuous cycle further supports an economic expansion.
How the $3.7 trillion in QE affects various asset classes is often debated. While it is nearly impossible to single out the effects of QE from other market influences, some estimates include 1% lower 10-year U.S. Treasury rates as a result of nearly $2 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities and 25 basis points or more in tighter mortgage spreads from the $1.8 trillion of MBS added to the Fed’s balance sheet. In corporate credit and equities, the effects on valuations are much more difficult to quantify given they are part of the second derivative effect of QE.
Essentially investors have crowded into asset classes like corporate credit and equities given yield and return hurdles were no long attainable in U.S. Treasuries and agency MBS. Outside of the unquantifiable spread tightening in corporate credit, we have also seen an increase in opportunistic issuance from companies looking to take advantage of low interest rates and attractive credit spreads. As a partial result, the size of the U.S. credit markets has doubled since 2007.
How Will the Market Digest a Reversal of QE?
The reversal of QE will have to be very slow, measured and well telegraphed in order to minimize what could be an inevitable market impact. Currently the Fed reinvests all of its maturities and principal paydowns equating to approximately $25-$33 billion per month or $300-$400 billion per year for US. Treasuries and agency MBS held on its balance sheet. According to the Fed, this potential balance sheet reduction could begin this year, however, it will start off slowly with a maximum monthly reduction in reinvestments of $10 billion between U.S. Treasury and agency MBS combined. This pace of tapering will then pick up quarterly by $10 billion combined each month culminating in a monthly reduction in reinvestment of $50 billion combined between Treasuries and agency MBS twelve months hence. At that point, the Fed could either begin selling the remainder of its intended portfolio reduction or much more likely, continue to let the portfolio slowly shrink over several years from strictly maturities and principal paydowns.
L’Handelsblatt è l’organo ufficioso della confindustria tedesca.
Negli ultimi tempi sta svolgendo un ruolo particolarmente aggressivo in campo di politica economica.
Dal tenore e dagli argomenti trattati sembrerebbe delinearsi una confindustria divisa e, forse, conflittuale: cosa che non stupisce per nulla. Tutte le grandi economie hanno aspetti spesso divergenti.
«Much of Germany’s $2.6 trillion in total trade surpluses since 2000 will be lost forever»
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«Germany not only has a trade surplus from shipping many more goods abroad than it imports. It must also send all its export earnings abroad that it cannot invest domestically»
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«Germany is exporting its savings to the U.S., which then allow Americans to purchase German Porsches, designer kitchens and gummy bears»
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«Each year, the money the world owes to German corporations, banks, insurance companies and retirement savers grows by the amount of Germany’s annual trade surplus, or €253 billion in 2016 (plus changes in asset values of course). America’s total foreign debt, in turn, rises according to its annual trade deficit, or $480 billion in 2016 alone»
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«Similarly, some very large German companies have run up spectacular losses from ill-fated foreign takeovers, like Daimler’s disastrous purchase of Chrysler, BMW’s expensive foray into Britain, and steelmaker ThyssenKrupp’s heavy losses in Brazil»
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«Germany’s massive assets in the U.S. are subject to devaluation»
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«Unfortunately, Germany hasn’t invested its gigantic surpluses very well»
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«The country’s accumulated current account surpluses have increased to $2.6 trillion since the start of the millennium, while its current net foreign assets amount to only $1.6 trillion. That difference is lost, never to return»
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«it is Germany that should reconsider whether net capital exports on such a scale make sense in a world of highly volatile and speculative financial markets»
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Il prof Gunther Schnabl indica in modo documentato un altro punto di debolezza delle esportazioni tedesche.
È il solito giochetto di finanziare artificialmente le esportazioni, non ultimo a scopo di eludere il fisco tedesco.
Quando finalmente saranno finite le tornate elettorali in Europa, vedremo cosa potranno fare la Commissione Europea ed i governi dei singoli stati.
Poche cose sono certe, ma una lo sembrerebbe essere sicuramente. È necessario cambiare completamente le direttive di politica economica finora seguite, pena la catastrofe.
Fino a tanto che in Europa sarà più redditizio l’investimento finanziario a discapito di quello nel comparto produttivo il sistema economico resterà sempre in crisi.
