Pubblicato in: Armamenti, Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica America Latina., Geopolitica Mondiale

Paraguay. Elezioni. Riconoscendo la Cina disconosce Formosa. Crolla l’assetto americano nel Pacifico.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2023-01-23.

Paraguay Britannica 001

Il crollo politico di Joe Biden e dei liberal democratici comporta che tutti i loro passati supporter siano rimasti senza padrino che possa difenderli.

Ma quando si sgretola una potenza politica ed economica mondiale gli effetti emergono ovunque  sulla terra, spesso con azioni e controreazioni poco intuitive.

Con le elezioni prossime venture di fine aprile si prospetta la vittoria di Efrain Alegre che porterà il Paraguay a stabilire relazioni con la Cina, disconoscendo Formosa. Se così fosse, sarebbe un ulteriore terribile colpo a Joe Biden ed ai liberal democratici americani.

Taiwan resterebbe isolata ed impossibile da essere difesa. La Cina è lì ed aspetta con proverbiale pazienza il momento opportuno.

Ma persa Formosa, l’Oceano Pacifico diventerebbe immediatamente un oceano cinese.

* * * * * * *

Paraguay. Sta per disconoscere Formosa e riconoscere la Cina.

Mercosur. Nega l’accesso ad uno Zelensky che lo impetra. Intanto la Siberia lo aspetta.

America Latina. Cina ha scacciato l’America e sta dominando quel continente.

Trattato EU – Mercosur. Esplode la rabbia del comparto agroalimentare europeo.

* * * * * * *

                         Le prossime elezioni del Paraguay, che si terranno a fine aprile, potrebbero vedere il Paese stabilire finalmente dei legami con la Cina. Taipei è prevedibilmente preoccupata. Il 9 gennaio, la presidente taiwanese Tsai Ing-wen ha accolto una delegazione del Congresso della Repubblica del Paraguay presso l’ufficio presidenziale di Taipei. Il suo obiettivo era semplice: ricordare ai politici in visita il valore del suo Paese come alleato. Tsai ha accolto la delegazione in un momento di incertezza nei rapporti bilaterali. Tra i 13 Paesi sovrani – 14, se si include il Vaticano – che continuano a mantenere relazioni con Taiwan, il Paraguay è quello di gran lunga più grande, e l’unica nazione del Sud America. I legami diplomatici tra i due Paesi sono stati stabiliti nel 1957.

                         Efrain Alegre, principale candidato presidenziale dell’opposizione e leader del Partito Radicale Liberale Autentico (PLRA), ha dichiarato che una vittoria della sua coalizione alle elezioni generali del 30 aprile porterà il Paraguay a stabilire relazioni con la Cina. Si prevede che la dichiarazione del due volte candidato alle presidenziali sarà apprezzata dalle influenti industrie di carne bovina e di soia del Paese, che da tempo cercano di rimuovere le barriere all’esportazione dei loro prodotti in Cina. Pechino rifiuta le relazioni con qualsiasi Paese che riconosca formalmente Taiwan, quindi il Paraguay non ha praticamente accesso alla seconda economia mondiale, con risultati prevedibili.

                         Molti Paesi latinoamericani che hanno recentemente cambiato riconoscimento – come Panama e la Repubblica Dominicana – hanno visto un conseguente afflusso di investimenti cinesi e altri capitali. Il Paraguay vedrebbe senza dubbio risultati simili, soprattutto in considerazione dell’approfondimento dei legami economici tra i suoi partner del Mercosur – Argentina, Brasile e Uruguay – e la Cina. Questa attrattiva economica contribuisce a spiegare i molteplici voti del Congresso che, secondo le linee di partito, hanno sollecitato l’apertura delle relazioni con la Cina.

                         Le relazioni tra Taiwan e il Paraguay sono state spesso salvaguardate dal dominio del Partito Colorado, che ha governato il Paese per tutti gli ultimi 77 anni, tranne cinque.

                         Da quando Tsai ha assunto l’incarico nel 2016, Pechino ha strappato otto degli ex alleati diplomatici di Taiwan, tra cui quattro Stati dell’America Latina e della regione caraibica.

* * * * * * *

«Paraguay’s upcoming election in late April could see the country establish ties with China at long last. Taipei is predictably worried. On January 9, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen welcomed a congressional delegation from the Republic of Paraguay to the presidential office in Taipei. Her objective was simple: to remind the visiting politicians of her country’s value as an ally. Tsai welcomed this delegation amid an uncertain time in bilateral ties. Among the 13 sovereign countries – 14, if you include the Vatican – that continue to maintain relations with Taiwan, Paraguay is the by far largest, and the only nation in South America. Diplomatic ties between the two countries were established in 1957.»

«Efrain Alegre, chief presidential candidate of the opposition and leader of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA), has stated that a victory by his coalition in Paraguay’s April 30 general election would lead to the country establishing relations with China. The declaration from the two-time presidential runner-up is widely expected to be popular with the country’s influential beef and soy industries, which have long sought to remove barriers to exporting their products to China. Beijing refuses relations with any country that formally recognizes Taiwan, so Paraguay has virtually no access to the world’s second-largest economy, with predictable results.»

«Many Latin American countries that have recently switched recognition – such as Panama and the Dominican Republic – have seen a subsequent influx of Chinese investments and other capital. Paraguay would no doubt see similar results, particularly given the deepening economic ties between its Mercosur partners – Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay – and China. This economic appeal helps to explain the multiple congressional votes along party lines urging the opening of relations with China.»

«Taiwan’s relationship with Paraguay has often been safeguarded by the dominance of the Colorado Party, which has ruled the country for all but five of the last 77 years.»

«Since Tsai assumed office in 2016, Beijing has pried away eight of Taiwan’s former diplomatic allies, including four states in Latin America and the Caribbean region.»

* * * * * * *


The South American Election That Has Taiwan Scrambling.

Paraguay’s upcoming election in late April could see the country establish ties with China at long last. Taipei is predictably worried.

January 18, 2023.

On January 9, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen welcomed a congressional delegation from the Republic of Paraguay to the presidential office in Taipei. Her objective was simple: to remind the visiting politicians of her country’s value as an ally.

Tsai welcomed this delegation amid an uncertain time in bilateral ties. Among the 13 sovereign countries – 14, if you include the Vatican – that continue to maintain relations with Taiwan, Paraguay is the by far largest, and the only nation in South America. Diplomatic ties between the two countries were established in 1957 by the autocratic and anti-communist governments of Taiwanese President Chiang Kai-shek and Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner, and has persisted beyond the end of the Cold War and both countries’ simultaneous democratization.

However, that relationship is now under threat. Efrain Alegre, chief presidential candidate of the opposition and leader of the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA), has stated that a victory by his coalition in Paraguay’s April 30 general election would lead to the country establishing relations with China. The declaration from the two-time presidential runner-up is widely expected to be popular with the country’s influential beef and soy industries, which have long sought to remove barriers to exporting their products to China.

Beijing refuses relations with any country that formally recognizes Taiwan, so Paraguay has virtually no access to the world’s second-largest economy, with predictable results. A recent estimate demonstrated that Paraguay lost out on the equivalent of 1 percent of its gross domestic product annually during the commodities boom that powered South America early this century. While indirect trade has persisted through Argentine and Uruguayan ports, the movement to switch ties from Taipei to Beijing has gained momentum alongside China’s explosive economic rise and considerable loans to the region.

Many Latin American countries that have recently switched recognition – such as Panama and the Dominican Republic – have seen a subsequent influx of Chinese investments and other capital. Paraguay would no doubt see similar results, particularly given the deepening economic ties between its Mercosur partners – Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay – and China. This economic appeal helps to explain the multiple congressional votes along party lines urging the opening of relations with China.

