Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Europa. I macrodati odierni hanno spinto l’Eur-Usd a 1.186.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-30.

2021-06-30__ Europa 001

Questa mattina le banche centrali di molti stati europei hanno rilasciato una salva di macrodati inerenti il taso di inflazione in Europa.

Eurozona. Indice dei prezzi al consumo.

Italia. Indice dei Prezzi al Consumo.

Italia. Indice dei prezzi alla produzione.

Francia. Indice dei prezzi al consumo.

Regno Unito. Prodotto interno lordo.

Germania. Tasso di disoccupazione tedesco.

Sono ben poco confortanti, anche perché presentano delle incoerenze interne. La versione ufficiale è che l’inflazione sia un dato marginale nella eurozona. Conveniamo che il prezzo delle pietre focaie, degli acciarini, dei foconi, della biada e dei ventilabri sia rimasto invariato. In fondo, tutto soggiace al paniere scelto per acquisire il macrodato.

Ma, solo per citare la Francia,

«Prices for energy were up 10.9%, with prices for tobacco rising by 5.3% year-on-year»

Ci si domanda come un simile aumento dell’energia non si sia ripercosso sull’indice dei prezzi alla produzione e, quindi, su quello dei prezzi a consumo.

*


Economic Data from France and Germany Failed to Impress the EUR

Inflation and unemployment figures were in focus in the early part of the European session this morning. Later today, prelim June inflation figures for the Eurozone will also draw interest, as sensitivity to inflation lingers.

                         French Inflation.

In June, the annual rate of inflation ticked up from 1.4% to 1.5% based on prelim figures. This was in line with forecasts.

According to Insee.fr,

– Prices for energy were up 10.9%, with prices for tobacco rising by 5.3% year-on-year.

– Food prices were down by 0.3%, with prices for fresh food (-3.4%) weighing.

– Month-on-month, consumer prices increased by 0.2% after having risen by 0.3% in May.

                         German Unemployment.

In June, unemployment fell by 38k, following on from a 19k decline in May. Economists had forecast a more modest 20k fall. In spite of the larger than expected drop, the unemployment rate held steady at 5.9%.

                         Market Impact.

Ahead of today’s stats, the EUR had risen to a pre-stat and current day high $1.19090 before falling to a pre-stat low $1.18960.

In response to the French inflation figures, the EUR rose to a post-stat high $1.19081 before falling to a current day low $1.18931.

The EUR found support, however, with unemployment change figures from Germany beating forecasts. With unemployment holding steady at 5.9%, the upside to the EUR is likely to be limited ahead of the Eurozone inflation figures.

Recovering from the current day low, the EUR rose to a post-stat high $1.19050 before easing back

At the time of writing, the EUR was up by 0.05% to $1.19022.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Materie Prime

Cina. L’aumento delle materie prime comprime i profitti industriali.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-30.

2021-06-28__ Commodities 001

«Profit growth at China’s industrial firms slowed again in May as surging raw material prices squeezed margins and weighed on factory activity»

«Profits at China’s industrial firms rose 36.4% in May from a year earlier to 829.92 billion yuan ($128.58 billion) official data showed on Sunday»

«The world’s second-largest economy has largely recovered from disruptions caused by COVID-19, but it faces new challenges such as elevated raw material costs and global supply chain crunches»

«Imbalances in profitability became prominent between upstream and downstream firms due to high commodity prices»

«→→ For the January-May period, industrial firms’ profits grew 83.4% from the same period a year earlier to 3.42 trillion yuan ←←»

«China’s official manufacturing data this week is expected to show weaker growth in activity in June»

«Liabilities at industrial firms were up 8.2% year-on-year at the end of May, versus 8.6% growth a month earlier»

* * * * * * *

I prezzi delle materie prime sono aumenti significativamente negli ultimi tempi, soprattutto per gli energetici. Comparando i prezzi anno su anno, il mais è variato del +31.63%, il Brent è incrementato del 46.95%, il greggio del 52.51% ed il gas naturale del 38.09%. L’aumento del costo al consumo dell’energia è del tutto sequenziale. Per limitare gli aumenti dei prezzi al consumo, le imprese sono obbligate a ridurre i propri profitti, ma questa manovra da sola non è sufficiente. In talune situazioni è ancor più conveniente chiudere le attività improduttive.

Altra conseguenza di non poco conto è un impulso inflattivo strutturale: gli aumenti dei prezzi sono così destinati a crescere nel tempo e non sono per nulla ‘transitori‘ come peraltro taluni indurrebbero a credere.

«Inflation is here, to stay»

*


China’s industrial profit growth slows amid high raw material prices

Profit growth at China’s industrial firms slowed again in May as surging raw material prices squeezed margins and weighed on factory activity.

Profits at China’s industrial firms rose 36.4% in May from a year earlier to 829.92 billion yuan ($128.58 billion) official data showed on Sunday.

That was a slowdown from the 57% surge reported in April, according to National Bureau of Statistics.

The world’s second-largest economy has largely recovered from disruptions caused by COVID-19, but it faces new challenges such as elevated raw material costs and global supply chain crunches. Officials warn that China’s recovery remains uneven.

