«Corretto per gli effetti di calendario (i giorni lavorativi sono stati 19 contro i 18 di dicembre 2017), il fatturato totale diminuisce in termini tendenziali del 7,3%, con un calo del 7,5% sul mercato interno e del 7,0% su quello estero»
«A dicembre si stima che il fatturato dell’industria diminuisca in termini congiunturali del 3,5%. Nel quarto trimestre l’indice complessivo ha registrato un calo dell’1,6% rispetto al trimestre precedente»
«mezzi di trasporto (-23,6%), industria farmaceutica (-13,0%) e industria chimica (-8,5%).»
«L’indice grezzo degli ordinativi segna un calo tendenziale del 5,3%, derivante da diminuzioni sia per il mercato interno (-3,6%) sia per quello estero (-7,6%).»
«A dicembre 2018 entrambi i flussi commerciali con l’estero registrano una flessione congiunturale, più intensa per le esportazioni (-2,3%) che per le importazioni (-1,0%). La diminuzione congiunturale dell’export è da ascrivere al netto calo delle vendite verso i mercati extra Ue (-5,6%) mentre l’area Ue registra una contenuta crescita (+0,5%).»
«Su base annua, i paesi che contribuiscono maggiormente al calo delle esportazioni sono Turchia (-32,9%), Stati Uniti (-5,7%), Cina (-15,2%) e paesi OPEC (-8,3%).»
* * * * * * *
Questi dati non dovrebbero necessitare di grandi commenti.
Solo due considerazioni.
Ad una contrazione degli ordinativi all’industria consegue a breve nel tempo il relativo calo della produzione e quindi del fatturato.
Ma al calo del fatturato consegue il rispettivo calo nel gettito di imposte e tasse.
Al sodo: entreranno nelle casse dello stato denari in meno in ragione del -7.3%.
Adesso qualcuno cerchi di spiegare donde si trarranno i soldi per pagare pensioni ed assegni assistenziali.
Aumentando ancora le tasse?
Benissimo: così si fermerà tutto.
A quel punto vorremo vedere i “fedeli servitori dello stato” donde trarranno i loro agognati stipendi.
A dicembre si stima che il fatturato dell’industria diminuisca in termini congiunturali del 3,5%. Nel quarto trimestre l’indice complessivo ha registrato un calo dell’1,6% rispetto al trimestre precedente. Anche gli ordinativi registrano una diminuzione congiunturale sia rispetto al mese precedente (-1,8%), sia nel complesso del quarto trimestre rispetto al precedente (-2,0%).
Il calo congiunturale del fatturato riguarda sia il mercato interno (-2,7%) sia, in misura più accentuata, quello estero (-4,7%). La flessione degli ordinativi è la sintesi di un incremento delle commesse provenienti dal mercato interno (+2,5%) e di una marcata contrazione di quelle provenienti dall’estero (-7,4%).
A dicembre tutti i raggruppamenti principali di industrie segnano una variazione congiunturale negativa: -1,8% i beni di consumo, -5,5% i beni strumentali, -1,7% i beni intermedi e -9,7% l’energia.
Corretto per gli effetti di calendario (i giorni lavorativi sono stati 19 contro i 18 di dicembre 2017), il fatturato totale diminuisce in termini tendenziali del 7,3%, con un calo del 7,5% sul mercato interno e del 7,0% su quello estero.
Sempre con riferimento al fatturato corretto per gli effetti di calendario, tutti i principali settori di attività economica registrano cali tendenziali. I più rilevanti sono quelli dei mezzi di trasporto (23,6%), dell’industria farmaceutica (-13,0%) e dell’industria chimica (-8,5%).
L’indice grezzo degli ordinativi segna un calo tendenziale del 5,3%, derivante da diminuzioni sia per il mercato interno (-3,6%) sia per quello estero (-7,6%). Si registra una crescita per il solo comparto dei macchinari e attrezzature (+5,4%), mentre la diminuzione più marcata si rileva per l’industria delle apparecchiature elettriche (-21,4%).
Nella media dell’anno, il fatturato dell’industria registra una crescita del 2,3% rispetto al 2017, più sostenuta per il mercato estero (+3,5%) rispetto a quello interno (+1,8%). Al netto dell’energia, la crescita si riduce all’1,7%, risultando più ampia della media solo per i beni intermedi (+2,4%).
In autunno la Polonia terrà le elezioni politiche. I recenti sondaggi della propensione al voto assegnerebbero al PiS il 39.7% ed a Piattaforma Democratica il 28.2%. Il Wiosna, un partito liberal, prenderebbe l’8.6%, mentre il Kukiz 15 varrebbe il 7.4%. Partito Socialista (pps) e verdi (pz) sono riscontrabili in tracce.
Quando però i sondaggi stratificano il comportamento giovanile, si assiste ad un sostanziale spostamento dei giovani verso la sponda conservatrice.
«Young people in Poland disproportionately vote for right-wing parties»
«This shift is not just a temporary trend — the country’s increasingly patriotic youth are longing for more conservative values»
«Young people were marching through Warsaw, wrapped in red and white flags, singing the national anthem»
«They were lured into the streets by patriotism. They represent conservative values and vote for right-wing parties.»
«In Poland, the young generation’s shift to the right is neither a temporary trend nor an expression of protest»
«Young Poles long for post-material values such as the church, tradition and security.»
«This shift made its mark for the first time in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Two-thirds of voters between 18 and 29 supported parties to the right of center»
«The regional elections in October confirmed this pattern. Again, PiS won the most votes in this age group and Kukiz’15 was also able to count on their continuing support»
«They trust authorities, are dreaming of marriage, and are proud to be Polish citizens»
* * * * * * * *
La devoluzione dell’ideologia liberal e di quella socialista sta procedendo implacabile in tutto il mondo, ed in questo la Polonia ne è stata antesignana.
Poche volte vocabolo fu meglio utilizzato: l’antesignano era il soldato romano schierato in prima linea, davanti alle insegne della legione. E la devoluzione in oggetto ha un ché di militare, dalla grandiosità delle forze mobilitate fino all’asprezza della lotta, che da confronto politico i liberal han fatto diventare questione di vita o di morte.
I liberal stanno perdendo perché hanno fatto una lunga serie di errori pacchiani.
Che loro piaccia o meno, i giovani si riconoscono nel retaggio religioso, storico, culturale e sociale del proprio paese. Ossia nell’esatto opposto di ciò che essi propugnano.
Si valuti molto bene questa frase:
«They trust authorities, are dreaming of marriage, and are proud to be Polish citizens»
Ci si pensi bene e si cerchi di andare all’essenza: l’ideologia liberal si sta disgregando perché ha cercato di imporre la sua visione etica e morale.
Togliere alle donne il “sogno del matrimonio” equivale a snaturarle ad esseri meramente economici: invece di valorizzarle le umilia ad essere oggetti. La natura degli esseri umani non ammette filautia come movente di felicità.
Young people in Poland disproportionately vote for right-wing parties. This shift is not just a temporary trend — the country’s increasingly patriotic youth are longing for more conservative values.
It was an unusual sight when Poland celebrated 100 years of independence in November: Young people were marching through Warsaw, wrapped in red and white flags, singing the national anthem. They were lured into the streets by patriotism. They represent conservative values and vote for right-wing parties.
In Poland, the young generation’s shift to the right is neither a temporary trend nor an expression of protest. It represents a new self-image that has grown with the politics of recent years. Young Poles long for post-material values such as the church, tradition and security.
Think conservatively, vote right-wing
This shift made its mark for the first time in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Two-thirds of voters between 18 and 29 supported parties to the right of center. The national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, which today governs Poland, received 27 percent of their votes. A further 21 percent went to the new right-wing populist movement Kukiz’15. The regional elections in October confirmed this pattern. Again, PiS won the most votes in this age group and Kukiz’15 was also able to count on their continuing support.
“In the past three years, young Poles have turned even more towards conservative values,” said social psychologist Marta Majchrzak, who co-authored a study published in November by the commercial research institute IQS in which scientists interviewed childless Poles between the ages of 16 and 29. “They trust authorities, are dreaming of marriage, and are proud to be Polish citizens,” she explained.
The study classified only 9 percent of respondents as “cosmopolitan” and “open to being different.”
No memory of socialism
The younger generation’s conservative attitude can be explained by the economic reforms that followed the fall of the Soviet Union. Poles under 30 have no memory of life in a socialist system. They grew up at a time when their parents started their own shops and businesses. What mattered most was economic success. The West was the ideal. Parents promised children that their new Poland would soon become an equal member of the European Union. They predicted that Poland would develop until it was equal to its neighbor Germany.
