Giuseppe Sandro Mela.
Il Kiel Institute for the World Economy ha pubblicato un interessante report: China’s Overseas Lending.
«Compared with China’s dominance in world trade, its expanding role in global finance is poorly documented and understood. Over the past decades, China has exported record amounts of capital to the rest of the world. Many of these financial flows are not reported to the IMF, the BIS or the World Bank. “Hidden debts” to China are especially significant for about three dozen developing countries, and distort the risk assessment in both policy surveillance and the market pricing of sovereign debt. We establish the size, destination, and characteristics of China’s overseas lending. We identify three key distinguishing features. First, almost all of China’s lending and investment abroad is official. As a result, the standard “push” and “pull” drivers of private cross-border flows do not play the same role in this case. Second, the documentation of China’s capital exports is (at best) opaque. China does not report on its official lending and there is no comprehensive standardized data on Chinese overseas debt stocks and flows. Third, the type of flows is tailored by recipient. Advanced and higher middle-income countries tend to receive portfolio debt flows, via sovereign bond purchases of the People’s Bank of China. Lower income developing economies mostly receive direct loans from China’s state-owned banks, often at market rates and backed by collateral such as oil. Our new dataset covers a total of 1,974 Chinese loans and 2,947 Chinese grants to 152 countries from 1949 to 2017. We find that about one half of China’s overseas loans to the developing world are “hidden”. ….
Unlike other major economies, almost all of China’s overseas lending and investment is official, meaning that it is undertaken by the Chinese government, state-owned companies or the statecontrolled central bank. Most notable is the fact that the documentation of China’s capital exports is (at best) opaque. ….
China does not divulge data on its official flows with the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System, and it is not part of the OECD Export Credit Group, which provides data on long- and short-term trade credit flows ….
China’s direct loans and trade credits have climbed from almost zero in 1998 to more than 1.6 trillion USD, or close to 2 percent of world GDP in 2018. ….
In total, estimates suggest that the Chinese state now accounts for a quarter of total bank lending to emerging markets ….
This has transformed China into the largest official creditor, easily surpassing the IMF or the World Bank. ….
Overall, we combined details on more than 1,947 loans as well as 2,947 grants extended by the Chinese government and state-owned creditor agencies since 1949, to more than 150 countries worldwide, with total commitments of 530 billion US$. ….
using unpublished data from the World Banks’s Debtor Reporting System and data on BIS reported bank claims, we find that about 50% of China’s lending is “hidden”. Neither the IMF, nor the World Bank, nor credit rating agencies report on these “hidden” debt stocks, which have grown to more than 200 billion USD as of 2016 ….
These practices have a historical analogue. Indeed, China’s overseas loans share many features with French, German and British 19th century foreign lending, which also tended to be market based, partially collateralized by commodity income, and characterized by a close link of political and commercial interests ….
the government of China holds more than five trillion USD of debt towards the rest of the world (6% of world GDP) ….»