«i pentastellati sarebbero in perdita dello 0,6% rispetto a fine marzo, quando la loro forza era stimata al 33,9%. La Lega invece avrebbe raggiunto il 19,5% dal 19,2% assegnatogli nella scorsa rilevazione.»
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«Il Partito di Salvini sarebbe sempre più dominante nel centrodestra dove Forza Italia continua a perdere consensi: dal 13,1% al 12,9»
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«Pd in lieve ripresa, passando dal 18,8% al 19,5%.»
Matteo Salvini supera Luigi Di Maio. Il consenso del laeder della Lega è rimasto stabile rispetto a un mese fa (44 %), mentre la popolarità del candidato premier del Movimento 5 Stelle scende fino dal 49%, incassato a fine marzo, al 43%. Lo scrive Nando Pagnoncelli, presidente di Ipsos Italia, presentando l’ultimo sondaggio dell’istituto pubblicato sul Corriere della Sera. Secondo le intenzioni di voto elaborate da Ipsos, l’ultimo giro di consultazioni avrebbe penalizzato il Movimento 5 Stelle. Continua a crescere, invece, il consenso della Lega. Per l’istituto di Nando Pagoncelli, i pentastellati sarebbero in perdita dello 0,6% rispetto a fine marzo, quando la loro forza era stimata al 33,9%. La Lega invece avrebbe raggiunto il 19,5% dal 19,2% assegnatogli nella scorsa rilevazione. Il Partito di Salvini sarebbe sempre più dominante nel centrodestra dove Forza Italia continua a perdere consensi: dal 13,1% al 12,9%. Pd in lieve ripresa, passando dal 18,8% al 19,5%.
Se è vero che le elezioni regionali riflettano in buona parte le problematiche locali, e non da ultimo la scelta dei candidati presidenti, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare che M5S abbia conseguito il 4 marzo un 44.79%, risultato questo ben difficilmente ribaltabile.
Le aspettative si focalizzano quindi sulle variazioni delle percentuali ottenute alle elezioni politiche.
Da un punto di vista meramente statistico saranno significative variazioni di ±4 punti percentuali.
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Ma spesso la politica contraddice le statistiche.
Il 4 marzo ha visto in Molise un piccolo cataclisma: il partito democratico ha perso 15 punti percentuali netti.
È passato troppo poco tempo per poter considerare consolidata una perdita così elevata di consenso.
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Una cosa apparirebbe però alquanto certa: che questo risultato potrebbe pesare, ed anche molto, sul contesto politico generale, suggerendo così il tipo di governo da formare, se mai lo si formasse.
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Stiamo vivendo un periodo caratterizzato dalle attese.
Qui, in Italia, si attendono i risultati elettorali del Molise e quelli del Friuli-Venezia Giulia del 29 aprile. Qui la Coalizione di sinistra è al momento proiettata al 22 – 28%, M5S al 21 – 27%, ed il centro destra al 45 – 51%. Per il Friuli vale lo stesso ragionamento statistico: solo variazioni superiori al ±4 punti percentuali potranno essere considerate significative.
Poi, come usualmente avviene, tutti dichiareranno di aver vinto, oppure di aver perso per colpa di qualcuno di altro.
Ma ci si dovrebbe ricordare anche che, pur essendo il campione elettorale abbastanza ampio, esso è pur tuttavia molto disomogeneo rispetto al quadro nazionale. Estrapolare i futuri risultati a tutta l’Italia potrebbe avere un sensi logico solo se si assistesse a variazioni dell’ordine di una decina di punti percentuali.
Andrà forse al macero quel fortunato libro dal titolo “Il Molise non esiste” dopo l’ultima settimana di campagna elettorale per le regionali del 22 aprile: l’Italia della politica si è infatti trasferita in blocco nella piccola regione che fino all’altro ieri sembrava appunto non esistere,e oggi ha una visibilità mediatica inimmaginabile fino a qualche tempo fa. Molise esiste e chiama Italia: arrivano Di Maio, Di Battista, Martina, Salvini, Berlusconi, più la legione dei parlamentari leghisti sparsi sul territorio, tutti concentrati nei 4 giorni del rush finale.
Si riparte dal risultato del 4 marzo: ossia dal cappotto del M5S con il 44,79% e tutti i seggi conquistati, col centrodestra al 29,81% e il centrosinistra al 18,1% (e Leu, da sola, al 3,7%).
Intorno al candidato del centrodestra Donato Toma, commercialista in quota Forza Italia, lo scontro interno è tra Fi che parte dal 18% e la Lega che riparte dall’8,67% conquistato raccogliendo soprattutto gli ex voti di An. Matteo Salvini sembra ormai di casa in Molise ed è evidente che qui ha lanciato un’opa su Fi, sperando di fare il pieno dei voti e superarla.
Molto attivi sul territorio i leghisti calati da Roma chiamati da Salvini, in considerazione del fatto che nei grandi centri, ossia Campobasso, Termoli, Venafro, Isernia, Larino, dove si concentra il 50% della popolazione, sembra essere in vantaggio il voto grillino, più d’opinione, mentre nella campagna profonda il centrodestra tradizionalmente raccoglie più consensi. Ecco perché i vari deputati e senatori della Lega stanno facendo campagna elettorale tra Guardialfiera, Matrice, Longano, Portocannone. Più i mercati rionali tra Venafro o Campobasso.
Le speranze elettorali degli schieramenti si incrociano con le vicende romane e governative: anche Luigi Di Maio si sta spendendo tantissimo in questa campagna elettorale molisana e nelle scorse settimane ha battuto la regione in lungo e in largo, confrontandosi con varie categorie economiche, specie sulla più dinamica costa adriatica a sostegno del candidato M5s Andrea Greco. Corre di rimessa Carlo Veneziale, assessore Pd, appoggiato anche da Leu. Il Pd il 4 marzo ha preso il 15%, ma anche in casa dem guardano con attenzione alla diversa lettura tra grossi centri e piccoli paesi: anche nel 2011 quando il candidato dem Frattura perse di poco, il centrosinistra vinse nei centri urbani e perse tra le campagne. Frattura ha poi rivinto nel 2013 le elezioni ma non è stato ricandidato per questa tornata.
Il problema è semplicissimo da esporsi e quasi impossibile da risolversi.
«Un modo per riuscire a promuovere le riforme necessarie a conquistare maggiore competitività sarebbe quella di istituire un ministro europeo con possibilità di intervento diretto sui bilanci nazionali. Quest’idea, ha confermato Schaeuble, è di suo gradimento: senza il potere di intervento un ministro di questo tipo “non ha senso”, fatto sul quale anche Macron la pensa “esattamente allo stesso modo”, anche se “bisognerebbe cambiare i Trattati europei”. Il realismo, però, non manca al ministro tedesco, ben consapevole che le “modifiche dei Trattati richiedono l’unanimità e la ratifica nei Parlamenti nazionali o in alcuni Paesi addirittura un referendum”.»
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Come suo solito, Herr Schäuble è sintetico e va diritto al cuore del problema, che enunciamo per punti:
– L’Unione Europea così come è non funziona.
– Sarebbe necessario istituire un ministro europeo per l’economia, con potere diretto sui bilanci nazionali.
– Bisognerebbe cambiare i Trattati europei.
– Le modifiche dei Trattati richiedono l’unanimità e la ratifica nei Parlamenti nazionali o in alcuni Paesi addirittura un referendum.
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– Si constata come non esista al momento né una maggioranza né, tanto meno, una unanimità in seno al Consiglio Europeo;
– Se anche alcuni governi approvassero, la ratifica sarebbe bocciata in sede referendaria.
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«L’8 gennaio 130 giacobini furono arrestati e deportati, soprattutto nella Guiana, in virtù di un senatoconsulto approvato tre giorni prima»
Ci si metta l’anima in pace: l’attuale eurodirigenza sta preparando una riedizione del colpo di stato del 18 fruttidoro.
Vediamo, di seguito, cosa pensano Mr Macron, il Governo Merkel ed Herr Weidmann. La grafica iniziale dovrebbe essere stata esplicativa.
«Germany aims to turn the stability mechanism into a full-blown European Monetary Fund.
The world breathed a sigh of relief when Angela Merkel gave a positive reaction to Emmanuel Macron’s ambitious agenda for the future of the EU. But did she really? The German chancellor’s endorsement came with two big qualifiers. One relates to foreign policy, the other to the euro. On the euro, she said, Germany will make its own proposals. And my expectation is that these will prevail. Mr Macron may get his defence union, his European universities and maybe even a common corporate tax rate. But on the eurozone the French president will get very little. The great Franco-German debate about the future of the eurozone is focused on big headline issues like the European finance minister, the eurozone budget and transfer payments. Instead of focusing on institutions, it might be better to think about what reforms should accomplish. I would argue that as a priority we should think about how we should manage risk, and ask ourselves: are we equipped to deal with the next financial crisis? The Germans have a plan. Officials at the finance ministry and the Council of Economic Experts have proposals for eurozone reform in their drawers. The details will need to be negotiated in the upcoming talks to form a German government. The coalition agreement will also define the scope of the compromise Ms Merkel will be willing to make.»
«All through his presidential campaign, Emmanuel Macron touted his goal of a rejuvenated Europe with ideas that sounded clear and simple.
As French president, he would first restore his country’s economic credibility by convincing its European neighbors that he was dead serious about implementing long-overdue domestic reforms. Then, he would try to secure a German agreement to push for a more integrated eurozone, complete with its own budget, finance minister, and even micro-parliament.