But the promises were initially followed by disappointment. Under the liberal PO party, which ruled the country from 2007 to 2015, the economy grew, but not the younger generation’s economic security. Youth unemployment peaked at more than 27 percent in 2013. Young Poles ended up on temporary contracts and their wages were lower than they had hoped. In 2007 they helped the PO win the elections one last time, but punished the party in the following years by voting for the national conservatives, who promised them a social policy.
‘This generation is by no means right-wing radical’
The young generation wants a regulated economic system precisely because the economic situation has improved in recent years. “Young Poles compare Poland’s secure situation with the disorder in the world,” said Majchrzak. According to the IQS study, Poland’s youth view their country as a safe exclave that protects them from the world’s uncertainties. Three out of four respondents said they were against accepting refugees. Almost one-third said they would give up personal freedoms for more law and order.
However, this does not mean that young Poles are moving away from democratic values. “This generation is by no means right-wing radical. Young Poles are apolitical, which is why votes for the more radical parties carry more weight,” said sociologist Henryk Domanski, who serves as director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences. This also became apparent during the regional elections last autumn: A heated battle for votes took place between PO and PiS. The election campaign saw the largest voter turnout since 1990 at around 51 percent. But amongst 18 to 29-year-olds, only 37 percent voted.
“A right-wing party like Kukiz’15 can only temporarily benefit from the young generation’s conservatism,” said Domanski, noting that anti-establishment parties such as Ruch Palikota and Samoobrona won over the younger generation a few years ago, but have since lost their political significance. Domanski is convinced that young Poles will remain loyal to the conservative PiS in next year’s elections. And even beyond that, the under-30s will likely remain conservative: These days many children in Poland are growing up with parents who emigrated to Western Europe in search of better economic circumstances. These so-called Euro-orphans are growing up with their fathers or mothers away from home for months. They too, will be longing for tradition and security.
L’Unione Europea sta vivendo gli ultimi mesi del paludoso crepuscolo che sta calando sulla Commissione Europea uscente.
Spezzato l’asse francogermanico, Mr Macron ha i suoi problemi con i Gilets Jaunes e Frau Merkel conta e riconta i voti persi, con gli identitari sovranisti che si apprestano a conquistarsi un buon posizionamento nel prossimo parlamento europeo e con le incombenti elezioni politiche in sette stati dell’Unione, l’attuale eurodirigenza sta vedendo sgretolarsi tutta la sua costruzione.
Non solo: hanno una paura becca che in futuro saranno trattati per come hanno trattato, ma gli Elettori hanno loro voltato le spalle. Hanno ancora certamente molto potere, ma le crepe sono più che evidenti.
L’articolo allegato, che fa parte integrante di questo testo, è un condensato di queste paure.
Una sola nota prima di proseguire.
È scritto in politicamente corretto. Il termine ‘rule of law’ significa il potere dei dettami ideologici liberal e socialisti, mentre il termine ‘democray’ indica il governo di tali ideologie, essenso chiunque la pensasse differentemente un ‘illiberal’.
«Troubles with Hungary and Poland will be back on the agenda of EU affairs ministers next Tuesday (19 February) – but procedures looking into their dismantling of the rule of law and the erosion of democracy in the two countries will not move forward»
«Member states and the Romanian presidency of the EU have already been criticised for the lack of progress on Hungary last month.»
«No concrete outcome or a clear timeline for steps ahead is expected from the talks on Tuesday, either»
«It is the fourth time the situation in Hungary is discussed among EU affairs ministers, but the procedure has been bogged down by procedural issues»
«Under the previous Austrian presidency, ministers heard from EU commission vice-president Frans Timmermans laying out ongoing commission probes and court cases against Hungary on violating rights of asylum seekers, targeting and intimidating NGOs and amending a higher education law that eventually forced the Central European University in Budapest to decide to relocate to Vienna»
«But the procedure is stuck there party due to institutional jealousy between the parliament and the council of EU countries.»
«Several diplomats have said it is unclear to them how the Romanian presidency wants to handle the case of Hungary, while the Romanian presidency wants member states to give a clear direction on how to proceed»
«Around 18-19 member states want to keep Hungary on the agenda, but there is no consensus on how to approach the issue or when»
«Hungary’s government rejected the report, saying that Freedom House was part of the “empire” of George Soros, the Hungarian-born billionaire investor and philanthropist. Hungary’s government has also been labelling Timmermans as a ‘Soros stooge’»
* * * * * * * *
A maggio si vota: cambierà la composizione dell’europarlamento e sarà nominata una nuova Commissione Europea.
Verosimilmente, sarà alquanto difficile che la nuova dirigenza segua le orme della vecchia.
Troubles with Hungary and Poland will be back on the agenda of EU affairs ministers next Tuesday (19 February) – but procedures looking into their dismantling of the rule of law and the erosion of democracy in the two countries will not move forward.
No concrete outcome or a clear timeline for steps ahead is expected from the talks on Tuesday, either.
The EU commission launched the so-called Article 7 procedure against Poland in December 2017. The European Parliament triggered the same procedure against Hungary last September.
Under the procedure, ministers have to assess whether Hungary and Poland are breaching fundamental values laid down in the EU treaty and could address recommendations to the governments on how to remedy the situation.
It is the fourth time the situation in Hungary is discussed among EU affairs ministers, but the procedure has been bogged down by procedural issues.
Bogged-down in institutional jealousy
Under the previous Austrian presidency, ministers heard from EU commission vice-president Frans Timmermans laying out ongoing commission probes and court cases against Hungary on violating rights of asylum seekers, targeting and intimidating NGOs and amending a higher education law that eventually forced the Central European University in Budapest to decide to relocate to Vienna.
Hungary submitted over a hundred pages of written responses on the issues.
But the procedure is stuck there party due to institutional jealousy between the parliament and the council of EU countries.
The European parliament wants to participate in the process, as it was a parliament report by Dutch MEP Judith Sarghentini that triggered the procedure.
EP president Antonio Tajani sent a letter to the Austrian presidency last year to lobby for the parliament’s participation.
The Romanian presidency plans to discuss the issue with the head of the civil liberties committee of the parliament.
However, member states are wary of allowing the parliament or an MEP into their meetings, as they fear it would create a dangerous precedent for continued parliament interference in their work.
“We give a finger and the parliament takes an arm,” one EU diplomat quipped.
Several diplomats have said it is unclear to them how the Romanian presidency wants to handle the case of Hungary, while the Romanian presidency wants member states to give a clear direction on how to proceed.
Around 18-19 member states want to keep Hungary on the agenda, but there is no consensus on how to approach the issue or when.
Because Hungary’s Article 7 probe is complicated furthermore with an ongoing case at the EU’s top court.
Hungary’s government has challenged the way the parliament voted on Sarghetini’s report last September, arguing that excluding the abstentions when calculating the two-thirds majority needed for Article 7 to be triggered was against the rules.
Sarghenitni’s report was approved by 448 votes to 197, with 48 abstentions.
Some member states are reluctant to move ahead with the procedure before the Luxembourg-based European Court of Justice rules on the legality of the parliament vote.
But that ruling is not expected to happen this year, and judges are not expected to hear the case before the summer break, pushing the Article 7 procedure even further into the distant future.
Meanwhile, Hungary has become the first EU country to be designated as only “partly free” in an annual barometer of democratic freedoms by the Freedom House, a Washington-based think-tank earlier this month.
The erosion of democracy under prime minister Viktor Orban constitutes “the most dramatic decline ever charted” in the EU, the report said, while all other 27 EU members maintained their “free” label.
Hungary’s government rejected the report, saying that Freedom House was part of the “empire” of George Soros, the Hungarian-born billionaire investor and philanthropist. Hungary’s government has also been labelling Timmermans as a ‘Soros stooge’.
Poland in the meantime wants to convince fellow member states to close the Article 7 procedure as the Warsaw government has amended crucial legislation criticised by the EU
Timmermans will make the argument to EU affairs ministers that more needs to be done. “There is no real willingness [among member states] at this moment to drop Article 7,” said an EU source.
Member states would need to decide if they want to keep the pressure up on Poland and vote on if they believed Poland was violating EU values and propose recommendations. But that is unlikely to happen on Tuesday.
