Il Progetto Belt and Road è un piano a livello mondiale: si propone di costruire quasi ovunque nei paesi sottosviluppati infrastrutture di base: acquedotti, reti fognarie, centrali elettriche e relativa rete di distribuzione, strade, autostrade e ferrovie. Lungo il decorso di queste nuove arterie di comunicazione risulta essere conveniente impiantare realtà produttive, collegate in modo decente con il resto del mondo.
L’intero progetto sarebbe valutabile attorno ai 1,500 miliardi di dollari americani, 580 dei quali da spendersi entro il 2020.
La Cina si propone molti obbiettivi.
L’appoggio politico ed economico fornito a paese poveri, se porto con garbo, costituisce materiale cementante i rapporti. Permette di stabilire rapporti cordiali e di reciproca utilità, destinati ad incrementarsi nel tempo via via che questi paesi poveri entrano in una fascia di almeno relativo benessere.
Il progetto cinese è strategico: se sia vero che interessano anche i risultati immediati, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare come gli obbiettivi reali siano sul lungo termine. In linea generale potremmo dire tra venti – trenta anni.
Se è vero che il progetto Belt and Roda, di cui il Silk Road è una componente, mira ad aiutare le economie al momento misere ad emergere, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare che i cinesi intendono averne gestione diretta, anche perché i soldi sono i loro. Un caso paramount è la concessione degli appalti, in cui le ditte cinesi sono invariabilmente preferite a discapito di quelle occidentali.
Questa posizione cinese, peraltro ben capibile, è anche facilitata dalle posizioni occidentali, che legano la possibilità collaborativa delle proprie imprese a vincoli che rispecchiano la proprio particolare concezione etica e morale. Che poi le imprese sgattaiolino anche in modo rocambolesco è un altro paio di maniche, ma senza l’ombrello protettivo di una diplomazia aperta ed efficiente le imprese occidentali risultano essere fortemente penalizzate.
Confindustria tedesca ha definito il sistema cinese come una nuova Grande Muraglia eretta contro di lei.
Il nodo è che a cambiare non sarà certo la Cina: l’Occidente dovrebbe cambiare registro se intende lavorare nel progetto Belt and Road.
Poi, vi sono anche tutti i problemi di rapporti diplomatici con i paesi con i quali la Cina sta collaborando.
Con alcuni paesi questi sono chiari e facili, con altri alquanto tribolati.
Per esempio, la Cina ha ancora in essere un contenzioso territoriale con l’India, la quale non vede poi troppo di buon occhio il prorompente sviluppo economico cinese: il suo concreto timore è quello di restare accerchiata politicamente ed economicamente.
Altri paesi si stanno rendendo conto che, pur essendo il Progetto Belt and Road gigantesco quanto mai munifico, verosimilmente avrebbero potuto contrattare condizioni migliori. Questo è per esempio il caso del Myanmar.
Da ultimo, ma non certo per ultimo, il mondo inizia finalmente a rendersi conto a rendersi conto che, proseguendo su questo trend, tra due decenni la Cina sarà egemone a livello mondiale, evenienza questa che non tutti sono disposti ad accettare.
«The economic corridor did not play an important role in Indian development plans, whereas the Chinese attached great significance to it»
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Ci si pensi bene.
La Cina cura i propri interessi, pur avendo sempre molta attenzione a fare guadagnare anche gli altri: ma tra i due darà sempre priorità agli interessi cinesi.
The highly ambitious Belt and Road Initiative promises to fortify China as an economic superpower. But negotiations around the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor are proving contentious.
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China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the New Silk Road project, has been featured prominently in the media ever since President Xi Jinping initiated the program in 2013. China has been touting the BRI as the 21st century’s biggest project. By 2020, China plans to have invested €500 billion ($580 billion) into it.
Judging by some ecstatic media reports, one might assume that thousands of cargo trains are already barreling from China to Europe, and that millions of containers are being handled at ports along the New Silk Road. In reality, however, the BRI faces some severe and partially self-inflicted problems — as the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor demonstrates.
The BCIM is one of six planned economic corridors that China wants to promote in the context of the BRI. Initially, however, the BCIM started out as an independent subregional initiative pursued by China’s southwestern Yunnan province. Back then, it was not part of China’s large-scale BRI program.
In 1991, Yunnan established the BCIM Forum. Researchers and experts met to discuss the opportunities and risks involved in creating a direct land route between Kolkata and Kunming. They identified a number of potential benefits: The world’s most populous countries would be connected, a wealth of natural resources south of the Himalayas could be exploited, and hitherto isolated regions — chiefly India’s seven northeastern states, which depend on the Siliguri Corridor to for access to the rest of the country — could be integrated into the global economy. The political scientist Khriezo Yhome, from India’s Observer Research Foundation (ORF) think tank, even expressed hopes that the project could reduce competition between India and China and thereby contribute to peace and stability.
A BCIM Forum in 2013 brought few concrete results. That was mainly because of India’s reluctance to recognize the summit as an official intergovernmental meeting. So, the BCIM Forum remained little more than a place for academics and other experts to engage in dialogue, as the sociologist Patricia Uberoi, who works at the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi, told DW. Uberoi participated in and contributed to the BCIM talks for many years.
2013’s Turning point
Everything changed with the K2K car rally from Kolkata to Kunming. After Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited India in May 2013, he and his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, issued a joint statement saying that “encouraged by the successful BCIM Car Rally of February 2013 between Kolkata and Kunming, the two sides agreed to … initiating the development of a BCIM Economic Corridor.”
“By issuing this joint declaration,” Uberoi said, “the BCIM Economic Corridor became an official governmental project.” However, India and China had different expectations. “The economic corridor did not play an important role in Indian development plans, whereas the Chinese attached great significance to it.”
At the meeting, it was agreed to author a joint report on how to progress on the economic corridor project, based on four reports written by the individuals states. This was never realized, however, mainly because Myanmar lacks the resources to go ahead with the project, Uberoi said: “Myanmar said it needs more time. The process, started in 2013, still has not been completed and is way behind schedule.”
Competition — not cooperation
In addition to some states’ lack of resources, persistent mistrust and competition between India and China continue to pose a problem. In 2017, tensions came to the fore with the Doklam border standoff.
“India has repeatedly explained that the BCIM project is part of its ‘Look East’ policy,” Uberoi said. Since 1990, that has been all about connecting India with Southeast Asia in order to strength its own position — and weaken China’s.
The BCIM Forum started as a subregional initiative pursued by Yunnan and other western provinces. “But then Beijing took control over the initiative,” Uberoi said, “putting the commission in charge that also oversees the BRI.” Once China’s National Development and Reform Commission took over in 2015 — and began talking about the BCIM Economic Corridor along with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is hotly contested by India — it had become apparent that the BCIM initiative had been integrated into China’s wider BRI program. That is understandable from China’s perspective: It’s a means of maximizing its influence. But it did not go down well in India. “A new emphasis was lent to the BCIM project when China made it part of its Belt and Road program,” Uberoi said. Now, India feels disadvantaged. From the outset, officials in New Delhi have stressed that India does not want to be included in China’s ambitious BRI program. And they have remained resolute on this matter.
A missed opportunity
Uberoi said it was unfortunate that China had appropriated the BCIM initiative. She argues that the numerous cultural, ethnic, and social commonalities shared by China’s Yunnan province, northern Myanmar, northern Bangladesh and northeastern India can be better utilized and integrated through a regional initiative than through a project run out of Beijing. “Much will depend on whether local authorities will be involved,” she said. “If the initiative were coordinated by Yunnan province, it would not be seen as a big threat,” she added. “That way, at least China’s central government would not be in charge.”
It would be good, Uberoi said, if other projects emerge that are less under China’s control. Initiatives supported by international donors, for instance, would be less humiliating for India. Currently, India’s northeastern regions are set to lose out; many development projects are on hold given the current situation.
Officials in India, meanwhile, must realize that China has already created facts on the ground, Uberoi said: “If India wants to establish a land connection to Myanmar and Southeast Asia, it will be confronted with Chinese infrastructure inside Myanmar.” As an example, she cited an oil and gas pipeline leading from the Bay of Bengal, via Myanmar’s Rakhine state, to the Chinese city of Kunming. Some strategists have expressed hopes of countering China’s north-south pipeline by establishing a link running from east to west. But it’s too late for that. “You can’t turn back the clocks,” Uberoi said.
La Unione Europea esporta / esportava negli Stati Uniti acciaio per 5.3 miliardi di euro ed alluminio per 1.1 miliardi.
In migliaia di tonnellate, Germania 951, Olanda 633, Francia 237, Svezia 216, Italia 212, Lussemburgo 207, Spagna 193, Regno Unito 173, Portogallo 169, Belgio 154, Austria 87, Repubblica Ceka 69.
In linea generale, sono volumi e cifre non certo impegnative.
Si consideri, per esempio, come il pil prodotto nel 2017 dall’Unione Europea ammonti a 18,495.349 miliardi di Usd, mentre quello dell’eurozona a 16,199.074 miliardi.
«L’UE-28, la Cina e gli Stati Uniti sono i tre maggiori attori globali del commercio internazionale dal 2004, anno in cui la Cina ha superato il Giappone. Nel 2016 il valore totale di esportazioni e importazioni di merci riportato per l’UE-28, per la Cina e per gli Stati Uniti era pressoché identico, avendo raggiunto 3 455 miliardi di euro nell’UE-28 …. Il Giappone ha registrato il quarto valore più elevato di scambi di merci, pari a 1 131 miliardi di euro» [Eurostat]
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Appare del tutto evidente come i 6.4 miliardi imputabili ai dazi, pur rilevanti come cifra assoluta, siano percentualmente ben poca cosa rispetto all’export di 3,455 miliardi verso gli Stati Uniti d’America.
Sembrerebbe quindi lecito il domandarsi del perché di tanto clangore attorno a questo provvedimento.
Se è vero che la Germania sembrerebbe essere il paese più colpito, sarebbe altrettanto vera la constatazione che in termini percentuali non aggrava in modo significativo.
In un’altra ottica si potrebbe considerare il pessimo stato di salute della produzione di acciaio in Germania
Questa considerazione potrebbe almeno in parte giustificare il risentimento tedesco e, quindi, europeo.
Ma forse potrebbero essere altre considerazioni quelle più pregnanti.
La produzione dell’acciaio implica quella del carbone, e di buona qualità. Estrazione di materiali ferrosi, di carbone e produzione dell’acciaio sono intimamente correlati. Gli Stati Uniti stanno ora facendo tornare in auge il carbone, mentre la Germania argomenta che vorrebbe cessarne la produzione.
Però queste sono produzioni strategiche, che assommano una grande quantità di brevetti e di know-how. Senza una ragionevole export questa produzione già in crisi potrebbe diventare insostenibile.
Come si constata, il problema è molto sfaccettato.
