Giuseppe Sandro Mela.
2022-04-18.

Al 13 aprile 2022 gli Stati Uniti hanno raggiunto un Producer Price Index, PPI, dell’11.2%. L’Indice dei Prezzi al Consumo era 8.5%.
Nel converso, la Russia guadagna 320 miliardi di dollari dalle sue vendite di energia nel 2022, più di un terzo rispetto all’anno scorso.
Queste sono le conseguenze delle sanzioni furiose imposte da Joe Biden, e pagate dai Contribuenti americani.
«Bloomberg Economics stima che la Russia è sulla buona strada per guadagnare 320 miliardi di dollari dalle sue vendite di energia nel 2022, più di un terzo rispetto all’anno scorso, a causa dei prezzi più alti»
«Di conseguenza, specialmente se la Cina volesse comprare più petrolio russo, l’effetto principale dell’embargo europeo sarebbe quello di liberare i paesi dell’UE dal finanziamento diretto dello sforzo bellico, piuttosto che paralizzare economicamente la Russia»
Bloomberg ha pubblicato un articolo estensivo, ripreso e reso pubblico da darik.news.
Data la lunghezza del testo, ne riporteremo solo alcuni stralci, pur raccomandandone la lettura.
* * * * * * *
«Ukraine’s prime minister, Denis Schmihal, recently called payments for Russian energy “blood money”, underscoring the increasingly unstable moral position of the West»
«Leading global democracies express outrage at the atrocities committed by Russian forces in Ukraine but provide Moscow with hundreds of billions of dollars it could fund its military efforts»
«Bloomberg Economics estimates that Russia is on track to earn $320 billion from its energy sales in 2022, up more than a third from last year, due to higher prices»
«Last week, the European Union and Japan freely agreed to impose sanctions on purchases of Russian coal»
«Historically, Russia earned $4 in oil export revenue for every $1 it earned from selling natural gas overseas»
«Furthermore, given that the oil market is global and oil is a commodity that is easily shipped from one place to another, managing a European (but not global) ban on the sale of Russian oil should be less painful»
«this optionality of oil is a drawback rather than a merit to a potential ban on European imports. India is aggressively buying Russian oil which has been discarded by other buyers»
« As a result, especially if China wanted to buy more Russian oil, the main effect of the European embargo would be to free EU countries from direct funding the war effort, rather than economically crippling Russia»
«Europe now buys about half of Russia’s crude oil and petroleum products»
«But if more Russian oil comes out of the market, the price could move back up»
«Secondary sanctions are generally associated with American overreach and allied outrage, as they are often seen as examples of the US exercising its economic power when its diplomacy has failed to get others on board»
«Instead of having Modi choose between secondary sanctions or a complete severance of India’s energy ties with Russia, Biden could have made a more gradual and more realistic Indian move away from Russia»
«Sanctions are often referred to as “blunt tools”. They don’t need to be»
* * * * * * *
“Il primo ministro dell’Ucraina, Denis Schmihal, ha recentemente chiamato i pagamenti per l’energia russa “denaro sporco”, sottolineando la posizione morale sempre più instabile dell’Occidente”
“Le principali democrazie globali esprimono sdegno per le atrocità commesse dalle forze russe in Ucraina, ma forniscono a Mosca centinaia di miliardi di dollari che potrebbero finanziare i suoi sforzi militari”
“Bloomberg Economics stima che la Russia è sulla buona strada per guadagnare 320 miliardi di dollari dalle sue vendite di energia nel 2022, più di un terzo in più rispetto all’anno scorso, a causa dei prezzi più elevati”
“La settimana scorsa, l’Unione europea e il Giappone hanno liberamente concordato di imporre sanzioni sugli acquisti di carbone russo”
“Storicamente, la Russia ha guadagnato 4 dollari di entrate dalle esportazioni di petrolio per ogni dollaro guadagnato dalla vendita di gas naturale all’estero”
“Inoltre, dato che il mercato del petrolio è globale e il petrolio è una merce che viene facilmente spedita da un luogo all’altro, gestire un divieto europeo (ma non globale) sulla vendita di petrolio russo dovrebbe essere meno doloroso”
“questa opzionalità del petrolio è uno svantaggio piuttosto che un merito per un potenziale divieto delle importazioni europee. L’India sta acquistando aggressivamente il petrolio russo che è stato scartato da altri acquirenti”
” Di conseguenza, soprattutto se la Cina volesse comprare più petrolio russo, l’effetto principale dell’embargo europeo sarebbe quello di liberare i paesi dell’UE dal finanziamento diretto dello sforzo bellico, piuttosto che paralizzare economicamente la Russia”