Four months into his presidency, Macron’s ideas are still clear. But it turns out that they are far from simple. He still intends to see through the eurozone reforms he advocated as a candidate. But reality has struck.
First, the German election campaign makes it delicate for Macron to push hard ideas that run against Berlin’s reluctance, if not outright opposition. The second — less expected — source of skepticism about Macron’s eurozone designs comes from within the French government itself: There’s a serious debate on the wisdom of pushing for a grand plan, which some say might not even be needed.
The German problem, long expected, is the main reason why France hasn’t yet detailed its vision for the eurozone’s future beyond the president’s vague campaign slogans. “We don’t know which parties will govern in coalition with Merkel in Berlin, and we didn’t want to embarrass her or others with proposals on the monetary union that might have become campaign topics,” said a French government official.»
«Per quanti abbiano la capacità filtrare i messaggi fra le righe, l’intervista al ministro delle Finanze tedesco, Wolfgang Schauble, pubblicata da La Repubblica giovedì, rivela con chiarezza la visione di prospettiva sul futuro dell’area euro. Un futuro sicuramente incerto, anche se l’elezione di Emmanuel Macron sembra preannunciare convergenze più agevoli fra Parigi e Berlino: sempre nel segno del rigore.
La priorità dell’Eurozona, secondo Schaeuble, è quella di raggiungere “una convergenza adeguata delle politiche economiche e finanziarie” , fatto che si traduce nel “migliorare nei Paesi dove mancano le riforme strutturali e la competitività”. E l’unione fiscale? Il progetto degli eurobond e della mutualizzazione del debito?L’Unione bancaria con il deposito comune? Il messaggio del ministro divenuto simbolo dell’austerità è chiaro: “Prima di mettere i rischi in comune, dobbiamo ridurli”.
Un modo per riuscire a promuovere le riforme necessarie a conquistare maggiore competitività sarebbe quella di istituire un ministro europeo con possibilità di intervento diretto sui bilanci nazionali. Quest’idea, ha confermato Schaeuble, è di suo gradimento: senza il potere di intervento un ministro di questo tipo “non ha senso”, fatto sul quale anche Macron la pensa “esattamente allo stesso modo”, anche se “bisognerebbe cambiare i Trattati europei”. Il realismo, però, non manca al ministro tedesco, ben consapevole che le “modifiche dei Trattati richiedono l’unanimità e la ratifica nei Parlamenti nazionali o in alcuni Paesi addirittura un referendum”. »
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Alla luce di quanto sopra riportato, dovrebbe essere evidente il contenuto degli articoli che seguono.
Interview conducted by Burkhard Ewert and Ralf Geisenhanslüke.
Translation: Deutsche Bundesbank
Mr Weidmann, Germany now has a new government – what do you see as its most pressing tasks?
The same ones the last government had on its plate. It’s still the case that the ageing population and a feeble long-term growth trend pose huge challenges for us here in Germany. And then, of course, there’s how we deal with globalisation and digitalisation, and stake out the road ahead for the euro area. All this is tied up with the question of shared prosperity. The knottier global backdrop isn’t making these tasks any easier.
You’ve already made the acquaintance of the new Finance Minister, of course.
That’s right, I had the pleasure of getting to know Olaf Scholz in Berlin about ten years ago, back when he was Labour Minister and I was the Economic Policy Adviser at the Chancellery.
What’s your take on the SPD taking charge of the Ministry of Finance?
There’s nothing new about that. Remember, an SPD politician held the post of Finance Minister in the first grand coalition under Angela Merkel’s leadership. The governing parties during the last legislative period are continuing their coalition, albeit with a changed line-up and different priorities in some areas. In fiscal policy matters, the coalition agreement is largely focused on continuity.
Can the same be said about how Germany will operate in Brussels? Might we not see fresh nuance on the fiscal policy or debt management fronts? A shift away from the austerity diktat, perhaps in the interests of Italy?
I don’t buy all this talk about an austerity diktat – and there aren’t any figures to back it up either. Fiscal policy in the euro area has been more or less neutral since 2013. And let me add that fiscal prudence isn’t just some German fad. It was enshrined in the European treaties and besides, it is in the interests of the individual countries to have enough financial leeway to carry them through in good times and in bad. That’s why I see no reason why Olaf Scholz should not be pressing the case for sound public finances in Europe. Increased risk sharing, which is repeatedly being called for, is one major area in which healthy government finances would be a key prerequisite, albeit an insufficient one.
Germany’s target is to achieve a balanced budget. But what about Greece? Would debt forgiveness be an option once the third assistance package expires?
It’s safe to say that forgiving debt isn’t the key to ironing out the fundamental problems dogging Greece. It’s up to Greece itself to do what needs to be done to create a sound footing for a competitive economy and robust public finances over the medium and long term. At the end of the day, there needs to be a reliable prospect that the country will be able to stand on its own two feet. Failing that, even if debt is forgiven, we’ll be back where we started within the space of a few years. And we shouldn’t forget that the exceptionally favourable terms of the assistance loans have already gone a very long way indeed towards easing Greece’s debt burden.
How might a European Monetary Fund (EMF) come into this?
EMF is a term that means very different things to different people. But if a reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), say, helped promote sounder budgetary positions, it would get my backing. The Bundesbank has tabled proposals outlining how the ESM could improve fiscal surveillance and how it can be strengthened as a crisis resolution instrument. Yet there are many who are hoping for a mechanism which provides funds with no strings attached when the economy runs into choppier waters. If you ask me, that’s neither necessary nor sensible, because flexibility is already built into the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and enables member states to respond to cyclical fluctuations. And there is nothing to prevent fiscally sound countries from temporarily stepping up their borrowing within the SGP framework. In any case, the proposals on the table haven’t won me over, and I’m particularly sceptical about creating new scope for borrowing or transfer systems.
Are European governments too soft in matters of fiscal policy?
Let’s just say that the tailwinds provided by the very upbeat economy and the exceptionally low interest rates are not being harnessed for consolidation purposes. The highly indebted countries, especially, are only reducing their debt ratios at a very sluggish pace.
The EU is looking to tap revenue sources of its own, such as by levying a tax. What’s your take on this, and who should have the last say in how that revenue is shared – the Parliament, the Council or the Commission?
I think this debate is putting the cart before the horse. Tapping new sources of revenue and raising more funding for the EU isn’t an end in itself. We first need to work out where it makes more sense for tasks to be performed at the European level – border control, for instance, or transnational infrastructure projects – and where it would be better to organise the European Union’s activities on a decentralised basis. Perhaps work can also be re-delegated or returned to the member states. Only when the desired outcome, and an efficient path towards achieving it, have been mapped out can talk turn to the question of funding. Sequencing the steps in that order would, I feel, also boost public backing for the European project.
When do you think it will be clear when the Eurosystem’s asset purchases, which are scheduled to run until September, will come to an end?
The ECB Governing Council has yet to decide when the purchases will be terminated, and how. Speaking personally, I think the strong economic situation and also the projected price dynamics will allow us to set an early end-date. Market participants, at least, are expecting the purchase programme to be concluded before the year is out.
Interest rate policy has driven real estate prices higher. How do you see the path ahead?
We don’t forecast how prices will evolve in individual markets. Saying that, it is clear that the highly expansionary monetary policy combined with the exceptionally upbeat economy has sent asset prices higher, including for real estate. In Germany, property prices have raced higher, above all in urban areas. Our model calculations indicate that real estate in big cities is overvalued by as much as 35 %. But what matters to us as a central bank, and for our banking supervision and financial stability tasks, is whether this will evolve into a risk to the financial system, perhaps because borrowers take on too much debt or banks soften their lending standards. We see no sign of either development at present.
Looking at the market from a tenant’s vantage point, what do you think about the cap on rent increases?
The main reason why rental prices in new contracts are increasing is because housing demand in urban centres is far outstripping supply. The key to providing lasting relief in the real estate market, then, is to build more – that is, create additional housing. Construction activity already picked up noticeably last year, and if it is still constrained in any way, policymakers can and should take action.
The economy is booming, but inflation is lagging behind expectations. Wage growth is also proving to be sluggish. Why is that?
That’s not the case in Germany anymore. The recent pay deals negotiated by the IG Metall trade union are certainly meatier. This makes them consistent with a cyclically driven upturn in wage growth of the kind we were expecting to see. Price pressures also look set to increase in the next few years.
Yes, but the kind of pay deals that metalworkers negotiated in the past aren’t the same as what nursing assistants, say, or employees in other professions tended to get. Do you think things will be different this time around?
Wage growth will always vary from one sector to the next, of course, because of sectoral differences in the economic situation and labour market conditions, for example. That said, with capacity utilisation and employment levels high, we are currently expecting wage settlements to pick up overall.
You’re the clear favourite to become the ECB’s next president. If you get the job, what would you do differently?
Mario Draghi still has something like a year and a half of his term of office left to serve. Speculating about his successor at this stage would do the office a disservice and I’d rather stay out of any such speculation.
Succession is also the name of the game on the Bundesbank’s Executive Board, with both Carl-Ludwig Thiele and Andreas Dombret leaving the institution. Do you think expertise is always given the attention it deserves in the search for successors, or would you say that political matters have more of a bearing?