«France is the EU’s leading defender of Brussels – but Italy sees things very differently»
«French President Emmanuel Macron has lately shown himself unable to take the Italian government in his stride. Perhaps it is because he is worried about France’s own protests»
«The so-called Yellow Vest marchers have been rallying against Macron’s embattled government for three months now»
«Chalençon is given to blurting out various non-conforming sentiments on Twitter about the inevitability of civil war and the upside of military rule»
«Macron is Europe’s leading defender of Brussels and its ways»
«Politicians of his stripe generally attribute to the EU such miraculous powers of conflict resolution»
«But Italy sees things differently»
«Macron himself denounced the ‘leprosy’ of Italian and other nationalisms — although he has not so often invoked the ‘costs and consequences’ with which he threatens post-Brexit Britain»
«Like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán in the summer of 2015, he, Salvini, has only been doing what EU treaties envisioned — defending the community’s external border. Macron, meanwhile, was hermetically sealing the Franco-Italian internal border to ensure that Italy bore all the costs and consequences of an illegal migration that it had done nothing to summon.»
«Macron is optimistic enough to believe that populism is just a kind of rhetoric»
«Macron’s party is the most Europhile in Europe»
«Di Maio’s is among the most Eurosceptic»
«The logic of the Maastricht Treaty is that eventually Europe will be a country that replaces the old nation states»
«Really there is no clash between Italy and France. There is a clash between the winners and losers of the process of ‘building Europe’
Una diffusa quanto errata assunzione è che le rivoluzioni le facciano i popoli.
Per definizione, la rivoluzione è concepita ed attuata da una minoranza, e solo dopo che essa ha conquistato il potere con la forza la gente si accorge di quello che è successo. Se così non fosse, la rivoluzione sarebbe inutile, detenendo già la maggioranza.
La nobiltà inglese è sopravissuta per secoli perché si rinnovava – si pensi solo a sir Francis Drake -, mentre quella francese, che si era cristallizzata, fu spazzata via dalla ghigliottina. Le rigidità si spezzano.
Stesso itinerario quello odierno dei liberal socialisti, eurofili doc, tetragoni ad ogni possibile accordo, ad ogni possibile dialogo.
«a transitional government to hear and hear people …. I appeal to Mr. Macron, or, if he refuses, to the military. Today it is up to the military to come into play in order to facilitate the deployment of this government.»
Si pesino molto bene i significati espliciti e quelli impliciti a codeste parole.
“Civil war is inevitable”. These words are signed by Christophe Chalençon and presented as one of the leaders of the “yellow free west”. In a post on Facebook on December 23, accompanied by the headline “The Chaos Announced,” this spokesman for the Vaucluse protesters demands Emmanuel Macron’s resignation. A recurrent theme in “yellow west”.
But Christophe Chalençon goes further: he appeals to the army. He wants a “transitional government to hear and hear people”. And to be precise, “I appeal to Mr. Macron, or, if he refuses, to the military. Today it is up to the military to come into play in order to facilitate the deployment of this government.”
The intervention of the military was already mentioned by Christophe Chalençon. On December 3 he had called for a “real commander” in Matignon. According to him, as he had told our fellow Europeans 1, , Édouard Philippe had to be replaced by General de Villiers, the former chief of staff of the armies released by Emmanuel Macron.
La tensione in Francia continua a salire e un fuori onda mostrato da Piazza Pulita di uno dei leader dei gilet gialli spiega bene qual è la situazione nel Paese transalpino.
“Abbiamo paramiliatri pronti ad intervenire”. La tensione in Francia continua a salire e un fuori onda mostrato da Piazza Pulita di uno dei leader dei gilet gialli spiega bene qual è la situazione nel Paese transalpino.
“Abbiamo dei paramilitari pronti a intervenire perché anche loro vogliono far cadere il governo. Oggi è tutto calmo, ma siamo sull’orlo della guerra civile. Quindi si trovino delle soluzioni politiche molto rapidamente, perché dietro ci sono delle persone pronte a intervenire da ovunque. Delle persone che si sono ritirate dall’esercito e che sono contro il potere”, ha affermato Christophe Chalençon, uno dei leader dei gilet gialli incontrato da Di Maio e Di Battista in Francia, in un fuori-onda realizzato a margine dell’intervista trasmessa da Piazzapulita.
Parole forti che fanno capire quanto il movimento dei gilet gialli sia determinato nella sua battaglia contro il governo guidato da Emmanuel Macron. Nelle ultime settimane per le strade di Parigi si sono susseguite manifestazioni e scontri tra la polizia e gli stessi gilet gialli. La scorsa settimana una delegazione ha “sconfinato” a Sanremo per portare la voce della protesta anche in Italia. Il braccio di ferro con Macron dunque non è finito e lo scontro è destinato a durare ancora a lungo.
France is the EU’s leading defender of Brussels – but Italy sees things very differently.
Two weeks ago Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s vice-premier and Labour Minister and the top politician of the Five Star Movement (M5S), appointed a new commissioner for the UN cultural organisation Unesco. He chose the dog–whistling, bum-slapping sex–comedy actor Lino Banfi, star of How to Seduce Your Teacher, Policewoman on the Porno Squad and other films. The M5S was launched online by the 1980s comedian Beppe Grillo. It is run on the basis of a private computer operating system called Rousseau. Most Italians look at the M5S as either a breath of fresh air, a necessary gesture of defiance, or a ridiculous episode that will pass.
But you need a sense of humour for that. French President Emmanuel Macron has lately shown himself unable to take the Italian government in his stride. Perhaps it is because he is worried about France’s own protests. The so-called Yellow Vest marchers have been rallying against Macron’s embattled government for three months now. Di Maio travelled to the Loiret to meet the like-minded Christophe Chalençon, a sort of Yellow Vest renegade who has set up his own citizens’ software programme and a new political party, and seems interested in collaborating with M5S in May’s European elections. Chalençon is given to blurting out various non-conforming sentiments on Twitter about the inevitability of civil war and the upside of military rule. Macron responded to Di Maio’s visit by recalling France’s ambassador to Italy for consultations.
Macron is Europe’s leading defender of Brussels and its ways. Politicians of his stripe generally attribute to the EU such miraculous powers of conflict resolution that you would imagine European countries would no longer even need embassies in their neighbours’ capitals at all. But Italy sees things differently. Italy’s government is a coalition of the anti-corruption M5S and the anti-immigration League. Ever since interior minister Matteo Salvini of the League began implementing his policy of turning away boatloads of migrants crossing the Mediterranean from Africa, Macron has become Italy’s most strident oratorical adversary. One Macron aide said the Italian migration policy made him want to vomit. Macron himself denounced the ‘leprosy’ of Italian and other nationalisms — although he has not so often invoked the ‘costs and consequences’ with which he threatens post-Brexit Britain.
As Salvini sees it, Macron is a hypocrite. Like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán in the summer of 2015, he, Salvini, has only been doing what EU treaties envisioned — defending the community’s external border. Macron, meanwhile, was hermetically sealing the Franco-Italian internal border to ensure that Italy bore all the costs and consequences of an illegal migration that it had done nothing to summon.
Who had summoned it? Salvini makes no bones about it: ‘Ask Paris,’ he said last summer. The present migration route opened up in 2011, when one trio of western leaders (France’s then president Nicolas Sarkozy, along with David Cameron and Barack Obama) overruled another trio (Silvio Berlusconi, Angela Merkel and Vladimir Putin) to destroy the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi.
This antagonism, it must be said, has been good for both Salvini and Macron. But Di Maio got lost in the shuffle. His reputation has suffered at the hands of the other two. Salvini’s agenda is to keep migrants out. It requires will and thick skin, and Salvini has plenty of both. Di Maio’s agenda is to fix an economy that has been delivering lousy economic results to everyone but the rich. That requires money.
Things were supposed to get better once Di Maio muscled a modest guaranteed-income measure into Italy’s budget. But the EU’s finance commissioner Pierre Moscovici would not sign off on an Italian budget deficit higher than 2.04 per cent. (Moscovici is a Frenchman, although it is EU etiquette never to allude to the national origin of the various commissioners.) So Italy had to scale back some of Di Maio’s most popular programmes. By contrast, in December, when Moscovici’s former fellow socialist Macron offered a set of measures that would push France’s deficit over 3 per cent, Moscovici waved it through. He had a reason: Italy’s debt is higher. But Italians still resented it.
Although the M5S got the most votes in last year’s elections, it has been losing ground to the League almost daily. At regional elections in the Abruzzi last weekend, M5S saw its vote cut in half, falling under 20 per cent, as the League became the top party.
France’s Yellow Vest protesters do have grievances in common with Di Maio, and they are having just as hard a time taking political advantage. They are a variety of ordinary people from rural France who are seeing not just their standard of living but also their culture destroyed around them.
Macron has tried to defuse their complaints in several ways. This includes passing budget-busting new government benefits, which have reversed overnight his plan to ‘modernise’ the French economy, much as François Mitterrand in 1983 had to reverse his plan to socialise it. He has set out on a tour he calls le grand débat, but which is better thought of as a round of squabbles, some of which have gone on for six hours. And he has encouraged a confusion between the yellow-vest protesters and vandals who often follow in their wake, using the excesses of the latter to crack down on the former.
