Pubblicato in: Armamenti, Cina, Russia

Cina. Dispiegati nel sud-est asiatico gli S-400 russi.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-08-26.

Si-vis-pacem-para-bellum

«They will stand little chance of evading attacks by the new missile system.»


«It is critical to note when assessing its capabilities that the S-400 was designed largely in response to the United States’ development of advanced stealth aircraft, with the cash-strapped Russia forced to cancel Soviet era programs to develop stealth fighters of its own and instead rely on asymmetric surface-to-air batteries to ensure its continued ability to threaten the new American aircraft»

*

«Entering service just months after the U.S. Air Force’s F-22 Raptor, the lethal new American jet held the S-400 to extremely high standards. This implies that the missile platform is well within its limits to target non-stealthy older aircraft such as the F-15. Taiwanese jets today, considerably lighter, slower, lower flying than the F-15 and operating with high radar and heat signatures by the standards of modern combat jets, have an extremely poor level of survivability against the S-400 even at extreme ranges.»

*

«Taiwan’s fleet of unspecialized light multirole aircraft — six wings comprised of Mirage 2000 jets and F-5E Freedom Fighters (one wings each) as well as F-16A Fighting Falcons and indigenous F-CK Ching Kuo jets (two each) — lack even basic stealth technologies and use designs dating back to the 1970s or earlier. They will stand little chance of evading attacks by the new missile system.»

*

«Other than fighters, support aircraft such as the E-2 Hawkeye, while potentially highly effective force multipliers when operating at safe distances, will be extremely vulnerable as soon as they leave the ground, due to their poor maneuverability and bulky airframes . With the S-400’s missiles incoming at speeds of Mach 8.2, in the case of the 48N6E2, and Mach 14 in the case of the 48N6E3 and 40N6, the missiles can be launched from command posts on the Chinese mainland and will reach their targets over Taiwan in a matter of seconds.»

*

«While Chinese air defense capabilities were negligible until the early 1990s, the acquisition of advanced Russian technologies, including several variants of the S-300, was key to building up an advanced network capable of protecting the country’s airspace from a potential air or missile attacks — shifting the balance of forces in the air strongly in Beijing’s favor»

*

«The S-400 today is set to complement existing air defense platforms such as the HQ-16 and HQ-17, while fielding a number of game-changing capabilities, including new surface-to-air missiles and anti-stealth technologies»

*

«Even without the support of other air defense and aerial assets, the S-400 alone poses a major threat not only to hostile aircraft operating within Chinese airspace, but also, due to its extreme range, to aircraft to well beyond Chinese shores.»

* * * * * * *

“Si vis pacem, para bellum”.

Trenta anni or sono la Cina era politicamente, economicamente e militarmente un paese trascurabile.

Poi venne Deng Xiao Ping che mise in soffitta le ideologie ed instaurò un sano pragmatismo empirico.

Adesso è diventata una grande potenza e le sue forze armate iniziano a diventare davvero temibili.

L’acquisizione dei sistemi S-400 rende il suo spazio aereo ben difficilmente penetrabile, se non al costo di perdite intollerabili. Nessuna intenzione di sopravvalutare la potenza di fuoco degli S-400: solo che gli equilibri di forze hanno spostato significativamente le proprie frontiere.


The Diplomat. 2018-08-15. What China’s Newly Inducted S-400 Means for the Balance of Power in the Taiwan Strait

Taiwan’s fighter jets will stand little chance of evading attacks by the new missile system.

*

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) recent acquisition of Russian-made S-400 missile systems has considerably augmented what has already long been one of the world’s most formidable air defense networks, with wide-ranging implications for the balance of power in East Asia.

While Chinese air defense capabilities were negligible until the early 1990s, the acquisition of advanced Russian technologies, including several variants of the S-300, was key to building up an advanced network capable of protecting the country’s airspace from a potential air or missile attacks — shifting the balance of forces in the air strongly in Beijing’s favor. The S-400 today is set to complement existing air defense platforms such as the HQ-16 and HQ-17, while fielding a number of game-changing capabilities, including new surface-to-air missiles and anti-stealth technologies. Even without the support of other air defense and aerial assets, the S-400 alone poses a major threat not only to hostile aircraft operating within Chinese airspace, but also, due to its extreme range, to aircraft to well beyond Chinese shores.

While China’s acquisition of the S-400 is set to have considerable implications for a number of potential conflict zones, including the country’s ongoing disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and with India over the border region, it is in the Taiwan Strait where the weapon’s deployment may well have the greatest impact. The S-400 is able to engage a phenomenal 80 aircraft simultaneously, equivalent to approximately one-third of Taiwan’s fighting fleet, allocating two missiles per target. In addition, the missile system’s 48N6E2, 48N6DM/48N6E3, and 40N6 missiles retain ranges of 200 km, 250 km and 400 km respectively, all giving extensive coverage over Taiwanese airspace. Thus the PLA’s acquisition of the S-400 allows it to enforce an effective no fly zone over the territories under Taipei’s control in the event of cross-strait war.

It is critical to note when assessing its capabilities that the S-400 was designed largely in response to the United States’ development of advanced stealth aircraft, with the cash-strapped Russia forced to cancel Soviet era programs to develop stealth fighters of its own and instead rely on asymmetric surface-to-air batteries to ensure its continued ability to threaten the new American aircraft. Entering service just months after the U.S. Air Force’s F-22 Raptor, the lethal new American jet held the S-400 to extremely high standards. This implies that the missile platform is well within its limits to target non-stealthy older aircraft such as the F-15. Taiwanese jets today, considerably lighter, slower, lower flying than the F-15 and operating with high radar and heat signatures by the standards of modern combat jets, have an extremely poor level of survivability against the S-400 even at extreme ranges.

Taiwan’s fleet of unspecialized light multirole aircraft — six wings comprised of Mirage 2000 jets and F-5E Freedom Fighters (one wings each) as well as F-16A Fighting Falcons and indigenous F-CK Ching Kuo jets (two each) — lack even basic stealth technologies and use designs dating back to the 1970s or earlier. They will stand little chance of evading attacks by the new missile system.

Other than fighters, support aircraft such as the E-2 Hawkeye, while potentially highly effective force multipliers when operating at safe distances, will be extremely vulnerable as soon as they leave the ground, due to their poor maneuverability and bulky airframes . With the S-400’s missiles incoming at speeds of Mach 8.2, in the case of the 48N6E2, and Mach 14 in the case of the 48N6E3 and 40N6, the missiles can be launched from command posts on the Chinese mainland and will reach their targets over Taiwan in a matter of seconds.

While Taiwan’s air fleet already faced a considerable challenge operating against China’s existing air defense batteries such as the HQ-9B and elite air superiority fighters such as the J-11B and Su-35, the emergence of the S-400 not only eliminates an offensive or retaliatory strike role for Taiwan’s air fleet but it also seriously hinders its ability to undertake even very basic defensive operations. As Taiwan continues to invest heavily in costly but seemingly inconsequential modernizations for its aging fighters, from new cruise missiles to stronger radars, the armed forces would do well to consider the threat the S-400 poses to the continued viability of their fleet.

Possible counters to the new weapons system could include heavy investments in electronic warfare and potentially the acquisition of stealth fighters which, at least at extreme ranges, should retain a degree of survivability against the S-400. With the situation for Taiwan’s air force looking increasingly bleak, the military may well move to concentrate more heavily on acquiring and modernizing its own ground based surface-to-air missile systems as an asymmetric response – an effective means of denying the PLA Air Force access to its airspace even if its own fighter fleet remains grounded.

Annunci
Pubblicato in: Russia

17 luglio 1918. La fine dei Romanov.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-07-17.

Tomba_002

Cento anni fa i comunisti sterminarono tutti i membri della famiglia imperiale Romanov.

Tutte le rivoluzioni esigono la testa dei capi dei precedenti regimi. Poi, non sazie, quelle dei collaboratori e dei sostenitori, infine di tutti gli oppositori. Ed andrebbe financo bene se si fermassero lì: ma la storia insegna che non si fermano per nulla.

Olivier Cromwell fece decapitare Re Carlo I. La rivoluzione francese fece altrettanto con Re Luigi XVI. Poi, tutti gli altri.

C’è poco da fare: la storia è scritta con il sangue.

*

Questo è un sunto schematico degli avvenimenti.

«Jakov Michajlovič Jurovskij fu incaricato di occuparsi personalmente della preparazione, dell’esecuzione e del successivo occultamento dell’eccidio della famiglia imperiale e delle persone che l’avevano seguita: in totale sarebbero morte 11 persone. Venne nominato comandante della Casa a destinazione speciale, ossia della Casa Ipat’ev, dove erano detenuti lo zar deposto Nicola II e tutta la sua famiglia, e nelle loro ultime settimane di vita gestì i ritmi della casa.