It goes without saying that Executive Board members need to possess the relevant professional qualifications to look after the Bundesbank’s various tasks. And in my view, it’s also important for us to assemble a good blend of skills and experience on our Executive Board. Having a political background can certainly be of merit – the Bundesbank does, after all, operate in a political context as well. Similarly, administrative abilities are valuable because the Bundesbank is a large institution that needs to be run professionally. And we need Board members with the ability to take charge of banking supervision, say, or shape monetary policy. It’s the blend that counts.
Talking about having a good blend, wouldn’t it be preferable to have an additional female Executive Board member?
You’re right there – our Executive Board is another area where women are underrepresented. I would like to see a greater number of qualified women on our Executive Board in the future.
Women make up 60 % of employees in the financial sector, but hold just 5 % of the top jobs. Should women stick to being a pretty face at the bank counter and forget about wanting to move upstairs?
I can only speak for the Bundesbank, and that’s not a commercial bank but a central bank, a public institution, where the share of female employees is currently 44 % and rising all the time. Equality is something I feel strongly about, not least in terms of managerial positions, and we’re on the right track to boost the proportion of women with leadership responsibility. Our future depends on our ability to unlock our employees’ potential, whether they are female or male. And given that the Bundesbank is also feeling the effects of an ageing society, we need to be an attractive employer, not least for women.
18 March was Equal Pay Day, the symbolic day dedicated to raising awareness of the gender pay gap. Do women earn less than men at the Bundesbank, too?
Our wages are based on the public sector pay scale, and that means same work, same pay. It’s all about boosting the number of women holding managerial posts. That’s one reason why we drew up an equal opportunities action plan, which made it easier to work part-time, say, and saw the launch of a mentoring programme. And the day nursery here on the Bank’s grounds also helps our employees improve their work-life balance. What counts is that we embrace and promote equality on a daily basis here at the Bundesbank.
But you have failed to achieve the targets you set yourself, and a comparison with the supreme Federal authorities also shows that women tend to be promoted less frequently at the Bundesbank, relative to the proportion of female staff employed there. Isn’t your action plan having the desired effect?
It is, although I’m not denying that we still have some way to go. During my term of office, the share of women in managerial posts has risen by five percentage points, from roughly one-fifth to one-quarter. That has brought us very close to our milestones, and we are looking to push this figure notably higher in the years ahead. I see eye to eye with our equal opportunities officer on this score that it’s mainly a question of taking concrete measures to move us closer towards the target. A multiyear analysis needs to show that clear progress has been made.
Il Brandenburg è un Land dell’est poco popolato, circa due milioni e mezzo di abitanti. È uno dei Länder tedeschi più poveri e trascurati dal Governo federale. Il suo pil procapite valeva 24,200 euro.
Nelle elezioni del 24 settembre scorso la Cdu ha preso il 26.7%, l’Spd il 17.2% ed AfD il 20.2%.
Si dovrebbe far notare come i sondaggi a ridosso delle elezioni avessero fornito risultati molto differenti: CDU 25%, Spd 28%, AfD 15%.
Le più recenti prospezioni elettorali della Civey indicherebbero la Spd in discesa dal 31.9% del 2014 all’attuale 21.8%, la Cdu dal 23% al 22.1% ed AfD in salita dal 12.2% all’attuale 18.8%.
Nessuno si stupirebbe che queste proiezioni sovrastimassero Cdu ed Spd e sottostimassero AfD.
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Tuttavia il problema reale sembrerebbe non essere questo.
Se tutti sono concordi nel constatare come il Brandenburg conti nella Federazione per il solo 3.05% della popolazione, tutti sono peraltro concordi nel constatare sia l’importanza politica di questo Land sia il fatto che anche esso manda i suoi senatori al Bundesrat. Alla conquista del governo di un Land corrisponde una nuova presenza nel Burdesrat.
Spesso il destino delle guerre si decide in una battaglia anche molto lontana dalla capitale: si pensi solo a Midway oppure a Kursk. Per Frau Merkel le battaglie saranno l’Assia, la Baviera e poi il Brandenburg, sempre che non sia già stata rimossa dalla carica che occupa.
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«Ingo Senftleben (10. August 1974 in Großenhain) ist ein deutscher Politiker (CDU) und seit dem 18. November 2014 als CDU-Fraktionsvorsitzender Oppositionsführer im Landtag von Brandenburg. Am 25. April 2015 wurde er zudem zum Landesvorsitzenden der CDU Brandenburg gewählt. ….
Von 2004 bis 2009 war er Vorsitzender des Ausschusses für Bildung, Jugend und Sport und bildungspolitischer Sprecher der CDU-Landtagsfraktion im Landtag Brandenburg. Von 2009 bis 2014 war er Parlamentarischer Geschäftsführer der CDU-Fraktion Brandenburg und Sprecher der CDU-Fraktion für den ländlichen Raum und Demographie. Seit 2009 ist er Mitglied im Präsidium und Hauptausschuss des Landtages Brandenburg. Im November 2014 übernahm er den Fraktionsvorsitz in der CDU-Landtagsfraktion.
Mitglied im Braunkohleausschuss des Landes Brandenburg ist Senftleben seit Oktober 2014, im rbb-Rundfunkrat sitzt er seit Februar 2015.» [Fonte]
Herr Ingo Senftleben dal 18 novembre 2014 è a capo del gruppo parlamentare della CDU nel parlamento di stato del Brandeburgo. Il 25 aprile 2015 è stato anche eletto presidente di stato della CDU
Dal 2009 al 2014 è stato direttore parlamentare della fazione CDU in Brandeburgo ed è portavoce della fazione CDU per le aree rurali e la demografia.
Dall’ ottobre 2014 Senftleben è membro del comitato per la lignite del Land Brandeburgo e dal febbraio 2015 è membro del Consiglio radiotelevisivo Rbb.
Herr Ingo Senftleben è dunque un personaggio politico di rilievo nella Cdu tedesca ed in quella del Brandenburg in modo particolare.
Volente o nolente la Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel non può fare a meno di sentire i pareri espressi da Herr Ingo Senftleben.
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Adesso che la situazione generale è stata delineata possiamo meglio comprendere cosa stia succedendo.
Da quando in Germania sono comparse sulla scena politica Pegida a Dresden ed Alternative für Deutschland nella Federazione, i partiti tradizionali, Union, Cdu, Csu ed Spd hanno cercato di ghettizzarle in una sorta di novello arco costituzionale, rifiutandosi di aver rapporto alcuno con esse. Ma gli equilibri sono stati rotti.
AfD ha però ottenuto il 24 settembre uno straordinario risultato elettorale, entrando al Bundestag con oltre 90 deputati, con i quali bene o male i partiti tradizionali devono fare i conti. Non è tanto AfD che ha vinto, quanto piuttosto Cdu, Csu ed Spd che hanno perso il consenso elettorale.
Nei Länder dell’ex est AfD è proiettata al momento al 25%. Non è detto che possa mantenere queste percentuali, ma non è nemmeno escluso che possa migliorarle.
Il quadro che inizia a delinearsi in Brandenburg, così come in altri Länder, è l’impossibilità di formare un governo, causa i veti incrociati.
In Brandenburg sarebbe impossibile una Große Koalition, essendo Cdu al 22.1% ed Spd al 21.8%. Un governo Spd, Linke e Grüne sarebbe altrettanto impossibile sia numericamente sia per incompatibilità personali.
Lo stallo politico è evidente.
Ecco quindi che Herr Ingo Senftleben avanza nuove proposte, che per Frau Merkel sono sia un insulto personale sia una eresia degna della Siberia di un volta.
«Ingo Senftleben, leader of Mrs Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) in the state of Brandenburg, said he would hold negotiations with the AfD after regional elections next year»
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«Germany’s mainstream parties have all refused to enter talks or share power with the AfD, which they consider far-Right»
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«If we have the opportunity after the state election, I will open talks with all parties. …. I do not rule out discussions with the AfD»
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Questo è il commento di Frau Merkel
«We are sticking to a clear demarcation both on the right and to the left, which I made clear in a to the Brandenburg CDU leader»
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Questo è quanto.
Ma la poltrona della Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel sta vistosamente scricchiolando
Che Herr Ingo Senftleben l’anno prossimo sia ancora alla guida di ciò che resta nel suo Land della Cdu se ne hanno ragionevoli sicurezze, ma che la Cdu sia ancora a guida di Frau Merkel potrebbero esserci fortissimi dubbi.
ANGELA Merkel has been plunged into fresh crisis tonight as a senior member of her party opens the door for talks with election rivals and nationalist party Alternative for Germany party (AfD) after saying he is ready to go into coalition with them.
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Ingo Senftleben, leader of Mrs Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) in the state of Brandenburg, said he would hold negotiations with the AfD after regional elections next year.
The AfD finished third in last year’s general election and became the first nationalist party to sit in the German parliament since the 1960s.
It also hold seats in all but two of the country’s 16 regional parliaments but Germany’s mainstream parties have all refused to enter talks or share power with the AfD, which they consider far-Right.
But Mr Senftleben has now declared he is prepared to consider a deal with the party if it enabled him to win power.
He said: “If we have the opportunity after the state election, I will open talks with all parties.
“I do not rule out discussions with the AfD.”
But he said there would be no deal with the AfD under Brandenburg leader Andreas Kalbitz, who he said had “links to the far-Right”.
Germany’s federal system gives regional governments considerable power and for the AfD to win a share of power would be seen as a major coup for the party and huge blow to the Merkel administration.
Mr Senftleben was immediately slapped down by party chairman Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who is widely seen as Mrs Merkel’s chosen successor.
She said: “We are sticking to a clear demarcation both on the right and to the left, which I made clear in a to the Brandenburg CDU leader.”