Macron is optimistic enough to believe that populism is just a kind of rhetoric. If these uncredentialled citizens can learn to wield the irrational populist magic, why can’t he? This attitude may be what turned Di Maio’s visit — a run-of-the mill episode of political friction — into an institution-damaging scandal.
Macron’s party is the most Europhile in Europe. Di Maio’s is among the most Eurosceptic. But both lack allies at the continental level. Each is trying desperately to fix this problem as May’s European elections approach. That Di Maio would come to France to meet like-minded political agitators on the eve of the European elections is the most natural thing in the world. Until Angela Merkel was repudiated at the ballot box in 2017, Macron ran his government as a joint venture with the Germans. It was only a few weeks ago that he was sketching out plans for bilateral defence with Berlin, and he has not been shy about telling London how it should manage Brexit. That’s what the EU is.
Really there is no clash between Italy and France. There is a clash between the winners and losers of the process of ‘building Europe’. In France, in Italy, and everywhere else in Europe, there is a class war going on. This week in Spain, El País editoria-lised that the ambassadorial contretemps pits the ‘liberal and democratic values of the EU founders’ (Macron) against ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘-insurrection’ (Di Maio). If you’re prole-friendly, you’re with Di Maio. If you’re among the nobs of the information economy, you’re with Macron. That may be why Salvini calls Macron signorino — the young master.
The logic of the Maastricht Treaty is that eventually Europe will be a country that replaces the old nation states. If you think this way, as Macron day after day shows he does, then the institutions of the old nations are vestigial, soon-to-expire, worthless. Why protect or respect, for instance, diplomatic protocol? Why not use it to leverage yourself into a more advantageous position in the future order in which all politics will be continental? That is what Obama likely thought he was doing when he warned that Britain would have to get to the ‘back of the queue’ if it passed Brexit — he thought he was burning a relationship with a country that would not exist a generation from now, in order to win the trust of a country that would.
La situazione politica tedesca è a livello di una palude. I partiti tradizionali della Große Koalition hanno perso larghe fasce di Elettorato e sembrano pugili suonati alle corde.
Soprattutto sembrerebbero essere incapaci di formulare un minimo di programma politico che li differenzi gli uni dagli altri.
La nuova dirigenza dalla spd è praticamente invisibile e la cdu risulta essere azzoppata dal duopolio direttivo: Frau Merkel ancora alla cancelleria e Frau Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer alla presidenza del partito. Al di là dei sorrisi di rito, rappresentano due linee divergenti. Il passato che non si rassegna a farsi in un canto ed il nuovo che non ha la forza di imporsi.
La pregressa ondata di voti che si era riversata sui Grüne sta refluendo, lentamente ma sta refluendo. È una situazione di chaos che lascia interdetto l’Elettorato tedesco.
Un aspetto cui dovremo abituarci è la frammentazione politica, che porta inevitabilmente alla formazione di coalizioni locali tra partiti con obiettivi altamente divergenti. Da ciò deriva stasi decisionale, e proprio in un periodo che richiederebbe invece di avere un forte governo centrale.
* * * * * * *
Il 26 maggio si vota a Bremen.
Il 1° settembre si vota nel Brandenburg.
Il 1° settembre si vota in Sachsen.
Il 27 ottobre si vota in Thüringen.
* * * * * * *
Brema è una città stato, di piccole dimensioni, da sempre orientata a sinistra. Lì AfD non è riuscita a penetrare in modo significativo.
Negli altri Länder, tutti derivati dalla ex Ddr, AfD è il secondo partito, coagulando quasi un Elettore su quattro.
Questa elezioni saranno il banco di prova della conduzione di Frau Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, e potrebbero decretare la definitiva uscita di scena di Frau Merkel.
Se Akk non riuscisse a riportare la cdu almeno sopra il 36% avrebbe fallito la sua missione.
In Internet sono riscontrabili centinaia di migliaia di notizie ed informazioni, talune obiettive, altre partigiane, un gran numero inventate di sana piante.
I social ne rigurgitano, ma è anche rilevante il numero di siti dignitosi, che val la pena di seguire.
Da questo punto di vita, i motori di ricerca possono offrire un servizio di grande utilità. Inserite delle parole chiave, il motore ritorna un elenco di pubblicazioni internet che le contengono. Se la ricerca usa termini generali, il numero di risultati può essere ancora troppo elevato. Avere migliaia di risultati organizzati su centinaia di pagine è la norma.
Nei fatti, l’utente medio si accontenta di leggere le prime due o tre pagine fornite dal motore di ricerca.
Diventa quindi di fondamentale importanza l’ordine con cui le voci sono presentate. I link segnalati per primi hanno una probabilità di lettura molto più elevata di quelli riportati nelle pagine successive,
Google asserisce di porgere i risultati in ordine di audience.
Ma, a ben pensarci, questo sistema di presta ad una forma sofisticata di censura. Le voci politicamente sgradite sono riportate, ma impaginate in posizioni virtualmente inaccessibile, tipo pagina 10,102. Chi ma si legge diecimila pagine di Google?
L’esempio che portiamo dovrebbe essere chiaro.
Venerdì 15 febbraio, nel primo pomeriggio, sono state digitata le seguenti parole chiave:
«gilets jaunes act XIV»
Il risultato fornito da Google è scarno, quasi che l’argomento fosse ininfluente. La fotocopia è riportata all’inizio.
Sotto invece è riportata la prima pagina ottenuta digitando le stesse keywords sul motore di ricerca DuckDuckGo.
La differenza è stupefacente.
Google esercita una censura sottile ma efficace su tutte le informazioni che non seguano i canoni dell’ideologia liberal socialista. Non le manipola, ma semplicemente le relega in posizioni irraggiungibili.
Suggeriremmo fortemente a tutti di utilizzare il motore di ricerca DuckDuckGo.
«In an unprecedented move against a member state, the European Parliament has triggered Article 7 of the EU’s governing treaty intended to protect its core principles: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including minority rights.
The EU accuses the Hungarian government led by Prime Minister Viktor Orban of breaching those values by passing anti-refugee laws, manipulating the media, disregarding government corruption and removing independent judges.»
Si noti come il termine “EU accuses” dovrebbe essere tradotto nel fatto che è l’attuale eurodirigenza che accusa. Ma a maggio questa se ne tornerà a casa sua.
Operazione difficile il supporto alle famiglie, dato l’ancora persistere della mentalità liberal che inneggia il controllo delle nascite, l’aborto, la visione della femmina che si realizzerebbe esclusivamente nel lavoro, nonché una sostanziale avversione al concetto stesso di famiglia. Una cultura di morte.
L’unico rimedio noto alle crisi demografiche è riprendere a fare figli.
«Hungarian women with four children or more will be exempted for life from paying income tax»
«It was a way of defending Hungary’s future without depending on immigration»
«young couples will be offered interest-free loans of 10 million forint ($36,000), to be cancelled once they have three children»
«A pledge to create 21,000 nursery places over the next three years»
«An extra $2.5bn to be spent on the country’s healthcare system»
«State support for those buying seven-seat vehicles»
«Hungarian people think differently, …. We do not need numbers. We need Hungarian children»
«Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban launched his European elections campaign on Sunday, calling on voters to defend “Christian” nations against immigration»
* * * * * * *
Prendiamo atto con piacere che Mr Orban abbia potuto mettere in essere una serie di provvedimenti a favore e tutela della famiglia e della maternità. Questo è uno dei tanti segni della devoluzione dell’ideologia liberal.
Non possiamo fare a meno di notare però come il supporto finanziario alla famiglia ed alla prole sia soltanto una parte dell’impresa testé iniziata.
Occorre ritornare appieno al retaggio religioso, storico, culturale e sociale delle nostre nazioni. Occorre smantellare, con calma ma con fermezza, tutta la dottrina giuridica liberal in materia, dalle leggi sulla separazione e sul divorzio, fino all’abrogazione delle leggi sull’aborto. Ci vorrà ancora un po’ di tempo, ma la strada è questa. La famiglia deve essere difesa allo strenuo.
Sì: l’Occidente è cristiano ed è anche orgoglioso di esserlo.
Prime Minister Viktor Orban also announces raft of measures intended to address Hungary’s declining population.
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban launched his European elections campaign on Sunday, calling on voters to defend “Christian” nations against immigration, which he said led to the “virus of terrorism”.
Delivering a “state of the nation” speech in the capital, Budapest, Orban also announced a seven-point package of tax breaks and subsidies to encourage families to have more children – a move he called “Hungary’s answer” to its falling population, instead of increasing immigration.