I Romanov vivevano sotto stretta sorveglianza e la prolungata convivenza con le guardie rosse era costellata di soprusi e angherie da parte di queste ultime verso l’ormai impotente famiglia, specialmente verso le figlie adolescenti dell’ex sovrano Ol’ga, Tat’jana, Marija e Anastasija. Sotto il precedente comandante della casa, i furti e gli scherzi triviali verso la famiglia erano all’ordine del giorno e i Romanov avevano persino difficoltà a tutelare la salute cagionevole del figlio minore di Nicola II, Aleksej, malato di emofilia, e della ex zarina Aleksandra Fëdorovna, sofferente di sciatica.

Con l’arrivo del commissario Jakov Michajlovič Jurovskij il regime della Casa a destinazione speciale cambiò: le guardie furono disciplinate a non avere contatti con i prigionieri e i furti cessarono improvvisamente.

Jurovskij si informava giornalmente da Nicola Romanov circa la salute della moglie e del figlio, talvolta accettava di portare qualche richiesta all’esterno e permise alle suore di un convento vicino di portare latte e uova fresche per i prigionieri. Nel frattempo effettuava tutti i preparativi per l’esecuzione.

Nella seduta del Soviet dove si sarebbero decisi i bersagli dei carnefici, le guardie rosse si rifiutarono di sparare sui figli e Jurovskij dovette chiamare ex prigionieri di guerra austro-ungarici che avevano aderito alla rivoluzione a cui spiegò tutto in tedesco; fra di loro si dice fosse presente anche il giovane Imre Nagy, in realtà è appurato che l’Imre Nagy ivi presente fosse soltanto un omonimo e si consideri che all’epoca questo nome era parecchio diffuso.

La notte tra il 16 e il 17 luglio, alle 11 di sera, Jurovskij chiamò il suo assistente Medvedev e gli diede le seguenti disposizioni:

    raccogliere 11 revolver dai soldati della casa;

    avvisare il corpo di guardia della casa di non allarmarsi, se avesse udito degli spari.

« Al pianterreno era stata scelta una stanza con un tramezzo di legno stuccato (per evitare rimbalzi), da cui erano stati levati tutti i mobili. La squadra era pronta nella stanza accanto. I Romanov non avevano intuito nulla.[3] »

(Dalla nota di Jurovskij)

A mezzanotte, Jurovskij svegliò i Romanov e ordinò loro di prepararsi per una partenza; spiegò che, in concomitanza dell’arrivo imminente dei bianchi in città era scoppiata una sommossa e che sarebbe stato più sicuro trasferirli altrove. Mezz’ora più tardi Nicola II, la moglie Aleksandra, il medico Botkin, l’inserviente Trupp, il cuoco Charitonov, poi i cinque figli, Ol’ga, Tatijana, Marija, Anastasija, Aleksej e la dama di compagnia Anna Demidova scesero le scale e Jurovskij li invitò ad entrare nella stanza del pianterreno.

« Nikolaj aveva in braccio Aleksej, gli altri portavano dei cuscinetti e delle piccole cose di vario genere. Entrando nella stanza vuota, Aleksandra Fëdorovna domandò: «Ma come, non c’è neppure una sedia? Non ci si può neppure sedere?». Il com. ordinò di portare due sedie. Nikolaj fece sedere su una sedia Aleksej, mentre sull’altra prese posto Aleksandra Fëdorovna. Ai rimanenti il com. ordinò di disporsi in fila.[4] »

(Jurovskij – che narra in terza persona)

Alludendo alla sua professione di fotografo, il commissario li dispose come per una fotografia di notifica: seduti in prima fila Aleksandra Fëdorovna e Aleksej, accanto a loro Nicola e alle loro spalle le figlie; sui lati i membri del seguito.

« Con rapidi gesti del braccio Jurovskij indicava a ciascuno dove doveva disporsi. Calmo, a bassa voce: «Prego, voi mettetevi qua, e voi qua… ecco, così, in fila…». I detenuti si disposero in due file. Nella prima c’era la famiglia dello zar, nella seconda la loro gente.[5] »

(Sterkotin, membro del commando)

Quando tutto fu pronto, Jurovskij chiamò il commando armato e 10 uomini si ammassarono sulla porta attendendo l’ordine.

«Quando entrò la squadra, il com. disse ai Romanov che in considerazione del fatto che i loro parenti continuavano l’attacco contro la Russia sovietica, il Comitato esecutivo degli Urali aveva deciso di giustiziarli. Nicola voltò le spalle alla squadra, volgendosi verso la famiglia, poi, come tornato in sé, si girò in direzione del com., chiedendo: «Come? Come?» […] Il com. ripeté in fretta e ordinò alla squadra di puntare. Nicola non disse più nulla, si voltò di nuovo verso la famiglia, agli altri sfuggirono altre esclamazioni sconnesse. Tutto ciò durò alcuni secondi.[6] »

(Jurovskij)

«Detta l’ultima parola, Jurovskij estrasse di colpo il revolver dalla tasca e sparò allo zar. La zarina e la figlia Ol’ga cercarono di farsi il segno della croce, ma non fecero in tempo.[7] »

(Strekotin)

Gli uomini ammassati sulla porta tesero i revolver e bersagliarono sul gruppo: Aleksandra Fëdorovna cadde subito dopo il marito, seguita da Aleksej; dopo di loro si rivolsero alle figlie e al seguito.

« […] Si formarono tre file di uomini che sparavano con le pistole. E la seconda e la terza fila sparavano al di sopra delle spalle di quelli che erano davanti. Le braccia con i revolver, protese verso i condannati, erano così tante e così vicine l’una all’altra che quelli che erano davanti ebbero il dorso della mano ustionato dagli spari di quelli che erano dietro.[8]»

(Kabanov, membro del commando)

Nella confusione generale, i pianti e le urla delle ragazze confondevano gli uomini, che non riuscivano a mirare correttamente; le figlie, avendo cucito alcuni gioielli nei vestiti, dovettero subire più colpi prima di cadere e far cessare le urla che disturbavano i carnefici.

« Il mio aiutante dovette consumare un intero caricatore.[9] »

(Jurovskij)

« Le due figlie minori dello zar erano accovacciate per terra contro la parete, con le braccia strette sul capo. Intanto due stavano sparando contro le loro teste. Aleksej era disteso sul pavimento. Qualcuno sparava anche contro di lui. La frel’na [tata, la Demidova] era sul pavimento ancora viva. »

(Kabanov)

I gioielli cuciti negli abiti facevano rimbalzare i proiettili sui corpi delle donne, che ferite e spaventate, non sembravano smettere di dibattersi in preda al dolore e al terrore.

« Allora mi slanciai nel locale dell’esecuzione e urlai di smetterla di sparare e di finire quelli che erano ancora vivi a colpi di baionetta… Uno dei compagni cominciò a spingere nel petto della frel’na la baionetta del suo fucile americano Winchester. La baionetta aveva l’aspetto di un pugnale, ma la punta non era acuminata e non penetrava. Ella si aggrappò con ambo le mani alla baionetta e cominciò a urlare. Poi la colpirono con i calci dei fucili.[10] »

(Kabanov)

Dopo circa venti minuti, l’esecuzione ebbe termine.

« Il sangue scorreva a rivoli. Quando io arrivai l’erede era ancora vivo e rantolava. Jurovskij gli si accostò e gli sparò due o tre colpi a bruciapelo. L’erede tacque. Quel quadro mi provocò un conato di nausea.[11] »

(Medvedev, assistente di Jurovskij)

Tuttavia, al momento di trasportare i corpi all’autocarro, il commando si accorse che non tutti erano morti.

« Quando deposero sulla barella una delle figlie, essa lanciò un urlo e si coprì il volto con una mano. Constatammo che erano vive anche le altre. Ormai non si poteva più sparare, perché le porte erano aperte […] Ermakov prese il mio fucile con la baionetta innestata e a colpi di baionetta finì tutti coloro che erano ancora vivi.[12] »

(Sterkotin)

I cadaveri vennero caricati su una camionetta che, seguita dal commando di Jurovskij, si addentrò nel bosco di Koptjakij per passare alla fase dell’occultamento. A metà strada l’autocarro si impantanò: il commissario decise quindi di bruciare sul posto due corpi per confondere un’eventuale futura indagine dei bianchi. Nella sua nota egli attesta che bruciò il corpo di Aleksej e di una donna (probabilmente Marija o Olga) che identifica con Anna Demidova.

Dopo la prima cremazione e il disincaglio del carro, Jurovskij e i suoi arrivarono nel luogo prescelto: una cava abbandonata chiamata la radura dei quattro fratelli (per la presenza di quattro ceppi di abeti).

Lì i cadaveri vennero spogliati (fu allora che gli uomini scoprirono i gioielli nascosti dalla zarina e dalle figlie) e fatti a pezzi con asce e coltelli; gettati nella cava, vennero cosparsi di acido solforico e poi dati alle fiamme.