Imbalances in profitability became prominent between upstream and downstream firms due to high commodity prices, said Zhu Hong, an official at the statistics bureau.

“The foundation for recovery is not yet solid,” he said in a statement accompanying the data.

Profits grew rapidly in the metals, chemicals and petroleum sectors, while smaller and downstream enterprises saw much more pressure, Zhu said.

For the January-May period, industrial firms’ profits grew 83.4% from the same period a year earlier to 3.42 trillion yuan.

Factory-gate inflation saw its fastest annual growth in over 12 years in May driven by surging commodity prices, posing risks to profit margins for mid- and downstream firms.

Chinese policymakers have stepped up efforts in recent weeks to cool runaway metals prices, including selling supplies from state reserves, but with global demand continuing to recover some analysts believe the moves will have only a limited impact.

China’s official manufacturing data this week is expected to show weaker growth in activity in June, likely due to disruptions caused by COVID-19 flare-ups at the country’s major southern ports. In addition, investors will be looking to trends in input costs and selling prices for any further signs of margin pressure.

Liabilities at industrial firms were up 8.2% year-on-year at the end of May, versus 8.6% growth a month earlier.

The industrial profit data covers large firms with annual revenues of over 20 million yuan from their main operations.

Pubblicato in: Brasile, Economia e Produzione Industriale

Brasile. Giugno21. IPCA-15. Indice dei Prezzi al Consumo annuale 8.13%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-30.

2021-06-27__ Brasile - IPC (Indice dei Prezzi al Consumo) di metà mese (Annuale) 001

«After this year’s projected contraction due to the Covid-19 hit, the economy is seen rebounding strongly in 2021 as domestic and foreign demand recover. However, the gradual reducing of fiscal stimulus as the coronavirus shock fades, an elevated unemployment rate and ballooning public debt represent downside risks to the outlook. FocusEconomics analysts see the economy rebounding and growing 3.4% in 2021, which is down 0.1 percentage points from last month’s forecast. In 2022, panelists see GDP growth at 2.5%.»

2021-06-27__ Brasile - IPC (Indice dei Prezzi al Consumo) di metà mese (Annuale) 002

Si faccia attenzione ai valori annuali, ultime due colonne: a sinistra quelli calcolati sugli ultimi dodici mesi, ed a destra quelli calcolati anno su anno, che sembrerebbero deescrivere meglio la situazione economica. Il PPI vale 16.08.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

Usa. 14,845,450 persone (+3,756) ancora assistite con sovvenzioni federali.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-30.

2021-06-25__ Usa Sussidi 001

Lo U.S. Department of Labor ha rilasciato i dati sulle richieste di nuovi sussidi di disoccupazione e sulle richieste di disoccupazione continua.

La situazione è statisticamente invariata.

* * * * * * *


Lo U.S. Department of Labor ha rilasciato il Report Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Report.

                         SEASONALLY ADJUSTED DATA

In the week ending June 19, the advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims was 411,000, a decrease of 7,000 from the previous week’s revised level. The previous week’s level was revised up by 6,000 from 412,000 to 418,000. The 4-week moving average was 397,750, an increase of 1,500 from the previous week’s revised average. The previous week’s average was revised up by 1,250 from 395,000 to 396,250.

The advance seasonally adjusted insured unemployment rate was 2.4 percent for the week ending June 12, a decrease of 0.1 percentage point from the previous week’s unrevised rate. The advance number for seasonally adjusted insured unemployment during the week ending June 12 was 3,390,000, a decrease of 144,000 from the previous week’s revised level. This is the lowest level for insured unemployment since March 21, 2020 when it was 3,094,000. The previous week’s level was revised up 16,000 from 3,518,000 to 3,534,000. The 4-week moving average was 3,552,500, a decrease of 55,250 from the previous week’s revised average. This is the lowest level for this average since March 21, 2020 when it was 2,071,750. The previous week’s average was revised up by 4,000 from 3,603,750 to 3,607,750.

                         UNADJUSTED DATA

The advance number of actual initial claims under state programs, unadjusted, totaled 393,078 in the week ending June 19, a decrease of 14,720 (or -3.6 percent) from the previous week. The seasonal factors had expected a decrease of 7,823 (or -1.9 percent) from the previous week. There were 1,447,127 initial claims in the comparable week in 2020. In addition, for the week ending June 19, 51 states reported 104,682 initial claims for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance.

The advance unadjusted insured unemployment rate was 2.3 percent during the week ending June 12, a decrease of 0.1 percentage point from the prior week. The advance unadjusted level of insured unemployment in state programs totaled 3,210,285, a decrease of 94,092 (or -2.8 percent) from the preceding week. The seasonal factors had expected an increase of 50,364 (or 1.5 percent) from the previous week. A year earlier the rate was 12.2 percent and the volume was 17,823,790.

The total number of continued weeks claimed for benefits in all programs for the week ending June 5 was 14,845,450, an increase of 3,756 from the previous week. There were 31,337,556 weekly claims filed for benefits in all programs in the comparable week in 2020.