The benefits include a lifetime personal income-tax exemption for women who give birth to and raise at least four children and a subsidy of 2.5 million forints ($8,825) towards the purchase of a seven-seat vehicle for families with three or more children.
A low-interest loan of 10 million forints ($35,300) for women under the age of 40 who are marrying for the first time will also be introduced.
Orban, who has made “zero tolerance” for immigration his main theme over the past four years and was elected to a third consecutive term as prime minister in April of last year, also said May’s elections for the European Parliament were an “historic crossroads” for Europe.
He framed the vote as a choice between the “new internationalism” of pro-migration Brussels bureaucrats under the sway of “money men”, such as liberal US billionaire George Soros, and sovereign nation-states defending tradition and Christianity.
He also warned against voting for pro-immigration parties.
Those who “decide for immigration and migrants for whatever reason, in reality, are creating mixed-race nations”, he said.
‘We want Hungarian babies’
Referring several times to Hungary’s abandoning of communism in 1989, he said Hungarians were again confronted with “those who would wipe out our traditions and nation states”.
He added: “Historic traditions in immigrant countries come to an end … in such countries Christian-Muslim worlds are created with continually shrinking Christian proportions.”
Orban, who has emerged as a self-styled “illiberal” figurehead for nationalist politicians in Europe, added that “immigration brings increased crime, especially crimes against women, and lets in the virus of terrorism”.
Announcing his seven-point programme, Orban ruled out any move to tackle Europe’s declining birth numbers with higher immigration as “capitulation”.
“We don’t just want numbers, we want Hungarian babies,” he said.
Hungary’s population has fallen below 10 million in recent years and it has one of the lowest fertility rates in the OECD. An estimated 500,000 Hungarians, meanwhile, have emigrated to Western Europe since it joined the European Union in 2004.
Several hundred members and supporters of Hungary’s main opposition parties held an anti-Orban rally in Budapest following the Hungarian leader’s speech.
The event also was aimed at protesting against recent heavy fines the state audit office imposed on several opposition parties.
Opposition leaders allege the fines, which cannot be challenged in Hungarian courts, are politically motivated and intended to hinder their campaigns for the European Parliament and municipal elections in Hungary later this year.
Una consolidata regola diplomatica impone di mandare un telegramma di augurio ad un nuovo eletto entro il giorno stesso della elezione. Nel caso di Mr Trump, Francia e Germania provvidero ben oltre dopo una settimana. Questo fu uno sgarro del quale ben difficilmente ci si potrebbe dimenticare.
Francia e Germania avevano fatto attive campagne elettorali a favore di Mrs Hillay Clinton. Nulla da eccepire, tranne il fatto che una potenza straniera mai dovrebbe ingerirsi negli affari interni di un’altra potenza.
Mr Macron e Frau Merkel furono tra gli ultimi ad essere ricevuti alla White House, e non per invito, ma a loro richiesta. Mr Trump concesse a Mr Macron un’accoglienza trionfale durata svariati giorni, mentre Frau Merkel fu ricevuta prima da un addetto di quarta categoria, e poi poté vedere per 17 minuti il presidente Trump.
Questo linguaggio diplomatico è molto chiaro.
Ci si domanda quindi come si sia potuto deteriorare un rapporto Trump – Macron che, apparentemente, era iniziato abbastanza bene.
* * * * * * *
«After 18 months of frustrating efforts to sustain a partnership with America’s president, the “special relationship” is over.»
«On a damp Tuesday evening in December, most of France was focused on the Yellow-Vest crisis that had seen demonstrators smashing up Paris. But holed up in his Elysee palace, President Emmanuel Macron and his team were dealing with a greater threat to the status quo not just in France, but across the western world.»
«Donald Trump was about to announce the pullout of U.S. troops from Syria …. Such a decision would be a body-blow to U.S. allies in the European Union»
«EU leaders can no longer rely on the U.S. to help underpin European security»
«On the call that night in December, the 41-year-old president reminded Trump of his pledge to stand alongside his allies in the fight against terrorism and urged him to consider his responsibilities to Europe. Less than 24 hours later, Trump announced the withdrawal in a tweet.»
«“Both of us are probably mavericks,” Macron said in April during a state visit to Washington. “We have a very special relationship.”»
«Call logs from both presidents’ offices, which can sometimes be incomplete, indicate the two men held at least 19 phone calls last year. Trump spoke to Merkel just three times»
«By the time Trump returned to France to commemorate the centenary of the end of World War I, any pretense at a rapport was gone.»
«Macron lectured Trump in front of dozens of world leaders, saying nations that put their own interests first had lost their moral compass. Trump responded by mocking France for its military defeats to Germany.»
«Behind the scenes, French aides insisted Macron’s attacks on nationalism were not directed at Trump. But they also signaled that the French leader was deliberately taking a more assertive posture in diplomatic relations»
«Trump though has frequently shown tepid support for the alliance, complaining that U.S. allies don’t spend enough on defense and raising questions about Article V. An actual U.S. withdrawal would mean a tectonic shift in the global order and hand Putin the biggest victory of his career.»
«allies should consider buying American missiles.»
«The two men aren’t due to meet again until the G-20 summit in Japan in June. Then Macron himself will host the G-7 leaders in France in August.»
«Macron’s team …. are leaning toward not even attempting a joint statement at the end of the meeting»
* * * * * * * *
Per cercare di comprendere la dinamica del sistema, sarebbe necessario razionalizzare alcuni concetti che, essendo semplici, suscitano una quasi naturale repulsa: tutto qua?
«Da oggi ci liberiamo dal socialismo e dal politicamente corretto»
Questa frase detta da Mr Jair Bolsonaro, Presidente del Brasile di fresca elezione, sintetizza ciò che Mr Trump vuole e sta facendo negli Stati Uniti e nel mondo.
È un outsider, Macron lo ha definito un ‘maverick’: nei fatti non è espressione propria dei repubblicani, molti dei quali abituati da lunga pezza a trovare in loggia accordi con i democratici, per poi spartirsi i ruoli sul palcoscenico, recitando però lo stesso copione.
Obiettivo primario, strategico, di Mr Trump è l’annientamento dei liberal democratici negli Stati Uniti e dei loro alleati all’interno dell’Occidente. Lo scacchiere estero è giocato tutto in funzione del conseguimento dell’obiettivo primario.
Compreso questo banale concetto, Mr Trump si rivela essere facilmente capibile e prevedibile.
In patria sta sistematicamente tagliando tutte le fonti di finanziamento dei liberal, nonché delle enclavi di posti politicamente donati tramite sussidi statali. Sta bonificando il parastato americano, giustizia compresa. Li sta semplicemente strozzando economicamente. Un caso eclamptico, il suo comportamento nei confronti del ‘clima’ e dell’Epa.
All’estero, la Francia di Mr Macron e la Germania di Frau Merkel sono le realtà da ridimensionare.
Del tutto sequenziale la attuale posizione americana nei confronti di Polonia, Ungheria ed Italia.
Del tutto logico il suo appoggio ai Gilets Jaunes che hanno imbottigliato Mr Macron in un vicolo cieco, così come il suo comportamento nei confronti della residua industria tedesca: senza produzione industriale la Germania è kaptt, così come sarebbe finita senza l’approvvigionamento del gas russo.
Mr Trump sa che il tempo lavora per lui: ancora una decina di anni e la Germania inizierà a spopolarsi della sua popolazione autoctona, e saranno forti dolori. Tollera ancora Frau Merkel solo perché è l’unica persona al momento in grado di distruggere la Germania.
Infine, Mr Trump sa benissimo come gli europei siano impantanati in un welfare non più a lungo sostenibile, Ma sa anche benissimo come senza forze armate sia impossibile concepire ed attuare una politica estera.
Se Mr Macron si fosse dichiarato suddito leale lo avrebbe anche sopportato: ma dal momento che si è dimostrato superbo lo annienta.
Mr Macron si era semplicemente illuso di poter trattare Mr Trump in via paritetica.
After 18 months of frustrating efforts to sustain a partnership with America’s president, the “special relationship” is over.
On a damp Tuesday evening in December, most of France was focused on the Yellow-Vest crisis that had seen demonstrators smashing up Paris.
But holed up in his Elysee palace, President Emmanuel Macron and his team were dealing with a greater threat to the status quo not just in France, but across the western world. A White House contact had warned Macron that Donald Trump was about to announce the pullout of U.S. troops from Syria.
Such a decision would be a body-blow to U.S. allies in the European Union. It risked releasing hundreds of Islamic State veterans and giving Russia’s Vladimir Putin influence over the flow of refugees which has fueled a populist backlash in the EU. For Macron, it heightened his concerns that the U.S. might back away from another, more sacred commitment: the NATO defense alliance.