Gunther Schnablis a professor of economics at the University of Leipzig. To contact the author: gastautor@handelsblatt.com.
Germany’s surplus is a problem, but not for the reasons Donald Trump thinks. Much of Germany’s $2.6 trillion in total trade surpluses since 2000 will be lost forever.
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Peter Navarro, the new U.S. trade advisor under President Trump, has lashed out at Germany for exploiting the U.S. with its trade surplus. While Navarro is right that Germany runs a massive surplus with the U.S. (in 2016, Americans spent €49 billion more on German goods than vice versa), he’s wrong about who’s exploiting whom. Because it’s entirely uncertain if the bulk of the money that America owes Germany for all those goods will ever be repaid.
But first, consider this basic lesson from Econ 101: Germany not only has a trade surplus from shipping many more goods abroad than it imports. It must also send all its export earnings abroad that it cannot invest domestically – that’s known as a capital surplus. In fact, the trade and capital surpluses are equal in a world of free exchange rates.
In other words: Germany is exporting its savings to the U.S., which then allow Americans to purchase German Porsches, designer kitchens and gummy bears. The U.S., meanwhile, runs up debt to afford itself more private and public consumption. Over time, Germany’s claims on U.S. assets grow. Each year, the money the world owes to German corporations, banks, insurance companies and retirement savers grows by the amount of Germany’s annual trade surplus, or €253 billion in 2016 (plus changes in asset values of course). America’s total foreign debt, in turn, rises according to its annual trade deficit, or $480 billion in 2016 alone.
In theory, all those assets that Germans are accumulating will at some point be repaid – including America’s running tab for German imports. That’s exactly what happened in the 1990s following German reunification, when Germany repatriated substantial foreign assets to pay for the reconstruction of the former East Germany.
But it’s a very different story when those foreign assets are devalued. Take the German publicly-owned Landesbanken: During the U.S. mortgage crisis in 2008 and 2009, their bad investments vanished into thin air like so many Lehman Brothers certificates. Similarly, some very large German companies have run up spectacular losses from ill-fated foreign takeovers, like Daimler’s disastrous purchase of Chrysler, BMW’s expensive foray into Britain, and steelmaker ThyssenKrupp’s heavy losses in Brazil.
Even without such costly mistakes, Germany’s massive assets in the U.S. are subject to devaluation. That’s because America’s foreign liabilities are mainly denominated in dollars, not in the euros that matter to Germans. If the U.S. dollar falls – for example, because the Federal Reserve decides to run an inflationary monetary policy – the real value of America’s foreign debt falls. Every American asset held by other countries in the form of U.S. Treasury bills, stakes in companies or asset-backed securities now incurs losses in terms of those other countries’ own currencies.
In the past, the U.S. has frequently undertaken such devaluations with interest rate cuts. By pumping money into the economy, low interest rates create financial market bubbles (such as the 2000 dotcom bubble and the pre-2008 U.S. mortgage-loan boom), which devalue liabilities when they burst. Low interest rates also devalue the dollar. As a result of both types of devaluation, foreign holders of American assets lose repayment of a considerable part of their holdings.
While America has run up current account deficits (or net capital imports) totaling $10.8 trillion since 1980, net foreign liabilities today are around $3 trillion lower. Back in the 1960s, the then-president of France, Charles de Gaulle, already criticized America’s ability to slash the value of foreign-held debt to its own advantage as an “exorbitant privilege.”
Unfortunately, Germany hasn’t invested its gigantic surpluses very well. The country’s accumulated current account surpluses have increased to $2.6 trillion since the start of the millennium, while its current net foreign assets amount to only $1.6 trillion. That difference is lost, never to return. A large part of German savings invested abroad went up in smoke during the U.S. mortgage market boom. A similar thing happened in southern Europe, where German savings resulting from the trade surplus financed everything from Greek government bonds to inflated Spanish real estate. Ditto for Ireland during that country’s financial-sector collapse, and many other places around the world. Total losses to Germany have reached almost $1 trillion. Gone. Poof. Auf Wiedersehen.