The CDU is in opposition in Brandenburg and Mr Senftleben is clearly trying to find the best position from which to win power.
The AfD reacted coolly to the CDU’s advances.
A spokesman said: “The AfD alone decides about its personnel.”
Hastein. Re Vikingo. Saccheggiò Norbona, Nimes, Arles; poi Bourges, Orléans ed Anger. I suoi successori sognano il saccheggio dell’Esm.
L’Italia sta danzando il minuetto della eventuale quanto improbabile formazione di un governo con grande soddisfazione dei paesi che formano gli otto Nordici: l’assenza dell’Italia consente loro di far piani che poi lo Stivale dovrà calcare, volente o nolente.
Ma non è mica detto che questo dispiaccia poi troppo ai signori Di Maio, Salvini e Berlusconi. Infatti, anche se non è ancora definito il da farsi, è molto verosimile che l’Italia ne esca con le ossa rotte ed i Contribuenti italiani ridotti alla miseria. Nessun governo ama invero il prendere decisioni impopolari.
In buona sostanza il club degli Otto Paesi Nordici vorrebbe:
– nessuna assicurazione comune europea sui depositi bancari (“European Deposit Insurance Scheme”) inferiori ai 100.000 euro;
– si deve prima attuare:
– – – ulteriori misure di “riduzione del rischio”
– – – un drastico taglio ai crediti deteriorati Npl detenuti soprattutto dalle banche greche, italiane e portoghesi
– – – una severa limitazione, nei bilanci delle banche, dei titoli di Stato emessi dai paesi in cui operano (una vecchia idea di Wolfgang Schauble)
– nuovi interventi del Fondo salva Stati Esm solo se gli stati riceventi ristrutturano il loro debito
– nessun utilizzo dell’Esm come rete di sicurezza (“backstop”) per il Fondo unico europeo di risoluzione delle crisi bancarie
– apparentemente tutti contro la conversione dell’Esm in Fondo Monetario europeo.
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Ciascuno di questi punti sarebbe già di per sé stesso doloroso per l’Italia, ma uno potrebbe essere un colpo mortale.
Sarebbe questo la severa limitazione all’ammontare massimo che le banche di un paese possano detenere in titoli sovrani emessi da quel paese stesso.
Una regola del genere che entrasse in vigore in un momento di rialzo dei tassi di interesse a livello mondiale genererebbe una situazione che potrebbe rapidamente sfuggire di mano sia a Banca di Italia sia al Governo. Senza esserne obbligate ben difficilmente le banche proseguirebbero gli acquisti di titoli sovrani, figurarsi poi se fosse imposto un tetto.
Bruxelles, 13 apr. (askanews) – Le posizioni degli Otto Stati nordici possono essere riassunte così: 1) niente assicurazione comune europea sui depositi bancari (“European Deposit Insurance Scheme”) inferiori ai 100.000 euro, senza aver attuato prima ulteriori misure di “riduzione del rischio”: un drastico taglio ai crediti deteriorati Npl detenuti soprattutto dalle banche greche, italiane e portoghesi, e una severa limitazione, nei bilanci delle banche, dei titoli di Stato emessi dai paesi in cui operano (una vecchia idea di Wolfgang Schauble); 2) eventuali nuovi interventi del Fondo salva Stati Esm condizionati a ristrutturazioni “semi automatiche” del debito pubblico dei paesi richiedenti, in cambio della trasformazione dello stesso Esm in un Fondo Monetario europeo con capacità finanziarie accresciute; 3) no all’utilizzo dell’Esm come rete di sicurezza (“backstop”) per il Fondo unico europeo di risoluzione delle crisi bancarie.
Ieri sono arrivate anche, particolarmente dure, le dichiarazioni di Ralph Brinkhaus, numero due della coalizione di Cdu-Csu guidata dalla cancelliera Angela Merkel: una serie di “no” e di altre risposte praticamente in linea con le posizione degli Otto paesi nordeuropei. E Brinkhaus ha minacciato anche una bocciatura netta “del popolo tedesco” alla reintroduzione “dalla porta di servizio” di qualunque proposta di emissione di “eurobond” per sostituire anche solo parzialmente i titoli di Stato nazionali. Brinkhaus, semplicemente, sembra preferire lo status quo a qualunque riforma maggiore integrazione che vada nel senso di rendere l’Uem più solidale nei confronti dei paesi del Sud.
E anche il presidente della Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, un falco dell’austerità che i tedeschi sperano di mettere al posto di Mario Draghi alla testa della Bce l’anno prossimo, si è espresso ieri contro la conversione dell’Esm in Fondo Monetario europeo.
Quello che manca ancora, in questo quadro, è un accordo fra la cancelliera Merkel e il nuovo ministro delle Finanze per arrivare a una posizione consolidata su tutti questi punti da parte del governo tedesco, per poi tentare di trovare una linea comune (che a questo punto appare molto difficile) con la Francia di Macron, prima del Consiglio europeo di giugno.
E manca, infine, l’Italia. La mancanza ancora a lungo di un governo a Roma può sbilanciare gravemente a favore dell’asse nordico-tedesco questa discussione, sempre più accesa, fondamentale per l’Ue e per il posto che l’Italia avrà nel suo futuro.
Sul bombardamento effettuato da forze occidentali sulla Siria non si hanno notizie ufficiali e sicure, controllate e controllabili.
I media hanno riportato un elevato numero di cifre discordanti e conflittuali. Riportiamo quindi il comunicato del Ministero della Difesa Russo, l’unico ufficiale al momento noto.
«The US alongside its allies conducted a missile strike by its air and naval carriers targeting military and civil facilities of the Syrian Arab Republic on April 14 in the period from 3.42 am till 5.10 am (MSK).»
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«Announced French aircraft have not been registered by the Russian air defence systems.»
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«It is reported that the B-1B, F-15 and F-16 aircraft of the USAF as well as the Tornado airplanes of the UK RAF over the Mediterranean Sea, and the USS Laboon and USS Monterey located in the Red Sea were used during the operation»
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«As preliminary reported, there are no civilian casualties and losses among the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Information will be further specified and made public.»
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«As evident by the available data, 103 cruise missiles have been launched, including Tomahawk naval-based missiles as well as GBU-38 guided air bombs fired from the B-1B; the F-15 and F-16 aircraft launched air-to-surface missiles. …. The Tornado airplanes of the UK RAF launched eight Scalp EG missiles.»
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«In total, 71 cruise missiles have been intercepted. The S-125, S-200, Buk, Kvadrat, and Osa Syrian AD systems were involved in repelling the attack.»
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«There were no cruise missiles entering the Russian AD responsibility area. The Russian air defence systems were not applied.»
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Cerchiamo di ragionare sui pochi dati disponibili e tenendo presente che potrebbero anche non essere sicuri: sono soltanto quelli ritrovabili da fonte ufficiale.
– L’attacco sarebbe stato condotto da un centinaio di missili da crociera.
– Sarebbero stati bombardati una decina circa di siti militari, ma non si lamentano vittime. Fatto questo abbastanza strano per un attacco con armi offensive di tal tipo e di tale potenza.
– La contraerea siriana avrebbe abbattuto ben più della metà dei missili di crociera che sarebbero stati lanciati. Si resta stupefatti di fronte ad una simile notizia, sempre che poi risulti essere vera. La Siria è infatti dotata di sistemi d’arma S-125 ed S-200: sistemi vetusti ed ampiamente obsoleti. Non solo gli S-125 sono stati progettati negli anni cinquanta, ossia settanta anni or sono, ma hanno un raggio di azione di 25 km, ed una tangenza di 25,000 metri. Il sistema S-200 è stato realizzato negli anni sessanta. Ha una raggio di azione di 300 km, ed una tangenza di 20,000 metri. Fu un S-200 ad abbattere il 10 febbraio 2018 un cacciabombardiere F-16 della aviazione israeliana.
Si tenga presente come la Russia abbia sviluppato dopo questi sistemi l’S-300, l’S400 ed in fine l’S-500.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Considerazioni.
La prima considerazione verte il fatto che il lancio di un gran numero di missili da crociera non abbia esitato in almeno una perdita da parte siriana. Una che si una. Questa azione rassomiglierebbe più ad una usuale esercitazione di tiro che ad un’operazione militare. Né si venga a dire che la precisione dei cruise occidentali sia tale da evitare con cura le persone umane. Tutto lascerebbe pensare che tale azione sia stata preventivamente concordata: vi lanciamo addosso un po’ di missili, ma voi sgombrate prima gli obbiettivi. Le basi russe saranno puntigliosamente evitate.
La seconda considerazione verte sui cruise che sono stati lanciati. Gli occidentali dispongono sicuramente di missili da crociera in grado di non essere intercettati da sistemi d’arma vecchi di settanta anni. Per averne persi 71 dei 103 lanciati devono essere stati anche loro davvero vecchietti. Oppure le loro rotte furono preventivamente rese note.
La terza considerazione verte la globalità dell’azione. Da che mondo è mondo, nessuna operazione militare è reclamizzata e minacciata come quella degli occidentali in Siria. Il fattore sorpresa è sempre stato essenziale nel condurre operazioni militari.
Conclusione.
I dati disponibili sembrerebbero deporre per un’azione ampiamente concordata tra le parti, un teatrino per i media che hanno poi riportato l’accaduto in toni drammatici, distogliendo l’attenzione del largo pubblico dai pressanti problemi interni dei paesi coinvolti.