I dazi introdotti dagli Stati Uniti minacciano circa 40 miliardi di euro di Made in Italy. Secondo alcune recenti analisi, la stretta di Trump – che prevede dazi del 25% sulle importazioni di acciaio e del 10% sull’alluminio – sta per ricadere su una serie di prodotti italiani che ogni anno vengono esportati negli Usa.
Secondo un’analisi Coldiretti – su base dati Istat – a rischio ci sarebbero 40,5 miliardi di esportazioni italiane, che nel 2017 hanno raggiunto il record storico. Gli Stati Uniti sono inoltre il principale mercato di riferimento per il Made in Italy fuori dall’Unione europea, con un impatto rilevante anche per l’agroalimentare.
Una strategia, quella dell”America First’, che – come ha fatto sapere il presidente della Commissione Ue, Jean-Claude Juncker – non lascia altra scelta “se non procedere con un ricorso all’Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio e con l’imposizione di dazi aggiuntivi su una serie di importazioni” da oltre Atlantico.
MISURE UE – Tali ‘misure di riequilibrio’ su prodotti importati dagli Usa potrebbero essere attivate entro 90 giorni dall’entrata in vigore dei dazi americani. Una black list che potrebbe includere magliette, pantaloni, biancheria e scarpe (che l’Italia importa dagli Usa per 18,6 milioni di euro, dati 2017) e cosmetici (rossetti, ciprie, manicure per 10,4 milioni di euro).
Ma anche, come reso noto dalla Commissione lo scorso marzo, fagioli rossi secchi, alcuni tipi di riso come il parboiled o la spezzatura di riso, il burro d’arachidi, i mirtilli rossi, il succo d’arancia, il Bourbon Whiskey americano e le sigarette.
NEL 2016 – Secondo un’altra analisi, fatta dal Centro studi di Unimpresa (su dati Istat e riferita al 2016), il totale delle esportazioni italiane negli Stati Uniti d’America ammonta a 36,7 miliardi di euro.
Nel dettaglio, sul totale delle esportazioni, nel 2016 gli alimentari pesano per 2,02 miliardi (5,49%), in crescita di 137 milioni rispetto al 2015 (+7,25%); le bevande per 1,7 miliardi (4,66%), in crescita di 74 milioni (+4,49%) sul 2015; il settore tessile vale 515 milioni (1,39%), in diminuzione di 34 milioni (-6,19%) sull’anno precedente; quota 1,5 miliardi (4,25%) per l’abbigliamento, in discesa di 95 milioni (-5,71%) sul 2015; per quanto riguarda la pelle, l’ammontare delle esportazioni si è attestato a 1,7 miliardi (4,73%), in calo di 56 milioni (-3,11%).
LE AREE – Cambiando area, il settore della chimica ha fatto registrare esportazioni per 1,6 miliardi (4,46%) in crescita di 44 milioni (+2,74%) sull’anno precedente; nel 2016, poi, sono stati esportati prodotti farmaceutici per 1,9 miliardi (5,26%), cifra in aumento di 415 milioni (+27,18%) sul 2015; l’export dei minerali si è attestato a 1,3 miliardi (3,76%), in crescita di 62 milioni (+4,67%), mentre quello dei metalli è calato di 456 milioni (-31,58%) a quota 988 milioni (2,68%).
E ancora: l’elettronica vale 1,3 miliardi (+3,56%), valore in crescita di 31 milioni (+2,41%) rispetto ai 12 mesi precedenti. Crescita di 212 milioni (+3,05%) per i macchinari, che pesano 7,1 miliardi (19,40%), mentre è risultato in calo di 375 milioni (-7,66%) l’ammontare delle esportazioni di autoveicoli, sceso a 4,5 miliardi (12,24%); l’export di navi, treni e aerei ammonta a 3,6 miliardi (9,89%), in salita di 873 milioni (+31,43%).
Nel 2016, poi, sono stati esportati mobili per 911 milioni (2,47%) in crescita di 90 milioni (+10,96%); altri prodotti di manifattura pesano per poco più di 2 miliardi (5,45%), in salita di 114 milioni (+6,01%). Il resto delle esportazioni di made in Italy, che non rientrano nelle precedenti categorie, valgono 3,8 miliardi (10,32%), in discesa di 96 milioni sul 2015 (-2,46%).
«German Chancellor Merkel has arrived in the Saudi port city of Jeddah to hold talks with the kingdom’s authorities. Women’s rights are high on her agenda following massive criticism of Riyadh’s UN women’s body role.»
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«dedicated to the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women.»
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Frau Merkel non riuscì a vendere ai sauditi tutte le armi che si sarebbe proposta.
«We will not cause any more problems for the German government with new requests for weapons»
Il re saudita aveva così declinato l’invito a farsi femminista, ad abbracciare l’lgbt passando ad ingrandire la schiera dei diversamente senzienti: nemmeno aveva voluto abdicare in favore di una femmina. Anche il principe ereditario aveva declinato le pressanti richieste di Frau Merkel. Ma può la Germania commerciare con gente di quella risma? Gente avara della propria rima anale?
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«Following diplomatic discord between Berlin and Riyadh, contracts for German businesses in Saudi Arabia have been drying up»
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«Is the crown prince punishing them?»
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«65 percent of Daues’ revenues come from Saudi Arabia.»
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«Riyadh withdrew its ambassador from Germany and he still hasn’t returned»
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«For Germans, the doors in Riyadh have suddenly been closed»
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«Meetings with delegations from Germany that were set up before the crisis are being canceled»
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«Young crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS for short, appears to be “deeply offended” by the German government»
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«Relations between the two countries began souring last November when then-German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel spoke of spreading “political adventurism” in the Middle East, a remark many thought was aimed at Saudi Arabia»
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«the prince was not happy»
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«German government has succeeded in upsetting the country so badly that German firms are being excluded from being awarded contracts»
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«The affront from Gabriel over Lebanon was followed by a line in the Berlin coalition agreement explicitly stating that Germany will not deliver weapons to countries involved in the war in Yemen — Saudi Arabia above all»
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«No more contracts will be awarded to German companies and our invoices are no longer being paid»
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I tedeschi un giorno o l’altro si toglieranno lo scolapasta dalla testa e cacceranno la loro attuale classe politica.
Per l’intanto, quello dell’Arabia Saudita è solo un altro mercato che si chiude ai loro commerci.
Following diplomatic discord between Berlin and Riyadh, contracts for German businesses in Saudi Arabia have been drying up. Is the crown prince punishing them?
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Detlef Daues is a pioneer of the German small- and medium-sized companies that have made Germany what it is today: a prosperous nation with good international relations that stretch to even the farthest-flung corners of the world.
His Hannover-based virtual department store for original replacement parts, V-Line GmbH, services customers in countries like Mexico, the United States, Qatar and Oman in addition to others in East Asia. But 65 percent of Daues’ revenues come from Saudi Arabia.
But currently, the once-positive relationship between Saudi Arabia and Germany has worsened. Six months ago, Riyadh withdrew its ambassador from Germany and he still hasn’t returned. There has been little open discussion of the reasons behind the conflict, but for people like Daues in the business community, the rift is as plain as day. “For Germans, the doors in Riyadh have suddenly been closed,” says one experienced businessman in the Saudi capital. Meetings with delegations from Germany that were set up before the crisis are being canceled. “That hurts,” says Oliver Oehms of the German-Saudi Arabian Liaison Office for Economic Affairs in Riyadh.
Young crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS for short, appears to be “deeply offended” by the German government, says Daues, who adds that his information comes from confidants in Riyadh. Relations between the two countries began souring last November when then-German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel spoke of spreading “political adventurism” in the Middle East, a remark many thought was aimed at Saudi Arabia. The impression was widespread at the time that Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri was being held against his will in Riyadh and that he was being strong-armed by the rulers there to step down.
Blunt public criticism of that nature is considered a no-no in the world of diplomacy. “Why didn’t Gabriel pick up the phone and call Riyadh if he was concerned,” asks one influential member of the royal family during a meeting a in Riyadh. Within the palace, the impression was that the remarks made on Nov. 16 were a cheap shot by the German foreign minister to drum up support among voters, the royal family member says, adding that the prince was not happy.
Profound Transformation
Saudi Arabia is currently undergoing a profound transformation. Crown prince MBS wants to shed his country of its religious fundamentalism and he is preparing it for the post-oil economy. It’s a change that German companies would also like to benefit from.
Daues himself invested $5 million to place his company at the forefront as that change comes. But now the “German government has succeeded” in “upsetting the country so badly that German firms are being excluded from being awarded contracts,” the entrepreneur wrote in a letter to Bernd Althusmann, the economics minister for the state of Lower-Saxony, where his company is located. He wrote that he had been deliberately excluded from contracts for the first time.
No one is able to say precisely whether the prince has issued a written order, as sources in Riyadh claim, or whether there was just a verbal decree that civil servants have been all too eager to obey.
MBS himself is actually an admirer of Germany. Recently, though, there has been one hitch in relations after the other. The affront from Gabriel over Lebanon was followed by a line in the Berlin coalition agreement explicitly stating that Germany will not deliver weapons to countries involved in the war in Yemen — Saudi Arabia above all.
The situation is further complicated by Germany’s role in the current wrangling over Iran. Berlin is determined to stick with the nuclear deal despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s announcement he will withdraw from it, whereas there is deep-seated distrust of the government in Tehran in Riyadh. It may be that the Saudi crown prince views Germany’s conduct as criticism of his governance. Sources close to him say that a relaxed attitude toward differences of opinion is not one of the prince’s strong points.
An Important Trading Partner
Germany remains Saudi Arabia’s most important European trading partner. Some 800 German companies are active in the country, and 200 have offices in Saudi Arabia with a total of 40,000 employees. In 2017, the volume of German exports to Saudi Arabia was 6.6 billion euros. But the mood is shifting.
Well-informed observers in Saudi Arabia are reporting that even larger German companies like Daimler have been affected. The Saudis, for example, threatened to temporarily postpone the delivery of several hundred Mercedes buses. Officially, the company has vehemently denied the reports, with Daimler saying it cannot confirm any delay. The bus project, the company insists, is proceeding on schedule.
The Saudi Health Ministry, which has worked closely together with medical equipment supplier Siemens and pharmaceutical companies Bayer and Boehringer for years, has also distanced itself from its German partners recently. “The business is tougher,” a spokesman for Siemens says in a cautious formulation. “We don’t want to comment on the matter,” spokespeople for Bayer and Boehringer stated. No one wants to further rile the government in Saudi Arabia. Recently, Riyadh’s city development authority ADA issued a contract for the construction of a major bike path that will run through the capital city’s green belt to the American architecture firm Coen+Partners. But only a year ago, it had planned to award the contract to the German firm AS+P Albert Speer and Bödeker Landscape Architects.
This prompted German landscape architect Alexandra von Bieler at Bödecker to write a letter to Foreign Minister Heiko Maas in which she pleads for a patching up of relations with Saudi Arabia. “No more contracts will be awarded to German companies and our invoices are no longer being paid,” the letter states, before going on to say that her office has been “pushed to its limits.”