Tsai is aware of all these realities, which explains in large part how she has approached relations with her country’s largest formal ally. One of her very first state visits as president was to Paraguay, where she attended a 2016 state banquet hosted by then-President Horacio Cartes in her honor. She returned the favor a year later, hosting Cartes and other Paraguayan leaders in Taiwan, and has continued a trend of high-level visits which includes last Monday’s meeting.

Meanwhile, there are Taiwan-donated monuments commemorating decades of friendship at a stone’s throw from the Paraguayan seat of government in the Palacio de López, while statues of Chiang Kai-shek can be seen on avenues in Asunción bearing his name. Facilities displaying the Taiwanese flag even appear sporadically along Paraguay’s major Route 2, which connects the capital with the commercial city of Ciudad del Este.

While it cannot keep up with China’s economy, Taipei has been active in demonstrating that it prioritizes Paraguay’s government in a way that few other states do, as part of what has been called a mutual “exchange of international status.”

The pandemic has also carried steep implications for the countries’ relations. In March 2021, as Paraguay dealt with a surge in COVID-19 cases, the foreign ministry released a statement rejecting a proposed offer of Chinese vaccines in return for breaking off ties with Taiwan. Taipei was quick to respond, urging democratic allies such as India and Japan to step up their provision of vaccines to the country in order to counter China’s so-called “vaccine diplomacy.” Accounts later differed as to whether Taiwan played a role in India’s supplying of hundreds of thousands of doses to Paraguay.

The democratic focus in Taiwan’s messaging has also been consistent. During last Monday’s meeting, Tsai stressed the need for a democratic alliance “in the face of the continued expansion of authoritarianism.” Her comments were perhaps above all addressed to President of the Chamber of Deputies Carlos María Lopez Lopez, who led the delegation and who comes from the same party as Alegre – who, owing to divisions within Paraguay’s ruling Colorado Party, may just yet pull off a victory in April.

Taiwan’s relationship with Paraguay has often been safeguarded by the dominance of the Colorado Party, which has ruled the country for all but five of the last 77 years. The party’s presidential candidate for April, Santiago Peña, supports continued ties with Taiwan, in stark contrast to Alegre, but is not guaranteed a surefire victory as in past decades. Notably, the last man to defeat the Colorado Party and become president also vowed to open relations with China. (He was later removed from office on an unrelated matter).

Last July, President Mario Abdo Benitez defended the relationship with Taipei and urged caution as Mercosur partners weighed a free-trade agreement with China, demonstrating continued support for Taiwan within the Colorado Party. However, with los colorados once more at risk of losing the presidency, Taiwan risks losing its last remaining ally in South America.

It wouldn’t be the first such setback for Taipei. Since Tsai assumed office in 2016, Beijing has pried away eight of Taiwan’s former diplomatic allies, including four states in Latin America and the Caribbean region.

A little-known fact is that Paraguay is the exact opposite point – or antipode – on Earth from Taiwan, meaning every other location on the planet is technically closer. At last Monday’s meeting, Lopez mentioned this distance, warmly noting its contrast with “the affection and appreciation” the two countries shared.

Come April, his party will contest an election that could well change that relationship – in the process costing Taiwan one more valuable chip in its struggle for recognition.

Pubblicato in: Agricoltura, Banche Centrali, Cina, Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica America Latina.

Paraguay. Sta per disconoscere Formosa e riconoscere la Cina.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2022-10-24.

Paraguay Britannica 001

                         Il Paraguay è uno dei pochi Paesi che ancora riconosce ufficialmente Taiwan. Tuttavia, le preoccupazioni aumentano dopo che il presidente del Paraguay ha recentemente esortato Taipei a investire 1 miliardo di dollari nel suo Paese. In un annuncio che ha allarmato molti taiwanesi, il presidente del Paraguay Mario Abdo Benitez ha esortato Taipei a investire 1 miliardo di dollari (1.02 miliardi di euro) nel suo Paese, resistendo alle pressioni interne per il passaggio del riconoscimento diplomatico alla Repubblica Popolare Cinese (RPC). I produttori agricoli del Paese sudamericano hanno sollecitato il governo a ottenere l’accesso al mercato cinese in seguito al calo dei prezzi della carne. Stiamo lavorando con il presidente di Taiwan affinché il popolo paraguaiano percepisca i reali benefici dell’alleanza strategica. Ci sono investimenti taiwanesi per oltre 6 miliardi di dollari in Paesi che non hanno relazioni diplomatiche con Taiwan, vogliamo che da questi 1 miliardo di dollari venga messo in Paraguay.

                         Dal 2016, quattro Paesi della regione hanno cambiato il riconoscimento diplomatico da Taiwan alla Cina, riducendo il numero degli alleati diplomatici di Taipei a soli 14 in tutto il mondo. La Cina ha cercato in tutti i modi di bloccare qualsiasi riconoscimento internazionale dell’isola e attualmente solo 14 nazioni al mondo hanno relazioni diplomatiche formali con Taiwan.

                         Pechino spesso attira gli alleati diplomatici di Taipei promettendo un aumento del commercio, dei prestiti e degli investimenti. Il Paraguay è attualmente il Paese più grande per dimensioni che ancora riconosce Taiwan come Paese e perderlo significherebbe che Taiwan non ha più alleati diplomatici in Sud America.

                         Il commercio tra Taiwan e il Paraguay ha raggiunto la cifra record di 196 milioni di dollari nel 2021, ma rappresenta meno dell’1% del commercio totale della nazione sudamericana in quell’anno. Al contrario, il Paraguay ha sempre avuto il desiderio di accedere al mercato cinese, poiché è uno dei più grandi mercati del mondo e anche il consumo di carne bovina in Cina è elevato. Con il cambio di guardia in Paraguay dopo le elezioni presidenziali del prossimo anno, è molto probabile che il tema del cambio di riconoscimento diplomatico riemerga. Sebbene gli Stati Uniti, l’Unione Europea e il Giappone sostengano Taiwan ora, c’è una grande differenza tra avere 20-30 alleati diplomatici che ti aiutano a far sentire la tua voce alle Nazioni Unite e avere solo 10 o 8 alleati che parlano per te.

* * * * * * *

«Paraguay is one of only a few countries that still officially recognize Taiwan. However, concerns are growing after Paraguay’s president recently urged Taipei to invest $1 billion in his country. In an announcement that alarmed many people in Taiwan, Paraguay’s President Mario Abdo Benitez urged Taipei to invest $1 billion (€1.02 billion) in his country as he resists domestic pressure to switch diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Agricultural producers in the South American nation have been urging the government to gain access to the Chinese market amid falling meat prices. We are working with the president of Taiwan so that the Paraguayan people feel the real benefits of the strategic alliance. There is Taiwanese investment of more than $6 billion in countries which don’t have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we want from that $1 billion to be put in Paraguay»

«Since 2016, four countries in the region have switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, reducing the number of Taipei’s diplomatic allies to only 14 worldwide. China has tried hard to stop any international recognition of the island and only 14 nations worldwide currently have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Beijing often poaches Taipei’s diplomatic allies by promising increased trade, loans and investment. Paraguay is currently the biggest country by size that still recognizes Taiwan as a country and losing it would mean that Taiwan no longer has diplomatic allies in South America»

«Trade between Taiwan and Paraguay hit a record $196 million in 2021, but it represented less than 1% of the South American nation’s total trade that year. On the contrary, Paraguay always has the desire to gain access to the Chinese market, since it’s one of the largest markets in the world and the beef consumption in China is also high. There is a change of guard in Paraguay after next year’s presidential election, it is very likely that the topic of switching diplomatic recognition will resurface. While the US, EU and Japan support Taiwan now, there is a big difference between having 20 to 30 diplomatic allies helping you make your voice heard in the United Nations versus having only 10 or 8 allies speaking up for you»

* * * * * * *


Will Taiwan lose another diplomatic ally to China?