“L’Europa ora compra circa la metà del greggio e dei prodotti petroliferi della Russia”
“Ma se più petrolio russo esce dal mercato, il prezzo potrebbe risalire”
“Le sanzioni secondarie sono generalmente associate all’eccesso di potere americano e all’indignazione degli alleati, poiché sono spesso viste come esempi di come gli Stati Uniti esercitino il loro potere economico quando la loro diplomazia non è riuscita a convincere gli altri”
“Invece di far scegliere a Modi tra sanzioni secondarie o una completa rottura dei legami energetici dell’India con la Russia, Biden avrebbe potuto fare un allontanamento indiano dalla Russia più graduale e più realistico”
“Le sanzioni sono spesso definite “strumenti contundenti”. Non hanno bisogno di esserlo”
* * * * * * *
Russia’s oil sanctions don’t have to be a blunt instrument
Ukraine’s prime minister, Denis Schmihal, recently called payments for Russian energy “blood money”, underscoring the increasingly unstable moral position of the West. Leading global democracies express outrage at the atrocities committed by Russian forces in Ukraine but provide Moscow with hundreds of billions of dollars it could fund its military efforts.
Bloomberg Economics estimates that Russia is on track to earn $320 billion from its energy sales in 2022, up more than a third from last year, due to higher prices. This disconnect is likely to be politically destabilizing, especially jaw-dropping in its brutality given the potential Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine.
Western policymakers are grappling with ways to punish Russia amid significant energy market uncertainty. To break out of this dilemma, he should look to policy innovations of a decade ago, largely designed in response to Iran’s nuclear activities.
The wave of sanctions against Moscow is still at its peak. In response to Ukrainian requests, major oil-trading houses such as Vitol and Trafigura announced that they would fulfill existing contractual obligations, but would not take on any new business related to Russian oil. Last week, the European Union and Japan freely agreed to impose sanctions on purchases of Russian coal.
Debate on doing more.
European officials have acknowledged they will continue to discuss further cuts in Russian energy imports, although member states are divided over what costs in their quest to increase pressure on President Vladimir Putin.
While much of the focus has been on European imports of natural gas, Russian oil purchases will be the next shoe in decline. Concentrating on oil, while difficult, is easier and can have a greater impact than concentrating on gas.
Historically, Russia earned $4 in oil export revenue for every $1 it earned from selling natural gas overseas. (This oil/gas dollar ratio fell from 3 to 1 in 2021 due to exorbitant natural gas prices.) Targeting oil sales is going for the Russian juggler.
Furthermore, given that the oil market is global and oil is a commodity that is easily shipped from one place to another, managing a European (but not global) ban on the sale of Russian oil should be less painful. At least in theory, Russian oil dumped by Europe could make its way into other markets, displacing non-Russian producers who would work their way to Europe, alleviating the pain at the pump.
For some, however, this optionality of oil is a drawback rather than a merit to a potential ban on European imports. India is aggressively buying Russian oil which has been discarded by other buyers. In a virtual meeting this week, President Joe Biden reportedly advised Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi not to increase India’s dependence on Russian energy.
In this view, Russia’s steep discounts to lubricate sales would mean a European embargo would reduce somewhat – but not radically – revenue flows into Moscow. As a result, especially if China wanted to buy more Russian oil, the main effect of the European embargo would be to free EU countries from direct funding the war effort, rather than economically crippling Russia.
For others, the main concern over Moscow’s European embargo on oil concerns its consequences for the global economy, not its impact on Russia. Europe now buys about half of Russia’s crude oil and petroleum products. A sudden disruption of these flows could shock energy markets, given the uncertainty about how quickly, completely and seamlessly the oil market will resume oil-trade flows. Mohamed Barkindo, secretary-general of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, told EU officials this week that it would be “nearly impossible to reverse a loss of this magnitude” when it comes to potentially removing Russian oil exports from the market.