The Bödeckers have worked together with the Saudi urban planning agency for more than 40 years, developing recreational areas, parks and entire city districts. Company founder Richard Bödecker, 84, has known many members of the royal family personally for decades. But he, too, is now being faced with a wall of silence.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has since had a telephone conversation with the crown prince in which she assured her personal regard for the prince and said she was looking forward to future cooperation with the kingdom. Gabriel also stated repeatedly before leaving office in March that his remark about Middle East adventurism had not been specifically aimed at Riyadh. Diplomatic notes have since been exchanged and meetings between ambassadors held.
But none of that has sufficed. Sources inside the palace in Riyadh say they are expecting an “apology.” “The Saudis are a proud people and they are also very sensitive to criticism,” says landscape architect Bieler, who has long been familiar with the country’s culture.
Lo Stretto di Malacca mette in comunicazione tramite il Mare delle Andamane l’Oceano Indiano con il mare Cinese Meridionale. Attraverso di esso transitano ogni anno merci per un controvalore di circa 3,000 miliardi di dollari americani. Nel pressi di Singapore lo Stretto si restringe con una ampiezza minima di 2,8 km rendendo la navigazione più difficile vista l’intensità di traffico. Le dimensioni massime delle navi che lo possono attraversare sono definite dal Malaccamax.
La sua importanza strategica è semplicemente evidente.
La Cina ha fatto ampli sforzi per ottenere il controllo del mare Cinese Meridionale costruendovi un buon numero di isole artificiali, tramutate rapidamente in basi aereonavali armate allo stato del’arte.
Non solo. La Cina ha anche messo in atto un intenso programma di costruzioni di linee ferroviarie ad alta velocità che la collegano a porti locati sull’Oceano Indiano, stringendo ovviamente contatti politici, militari ed economici con i relativi paesi.
È semplicemente intuitivo come la Cina in un domani sentirà la esigenza di difendere le proprie rotte commerciali anche nell’Oceano Indiano, ossia ad ovest dello Stretto di Malacca.
Ma India ed Indonesia, al contrario dell’Occidente, si sono attivate per tempo: nella vita non si sa mai.
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«Sabang is a city consisting of a main island (Weh Island) and several smaller islands off the northern tip of Sumatra. The islands form a city within Aceh Special Region, Indonesia. The administrative centre is located on Weh Island, 17 km north of Banda Aceh. The city covers an area of 153.0 square kilometres and according to the 2010 census had a population of 30,653 people; the latest estimate (for January 2014) is 32,271. Sabang is also known as the northernmost and westernmost city of Indonesia.» [Fonte]
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Se si desse una rapida occhiata alla carta geografica, la posizione strategica di Sabang salta immediatamente agli occhi. Non a caso nel corso della seconda guerra mondiale i giapponesi vi costruirono imponenti strutture di difesa. e basi aeronavali.
Se si guarda la fotografia satellitare, si nota un ampio porto con pescaggio attorno ai quaranta metri, con immediatamente a ridosso un aeroporto. Possono attraccarvi portaerei e sommergibili atomici.
Essendo un’isola, Sabang ha accessi facilmente controllabili, è vicina ad un’isola di grandi dimensioni e con strutture abbastanza adeguate a supportarla, è messa nella posizione ideale per controllare quella porsione di Oceano Indiano che aggetta sulla Malacca, nonché lo stretto stesso.
Una volta ben attrezzata e munita sia di missilistica contraerea adeguata sia di missili antinave potrebbe costituire un baluardo del quale sarebbe impossibile non dover tener conto.
«Indonesia and India pledged on Wednesday to step up defense and maritime cooperation, with plans to develop a strategic Indonesian naval port in the Indian Ocean»
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«Indonesian President Joko Widodo met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to discuss, among other issues, developing infrastructure and an economic zone at Sabang, on the tip of Sumatra island and at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, one of the busiest shipping channels for global trade»
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«Analysts say the move comes amid concerns over China’s rising maritime influence in the region, and is part of Modi’s “Act East” policy of developing stronger ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).»
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Una sola mesta nota di commento.
Anche se distante migliaia di miglia, lo Stretto di Malacca sarebbe strategico anche per gli occidentali, europei soprattutto. Ma nessuno se ne cura più di tanto.
Indonesia and India pledged on Wednesday to step up defense and maritime cooperation, with plans to develop a strategic Indonesian naval port in the Indian Ocean, the leaders of the two countries said after meeting in Jakarta.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to discuss, among other issues, developing infrastructure and an economic zone at Sabang, on the tip of Sumatra island and at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, one of the busiest shipping channels for global trade.
“India is a strategic defense partner…and we will continue to advance our cooperation in developing infrastructure, including at Sabang Island and the Andaman Islands,” Widodo told a news conference after the meeting at the presidential palace.
Analysts say the move comes amid concerns over China’s rising maritime influence in the region, and is part of Modi’s “Act East” policy of developing stronger ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
“The India-ASEAN partnership can be a force to guarantee peace and progress in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond,” Modi said in a statement read in Hindi.
Modi this year invited the leaders of all ten ASEAN nations to attend New Delhi’s Republic Day parade, the biggest such gathering of foreign leaders at the annual event.
There has been tension in Southeast Asia over the disputed South China Sea, a busy waterway claimed in most part by China. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have conflicting claims in the area, through which about $3 trillion worth of sea-borne goods passes every year.
While not a claimant, Indonesia has clashed with Beijing over fishing rights around the Natuna Islands and expanded its military presence there. It has also renamed the northern reaches of its exclusive economic zone, to reassert its sovereignty. Modi, who is making his first trip to Indonesia, is also set to visit the Istiqlal mosque in the capital of the world’s biggest Muslim-majority country.
The Indian leader flies to Malaysia on Thursday to meet recently elected Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad before heading to neighboring Singapore to address a regional security forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue.
Last week, Indonesia’s chief maritime affairs minister, Luhut Pandjaitan, said the existing port at Sabang, which is 40 meters (131 ft) deep, could be developed to accommodate both commercial vessels and submarines, according to media.
Indonesia’s transport minister told reporters on Wednesday that Sabang would get a transshipment port that could be developed over two years.
Asked about Indian investment in Sabang, Indian foreign ministry official Preeti Saran said New Delhi was interested in helping build infrastructure across Southeast Asia.
“There have been discussions about building infrastructure, it’s not just seaports, but airports,” she said. “There would be a lot of interest among Indian companies.”
Widodo and Modi also signed pacts on cooperation in the pharmaceuticals and technology industries.
«La Groenlandia (in groenlandese: Kalaallit Nunaat, Terra degli uomini; in danese Grønland, Terra verde) è un’isola appartenente, geograficamente parlando, al continente americano, collocata nell’estremo nord dell’oceano Atlantico tra il Canada a sud-ovest, l’Islanda a sud-est, l’Artide e il Mar Glaciale Artico a nord. Dal punto di vista politico, costituisce una nazione in seno al Regno di Danimarca. ….
Dopo la guerra [mondiale] il controllo dell’isola ritornò alla Danimarca e, nel 1953, lo status coloniale venne trasformato in quello di un Amt (contea) d’oltremare. Nel 1985 l’isola ha abbandonato la CEE, a cui era unita dal 1973 in quanto parte della Danimarca. ….
Il 26 novembre 2008, è passato in Danimarca il referendum sulla auto determinazione, con una percentuale del 75,5% di favorevoli.
Con questa riforma si sono rivisti gli statuti dell’autonomia, secondo i quali, a partire dal 21 giugno 2009, alla Groenlandia è riconosciuto l’auto-governo e la gestione autonoma delle proprie risorse naturali ….
Di fatto dal 21 giugno 2009 la Groenlandia è uno Stato federato, quasi indipendente, fatta eccezione per la politica estera. » [Fonte]
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Attualmente, la Groenlandia ha rapporti sia con Danimarca sia con l’Unione Europea.
«Since breaking from the EU, Greenland has relied heavily on cash from Denmark, currently a grant of 3.6 billion crowns ($700 million) a year. ….
The European Union provides about 31 million euros ($44.71 million) a year to Greenland, mainly to promote education, and 16 million euros a year to help develop fisheries.»
La Danimarca eroga alla Groenlandia 700 milioni Usd l’anno e l’Unione Europea 16 milioni euro, principalmente in corresponsione a diritti estrattivi e di pesca.
Sono somme da elemosine sui sagrati di chiese sconsacrate.
Quindi non ci si dovrebbe stupire più di tanto di quanto sta evolvendo.
«China on Friday outlined its ambitions to extend President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative to the Arctic by developing shipping lanes opened up by global warming.
Releasing its first official Arctic policy white paper, China said it would encourage enterprises to build infrastructure and conduct commercial trial voyages, paving the way for Arctic shipping routes.
“China hopes to work with all parties to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ through developing the Arctic shipping routes,” said the paper, which is issued by the State Council Information Office.
Among its increasing interests in the region is its major stake in Russia’s Yamal liquefied natural gas project which is expected to supply China with four million tonnes of LNG a year, according to the state-run China Daily»
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Ricapitoliamo.
La Groenlandia è ricca di giacimenti minerari ed i suoi mari sono pescosi.
Nel 1985 aveva abbandonato l’allora Cee essendo questa ultima esosa: la trattava da paria.
Danimarca ed Unione Europea versano alla Groenlandia cifre da fame in cambio di permessi e concessioni, senza prendersi l’incomodo di aiutarla a dotarsi di infrastrutture.
Lo spazio lasciato libero da un’Unione Europea intenta a scrutare i sexual harassment, quegli ungheresi riottosi a rinunciare alle proprie tradizioni nazionali ed ai polacchi tetragoni a negare ogni abiura, bene, questa dirigenza dell’Unione Europea ha spinto la Groenlandia in braccio alla Cina.
Mr Xi non ci ha pensato su due volte, e con abile mossa ha inglobato la Groenlandia nel Progetto ‘Polar Silk Road’.
I pescherecci dell’Unione saranno trasformati in enormi stampanti 3D che sforneranno pesce di polipropilene isotattico: non è commestibile ma anche l’occhio reclama la sua parte. Per non parlare poi di tutte le risorse minerarie: come se l’Unione Europea ne avesse troppe.
«China sees the expanding global markets for natural gas and minerals as solid reasons to invest heavily in exploration, development and infrastructure from Canada to Greenland to Russia, a panel of Arctic experts said Friday.
Mark Rosen, co-author of a recent CNA report on the challenges this investment poses for international security, advised observers to “follow the money” in evaluating at China’s ambitions in the North. .
China’s investment in Greenland’s economy is 12 percent of its gross domestic product and about six percent of Iceland’s, he said. “Money is power,” and China is dispensing funds for influence around the globe. In recent years, China has invested $90 billion in a host of projects above 60 degrees north with likely more to follow, if oil prices rise.
Hong Nong, executive director and senior fellow at the Institute for China-America Studies, said China’s new white paper on the Arctic is seen by many observers as Beijing’s quest for “a polar or ice silk road,” similar to “One Belt/One Road” strategy of expansion westward into Europe, Africa and Latin America. ….