In other words: It’s the U.S. that exploits its trading partners, not the other way around. America’s biggest paymasters are Germany, Japan and China. Trump would be mad to abandon his “exorbitant privilege” by bringing his deficit down. If anything, it is Germany that should reconsider whether net capital exports on such a scale make sense in a world of highly volatile and speculative financial markets. They could probably be better invested in Germany – in new roads, better bridges, faster rail links, more kindergartens and smart new inner cities for blighted industrial towns like Duisburg and Dortmund. At least these investments wouldn’t disappear without a trace, like so many of Germany’s assets do now.
«An international group of bankers, lawyers and stockbrokers – reportedly with links to the City of London – appears to have fiddled the tax system, employing practices which were at best unethical, at worst illegal»
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«Ultimately they may have deprived the state of nearly €32bn (£28bn; $36bn)»
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«In the first type, German banks and stockbrokers bought and sold shares for foreign investors in a way which allowed them to claim a tax refund for which they were not eligible»
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«In the second (a more complicated variation), investors and banks bought and sold shares just before and just after dividends were paid»
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«With a bit of imaginative paperwork, and by exploiting a procedure which allows more than one person or institution to simultaneously own a share, they were able to claim numerous tax refunds»
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Di tutta questa questione si sta occupando la magistratura.
Una considerazione emerge però naturale.
Il mondo economico e finanziario è diventato nel tempo sempre più complesso, ed ha richiesto di conseguenza una legislazione altrettanto complessa.
La globalizzazione ha posto in modo inequivocabile il problema della differenze formali e sostanziali delle leggi che regolano i mercati in ciascuno stato del mondo. Una qualsiasi società multinazionale è in grado di minimizzare il carico fiscale ottimizzando la ripartizione di investimenti ed utili.
Gli stati nazionali singoli sono semplicemente impotenti di fronte a fenomeni di questo tipo.
Se quanto detto è sicuramente vero, altrettanto vero è il fatto che un sistema giuridico troppo complicato espone agli abusi con maggiore probabilità di un sistema semplice e chiaro.
Una tassa flat certamente fa di tutt’erba un fascio, commettendo da alcuni punti di vista anche qualche lieve ingiustizia, ma alla fine risulta essere quasi impossibile eluderla.
It is reckoned to be the biggest tax scandal in German post-war history.
An international group of bankers, lawyers and stockbrokers – reportedly with links to the City of London – appears to have fiddled the tax system, employing practices which were at best unethical, at worst illegal.
Ultimately they may have deprived the state of nearly €32bn (£28bn; $36bn). As the German broadcaster ARD wryly noted, that would have paid for repairs to a lot of schools and bridges.
The newspaper Die Zeit adds that the sum would more than cover the cost of the refugee influx for a year.
Prosecutors have been investigating for some time. And gradually it is emerging that large-scale tax avoidance was taking place right under the noses of the authorities.
And that – in some cases – they turned a blind eye to practices employed, not just by individuals out to make a fortune, but by some of the country’s biggest banks and respected businesses.
Creative accounting
We may never really know the full extent of those practices; largely because they involved fiendishly complex transactions, which German media broadly divide into two kinds.
In the first type, German banks and stockbrokers bought and sold shares for foreign investors in a way which allowed them to claim a tax refund for which they were not eligible. Many question the legality of the practice.
In the second (a more complicated variation), investors and banks bought and sold shares just before and just after dividends were paid. With a bit of imaginative paperwork, and by exploiting a procedure which allows more than one person or institution to simultaneously own a share, they were able to claim numerous tax refunds. The practice was outlawed in 2012.
Whistleblowers
German prosecutors are investigating a number of banks – among them institutions which were bailed out by the state – and individuals.
But in the meantime, a group of German journalists has been researching too, working alongside an expert from the University of Mannheim.
Their investigations, broadcast on Thursday night, reveal that, despite a warning from State Commissioner August Schäfer in 1992 and the testimony of five whistleblowers, the practices continued and were widespread.
They involved 40 German banks and scores of other financial institutions around the world.
And, as those German reporters reveal, in the end it wasn’t a national authority, a finance minister or the justice system who finally exposed the practice.
It was a young administrative assistant in Germany’s central tax office, who noticed that she was receiving claims for huge tax rebates from a single US pension fund.