During the week ending June 5, Extended Benefits were available in the following 12 states: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Texas. 3

Initial claims for UI benefits filed by former Federal civilian employees totaled 905 in the week ending June 12, an increase of 292 from the prior week. There were 569 initial claims filed by newly discharged veterans, an increase of 141 from the preceding week.

There were 10,764 continued weeks claimed filed by former Federal civilian employees the week ending June 5, a decrease of 276 from the previous week. Newly discharged veterans claiming benefits totaled 6,554, an increase of 205 from the prior week.

During the week ending June 5, 51 states reported 5,950,167 continued weekly claims for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance benefits and 51 states reported 5,273,180 continued claims for Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation benefits.

The highest insured unemployment rates in the week ending June 5 were in the Virgin Islands (19.5), Rhode Island (4.8), Nevada (4.5), California (3.9), Connecticut (3.9), Puerto Rico (3.9), Alaska (3.7), Illinois (3.6), New York (3.6), and District of Columbia (3.2).

The largest increases in initial claims for the week ending June 12 were in Pennsylvania (+21,905), California (+15,131), Kentucky (+9,172), Florida (+3,344), and Texas (+3,127), while the largest decreases were in Michigan (-5,615), Delaware (-2,516), Washington (-1,998), Tennessee (-1,746), and Alabama (-1,706).

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Materie Prime

Materie Prime. Rincari che sostengono una inflazione strutturale, duratura e severa.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-29.

Nessuna società industrializzata può sopravvivere senza utilizzare le materie prime, ma molte realtà, quali l’Unione Europea e gli Stati Uniti (per quanto riguarda le terre rare) non sono autosufficienti.

È sequenziale che aumenti dei costi delle materie prime si ripercuotano sui costi di produzione all’ingrosso e, quindi, sui costi al dettaglio.

L’insieme di questi fenomeni concorre a generare processi inflattivi strutturali, non correggibili con le sole manovre finanziarie, per quanto spudorate esse possano essere.

Inflazione. Il costo di un container da Shanghai a Rotterdam è 10,522 Usd, +547%.

Fao Food Price Index +39.7% anno su anno. Inflazione. – Fao.

Germania. Maggio21. Prezzi di produzione (PPI) +7.2% anno su anno. – Destatis.

* * * * * * *

Questi macrodati sono significativi, ma presi uno per uno non danno la visione di insieme necessarie per comprendere appieno i tempi correnti.

Accludiamo quindi alcune Tabelle per le categorie di maggiore interesse.

L’epidemia da Covid c’entra ben poco, anche se adesso è di moda demonizzarla ed imputarle tutti i guai.

Buona lettura!

2021-06-24__ Commodities 001

2021-06-24__ Commodities 002

2021-06-24__ Commodities 003

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

Usa. Occupati. La Fed di Atlanta fa scoraggianti affermazioni.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-29.

FED 001

Il Bureau of Labor Statistics rilascerà il due luglio i dati sugli occupati negli Stati Uniti.

Le ultime rilevazioni fornivano dati sconfortanti: 218,000 in Aprile e 492,000 in Maggio, tutti dati di gran lunga sotto le attese.

Adesso iniziano a circolare delle indiscrezioni sui dati di Giugno. E sembrerebbero non essere ottimiste.

* * * * * * *

«Fed officials say employment is down significantly, businesses reluctant to hire»

«The U.S. economy is rebounding rapidly from last year’s decline, but much improvement is needed in the labor market, two Federal Reserve officials said on Thursday»

«But even as GDP has almost entirely recouped its losses from last year, employment remains down significantly»

«While some workers are seeing their incomes rise, there are still nearly 7.6 million fewer people working than before the pandemic, he said»

«The jobs hole grows to 10.6 million jobs if you factor in the job growth taking place before the pandemic, when the economy was adding about 200,000 jobs a month»

«Fed officials agreed last week to leave interest rates near zero and to keep purchasing $120 billion a month in bonds. But central bank officials also moved their projections for when the Fed will start to lift interest rates, with 13 of 18 policymakers foreseeing a “liftoff” in borrowing costs by 2023»

«Bostic has said he believes the Fed will need to start raising interest rates in 2022, a more-aggressive timeline than most of his colleagues.»

Nota.

Mr Raphael Bostic è il presidente della Banca Fed di Atlanta.

* * * * * * *


Il numero degli U.S. Private Nonfarm Payrolls, ossia degli occupati escludendo quelli del comparto agricolo, è il vero macrodati di interesse nel giudicare lo stato di salute del sistema economico.

Rispetto al momento prima della crisi da Covid, devono essere recuperati 10milioni e seicentomila posti di lavoro.

Forse la Harris-Biden Administration farebbe bene a curare di più l’economia reale.

*


Fed officials say employment is down significantly, businesses reluctant to hire

The U.S. economy is rebounding rapidly from last year’s decline, but much improvement is needed in the labor market, two Federal Reserve officials said on Thursday.