Nota.
Nessuno intende mettere in dubbio la buona fede di chicchessia. Ma si constata come al momento almeno non siano state prodotte prove incontestabili dell’uso di armi chimiche. Che poi la fotografia di un bambino sotto un getto di acqua possa costituire prova è fatto che lascia davvero sorridenti: chiunque abbia fatto anche un corso sommario di guerra abc sa benissimo che il quadro clinico di un contaminato è del tutto differente.
→ Министерство обороны Российской Федерации. 2018-04-14. Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Russian General Staff Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy holds briefing for mass media.
The US alongside its allies conducted a missile strike by its air and naval carriers targeting military and civil facilities of the Syrian Arab Republic on April 14 in the period from 3.42 am till 5.10 am (MSK).
The Russian air defence systems at the Khmeimim and Tartus air base timely located and controlled all naval and air launches made by the USA and the UK.
Announced French aircraft have not been registered by the Russian air defence systems.
It is reported that the B-1B, F-15 and F-16 aircraft of the USAF as well as the Tornado airplanes of the UK RAF over the Mediterranean Sea, and the USS Laboon and USS Monterey located in the Red Sea were used during the operation.
The B-1B strategic bombers approached the facilities over the Syrian territory near al-Tanf illegally seized by the USA.
A number Syrian military airfields, industrial and research facilities suffered the missile-bomb strike.
As preliminary reported, there are no civilian casualties and losses among the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Information will be further specified and made public.
As evident by the available data, 103 cruise missiles have been launched, including Tomahawk naval-based missiles as well as GBU-38 guided air bombs fired from the B-1B; the F-15 and F-16 aircraft launched air-to-surface missiles.
The Tornado airplanes of the UK RAF launched eight Scalp EG missiles.
The Syrian air defence systems, which are primarily the USSR-made AD systems, have successfully countered the air and naval strikes.
In total, 71 cruise missiles have been intercepted. The S-125, S-200, Buk, Kvadrat, and Osa Syrian AD systems were involved in repelling the attack.
It proves high efficiency of the Syrian armament and professional skills of the Syrian servicemen trained by the Russian specialists.
Over the last eighteen months, Russia has completely recovered the Syrian air defence systems, and continues its development.
It is to be stressed that several years ago given the strong request by our western partners, Russia opted out of supplying the S-300 AD systems to Syria. Taking into account the recent incident, Russia believes it possible to reconsider this issue not only regarding Syria but other countries as well.
The strike targeted Syrian air bases as well. Russia has registered the following data.
Four missiles targeted the Damascus International Airport; 12 missiles – the Al-Dumayr airdrome, all the missiles have been shot down.
18 missiles targeted the Blai airdrome, all the missiles shot down.
12 missiles targeted the Shayrat air base, all the missiles shot down. Air bases were not affected by the strike.
Five out of nine missiles were shot down targeting the unoccupied Mazzeh airdrome.
Thirteen out of sixteen missiles were shot down targeting the Homs airdrome. There are no heavy destructions.
In total 30 missiles targeted facilities near Barzah and Jaramana. Seven of them have been shot down. These facilities allegedly relating to the so-called “Damascus military chemical programme” were partially destructed. However, the objects have not been used for a long time, so there were no people and equipment there.
The Russian air defence systems have been alerted. Fighter jets are on combat air patrol now.
There were no cruise missiles entering the Russian AD responsibility area. The Russian air defence systems were not applied.
Russia considers the strike to be a response to the success of the Syrian Armed Forces in fighting international terrorism and liberating its territory, rather than a response to the alleged chemical attack.
Besides, the attack took place on a day when the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) special mission was to start working on investigating incident in the city of Douma where chemical attack allegedly occurred.
It is to be stressed that there are no facilities on producing chemical weapons in Syria, and this has been documented by the OPCW.
The American aggression proves that the USA is not interested in objectivity of the ongoing investigation, seeks to wreck peaceful settlement in Syria and destabilize environment in the Middle East, and all these have nothing to do with declared objectives of countering international terrorism.
Currently the situation in Damascus and other settlements is assessed to be stable.The environment is being monitored.
Herr Weidmann ha la caratteristica fuori dall’ordinario di saper andare all’essenziale dei problemi e di presentare un modo semplice argomenti anche molto complessi.
Si condividano o meno le sue argomentazioni, val sempre la pena di leggerle con molta cura. Poi, come tutti i Governatori di grandi banche centrali, parla anche molto tra le righe.
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«Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann has welcomed the United States’ decision to initially exempt the European Union from the recently enacted tariffs on steel and aluminium.»
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«Nonetheless, this is no victory for international free trade»
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«The objective must be not only to prevent new barriers to trade or keep them as low as possible, but also to eliminate existing barriers»
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«Mr Weidmann described market expectations of a first rate hike around the middle of 2019 as “not wholly unrealistic”.»
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«Mr Weidmann also discussed institutional reform of the monetary union»
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«He considered it a mistake, he said, to reduce the discussions about the EU’s financial framework to issues surrounding net payments to the EU budget»
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«It would make more sense to first clarify which tasks the European Union is to take on in future, which tasks it might be possible to return to the member states, and where savings could be made»
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«A shock such as the Greek crisis would no longer find the euro area in such an unprepared state»
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«But the euro area isn’t yet permanently crisis-proof»
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«It would send the wrong signal …. to mutualise risks that arose under national responsibility»
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«there was little scope to expand the liability of savers or taxpayers from other member states»
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Riassumiamo e traduciamo dal linguaggio ieratico dei Governatori di banche centrali ad un linguaggio corrente, tenendo conto di tutto il testo dell’intervento.
– Il commercio deve essere libero in modo bidirezionale. Meglio sarebbe senza dazi, ma nel caso che siano eguali o bilanciati da ambo le parti;
– gli accordi bilaterale sembrerebbero essere più facilmente gestibili di quelli intercorrenti tra molte entità;
– circa la riforma dell’unione economica sarebbe errato limitare i discorsi al solo quadro finanziario;
– il cuore del problema è «to first clarify which tasks the European Union is to take on in future», ossia chiarire in primo luogo quali compiti l’Unione europea dovrà assumere in futuro.
*
Seguono due severi warning.
– L’area dell’euro non è ancora definitivamente a prova di crisi;
– sarebbe errato far assumere a responsabilità collettiva i rischi assunti dalle diverse nazioni;
– infatti:
«there was little scope to expand the liability of savers or taxpayers from other member states».
Ci sono ben pochi margini.
Come non condividere queste considerazioni?
Ci si ricorda come titolava il 17 aprile 2013 il The Telegraph:
iddle of 2019 as “not wholly unrealistic”. Price pressures in the euro area remained sluggish. Nonetheless, in their most recent projections, the European Central Bank’s economists said they expected inflation to rise to 1.7% by 2020. This figure was “broadly” in line with the medium-term definition of price stability, Mr Weidmann explained. With that in mind, it was no surprise that financial markets had, for some time, been expecting net asset purchases to end before 2018 is out.
Asymmetrical monetary union susceptible to crises
In his remarks, Mr Weidmann also discussed institutional reform of the monetary union. He considered it a mistake, he said, to reduce the discussions about the EU’s financial framework to issues surrounding net payments to the EU budget. “It would make more sense to first clarify which tasks the European Union is to take on in future, which tasks it might be possible to return to the member states, and where savings could be made.” Once that had been accomplished, policymakers should go about clarifying how joint responsibilities should be funded.
Mr Weidmann believes that the euro area is currently in a much better position compared with 2010. A shock such as the Greek crisis would no longer find the euro area in such an unprepared state, he said. “But the euro area isn’t yet permanently crisis-proof,” he warned. He therefore welcomed the fact that France’s President Emmanuel Macron has given the debate fresh momentum with his reform proposals.
“Joint liability must come with the option of co-determination”
It would send the wrong signal, Mr Weidmann believes, to mutualise risks that arose under national responsibility. It was important, he explained, first to make significant progress in getting rid of legacy risks. That included the outstanding stocks of non-performing loans and sovereign bonds on banks’ balance sheets, the Bundesbank’s president explained. As long as it remained possible for actions at the national level to have a substantial impact on banks, there was little scope to expand the liability of savers or taxpayers from other member states, Mr Weidmann said. It was essential that the unity of actions and liability for their consequences be maintained, for it was only in so doing that a stable regulatory framework could emerge in which monetary policymakers were free to concentrate on their mandate of preserving price stability. “After all, it won’t do them any good in the long run to have to intervene constantly as a crisis response unit,” Mr Weidmann warned.
23 maggio 1918. Defenestrazione di Praga. I Praghesi insorti catturarono i due governatori imperiali, Jaroslav Bořita z Martinic e Vilém Slavata, ed un loro segretario, Philip Fabricius, e li lanciarono fuori dalle finestre del castello.
«One of the goals of the movement is to remove Merkel as the head of the Union at a party conference in the autumn»
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«A faction within Merkel’s conservatives want her to change course from centrist policies»
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«Disgruntled members from within German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservative bloc are calling for a reversal of her centrist policies and a return to conservative “core beliefs.”»
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«Traditionalists from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), will launch a “conservative manifesto” on Saturday to push for a change of course»
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«The group “WerteUnion,” (Union of Values) wants the party to focus on family values, limit immigration, reintroduce compulsory military service and end dual nationality »
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«We want the Union to reflect on its core values and to translate our beliefs based on Christianity into everyday political life. This includes above all questions on the right to life, the family and human dignity»
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«a more restrictive immigration policy based on skills shortages, an “end to a hasty clean energy transition” and an end to “state support of ideologically motivated gender research.”»