Paraguay is one of only a few countries that still officially recognize Taiwan. However, concerns are growing after Paraguay’s president recently urged Taipei to invest $1 billion in his country.

In an announcement that alarmed many people in Taiwan, Paraguay’s President Mario Abdo Benitez urged Taipei to invest $1 billion (€1.02 billion) in his country as he resists domestic pressure to switch diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  

In an interview with the Financial Times newspaper last week, Abdo said agricultural producers in the South American nation have been urging the government to gain access to the Chinese market amid falling meat prices.

“We are working with the president of Taiwan so that the Paraguayan people feel the real benefits of the strategic alliance,” he told the FT during a trip to the US. “There is Taiwanese investment of more than $6 billion in countries which don’t have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we want from that $1 billion to be put in Paraguay.”

Abdo’s comments raise concerns in Taiwan about potentially losing another diplomatic ally to China. Since 2016, four countries in the region have switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, reducing the number of Taipei’s diplomatic allies to only 14 worldwide.

                         Paraguay denies tying funding to recognition 

China views self-governing democratic Taiwan as part of its territory and vows to annex it by force if necessary. The government in Taipei rejects Beijing’s claim, insisting Taiwan is already a de facto sovereign nation.

China has tried hard to stop any international recognition of the island and only 14 nations worldwide currently have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Beijing often poaches Taipei’s diplomatic allies by promising increased trade, loans and investment. Paraguay is currently the biggest country by size that still recognizes Taiwan as a country and losing it would mean that Taiwan no longer has diplomatic allies in South America.

After the Paraguayan president’s comments, the nation’s Foreign Ministry immediately came out to reaffirm the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, saying “at no time during the interview did the president refer to conditioning the relationship with Taiwan, much less subjecting it to some amount.”

Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry also said officials from both sides had cleared things up, and that there were no strings attached to the relationship.

However, Francisco Urdinez, a political scientist at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, said the Paraguayan president’s remarks could be an indication that Paraguay was considering other alternatives.

“I think Paraguay is trying to show ambivalence and they want to show that Paraguay is not 100% committed to maintaining ties with Taiwan,” he told DW.

“We have been expecting Paraguay’s agricultural businesses to start lobbying in favor of a diplomatic switch. The reason is quite obvious, as it has to do with the comparative advantages and how much the businesses can benefit from having a larger market to sell their products,” he added. 

In a paper published in the journal Foreign Policy Analysis last year, Urdinez and his co-author Tom Long estimated that Paraguay’s diplomatic relationship with Taiwan may have cost the South American country aid and investment from China equivalent to 1% of its GDP between 2005 and 2014. “Paraguay received nil from China,” they wrote in the paper. “This was not offset by flows from Taiwan.”

                         Taiwan’s dilemma

While Taiwan has sent two investment delegations to Paraguay in 2022, Urdinez stressed that the Paraguayan president’s call for more investment is a huge problem for Taipei.

“Compared to China, the Taiwanese government doesn’t have the leverage over private sector to force Taiwanese companies to invest $1 billion in Paraguay,” the expert said.

“Beijing does have leverage over their state-owned enterprises and through government-to-government deals, they can make sure that some capital may flow. For Taiwan, it’s a tricky situation that they can’t guarantee that investment may flow to Paraguay. That depends on the business environment and opportunities,” he added. 

Trade between Taiwan and Paraguay hit a record $196 million in 2021, but it represented less than 1% of the South American nation’s total trade that year, according to Bloomberg.

Paraguay, which has a GDP of about $39 billion, relies heavily on agriculture, particularly on the exports of soybeans and beef.

Given that the country is already one of the largest beef exporters to Taiwan, some experts say there is limited room for bilateral trade to expand further.

“On the contrary, Paraguay always has the desire to gain access to the Chinese market, since it’s one of the largest markets in the world and the beef consumption in China is also high,” said Kung Kwo-Wei, director of the Graduate Institute of Latin American Studies at Tamkang University in Taiwan.

Kung added that while Taiwan keeps sending trade delegations to Paraguay and works hard on procuring more products from there, the list of products that Taiwan can buy is limited. “I think the Paraguayan president should re-evaluate which sectors in Paraguay can other countries invest in or what opportunities exist between Taiwan and Paraguay,” he told DW.

Apart from the economic reasons, Urdinez said, Paraguay’s struggle to get enough COVID-19 vaccines has also had an impact on the public opinion about its diplomatic alliance with Taiwan.

Only about 50% of the Paraguayan population have so far been fully vaccinated, which is below the global average of 63.5%. “They couldn’t access the Chinese vaccines and they have had to buy Chinese doses through third parties,” he pointed out. “Amid COVID-related deaths, it became a very important issue.”

                         What’s Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy moving forward?

While both governments say the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Paraguay remains strong, Urdinez believes if there is a change of guard in Paraguay after next year’s presidential election, it is very likely that the topic of switching diplomatic recognition will resurface.

“The left-wing coalition in Paraguay is very clear about their intention of switching diplomatic recognition to China, even though Taiwan has been doing its best to stop that from happening,” he said.

Sana Hashmi, a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation in Taipei, said that losing more diplomatic allies could be a setback for Taiwan. And she stressed that it is important for the democratic island to consider what diplomatic strategy might be beneficial for itself moving forward.

“I believe relationship with diplomatic allies should be on the basis of mutual benefits,” she said.

“We also have to see the tangible benefits. I believe that Taiwan needs to reach out to countries that have more say and think about highlighting its strength and motivate them to collaborate with Taiwan. For example, when the US, Japan or India mentions Taiwan, it becomes a bigger news and it has impact and weight,” she argued.

Kung from Tamkang University however believes Taiwan should pull out all the stops to maintain its relations with existing diplomatic allies. “In order to participate in the international community, you need support,” he said.

“While the US, EU and Japan support Taiwan now, there is a big difference between having 20 to 30 diplomatic allies helping you make your voice heard in the United Nations versus having only 10 or 8 allies speaking up for you.”

Pubblicato in: Brasile, Devoluzione socialismo, Diplomazia, Geopolitica America Latina.

Mercosur. Nega l’accesso ad uno Zelensky che lo impetra. Intanto la Siberia lo aspetta.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2022-07-26.

Lavron e Putin che ridono 003

Nella terminologia scientifica il rilassamento di una funzione indica il suo crollo quasi istantaneo. Ma questo tipo di comportamento è riscontrabile anche in politica e nelle scienze umane.

Basti pensare a quanto è accaduto negli ultimi due mesi.

Il vanaglorioso Macron ha avuto una severa débâcle con la perdita delle elezioni per il rinnovo della Assemblea Nazionale. Senza maggiorana parlamentare Macron conta meno del due di briscola, e le opposizioni ne approfittano per togliersi i molti sassolini che avevano nelle scarpe.

Boris Johnson è stato costretto alle dimissioni dalla rivolta che si era sviluppata proprio in seno al suo partito, che lo ha cacciato via a badilate nei denti. La superbia è una gran brutta bestia.

Di questi giorni Mario Draghi ha visto liquefarsi la sua maggioranza parlamentare ed anche lui è stato costretto a dimettersi, mentre il presidente Mattarella, obtorto collo, ha dovuto indire nuove elezioni politiche anticipate.