Anna Schablonski (a pseudonym) dug further and, despite threats, began to uncover other cases. She is modest about her role – even though 30 colleagues are now dedicated to trying to recover some of the money, and prosecutors are building their cases against some of those involved.
She does not want to be cast as a hero, she says. She was just doing her job.
Una delle tristi eredità lasciate da Mr Obama ai Cittadini Contribuenti è la gestione del debito dei consumatori, che ammonta a 12,730 miliardi di dollari, grosso modo due terzi del debito sovrano.
Ma questo sarebbe ancora il meno. La perniciosa eredità di Mr Obama e degli economisti di stampo liberals è la ‘cultura del debito‘, ossia l’illazione che di debiti si possa vivere indefinitamente. E questa è una distorsione caricaturale delle teorie espresse a suo tempo da Mr Keynes, che peraltro aveva avuto la mano ben pesante.
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«Americans faced with lackluster income growth have been financing more of their spending with debt instead»
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«There are early signs that loan burdens are growing unsustainably large for borrowers with lower incomes»
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«And with economic optimism having lifted borrowing rates since the election and the Federal Reserve expected to hike further, it’s getting more expensive for borrowers to refinance»
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«Companies may have reason to be concerned»
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«Consumer spending notched its weakest gain in the first quarter since the end of 2009, a problem in an economy where consumers account for 70 percent of spending»
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«We’ve conditioned American consumers to use debt to close the gap between their wages and their spending. When the Fed hikes, riskier borrowers are going to get pinched first»
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Cerchiamo di parlare chiaramente.
– 12,730 miliardi di debiti dei consumatori non costituiscono un pericolo in atto per il sistema economico americano: quindi, nessun allarmismo attuale.
– Questo dato desta molte perplessità, invece, se visto contro una crescita economica delle famiglie molto pigra, nettamente inferiore al volume dei debiti contratti: gli americani stanno finanziando il proprio tenore di vita con il ricorso al debito. Se di per sé ciò è ragionevole, potrebbe a breve diventare irragionevole per aver oltrepassato la soglia. In altri termini: un bicchiere di vino è piacevole e tutto sommato benefico, tre bicchieri rasentano il limite massimo, ma una dozzina portano all’ubriacatura.
– Sta aumentando il numero degli insolventi. Nuovamente, al momento attuale non è una quota che possa generare una crisi economica sistemica, ma se questo trend persistesse, potrebbe sicuramente diventare un grande elemento destabilizzante.
– Sicuramente, l’aumento prossimo venturo dei tassi di interesse non farà altro che aumentare le sofferenze di questo comparto.
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Si sul dire che prevenire sia meglio che curare.
Certo, le cure spesso sono dolorose, e fare un passo indietro nella gestione delle spese familiari è sempre un evento percepito dolorosamente, anche se non comporta certo il ritorno alla povertà. Segnaliamo però come degli Stati Uniti i valori medi siano ben poco rappresentativi di una curva di distribuzione dei reddito fortemente asimmetrica per una lunga coda destra. Il pil medio pro capitevaleva 55,836.79 Usd nel 2015, mentre il valore mediano non superava i 30,000 Usd. È questo il valore da tenere presente. Si ricordi infine che con il suffragio universale votano anche le persone meno abbienti, i poveri e financo i miseri, che delle quotazioni di borsa non se ne fanno un granché.
– Percentage of overdue debt has risen for last two quarters
– Consumer companies say their customers are under stress
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After bingeing on credit for a half decade, U.S. consumers may finally be feeling the hangover.
Americans faced with lackluster income growth have been financing more of their spending with debt instead. There are early signs that loan burdens are growing unsustainably large for borrowers with lower incomes. Household borrowings have surged to a record $12.73 trillion, and the percentage of debt that is overdue has risen for two consecutive quarters. And with economic optimism having lifted borrowing rates since the election and the Federal Reserve expected to hike further, it’s getting more expensive for borrowers to refinance.
Some companies are growing worried about their customers. Public Storage said in April that more of its self-storage customers now seem to be under stress. Credit card lenders including Synchrony Financial and Capital One Financial Corp. are setting aside more money to cover bad loans. Consumer product makers including Nestle SA posted slower sales growth last quarter, particularly in the U.S.