Questa Große Koalition riunisce le tre componenti uscite perdenti dalle elezioni del 24 settembre.
È nata perché così è stato imposto alla Germania, ma è un trio contro natura.
Pur di formare un governo, Cdu, Csu ed Spd hanno dovuto abiurare a tutti quei principi dei quali si erano fatti paladini in campagna elettorale. Questo non è stato un accordo, bensì un compromesso.
Compromesso decantato dalla stampa liberal di sinistra, ma sgradito agli elettori. Infratest dmap nel sondaggio del 4 aprile assegna alla Union (Cdu + Csu) il 32.6%, alla Spd il 17.9% ed ad AfD il 14.0%. AfD ha raggiunto il 25% nei Länder dell’est. Ed ad ottobre si andrà a votare in Hesse ed in Baviera.
O questo governo cambia, anche rapidamente, oppure si suicida andando incontro ad una nuova débâcle elettorale, ben peggiore di quella subita il 24 settembre.
Se i socialdemocratici appaiono del tutto storditi ed incapaci di reagire, nell’Union sta crescendo come una marea un movimento che reclama a voce sempre più alta e chiara un abbandono delle politiche liberal ed un ritorno ai “core values and to translate our beliefs based on Christianity“.
L’obbiettivo è defenestrare la Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel alla tradizionale assemblea autunnale del partito.
Con questa linea politica forse la Csu potrebbe farcela a non perdere le elezioni statali: Civey nel sondaggio del 6 aprile dava la Csu in rimonta al 44.5%, una bella risalita dal 39% ove la aveva fatta precipitare Frau Merkel.
Quindi, pochi giorni dopo, la fondazione del Gruppo “WerteUnion“.
Pochi avevano previsto che in Germania qualcuno avrebbe osato tornare a parlare di “beliefs based on Christianity” e di Heimat. Già: proprio in Germania.
A faction within Merkel’s conservatives want her to change course from centrist policies. One of the goals of the movement is to remove Merkel as the head of the Union at a party conference in the autumn.
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Disgruntled members from within German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservative bloc are calling for a reversal of her centrist policies and a return to conservative “core beliefs.”
Traditionalists from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), will launch a “conservative manifesto” on Saturday to push for a change of course.
The group “WerteUnion,” (Union of Values) wants the party to focus on family values, limit immigration, reintroduce compulsory military service and end dual nationality, among other things.
“We want the Union to reflect on its core values and to translate our beliefs based on Christianity into everyday political life. This includes above all questions on the right to life, the family and human dignity. Our endeavor also applies to the preservation of God’s creation,” reads the draft manifesto.
Among the principles to be protected is that of “father, mother and child” as the foundation of society, a reference to the legalization of gay marriage last year.
According to the group’s website, WerteUnion seeks “to create a stronger network among conservative and economic liberal forces within the Union and contribute especially to the CDU reflecting on its core values.”
The conservative faction calls for a more restrictive immigration policy based on skills shortages, an “end to a hasty clean energy transition” and an end to “state support of ideologically motivated gender research.”
Alexander Mitsch, the head of WerteUnion, called the appointment to the interior ministry of Horst Seehofer, the CSU head and critic of Merkel’s refugee policy, a “good start.”
“Now he has to deliver and prove that he can preserve the core values of our society despite threats like uncontrolled mass immigration and rising crime,” he said.
Seeking to distance the group from the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), he stressed that right-wing, left-wing and Islamist extremism must be equally opposed.
One of the goals of the movement is to remove Merkel as the head of the Union at a party conference in the autumn.
«Fidesz, il partito di Orbán, è ancora il più votato con il 49% dei consensi, il che gli assicura nuovamente la maggioranza costituzionale dei due terzi nell’Assemblea nazionale, questa volta con 134 seggi su 199»
«Nonostante gli accordi di desistenza raggiunti dai partiti dell’opposizione in 29 collegi, Fidesz ha vinto ben 97 mandati diretti.»
I collegi sono 106. Gli accordi di desistenza tra partiti che non prendono voti lasciano il tempo che trovano. Si rassegnino i liberal: in Ungheria non contano più nulla. Non sono riusciti a far eleggere nemmeno un loro deputato: nessuno, manco uno per sbaglio. E più continuano a vantarsi di rappresentare la “società civile“, tutto il popolo, più si coprono di ridicolo: la gente li sberleffa. Li mette alla berlina.
*
Stiamo vivendo una realtà schizofrenica.
Da una parte vi sono i relitti di una dirigenza europea che non ha più maggioranza. È cambiata la composizione del Consiglio Europeo ed il prossimo anno si voterà per il rinnovo del parlamento europeo.
Se è vero che Frau Merkel è nuovamente cancelliera tedesca, sarebbe altrettanto vero il constatare che politicamente il suo peso è ai minimi storici per un governo tedesco.
Se è vero che i media sono ancora quasi tutti in mano ai liberal socialisti, è altrettanto vero che non contano più nulla: basti pensare alle elezioni tedesche del 24 settembre, quelle italiane del 4 marzo, ed ora a quelle ungheresi.
Possono starnazzare quanto vogliono, che tanto gli Elettori non li votano più. Gli Elettori dei liberal e dei socialisti non ne vogliono proprio più sapere.
È quindi solo logica conseguenza che questa Unione Europea che avrebbe voluto essere uno stato, liberal e socialista, si stia sgretolando.
* * * * * * *
Cerchiamo di riassumente a grandi linee i motivi della annosa lite tra Polonia e paesi del Visegrad, dell’ex Europa orientale in generale, con l’Unione Europea.
In primo luogo, chiariamo immediatamente come l’Unione Europea e la sua attuale dirigenza pro tempore siano due entità totalmente differenti. La attuale presidenza Juncker e Tusk ha perso la maggioranza in seno al Consiglio Europeo, ossia l’assise dei capi di stato o di governo dei ventotto paesi afferenti l’Unione. Con le tornate elettorali degli ultimi tempi, Mr Macron ha sostituito Mr Hollande, Herrr Sebastian Kurz ha sostituito il socialista Herr Christian Kern, la Frau Merkel dei nostri giorni è il fantasma di ciò che era in passato, ed a breve Mr Gentiloni sarà sostituito da un Di Maio oppure da un Salvini, che sembrerebbero manifestare idee diametralmente opposte.
Ad oggi, a meno di clamorosi cambi di campo, Mr Juncker non ha nemmeno la maggioranza qualificata dei 4/5, necessaria per prendere decisioni punizionali ne confronti di un qualche stato.
In secondo luogo, or è giusto un anno fa che Frau Merkel ed Mr Juncker avevano minacciato la Polonia che la avrebbero cacciata via dall’Unione Europea. Lungo l’elenco delle birbonate polacche.
– La Polonia non condivide l’idea di avere degli Stati Uniti di Europa, rinunciando alla propria sovranità. I media liberal denominano questa eresia “euroscetticismo”: essa si annida tra gli stati dell’ex est europeo, specie poi nei paesi del Visegrad.
– La Polonia non condivide la scala valoriale liberal di Frau Merkel e di Mr Juncker.
“Poland doesn’t adhere to the basic principles of the rule of law”
Fatto si è che l’Unione Europea non è dotata di una Costituzione, anzi, quella proposta fu a suo tempo bocciata da referendum popolari. Restano così indefiniti i “basic principles”, che molto modestamente Frau Merkel e Mr Juncker asseriscano debbano essere i loro. L’Unione Europea è così quel simpaticissimo posto che si è dotato di una Corte Costituzionale che applica una costituzione che non esiste: ‘interpreta‘ i desideri di Mr Juncker e di Frau Merkel.. Ed i polacchi ancora avrebbero di che ridire.
In terzo luogo, in Polonia le elezioni politiche sono state vinte dal partito PiS, che non condivide la Weltanschauung liberal e nemmeno quella socialdemocratica: Frau Merkel, Herr Juncker, Herr Tusk e tutta la stampa liberal bolla coralmente un simile partito di essere “populista“. Nella terminologia liberal questo termine è una dei peggiori insulti possibili, secondo solo a quello di “omofobo“.
– In quarto luogo, la Polonia è fiera ed orgogliosa del proprio retaggio religioso cattolico, storico, culturale e sociale: essa sostiene in pratica tutto l’opposto di quanto sostenuto dai liberal socialisti.
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«the question focuses on whether the European Union will continue to pay subsidies to the country if Poland doesn’t adhere to the basic principles of the rule of law»
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«Ultimately, there is a lot at stake for Poland and other Eastern European countries: Namely, what the next EU budget will look like and how much those countries will receive in subsidies.»
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«The situation is even more difficult this time around because even though the EU wants to spend more money on issues like protecting its external borders, the integration of immigrants and pan-European scientific research, it will have less cash at its disposal following Brexit and the departure of one of its financially strongest member states.»
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«In response to the governing Law and Justice (PiS) party’s controversial recent judicial reforms, which have the potential to make the country’s judges compliant to the government, the European Commission implemented legal proceedings under Article 7 of the EU treaty. The proceedings could ultimately strip Poland of its voting rights in EU bodies, at least in theory»
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«But so far, Poland’s most powerful man, PiS party head Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has simply ignored Brussels»
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A questo punto sarebbe necessaria una considerazione finale.