Caratteristica politica comune la fede nella dottrina liberal e l’essere andati di persona a sostenere a Kiev il presidente pro tempore Zelensky.

Questi, avvezzo ad un appoggio incondizionato da parte dei liberal occidentali, fu invitato con grandi onori a parlare in sedi di potere apicale quali, per esempio, le Nazioni Unite.

Già.

Ma adesso Macron, Johnson e Draghi non esistono più e Joe Biden ha i suoi grattacapi con una inflazione stroboscopica e midterm alle porte. Ancora tre mesi, e Biden farà la fine di Macron, sempre che Embolo non accorci i tempi.

Da ultimo

«South America’s Mercosur trade bloc has declined a request by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to address its upcoming summit».

Serve solo avere ancora un pochino di pazienza.

Mr Putin e Mr Lavrov intanto si sganasciano dal ridere.

«despite international sanctions against Moscow».

I liberal sono di coccio. Il mondo libero se ne infischia delle loro sanzioni.

* * * * * * *

Il blocco commerciale sudamericano Mercosur ha rifiutato la richiesta del presidente ucraino Volodymyr Zelensky di intervenire al suo prossimo vertice, ha dichiarato mercoledì il Paraguay, paese ospitante.

I membri del blocco Argentina, Brasile, Uruguay e Paraguay non sono riusciti a trovare un accordo sulla richiesta di Zejlensky, presentata al Paese ospitante la scorsa settimana.

Zelensky si è rivolto a diversi parlamenti nazionali e a forum regionali e internazionali dopo l’invasione del suo Paese da parte della Russia a febbraio.

Il leader ucraino ha parlato con il presidente del Paraguay Mario Abdo Benitez la scorsa settimana, chiedendo di poter intervenire a un vertice del Mercosur.

Il mese scorso, Bolsonaro ha dichiarato di aver ricevuto da Putin la garanzia che la Russia continuerà a fornire al gigante agricolo sudamericano i fertilizzanti di cui ha bisogno.

La settimana scorsa, il Brasile ha dichiarato che avrebbe acquistato quanto più gasolio possibile dalla Russia, nonostante le sanzioni internazionali contro Mosca.

Creato nel 1991, il Mercosur rappresenta un mercato di circa 300 milioni di persone, con un territorio di quasi 5,8 milioni di miglia quadrate (14,8 milioni di chilometri quadrati).

I ministri hanno anche concordato di ridurre del 10% la tariffa esterna comune (AEC) su una serie di prodotti importati, una richiesta chiave del Brasile.

Non è ufficialmente all’ordine del giorno della riunione il piano dell’Uruguay di negoziare unilateralmente un accordo di libero scambio con la Cina.

* * * * * * *

«South America’s Mercosur trade bloc has declined a request by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to address its upcoming summit, host Paraguay said on Wednesday»

«Bloc members Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay failed to reach an agreement on Zelensky’s request, made to the host country last week»

«Zelensky has addressed several national parliaments as well as regional and international forums since Russia’s invasion of his country in February»

«The Ukrainian leader spoke to Paraguay’s President Mario Abdo Benitez last week, asking to be allowed to address a Mercosur summit»

«Last month, Bolsonaro said he had received assurances from Putin that Russia would continue to deliver much-needed fertilizer to the South American agricultural giant»

«Last week, Brazil said it would buy as much diesel from Russia as it could, despite international sanctions against Moscow»

«Created in 1991, Mercosur represents a market of some 300 million people, with a territory of almost 5.8 million square miles (14.8 million square kilometers)»

«The ministers also agreed to reduce by 10 percent the Common External Tariff (AEC) on a range of imported products — a key demand of Brazil»

«Not officially on the agenda for the meeting is Uruguay’s plan to unilaterally negotiate a free trade agreement with China»

* * * * * * *

Mercosur Declines Zelenskiy Request to Address Bloc’s Summit

South America’s Mercosur trade bloc has declined a request by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to address its upcoming summit, host Paraguay said on Wednesday.

Bloc members Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay failed to reach an agreement on Zelensky’s request, made to the host country last week, according to deputy foreign minister Raul Cano, who declined to say which states were against it.

Zelensky has addressed several national parliaments as well as regional and international forums since Russia’s invasion of his country in February, including NATO, the G7, the World Economic Forum, the United Nations and even the Cannes Film Festival.

The Ukrainian leader spoke to Paraguay’s President Mario Abdo Benitez last week, asking to be allowed to address a Mercosur summit to be held on Thursday, following a ministerial meeting on Wednesday.

“There was no consensus,” said Cano, adding the decision had been communicated to Kyiv.

Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro, whose presence at the summit has not been confirmed, has said his country would remain “neutral” over Russia’s war on Ukraine.

He had travelled to Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in February, just days before the invasion.

                         Deal with Singapore

Last month, Bolsonaro said he had received assurances from Putin that Russia would continue to deliver much-needed fertilizer to the South American agricultural giant.

Last week, Brazil said it would buy as much diesel from Russia as it could, despite international sanctions against Moscow.

Argentina’s Alberto Fernandez was also in Moscow in early February. On the day of the start of the invasion on February 24, Fernandez urged “all parties” in a tweet “not to use military force.”

“We call on the Russian Federation to put an end to the actions taken and for all parties involved to return to the dialogue table,” he said at the time.

Brazil and Argentina did not sign a February 25 Organization of American States (OAS) resolution condemning the war, while Uruguay and Paraguay did.

Mercosur announced Wednesday that it had concluded a free trade agreement with Singapore.

Mercosur exports to Singapore in 2021 amounted to $5.9 billion, and imports $1.2 billion, according to data provided by the four-member bloc.

Created in 1991, Mercosur represents a market of some 300 million people, with a territory of almost 5.8 million square miles (14.8 million square kilometers).

The deal could mean additional exports of about $500 million per year to Singapore, a country of about six million people, said Paraguay’s deputy economy minister Ivan Haas.

The ministers also agreed to reduce by 10 percent the Common External Tariff (AEC) on a range of imported products — a key demand of Brazil.

The bloc imposes common tariffs on imports from abroad, and Argentina — for whom Brazil is a major tariff-free market — has opposed a reduction of the AEC.

“It is a historic decision, an essential decision… particularly at a time of economic crisis and international inflation,” according to Brazilian Foreign Minister Carlos Franca, who said it would boost competitiveness and regional production.

Not officially on the agenda for the meeting is Uruguay’s plan to unilaterally negotiate a free trade agreement with China.

Mercosur introduced a rule in 2000 under which it is compulsory to jointly negotiate common trade deals with third parties.

Argentina is opposed to Uruguay’s proposal.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica America Latina., Stati Uniti

Biden convoca in un Summit gli stati sudamericani ma ripete i classici errori dei liberal.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2022-06-08.Gilles de Rais 013

 

I paesi della America latina sono ambiti collaboratori per le superpotenze.

Cina alla conquista dell’America Latina. – Bloomberg

«China in 2009 surpassed the U.S. as Brazil’s largest export market, as South America’s biggest economy stepped up shipments of everything from iron ore to soy beans»

* * *

America Latina. Cina ha scacciato l’America e sta dominando quel continente.

«And now the Chinese appear offering financing without demanding control of the country in return, treating everyone as de facto trading partners rather than vassals. Who do you think we South Americans will prefer?»

«You have this poor governor from Argentina who has Xi Jinping’s phone number»

«China on the other hand basically says… Here’s the money, you KNOW who we are.. but you keep doing what you do»

* * *

Il segreto della penetrazione politica, sociale e economica della Cina è di una sconcertante semplicità.