Not only is China investing there in mining for rare minerals; but Greenland is an autonomous, constituent country within the Kingdom of Denmark, a NATO ally with an American air base at Thule. “It may be the first nation born from climate change” as more of its glacier ice melts and its population grows beyond the 60,000 residents there now»
The coalition that is formed could affect the rate of mining investment and autonomy from Denmark.
*
Greenland Prime Minister Kim Kielsen’s Siumut party won the most votes in a parliamentary election, results showed on Wednesday, though it lost ground to centrist rivals.
Dog sleds had to ferry voting papers to polling stations across the sparely populated country for Tuesday’s vote. Surveys suggested that the 40,769 eligible voters were most interested in improving poor infrastructure and boosting an economy that depends on fishing and annual grants from Denmark.
The social-democratic Siumut party won 27 per cent of votes, down from 34 per cent four years ago. That sets the stage for coalition talks with either the left-wing Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) party or Demokraterne, which emerged as the third biggest party with 20 per cent, taking votes from both Siumut and IA.
Greenland, a part of the Kingdom of Denmark but with self-rule since 2009, relies on fishing and annual grants from Denmark.
Investors from China to Canada were said to be watching Greenland’s election for signs of the political will to get a flagging mining programme on the island back on track.
Greenland is hoping rising commodity prices can help attract foreign investment and get its fragile economy up to speed to realize the goal of independence.
Hype about a possible mining boom in Greenland after it achieved self-rule from Denmark in 2009 faded in a morass of red tape and a commodity price slump around five years ago. It left the economy reliant on fishing and grants from Denmark.
But with the country’s sole producing mine starting up last year — a ruby pink sapphire mine operated by Norway’s LNS Group — and Canada’s Hudson Resource’s anorthosite project due to begin operations this year, locals are again hoping more investments will follow.
Improved access to and from the Arctic island as the ice melts, and a more favourable investment climate, would go some way to alleviate the barriers to business of perpetual winter darkness and temperatures reaching as low as minus 50 Celsius.
Chinese interest in Greenland comes after Beijing laid out its ambitions to form a “Polar Silk Road” by developing shipping lanes opened up by global warming and encouraging enterprises to build infrastructure in the Arctic.
“A new government led by Kielsen and Siumut but without IA will create more openness towards attracting investments, including from China,” said Rasmus Leander Nielsen, assistant professor at the University of Greenland in Nuuk.
“IA is more skeptical. They want mining activity, but have more emphasis on the environment,” Nielsen said.
«Last year, nearly 50 percent of U.S. steel and aluminum imports in 2017 came from the EU, Canada and Mexico.»
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«Trump first announced tariffs of 25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum for national security reasons in March.»
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«Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross on Thursday said President Trump has decided to end the temporary exemptions for the three key trading allies despite their two months of lobbying to avoid the tariffs.»
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«We look forward to continued negotiations with Canada and Mexico on one hand and with the European Commission on the other hand as there are other issues we need to get resolved»
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«The EU is expected to quickly retaliate with promised tariffs of about $3.3 billion on iconic American products such as bourbon, jeans and motorcycles.»
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«the United States has levied the tariffs doesn’t mean that negotiations with the countries are halted even if they retaliate»
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Non ci si può sedere ad un tavolo di trattative e menare il can per l’aia cercando di raggirare la controparte.
Le dichiarazioni di Mr Juncker suonano di patetica impotenza. Forse potrà innalzare i dazi europei già in essere sui superalcolici americani, ma senza bourbon si può vivere lo stesso, mentre senza acciaio ed alluminio si ferma l’intero comparto produttivo. Per non parlare poi dell’indotto.
«Dazi e nuove minacce piovono sull’Europa. Gli Stati Uniti hanno deciso di applicare le tariffe su acciaio (25%) e alluminio (10%) a carico dell’import dalla Ue: entreranno in vigore dalla mezzanotte. La scure cade anche su Canada e Messico, nonostante le trattative in corso con Washington sulla riforma del Nafta, l’area di libero scambio del Nordamerica. Immediata la risposta della Ue: «Questo è un giorno molto brutto per il commercio mondiale. Faremo immediatamente ricorso alla Wto e annunceremo misure compensative nelle prossime ore» …. È del tutto inaccettabile che un Paese imponga misure unilaterali»
Ancor più patetica la dichiarazione della Commissaria al Commercio, Cecilia Malmström: «Gli Usa hanno cercato di usare la minaccia dei dazi per ottenere concessioni dalla Ue. Non è questo il modo in cui noi facciamo affari. Faremo tutto il necessario per protegge il mercato Ue dalle distorsioni commerciali causate dalle restrizioni Usa».
Il problema di questa Unione Europea non è che
«Non è questo il modo in cui noi facciamo affari»
Il problema è che di affari l’Unione Europea non ne fa più. Questa eurodirigenza è inetta. Ed il recente caso dell’Arabia Saudita dovrebbe ben dare da pensare.
The Trump administration will levy hefty steel and aluminum tariffs on the European Union, Canada and Mexico starting on Friday, a move likely to lead to retaliation and risk the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross on Thursday said President Trump has decided to end the temporary exemptions for the three key trading allies despite their two months of lobbying to avoid the tariffs.
“We look forward to continued negotiations with Canada and Mexico on one hand and with the European Commission on the other hand as there are other issues we need to get resolved,” Ross told reporters on a conference call.
Ross said the White House would need to see the reactions of Canada, Mexico and the 28-nation European bloc before determining what to do next.
But he said that U.S. officials are “quite willing and eager” to have further discussions with all of the parties.
The trading partners have all warned the U.S. that they will impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports if the U.S. goes through with the steel and aluminum tariffs.
The EU is expected to quickly retaliate with promised tariffs of about $3.3 billion on iconic American products such as bourbon, jeans and motorcycles.
Last year, nearly 50 percent of U.S. steel and aluminum imports in 2017 came from the EU, Canada and Mexico.
Trump first announced tariffs of 25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum for national security reasons in March.
Canada and Mexico have said tariffs are unacceptable, don’t affect U.S. national security and that their implementation could put the fate of NAFTA at stake.
The tariffs on aluminum and steel are just one plank in an aggressive effort by Trump to reshape the nation’s trade policies that has rattled allies, markets and U.S. businesses.
Trump has also threatened to impose tariffs on imported automobiles and is battling with China on a range of proposed restrictions.
The decisions have prompted a pushback from Republicans in Congress, who are worried retaliation from trading partners could hurt farmers in particular.
Ross repeated remarks he made on Wednesday in Paris during a meeting of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development that just because the United States has levied the tariffs doesn’t mean that negotiations with the countries are halted even if they retaliate.
“If any of these parties retaliate that does not mean that there can’t be continuing negotiations,” Ross told reporters.
“Take the example of China: The tariffs that we’ve imposed went into effect on China on the 23rd of March and, as you’re well aware, we have continued to have trade negotiations with China,” he said.
“So, the fact that we took the tariff action doesn’t mean that there cannot be negotiation,” he said.
The U.S. had delayed imposing the tariffs on Canada and Mexico pending talks on NAFTA and related national security issues, Ross said.
“Those talks are taking longer than we’d hoped. There is no longer a precise date when they may be concluded, so they were added into list of those who will bear tariffs,” he said.
Discussions with the EU made some progress but didn’t get to the point where it was warranted to give the bloc a continued temporary exemption or a permanent exemption, Ross said.
South Korea had previously reached a deal with the Trump administration for an exemption. Argentina, Brazil and Australia have reached agreements that will exempt them from the tariffs for now.
Ross said that Trump can “do anything he wishes at any point subsequent from today” on whether to impose tariffs and quotes.
“There is potential flexibility going forward,” Ross said.
The Section 232 law, which is rarely used, allows tariffs to be placed on imports in the name of national security. Trump is considering the same law to employ tariffs on automobiles.
On January 19, 2018, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) transmitted to me a report on his investigation into the effect of imports of aluminum articles on the national security of the United States under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862).
In Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), I concurred in the Secretary’s finding that aluminum articles are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States, and decided to adjust the imports of aluminum articles, as defined in clause 1 of Proclamation 9704, as amended (aluminum articles), by imposing a 10 percent ad valorem tariff on such articles imported from most countries, beginning March 23, 2018. I further stated that any country with which we have a security relationship is welcome to discuss with the United States alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused by imports from that country, and noted that, should the United States and any such country arrive at a satisfactory alternative means to address the threat to the national security such that I determine that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, I may remove or modify the restriction on aluminum articles imports from that country and, if necessary, adjust the tariff as it applies to other countries, as the national security interests of the United States require.
In Proclamation 9710 of March 22, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), I noted the continuing discussions with the Argentine Republic (Argentina), the Commonwealth of Australia (Australia), the Federative Republic of Brazil (Brazil), Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the European Union (EU) on behalf of its member countries, on satisfactory alternative means to address the threatened impairment to the national security posed by imports of aluminum articles from those countries. Recognizing that each of these countries and the EU has an important security relationship with the United States, I determined that the necessary and appropriate means to address the threat to national security posed by imports of aluminum articles from these countries was to continue the ongoing discussions and to exempt aluminum articles imports from these countries from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9704, as amended, until May 1, 2018.
In Proclamation 9739 of April 30, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), I noted that the United States had agreed in principle with Argentina, Australia, and Brazil on satisfactory alternative means to address the threatened impairment to our national security posed by aluminum articles imports from these countries and extended the temporary exemption of these countries from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9704, as amended, in order to finalize the details.
The United States has agreed on a range of measures with Argentina and Australia, including measures to reduce excess aluminum production and excess aluminum capacity, measures that will contribute to increased capacity utilization in the United States, and measures to prevent the transshipment of aluminum articles and avoid import surges. In my judgment, these measures will provide effective, long-term alternative means to address these countries’ contribution to the threatened impairment to our national security by restraining aluminum articles exports to the United States from each of them, limiting transshipment and surges, and discouraging excess aluminum capacity and excess aluminum production. In light of these agreements, I have determined that aluminum articles imports from these countries will no longer threaten to impair the national security and thus have decided to exclude these countries from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9704, as amended. The United States will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the measures agreed upon with these countries to address our national security needs, and I may revisit this determination, as appropriate.
In light of my determination to exclude, on a long‑term basis, these countries from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9704, as amended, I have considered whether it is necessary and appropriate in light of our national security interests to make any corresponding adjustments to such tariff as it applies to other countries. I have determined that, in light of the agreed-upon measures with these countries, and the fact that the tariff will now apply to imports of aluminum articles from additional countries, it is necessary and appropriate, at this time, to maintain the current tariff level as it applies to other countries.
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, authorizes the President to adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives that are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.
Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), authorizes the President to embody in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) the substance of statutes affecting import treatment, and actions thereunder, including the removal, modification, continuance, or imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction.