Il giorno seguente all’esecuzione, Sverdlov interruppe i lavori del comitato centrale di Mosca e mormorò qualcosa a Lenin, che dice a voce alta: «Il compagno Sverdlov ha da fare una dichiarazione». «Devo dire» dice Sverdlov «che abbiamo ricevuto notizie da Ekaterinburg. Per decisione del Soviet regionale, è stato fucilato Nicola II in un tentativo di fuga mentre le truppe cecoslovacche si avvicinavano alla città. Il presidium del comitato esecutivo centrale panrusso approva tale decisione». Segue un “silenzio generale”, fino a quando Lenin non propone di continuare il lavoro interrotto.[13]

Il 20 luglio venne pubblicato a Ekaterinburg il decreto dell’eseguita esecuzione:

« Decreto del Comitato esecutivo del Soviet degli Urali dei deputati operai, contadini e dell’Armata Rossa. Avendo notizia che bande cecoslovacche minacciano Ekaterinburg, capitale rossa degli Urali, e considerando che il boia coronato, qualora si desse alla latitanza, potrebbe sottrarsi al giudizio del popolo, il Comitato esecutivo, dando corso alla volontà del popolo, ha decretato di procedere all’esecuzione dell’ex zar Nikolaj Romanov, colpevole di innumerevoli crimini sanguinosi.[14] »

Nonostante il Soviet centrale di Mosca avesse negato in seguito lo sterminio dell’intera famiglia, comunicando la sola fucilazione dello zar “in un tentativo di fuga”, e nonostante gli sforzi di Jurovskij e dei suoi uomini di occultare nel modo più assoluto ogni traccia dell’esecuzione di massa, i resti nella cava dei quattro fratelli sono stati portati alla luce nel 1979.

Alapaevsk, 18 luglio 1918

La notte tra il 17 e il 18 luglio 1918, nella località di Alapaevsk sono passati per le armi: la granduchessa Elizaveta Fedorovna, sorella della zarina, il granduca Konstantin Konstantinovič, il granduca Igor’ Konstantinovič, il granduca Ivan Konstantinovič, il granduca Sergej Michajlovič, suor Varvara Jakovleva e infine il principe Vladimir Pavlovič Paley.»

* * * * * * *

Nessuno si faccia la minima illusione. Ma proprio nessuna.

Su questa Europa odierna si stanno addensando cupe nuvole. Un ancien régime che sta facendo l’impossibile per non morire ed un nuovo emergente. La concreta possibilità di uno sbocco violento è tutt’altro che remota.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Putin, Russia

Pussy Riot. La Alyokhina ancora nei guai.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-07-14.

Pussy Riot 001

A dirla franca, le Pussy Riot sono più famose in Occidente che in Russia.

E, verosimilmente, sono più famose per gli ampi spazi loro concessi dai media liberal che per audience generale. Solo che sono popolari tra i liberal che leggono compitandoli i loro giornali: gli altri usualmente le ignorano come se nulla fosse.

«Pussy Riot è un collettivo punk rock russo, femminista e politicamente impegnato che agisce sotto rigoroso anonimato: le attiviste organizzano proteste per lo sviluppo della democrazia, in Russia e altre parti del mondo. ….

Pussy è un termine equivocabile in quanto significa micio e, nello slang anglosassone, indica vagina; riot significa rivolta.

Il gruppo è attivo a Mosca, città che fa da palcoscenico ai flash mob e alle performance estemporanee attraverso cui il gruppo dà espressione a provocazioni politiche nei confronti dell’establishment politico e istituzionale, su argomenti come la situazione delle donne in Russia ….

Nel mese di marzo 2012, tre donne del gruppo sono state arrestate con l’accusa di “teppismo e istigazione all’odio religioso”[1] per aver messo in scena, durante una celebrazione religiosa nella Cattedrale di Cristo Salvatore. ….

A tale proposito hanno affermato: «quello che abbiamo in comune è l’impudenza, testi che si nutrono di argomenti politici, l’importanza delle tematiche femministe e un’immagine femminile non-standard» ….

Il 21 febbraio 2012, nell’ambito di una protesta contro la rielezione di Vladimir Putin, tre artiste del gruppo si sono introdotte nella Cattedrale di Cristo Salvatore, tempio della Chiesa ortodossa russa a Mosca e, dopo essersi fatte il segno della croce, hanno cercato di esibirsi con una canzone. In meno di un minuto sono state scortate fuori dalle guardie. ….

Il 3 marzo 2012, a seguito di operazioni di indagine che hanno visto in campo reparti della polizia antiterrorismo, le autorità russe hanno arrestato due presunte appartenenti al gruppo, Marija Alëchina (23 anni all’epoca dei fatti) e la siberiana Nadežda Tolokonnikova (22 anni), accusate di teppismo. Entrambe le donne hanno dapprima negato l’affiliazione del gruppo e hanno iniziato uno sciopero della fame per protesta contro il regime di detenzione.

Il 16 marzo è stata arrestata un’altra donna, Ekaterina Samucevič (29 anni), già ascoltata in precedenza come testimone del caso.

Sottoposte a interrogatori, le tre donne non hanno mai rivelato agli inquirenti i nomi delle altre componenti coinvolte nell’azione di protesta. ….

Il 17 agosto 2012 è iniziata la lettura del lungo dispositivo della sentenza ….

Il 10 ottobre 2012, in appello, Ekaterina Samucevič è stata scarcerata mediante cauzione …. È stata invece confermata la pena di due anni per la moscovita Marija Alëchina e per la siberiana Nadežda Tolokonnikova

La Chiesa ortodossa russa, ad esempio, si è espressa sulla questione ai suoi massimi livelli: il 21 marzo 2012, officiando la liturgia nella Chiesa della Deposizione della Veste di Mosca, il patriarca di Mosca e di tutte le Russie, Cirillo I, ha condannato severamente l’azione delle Pussy Riot, bollandola come blasfema e demoniaca:.» [Fonte]

*

In Russia la legge vieta e considera reato lo scassinare le porte chiuse dei privati, così come irrompere in una Chiesa, interrompendo le sacre funzioni danze oscene e canti ‘sui generis‘. Similmente, opporsi all’attuale governo è cosa lecita, purché nel farlo non si incorra in reati, ossia in comportamenti da codice penale.

«Срань, срань, срань Господня!»

Merda, merda, merda del Signore

Ci si provi a dir ciò nella tollerante Francia di Mr Macron, indirizzandosi alla Sua persona. Ci si provi a dire in un gay pride che sono dei debosciati: si finisce a Porto Azzurro a vita.

*

«Pussy Riot band member Maria Alyokhina has been fined for failing to perform community service, part of a punishment for several protests aimed at the Russian security services»

*

«Alyokhina was detained last December for displaying a banner calling Russia’s secret services butchers, and again in April for throwing paper planes near the Federal Security Service (FSB) building in support of the Telegram instant messaging service»

*

«A court ordered Alyokhina to volunteer a total of 140 hours of community service for both acts of civil disobedience»

*

«Alyokhina, who has focused on human rights activism after spending two years behind bars for performing a “punk prayer” in Russia’s main church, did not perform the community service»

* * * * * * * *

Il caso ha avuto risonanza sui media liberal occidentali.

È utilizzato come argomentazione contro l’attuale governo russo, accusato di esser autocratico.

Ma quando la politica si appropria di fatti giudiziari, la partigianeria è quasi di obbligo.

Adesso poniamo una domanda.

Cosa sarebbe accaduto ad una persona che negli Stati Uniti oppure in Germania avesse disobbedito ad una sentenza emessa da un tribunale?


The Moscow Times. 2018-07-11. Pussy Riot Activist Fined for Avoiding Community Service

Pussy Riot band member Maria Alyokhina has been fined for failing to perform community service, part of a punishment for several protests aimed at the Russian security services.

Alyokhina was detained last December for displaying a banner calling Russia’s secret services butchers, and again in April for throwing paper planes near the Federal Security Service (FSB) building in support of the Telegram instant messaging service. A court ordered Alyokhina to volunteer a total of 140 hours of community service for both acts of civil disobedience.

Alyokhina, who has focused on human rights activism after spending two years behind bars for performing a “punk prayer” in Russia’s main church, did not perform the community service.

The activist was detained outside a Moscow courthouse while attending a hearing on an unrelated defamation lawsuit.

Alyokhina later told Interfax that she was fined 200,000 rubles ($3,217) for missing both rounds of community service, for a total fine of 400,000 rubles ($6,435).

The activist plans to appeal the decision — and continue disobeying the court orders to complete her community service — she told the Ekho Moskvy radio station Wednesday.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Russia, Unione Europea

Russia. Ritirerebbe la licenza a France 24 ed a Deutsche Welle.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-07-07.

Kremlino 001

Nel 1980 era stato introdotto all’interno del Manuale Diagnostico e Statistico dei Disturbi Mentali (DSM III) il Disturbo della Personalità Multipla (attualmente denominato Disturbo Dissociativo dell’Identità, dalla IV edizione del DSM – 1994).

Tale disturbo è caratterizzato dalla presenza di due o più identità distinte. Questo comporta una forte compromissione della continuità del senso di sé, accompagnata da alterazioni negli affetti, nei comportamenti, nella coscienza, nella memoria, nella percezione, nella cognizione e nelle funzioni senso-motorie. Queste alterazioni possono essere auto-riferite o riportate da terzi.