U.S. economic growth “has come roaring back” and some metrics including consumption, housing, and manufacturing are now “extremely healthy,” Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank President Patrick Harker said during a virtual event as part of the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum.

“But even as GDP has almost entirely recouped its losses from last year, employment remains down significantly,” Harker said.

While some workers are seeing their incomes rise, there are still nearly 7.6 million fewer people working than before the pandemic, he said. The jobs hole grows to 10.6 million jobs if you factor in the job growth taking place before the pandemic, when the economy was adding about 200,000 jobs a month, Harker said.

Atlanta Fed Bank President Raphael Bostic, speaking on the same panel, said many business leaders are reluctant to hire workers because they are unsure of what their demand will be after the economy stabilizes.

But Bostic said it is too soon to know if demand for workers will remain low as the economy continues to grow.

Both Fed officials said U.S. policymakers need to invest in infrastructure, including expanding access to broadband internet, to ensure that the economy is more equitable. They also said some workers need help transferring into higher paying jobs that don’t require college degrees.

“We really need an economy that works for everyone,” Bostic said.

Fed officials agreed last week to leave interest rates near zero and to keep purchasing $120 billion a month in bonds. But central bank officials also moved their projections for when the Fed will start to lift interest rates, with 13 of 18 policymakers foreseeing a “liftoff” in borrowing costs by 2023.

Bostic has said he believes the Fed will need to start raising interest rates in 2022, a more-aggressive timeline than most of his colleagues.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Fisco e Tasse

Italia. Fra pochi giorni scatterà il prelievo forzoso dello Stato.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-29.

BOIA__0054__Caravaggio__Giuditta_ed_Oloferne__

Amici miei: ce li siamo votati e quindi ce li dobbiamo tenere.

Leggete con cura questa sentenza capitale.

Poi latrate pure alla luna.

* * * * * * *


Scattano i prelievi su conti correnti e titoli: ecco chi paga

Fra pochi giorni scatterà il prelievo forzoso dello Stato, poche le situazioni in cui è possibile evitare l’imposta.

Attenzione al saldo del proprio conto corrente: in questi giorni, infatti, lo Stato applicherà l’imposta di bollo. Un vero e proprio prelievo forzoso (l’operazione, infatti, avverrà senza aver ricevuto il consenso dei titolari dei conti), previsto per il mese di giugno.

Andando nello specifico, si tratta di 34,20 euro per le persone fisiche e di ben 100 euro per le persone giuridiche. In caso di depositi titoli, buoni fruttiferi e polizze, il prelievo sarà più massiccio: si parla dello 0,2% del controvalore a fine giugno.

                         Il prelievo forzoso.

La tassazione sarà flat, ossia riguarderà tutti i conti, senza progressività. La somma può essere sottratta in un’unica soluzione oppure tramite pagamento trimestrale: nel caso dei 34,20 euro all’anno previsti per le persone fisiche, verranno sottratti 8,55 euro in 4 soluzioni. Se in vece il conto corrente appartiene ad una persona giuridica, come una società, allora l’importo annuale dell’imposta di bollo è di 100 euro, ed il prelievo trimestrale ammonterà a 25 euro.

Anche in caso di prelievo su titoli e depositi, le banche solitamente intervengono per conto dello Stato a cadenza trimestrale. L’imposta di bollo è fissata in termini percentuali (0,2%) e l’ammontare della somma sottratta dipende dal valore dei titoli in portafoglio.

                         Chi potrà evitarlo.

Come anticipato, questo tipo di imposta applicata dallo Stato riguarda tutti, fatta eccezione per alcune particolari condizioni. Il prelievo, ad esempio, non riguarderà quei conti correnti che hanno una giacenza media trimestrale inferiore a 5mila euro. Attenzione, però. Lo stesso non si può dire per chi, ad esempio, possiede due conti entrambi dal valore inferiore a 5mila euro. L’imposta di bollo, infatti, si calcola sulla somma delle giacenze e se queste superano la soglia limite scatterà il prelievo.

A non pagare saranno anche coloro che hanno dichiarato un Isee del valore inferiore a 7,500 euro. In questo caso, però, il cittadino deve avere inoltrato entro il 31 maggio alla propria banca un’autodichiarazione in cui chiede di non applicare l’imposta di bollo.

Un altro modo per evitare il prelievo forzoso è quello di essere titolari di un conto corrente base, utile solo per depositarvi la pensione. Anche in caso di conto in negativo non sarà naturalmente sottratta alcuna cifra.

                         L’imposta sui titoli.

Praticamente inevitabile, invece, l’imposta di bollo dello 0,2% sul portafoglio titoli o sui conti deposito. Una via percorribile potrebbe essere quella di trasferire in anticipo il denaro dal conto deposito al conto corrente: in questo modo invece di pagare lo 0,2% il titolare della somma si vedrà sottrarre solo i 34,20 euro. Si tratta di un’operazione da ponderare, soprattutto in caso di cifre vincolate o di titoli, che devono prima essere venduti. A volte, purtroppo, è meglio non far nulla ed accettare di pagare quello 0,2%.