«Chinese appear offering financing without demanding control of the country in return, treating everyone as de facto trading partners rather than vassals»

* * *

Biden è seriamente preoccupato ed ha indetto un Summit dei paesi dell’America Latina.

Tuttavia sta ripetendo pedissequamente tutti gli errori fatti in passato. I motivi per i quali quegli stati preferiscono la Cina.

Biden vorrebbe riaffermare la supremazia degli Stati Uniti sul crescente peso della Cina in America Latina. Ma i tempo sono mutati.

Gli antagonisti degli Stati Uniti, Cuba, Venezuela e Nicaragua, sarebbero stati esclusi in quanto Biden non li reputa essere democratici, vecchio ed usurato chiodo fisso dei liberal occidentali.

Il presidente messicano Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador ha detto che non sarebbe andato se non fossero stati invitati tutti i Paesi delle Americhe.

Non solo, alcuni leader centroamericani si sono irritati per le richieste degli Stati Uniti di affrontare la corruzione del governo.

Questo summit sarà un altro buco nell’acqua.

Joe Biden dovrebbe togliersi lo scolapasta che si è messo in testa.

* * * * * * *

«Biden targets Latin America reset at summit marred by invite tension»

«When the United States said last year it would host the 2022 Summit of the Americas, officials had high hopes …. reassert U.S. primacy over China’s growing clout in Latin America»

«But on the cusp of the coming week’s gathering in Los Angeles, U.S. President Joe Biden faces a struggle to make a success of a summit plagued by problems before it even began»

«skepticism about U.S. commitment to Latin America, and low expectations for major accords on issues such as migration and economic cooperation have already tarnished the event»

«The Americans basically misread the situation in not having foreseen there would be a fuss about who was attending»

«Biden aims to re-engage with southern neighbors to forge a common vision»

«Those hopes have been tempered by wrangling over who will attend»

«U.S. antagonists Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua would be excluded on the grounds they are undemocratic»

«That upset some leaders, including Mexico’s leftist president Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who said he would not go unless all countries from the Americas were invited»

«many Latin American countries are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead as unquestioningly as they were at times in the past»

«Some Central American leaders have chafed over U.S. demands that they tackle government corruption»

«Biden officials also want to make the case for sticking with Washington as Latin America’s main economic partner to counteract inroads by China»

«global rivals are making their financial and political presence strongly felt»

«Washington has so far registered little success in persuading Latin American producers to pump more crude»

«Friction may loom if Biden presses the cause of democratic freedom»

* * * * * * *

Biden targets Latin America reset at summit marred by invite tension.

Washington/Mexico City, June 5 (Reuters) – When the United States said last year it would host the 2022 Summit of the Americas, officials had high hopes the event would help repair Trump-era damage to relations and reassert U.S. primacy over China’s growing clout in Latin America.

But on the cusp of the coming week’s gathering in Los Angeles, U.S. President Joe Biden faces a struggle to make a success of a summit plagued by problems before it even began.

Ideological discord over who to invite, skepticism about U.S. commitment to Latin America, and low expectations for major accords on issues such as migration and economic cooperation have already tarnished the event, officials and analysts say.

“The Americans basically misread the situation in not having foreseen there would be a fuss about who was attending,” said Andres Rozental, a former Mexican deputy foreign minister, arguing the summit ran the risk of becoming “lackluster”.

One U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, conceded preparations were “messier than we envisioned.”

Lower-level events begin on Monday, then leaders start to arrive. Biden is due in on Wednesday to formally open the first U.S.-hosted summit since the inaugural gathering in 1994.

Despite pressing concerns such as inflation, mass shootings, and the Ukraine conflict, Biden aims to re-engage with southern neighbors to forge a common vision after years of relative neglect under his ‘America First’ predecessor, Donald Trump, who skipped the last summit in Lima in 2018.

Those hopes have been tempered by wrangling over who will attend. As host, the United States can choose who it invites but early plans indicated that U.S. antagonists Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua would be excluded on the grounds they are undemocratic.

That upset some leaders, including Mexico’s leftist president Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who said he would not go unless all countries from the Americas were invited.

Washington has ruled out Venezuela and Nicaragua attending. It remains unclear whether Communist-ruled Cuba might be represented.

Most regional leaders have signaled they will attend anyway, but the pushback suggests many Latin American countries are no longer willing to follow Washington’s lead as unquestioningly as they were at times in the past.

U.S. officials say the guest list ruckus will blow over, and that the summit will yield progress no matter who attends.

                         MIGRATION, CHINA

With Biden under pressure over record numbers of migrants at the U.S. southern border, he is expected to seek commitments to curb those flows, especially from Mexico and Central America.

Biden aides say they are working on an “ambitious” migration statement. But a major breakthrough appears unlikely.

Some Central American leaders have chafed over U.S. demands that they tackle government corruption, seen as a driver of migration from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.

A senior Biden administration official sought to downplay the centrality of migration to the summit, saying U.S. relations with Latin America were much broader, citing economics, climate policy and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Biden officials also want to make the case for sticking with Washington as Latin America’s main economic partner to counteract inroads by China.

Expert witnesses at a recent U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing on the summit chided the administration for not doing more to improve relations with the rest of the Americas.

“The region is polarized, COVID-19 has laid bare public health and economic challenges, democracy is in retreat,” said Rebecca Bill Chavez, head of the Inter-American Dialogue. “And global rivals are making their financial and political presence strongly felt.”

Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas think tank, wants to see a regional trade initiative similar to the one for the Indo-Pacific Biden announced during his Asia tour in May.  

That would likely face U.S. protectionist pushback.

The Biden administration is targeting regional initiatives to bolster near-shoring of supply chains, including medical equipment, and to expand internet and clean energy.

Running parallel is a U.S. drive to deepen regional supplies of oil and gas to dry up the cashflow used to fund the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine, and to wean the West off Russian energy.

Washington has so far registered little success in persuading Latin American producers to pump more crude.

Friction may loom if Biden presses the cause of democratic freedom. U.S. officials have raised concerns about democratic backsliding in countries including Brazil, whose president Jair Bolsonaro is due to meet Biden for the first time.  

Marcos Caramuru, a former Brazilian ambassador to China and Malaysia, said he did not expect the summit to yield a major improvement in diplomatic relations, arguing that Latin America simply did not matter as much as Asia to Washington.

“Asia is much more important, because it is closer connected with U.S. security and China containment,” Caramuru said.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica America Latina., Stati Uniti

America Latina. Cina ha scacciato l’America e sta dominando quel continente.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2022-03-02.

America Latina 001

La dottrina Monroe indica un messaggio ideologico di James Monroe contenuto nel discorso sullo stato dell’Unione pronunciato innanzi al Congresso il 2 dicembre 1823, esprime l’idea della supremazia degli Stati Uniti nel continente americano.

Fu un diktat nei confronti del resto del mondo: L’America agli americani. Per due secoli gli Stati Uniti hanno ritenuto di poter fare e disfare a piacer loro nell’America Latina, rendendosi così anche molto invisi.

«And now the Chinese appear offering financing without demanding control of the country in return, treating everyone as de facto trading partners rather than vassals. Who do you think we South Americans will prefer?»

* * * * * * *

«How China beat out the U.S. to dominate South America»

«Beneath the remote, craggy hills and vast salt lakes lie veins of copper, lithium, and zinc, the raw materials of 21st century»

«It’s no secret that China has been pouring resources into South America this century, chipping away at the U.S.’s historic dominance and making itself the continent’s No. 1 trading partner»

«going local to expand and strengthen its financial grip. …. Instead of focusing on national leaders, China and its companies have built relationships from the ground up»

«no region is too remote for China’s scrupulous attention»

«You have this poor governor from Argentina who has Xi Jinping’s phone number»

«Its not so much money as money without any obvious upfront strings»

«The US when they invest (as a country rather than as a company), they basically want the place to change to something favourable to them.. and that often creates instability and power struggles..»