Anche se non patognomonica, si constata spesso la simultanea presenza di Ddi con la schizofrenia di tipo paranoide, caratterizzata da delirio di persecuzione: il soggetto ritiene di vivere in un mondo da lui ritenuto essere ostile. Ritiene di essere vittima delle azioni malevole delle altre persone, e rimugina sui contenuti dei suoi deliri, che rappresentano di fatto l’unica giustificazione alle proprie sofferenze. Alcol e droghe solitamente inducono sia dissociazione della personalità sia schizofrenia.

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Molte grandi nazioni europee sembrerebbero soffrire di dissociazione della personalità unita a schizofrenia paranoide.

La Germania politica reclama a gran voce sanzioni sempre più severe nei confronti della Russia, accusandola sì di cose anche vere, ma molte di pura fantasia, come per esempio l’accusa di aver manipolato i risultati elettorali al punto di aver cambiato il decorso della storia. Che la Russia sia militarmente potente è un dato di fatto, ma che sia onnipotente è cosa tutta da dimostrare.

Nel contempo, i tedeschi sono ciccioli e lingua in bocca con i russi per la costruzione del gasdotto Nord Stream 2, delocalizzano in Russia interi stabilimenti per la costruzione di motori di automobili, e commerciano allegramente con la Russia alla faccia del sanzioni che agli altri impongono di osservare.

Germania. L’ex-cancelliere Spd Schröder nel board della russa Rosneft.

Già: ma la Rosneft è sotto sanzioni.

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«Russia said it might strip the licenses of France 24TV channel and Germany broadcaster Deutsche Welle»

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«The threat came a day after the French media regulator (CSA) warned RT’s French office, accusing it of misrepresenting facts»

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«During an analysis of the licensing agreements in (watchdog) Roskomnadzor’s possession, it has been established that the editorial activity of (France 24) is under the control of a foreign legal entity»

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«The official pointed out that this would violate a Russian media law introduced in 2015 which restricts foreign ownership of media companies in Russia to 20 percent or less»

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A nostro parere, sia France 24 sia Deutsche Welle svolgono un ruolo quasi indispensabile nel panorama giornalistico internazionale.

La loro lettura conferisce la certezza quasi assoluta che è vero il contrario di quanto essi asseriscono: come si vede, svolgono un ruolo della massima importanza.


→ Paris Guardian. 2018-07-02. Russia threatens to strip French, German media off licences

– The move comes at a time when relations between the West and Moscow have hit a new low

– Russia said it might strip the licenses of France 24TV channel and Germany broadcaster Deutsche Welle

– The threat came a day after the French media regulator (CSA) warned RT’s French office, accusing it of misrepresenting facts

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MOSCOW, Russia – As the conflict between Russia and the West intensifies, now, Russia has warned that it might strip the France 24 TV channel and German broadcaster Deutsche Welle of their Russian operating licenses.

Ties between the West and Moscow have deteriorated dramatically over the last few months and Russia’s recent warning to European broadcasters came a day after French authorities accused Russian broadcaster RT of airing distortions about the conflict in Syria.

In a statement issued in Russian news agencies, the country’s communications watchdog said that it may act against the French media outlet.

This is not the first time Russia has threatened foreign outlets with expulsion using laws regulating media ownership.

Russia has previously responded to measures taken by foreign governments against RT by tit-for-tat measures against outlets from foreign countries.

The French media regulator (CSA) issued a warning to RT’s French office last week, accusing it of misrepresenting facts in a news bulletin about events in Syria.

In the particular report, RT’s program had questioned whether chemical attacks in the eastern region of Ghouta had really occurred.

The report further accused a local group of fabricating the attack and its effects on the local population.

Meanwhile, in response, Russian news agency RIA quoted a Russian broadcasting industry source as saying, “During an analysis of the licensing agreements in (watchdog) Roskomnadzor’s possession, it has been established that the editorial activity of (France 24) is under the control of a foreign legal entity.”

The official pointed out that this would violate a Russian media law introduced in 2015 which restricts foreign ownership of media companies in Russia to 20 percent or less.

In a report, Interfax news agency further noted that Roskomnadzor could now ask a court to strip Media Communications, a Russian entity, of its license to broadcast France 24 in Russia.

Further intensifying the threat, RT chief Margarita Simonyan was quoted as saying in RIA, “Unlike others, Russia can afford such a luxury as reciprocal measures.”

Subsequently, a committee of the upper house of the Russian parliament said that it would ask “the regulatory authorities” to examine how Germany’s Deutsche Welle is complying with Russian legislation.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Russia

Relazioni sino – russe. Analisi. – The Diplomat.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-07-06.

 Accordo 001

«The pomp and circumstance that accompanied Putin’s recent visit to China obscure the real significance of the bilateral deals and statements it yielded»

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«While in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping awarded Putin the first-ever “Order of Friendship” for his role in guiding and shaping Sino-Russian relations»

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«While the G7 summit proved a fantastic show of disunity and petty division due to U.S. President Donald Trump, two of the world’s leading authoritarian states managed to display unity.»

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«Putin’s coterie ambled into town ready to discuss a framework trade agreement that would ideally lead to a bilateral trade deal in about two-and-a-half years»

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«Sources at the Ministry of Economic Development (MinEkonomiki) called the future deal an analogue of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)»

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«Chinese investors want Russia to better protect their investments, their property rights, and let Chinese firms compete for market share»

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«The first is unlikely since the Kremlin’s political constituencies of rich businessmen and state firms crucial to the budget enrich themselves at the expense of efficiency, sustainable growth, and partners when possible»

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«The second is even less likely for a similar reason: the power to seize assets is vital to the contract governing Russia’s politics»

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«The third is simply impossible because Russia’s manufacturers employ over 14 percent of Russia’s workforce, often in less populated regions that form a core political constituency for Putin»

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«Regarding high-speed rail, the proposed Moscow-Kazan route is estimated to cost $20.1 billion thanks to Russia’s inflated construction costs»

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Riassumendo, in estrema sintesi.

Russia e Cina sono al momento in una particolare sintonia di obiettivi comuni, facilitate in questo anche, e forse soprattutto, dalla scomposta politica occidentale.

Ma non è certo detto che le contingenze delle situazioni attuali si perpetuino nel tempo, né, tanto meno, che il quadro geopolitico mondiale non vari anche esso.


The Diplomat. 2018-06-20. Putin on the Ritz in China.

Over the last few years it’s become commonplace for Russia watchers and political scientists to compare Vladimir Putin to Leonid Brezhnev. Both leaders held power over the course of an entire generation and, now for Putin, share the misfortune of having overseen deepening economic and social stagnation. After Putin issued decrees naming his new presidential administration, Carnegie Moscow fellow Alexander Gabuev quipped on Twitter that since 80 percent of the team wasn’t changing, “it’s brezhnevization, but with more advanced medical services for the top leadership.”

The parallels between the two are strong, but Putin faces a different geopolitical and economic environment. Russia is politically isolated from the West and under financial and economic sanctions due to its war in eastern Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea. Russia’s lackluster economic growth and development has rendered it increasingly dependent on China for natural resource demand and financing, a situation Brezhnev never faced. But as Brezhnev’s doctors might have joked, different strokes for different folks.

The pomp and circumstance that accompanied Putin’s recent visit to China obscure the real significance of the bilateral deals and statements it yielded. The asymmetries in the relationship are by some turns accelerating and others, stagnating.

Xi and Kasha

While in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping awarded Putin the first-ever “Order of Friendship” for his role in guiding and shaping Sino-Russian relations. The visual was somewhat reminiscent of Brezhnev, known for his love of medals, but was a valuable symbol for domestic and international audiences. While the G7 summit proved a fantastic show of disunity and petty division due to U.S. President Donald Trump, two of the world’s leading authoritarian states managed to display unity. Though significant news emerged from the Beijing visit, details don’t suggest relations are necessarily improving.

Putin’s coterie ambled into town ready to discuss a framework trade agreement that would ideally lead to a bilateral trade deal in about two-and-a-half years. Sources at the Ministry of Economic Development (MinEkonomiki) called the future deal an analogue of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). That’s a far cry from reality. Certain agreements will likely be reached, but Chinese investors want Russia to better protect their investments, their property rights, and let Chinese firms compete for market share.

The first is unlikely since the Kremlin’s political constituencies of rich businessmen and state firms crucial to the budget enrich themselves at the expense of efficiency, sustainable growth, and partners when possible. The second is even less likely for a similar reason: the power to seize assets is vital to the contract governing Russia’s politics. The third is simply impossible because Russia’s manufacturers employ over 14 percent of Russia’s workforce, often in less populated regions that form a core political constituency for Putin. Introducing competition may threaten the Kremlin’s strategy of maintaining higher employment at the expense of efficiency to prevent protests and dissent from spreading.

The best that can be hoped for is improving market access for sectors in a manner that won’t threaten support. Things like consumer services and e-commerce come to mind.

Invested Interests

In big financial news, China Development Bank (CDB) loaned Vneshekonombank (VEB) more than 600 billion rubles ($9.6 billion). The agreement for the loan was predicated on providing financing for projects linked to Eurasian integration initiatives. VEB mentioned Arctic infrastructure for the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in its press release. Some have perked up at the thought that the money could finance the Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail line that’s been kicked around for several years now.