Now, Therefore, I, Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, do hereby proclaim as follows:
(1) Clause 2 of Proclamation 9704, as amended, is further amended by striking the last two sentences and inserting in lieu thereof the following two sentences: “Except as otherwise provided in this proclamation, or in notices published pursuant to clause 3 of this proclamation, all aluminum articles imports specified in the Annex shall be subject to an additional 10 percent ad valorem rate of duty with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, as follows: (a) on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on March 23, 2018, from all countries except Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, South Korea, and the member countries of the European Union, (b) on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on May 1, 2018, from all countries except Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the member countries of the European Union, and (c) on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 1, 2018, from all countries except Argentina and Australia. This rate of duty, which is in addition to any other duties, fees, exactions, and charges applicable to such imported aluminum articles, shall apply to imports of aluminum articles from each country as specified in the preceding sentence.”.
(2) In order to implement a quota treatment on aluminum articles imports from Argentina, U.S. note 19 to subchapter III of chapter 99 of the HTSUS is amended as provided for in Part A of the Annex to this proclamation. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security shall implement this quota as soon as practicable, taking into account all aluminum articles imports from this country since January 1, 2018.
(3) The “Article description” for heading 9903.85.01 of the HTSUS is amended by deleting “of Brazil, of Canada, of Mexico, or of the member countries of the European Union”.
(4) For the purposes of administering the quantitative limitations applicable to subheadings 9903.85.05 through 9903.85.06 for Argentina, the annual aggregate limits set out in Part B of the Annex to this proclamation shall apply for the period starting with calendar year 2018 and for subsequent years, unless modified or terminated. The quantitative limitations applicable to subheadings 9903.85.05 through 9903.85.06 for Argentina, which for calendar year 2018 shall take into account all aluminum articles imports from Argentina since January 1, 2018, shall be effective for aluminum articles entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after June 1, 2018, and shall be implemented by CBP as soon as practicable, consistent with the superior text to subheadings 9903.85.05 through 9903.85.06. The Secretary of Commerce shall monitor the implementation of the quantitative limitations applicable to subheadings 9903.85.05 through 9903.85.06 and shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the United States Trade Representative, and such other senior Executive Branch officials as the Secretary deems appropriate, inform the President of any circumstance that in the Secretary’s opinion might indicate that an adjustment of the quantitative limitations is necessary.
(5) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with CBP and with other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall revise the HTSUS so that it conforms to the amendments and effective dates directed in this proclamation. The Secretary shall publish any such modification to the HTSUS in the Federal Register.
(6) Clause 5 of Proclamation 9710, as amended, is amended by striking the phrase “as amended by Proclamation 9710,” in the first and second sentences and inserting in lieu thereof the following phrase: “as amended, or to the quantitative limitations established by proclamation,”. Clause 5 of Proclamation 9710, as amended, is further amended by inserting the phrase “or quantitative limitations” after the words “ad valorem rates of duty” in the first and second sentences.
(7) Clause 4 of Proclamation 9739 is amended by striking the phrase “as amended by clause 1 of this proclamation,” and inserting in lieu thereof the following phrase: “as amended, or to the quantitative limitations established by proclamation,” in the first sentence. Clause 4 of Proclamation 9739 is further amended by striking the words “by clause 3 of this proclamation” from the second sentence.
(8) Any provision of previous proclamations and Executive Orders that is inconsistent with the actions taken in this proclamation is superseded to the extent of such inconsistency.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
thirty-first day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand eighteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-second.
On January 11, 2018, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) transmitted to me a report on his investigation into the effect of imports of steel mill articles on the national security of the United States under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862).
In Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States), I concurred in the Secretary’s finding that steel mill articles are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States, and decided to adjust the imports of steel mill articles, as defined in clause 1 of Proclamation 9705, as amended (steel articles), by imposing a 25 percent ad valorem tariff on such articles imported from most countries, beginning March 23, 2018. I further stated that any country with which we have a security relationship is welcome to discuss with the United States alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused by imports from that country, and noted that, should the United States and any such country arrive at a satisfactory alternative means to address the threat to the national security such that I determine that imports from that country no longer threaten to impair the national security, I may remove or modify the restriction on steel articles imports from that country and, if necessary, adjust the tariff as it applies to other countries, as the national security interests of the United States require.
In Proclamation 9711 of March 22, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States), I noted the continuing discussions with the Argentine Republic (Argentina), the Commonwealth of Australia (Australia), the Federative Republic of Brazil (Brazil), Canada, Mexico, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the European Union (EU) on behalf of its member countries, on satisfactory alternative means to address the threatened impairment to the national security posed by imports of steel articles from those countries. Recognizing that each of these countries and the EU has an important security relationship with the United States, I determined that the necessary and appropriate means to address the threat to national security posed by imports of steel articles from these countries was to continue the ongoing discussions and to exempt steel articles imports from these countries from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9705, as amended, until May 1, 2018.
In Proclamation 9740 of April 30, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States), I noted that the United States had agreed in principle with Argentina, Australia, and Brazil on satisfactory alternative means to address the threatened impairment to our national security posed by steel articles imports from these countries and extended the temporary exemption of these countries from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9705, as amended, in order to finalize the details.
The United States has agreed on a range of measures with these countries, including measures to reduce excess steel production and excess steel capacity, measures that will contribute to increased capacity utilization in the United States, and measures to prevent the transshipment of steel articles and avoid import surges. In my judgment, these measures will provide effective, long-term alternative means to address these countries’ contribution to the threatened impairment to our national security by restraining steel articles exports to the United States from each of them, limiting transshipment and surges, and discouraging excess steel capacity and excess steel production. In light of these agreements, I have determined that steel articles imports from these countries will no longer threaten to impair the national security and thus have decided to exclude these countries from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9705, as amended. The United States will monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the measures agreed upon with these countries to address our national security needs, and I may revisit this determination, as appropriate.
In light of my determination to exclude, on a long‑term basis, these countries from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9705, as amended, I have considered whether it is necessary and appropriate in light of our national security interests to make any corresponding adjustments to such tariff as it applies to other countries. I have determined that, in light of the agreed-upon measures with these countries, and the fact that the tariff will now apply to imports of steel articles from additional countries, it is necessary and appropriate, at this time, to maintain the current tariff level as it applies to other countries.
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, authorizes the President to adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives that are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.
Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), authorizes the President to embody in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) the substance of statutes affecting import treatment, and actions thereunder, including the removal, modification, continuance, or imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction.
Now, Therefore, I, Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, do hereby proclaim as follows:
(1) The superior text to subheadings 9903.80.05 through 9903.80.58 of the HTSUS is amended by replacing “South Korea” with “Argentina, of Brazil, or of South Korea”.
(2) For the purposes of administering the quantitative limitations applicable to subheadings 9903.80.05 through 9903.80.58 for Argentina and Brazil, the annual aggregate limits for each country set out in the Annex to this proclamation shall apply for the period starting with calendar year 2018 and for subsequent years, unless modified or terminated. The quantitative limitations applicable to subheadings 9903.80.05 through 9903.80.58 for these countries, which for calendar year 2018 shall take into account all steel articles imports from each respective country since January 1, 2018, shall be effective for steel articles entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after June 1, 2018, and shall be implemented by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security as soon as practicable, consistent with the superior text to subheadings 9903.80.05 through 9903.80.58. The Secretary of Commerce shall monitor the implementation of the quantitative limitations applicable to subheadings 9903.80.05 through 9903.80.58 and shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the United States Trade Representative, and such other senior Executive Branch officials as the Secretary deems appropriate, inform the President of any circumstance that in the Secretary’s opinion might indicate that an adjustment of the quantitative limitations is necessary.
(3) The text of subdivision (e) of U.S. note 16 to subchapter III of chapter 99 of the HTSUS is amended by striking the last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following sentence: “Beginning on July 1, 2018, imports from any such country in an aggregate quantity under any such subheading during any of the periods January through March, April through June, July through September, or October through December in any year that is in excess of 500,000 kg and 30 percent of the total aggregate quantity provided for a calendar year for such country, as set forth on the Internet site of CBP, shall not be allowed.”.
(4) The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with CBP and with other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall revise the HTSUS so that it conforms to the amendments and effective dates directed in this proclamation. The Secretary shall publish any such modification to the HTSUS in the Federal Register.
(5) Clause 5 of Proclamation 9711, as amended, is amended by striking the phrase “as amended by Proclamation 9711,” in the first and second sentences and inserting in lieu thereof the following phrase: “as amended, or to the quantitative limitations established by proclamation,”. Clause 5 of Proclamation 9711, as amended, is further amended by inserting the phrase “or quantitative limitations” after the words “ad valorem rates of duty” in the first and second sentences.
(6) Clause 5 of Proclamation 9740 is amended by striking the phrase “as amended by clause 1 of this proclamation,” and inserting in lieu thereof the following phrase: “as amended, or to the quantitative limitations established by proclamation,” in the first sentence. Clause 5 of Proclamation 9740 is further amended by striking the words “by clause 4 of this proclamation” from the second sentence.
(7) Any provision of previous proclamations and Executive Orders that is inconsistent with the actions taken in this proclamation is superseded to the extent of such inconsistency.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this thirty-first day of May, in the year of our Lord two thousand eighteen, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-second.
«Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries is a Chinese institution under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. The institution deals with communication and coordination of cooperation work between China and Central and Eastern European countries, the preparatory meeting of leaders, preparation for economic and trade forum, and the implementation of those outcomes. The Secretary-General, Executive Secretary-General, and Deputy Secretary-General of Secretariat are respectively assumed by Liu Haixing, the Assistant Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chen Xu, the Director-General of the Department of European Affairs, and Wang Wengang, the Counselor of the Department of European Affairs. The Secretariat consists of 24 member units, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Department of the Central Committee of CPC, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, the National Health and Family Planning Commission, the People’s Bank, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, the National Tourism Administration, the National Railway Administration, the Civil Aviation Administration, the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, the Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, the Industrial and Commercial Bank, the Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, and the China Railway Corporation. The Secretariat office is located in the Department of European Affairs of China’s Foreign Ministry to handle daily affairs.
National coordinators are appointed by the Central and Eastern European countries to be responsible for coordination with the Secretariat and to jointly promote the China and Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation»
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«The 16+1 format is an initiative by the People’s Republic of China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU Member States and 5 Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia) in the fields of investments, transport, finance, science, education, and culture. In the framework of the initiative, China has defined three potential priority areas for economic cooperation: infrastructure, high technologies, and green technologies.»
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La politica cinese nei confronti dei paesi europei è estremamente cauta, ma non per questo inefficace. È una politica strategica, ossia articolata sull’arco dei decenni, volta a metabolizzare nel sistema politico ed economico cinese le attuali realtà dell’est europeo e dei Balcani. Paesi al momento con sistemi economici ancora bisognosi di ampio sostegno, che si sono rivolti alla Cina per cercare di ottenere ciò che l’attuale Dirigenza dell’Unione Europea ha loro pervicacemente negato: trattamento paritetico senza imposizione alcuna, rispetto delle tradizioni nazionali, cooperazione nella generazione di infrastrutture degne di quel nome, avere una controparte strategica, degna di fede, nella politica e nei commerci.