Companies may have reason to be concerned. Consumer spending notched its weakest gain in the first quarter since the end of 2009, a problem in an economy where consumers account for 70 percent of spending, though analysts expect the dip to be transitory. And debt delinquencies are rising even as the job market shows signs of strength.
“There are pockets of consumers that are going to be sorely tested,” said Christopher Low, chief economist at FTN Financial. “We’ve conditioned American consumers to use debt to close the gap between their wages and their spending. When the Fed hikes, riskier borrowers are going to get pinched first.”
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the Fed has kept rates low to encourage companies and consumers to borrow more and spur economic growth. Much of the gains in household debt since 2012 have come from student loans, auto debt and credit cards. Over that time, wage growth has averaged around 2.2 percent a year, and the pace has been slowing for much of this year.
Even if economists forecast that income growth will accelerate, those pickups have remained elusive. Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election in part by convincing voters that he understood their economic pain.
Keeping up with household debt payments is still broadly manageable for consumers. As of the end of last year, the ratio of principal and interest payments to disposable income for Americans was just shy of 10 percent, less than the average going back to 1980 of 11.33 percent. And it’s too soon to say whether growing signs of pain among borrowers are just a return to more normal levels of delinquencies or evidence of a more serious credit downturn. Loan delinquencies are creeping higher after plunging from 2010 until the middle of 2016, but are still below historical averages.
Nevertheless, debt levels for some borrowers may be growing too high, particularly those with lower income. Richard Fairbank, chief executive officer of Capital One, cautioned on a conference call in April that “increasing competitive intensity, a growing supply of credit and rising consumer indebtedness,” which could hurt the company’s growth rate. Ronald Havner, CEO of Public Storage, said in April that “you’re seeing a variety of things where the consumer, which is basically our customer, is stretched and or under stress.” And retailer Conn’s Inc. said on a quarterly conference call on Tuesday that it sees “general consumer softness,” which weighed on its sales last quarter.
There are signs that lenders have started to pull back from lending to car buyers. The latest Federal Reserve survey of senior loan officers showed banks tightening standards for auto loans. Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc., one of the nation’s biggest subprime auto lenders, said in April that it stopped allowing borrowers to make payments with credit cards.
A survey by UBS Group AG found that the pain may spread to other loan types. In the first quarter, 17 percent of U.S. consumers said they were likely to default on a loan payment over the next year, up from 12 percent in the third quarter, before the election, wrote strategists Matthew Mish and Stephen Caprio.
The percentage of debt that’s at least 90 days delinquent rose to 3.37 percent in the first quarter, the second consecutive quarterly gain, according to data from the New York Fed. It’s the first time those delinquency figures have risen twice in a row since the end of 2009 and beginning of 2010. About 46 percent of Americans surveyed by the Federal Reserve could not pay a hypothetical $400 emergency expense, or would have to borrow to do so, according to a 2016 report.
“If the economy stumbles, the most vulnerable borrowers, the low-income, high-debt burdened, they’re going to get nailed,” said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics. There could be patches of difficulty in various parts of the country, such oil-producing states, he said, adding that he isn’t forecasting a U.S. recession.
Mortgage debt has been growing slowly since 2012. The fastest-growing types of borrowings have been student loans, credit cards and auto debt. For much of this debt, there is either no collateral, like credit card loans, or collateral whose value declines over time, such as cars, said Danielle DiMartino Booth, founder of an economic consulting firm and a former adviser to then-Dallas Federal Reserve president Richard Fisher.
“This household credit cycle has been defined by the advent of all kinds of new types of unsecured lending,” Booth said. “And for a lot of those borrowers, they have nothing to show for it.”
Il 20 aprile 2007 una azione del Banco Popular era quotata 15.87. Il due di giugno 2017 la quotazione era 0.41.
La sua capitalizzazione di mercato ammonta a 1.73 miliardi.