Dall’imposta di bollo non si salvano neppure i conti correnti aperti all’estero. I titolari sono infatti tenuti a pagare la medesima cifra prevista in Italia.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo

Francia. Elezioni Regionali. Alcune considerazioni. – Macron grillé.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-28.

Pollo allo Spiedo 001

Anche se non sono ancora disponibili i dati ufficiali, alcune conclusioni potrebbero essere tratte.

– La partecipazione al voto è stata infima

– Nelle elezioni regionali i problemi locali sono valutati più di quelli nazionali.

– Difficilmente i risultati di queste elezioni possono essere estrapolati al quadro politico generale.

– Macron ed il suo partito è rimasto inchiodato al 7% dei suffragi.

– I Les Républicains hanno ottenuto il 38% dei voti.

– La sinistra ha ottenuto il 34.5% dei suffragi.

– La Le Pen ed il suo partito hanno conseguito il 20% dei voti.

* * * * * * *

                         Alcune considerazioni.

In primo luogo, il livello dell’astensionismo è davvero preoccupante. Il Cittadino medio percepisce la politica come un qualcosa di alieno, sul quale possa incidere poco o nulla. Starà alle formazioni politiche ed ai leader trovare canali comunicativi efficaci: la politica degli slogan parrebbe essere tramontata. I Cittadini temono la recessione economica e l’inflazione.

In secondo luogo, per Macron queste elezioni sono state un débâcle. Pur considerando tutte le possibili attenuanti, appare evidente come non abbia saputo utilizzare questi anni di presidenza per consolidarsi sul territorio. Aver ottenuto un misero 7% non sarebbe individuabile come un buon prognostico per le elezioni presidenziali del prossimo anno. Sarebbe una rimonta epica.

Essere il presidente più esecrato che mai la Francia abbia avuto non giova certo ad una buona riuscita elettorale.

– In terzo luogo, i Les Républicains hanno ottenuto una significativa rinascita, che pone una seria ipoteca sulle prossime elezioni presidenziali. Con il loro 34.5%, le sinistre hanno dimostrato sia di avere un elettorato affezionato sia di aver saputo mantenere le posizioni elettorali nel tempo. Verosimilmente, saranno questi due gli schieramenti politici che si confronteranno per la presidenza.

– In quarto luogo, la Le Pen ha fortemente risentito dell’astensionismo, ma al momento sarebbe impossibile stimarne la portata in termini percentuali.

* * * * * * *


«Local polls don’t usually translate into national politics»

«Macron’s party fared poorly in the first round …. a repeat of last year’s failure to secure any major cities in the municipal elections»

«But He’s Far From Out. The French president’s party flopped in regional elections. That doesn’t have to dent his reelection chances if he draws lessons from the defeat.»

«French presidential careers tend to begin euphorically, screech to a halt in the face of protests over promises becoming policy and end somewhere between indifference and contempt when voters bring out the ballot-box equivalent of the guillotine»

«The anger propelling anti-establishment parties simply wasn’t on show.»

«Next year’s presidential election will also have to face the fact that French voters increasingly lean conservative»

«The latest presidential polls show the incumbent has a genuine shot at reelection, which would be a 20-year first, and that Le Pen is still the rival most likely to challenge him»

«But chances are it will be the delta variant, and the broader response to Covid, that will be Macron’s last chance to draw lessons from this latest election flop»

* * * * * * *

Macron and Le Pen Flop in Regional Poll as French Stay Home

– The far-right leader fails to grab her first region ever

– The traditional right and left parties are holding up locally

*

President Emmanuel Macron and far-right leader Marine Le Pen both look set for disappointing results in France’s regional elections.

The president’s LREM movement took just 7% in the race to renew 13 metropolitan councils on Sunday, while Le Pen’s National Rally got 20% of the nationwide vote, and is set to once again fail to win any region, exit polls showed.

The right won 38% nationwide and left parties — including the greens, the Socialists and the far-left France Unbowed party of Jean Luc Melenchon — garnered 34.5%, according to an Ifop poll.

So far, surveys suggest that incumbents — mostly from the traditional right, but also the left — will keep their regional seats. Turnout was at an all-time low for local elections, with only two-thirds of registered voters estimated to have bothered to show up.

Local polls don’t usually translate into national politics. But as the last nationwide election before the presidential race in April 2022, it is being followed closely for any insight into what voters are thinking. But what it has indicated is that the France’s traditional movements are holding up, four years after Macron imploded the two-party system with his centrist run.

Le Pen has a lot riding on this vote because winning even one region for the first time could help her convince the French she can be trusted in power. Instead, her candidate in the Marseille region, the one who stood the best chances of winning, looks set to lose to the conservative incumbent. Overall, her party is on track to do worse than in the last regional election in 2015, when she got 27%.

Macron’s party fared poorly in the first round and isn’t expected to win any region on its own, a repeat of last year’s failure to secure any major cities in the municipal elections. The dismal showing could discourage grass roots supporters who the president will need to knock at doors and hand out leaflets next year and it’s unlikely to boost the morale of the party members he’ll need to help drive the presidential campaign.