As Macron prepared for a call with the White House that evening, his view on Syria was informed by a broader realization after 18 months of frustrating efforts to woo Trump: EU leaders can no longer rely on the U.S. to help underpin European security.
This account of how Macron was forced to rethink his entire relationship with Trump is based on conversations over several months with three people who have detailed knowledge of the president’s thinking.
On the call that night in December, the 41-year-old president reminded Trump of his pledge to stand alongside his allies in the fight against terrorism and urged him to consider his responsibilities to Europe. Less than 24 hours later, Trump announced the withdrawal in a tweet.
The decision came as a shock even in Washington, and triggered the resignation of Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. For Macron and his inner circle, it was a watershed moment.
Though in public, Macron still maintains that the historical alliance between France and the U.S. runs too deep to be jeopardized by disagreements between two presidents, something in him snapped.
The previous month Trump had offered Macron assurances both on Syria and on NATO during a visit to Paris. A few weeks later, the Syria commitment was history. From now on, the French leader will assume that Trump is liable to ditch any commitment he might have made if he decides it serves his interests.
The French leader had invested significant amounts of time and political capital in trying to establish a relationship with Trump since coming to power in Paris in May 2017.
Early last year, people close to him were keen to play up the symmetry between the two presidents. They argued that both were political outsiders who’d shaken up the establishment with their election victories, and their straight-talking style made them a good match personally.
They shared macho handshake games and private talks, watched military parades and had dinner at the Eiffel Tower with a special, meat-heavy menu, to appeal to the U.S. leader’s taste.
“Both of us are probably mavericks,” Macron said in April during a state visit to Washington. “We have a very special relationship.”
That effort succeeded in making Macron the guy you call when you want to speak to Europe.
Call logs from both presidents’ offices, which can sometimes be incomplete, indicate the two men held at least 19 phone calls last year. Trump spoke to Merkel just three times and dished out public humiliations to Britain’s Theresa May—in July he trashed her Brexit plans—making it clear where she stood in the White House spheres of influence.
But Trump’s America First policy was always likely to become a problem and that became clear as Europe was drawn into the U.S. trade offensive. Macron’s lobbying effort during his April trip to the White House failed to avert tariffs on European steel and aluminum. Just as he failed to keep the U.S. in the Iran nuclear deal or the Paris Climate Accord.
The phone records suggest that the relationship started to cool after that visit, with their recorded conversations becoming less frequent. Before that they spoke as many as six times a month. Since then the contact has dwindled.
By the time Trump returned to France to commemorate the centenary of the end of World War I, any pretense at a rapport was gone.
Macron lectured Trump in front of dozens of world leaders, saying nations that put their own interests first had lost their moral compass. Trump responded by mocking France for its military defeats to Germany.
Behind the scenes, French aides insisted Macron’s attacks on nationalism were not directed at Trump. But they also signaled that the French leader was deliberately taking a more assertive posture in diplomatic relations.
Talking to people close to the president around the turn of the year, their confidence in his ability to do business with Trump has evaporated. One described the Elysee’s attitude to Trump as “clear-eyed.” Asked about reports in January that Trump had considered pulling out of NATO officially, the person said nothing the U.S. could do now would surprise the French leader.
Macron’s approach to Trump at this point is more about managing the U.S. president’s impulsiveness rather than genuine engagement. His advisers plot their response to different scenarios, they seek intel on his state of mind and his personal agenda, and try to work out how that might affect the post-war alliance with Europe.
But the Syria withdrawal still stung.
“An ally must be reliable, and coordinate with other allies,” Macron said from a military base in Mali, where French troops are involved in anti-terrorism operations. Macron said he “very deeply regretted” Trump’s decision.
After the December announcement, Macron kept up the pressure on Trump for a time with several subsequent calls, trying to persuade the U.S. leader to change his mind, or at least allow an orderly withdrawal.
He urged Trump to stay on the battle field. He told him the U.S. army was the backbone of the coalition forces and warned of the message it would send to Iran and Syria’s Bashar al Assad if he left with the job half done. It made little difference.
The final U.S. pullout may still be some weeks away as U.S.-backed Syrian forces launch an offensive against Islamic State in the east of the country. Macron hasn’t spoken to Trump for over a month.
Macron’s discussions about French security strategy are now framed by question marks over all joint French-U.S. operations. The two countries are currently fighting together against Islamists in Africa and the Middle East and combating piracy in the Indian Ocean. France is also supporting U.S. efforts to contain China’s expansionary instincts in the South China Sea.
America’s commitment to NATO, though, is the elephant in the room. Under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s founding text of 1949, all are obliged to come to the defense of any members that come under attack.
That was the foundation of the western bulwark against the Soviet bloc during the Cold War and has served to deter Russian efforts to extend its influence in eastern Europe since then.
Trump though has frequently shown tepid support for the alliance, complaining that U.S. allies don’t spend enough on defense and raising questions about Article V.
An actual U.S. withdrawal would mean a tectonic shift in the global order and hand Putin the biggest victory of his career.
More recently, however, Trump has switched from criticism to claiming credit for getting European allies to bolster their defense spending. At the armistice commemoration in Paris in November, the U.S. leader told Macron he was committed to NATO. On Jan. 17 Trump said he was backing NATO “100 percent” and then added a rider: allies should consider buying American missiles.
But doubts remain. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo put international organizations on notice that they shouldn’t take U.S. support for granted during a December speech in Brussels, where NATO has its headquarters. Organizations such as the EU and the United Nations, Pompeo said, “must be reformed or eliminated.”
For Macron, the doubts are enough to shift his outlook: a security guarantee you can’t depend on is no longer a guarantee.
“Trump’s attitude and statements affect the credibility of NATO as a deterrent and a defense instrument,” said Bruno Tertrais, deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris. “The question is whether this is a transitory crisis for the European-U.S. post-war alliance, or something deeper.”
The two men aren’t due to meet again until the G-20 summit in Japan in June. Then Macron himself will host the G-7 leaders in France in August.
Welcoming the G-7 to the Atlantic resort of Biarritz will give the French some control of the choreography. Macron’s team has observed the drama Trump caused at recent international gatherings in Canada and Argentina and they are leaning toward not even attempting a joint statement at the end of the meeting.
Such a departure from protocol offers a bleak view of the state of relations between the U.S. and its allies. But it’s one less opportunity for Trump to cause trouble.
Osservate con cura. Né la vena cefalica, né la basilica, né quella cubitale mediana del braccio destro presentano segni di endovene. Questa ragazza sostiene Mr Bolsonaro: non è drogata.
«President Jair Bolsonaro is taking his anti-leftist ideological war to Brazil’s classrooms and universitie»
«Bolsonaro and top officials have announced plans to revise textbooks to excise references to feminism, homosexuality and violence against women»
«One of the goals to get Brazil out of the worst positions in international education rankings is to combat the Marxist rubbish that has spread in educational institutions»
«Bolsonaro said he wanted to “enter the Education Ministry with a flamethrower to remove Paulo Freire.”»
«The government does not have to educate anyone; it is the society that has to educate itself»
«After Bolsonaro took office Jan. 1, the Education Ministry dismantled its diversity department and published a new set of guidelines for textbook publishers that eliminated references to topics such as violence against women and sexism»
«Education Minister Ricardo Velez Rodriguez vowed in his inaugural speech to end the “aggressive promotion of the gender ideology.”»
«Brazil has 13 military-run schools, which are aimed at educating children of soldiers but also accept some students based on merit. The military is the most respected institution in the country and its schools have a better reputation than many public schools»
«the new administration’s conservative views played well with evangelicals, a powerful voter base for Bolsonaro during the campaign. Fifty-nine percent of evangelicals said they did not approve of sexual education being discussed at school.»
«Bolsonaro and others to decry feminism and LGBTQ+ rights that poses its beneficiaries — queer people, trans people, and women — enemies of the state»
* * * * * * * *
Quando i liberal socialisti erano al potere, hanno imposto l’indottrinamento all’omosessualità nelle scuole, reprimendo con forza ogni possibile reazione contraria. I così detti corsi di educazione sessuale erano programmi di addestramento all’omosessualità, vanta come culmine dello sviluppo umano.
Adesso i partiti che propugnavano tale ideologia hanno perso il consenso degli elettori: è sequenziale che chi sia subentrato smonti tutto ciò che avevano fatto: “aggressive promotion of the gender ideology“.
President Jair Bolsonaro is taking his anti-leftist ideological war to Brazil’s classrooms and universities, causing angst among teachers and education officials who say the government wants to fight an enemy that doesn’t exist.