La dirigenza dell’Unione Europea ha scagliato contro la Polonia ogni sorta di insulti ed improperi possibili: la ha minacciata di ogni sorta di ritorsione, fino al punto da spaventarla a morte ventilando l’applicazione dell’art 7.
«Officials in Brussels are tired of transferring billions of euros each year to Eastern Europe only for the recipients to cause headache after headache. The four Visegrad Group countries — Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary — alone have received around 150 billion euros in net subsidies from the EU budget since 2007. But when it comes to taking in refugees or adhering to rulings made by the European Court of Justice, they show the EU the cold shoulder.»
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«It is an approach, say officials in Brussels, that is particularly helpful to right-wing populist parties. And the complaint is increasingly being adopted by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government as well.»
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«Officials in Brussels»:
questo è il nodo della questione.
I funzionari di Bruxelles si diano una regolata: non distribuiscono denari propri, bensì quelli messi a disposizione dal Consiglio Europeo, dal popolo sovrano.
Poi, se ne diano una ragione, il Consiglio Europeo è cambiato e con le elezioni dell’anno prossimo cambierà il parlamento europeo: questi funzionari se ne torneranno a casina loro, trotterellando dietro a Mr Juncker.
The European Commission is considering linking member-state subsidies to adherence to the rule of law, a step aimed at bringing a handful of Eastern European countries back into line. But the proposal also threatens to deepen the current rift in Europe.
*
When Günther Oettinger enters the Polish parliament, the Sjem, dozens of cameras immediately turn toward him. A journalist calls out a question to him in German, demanding to know if he hopes to change anything in terms of “regional subsidies.” The question is rather technically formulated, but no matter how Oettinger responds, his answer is guaranteed to be big news here in Poland. After all, the question focuses on whether the European Union will continue to pay subsidies to the country if Poland doesn’t adhere to the basic principles of the rule of law. And during this visit to Warsaw on March 26, it is a question that follows Oettinger throughout the day.
Oettinger is the European Union budget commissioner. It is hardly the most glamorous of posts, but he is nonetheless treated like an official state guest in Warsaw, and both Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and his foreign minister took time out of their schedules to meet with the Brussels officials. Ultimately, there is a lot at stake for Poland and other Eastern European countries: Namely, what the next EU budget will look like and how much those countries will receive in subsidies.
It possible there will be significantly less money from subsidies than in the past — and the blame for that lies with the government in Warsaw. In response to the governing Law and Justice (PiS) party’s controversial recent judicial reforms, which have the potential to make the country’s judges compliant to the government, the European Commission implemented legal proceedings under Article 7 of the EU treaty. The proceedings could ultimately strip Poland of its voting rights in EU bodies, at least in theory. But so far, Poland’s most powerful man, PiS party head Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has simply ignored Brussels. Now, however, the EU is mulling new leverage the efficacy of which is undisputed. Oettinger’s EU budget plans for the period from 2021 to 2027 could finally convince Warsaw to budge.
Negotiations in the EU are never as tough as when money is at stake — particularly when 1 trillion euros are to be divvied up. The last negotiations between the net payers and the net beneficiaries took over 29 months. The situation is even more difficult this time around because even though the EU wants to spend more money on issues like protecting its external borders, the integration of immigrants and pan-European scientific research, it will have less cash at its disposal following Brexit and the departure of one of its financially strongest member states.
Showing Brussels the Cold Shoulder
Add to that the question being raised by Oettinger in Warsaw: Should the EU also use the budget to discipline intractable EU member states? The Commission hasn’t made a final decision, but Oettinger’s own position is clear. And at a Commission meeting last Wednesday, he received broad support for his idea.
The situation at the moment is potentially explosive. Officials in Brussels are tired of transferring billions of euros each year to Eastern Europe only for the recipients to cause headache after headache. The four Visegrad Group countries — Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary — alone have received around 150 billion euros in net subsidies from the EU budget since 2007. But when it comes to taking in refugees or adhering to rulings made by the European Court of Justice, they show the EU the cold shoulder. It is an approach, say officials in Brussels, that is particularly helpful to right-wing populist parties. And the complaint is increasingly being adopted by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government as well.
“The EU is a community of values, not just a single market,” says Michael Roth of Germany’s center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), which is Merkel’s junior coalition partner. Roth is the senior official responsible for EU policy in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. “But that also then needs to be reflected in the EU budget,” Roth continues. He says that all member states are obligated to adhere to the principles of the rule of law. “If that doesn’t happen, then it also has to have an effect on the allotment of EU funds.”
The development threatens to further widen the rift between east and west at a time when unity needs to be shown in the wake of the nerve gas attack in Salisbury and the threat of a trade war made by U.S. President Donald Trump. “A fight pitting migration against cohesion and agricultural subsidies against funds for a mutual defense force would divide the EU,” Oettinger warned in the Polish parliament. And EU Agricultural Commissioner Phil Hogan also lamented that the rivalry between the east and west is “creeping into the debate.”
German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas also expressed concern during a recent trip to Warsaw made immediately after he was sworn in to his new post. The issue of rule of law was one of the items discussed in a meeting with his Polish counterpart Jacek Czaputowicz. “I hope we don’t get into a situation where structural funds play any kind of role,” Maas said.
Support in Berlin
But behind closed doors, he leaves no doubt that the German government backs the European Commission’s plan to link money and values. The argumentation is simple: If Germany is going to pay more into the EU budget in the future as it has already said it would, then Berlin also wants to have a say in how that money is spent.
Oettinger has happily taken up the issue. “We can only apply our budgetary resources in places where we know that the courts are independent,” he told Polish business leaders in Warsaw.
The commissioner is also fully aware of the strength of his threat given that the transfers from Brussels are already calculated into national budgets in the east. For the budget period between 2014 and 2020, EU subsidies comprise 2.6 percent of Hungary’s gross domestic product, 2. 4 percent in Poland, 1.8 percent in the Czech Republic and 2.3 percent in Slovakia.
The funds are used in an effort to raise the standard of living in Eastern Europe closer to that enjoyed in the west. It’s a success story that the EU’s general director for regional policies sought to convey to budget controllers last Tuesday. But what his PowerPoint presentation did not mention is something that is also a part of everyday European life: Controllers frequently find instances of misuse of funding.
The primary reason, says Inge Grässle, the chair of the European Parliament’s Budgetary Control Committee, is that the EU does not have the capacity to monitor the use of funds, meaning the benficiary countries must do so themselves. Grässle, who like Oettinger is a member of the conservative Christian Democratic Union party, says it is unsurprising that countries aren’t particularly eager about exposing abuses back home.
Lack of Cooperation
Last September, for example, Grässle and her team traveled to Budapest, where, in addition to talks with the government, the visit included a ride on a narrow-gauge railway. The train didn’t have many passengers, but it did travel through an area near Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s hometown, a circumstance that raised suspicion among controllers.
Problems began cropping up even during the trip’s planning stages. “The preparation and organization of the mission was rendered difficult by the initial lack of cooperation from the Hungarian Authorities,” a later parliamentary report on the visit states. The report was also devastating in its conclusion that “public spending in Hungary suffers from a lack of transparency and corruption risk in public decision making is perceived to be high.”
Now, a new multi-billion-euro corruption scandal has created additional pressure for Orbán. The daily newspaper Magyar Nemzet recently reported on a Hungarian man who is in the FBI’s witness protection program in the United States. The witness reportedly told the FBI about a massive money laundering operation in which up to 4 billion euros in EU subsidies were smuggled out of the country. According to the story, the money trail reaches into the upper echelons of Orbán’s political party Fidesz.
The situation is even tenser in Slovakia, particularly after the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée. Kuciak had learned through his reporting that EU money was apparently seeping into mafia channels. A hastily organized European Parliament delegation visited the country in early March on the search for answers to a long list of questions. But the Slovakian government did not appear particularly eager to clear things up. On one occasion, there was no simultaneous interpreter on hand, and on another, according to the report on the trip, the Slovakians tried to prevent all of the delegation from being present at talks.
Stronger Instruments
As such, Grässle’s conclusions aren’t all that surprising. “I would like to see stronger instruments in the next multiannual financial framework, and a link to the issue of rule of law is appropriate,” she says.
Oettinger has been hard at work on the issue for quite some time and last Wednesday, he presented initial details at an internal Commission meeting. The idea isn’t free of controversy given the fears some have that such a move could backfire if the citizens of the countries in question ultimately paid the price of any punitive action taken by Brussels.
In order to get around that problem, it appears Oettinger wants to take advantage of tendering procedures. Normally, EU member states pay the costs of EU-financed projects up front and they are later reimbursed by Brussels. But this repayment in the future would be capped if rule-of-law violations are found in a country.
The threat is already having a certain effect, as the procedures currently underway against Poland have shown. For months, Poland had stonewalled the European Commission, but more recently, the Poles have, for the first time, indicated that they would be prepared to make some changes to the judicial reform. They submitted three proposals to Brussels. One would entail equalizing the minimum retirement age for men and women after the EU had rebuked the Polish government on this point, saying the rules in place were discriminatory.
A First Step?
The assessment in Brussels is that this doesn’t go nearly far enough in meeting the EU’s demands, but many believe that the suggestions for improvement are only a preliminary signal. “Others will follow,” said one EU diplomat.
One reason could be because the incentive for the Polish government to fall back into line might be greater than previously thought. If Poland relents, Oettinger told a small group in Warsaw, then he could refrain from including a rule-of-law clause in his budget framework or drop it at a later date. Officially, the Commission is denying such a link, but diplomats with knowledge of the issue confirmed to DER SPIEGEL that such a correlation has, in fact, been established.