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«Popular shares have fallen 75 percent over the past year, making them the worst performers on the European STOXX banking index»
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«Popular’s shares fell almost 40 percent in the past three days on concern it would not find a buyer or raise new capital to fix its balance sheet, which is weighed down with 37 billion euros ($41 billion) of non-performing real estate assets»
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«One of Europe’s top bank watchdogs warned European Union officials that Popular might need to be wound down if it failed to find a buyer»
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«it booked a 3.6 billion-euro ($4 billion) loss for 2016.»
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«Popular would add about 34 billion euros of performing loans to small and medium-sized enterprises»
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Ritorniamo in seconda elementare e facciamo una somma.
«37 billion euros of non-performing real estate assets»
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«34 billion euros of performing loans to small and medium-sized enterprises»
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Ergo, 34 + 37 = 71 miliardi in sofferenza, ossia che non si vedranno mai più.
→ Reuters. 2017-06-03. Banco Popular head tells staff to stay calm, source says ECB meet planned
The chairman of Banco Popular has told his executives that the struggling Spanish lender was solvent and urged them to remain calm and confident, while a source said he would hold a routine meeting with the European Central Bank next week.
Popular’s shares fell almost 40 percent in the past three days on concern it would not find a buyer or raise new capital to fix its balance sheet, which is weighed down with 37 billion euros ($41 billion) of non-performing real estate assets.
One of Europe’s top bank watchdogs warned European Union officials that Popular might need to be wound down if it failed to find a buyer, an EU official told Reuters this week.
“Banco Popular remains solvent and has positive equity,” Chairman Emilio Saracho wrote to his executives in a letter sent on Friday, seeking to reassure them despite what he called the “difficult situation.”
The letter, first published by Expansion newspaper, was confirmed by a bank spokeswoman who read the content to Reuters.
Saracho would meet ECB officials on Tuesday, a source familiar with the meeting told Reuters, adding that the appointment was part of the ECB’s routine supervisory responsibilities and was scheduled “some time ago”.
Popular and the ECB declined to comment on the meeting.
Saracho, hired in February in a leadership reshuffle, said in his letter that Popular would continue to seek new capital or a sale to fix its non-performing real estate assets that are the highest among Spanish banks.
“Our clients and shareholders are the most important for us. For that reason we must relay them a message of calm and confidence that we are trying as hard as possible to overcome this situation,” Saracho, a former JP Morgan executive, wrote.
Elke Koenig, who chairs the EU’s Single Resolution Board (SRB), a body that resolves struggling banks, had issued an “early warning”, according to the EU official. The SRB said at the time it could not confirm the story.
Spain’s government said on Friday it was not worried about Popular and would await the outcome of the sale process, which the bank says it could extend past a June 10 offer deadline.
The economy minister, Luis de Guindos, has said he does not expect a state bailout given Popular’s capital levels were still above regulatory requirements set out by the ECB.
Spain’s biggest bank Santander and state-owned lender Bankia are seen as the most likely buyers for any acquisition. A capital increase, which analysts say would need to raise at least 3 billion euros, faces resistance from shareholders who fear greater dilution.
Popular shares have fallen 75 percent over the past year, making them the worst performers on the European STOXX banking index. This week’s slip made Popular the smallest company by valuation on Spain’s blue-chip Ibex index.
For years, the Spanish lender managed to hold onto a mountain of soured real-estate loans made before the global financial crisis, tapping shareholders for new capital three times in the last five years. Now, with the stock down 98 percent from its 2007 peak and a market value barely above the amount it raised from investors last year, Chairman Emilio Saracho is pulling out all the stops to stabilize the lender.
On Tuesday, the bank said it asked competitors whether they’d be interested in buying the company. A day later, the lender raised cash selling a stake in a property company. Then on Thursday, Popular moved to reassure markets that it will pay a July coupon on its riskiest bonds after the notes tumbled on speculation losses may be imposed on the debt to preserve reserves.
“The best outcome would be that there is a deal on the table — that would be the cleanest solution,” said Puja Karia, an analyst CreditSights Ltd. in London. “Things can’t linger on.”
$4 Billion Loss
The events of this week highlight the pressure on Saracho, a former JPMorgan Chase & Co. vice-chairman elected in December to replace Angel Ron, who held the post for more than a decade and refused a state bailout in 2012. Now Saracho is on a mission to line up more capital for the bank or sell it, after it booked a 3.6 billion-euro ($4 billion) loss for 2016.