«→→ China on the other hand basically says… Here’s the money, you KNOW who we are.. but you keep doing what you do.. meanwhile I’ll take my points on the back end. ←←»

«So from an investment stance, its more desirable to partner with China than the US»

«→→ And now the Chinese appear offering financing without demanding control of the country in return, treating everyone as de facto trading partners rather than vassals. Who do you think we South Americans will prefer? ←←»»

«Probably enough to swing votes at the UN, in the manner of the soviet union»

«There is a general idea, in the US that other countries should feel honored to have us a trading partner, and they should change their laws to accommodate us»

«Well into the 1980s, Washington supported coups and sent troops into sovereign neighbors to its south»

«This interference inspired anti-American resentment, creating an opening for China»

«The USA loves talking about freedom until people freely elect governments that the USA doesn’t like»

«Then it’s sanctions and assassinations and regime change»

«It’s a void that didn’t need to exist, so China’s there to fill it»

«The top reasons for China’s success in South America»

«1/ The US has treated S. America like a colony for 200+ years»

«2/ The US has treated everyone S of the Rio Grande like shit for 200+ years»

«4/ The US has supported murderous fascist dictators south of the border like Batista, Pinochet, Strossner (Paraguay), Peron, Menza (Bolivia), Videla (Argentina) and Trujillo. Look them up»

«5/ The US has aggressively supported banks and corporations, often with the military, who oppress the people in the region»

«6/ The Keystone Cops drug wars where the US sends the military into other countries to kill civilians and lets it’s own rich and/or famous use drugs and brag about it»

«The Caribbean basin is another thing, however»

«general trend of both parties to be geopolitically ignorant and navel-gaze US domestic issues»

«China has a tremendous advantage in South America because paying bribes is a prerequisite for doing business there and U.S. corporations are legally prohibited from paying foreign bribes»

* * * * * * *

Tutto il segreto del successo cinese nel’America Latina, come anche nel resto del mondo, è racchiuso in questa semplice frase:

«And now the Chinese appear offering financing without demanding control of the country in return, treating everyone as de facto trading partners rather than vassals. Who do you think we South Americans will prefer?»

* * * * * * *


How China Beat Out the U.S. to Dominate South America. – Bloomberg.

Chinese technology and money have helped build one of Latin America’s largest solar energy plants in Jujuy (pronounced hu-HUY), where hundreds of thousands of panels coat the desert like giant dominoes. Chinese security cameras guard government buildings across the provincial capital. Servers hum in a Chinese data storage plant. Beneath the remote, craggy hills and vast salt lakes lie veins of copper, lithium, and zinc, the raw materials of 21st century — technology — including Chinese-made electric-car batteries. It’s no secret that China has been pouring resources into South America this century, chipping away at the U.S.’s historic dominance and making itself the continent’s No. 1 trading partner. But while international focus has turned in recent years to China’s ventures in Africa and Asia, an important shift has gone largely unnoticed in the country’s approach to South America: going local to expand and strengthen its financial grip.

Instead of focusing on national leaders, China and its companies have built relationships from the ground up. In 2019 alone, at least eight Brazilian governors and four deputy governors traveled to China. In a September 2019 speech, Zou Xiaoli, China’s ambassador to Argentina, said his country’s infrastructure push was helping weave Latin America into the global marketplace. “China will lend strong support to Argentina’s economic and social development,” he said. As Argentina’s Jujuy province illustrates, no region is too remote for China’s scrupulous attention. With perhaps a touch of hyperbole, Gabriel Marquez, chief executive officer of a Jujuy lithium research and development center, describes the effectiveness of the approach: “You have this poor governor from Argentina who has Xi Jinping’s phone number.”

Its not so much money as money without any obvious upfront strings.

The US when they invest (as a country rather than as a company), they basically want the place to change to something favourable to them.. and that often creates instability and power struggles..

China on the other hand basically says… Here’s the money, you KNOW who we are.. but you keep doing what you do.. meanwhile I’ll take my points on the back end.

So from an investment stance, its more desirable to partner with China than the US. (Basically China is doing what the US USED to do.. leverage their economic clout and history as soft power.. vs. the US increasingly uses more hard power and manipulation along with the influx of craziness)

It’s a little worse than that. In the recent history of South America, whenever a government tried to evolve its own country in some way that did not favor the US or go against its interests, the CIA appeared to overthrow the government and put a puppet in its place. This keeps happening in Brazil for example, the current puppet is this Bolsonaro. And if Lula wins the next elections and doesn’t dance to the music of Wall Street, they will try to bring him down again.
And now the Chinese appear offering financing without demanding control of the country in return, treating everyone as de facto trading partners rather than vassals. Who do you think we South Americans will prefer?

                         Money talks.

Yep. All that infrastructure built on credit, and if the government starts missing the payments the ownership reverts to the Chinese government.

That’s the overall plan for China to take over/own the major infrastructure giving them enormous leverage – essentially control – in various countries.

In about 20 years we can expect a fair number of essentially communist bloc countries across the world, in the manner of the soviet union. Probably enough to swing votes at the UN, in the manner of the soviet union.

But the general snobbishness of US. There is a general idea, in the US that other countries should feel honored to have us a trading partner, and they should change their laws to accommodate us.

I once did a business analysis for a growing company to find new opportunities. My research showed Brazil to be an excellent location to expand to, even accounting in Brazil general intolerance towards imports with complex laws, it still showed to be a very profitable location. However it was rejected, because they didn’t personally like the laws, as they were too much like “Communism”, where the options were to price to deal with a higher tariff, or setup a factory in Brazil (either would still be very profitable)

China is use to such restrictions and is more apt to deal with other countries in order to get into the game, and being still the #2 economy out there, they are more apt to accommodate their practices to get the business.

                         But it’s NOT just money.

Latin America has long been a focus of great powers. In the 15th and 16th centuries, Spain and Portugal divided the region for colonial exploitation. After national revolutions in the 19th century created independent states, Washington promulgated the Monroe Doctrine, which required European powers to consider the Western Hemisphere the U.S. sphere of influence. Well into the 1980s, Washington supported coups and sent troops into sovereign neighbors to its south.

This interference inspired anti-American resentment, creating an opening for China. Over the past two decades, as the U.S. focused on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, China moved into the Western Hemisphere with exceptional speed, as well as financial and political muscle. Much of China’s investment began at the start of the century during the so-called pink tide, when leftist parties rose to power in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

The USA loves talking about freedom until people freely elect governments that the USA doesn’t like. Then it’s sanctions and assassinations and regime change. if I lived in South America I’d be looking somewhere else for money, too. China’s money only talks because the USA has been so antagonistic for so long. It’s a void that didn’t need to exist, so China’s there to fill it.

If the people of Africa and South America think China is going to be less exploitative than the West they are going to be surprised.

The top reasons for China’s success in South America. 1/ The US has treated S. America like a colony for 200+ years. 2/ The US has treated everyone S of the Rio Grande like shit for 200+ years. 3/ The US policy has been against solar power since forever and it remains in the balance. 4/ The US has supported murderous fascist dictators south of the border like Batista, Pinochet, Strossner (Paraguay), Peron, Menza (Bolivia), Videla (Argentina) and Trujillo. Look them up. 5/ The US has aggressively supported banks and corporations, often with the military, who oppress the people in the region. 6/ The Keystone Cops drug wars where the US sends the military into other countries to kill civilians and lets it’s own rich and/or famous use drugs and brag about it, i.e. the late PJ O’Rourke, everyone in Hollywood, everyone in Silicon Valley and everyone on Wall Street.