But there are few concrete projects in the pipeline to develop the NSR, nor is legislation regarding legal responsibility for the NSR even finalized. The route has been given to nuclear giant Rosatom, but many questions remain as to what its powers actually are. Regarding high-speed rail, the proposed Moscow-Kazan route is estimated to cost $20.1 billion thanks to Russia’s inflated construction costs. The money likely has a different purpose despite naming 70 potential projects for joint investment.

Igor Shuvalov, first deputy minister in Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s cabinet until May, now heads VEB. The bank has been tasked with becoming a driver of development meant to help realize Putin’s May decrees concerning various socioeconomic development goals. The reality is that most of the relevant investments into infrastructure do not qualify as pertinent to Eurasian integration. Further, Shuvalov is expected to oversee laying off 40-50 percent of the bank’s employees to improve its efficiency.

Efficiency has become a pressing priority given that VEB has been a clearinghouse for insider deals aimed at maximizing costs to transfer money to friends of the Kremlin. China knows this, which is why VEB is only being given five years to service the loans. Such terms should force VEB to spend on projects, particularly as it’s stipulated by the agreement that they won’t invest more than 30-40 percent of the financing needed for each project to encourage bringing in partners.

But the likeliest scenario is that the bank will funnel the money toward projects whose costs will spiral, thus creating a loop where more money will be loaned via VEB to contractors who should then service that debt to make it appear as though the bank is generating profits. With those profits, they can then argue that efficiency is rising regardless of what gets built or which foreign partners, if any, are involved. Odds are low, particularly with higher oil prices providing more revenues to finance domestic contractors.

By the terms of the loan agreement, it’s clear CDB doesn’t trust Russia to build what it says it will. VEB will have to get creative so it can take the money and run. That’s a template Rosneft – Russia’s largest oil producer – had, until recently, mastered with China.

You’re SOE Vain

Before Putin arrived in Beijing, Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin met with China’s Minister of Commerce Zhong Shan. Although Rosneft’s press release stated that China would “give full support to mutually beneficial investment projects,” the meeting was proof of Rosneft’s declining political stock. The Ministry of Commerce oversees China’s foreign investments. That means the ministry was involved in scuttling CEFC China Energy’s deal to acquire 14.2 percent of Rosneft’s shares last year. No other Chinese firms expressed interest in Rosneft; likely any acquisition of shares in Rosneft was a poor investment. No oil and gas delegations met with Sechin. Rosneft is too politicized, unprofitable, and unwilling to allow large-scale investments into Russian oil and gas fields.

Rosneft’s corporate approach to China may have served the Kremlin’s interests in increasing Russia’s share of China’s oil market, but working with a private sector actor reliant on bad credit without improving its own profitability for shareholders worked at cross purposes to political relations between Moscow and Beijing. China will likely now demand more guarantees of profitability and access to fields, evidenced by reported interest from China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in an LNG project with Novatek – a privately-owned natural gas producer in Russia.

Hairsplitting the Atom

Russian nuclear monopoly Rosatom reached deals with China National Nuclear Power Co. Ltd (CNNPC) to build four reactor units worth an estimated $3.62 billion. The announcement was heralded as Rosatom had successfully beaten out U.S. firm Westinghouse for the contracts. However, the agreement likely came due to pressures facing Rosatom.

In February, the company requested a trillion rubles ($16 billion) to fund the modernization of existing plants and transmission systems. Rosatom aims to match or exceed Gazprom and Rosneft’s investment programs’ annual expenditures by 2023, a pressing priority to position itself to build abroad to advance Russia’s foreign policy aims.

However, the company’s international projects are frequently unprofitable. Oil and gas companies provide real tax revenues, meaning they’re frequently likelier to get what they ask for from Moscow. These deals would likely provide Rosatom a quick cash infusion while providing China another avenue to steal Russian intellectual property and replace Russian expertise and technology domestically over time.

Bilateral Damage

Putin’s visit to Qingdao for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit offered virtually nothing of substance to assess. Russia’s bilateral agenda with China dwarfs any of the other considerations from the summit. The Qingdao Declaration – the summit’s closing communique – is largely a puff piece filled with hypocritical teeth-gnashing. The tartuffery on display in Qingdao reflected the large gap between Russia’s multilateral rhetoric and the reality of its bilateral relationship with China.

Addressing the summit, Putin noted that “Russia and China are also preparing an agreement on the Eurasian Economic Partnership, which, of course, will be open to all the SCO countries.” Talk of trade multilateralism is farcical for now. Russia lacks proper institutional capacity to carry out trade negotiations with China, let alone the entire bloc simultaneously.

There are no notable China hands within Putin’s presidential administration, there’s no clear organization to the China policy community in Moscow, nor is MinEkonomiki well suited to the task. The ministry has been gutted of much of its institutional heft, likely being handed trade talks so as to hang a sword of Damocles over Minister Maxim Oreshkin’s head. Any trade deal involving the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) only adds yet more lobbying considerations and threats to Russian firms’ competitiveness.

A mix of growing dependence on financing, status quo stagnation in energy relations, and stale rhetoric is all Putin could deliver in Beijing and Qingdao. In June of 1978, Brezhnev excoriated Jimmy Carter and the United States for trying to “play the China card” against the Soviet Union. “Its architects may bitterly regret it,” Brezhnev declared. Putin faces no such pressure today but seems happy to play the China card himself. The question remains when he’ll regret it.

Pubblicato in: Armamenti, Geopolitica Europea, Geopolitica Militare, Russia, Unione Europea

Russia. Kulikovo, Kaliningrad, ospiterebbe un arsenale atomico russo.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-25.

2018-06-21__Kalinigrad__001

Kulikovo è un nome sacro per la Russia.

L’8 settembre 1380 i russi guidati dal Granduca di Vladimir, Dmitrij Ivanovič di Mosca, sconfissero l’armata dell’Orda d’Oro con gli alleati lituani. Fu l’inizio di una lunga guerra di liberazione che terminò con la battaglia sull’Ugra, un secolo dopo.

Nessuna sorpresa quindi che quando la Prussia Orientale passò nel 1945 da tedesca a russa con il nome di Circondariato Federale Nordoccidentale, Oblast di Kaliningrad, nella ridenominazione dei paesi e delle cittadine una avesse assunto il glorioso nome di Kulikovo.

L’Oblast di Kaliningrad è altamente strategico. È l’estrema punta occidentale della Russia ed i suoi porti non ghiacciano durante l’inverno: sono infatti sede della Flotta del Baltico. Con l’acuirsi dei dissensi tra occidentali e russi, quell’area strategica è stata riarmata.

Una cosa è certa. Se in passato gli occidentali trovarono una buona ragione per andare a morire per Danzica, oggi i russi ne hanno altrettanta per andare a morire per Kaliningrad.

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Mar Baltico. Ancora tensioni tra Russia, Nato ed Unione Europea.

Russia. Schierati gli Iskander a Kaliningrad. Hanno svegliato l’orso che dormiva.

La Russia vuole essere rispettata. Un articolo della Bbc che fa pensare

Russia Aims Missiles At Europe? Moscow Bolsters Air Defense System In Baltic Region Near Poland

Kaliningrad. Zeppo di missili atomici adesso anche black hole.

Kaliningrad. Adesso il buco nero inizia a preoccupare la Nato.

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«The anti-aircraft systems, which have a range of 400 km, will then be deployed to secure the air space along Russia’s north-western border»

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«Lanciabile da una piattaforma mobile, l’Iskander viaggia a mach 6.2 – è ipersonico -: in tre o quattro minuti primi arriva da Kaliningrad a Berlino. Quasi nemmeno il tempo di poter dare l’allarme. …. Può portare testate convenzionali ma anche una bomba termonucleare da 50 kTon»

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«During flight it can maneuver at different altitudes and trajectories and can turn at up to 20 to 30 G to evade anti-ballistic missiles»

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2018-06-21__Kalinigrad__002

Chiariti questi elementi di base, entriamo nel merito.

La Federation of American Scientists (FAS) ha rilasciato un documento che suggerirebbe quanto segue.

«Russia may have significantly upgraded its nuclear bunker in Kaliningrad»

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«The photos reportedly showed that Russia may have modernized the nuclear weapons storage bunker which is located in a sensitive enclave of Russian territory which is between Poland and the Baltics.»

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«one of three underground bunkers at the location was excavated and deepened before it appeared to have been covered over in recent months, “presumably to return (to) operational status soon.”»

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Il problema è drammaticamente semplice.

Usualmente le superpotenze atomiche schierano i loro arsenali nucleari molto addentro i loro territori: chiaro indizio di quanto essi costituiscano elemento deterrente, di difesa.

Ma i missili balistici intercontinentali sono abbastanza facilmente rilevabili dai radar avversi e, soprattutto, con un margine di tempo sufficiente per mettere in atto tutte le opportune contromisure. I sistemi anti – missile da ambo le parti sono riferiti in grado di abbattere un buon numero di testate in arrivo.

L’introduzione di missili a corto raggio ma ipersonici ha cambiato le esigenze dello scacchiere.