Oil prices are now down from earlier spikes, mostly thanks to a revision in China’s expected oil demand this year, due to heavy releases from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve and a Covid-induced slowdown in China’s economy. But if more Russian oil comes out of the market, the price could move back up. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies estimates that disrupting half of Russia’s oil exports, roughly the same amount that Europe buys every day, could push oil prices up to $160 a barrel by summer.
Both of these reservations about a future embargo on Russian oil purchases are valid, but they will not eliminate a deep unease over continuing energy ties with Russia as its forces invade eastern Ukraine.
Policy making in the face of uncertainty
Fortunately, there are other options than doing nothing or risking the state of the global economy. One, already somewhat adopted by Europe, is to announce a ban on Russian energy imports that will expire during the coming months or the remainder of 2022. In addition to the new sanctions on coal, Germany says it may stop buying Russian oil by the end of the year.
Another option under consideration is creating an escrow account in which a portion of the proceeds of any sale of Russian oil will go, above some value, that is deemed sufficient to induce continued Russian sales.
But such measures could seem insufficiently ambitious or too selfish in the coming weeks, putting pressure on political leaders to do more.
The US will also be urged to do more, even though the Biden administration has already ended US purchases of Russian energy. Members of Congress are speaking about “secondary sanctions” – penalties on third parties (such as corporations or banks) that continue to transact with Russia that reinforce some specified element of the state. Energy purchases firmly fall into that category.
Uncertainty is always a challenge for policymakers, but in this instance the uncertainty is epic, especially in the face of rising sentiment over Russia’s allegations of atrocities and genocide.
When faced with future scenarios that are both plausible but widely different, good policy makers often ask whether there are tools or strategies that may prove useful if either situation occurs. This time should be no different.
Lessons from a Sanctions Superpower.
American policymakers are fortunate that America is a sanctions superpower. This exaggeration applies not only in the sense that the US uses sanctions more often and more aggressively than any other power. It has also experimented with restrictions in the past, employing creative ideas that serve as suggestions for the future.
Secondary sanctions are generally associated with American overreach and allied outrage, as they are often seen as examples of the US exercising its economic power when its diplomacy has failed to get others on board. This need not be the case.
In fact, the secondary sanctions that have been used to prevent non-US countries and companies from buying Iranian oil may offer some useful lessons for today. The sanctions included in the National Defense Authorization Act in 2012 proposed a series of mechanisms that allowed policymakers to pressure Iranian oil flows based on market conditions and political realities.
In 2012, the Arab Revolution was sweeping the Middle East, and oil prices had been hovering near $100 for a few years. With high prices and the world still pulling out of the Great Recession, officials in President Barack Obama’s administration and elsewhere are without some key safeguards to isolate Iran, one of the world’s largest suppliers of crude, from the global oil market. were reluctant to
The Defense Authorization Act recognized this and required that the administration report periodically to Congress about the state of the oil market. And the president was to provide a regular determination as to whether oil markets were supplied with enough for sanctions to continue. (Given Saudi cooperation at the time to stabilize oil markets in the US and accelerate shale oil production, the administration was not required to use the provision to circumvent sanctions.)
In addition, the NDAA created what is known as a “critical deficiency exemption” from sanctions. The Obama administration could employ these exemptions for countries that have made progress in significantly reducing dependence on Iranian oil.
The package allowed the White House greater discretion and exemptions for some of the US treaty allies, such as Japan and South Korea, as well as non-allies including China and India. The law also includes general national-security exemptions, which give the executive branch the option to declare that a suspended sanction in a particular case would be in the national interest.
As pressure mounts in Washington for more economic penalties on Russia, and especially for secondary sanctions, Congress would be wise to consider these innovations from 2012. They could give the Biden administration the flexibility it needs to reduce its reliance on Russian energy.
For example, imagine that Biden and Modi discussed the sanctions provisions used with Iran in the 2012 NDAA. Biden could have allayed any (legitimate) fears that tightening oil markets could spiral out of control, by assuring the prime minister that he had the tools needed to roll back any US sanctions if oil markets were too strong. seem tight.
Instead of having Modi choose between secondary sanctions or a complete severance of India’s energy ties with Russia, Biden could have made a more gradual and more realistic Indian move away from Russia.
Sanctions are often referred to as “blunt tools”. They don’t need to be.