First, let’s either reject or accept the Monroe Doctrine: is South America something the US should *particularly* be attending to, or is this a colonialist view that we should disregard?
Yes, it’s ‘connected’ to the US (in a way that touches something unique for American strategic planners), but I don’t think in 2022 that bears any weight, geopolitically.

The Caribbean basin is another thing, however.

South America otherwise is a mixed 2nd/3rd world zone of -let’s be blunt – no objectively greater importance strategically than other non-connected places. Would it be less good for the US if, say, China had a naval base there? Sure. But we’ve lived with Cuba for 50 years, we can deal with China too.

To the original point: I blame both parties for two reasons.
1) this is what constant irresponsible debt does. 2nd/3rd world economies generally need support from wealthier states, and they trade that for money. Simple as that. Whoever writes Argentina bigger checks, consistently, reliably, will be their friend. Having 1/4 of US spending being borrowed means even irresponsible presidents don’t have the pockets to spread the largesse. It’s not a surprise that the country we’re borrowning from is winning that race. Anyone see a problem with that?

2) general trend of both parties to be geopolitically ignorant and navel-gaze US domestic issues. We argue about what gender can use bathrooms, while shit on the other side of the world IS ACTUALLY BLOWING UP but since we can’t find it on a map, we don’t care. That’s a STUPID policy in the long run that will bite us in the ass.

China has a tremendous advantage in South America because paying bribes is a prerequisite for doing business there and U.S. corporations are legally prohibited from paying foreign bribes.

That effect has been common knowledge among experts for a long time, I heard the United States Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in the 1980’s remark then that it placed U.S. businesses at a significant disadvantage when operating in third-world countries.

China will soon discover what everyone else on the planet has discovered: When dealing with 3rd world countries, especially corrupt one, they will gladly take your money and proclaim friendship.

However, more money will usually be required, and that friendship simply depends on bribes. There is no repayment. You can try to get paid back, but then they just flip you the bird and are actively your enemy. Good luck with that.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica America Latina.

Nicaragua. Cessa le relazioni con Taiwan, che riconosce essere territorio cinese.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-12-12.

Cina Usa Commercio 001

«It’s a gift for the so-called summit for democracy, and a slap in the face for the US and Taiwan»

Questa manovra diplomatica è una ulteriore débâcle della Harris-Biden Administration, la quale si ritrova sempre più isolata sul proscenio politico mondiale.

Al momento, gli stati che riconoscono Taiwan sono solo 14.

Joe Biden ha ridotto l’America al rango dei burattini senza credibilità alcuna, Afganistan docet.

* * * * * * *

«Nicaragua ends relations with Taiwan in diplomatic victory for China»

«Nicaragua’s government has broken off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and embraced Beijing, declaring “there is only one China in the world.”»

«The Nicaraguan announcement now leaves a little more than a dozen countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with self-ruled Taiwan»

«The People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing all of China and Taiwan is an undoubted part of the Chinese territory …. The government of the Republic of Nicaragua breaks diplomatic relations with Taiwan as of today and stopped having any contact or official relationship»

«Beijing refuses to maintain diplomatic ties with any country that recognizes Taiwan»

«The number of countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than Beijing has shrunk rapidly in recent years»

«In 2018, El Salvador, Burkina Faso and the Dominican Republic all said they would no longer recognize Taipei, followed by the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019»

«The One-China principle is a consensus widely accepted by the international community and allows no challenge»

«Thursday’s announcement leaves Taiwan with just 14 diplomatic allies, mostly small nations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, as well as the Vatican»

«A US State Department spokesperson said in a statement the decision to severe ties with Taiwan “deprives Nicaragua’s people of a steadfast partner in its democratic and economic growth …. We encourage all countries that value democratic institutions, transparency, the rule of law, and promoting economic prosperity for their citizens to expand engagement with Taiwan»

* * * * * * *

«It’s a gift for the so-called summit for democracy, and a slap in the face for the US and Taiwan …. All Taiwanese embassy officials and engineers stationed in Nicaragua will be recalled …. Taiwan also risks losing Honduras» [South China Morning Post]

* * * * * * *

L’elenco degli insuccessi più clamorosi di Joe Biden sarebbe davvero molto lungo. Ne riportiamo solo alcuni.

G20. Prima giornata. Una altra disastrosa débâcle dei liberal. Contano quasi nulla.

Afganistan. Biden, lo zimbello del mondo. I media lo abbandonano irati. Terrorismo.

Cop26. O l’ovest paga oppure India resterà a lungo con il carbone. ~5 trilioni di Usd.

Questa nuova débâcle di Joe Biden segna la tappa epocale della perdita di controllo delle UN.

G20. Roma. Cina, Russia ed India non vogliono abbandonare il carbone.

Cina. Silura ed affonda con scherno COP26. Costruirà nuove centrali a carbone e petrolio.

Biden. Anche i democratici si stanno ribellando pensando a midterm. Trombati.

Usa. Nonfarm Payrolls 253,000. La débâcle economica di Joe Biden.

Cina. Biden travolto da critiche interne ed estere per la vergognosa débâcle in Afganistan.

La lenta agonia di Joe Biden e dei democratici. L’anno prossimo potrebbero implodere.

Biden. Immettere due trilioni Usd bloccherà l’inflazione.  La gente sghignazza. – Bloomberg.

Biden. Il re dei trasformisti. Ecco cosa diceva ed ecco cosa ha fatto.

Usa. Oct21. PCI, Indice dei Prezzi al Consumo, +6.2% anno su anno.

Virginia. Analisi di un Elettorato mutato, contagioso per tutta la America. Midterm è vicino.

Germania lascia il Consiglio di Sicurezza Onu. ‘Che liberazione!’ dice la Cina.

Dushanbe. Russia e Cina integrano l’Iran nello SCO. Altra débâcle irredimibile di Joe Biden.

Cina. 2020. Gli Investimenti Diretti Esteri in Cina superano quelli negli Stati Uniti.

Cina. Si avvia alla maggioranza nelle Nazioni Unite.

Questa nuova débâcle di Joe Biden segna la tappa epocale della perdita di controllo delle UN.

* * * * * * *

«It’s a gift for the so-called summit for democracy, and a slap in the face for the US and Taiwan»

Gli Stati Uniti sono in piena crisi da stagflazione, che la Harris-Biden Administration con la Fed ha potentemente concorso a generare. La crisi economica si associa ad una sempre più evidente devoluzione politica, domestica ed internazionale.

Nessuno si fida più di Joe Biden e dell’America, che rimangono soli soletti in compagnia della stagflazione.

* * * * * * *


Nicaragua ends relations with Taiwan in diplomatic victory for China

Nicaragua’s government has broken off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and embraced Beijing, declaring “there is only one China in the world.”

The Nicaraguan announcement now leaves a little more than a dozen countries that maintain official diplomatic relations with self-ruled Taiwan, including fellow Central American nations Honduras and Guatemala.

“The People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing all of China and Taiwan is an undoubted part of the Chinese territory,” Nicaragua’s Foreign Minister Denis Moncada said in a televised announcement from capital city Managua on Thursday.

“The government of the Republic of Nicaragua breaks diplomatic relations with Taiwan as of today and stopped having any contact or official relationship,” he said.