Forbes aveva riassunto in modo chiaro il punto vi vista occidentale, liberal in materia. Le critiche che esso avanza al “16 + 1” sono esattamente le caratteristiche che le nazioni dell’est europeo e dei Balcani vedono con grande favore.
Hungary’s controversial Prime Minister Viktor Orban seems to enjoy baiting western world opinion whenever he gets the chance. He’s been known to cozy up to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and he is perhaps the only remaining supporter of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the European Union. His long-running battle with Hungarian-American billionaire philanthropist George Soros is legendary.
This week he’s poking western Europe in the eye by hosting China’s Premier Li Keqiang for the sixth annual meeting of the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, or “16+1.” The 16+1 grouping links China with 16 central and eastern European (CEE) countries, 11 of them members of the EU. Orban is courting Chinese investment for a series of prestige projects, including a vague plan for cooperation in the healthcare industry and the troubled Budapest-Belgrade high speed rail upgrade.
Off the rails?
The Budapest-Belgrade railway project was launched with much fanfare the last time 16+1 was in Belgrade, in 2014. It was supposed to be finished in time for this year’s 16+1 meeting. So far it has gone precisely nowhere.
The Hungarian half of this high speed railway to nowhere is under investigation for breaking EU tendering rules. The Serbian half is apparently going forward, though where it will go without a connection on the Hungarian side is anyone’s guess.
Despite the fact that the current railway journey takes eight hours, there are only two flights a week connecting Belgrade and Budapest, and they’re run by Belavia, the Belarussian state airline. Google Maps makes it out to be a four-hour drive.
Other 16+1 hopes for big injections of Chinese money have also been slow to bear fruit. Earlier this year there was a lot of talk about China financing a new airport for Poland’s capital Warsaw, but nothing has come of it yet. Meanwhile China has reportedly set up a 10 billion Euro fund to finance CEE infrastructure projects, but in the year since the announcement was made, none of it seems to have been spent.
China’s outbound foreign direct investment in CEE remains modest and is concentrated in just a few countries. The headline list of projects completed to date seems to consist of a bridge in Serbia and two roads in Macedonia — and little else. Chinese firms have invested heavily in port infrastructure in Greece, but CEE dreams that China would use its Greek ports as gateways for the economic development of the Balkans have so far failed to materialize.
The 16+1 meetings may give CEE leaders like Orban a welcome opportunity to talk big with China, but it seems increasingly unlikely to deliver them any tangible benefits. The most 16+1 can offer CEE is perhaps a little better visibility among Chinese investors, for whom countries like Slovakia (population 5.4 million) and Slovenia (2 million) are equally obscure minor markets.
Western pundits routinely wring their hands over the possibility that CEE may sell out to China. Orban seems more likely to sell out to Russia, if he sells out at all. China still hasn’t committed the resources needed to have any serious political impact in CEE. China has put on a load of conferences, issued press releases, and subsidized yet more talking shops in the region, but it will have to spend a lot more if it wants to buy any real influence.»
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Il maggiore risultato ottenuto dai cinesi con il progetto “16 + 1 ” è quello di essere riusciti a renderlo indecifrabile da parte di quanti siano incardinati nell’ideologia liberal e socialista. Costoro ragionano esclusivamente nell’ottica di un ritorno economico immediato o, al massimo, nel brevissimo termine, mentre i cinesi ragionano in ottica strategica pluridecennale.
Di conseguenza i cinesi collocano qua e là, secondo opportunità, tasselli del loro puzzle, facendo anche bene attenzione che non sia facile comprendere quale sarà la composizione finale.
Una cosa parrebbe però certa.
I cinesi non hanno certo investito in una alta velocità tra Budapest e Belgrado per lasciare una cattedrale nel deserto.
Di questi giorni infatti assistiamo a meeting tra cinesi e serbi.
China and Serbia should step up pragmatic cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative and through the “16+1” cooperation mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, officials from both sides have agreed.
Cao Jianming, vice-chairperson of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, during his visit in Serbia on May 14-16, met with Speaker of National Assembly of Serbia Maja Gojkovic, Prime Minister of Serbia Ana Brnabic, and Serbia’s Republic Public Prosecutor Zagorka Dolovac.
During the meetings, Cao noted that recent years have seen a high-level development of China-Serbia ties, marked by frequent exchange of high-level visits, solid political mutual trust and fruitful achievements in various areas of cooperation between both countries.
Cao expressed hope that the two sides, within the framework of Belt and Road Initiative and the China-CEE cooperation mechanism, would further align their development strategies, expand pragmatic cooperation and step up exchanges of both countries’ legislative bodies, so as to further promote the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.
The Serbian side expressed willingness to actively participate in the Belt and Road construction and the “16+1” cooperation and to boost mutually beneficial cooperation in all fields. The Serbian parliament is also ready to deepen exchanges and cooperation with China’s National People’s Congress with an aim to promote bilateral ties.
«Xinhua News Agency or New China News Agency is the official press agency of the People’s Republic of China. Xinhua is the biggest and most influential media organization in China, as well as the largest news agency in the world in terms of correspondents worldwide. Xinhua is a ministry-level institution subordinate to the Chinese central government, and is the highest ranking state media organ in the country alongside the People’s Daily. Its president is a member of the Central Committee of China’s Communist Party.» [Fonte]
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«China will cut import tariffs on vehicles and auto parts starting July 1, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) announced Tuesday.»
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«For car imports, the 25-percent tariff levied on 135 items and the 20-percent duty on four items will both be slashed to 15 percent, down 40 percent and 25 percent respectively»
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«For car imports, the 25-percent tariff levied on 135 items and the 20-percent duty on four items will both be slashed to 15 percent, down 40 percent and 25 percent respectively»
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«Import tariffs for 79 items of auto parts will be reduced to 6 percent from the current levels of 8 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent, down 46 percent on average.»
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«After the move, the average tariff rate on vehicles will stand at 13.8 percent, while that on auto parts will be 6 percent. The adjusted rates will be “in line with the reality of the country’s auto industry,” the ministry said.»
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«Un trasporto diffuso maggiormente su rotaia, visto che alla fine del 2009 la rete ferroviaria cinese aveva una lunghezza di 86.000 km, consentendo di guadagnare il secondo posto al mondo per estensione. Inoltre la rete ferroviaria per passeggeri, si è ulteriormente allungata di 2.319 km, il più alto incremento al mondo. A questo si aggiunge l’entrata in servizio dei treni ad alta velocità (circa 395 km/h), che hanno largamente contribuito ad aumentare l’efficienza dei trasporti ferroviari. Ad oggi è stata ultimata anche la linea ad alta velocità, che consente di unire i 1.320 chilometri che separano le due più importanti città della Cina, Pechino e Shanghai. Il treno corre a una velocità di 350 chilometri all’ora, per coprire la distanza tra le due metropoli in appena cinque ore.» [Fonte]
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«Ad oggi in Cina vi sono 43 costruttori cinesi (24 pubblici e 19 privati), e circa 10 joint venture con marchi quali Volkswagen, BMW, Toyota, GM, Kia, Mitsubishi. Oltre a questi marchi, sono presenti tutti i maggiori costruttori mondiali»
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«Un’auto media cinese (paragonabile a Fiat Punto) costa sui 50.000 RMB (circa 5.000 euro). Una media di produzione giapponese oppure occidentale, costa tra i 50.000 e 100.000 RMB. Una piccola cinese (paragonabile a VW Polo) costa circa 30.000 RMB»
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«Il parco circolante mondiale attualmente è di circa un miliardo e duecento milioni di auto, considerando che la popolazione mondiale ammonta a circa 7,477,220 persone»
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«Cina, India, Brasile, Russia e Messico hanno visto una rapida motorizzazione: la Cina è passata da 21 milioni di autovetture nel 2005 a 136 nel 2015, l’India da 8 a 22 milioni e il Brasile da 19 a 36 milioni, la Russia da 26 a 44 milioni e il Messico da 14 a 27 milioni di auto.» [FerPress]
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Con il nuovo piano decennale di emersione alla classe media la Cina si sta avviando verso una consistente crescita del mercato automobilistico interno. Grosso modo si potrebbe stimare che nel giro di dieci anni potrebbero essere circolanti in Cina oltre seicento milioni di autovetture.
Questo significa una produzione automobilistica di circa cinquanta milioni di auto ogni anno: è un mercato da capogiro, ma data la popolosità e l’estensione, tutto in Cina è grandioso.
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Alla luce di quanto detto il problema risulta essere semplice nella formulazione e nella sua soluzione.
Fino a due anni or sono gli Stati Uniti imponevano alle merci estere dazi minimali, mentre la Cina aveva innalzato delle barriere doganali consistenti, anche se non a livello di quelle dell’Unione Europea.
Costava ben poco esportare automobili negli Stati Uniti, mentre questi erano penalizzati nel controflusso.
Con il gennaio 2017 Mr Trump è stato intronizzato Presidente degli Stati Uniti, e le cose sono cambiate, tra pianti e lacrime dell’Unione Europea e sorpresa risentita della Cina.
Ma alla fine un accordo è stato trovato con i cinesi:
BEIJING, May 22 (Xinhua) — China will cut import tariffs on vehicles and auto parts starting July 1, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) announced Tuesday.
For car imports, the 25-percent tariff levied on 135 items and the 20-percent duty on four items will both be slashed to 15 percent, down 40 percent and 25 percent respectively.
Import tariffs for 79 items of auto parts will be reduced to 6 percent from the current levels of 8 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent, down 46 percent on average.
“China safeguards a multilateral trade system. Lowering auto import tariffs is a major step to expand reform and opening-up,” the MOF said.
After the move, the average tariff rate on vehicles will stand at 13.8 percent, while that on auto parts will be 6 percent. The adjusted rates will be “in line with the reality of the country’s auto industry,” the ministry said.
Cutting auto import tariffs to a significant degree will help the advance of supply-side structural reform, benefit the structural adjustment, transformation, and upgrading of the auto industry, and guide the improvement of quality and efficiency in auto products, according to the ministry.
It will also enrich domestic market supply and meet the diverse needs of the people to provide more plentiful and affordable consumer experiences, the ministry said.
La Cina ridurrà al 15% i dazi all’importazione sulle autovetture, dando così impulso ai produttori di auto di lusso come Bmw e l’unità Lexus di Toyota Motor Corp. Il Consiglio di Stato, il governo cinese, ha deciso di ridurre il prelievo dal 25% attuale, prelievo in vigore per più di un decennio.
La riduzione dei dazi all’importazione è stata decisa dopo la tregua tra Usa-Cina sui dazi per scongiurare una vera e propria guerra commerciale a tutto campo. La riduzione del prelievo potrebbe avvantaggiare non soltanto i produttori automobilistici statunitensi come Tesla e Ford, ma anche i produttori europei e asiatici, da Daimler a Toyota. Questa mossa, unita a altre iniziative come il riavvio di una revisione della domanda di Qualcomm Inc. per l’acquisizione di NXP Semiconductors NV, segna una posizione conciliante da parte cinese.