Lanciabili da mezzi mobili, i missili ipersonici arriverebbero sul bersaglio in tempi così ristretti da rendere impossibile l’attivazione dei sistemi anti – missile. Non solo. Ma gli attuali sistemi radar e missili – antimissile non sarebbero in grado di intercettarli.

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Sapere che l’Oblast di Kaliningrad rigurgita di questi missili e che a Kulikovo sono stati costruiti grandiosi depositi per armamenti nucleari non concorrerebbe a lasciar fare soni tranquilli.


Fas. 2018-06-19. Russia Upgrades Nuclear Weapons Storage Site In Kaliningrad

During the past two years, the Russian military has carried out a major renovation of what appears to be an active nuclear weapons storage site in the Kaliningrad region, about 50 kilometers from the Polish border.

A Digital Globe satellite image purchased via Getty Images, and several other satellite images viewable on TerraServer, show one of three underground bunkers near Kulikovo being excavated in 2016, apparently renovated, and getting covered up again in 2018 presumably to return operational status soon.

The site was previously upgraded between 2002 and 2010 when the outer security perimeter was cleared. I described this development in my report on U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons from 2012.

The latest upgrade obviously raises questions about what the operational status of the site is. Does it now, has it in the past, or will it in the future store nuclear warheads for Russian dual-capable non-strategic weapon systems deployed in the region? If so, does this signal a new development in Russian nuclear weapons strategy in Kaliningrad, or is it a routine upgrade of an aging facility for an existing capability? The satellite images do not provide conclusive answers to these questions. The Russian government has on numerous occasions stated that all its non-strategic nuclear warheads are kept in “central” storage, a formulation normally thought to imply larger storage sites further inside Russia. So the Kulikovo site could potentially function as a forward storage site that would be supplied with warheads from central storage sites in a crisis.

The features of the site suggest it could potentially serve Russian Air Force or Navy dual-capable forces. But it could also be a joint site, potentially servicing nuclear warheads for both Air Force, Navy, Army, air-defense, and costal defense forces in the region. It is to my knowledge the only nuclear weapons storage site in the Kaliningrad region. Despite media headlines, the presence of nuclear-capable forces in that area is not new; Russia deployed dual-capable forces in Kaliningrad during the Cold War and has continued to do so after. But nearly all of those weapon systems have recently been, or are in the process of being modernized. The Kulikovo site site is located:

– About 8 kilometers (5 miles) miles from the Chkalovsk air base (54.7661°, 20.3985°), which has been undergoing major renovation since 2012 and hosts potentially dual-capable strike aircraft.

– About 27 kilometers (16 miles) from the coastal-defense site near Donskoye (54.9423°, 19.9722°), which recently switched from the SSC-1B Sepal to the P-800 Bastion coastal-defense system. The Bastion system uses the SS-N-26 (3M-55, Yakhont) missile, that U.S. Intelligence estimates is “nuclear possible.”

– About 35 kilometers (22 miles) from the Baltic Sea Fleet base at Baltiysk (54.6400°, 19.9175°), which includes nuclear-capable submarines, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes.

– About 96 kilometers (60 miles) from the 152nd Detachment Missile Brigade at Chernyakovsk (54.6380°, 21.8266°), which has recently been upgraded from the SS-21 SRBM to the SS-26 (Islander) SRBM. Unlike other SS-26 bases, however, Chernyakovsk has not (yet) been added a new missile storage facility.

– Near half a dozen S-300 and S-400 air-defense units deployed in the region. The 2018 NPR states that Russian’s air-defense forces are dual-capable. These sites are located 20 kilometers (13 miles) to 98 kilometers (60 miles) from the storage site.

So there are many potential clients for the Kulikovo nuclear weapons storage site. Similar upgrades have been made to other Russian nuclear weapons storage sites over the base decade, including for the Navy’s nuclear submarine base on the Kamchatka peninsula. There are also ongoing upgrades to other weapons storage sites in the Kaliningrad region, but they do not appear to be nuclear.

The issue of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons has recently achieved new attention because of the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, which accused Russia of increasing the number and types of its non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Review stated Russia has “up to 2,000” non-strategic nuclear weapons, indirectly confirming FAS’ estimate.

NATO has for several years urged Russia to move its nuclear weapons further back from NATO borders. With Russia’s modernization of its conventional forces, there should be even less, not more, justification for upgrading nuclear facilities in Kaliningrad.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Problemia Energetici, Russia

Russia – Cina. Accordo per costruire reattori nucleari di nuova generazione.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-15.

Cina. Centrali atomiche. 001

La Cina è un paese da oltre un miliardo e trecento milioni di abitanti: nel breve volgere di trenta anni è passata da un paese misero ad essere la prima potenza economica mondiali, se misurata come pil ppa.

Di questi tempi ha varato un grandioso progetto per fare emergere dalla povertà nella fascia della classe media circa seicento milioni di persone. Si delinea quindi un mercato interno di dimensioni quasi eguali a quelle di tutto l’occidente considerato assieme.

Cina ed emersione dalla povertà rurale.

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A parte il carbone, la Cina non dispone di significative quantità di energetici estrattivi, ed infatti è il maggiore importatore mondiale di petrolio e gas naturale.

Dimenticate Russia, Arabia, Iran, Opec. È la Cina che fa i prezzi del petrolio.

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Per queste considerazioni la Cina ha come passo obbligato il dotarsi di una consistente quantità di centrali atomiche.

Cina. Centrali elettriche nucleari. 37 reattori attivi, 60 in costruzione, 179 programmati.

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«China’s nuclear industry has grown from its experience importing technology sold by foreign companies hoping to benefit from booming demand in the world’s largest energy consumer»

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«The nation’s ambitions to build out its nuclear power industry at home, and sell its own technology abroad, is beginning to overcome cost overruns and tighter regulations.»

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«Deal signed in Beijing to build four Rosatom-designed reactors. Nations set to build two VVER-1200s at Xudabao, two at Tianwan»

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«China has agreed to pursue building next-generation nuclear reactors designed by Russia’s Rosatom Corp., the latest player seeking a boost for its new technology from China’s embrace of atomic power»

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«The agreements are worth more than 20 billion yuan ($3.1 billion) and total construction costs could exceed 100 billion yuan, according to China National Nuclear Corp., adding it’s the biggest nuclear pact ever between the two countries»

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«As part of the agreements signed Friday, the countries will seek to build two Russian VVER-1200 units at the Xudabao power plant in China’s Liaoning province and two more at Tianwan in Jiangsu, according to a statement from Moscow-based Rosatom»

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Questa notizia dovrebbe dare da pensare a molti.

Sul mercato mondiale l’occidente è rappresentato soltanto dalla Westinghouse Electric Co., la quale però sta vincendo sempre meno commissioni e virtualmente è impossibilitata a costruire reattori in patria. In una situazione del genere i suoi prodotti diventano presto obsoleti e poco competitivi.

Se è vero che la Korea del Sud riesce ancora a reggere sul mercato del nucleare, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare come sia specializzata in reattori atomici di bassa – media potenza. Un’offerta che può soddisfare molte esigenze locoregionali, ma non certo le richieste energetiche della Cina.

A parte il fatto che i reattori della Rosatom siano allo stato dell’arte, in pratica sono gli unici acquistabili sul mercato e con solide garanzie della manutenzione.

La prima centrale nucleare in Egitto a firma russa

La politica nucleare di Putin tra Nordafrica e Medio Oriente

Nucleare: Intesa tra Russia e Sud Africa per la costruzione di nuovi reattori nucleari (9,6 GW)

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L’occidente ha abbandonato per motivazioni ideologiche un settore altamente strategico nelle mani dei russi e dei cinesi.

È stato dissipato un know-how di difficile e costosa acquisizione con una leggerezza difficilmente comprensibile.


Bloomberg. 2018-06-09. Russia Joins China’s Race for Next-Generation Nuclear Reactors

– Deal signed in Beijing to build four Rosatom-designed reactors

– Nations set to build two VVER-1200s at Xudabao, two at Tianwan

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China has agreed to pursue building next-generation nuclear reactors designed by Russia’s Rosatom Corp., the latest player seeking a boost for its new technology from China’s embrace of atomic power.

A plan to build four Russian units was among four deals signed Friday during a ceremony in Beijing attended by presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. The agreements are worth more than 20 billion yuan ($3.1 billion) and total construction costs could exceed 100 billion yuan, according to China National Nuclear Corp., adding it’s the biggest nuclear pact ever between the two countries. China will finance the reactor construction, Rosatom Chief Executive Officer Alexey Likhachev said after the ceremony.

China’s nuclear industry has grown from its experience importing technology sold by foreign companies hoping to benefit from booming demand in the world’s largest energy consumer. The nation’s ambitions to build out its nuclear power industry at home, and sell its own technology abroad, is beginning to overcome cost overruns and tighter regulations.

The nation signaled in March it would end a multiyear freeze on new reactor construction this year, and a month later approved the fuel-loading of Westinghouse Electric Co.’s AP1000 in Zhejiang province’s Sanmen and French-designed EPR in Guangdong’s Taishan. That paves the way for startups within months, which would be the first successful operations globally for units of their kind.