Bolsonaro and top officials have announced plans to revise textbooks to excise references to feminism, homosexuality and violence against women, say the military will take over some public schools and frequently bash Paulo Freire, one of Brazil’s most famous educators, whose ideas had worldwide influence.
“One of the goals to get Brazil out of the worst positions in international education rankings is to combat the Marxist rubbish that has spread in educational institutions,” Bolsonaro tweeted on the eve of his inauguration.
While students may not yet find many differences as they return to school this month, changes are afoot.
“We are still waiting to see how, in practice, all this is going to turn out,” said Nilton Brandao, president of one of Brazil’s largest teachers’ unions, PROIFES Federacao. “Right now, it does not make any sense.”
For the government, the ideological battle begins with the removal of Freire’s legacy in schools, which Bolsonaro and other conservatives say turns students into “political militants.”
Freire, who died in 1997, was one of the founders of critical pedagogy. Conservatives contend Freire’s method encourages students to challenge traditional values such as family and the church. A socialist, Freire was briefly imprisoned during the 1964-1985 military dictatorship that Bolsonaro has repeatedly praised.
On the campaign trail, Bolsonaro said he wanted to “enter the Education Ministry with a flamethrower to remove Paulo Freire.”
Bolsonaro and his education minster appear to be looking for inspiration in philosophers like Olavo de Carvalho, a Brazilian who lives in the U.S. and is known for his anti-globalism and anti-socialist views.
While Freire believed in the state’s mission to educate the Brazilian people, including poor rural farmers and the illiterate, de Carvalho advocates reducing the state’s role in education, favoring private or religious schools.
“The government does not have to educate anyone; it is the society that has to educate itself,” de Carvalho said last year during a talk about education on his YouTube channel. He added that proposals “based on the idea that the federal government is the great educator I am going to fight to the death.”
After Bolsonaro took office Jan. 1, the Education Ministry dismantled its diversity department and published a new set of guidelines for textbook publishers that eliminated references to topics such as violence against women and sexism.
Receiving an outpouring of criticism, officials backtracked on the revised texts, saying the new guidelines had been written by the previous administration and published by mistake. Even so, Education Minister Ricardo Velez Rodriguez vowed in his inaugural speech to end the “aggressive promotion of the gender ideology.”
Velez instead defended what he called traditional values, such as family, church, school and the nation, which he said were threatened by a “crazy globalist wave.”
“The Brazilian who travels is a cannibal. He steals things from the hotel, steals the life jacket from the plane,” said Velez in an interview with Veja magazine this week. “Our kids and teenagers must receive citizenship education, which teaches how to act according to the law and morality.”
Bolsonaro has said he would review the content of Brazil’s national high school exam to rid it of any questions on gender or LGBT movements. He made the announcement in a YouTube video after seeing a question from last year’s exam on a “secret dialect used by gays and transvestites,” called Pajuba.
The Pajuba dialect mixes Portuguese and West African languages and is mostly used in Afro-Brazilian religions but has also been adopted by the Brazilian LGBT community.
“Don’t worry, there won’t be any more questions like this,” Bolsonaro said.
After his inauguration, Velez told the newspaper Folha de S. Paulo that his office will encourage municipalities interested in letting their schools be run by the military or the police.
Brazil has 13 military-run schools, which are aimed at educating children of soldiers but also accept some students based on merit. The military is the most respected institution in the country and its schools have a better reputation than many public schools.
The military is also sometimes called in to co-run public schools and bring back order.
Last year, 39.5 million students attended a public school, while private institutions, which can cost several thousand dollars a month, served 9 million.
Opponents say the selective admission process of military schools would end up being discriminatory in impoverished areas.
In general, critics say the administration is focused on the wrong things.
Claudia Costin, director of Brazil’s Center for Excellence and Innovation in Education Policies, a think tank based in Rio de Janeiro, said efforts should focus on improving training and salaries for teachers, making the entrance exam for teachers tougher and building a common syllabus for schools across the country.
The government “complains about indoctrination at school,” Costin said. “But it is not with laws that you solve these things.”
Brazil ranked 63rd out of the 72 countries and regions in the 2015 Program for International Student Assessment, conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
According to the group, Brazil has as one of the largest shares of adults without secondary education. Schools are overcrowded, teacher salaries and low and school buildings are often crumbling.
More than 5.800 schools had no water supply in 2017, nearly 5.000 had no electricity and 8.400 had no sewage, according to government figures.
Many Brazilians don’t appear convinced by Bolsonaro’s plans.
In a poll published Jan. 8, 71 percent of those surveyed said politics should be discussed at school and 54 percent thought it was fine to discuss sexual education inside the classroom.
The poll, however, indicated that the new administration’s conservative views played well with evangelicals, a powerful voter base for Bolsonaro during the campaign. Fifty-nine percent of evangelicals said they did not approve of sexual education being discussed at school.
The Datafolha poll was based on 2,077 interviews carried out Dec. 18 and Dec. 19, with a margin of error of two percentage points.
Caua dos Santos Borges, a 15-year-old public school student in Rio de Janeiro, said that in her experience teachers rarely spoke about politics in the classroom and gender had never felt like a core area of the curriculum.
“Once, a student asked the teacher if he supported Bolsonaro, but the teacher didn’t respond and changed the subject,” dos Santos Borges said.
Präsident Bolsonaro will das Bildungssystem des Landes reformieren und verbessern. Dazu müsse der ‚marxistische Unsinn’ bekämpft werden, der in den Schulen des Landes verbreitet sei.
Der neue brasilianische Präsident Jair Bolsonaro hat bekannt gegeben, dass seine Regierung plant, Referenzen auf Homosexualität, die „Homo-Ehe“ und Gewalt gegen Frauen aus den Schulbüchern der öffentlichen Schulen zu streichen.
Schon Anfang Januar hat die neue Regierung des südamerikanischen Landes neue Richtlinien für Schulbücher beschlossen, die auf die Gender-Ideologie und Sexismus verzichtet haben. Das Ministerium hat außerdem seine „Diversitätsabteilung“ Am Abend seiner Inauguration am 1. Januar hat Bolsonaro über Twitter seine Absicht bekannt gegeben, Brasilien aus den hinteren Plätzen der Bildungsrangliste zu bringen. Dazu sei es notwendig, den „marxistischen Unsinn“ zu bekämpfen, der in den Bildungseinrichtungen verbreitet sei. Bildungsminister Ricardo Velez Rodriguez hat in seiner Antrittsrede versprochen, die „aggressive Verbreitung der Gender-Ideologie“ in den Schulen zu beenden.
Im „Program for International Student Assessment“, einer Untersuchung der OECD im Jahr 2015, erreichte Brasilien nur den 63. von 72 untersuchten Nationen und Regionen. Brasilien hat einen hohen Bevölkerungsanteil ohne sekundäre Bildung. Die Schulen sind überfüllt und oft in schlechtem Zustand und die Lehrergehälter sind niedrig.
The Brazilian president’s war on what he calls the “gender ideology” rages on.
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro has promised to remove LGBTQ+ content from the South American country’s high school curriculum as part of a greater purge of what he calls “Marxist rubbish” from schools, the Associated Press reports.
Bolsonaro, whose assault on LGBTQ+ Brazilians and other marginalized groups began the day he took office Jan. 1, said that he plans to remove references to feminism, homosexuality, and violence against women from state textbooks. He also said that he plans to comb through the content of Brazil’s national high school exam after learning that a question about Pajubá, an Afro-Brazilian slang language spoken by many LGBTQ+ Brazilians, was included in last year’s exam. “There won’t be any more questions like this,” he said in a YouTube video.
The president’s education minister, Ricardo Vélez Rodríguez, has also spoken out against what he calls the “aggressive promotion of the gender ideology,” conservative rhetoric used by Bolsonaro and others to decry feminism and LGBTQ+ rights that poses its beneficiaries — queer people, trans people, and women — enemies of the state.
“We are still waiting to see how, in practice, all this is going to turn out,” said teachers’ union president Nilton Brandao. “Right now, it does not make any sense.”
Laws banning the instruction of LGBTQ+ material aren’t a uniquely Brazilian phenomenon. Seven states in the U.S. have what GLSEN calls “No Homo Promo Laws” on the books, which seek to remove any positive mention of queerness from sexual health curricula. South Dakota state lawmakers also recently introduced a bill that would ban instruction on gender dysphoria from grades kindergarten through seventh, effectively banning instruction on trans people. That bill awaits a House vote.