Buyer interest has been muted, with mainly two rivals raising their hands so far, El Pais newspaper has reported: Banco Santander SA, Spain’s biggest lender, and Bankia SA, the fourth-biggest. Santander’s capital position looks thin relative to its European peers. Bankia is state-owned after it was nationalized as part of a European bank bailout.
Santander hired Citigroup Inc. to advise it on a potential bid for Popular, a person familiar with the matter said Friday. It has requested state guarantees to protect against potential future losses at Popular, said the person, asking not to be identified because the talks are private.
Officials for the banks declined to comment. Economy Minister Luis de Guindos said Tuesday that Bankia was examining Popular’s situation. Susan Monahan, a spokeswoman for Citigroup in London, had no immediate comment.
Popular’s shares rose as much as 8.6 percent on the news of Santander’s interest, which was earlier reported by El Confidencial. The stock was trading 4.6 percent higher at 12:18 p.m. in Madrid, paring losses this year to 25 percent. That’s still the worst performance in the 38-member Bloomberg Europe Banks and Financial Services Index, which is up 9 percent.
“I don’t see any incentive to offer the equity holders of Popular really very much — if they offer them anything,” Daragh Quinn, an analyst at Keefe Bruyette & Woods, said by phone. “Popular doesn’t have much negotiating power at this point.”
Popular’s one attraction is its business serving small and medium-sized Spanish companies, said Inigo Lecubarri, founding partner of Abaco Asset Management LLP, who helps oversee more than $1 billion invested in mostly European financial stocks. Margins in the business are attractive because it is based on relationship banking that’s shielded to some extent from low-cost competitors, he said.
“Here you have the chance to buy 7 percent banking market share in Spain with no premium — it’s a fantastic opportunity,” said Lecubarri. “If I were a bank, I would definitely be interested in looking at Popular.”
Soured Loans
Popular would add about 34 billion euros of performing loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, a business where Santander already claims a 20 percent market share. But any buyer would also have to deal with Popular’s 37 billion euros of non-performing assets.
Santander closed the first quarter with a CET1 fully-loaded ratio of 10.66 percent. That compares with 11.6 percent at BNP Paribas, 12.5 percent for Barclays Plc and 11.5 percent at Spanish rival CaixaBank SA. Bankia’s balance sheet is relatively clean after its bailout, with a 13.4 percent ratio that’s the highest of Spain’s main banks.
Santander could decide to use a purchase of Popular as a pretext to raise more funds from shareholders and shore up its own capital ratio, said Andrew Lowe, an analyst at Berenberg in London. Santander is adamant that its capital levels are adequate and that it’ll continue to build them as it generates profits.
‘Over-Raise Capital’
“They could in theory over-raise capital to fund an acquisition and repair their own capital situation at the same time,” said Lowe.
Would-be buyers could also accelerate cost cuts at a lender that still has almost 12,000 staff and 1,779 branches, even after reducing headcount by 21 percent over the past year, said Jefferies International analyst Benjie Creelan-Sandford.
Saracho had initially focused on selling off assets and a return to the core lending business, but rising concern about the bank’s financial strength has put a spotlight on Popular’s strategic options. The lender this month reported a worse-than-expected first-quarter loss as it booked charges to cover real estate losses. Both capital and bad-loan ratios worsened.
Share Slump
On Thursday, Popular sold a 2.86 percent stake in Merlin Properties for 143.8 million euros, a filing showed. The bank is in talks to sell its U.S. business to Chile’s Banco de Credito e Inversiones, people familiar with the matter said last month. The unit could be valued at about $500 million, the people said.
Creelan-Sandford estimates Popular itself would have to raise at least 4 billion euros of capital to take capital and loan loss coverage levels up to those comparable with its peers.
While Popular is still open to a capital increase, the European Central Bank and Spanish regulators have told it that a sale would be the most appropriate option under the current circumstances, El Pais reported, citing unidentified sources.
The bank is working with JPMorgan and Lazard Ltd. to test interest among potential buyers, people familiar with the matter said last week.