It would be a deal where everyone emerged victorious: the EU, because it ultimately lacks the votes to issue sanctions against Poland (given that Hungary has already announced it would use its veto); the Polish government, because it would return to the EU’s good graces; and Foreign Minister Maas, who would be freed from the uncomfortable position of having to maneuver between Brussels and Warsaw.
Berlin is encouraged. Although Warsaw has so far only raised the prospect of cosmetic changes to the judicial reforms, the German government is nevertheless saying that the discussion of the next EU budget framework is producing the first results. “Our talks,” says senior Foreign Ministry official Roth, “are having an impact.”
«Fidesz predicted to have constitutional 2/3 majority in Parliament again»
Mr Orban sembrerebbe essere avviato ad una seconda vittoria storica, conquistando non solo la metà dell’Elettorato, ma soprattutto la maggioranza qualificata dei seggi parlamentari.
Se però è vero che Mr Orban ha avuto una vittoria elettorale inequivocabile, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare come le sinistre liberal e socialiste abbiano subito una débâcle davvero severa: non contano quasi più nulla.
«Fino alla chiusura dei seggi, alle 19, circa 5,5 milioni di elettori sono andati alle urne, il 70%, contro un affluenza del 61,73% nel 2014»
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«Fidesz won almost half of the vote, with 93%f ballots counted»
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«the nationalist Jobbik party is in second place with 20% of the vote. The Socialists are in third with 12%, and the LMP, Hungary’s main Green Party, is in fourth with 7%.»
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«Voters are electing 199 members of parliament in a single round. A total of 106 seats can be won in single-member constituencies in a first-past-the-post system. The remaining 93 seats are awarded under a list system. Fidesz has changed election rules since 2010, boosting the ruling party’s chances against a fragmented left-wing opposition and the far-right Jobbik party.
Reuters has produced this useful list of the key changes.
– The total number of seats was reduced from 386 to 199 in 2011. District boundaries have been redrawn, and critics say gerrymandering was significant.
– A second voting round was eliminated, denying parties the option of clinching deals between the rounds, which contributed to the splintering of the current opposition.
– The system of voter compensation was changed in favour of winning candidates. In local districts, any vote not used to win a first-past-the-post race is added to national lists, including for the winner.
– Ethnic Hungarians were given the right to citizenship. Some 378,000 new citizens have registered to vote in this election and the majority of them support Fidesz.
– Postal votes were outlawed for hundreds of thousands of Hungarians working abroad, who are not necessarily Fidesz supporters. They can only vote in person at Hungarian embassies or consulates, limiting their ability to participate.
– Parties must field candidates in at least 27 local districts to maintain a national list and receive state support for their campaign, limiting options for parties to co-operate.» [The Guardian]
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Diamo atto a Mr Gergely Karácsony, il candidato socialista, di aver accettato il risultato elettorale:
«The result is not what we hoped for, but nevertheless as the losers we must always congratulate the winners. But it is difficult to do that in Hungary.
We are convinced that people believe that Hungary needs change… we accept the fact that today Hungarian voters have made a choice. ….
he result is not what we hoped for, but nevertheless as the losers we must always congratulate the winners. But it is difficult to do that in Hungary.
We are convinced that people believe that Hungary needs change… we accept the fact that today Hungarian voters have made a choice.»
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In attesa dei risultati definitivi, e del computo dei seggi assegnati, una considerazione emerge spontanea.
Tutta la stampa liberal mondiale considerava le sinistre ungheresi come maggioranza certa, e parlava delle ngo ancora operanti in Ungheria come sicure portavoce di tutto il popolo ungherese che avrebbe distrutto in sede elettorale l’autoritario Mr Orban, euroscettico.
Benissimo.
Adesso gli ungheresi si sono contati alle urne e possiamo dire con certezza che le ngo dichiaravano millantato credito: non contano nulla. Non riusciranno a far eleggere nemmeno un deputato: uno che sia uno.
Il premier ungherese ha vinto in maniera schiacciante le elezioni, conquistando il suo terzo mandato consecutivo dal 2010 in un voto che ha visto nel Paese un’affluenza record.
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Il premier ungherese Viktor Orban ha vinto in maniera schiacciante le elezioni, conquistando il suo terzo mandato consecutivo dal 2010 in un voto che ha visto nel Paese un’affluenza record. Il partito di governo Fidesz, secondo i risultati diffusi quando lo spoglio era ormai oltre l’80%, conserva la maggioranza assoluta nel parlamento con il 49% dei consensi. Secondo è il partito Jobbik con il 20%, terza l’alleanza socialisti-verdi con 12%. Per tutto il giorno si sono registrate lunghe code davanti ai seggi elettorali, un’affluenza mai vista nel Paese. Una grande partecipazione che aveva fatto ipotizzare agli analisti la possibilità di una buona affermazione delle opposizioni che avrebbero potuto far perdere la maggioranza assoluta a Fidesz. Cosa che non è avvenuta.
Fino alla chiusura dei seggi, alle 19, circa 5,5 milioni di elettori sono andati alle urne, il 70%, contro un affluenza del 61,73% nel 2014. Circa 1547 i candidati in lizza per i 199 seggi del parlamento. Fidesz e il suo alleato il partito cristiano democratico avrebbero ne avrebbero conquistati 133. Il secondo posto alle elezioni è andato a Jobbik di Gabor Vona, partito conservatore nazionalista, ma non più euroscettico, che aveva promesso una lotta contro la corruzione generalizzata attribuita a Orban. A seguire l’alleanza socialista-verde (Mszp-P) e le altre formazioni politiche.
La vittoria – sono state le prime parole di Orban che ha festeggiato il risultato con i suoi sostenitori – è un’opportunità “per difendere l’Ungheria”. A premiarlo, secondo gli osservatori, è stato soprattutto il martellamento andato avanti per mesi, anche attraverso i media pubblici da lui controllati, circa il “pericolo mortale” che starebbe minacciando gli ungheresi: l’arrivo di migliaia di migranti musulmani, con il ricollocamento obbligatorio voluto dall’Ue. “Dobbiamo decidere bene, perché sbagliando non ci sarà più modo di riparare, rischiamo di perdere il nostro Paese, che diventerà un Paese di immigrati”, aveva detto ancora il giorno delle elezioni. Un messaggio che ha evidentemente raccolto il favore dell’elettorato.
Hungary’s right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orban has claimed a landslide victory in Sunday’s general election.
The 54-year-old will serve a third consecutive term in office, with his party Fidesz projected to keep its key two-thirds majority in parliament.
Fidesz won almost half of the vote, with 93% of ballots counted, Hungary’s National Election Office said.
Mr Orban is a strong Eurosceptic who campaigned on an anti-immigration platform.
In a speech to supporters on Sunday night, Mr Orban said his victory gave Hungarians “the opportunity to defend themselves and to defend Hungary”.
Leaders of the second and third-placed parties have resigned in light of the result.
How did the result play out?
Polling stations were meant to close at 19:00 (17:00 GMT), but some stayed open hours later due to long queues. Voter turnout reached a near-record 69% – an outcome some believed would favour the prime minister’s opponents.
But with almost all votes counted, the nationalist Jobbik party is in second place with 20% of the vote. The Socialists are in third with 12%, and the LMP, Hungary’s main Green Party, is in fourth with 7%.
Jobbik’s chairman Gabor Vona stood down on Sunday night, telling a news conference: “Jobbik’s goal, to win the elections and force a change in government, was not achieved. Fidesz won. It won again.”
Socialist Party President Gyula Molnar was similarly downcast as he resigned, saying: “We regard ourselves as responsible for what happened [and] we have acknowledged the decision of voters.”
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Orban keeps the provinces but loses the youth vote
By the BBC’s Budapest Correspondent Nick Thorpe
As Fidesz paints the map of Hungary orange (their colour) once again, preliminary results show they will reach the 133 seats in the 199 seat Parliament needed for a constitutional two-thirds majority. They won two-thirds victories at both previous elections, in 2010 and 2014.
The prime minister’s party won in most rural constituencies and in provincial towns, while opposition parties took most seats in the capital, Budapest.
Mr Orban’s legitimacy on a European level will likely be strengthened, as nationalist parties across the continent take heart from his victory.
There were only two consolation prizes for anti-Fidesz voters: most constituencies in the capital, Budapest, went to opposition candidates. And Fidesz have also lost a large part of the youth vote. The next Fidesz government can be expected to include younger ministers, in an attempt to address this problem.
The result spells trouble ahead for civil society groups which campaign for human rights and against corruption, and for critical media. Viktor Orban has promised a “settling of accounts – moral, politically, and legally” with his opponents.
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What are Orban’s policies?
The election campaign was dominated by immigration, with Mr Orban promising to defend the country’s borders and block migration by Muslims.
The prime minister refused to publically debate with his opponents or speak to the independent media, speaking instead at rallies for his supporters.
These addresses focused on one core policy – stopping immigration.
“Migration is like rust that slowly but surely would consume Hungary,” Mr Orban said at his final rally on Friday.
In 2015, Hungary built a fence along its borders with Serbia and Croatia to stop illegal migrants.
Mr Orban is an avowed Eurosceptic who opposes further EU integration. He refused to take part in the EU’s refugee resettlement programme and has praised Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
Marine Le Pen, leader of France’s National Front, tweeted Mr Orban her congratulations and said the “mass immigration promoted by the EU has been rejected once again”.