Nel dettaglio, saranno soprattutto le automobili di fascia alta a risentire degli effetti di una riduzione delle tariffe perché la loro produzione si è spostata in misura minore a livello locale. Tra queste, ad esempio, Lexus.
Calano anche i dazi sulla componentistica
Il ministero delle Finanze ha dato una descrizione più dettagliata dell’operazione in vigore dal primo luglio interessando sia le auto a combustibili fossili sia quelle a nuova alimentazione (Nev): i dazi dal 25% al 15% riguardano 125 modelli di veicoli; altre quattro tipologie di tariffe sul settore scenderanno dal 20% al 15%; su 79 parti e componenti di veicoli i dazi passeranno al 6% dall’attuale 8-25 per cento. La Cina ha importato 1,22 milioni di veicoli nel 2017, pari a circa il 4,2% delle vendite totali del primo mercato al mondo delle quattro ruote di circa 28,9 milioni di veicoli. Dei 51 miliardi di dollari di valore, circa 13,5 miliardi derivano dal Nord America includendo anche i modelli di case non americane come Bmw.
Gli Occidentali trovano una grande difficoltà a cercare di comprendere come la Cina si muova su ottiche strategiche, e tendono a risolvere ogni problematica in una mera questione economica, con l’aggravante che di norma considerano soltanto l’immediato. Nulla quindi da stupirsi se quando iniziano a capire i giochi siano stati fatti, e da un bel pezzo.
Anche se occorre mutare i termini, sembrerebbe che si stia ripetendo la situazione determinata dalle campagne italiane di Napoleone. Il Consiglio Aulico austriaco, una sorta di rudimentale stato maggiore, avocava a sé gli spostamenti a livello di reggimento pur essendo il teatro di guerra distante ottocento kilometri: i tempi di comunicazione erano smisuratamente lunghi. Non solo. Il Consiglio Aulico dava per scontato che le truppe si spostassero portandosi dietro lunghe colonne di carriaggi a supporto logistico, che garantissero munizionamento e viveri, oltre a generi di conforto: il risultato era una velocità di spostamenti di solo una decina di kilometri al dì. Al contrario, Napoleone si era organizzato in corpi d’armata che ricevevano solo direttive strategiche, lasciando al loro comandante tutte le iniziative locali. Poi, i francesi non si trascinavano dietro che pochissimi carriaggi, per lo più munizioni, e vivevano come le cavallette sulle risorse locali. Il risultato era che le truppe napoleoniche potevano spostarsi anche di cinquanta kilometri al giorno, ed all’occorrenza, anche ben di più. Celeberrima la concentrazione effettuata da Napoleone ad Austerlitz. Gli austriaci proprio non riuscivano a capire come potesse napoleone essere così fulmineo delle sue azioni. Reputavano impossibile la cosa.
Il problema è anche quello delle risorse, ma di ben maggiore interesse è la modalità di impiego.
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Nel caso cinese, gli occidentali non riescono a comprendere quanto i cinesi siano determinati a rimandare lo sviluppo del mercato interno, e quindi della relativa situazione socio – economica, a dopo che abbiano conquistato posizioni strategiche di dominio economico mondiale.
In altri termini, l’occidentale ideologizzato vede il welfare minimale cinese come una imposizione tirannica invece che come una situazione voluta e condivisa: prima si vince, quindi si festeggia.
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Il progetto Belt and Road è strategico, ossia guarda ai decenni.
Il suo primo pilastro è la constatazione che senza infrastrutture – acquedotti, fogne, centrali elettriche, strade e strade ferrate – è semplicemente impossibile impiantare attività produttive e commerciali.
Il suo secondo pilastro è la volontà di fare emergere nazioni con sistemi economici ancora a livello di miseria. Certo, prima che il Bangladesh possa disporre di un sistema economico decentemente funzionante passeranno uno o due decenni. Però, quando i paesi del sud est asiatico, e quelli africani, saranno diventati economie emerse, essi continueranno a gravitare nell’orbita cinese e l’Occidente si troverà strategicamente accerchiato, quasi senza più nessuna opportunità operativa.
Il suo terzo pilastro è la sinizzazione strisciante dell’economia occidentale. La Cina sta perseguendo una accurata strategia di acquisti di realtà produttive strategiche, da ultima la Edp portoghese. Diamo tempo al tempo: alla fine l’Europa sarà sinizzata.
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«It traveled a 9,800-kilometer-long journey for 15 days through Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Slovakia, and slowly pulled into Vienna South Freight Center»
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«China-Europe freight trains have made 1,000 trips in the first three months, up 75 percent compared with the same period last year»
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«According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, the total trade volume between the two countries reached a historic high of 8.39 billion US dollars in 2017, a year-on-year increase of 15.5 percent from 2016»
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«The train will travel 11,000 kilometers to the Belgian city of Antwerp, through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany, said Xu Fengyi, head of the Tangshan Customs. …. The train service will cut transport time from the usual 45 days by sea, to just 16 days»
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«The train carried 53 containers of goods valued at 23 million yuan ($3.6 million), including textile machinery produced in Shandong. It will travel about 7,300 kilometers for 13 days to arrive at its destination in Uzbekistan»
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«Since the first cargo train set off from Daqing city, Heilongjiang province, for Belgium last June, the new China-Europe train service tailor-made for Volvo’s Daqing factory has transported 10,936 China-made Volvo cars»
– I treni merci cinesi sono in grado di trasportare 53 container l’uno, coprendo seicento kilometri al giorno.
– I cinesi hanno esportato in Europa, solo con questi treni, undicimila automobili Volvo prodotte in Cina.
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Da ultimo, ma non certo per ultimo, si faccia la seguente constatazione.
I paesi del Visegrad e, più in generale, i paesi dell’ex est europeo stanno per essere collegati meglio con la Cina che con il resto dell’Unione Europea. Entro poco tempo il loro interscambio commerciale con la Cina sarà superiore a quello con il resto dell’Europa. Poi non ci si stupisca se in un futuro tendessero a gravitare più sulla Cina che sulla Unione Europa.
VIENNA – A new China-Europe freight train arrived in Vienna on Friday, which Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen described as a symbol of the cooperation between China and Austria.
The train — carrying 41 containers of goods valued at 1.5 million US dollars, including LED displays, tires and lamps — departed from Chengdu, capital of southwest China’s Sichuan Province on April 12.
It traveled a 9,800-kilometer-long journey for 15 days through Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Slovakia, and slowly pulled into Vienna South Freight Center. From the station, the goods will be transported to the destination.
“This is really a symbol of the cooperation between China and Austria,” Van der Bellen told Xinhua. “We really hope this train is the first step of closer cooperation between China and Austria.”
With the new train, Austria is included into the network of China-Europe freight train service under the Belt and Road Initiative.
China-Europe freight trains have made 1,000 trips in the first three months, up 75 percent compared with the same period last year, according to China Railway Corporation.
The cross-border rail network links 43 Chinese cities with 41 European cities in 13 countries. Chengdu has 16 routes to cities including Nuremberg, Milan and Prague.
The first direct freight train came after Austria’s largest delegation visited China from April 7 to 12, during which both sides enhanced bilateral ties, especially Belt and Road cooperation.
Chinese Ambassador to Austria Li Xiaosi told Xinhua that the Austrian President had paid a successful visit to China.
After the new China-Europe cargo train in Vienna, both nations would work closely to facilitate more cooperation under the Belt and Road initiative, said Li.
Austria will build a new station as a terminal for the Belt and Road in the middle of the Europe, according to a memorandum of cooperation signed by Austrian OBB Holding AG and Chengdu International Rail Port Investment & Development (Group) Co., Ltd.
According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, the total trade volume between the two countries reached a historic high of 8.39 billion US dollars in 2017, a year-on-year increase of 15.5 percent from 2016.
SHIJIAZHUANG – A freight train service has been launched from a port in North China’s Hebei province to Belgium, a further line for freight between China and Europe.
A train carrying 41 containers of local products, such as kaoline and yeast, departed around noon Thursday from Jingtang Port District in the city of Tangshan, marking the inauguration of the service.
The train will travel 11,000 kilometers to the Belgian city of Antwerp, through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany, said Xu Fengyi, head of the Tangshan Customs.
The train service will cut transport time from the usual 45 days by sea, to just 16 days.
Tangshan, 150 km from Beijing and sitting on the north of the Bohai Sea, has just develop 32 km of its 230-km coastline for commercial use, where two port districts — Jingtang and Caofeidian — are located. It handled 573 million tonnes of freight last year, according to the city government.
The new freight service offers a new way not only for the freight of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei to Europe, but also for that of Japan and the Republic of Korea to Europe via China, according to Xu.
JINAN – A new freight train left Jinan, capital of East China’s Shandong province, for Uzbekistan Friday morning.
The train carried 53 containers of goods valued at 23 million yuan ($3.6 million), including textile machinery produced in Shandong. It will travel about 7,300 kilometers for 13 days to arrive at its destination in Uzbekistan.
This is the first China-Asia freight train service launched in the city, which will bring new opportunities for Jinan’s development, said the local railway bureau.
The province has eight international freight train routes. A total of 70 China-Europe and China-Asia freight trains departed from the province in the first three months of this year.
Since the first cargo train set off from Daqing city, Heilongjiang province, for Belgium last June, the new China-Europe train service tailor-made for Volvo’s Daqing factory has transported 10,936 China-made Volvo cars.
A one-way trip takes 18 days via the 10,887 kilometers-long route, passing through Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany, saving 28 days compared to the traditional marine transport.
The train to Zeebrugge Port in Belgium also marked the first time that China has exported complete vehicles to Western Europe.
The return train will also transport goods, opening up a faster, safer and more convenient way between Europe and China.
BERLIN – For centuries, endless river steamers run on the Rhine river, making their whistles as the symbol of the prosperity of German city Duisburg.
Today the sirens of trains coming from thousands of miles away and the sound of whistles converge here. Like a cheerful symphony, new vitality is being brought to the city.
Duisburg, Germany’s biggest inland port and one of the important slots of China Railway Express (CRE), has witnessed fruitful results of the Belt and Road Initiative over the past few years and harvested its own urban economic growth.
Witness: From few to many
Amelie Erxleben, of DIT Duisburg Intermodal Terminal, showed us recently around the terminal, where containers labeled with “China Railway Express” were seen everywhere. Large equipment machines were busy loading and unloading.
“About one third of our business now is related to China,” Erxleben said, adding that “around 25 west- and eastbound CRE trains are expected here every week.”
DIT, one of the nine large freight yards, is also a main railway container distribution center in the region. Only four years ago, DIT only handled seven to eight CRE trains weekly.
The soaring business volume makes dit appear more crowded. Even the road in front of its gated is often congested.
In order to deal with new situation, management of the terminal has recently bought another 200,000 square meters of land, according to Erxleben.