Russian Reactors

As part of the agreements signed Friday, the countries will seek to build two Russian VVER-1200 units at the Xudabao power plant in China’s Liaoning province and two more at Tianwan in Jiangsu, according to a statement from Moscow-based Rosatom.

China already uses some of Russia’s older technology. Two VVER-1000 units at Tianwan started in 2007, and a third was connected to the grid in December, Rosatom said.

“Tianwan has been a testing ground for Russian nuclear technology,” said Snowy Yao, an analyst at China Securities International Finance Holding Co. “China looks willing to try out all the latest designs before endorsing a winner.”

The two countries also on Friday signed deals for the supply of equipment, fuel and services for the CFR-600 fast reactor pilot project developed by state-owned CNNC, as well as the supply of generator parts for China’s lunar exploration program.

China previously signed a contract with Westinghouse to build two units at Xudabao, according to a World Nuclear Association report in October 2016. They were among six AP1000 reactors planned for the site, it said. A Beijing-based Westinghouse spokesman declined to comment Friday.

Pubblicato in: Logistica, Medio Oriente, Russia

Russia. Verosimilmente costruirà la Trans-Arabian Railway.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-10.

2018-06-08__Arabia_Russia_Rail__001

È da anni che i tedeschi sarebbero stati disposti a fare carte false pur di assicurarsi gli appalti per la costruzione della Trans-Arabian Railway.

Progetti naufragati sullo scoglio di una Germania che avrebbe voluto imporre la sua ideologia liberal al Regno Saudita, e che ha preso posizioni diplomatiche avverse al Regno. Una preclusione ideologica incompatibile con le più semplici possibilità di poter commerciare su base paritetica. Le conseguenze sono state drastiche.

Arabia Saudita. Imprese tedesche messe all’uscio.

Cina. Grande Muraglia contro la Germania. – Handelsblatt.

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Di questi giorni la notizia che il Principe ereditario Muḥammad bin Salmān avrebbe dato il via al progetto della per la costruzione della Trans-Arabian Railway, progetto da inserirsi nel quadro del Progetto cinese Belt and Road.

Secondo le ultime notizie, la Russia avrebbe parte principale nel progetto, avendo vinto tutta la restante concorrenza mondiale. Inutile dire la portata strategica di questa iniziativa ed i ritorno non solo economici, bensì anche politici, della Russia.

Tutto il Medio Oriente e l’Africa del Nord ha un bisogno disperato di avere un sistema ferroviario efficiente.

«Russian Railways is eyeing an opportunity to participate in construction of the Trans-Arabian Railway and other projects in Saudi Arabia»

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«Saudi Arabia approved a program of infrastructure development until 2030. It contains a railway component and the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of Saudi Arabia is currently preparing a tender for implementation of this project»

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«The concept is for the GCC states to tighten their non-energy economic integration with one another through a coastal railway that hugs the southern edge of the Persian Gulf and would run from Kuwait to Oman»

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«That might change in the coming future, however, as a result of trilateral cooperation between Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China»

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«To explain, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s ambitious Vision 2030 agenda of socio-economic reforms dovetails perfectly with China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity in the sense that it aims to position the Wahhabi Kingdom as a tri-continental economic hub for Afro-Eurasia»

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«Some of the over $130 billion worth of investments that China clinched in Saudi Arabia last year alone will be used to modernize the recipient’s economy and place it on the trajectory for developing a sustainable post-oil future, and it’s here where Russia’s railway expertise comes in.»

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«Moscow’s deepening all-around involvement in Arab affairs, especially with the influential GCC, will enable it to gain wider respect and acceptance as a Mideast power as well»

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La Germania non ha mai brillato per doti diplomatiche, che presuppongono un dialogo franco, fatto sostanzialmente dell’ascolto attento e rispettoso delle esigenze altrui. Poi, da quando ha assunto l’ideologia liberal, ha anche sviluppato un’arroganza comportamentale che le ha spesso alienato la possibilità di un rapporto costruttivo con l’interlocutore.

Lo stesso potrebbe essere detto per la diplomazia dell’Unione Europea, che per di più ha nominato come Alto rappresentante dell’Unione per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza una personalità ignota e fatiscente.

Sul tutto si aggiunga come l’impegno sino – russo nello scacchiere mediorientale abbia raggiunto i 130 miliardi Usd, contro un impegno europeo nullo.

Le conseguenze stratetiche, politiche, economiche e, forse, anche militari saranno di grande rilevanza.

«Moscow’s deepening all-around involvement in Arab affairs, especially with the influential GCC, will enable it to gain wider respect and acceptance as a Mideast power as well»


Oriental Review. 2018-06-06. Russia Building The Trans-Arabian Railway Will Make The Saudis More Multipolar

The CEO of Russian Railways, the state-backed leader in this industry, announced his company’s intent in participating in the Trans-Arabian Railway during last week’s Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), thus drawing attention to a project that’s been on the drawing board for a few years already but has failed to get off the ground. The concept is for the GCC states to tighten their non-energy economic integration with one another through a coastal railway that hugs the southern edge of the Persian Gulf and would run from Kuwait to Oman, but this vision hasn’t yet been prioritized. That might change in the coming future, however, as a result of trilateral cooperation between Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China.

To explain, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s ambitious Vision 2030 agenda of socio-economic reforms dovetails perfectly with China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity in the sense that it aims to position the Wahhabi Kingdom as a tri-continental economic hub for Afro-Eurasia. Some of the over $130 billion worth of investments that China clinched in Saudi Arabia last year alone will be used to modernize the recipient’s economy and place it on the trajectory for developing a sustainable post-oil future, and it’s here where Russia’s railway expertise comes in.

Russian Railways has been working very hard to establish itself as a global player and the Trans-Arabian Railway project provides the perfect opportunity for showcasing its services. Not only that, but it’s a quid pro quo for Saudi investment in the Russian economy over the past couple of years, and it will help to accelerate the Russian-Saudi rapprochement, too.  Moscow’s deepening all-around involvement in Arab affairs, especially with the influential GCC, will enable it to gain wider respect and acceptance as a Mideast power as well. Altogether, Russia’s successful involvement in the Trans-Arabian Railway project and China’s game-changing investments in the Kingdom could help Saudi Arabia diversify its foreign policy and ultimately become more multipolar as a result.


Tass. 2018-06-06. Russian Railways mulls participation in Trans-Arabian Railway construction.

PETERSBURG, May 24. /TASS/. Russian Railways is eyeing an opportunity to participate in construction of the Trans-Arabian Railway and other projects in Saudi Arabia, First Deputy CEO of the Russian railway operator Alexander Misharin told TASS in an interview on Tuesday at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).

“Saudi Arabia approved a program of infrastructure development until 2030. It contains a railway component and the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of Saudi Arabia is currently preparing a tender for implementation of this project. A consultant has been selected; we received a request for our proposals concerning performance of the company and terms. We furnished such data. Now we wait for the next stage – the tender announcement,” Misharin said. “We seriously consider participation in these projects, including in construction of the Trans-Arabian Railway passing through Saudi Arabia,” he added.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Europea, Russia, Unione Europea

Putin in Austria. Tempi che mutano.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-05.

Austria. Vienna. 001

Al momento di scrivere l’articolo, l’unico giornale italiano che riporta della visita di Mr Putin in Austria sarebbe il Sole 24 Ore

«Non è nostro obiettivo dividere niente o nessuno in Europa: al contrario, vogliamo vedere un’Europa unita e prospera, perché l’Unione Europea è il nostro principale partner commerciale ed economico. Più problemi ha, più rischi e incertezze abbiamo anche noi ….»

ci rendiamo perfettamente conto che per ciascun Paese dell’Unione Europea, preso singolarmente, è abbastanza complicato parlarne. Ma tutto quanto avviene in questo ambito non ci impedisce di sviluppare le nostre relazioni con l’Austria»

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Ampio invece il risalto dato dalla stampa estera, che riportiamo nei titoli e negli incipit.

Putin pushes for end to ‘harmful’ sanctions during Austria visit [The Guardia]

«Notionally scheduled to commemorate 50 years since Austria became the first western European country to sign a natural gas deal with the Soviet Union, the visit also offered the Russian and Austrian leaders opportunities to advance their respective geopolitical agendas, with a youthful Kurz, 32, pushing his credentials as a bridge builder between east and west.»

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Putin denies trying to divide Europe ahead of visit to Austria where he is accused of funding far-Right [The Telegraph]

«President Vladimir Putin on Monday downplayed suggestions Russia was seeking to disrupt the European Union’s cohesion, saying it was in his country’s interests for the bloc to remain “united and prosperous”.

“We have an interest in an EU that’s united and prosperous, since the EU is our most important commercial and economic partner,” Putin told Austria’s ORF television a day before an official visit to Vienna.»

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Putin says he wants to build bridges with Europe. Others see a wedge [Cnn]

«Russian President Vladimir Putin visits Austria on Tuesday, and he says he wants to build bridges to Europe.

Some fear he seeks to drive a wedge in it.