Brasiliens homophober Präsident Jair Bolsonaro führt seinen Kreuzzug gegen die LGBTI+ Community weiter fort: Diesmal hat er es auf die Jüngsten abgesehen, er will nämlich sämtliche LGBTI+ Themen aus den Schulen verbannen. Homosexualität, Gewalt gegen Frauen und Feminismus sollen in den Bildungseinrichtungen des Landes nicht mehr angesprochen werden dürfen…
Brasilien hat ohnehin ein massives Gewaltproblen, sei es gegen Frauen, aber insbesondere auch gegen die LGBTI+ Community. Die Situation dürfte sich unter dem neuen Präsidenten Jair Bolsonaro zudem noch weiter verschärfen, da er nicht nur keine Massnahmen dagegen ergreift, sondern im Gegenteil, Vorstösse lanciert um die aktuelle Lage zusätzlich zu verschärfen. Als eine der ersten Amtshandlungen an seinem ersten Tag als Präsident entfernte er kurzerhand die LGBTI+ Anliegen aus dem Ministerium für Menschenrechte, und in einer neuen Ankündigung hat er es nun auf die Jüngsten abgesehen.
Homosexualität, Feminismus und Gewalt gegen Frauen sollen künftig an den Schulen nicht mehr thematisiert werden dürfen. Diese Kapitel sollen aus den Schulbüchern verschwinden, kündigte er an, und des weiteren soll das Militär die Erlaubnis erhalten, Schulen übernehmen zu dürfen. Schon während seinem Wahlkampf hat er keinen Hehl daraus gemacht, wie er die brasilianischen Schulen umkrempeln will. Er werde mit einem Flammenwerfer ins Bildungsministerium gehen und Paulo Freire entfernen. Dieser war ein angesehener, liberaler Pädogoge und Philosoph, dessen Lehren weltweit einen grossen Einfluss auf das Bildungssystem und die Pädagogik hatten.
Der von Bolsonaro eingesetzte Bildungsminister Ricardo Velez Rodriguez machte ebenfalls nie einen Hehl aus seiner homo- und transphoben Haltung. Bereits in seiner Antrittsrede erklärte er, dass er die aggressive Gender-Ideologie abschaffen wolle.
Herr Mark Rutte è un uomo politico estremamente duttile, in grado di saper galleggiare indipendentemente dal liquido in è stato tuffato dall’alterna sorte. Se questa è la grande dote di un uomo politico, nel converso rende molto difficile capire cosa voglia, a parte la permanenza al potere.
«Mark Rutte è nato a L’Aia, 14 febbraio 1967: è un politico olandese. Appartiene al Partito Popolare per la Libertà e la Democrazia (VVD) ed è Primo ministro dal 14 ottobre 2010.
La sua linea politica potrebbe essere identificata con quella dei liberals democratici americani oppure con quella dei catto-comunisti italiani: più comunista che catto. Di cristiano non ha proprio nulla.
A fine 2017 è riuscito a formare una coalizione governativa dopo quasi nove mesi di gestazione a rischio, escludendo accuratamente il Partito Popolare per la Libertà, Pvv, di Geer Wilder, reo di avere una linea politica molto simile a quella di Mrs Margaret Thatcher e di essere per soprammercato un ‘eurocritico‘.»
In un incontro all’Istituto Europeo dell’Università di Zurigo Herr Rutte ha fatto un interessante discorso di politica estera, che lo differenzia nettamente dagli altri governanti nordici dell’Unione Europea.
«The European Union should be “less naive and more realistic” about its foreign policy and not be afraid to exercise power»
«The EU needs a reality check; power is not a dirty word. Realpolitik must be an essential part of Europe’s foreign policy toolkit»
«Nato remains our first line of defence and our guarantee of security, and in my opinion that rules out a European army»
«This means that the EU, which was built on the power of principles, is increasingly being confronted by the principles of power»
«But I seriously doubt whether this, on its own, will make the EU as effective and influential as it could be, as it wants to be, and as it should be in the future»
«We must always draw the line when fundamental values come under pressure»
«But a deal is also a deal when it comes to the euro and the Stability and Growth Pact. Because here too, bending the rules can erode the entire system, and we cannot have that»
«Trump has a point when calling on European Nato countries to spend more on defence»
«We need to stand by this commitment, not only because the Americans have a point when they press for a larger European contribution, but above all because it is in our own interest»
«One of the main problems is that, in many cases, member states and the European institutions are not on the same page, so in geopolitical terms we don’t pull our weight as we should and could»
«Currently, sanctions are decided by unanimity, so a veto by a single EU country can hold up the entire process.»
«There is a qualified majority when a measure has support from 55 percent of the EU member states that represent at least 65 percent of the EU population»
* * * * * * * *
Discorso espresso in termini diplomaticamente ineccepibili, ma anche molto chiaro.
Herr Rutte si stacca completamente dal classico pensiero francogermanico, specie poi da quello espresso nel recente accordo di Aachen.
* * * * * * *
– Realpolitik al posto di imposizione di quelli ritenuti essere valori fondamentali.
– Sanzioni, o anche condanne, sono al momento prese alla unanimità con diritto di veto: le procedure decisionali dovrebbero quindi essere rese più elastiche.
Si nota solo una grande contraddizione.
Quanti pratichino nei fatti la Realpolitik sanno che le sanzioni sono per definizione ad essa antitetiche:non possono convivere.
The European Union should be “less naive and more realistic” about its foreign policy and not be afraid to exercise power, Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte said in a speech on Wednesday (13 February).
“The EU needs a reality check; power is not a dirty word. Realpolitik must be an essential part of Europe’s foreign policy toolkit,” he said.
Rutte spoke at the Europe institute of the University of Zurich, in non-EU country Switzerland, where he was giving the annual Churchill Lecture.
The wide-ranging speech will further fuel speculation that Rutte may run for Jean-Claude Juncker’s job as EU Commission president, or Donald Tusk’s as head of the European Council – although he has denied being a candidate for either post.
Rutte said the EU did not need its own army, which was suggested a few months ago by France and Germany.
“Nato remains our first line of defence and our guarantee of security, and in my opinion that rules out a European army,” he said.
But Rutte added that soft power alone was no longer enough.
“Today we live in a multipolar world, in which a growing number of countries and political leaders seem to believe that international relations are a zero-sum game.”
“This means that the EU, which was built on the power of principles, is increasingly being confronted by the principles of power,” he said.
“But I seriously doubt whether this, on its own, will make the EU as effective and influential as it could be, as it wants to be, and as it should be in the future,” he said.
The Dutch PM noted that it was “relatively easy” for the EU to “claim the moral high ground” while depending on the United States’ protective umbrella.
The liberal leader said that the EU had leverage it could use geopolitically, like its market access, visa-free travel, trade agreements, and development aid.
It is quite a change for the Dutch politician, who began his career as PM with a much more eurosceptic attitude.
But since the UK, a close ally of the Netherlands, decided to leave the EU, Rutte has turned around towards embracing the EU.
Increasingly assertive Dutch
Rutte’s speech also marks an increasingly assertive Netherlands at the EU stage.
The country, a founding member of the EU, has been repositioning itself as an alternative to the EU’s two major forces, France and Germany.
This happened while the United Kingdom was on its way out, while Poland, Hungary and Italy have developed antagonistic relations with the EU institutions.
Rutte mentioned specifically that democracy and the rule of law need to be respected in the EU.
“We must always draw the line when fundamental values come under pressure, as they have in countries like Poland and Hungary,” he said.
“But a deal is also a deal when it comes to the euro and the Stability and Growth Pact. Because here too, bending the rules can erode the entire system, and we cannot have that,” noted Rutte.
While he did not mention France and Germany by name, this appeared a clear reference among EU-watchers to those countries – which have been running budget deficits in defiance of the pact.
Rutte also mentioned US president Donald Trump criticism on multilateral organisations, and called on the EU to seize that as an opportunity to reform the UN and the World Trade Organization.
He also stressed that Trump has a point when calling on European Nato countries to spend more on defence.
Nato countries agreed in 2014 that they should spend two percent of their GDP on defence by 2024, but many European countries have not yet reached that goal.
“We need to stand by this commitment, not only because the Americans have a point when they press for a larger European contribution, but above all because it is in our own interest,” said Rutte.
Ending sanctions vetoes?
Rutte also opened up the possibility to reform the way EU countries determine sanctions.
“One of the main problems is that, in many cases, member states and the European institutions are not on the same page, so in geopolitical terms we don’t pull our weight as we should and could,” he said.
Currently, sanctions are decided by unanimity, so a veto by a single EU country can hold up the entire process.
The Dutch leader called on his colleagues to “give serious thought to enabling qualified majority voting for specific, defined cases”.
“Certainly in its own geopolitical back garden, the EU should be a political force to be reckoned with,” he said.
There is a qualified majority when a measure has support from 55 percent of the EU member states that represent at least 65 percent of the EU population.