Duisburg is on one end of the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe rail line which started operation in 2011 from the Chinese southwest city of Chongqing. In recent years, more and more trains operated by the CRE from Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Yiwu, Shenyang and other Chinese cities are arriving here.
Statistics showed that 78 Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe trains, a year-on-year increase of 66 percent, have been operated since this January. More than 1,000 trains are planned this year.
Participation: Unlimited opportunities
Chen Si, a native woman from China’s western province of Sichuan, is exploring the huge market brought by CRE trains, together with her husband Klaus Hellmann, member of the supervisory board of the German logistics company Hellmann.
The transport between Germany and China takes CRE trains approximately 14 days, much faster than by sea and much cheaper than by air. Therefore, it has certain comparative advantage, according to Chen.
“Last year, the total volume of our business by rail from Europe to China amounted to 160,000 tonnes, almost equaling the weight of the Cologne Cathedral,” said Matthias Magnor, chief operating officer of Rail and Road at Hellmann, during an interview with Xinhua.
CRE trains has made a great contribution to that volume. Meanwhile, the business is growing very fast, Magnor added.
Many industries have benefited from the Europe-China freight trains.
“For example the fashion industry, the sales would be very much affected by seasonal reasons. Before the operation of CRE trains, it would take around 40 to 50 days to transport. But now 14 to 15 days are needed, which will sufficiently ensure the sales,” Magnor said.
In fact, when Hellmann began its CRE train business five years ago, some German companies were not very optimistic.
“I managed to persuade them that it is a viable transport option,” Hellmann said.
Facts speak louder than words. CRE trains under the Belt and Road Initiative have become the “third pillar” for the transportation between Europe and Asia besides air and sea ways.
Win-win: New sail for old ship
In recent years, Duisburg has also faced the problem of traditional growth momentum decline and is in search for new growth engines. It is just like an old ship opening a new sail. With CRE trains, another gold time will be presented to Duisburg.
Johannes Pflug, responsible for China affairs in the Duisburg municipality, said that the volume of the Port of Duisburg grew by 30 percent in 2017, making itself the fastest growing port in Germany.
CRE trains play an important role and more than 6,000 jobs in the area of logistics for the city have been created, Pflug told Xinhua, adding “we are the beneficiary of CRE trains.”
In Pflug’s opinion, CRE trains connect the Europe and Asia more closely, achieving a win-win situation. Not only Chinese goods, but also Chinese capital and companies are attracted to Duisburg. More than 100 Chinese companies have so far settled in the region.
“A Chinese company is constructing a 18-story hotel; Chinese company Huawei is responsible for the lighting project of the city,” Pflug said.
As the Mayor of Duisburg Soeren Link said, CRE trains have brought unlimited opportunities to the city. They bring not only the development of local logistics, but also the improvement of supporting services.
The Belt and Road Initiative sees Duisburg usher in a second spring, according to a commentary of German newspaper Sueddeutsche.
The Rhine crosses Duisburg and enters the North Sea. The world economy is just like the sea that can not return to the lake. Protectionism can not create current prosperity in Duisburg either. The new movement on the Rhine is precisely the pulse of this great new era.
La tragedia attribuita all’abile penna del D’Annunzio, assunta al successo per il Coro delle Vergini, ben rappresenta l’Unione Europea e la sua Dirigenza.
Non riportiamo il testo perché potrebbe urtare la sensibilità di taluni, ma ciò nulla toglie che seguendo il link si potrebbe apprezzare un pezzo magistrale per arte letteraria e per psicologia umana. Il ritratto delle femmine è spettacolare.
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Gli Eurocrati starnazzano come galline sodomizzate per i dazi americani sulle merci europee.
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Ecco quindi un summary dei dazi praticati dall’Unione Europea.
Un esempio?
«chiunque lo voglia esportare in Italia deve pagare una “tassa” pari a addirittura il 44,7%».
Sono centinaia i prodotti bloccati alle frontiere. Al top tabacco (44,7%) e preparati di carne
E’ tempo di dazi. Dopo la minaccia del presidente degli Stati Uniti Donald Trump di applicarli su acciaio e alluminio per favorire le aziende americane del settore che sarebbero danneggiate dalla concorrenza di quelle europee ed asiatiche, la Ue ha promesso ritorsioni e contrattacchi sui prodotti americani, e quindi l’inizio di una guerra commerciale. Una guerra commerciale che è iniziata già da anni, dato che complessivamente i dazi americani contro, ad esempio, la Cina sono decine, come Truenumbers ha raccontato in questo articolo.
Quanti sono i dazi europei
Tuttavia i dazi non sono una cosa nuova, esistono da tempo, e anche l’Europa ne ha moltissimi: nel grafico sopra sono elencati tutti quelli in essere a oggi con indicato, il dazio medio per ogni settore. I dazi, infatti, possono essere applicati all’interno di un range minimo-massimo.
Come si vede tra tutti i dazi europei, quello più importante riguarda il tabacco e i prodotti correlati: chiunque lo voglia esportare in Italia deve pagare una “tassa” pari a addirittura il 44,7% che è una media tra un dazio minimo del 10% e uno massimo del 74,9%. Ma non è finita: ogni prodotto industriale è composto da decine di, chiamiamoli così, “sottoprodotti” ognuno dei quali può avere un dazio particolare e diverso. Nel grafico sopra sono, perciò, indicati solo i prodotti “madre”, non tutti quelli che da quel prodotto sono ricavati.
Nel grafico sotto è indicato un valore particolare ovvero: facendo 100 il prodotto industriale “madre”, per esempio il “tabacco”, e considerando che al suo interno vi sono decine di sottoprodotti, qual è la quota del prodotto “tabacco” generalmente inteso che non è colpita da alcun dazio? La risposta, appunto, è nel grafico sotto che mostra questo valore per tutti i prodotti colpiti dai dazi europei. Nel caso del tabacco, in particolare, la quota non colpita da alcuna “tassa” all’ingresso è pari allo 0%. Significa semplicemente che tutti i prodotti derivati dal tabacco pagano dazi quando entrano in Europa i quali, come detto, sono compresi tra un minimo del 10% a un massimo del 74,9%. Ecco qual è la situazione per tutti i settori.
E’ evidente che, sempre nel caso del tabacco, l’Europa cerca di proteggere una produzione importante in aree depresse della Ue, come la Bulgaria, il sud della Spagna, dell’Italia, la Grecia, usando anche il pretesto della protezione della salute da prodotti dannosi.
La tassa sulla carne
A grande distanza vengono i dazi europei su preparati a base di carne, pesci, crostacei, molluschi, con il 18% medio, che varia tra zero e 26% a seconda dei sotto-prodotti. Solo il 2,4% di questo settore è a dazio zero. Gli altri dazi europei più importanti, quelli riguardanti preparati a base di verdura, frutta, nocciole, ecc, sono al 17,5%, con una variazione tra zero e 33,6%. Poi vengono i prodotti di macinazione (Milling industry), che d’altronde sono legati sempre al mondo agricolo e che variano, nei loro sotto-prodotti, da un minimo del 7,7% a un massimo del 19,2%, con una media del 12,2%
Gli accordi di libero scambio
Da anni la Ue porta avanti una politica di protezione del settore primario, cioè l’agricoltura, che mette in pratica non solo attraverso i dazi, ma anche con sussidi ad agricoltori e pescatori e anche con quote massime di produzione come quelle per il latte, per evitare un calo eccessivo dei prezzi.
Naturalmente ci sono eccezioni. La Ue negli anni ha stretto numerosi accordi con Paesi o gruppi di Paesi con cui c’è o si intendeva stringere, anche un rapporto politico. E, in particolare, su buona parte dei sotto-settori del comparto agricolo si applicano i seguenti accordi particolari per cui i dazi crollano a zero. Nella tabella qui sotto sono indicati proprio i più importanti accordi commerciali stretti dalla Ue che hanno come contenuto i “dazi zero”.
In molti casi sono accordi con singoli Paesi o molto vicini geograficamente, come quelli dell’area del Mediterraneo, o dei Balcani e dell’ex Unione Sovietica, Kosovo, Moldova, Ucraina, oppure Israele, Marocco, Turchia, Tunisia.
La “Economic Partnership Agreements Cariforum “ riguarda i Paesi dei Caraibi, la “Economic Partnership Agreements” Kenya e Costa d’Avorio. La “Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme” una serie di Paesi in via di sviluppo che vanno dall’India all’Indonesia, a gran parte di quelli dell’Africa Subsahariana e per cui vi è comunque un dazio scontato, non a zero. “Least Developed Countries (LDC) duties” e “Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme Plus” invece raccolgono di fatto tutti i Paesi africani o asiatici molto poveri per cui effettivamente il dazio è zero.
Le eccezioni sui dazi
Chiaramente tutto lo scema è molto complesso. Per ogni sotto-prodotto ci sono formule diverse. Un Paese può avere zero dazi su un prodotto e un dazio su un altro. Quello che è certo è che non ci sono eccezioni ed esenzioni per i più grandi concorrenti, come Cina, Giappone, Corea del Sud, Stati Uniti perché la Ue ha adottato una politica commerciale che punta ad accordi con Paesi piccoli e più poveri di Africa, Asia, Sudamerica, dai quali importare prodotti poco costosi e in cui esportare i propri, considerando che si tratta di realtà in grande crescita economica e che avranno sempre più bisogno di beni tecnologicamente avanzati.
Lo stesso vale anche per altri tre settori in cui vi sono i dazi maggiori, ovvero i due del tessile (“apparel and clothing”), sia cucito o non cucito (knitted), e quello legato alle calzature (Footwear). Si applica l’11,7%, l’11,3% e l’11,1% rispettivamente. Con una variabilità più ridotta, tra il 7,7% e il 19,2%, o tra l’8% e 12% nel caso del tessile, e più ampia, tra il 3% e il 17% in quello delle scarpe e simili. E con nessun sotto-prodotto con esenzione, presente invece per i soliti partner di cui si è parlato.
La carta sta a zero
All’opposto, in fondo alla classifica, tra i beni per cui non sono presenti dazi europei (tariffa a zero), neanche per Cina o Usa (o sono bassissimi) ci sono quelli riguardanti la carta (paper) o i prodotti di stampa (Product of the printing industry), nonché quelli farmaceutici e acciaio e ferro (Iron and steel), ma anche le barche (ships, boats), armi e munizioni (armd and ammunition), che hanno solo il 2,2% di tariffa, e molti sotto-segmenti che sono a zero. Si tratta in questo caso di beni che l’Europa produce ed esporta in gran numero, di cui è leader mondiale in molti casi.
Probabilmente c’è un minor timore della concorrenza straniera e soprattutto c’è la volontà di non provocare reazioni avverse nei partner extra-europei innalzando dazi che sarebbero subito imitati altrove, provocandoci grande danno.
A proposito di guerra commerciale. Un tipo di conflitto così si combatte (per fortuna) nelle aule di giustizia. Truenumbers ha spiegato in questo articolo quanti procedimenti per pratiche commerciali scorrette gli Usa hanno istruito contro la Cina, e viceversa.