Valerie Pecresse looked set to win populous and economically important Paris region. She could now be a presidential hopeful, along with another incumbent right-wing head of a regional council Xavier Bertrand, who’s set to win the poorer region of Hauts-de-France, and Laurent Wauquiez in the region around Lyon.

*

Emmanuel Macron Is Down, But He’s Far From Out

The French president’s party flopped in regional elections. That doesn’t have to dent his reelection chances if he draws lessons from the defeat.

French presidential careers tend to begin euphorically, screech to a halt in the face of protests over promises becoming policy and end somewhere between indifference and contempt when voters bring out the ballot-box equivalent of the guillotine. The results of regional elections this weekend seemed to prove the pattern. President Emmanuel Macron’s party racked up a humiliating defeat less than a year away from an increasingly tight re-election bid against far-right nemesis Marine Le Pen.

Yet on closer look, things are more complicated. While Macron has failed to broaden the appeal of newcomer La Republique En Marche beyond his white-collar base, his personal popularity is at the highest in a year thanks to the lifting of lockdown measures and a “whatever-it-takes” approach to public spending. That can still count for a lot in presidential elections.

If there’s a lesson here, it’s that Macron’s Covid-19 response has smothered voter anger without offering a real vision for the future. That’s what he’ll need to conjure up as the presidential election campaign shifts into high gear.

As seen at last year’s local elections, the enthusiasm generated by La Republique En Marche, created as a reformist, pro-European alternative to the establishment Left-Right parties, is gone. It won just 6.7% of the nationwide vote to renew metropolitan councils nationally, according to exit polls. Importantly, the biggest showing didn’t come from Le Pen’s National Rally, on track for 19.8%, which also struggled to broaden its appeal. It was the traditional forces Macron had aimed to usurp, with center-right and left-leaning parties coming in at 38.8% and 34.7%, respectively.

The Covid-19 voter mindset in France is slowly taking form, and it’s unimpressed with disruptive populist answers. Turnout was shockingly low and not a single region changed hands in mainland France. Despite a lot of frantic rhetoric that France was facing social unrest close to “civil war,” as one hugely-publicized letter by retired generals put it,  Le Pen’s results were poor, with her party failing to deliver on expectations of a regional win. The anger propelling anti-establishment parties simply wasn’t on show.

If there’s any momentum to speak of, it’s with the mainstream right, whose candidates are pitching themselves as the best bet to defeat Le Pen by tapping into public angst over security and immigration. The macho language on display from Xavier Bertrand, who described his victory in the northern Hauts-de-Seine region as having “smashed the jaws” of Le Pen’s party, sounded carefully chosen to portray Macron as a mere spectator. (It also elicited images of the ugly slap Macron received on the campaign trail.)

But none of this erases Macron’s popularity as president. A Harris poll conducted last week put his approval at 50%, the highest in a year. Right now, leading is less about reforming and more about spending: France’s budget deficit is at its highest since 1949 and its public debt is over 100% of GDP. It might seem odd to see Macron’s popularity rise nationally while tumbling locally, but it fits with the way Covid has empowered states to pursue their most Leviathan-esque dreams and sidelined local actions for now.

Next year’s presidential election will also have to face the fact that French voters increasingly lean conservative. The number of people polled who identify as being on the right rose to 39% last year from 34% in 2019. That explains why Macron has tried to tack right with promises to hire more police and to combat Islamist “separatism,” and also why Le Pen has ditched unpopular economic ideas like dropping the euro or leaving the European Union.

Clearly neither has hit on the right recipe yet. This will be an increasingly bitter, rightward, fight.

So, while France feels like it’s facing a political earthquake, it’s a tiny one. The latest presidential polls show the incumbent has a genuine shot at reelection, which would be a 20-year first, and that Le Pen is still the rival most likely to challenge him.

Yet the center-right can’t be easily discounted. The next six months could change things, and Macron’s advisors are likely already cooking up ideas to capture voters — a jobs program for the young, more measures to combat climate change or possibly even a divisive reform of pensions. But chances are it will be the delta variant, and the broader response to Covid, that will be Macron’s last chance to draw lessons from this latest election flop.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Diplomazia, Ong - Ngo, Unione Europea

Ungheria. Tutti i liberal europei vorrebbero cacciarla via, ma non sanno come fare.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-28.

Budapest 001

Il problema ungherese è simile giuridicamente a quello tedesco.

Unione Europea vs Germania. Conflitto tra le due supreme corti. Verso la implosione.

«→→ The courts are at loggerheads about the question as to who has the last say in matters relating to European law, Karlsruhe or Luxembourg? ←←»

«→→ The most likely reason is that the lawyers concerned are entering the court room with different sets of presuppositions ←←»

«This approach is based on the principles that states are sovereign, that they treat each other on equal footing and that they refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs»

«Violation of the principle of non-interference may constitute a reason for war»

* * * * * * *

Ungheria. Donato il terreno per la erigenda Università cinese in suolo magiaro. Povero Soros.