The official reason for the trip, Putin’s first foreign visit since he won a landslide re-election in March, is for talks with Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz and President Alexander Van der Bellen. Trade and economic cooperation are at the top of the agenda: Putin is slated to attend a meeting with Russian and Austrian business representatives to discuss investment opportunities and economic cooperation.

But the Kremlin leader is looking for an opening to a Europe that is witnessing a rise of right-wing, populist governments, with a clear aim of easing sanctions and ending Russia’s political isolation.

Austria is an interesting case in point. Late last year, a new coalition government took power in Vienna that includes the far-right Freedom Party as a junior partner.

Heinz-Christian Strache, Austria’s vice chancellor and leader of the Freedom Party, is an opponent of sanctions, which were imposed by the European Union and the US over Russia’s annexation of the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea in 2014.

In a recent interview with the newspaper Oesterreich, Strache made his position clear.

“It is high time to put an end to these exasperating sanctions and normalize political and economic relations with Russia,” he said.

The Austrian government has also done another major favor for Putin. It opted not to join over 20 other countries in expelling Russian diplomats over the March 4 nerve agent attack against Russian former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia Skripal, in Salisbury, England.

That’s raised questions in Austria about the real agenda for Putin’s visit.»

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Austria welcomes Putin but rebuffs his call for sanctions to be lifte

«Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Austria on Tuesday in his first trip to the West since being re-elected to the Kremlin and was rebuffed when he called for European Union sanctions to be lifted.

Austria, where a coalition of conservatives and the pro-Putin far right is in power, has a history of neutrality and relatively warm ties with Moscow.

It came in for criticism from its allies for being among the minority of EU member countries that did not expel any Russian diplomats over the poisoning of the former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal. ….

Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, whose conservatives control EU policy, repeated that Vienna would not break ranks with the rest of the bloc, which says the situation in eastern Ukraine must improve before sanctions can be lifted.

His Austrian trip is a rare and symbolic foray to the West for a man often at odds with Western governments over issues such as Syria and Ukraine. His last bilateral trip to Western Europe was to Finland last July.

Austria, which takes over the European Union’s rotating presidency in July, says it wants to act as a “bridge-builder” between east and west.

It has forged friendly ties with nationalist leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.»

Dalla lettura della stampa ci si formerebbe l’opinione che

«That’s raised questions in Austria about the real agenda for Putin’s visit.»

Pubblicato in: Problemia Energetici, Russia

Russia. Akademik Lomonosov. Prima centrale atomica mobile e galleggiante.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-05-28.

2018-05-22__Akademik Lomonosov __001

«La centrale nucleare galleggiante russa, il cui primo modello entrerà in funzione alla fine del 2019, è il primo progetto di una serie di unità mobili a bassa potenza trasportabili senza analoghi al mondo. Ne ha parlato a Sputnik Mikhail Evgenyev, project manager presso l’Istituto di Energia Nucleare di Atomenergomash.

“L’obiettivo principale del progetto è quello di creare una fonte di energia efficiente e sicura per garantire calore ed energia elettrica affidabile tutto l’anno ai consumatori in aree difficili da raggiungere, come la Regione del Nord, l’Estremo Oriente, ecc., Dove la fornitura di combustibili organici è difficile e costosa”, ha detto l’esperto.

Le centrali nucleari galleggianti sono una promettente fonte di energia anche per le aree remote dove l’energia è necessaria per un periodo limitato, ad esempio per i lavori di costruzione o per soddisfare le esigenze dell’industria nel campo della cogenerazione, ad esempio la produzione idrogeno o la dissalazione dell’acqua.

La centrale nucleare galleggiante può fungere da fonte di energia per grandi impianti industriali ad alta intensità energetica che coprono le proprie esigenze di energia elettrica attraverso la generazione di diesel, in particolare nel settore minerario. Come avviene in Indonesia, Vietnam, Sud Africa, Ghana, Messico, Brasile, Perù, Cile e altri paesi.» [Fonte]

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Lo sfruttamento industriale, specie quello minerario, richiede grandi quantità di energia. Tuttavia spesso le risorse sono disponibili in zone ove sarebbe impensabile per motivi climatici ed economici poter installare centrali elettriche tradizionali. Si pensi anche alla necessità dei rifornimenti di combustibile.

Quando poi si parli di zone sopra il circolo polare artico, l’ambiente avverso ed il clima quasi proibitivo generano difficoltà energetiche ancora maggiori, aggiungendosi la esigenza di utilizzo della corrente per riscaldamento e quella di illuminare a giorno la zona di lavoro durante la lunga notte invernale.

La soluzione identificata con la Akademik Lomonosov sembrerebbe essere particolarmente interessante.

«a floating nuclear power station …. The 144-by-30-metre (472-by-98-foot) barge holds two reactors with two 35 megawatt nuclear reactors that are similar to those used to power icebreaker ships …. The barge can produce enough electricity to power a town of 200,000 residents, far more than the 5,000 living in Russia’s northernmost town»

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Un aspetto che rende ancor più interessante questo progetto è legato alla facilità della manutenzione: quella ordinaria può essere eseguita in loco, ma per interventi maggiori si può rimorchiare l’interno complesso in un bacino di carenaggio appositamente attrezzato.

«China is also building a floating nuclear power plant»


South China Morning Post. 2018-05-19. Russia launches world’s first floating nuclear power station as part of its plan to develop oil resources in Arctic

As Russia is forced to push further north into the Arctic in the search for oil and gas, it needs electricity in far-flung locations.

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To meet its growing electricity needs in its drive to develop oil resources in remote Arctic regions, Russia has built a floating nuclear power station, a project that detractors deride as a “Chernobyl on ice”.

Built in Saint Petersburg, the Akademik Lomonosov is currently moored in Murmansk where it is being loaded with nuclear fuel before heading to eastern Siberia.

On Saturday, head of state nuclear power firm Rosatom unveiled the brown-and-mustard-painted facility in the city’s estuary as an orchestra played the national anthem.

Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev hailed the new power station as “a new world first,” which he said “underlines the undoubted leading role of Rosatom and the Russian nuclear energy sector on the global agenda.”

“I hope today will be a symbolic day for the Arctic,” Likhachev said, adding that Rosatom “is setting a trend, a demand for medium-capacity nuclear facilities, mobile facilities, for many decades ahead.”

The 144-by-30-metre (472-by-98-foot) barge holds two reactors with two 35 megawatt nuclear reactors that are similar to those used to power icebreaker ships.

The Akademik Lomonosov will be towed in the summer of 2019 to the port of Pevek in the autonomous Chukotka region in Russia’s extreme northeast.

The barge can produce enough electricity to power a town of 200,000 residents, far more than the 5,000 living in Russia’s northernmost town. But Akademik Lomonosov isn’t in Pevek to just keep the lights on in homes.

As Russia is forced to push further north into the Arctic in the search for oil and gas, it needs electricity in far-flung locations.

“The idea is to have low-capacity, mobile power plants that can be used in the Russian Arctic where large amounts of electricity aren’t needed” and the construction of a conventional power station would be complicated and costly, said Sergei Kondratyev at the Institute for Energy and Finance in Moscow.

“The alternatives are coal, gas and diesel. But diesel is very costly,” he said, while the gas needs to be delivered as liquefied natural gas or LNG.

Vitaly Trutnev, who is in charge of the construction and operation of floating nuclear power stations at Rosatom, said such units would “supply electricity and heat to the most remote regions, supporting also growth and sustainable development.”

He said use of such floating reactors can save 50,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per year.

The Akademik Lomonosov is set to replace an ageing nuclear reactor and a coal-fired power plant which are both located in Chukotka.

Trutnev said the barge has “the latest security systems and should be one of the safest nuclear installations in the world.”

Activists at the environmental group Greenpeace are not convinced and call for international monitoring.

They fear that the Akademik Lomonosov could become a “nuclear Titanic” or a “Chernobyl on ice” 32 years after the Soviet nuclear disaster.

Greenpeace Russia’s Rashid Alimov said that accidents are possible at all nuclear power plants, but that the barge “will be especially sensitive to storms, environmental phenomena and threats such as terrorism.”

He said a shift to more numerous small reactors would pose risks for proliferation of nuclear material.

Greenpeace nuclear expert Jan Haverkamp noted that the Akademik Lomonosov is being fuelled near Murmansk, a city of 300,000, before being towed across the Arctic.

“Its installation in the tough environment of the Russian Arctic will pose a constant threat for residents of the north and the Arctic’s pristine nature,” said Haverkamp.

The barge had initially been scheduled to be fuelled in Saint Petersburg, but that work was moved to Murmansk instead due to concern in countries along the Baltic Sea.

Kondratyev at the Institute for Energy and Finance in Moscow downplayed safety concerns about the barge, insisting it met the same safety rules as nuclear icebreakers and submarines.

“But it is a new piece of equipment. There may be concerns among the general populace, but there are additional risks compared to nuclear power plants,” he said.

Rosatom chief Likhachev said Saturday that the corporation hopes to build more such barges and to find Asian clients in need of power in remote regions, giving the examples of Indonesia and Philippines.

“In certain cases a floating nuclear power plant is more cost-effective than other electric power plants … it has its own niche,” Kondratyev said.

He said China is also building a floating nuclear power plant.