Hungary’s parliament passes anti-LGBT law ahead of 2022 election

Ungheria. Orban abbandona sia il PE sia il gruppo PPE.

Ungheria. Viktor Orban. Non rinnovata la licenza alla Klubradio broadcasting.

Eurocrati pronti a spaccare l’Unione sul rule-of-law. Piano B. Europa senza Polonia ed Ungheria.

Budget e Recovery Fund. Slovenia si schiera con Polonia ed Ungheria.

Ungheria. Orban mette in costituzione che il matrimonio è tra un uomo ed una donna.

* * * * * * *

I liberal socialisti europei odiano a morte Ungheria e Mr Viktor Orban, che hai loro occhi si sarebbe reso autore di orribili oltraggi. Rivendica la sovranità nazionale; ha scacciato dall’Ungheria Soros e le sue ngo, ivi compresa la sua università; a scritto nella costituzione che il matrimonio è tra un maschio ed una femmina; vieta la propaganda lgbt nelle scuole e nella società civile; più una altra lunga serie di posizioni antitetiche all’ideologia liberal.

Non potendolo uccidere, vorrebbero almeno scacciarlo dall’Unione Europea. Ma una cosa è il desiderio ed una del tutto diversa è la concreta possibilità operazionale.

*


Can the EU expel Hungary?

Even in the event that Rutte’s fellow EU leaders agreed, Hungary’s place within the bloc is not in peril. There is no legal mechanism in the EU’s treaties to expel a member state. The much-discussed Article 7 of the treaties removes a member states voting rights within the EU Council, the forum through which ministers and leaders of member states decide the political future of the EU.

However, invoking Article 7 and suspending the voting rights of a member state requires a unanimous decision in the council, meaning that all 26 leaders (Hungary, the subject of the vote, would not have a say) would need to vote in favor. The chances of this happening is very unlikely. The political leadership in many member states — most notably Poland, which is currently the subject of Article 7 proceedings for its assault on the nation’s courts — simply doesn’t want to set a precedent for Article 7 actually being used.

* * * * * * *

«There is no legal mechanism in the EU’s treaties to expel a member state»

«However, invoking Article 7 and suspending the voting rights of a member state requires a unanimous decision»

«The chances of this happening is very unlikely»

Quante parole inutili!

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

USA. 2021Q1. Pil ufficiale +6.4%. Detratte sovvenzioni ed inflazione circa zero. – BEA.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-06-25.

2021-06-25__ usa Pil 001

Si faccia la massima attenzione!

«Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 6.4 percent in the first quarter of 2021, reflecting the continued economic recovery, reopening of establishments, and continued government response related to the COVID-19 pandemic»

«The increase in real GDP in the first quarter reflected increases in personal consumption expenditures (PCE), nonresidential fixed investment, federal government spending, residential fixed investment, and state and local government spending The increase in real GDP in the first quarter reflected increases in personal consumption expenditures (PCE), nonresidential fixed investment, federal government spending, residential fixed investment, and state and local government spending»

«The increase in PCE reflected increases in durable goods (led by motor vehicles and parts), nondurable goods (led by food and beverages), and services (led by food services and accommodations). …. The increase in federal government spending primarily reflected an increase in payments made to banks for processing and administering the Paycheck Protection Program loan applications»

* * * * * * *

Cosa sta succedendo?

Il Bureau of Economic Analysis, ossia l’ente governativo che calcola e rilascia il pil ed il pec americano include nel pil tutte le sovvenzioni erogate dallo stato federale, dai singoli stati e dai governi locali. Una cifra immane generata ricorrendo al debito coperto dalla Fed con denaro fiat, che è stata trattata alla stregua di ricchezza generata dalla produzione nazionale, ossia dal lavoro.

Detratte dal calcolo le sovvenzioni assistenziali, il pil sarebbe circa eguale al 4%.

Ma il Pce, personal consumption expenditures, ossia l’indice di inflazione prediletto dalla Fed, è schizzato in questo trimestre proprio al 4%. In altri termini, l’inflazione si fagocita il valore degli aumenti del pil. Si da con una mano e si toglie con l’altra.

Ciò non desta sorprese.

Nel suo Report Personal Income and Outlays, April 2021 il Bureau of Economic Analysis  stesso riportava che il Disposable personal income era -14.6%. Una diminuzione delle entrate dei cittadini del -14.6% sembrerebbe essere non compatibile con un aumento del prodotto interno lordo.

Si noti anche come, sempre il Bureau of Economic Analysis aveva stimato il PCI al 5%:

Consumer prices increase 5.0 percent for the year ended May 2021

«The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers increased 5.0 percent from May 2020 to May 2021. Prices for food advanced 2.2 percent, while prices for energy increased 28.5 percent»

Ma con un aumento del 28.5% dell’energia, come fa l’inflazione ad essere solo il 4%?

*

Bureau of Economic Analysis. Gross Domestic Product (Third Estimate), GDP by Industry, and Corporate Profits (Revised), 1st Quarter 2021.

«Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 6.4 percent in the first quarter of 2021, reflecting the continued economic recovery, reopening of establishments, and continued government response related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The increase was the same rate as the “second” estimate released in May. In the first quarter, government assistance payments, such as direct economic impact payments, expanded unemployment benefits, and Paycheck Protection Program loans were distributed to households and businesses through the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act and the American Rescue Plan Act. In the fourth quarter of 2020, real GDP increased 4.3 percent.»

* * *

Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at an annual rate of 6.4 percent in the first quarter of 2021 (table 1), according to the “third” estimate released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the fourth quarter, real GDP increased 4.3 percent.

The “third” estimate of GDP released today is based on more complete source data than were available for the “second” estimate issued last month. In the second estimate, the increase in real GDP was also 6.4 percent. Upward revisions to nonresidential fixed investment, private inventory investment, and exports were offset by an upward revision to imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP (see “Updates to GDP”).

→→ The increase in real GDP in the first quarter reflected increases in personal consumption expenditures (PCE), nonresidential fixed investment, federal government spending, residential fixed investment, and state and local government spending that were partly offset by decreases in private inventory investment and exports. Imports increased. ←←

The increase in PCE reflected increases in durable goods (led by motor vehicles and parts), nondurable goods (led by food and beverages), and services (led by food services and accommodations). The increase in nonresidential fixed investment reflected increases in equipment (led by information processing equipment) and intellectual property products (led by software). The increase in federal government spending primarily reflected an increase in payments made to banks for processing and administering the Paycheck Protection Program loan applications as well as purchases of COVID-19 vaccines for distribution to the public. The decrease in private inventory investment primarily reflected a decrease in retail trade inventories (mainly by motor vehicles and parts dealers).

Current dollar GDP increased 11.0 percent at an annual rate, or $566.8 billion, in the first quarter to a level of $22.06 trillion. In the fourth quarter, GDP increased 6.3 percent, or $324.4 billion (table 1 and table 3). More information on the source data that underlie the estimates is available in the Key Source Data and Assumptions file on BEA’s website.

The price index for gross domestic purchases increased 4.0 percent in the first quarter, compared with an increase of 1.7 percent in the fourth quarter (table 4). The PCE price index increased 3.7 percent, compared with an increase of 1.5 percent. Excluding food and energy prices, the PCE price index increased 2.5 percent, compared with an increase of 1.3 percent.

Gross Domestic Income and Corporate Profits

Real gross domestic income (GDI) increased 7.6 percent in the first quarter, compared with an increase of 19.4 percent in the fourth quarter. The average of real GDP and real GDI, a supplemental measure of U.S. economic activity that equally weights GDP and GDI, increased 7.0 percent in the first quarter, compared with an increase of 11.6 percent in the fourth quarter (table 1).

Profits from current production (corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments) increased $55.2 billion in the first quarter, in contrast to a decrease of $31.4 billion in the fourth quarter (table 10).

Profits of domestic financial corporations decreased $6.4 billion in the first quarter, in contrast to an increase of $17.5 billion in the fourth quarter. Profits of domestic nonfinancial corporations increased $72.1 billion, in contrast to a decrease of $48.2 billion. Rest-of-the-world profits decreased $10.6 billion, compared with a decrease of $0.7 billion. In the first quarter, receipts increased $34.2 billion, and payments increased $44.8 billion.

Updates to GDP

In the third estimate, the change in first-quarter real GDP was the same as in the second estimate. Upward revisions to nonresidential fixed investment, private inventory investment, exports, and PCE were offset by an upward revision to imports. For more information, see the Technical Note. For information on updates to GDP, see the “Additional Information” section that follows.

Real GDP by Industry

Today’s release includes estimates of GDP by industry, or value added—a measure of an industry’s contribution to GDP. In the first quarter, private goods-producing industries increased 5.4 percent, private services-producing industries increased 7.7 percent, and government increased 0.2 percent (table 12). Overall, 17 of 22 industry groups contributed to the first-quarter increase in real GDP.

The increase in private goods-producing industries primarily reflected an increase in durable goods manufacturing (led by computer and electronic products, fabricated metal products, and machinery). The increase was partly offset by decreases in nondurable goods manufacturing (led by petroleum and coal products) and agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting (led by farms).

The increase in private services-producing industries primarily reflected increases in professional, scientific, and technical services; information (led by data processing, internet publishing, and other information services); administrative and waste management services (led by administrative and support services); real estate and rental and leasing; and retail trade. These increases were partly offset by decreases in other services (which includes activities of political organizations); healthcare and social assistance (led by ambulatory health care services); and utilities.

The increase in government reflected increases in federal as well as state and local.

Gross Output by Industry

Real gross output—principally a measure of an industry’s sales or receipts, which includes sales to final users in the economy (GDP) and sales to other industries (intermediate inputs)—increased 8.9 percent in the first quarter (table 16). Private goods-producing industries decreased 1.7 percent, private services-producing industries increased 13.4 percent, and government increased 6.0 percent. Overall, 17 of 22 industry groups contributed to the increase in real gross output, led by retail trade, finance and insurance, and information. A decrease in nondurable goods manufacturing was the most notable offset to these increases.