Mainland China and Taiwan have been governed separately since the end of the Chinese civil war more than 70 years ago. Taiwan is now a flourishing multi-party democracy, but the mainland’s ruling Chinese Communist Party regards the island as an inseparable part of its territory — despite having never controlled it

Beijing refuses to maintain diplomatic ties with any country that recognizes Taiwan and has spent much of the past 40 years attempting to isolate the island by chipping away at its diplomatic allies with offers of economic support.

The number of countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than Beijing has shrunk rapidly in recent years as China looks to ramp up its global influence under President Xi Jinping.

In 2018, El Salvador, Burkina Faso and the Dominican Republic all said they would no longer recognize Taipei, followed by the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019.

And Nicaragua might not be the last nation to switch from Taiwan to China in 2021 either.

Honduran President-elect Xiomara Castro has publicly floated the idea of ditching her country’s diplomatic ties with Taipei, leading to a concerted effort by President Tsai Ing-wen and her government to solidify ties with the Central American nation.

China’s ambassador to the United Nations Zhang Jun said on Twitter Friday that he “highly commended” Nicaragua’s decision to end diplomatic relations with Taiwan, “which is in line with the prevailing trend of the time and people’s aspiration.”

“The One-China principle is a consensus widely accepted by the international community and allows no challenge,” he said.

Under Xi, relations between Taipei and Beijing have deteriorated to levels not seen in decades. In October, China’s military sent a record number of warplanes into the air around the island, amid threats of further military action. Meanwhile, the United States — which switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979 — has sought to bolster Taiwan on the world stage with large arms sales and high-profile visits by American officials.

Thursday’s announcement leaves Taiwan with just 14 diplomatic allies, mostly small nations in the Caribbean and the Pacific, as well as the Vatican.

In a statement, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry expressed “pain and regret” at the news and said it would in turn sever diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, halt bilateral cooperation, and evacuate staffers from the country.

“The Ortega presidency disregarded the long-term friendship between Taiwanese and Nicaraguan that shared weal and woe. We are very sorry to see that,” it said, referring to Nicaragua’s recently reelected leader Daniel Ortega.

“Taiwan as a part of international society has the right to diplomatic relations with other countries. We will continue to promote “Steadfast Diplomacy” to expand our international surviving space, dedicating ourselves into maintaining regional peace and stability, fighting for the international status that we deserve, and protecting this nation’s interests and the benefit of the people,” Taiwan’s statement added.

A US State Department spokesperson said in a statement the decision to severe ties with Taiwan “deprives Nicaragua’s people of a steadfast partner in its democratic and economic growth.”

“We encourage all countries that value democratic institutions, transparency, the rule of law, and promoting economic prosperity for their citizens to expand engagement with Taiwan,” the statement said.

But speaking on Friday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi accused the US of a “double standard,” according to state-run broadcaster CCTV, pointing out that Washington has for decades maintained diplomatic relations with Beijing.

“What right (does the US) have to stop other sovereign states from making their own choices?” Wang said.

According to Taiwan’s official Central News Agency, this is not the first time Nicaragua has broken ties with the self-governing island. It previously switched recognition to Beijing in 1985 — also under President Ortega, who is currently serving his fifth non-consecutive term.

The two countries resumed ties in 1990, during the presidency of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, CNA reported.

Pubblicato in: Economia e Produzione Industriale, Geopolitica America Latina.

Brasile. Giugno. PMI in crescita, ma ancora in fascia di contrazione.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-07-08.

Brazil 001

Ricordiamo la definizione del Purchasing Managers Index (PMI).

«The Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) is a composite indicator designed to provide an overall view of activity in the manufacturing sector and acts as an leading indicator for the whole economy. The PMI is a composite index based on the diffusion indexes for the following five indicators and their weight: New orders – 0.3, Output – 0.25 , Employment – 0.2, Suppliers delivery times – 0.15 and Stock of items purchased – 0.1 with the Delivery times index inverted so that it moves in a comparable direction. When PMI is below 50.0 this indicates that the manufacturing economy is declining and a value above 50.0 indicates an expansion of the manufacturing economy. The individual survey indexes have been seasonally adjusted using the US Bureau of Census X-11 programme. The seasonally adjusted series are then used to calculate the seasonally adjusted PMI.»

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A giugno i PMI del Brasile sono tutti in crescita:

– PMI Servizi, dal 27.6 di maggio al 35.9 di giugno;

– PMI Composito, dal 28.1 di maggio al 40.5 di giugno;

– PMI Manifatturiero, dal 38.3 di maggio al 51.6 di giugno.

Sono valori in crescita, ma sotto la soglia di 50, tranne il manifatturiero.

«Economic activity in Brazil contracted significantly in June for a fourth month, a survey of purchasing managers’ activity showed on Friday, as the COVID-19 crisis ensured Latin America’s largest economy ended the second quarter on a weak footing»

«There was, however, a sharp divergence between manufacturing, which expanded slightly, and the dominant services sector, which remained under severe pressure and shed jobs at the fastest pace on record»

«the April-June PMIs are consistent with Brazil’s gross domestic product falling by around 7-8% in the second quarter, maybe more. GDP shrank 1.5% in the January-March period.»

«Brazil’s economy is expected to shrink by a record 6.3% this year, according to a Reuters poll of economists. The International Monetary Fund is forecasting a crash of 9.1%.»

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La crisi da Covid-19 ha flagellato il Brasile in modo severo.

Se è vero che si notano segnali di ragionevole ripresa, questi macrodati suggerirebbero un ritorno alla norma più lento di quanto sarebbe stato auspicabile.

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Reuters. Brazil PMIs show economic activity shrank in June for fourth straight month

Economic activity in Brazil contracted significantly in June for a fourth month, a survey of purchasing managers’ activity showed on Friday, as the COVID-19 crisis ensured Latin America’s largest economy ended the second quarter on a weak footing.

There was, however, a sharp divergence between manufacturing, which expanded slightly, and the dominant services sector, which remained under severe pressure and shed jobs at the fastest pace on record.

IHS Markit’s Brazil services purchasing managers index (PMI) rose to 35.9 in June from 27.6 in May, and the composite PMI encompassing manufacturing rose to 40.5 from 28.1.

Although both headline indexes rose on the month, they still signaled steep declines in activity: a reading above 50.0 marks expansion, while a reading below signifies contraction. Both marked the fourth month in a row of shrinking activity.

Paul Smith, economics director at data provider IHS Markit, said the April-June PMIs are consistent with Brazil’s gross domestic product falling by around 7-8% in the second quarter, maybe more. GDP shrank 1.5% in the January-March period.

“Despite easing somewhat since May, the downturn in Brazil’s services economy remains severe and of an unprecedented nature,” Smith said. “Indeed, the latest data on activity and new business was again quite simply awful,” he added.

Brazil’s economy is expected to shrink by a record 6.3% this year, according to a Reuters poll of economists. The International Monetary Fund is forecasting a crash of 9.1%.

The services employment index reading of 34.9 in June was the lowest since the index was constructed in 2007, IHS Markit said. The new business, outstanding business and new export business indexes all remained well blow 50.0.

On the upside, the services business expectations index jumped to 57.0, although Smith cautioned that even that is consistent with “historically muted” sentiment.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica America Latina., Medicina e Biologia

Peru. Epidemia da coronavirus quasi fuori controllo.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-05-03.

2020-04-27__Peru Lima 001

Secondo i dati riportati da Community Mobility Reports gli abitanti del Perù non brillano per disciplina nell’osservare il lockdown. Ma il Covid-19 non è per nulla comprensivo.

Secondo quanto riportato da World Meters al 25 aprile sarebbero stati constatati 21,648 casi di contagio, dei quali 7,496 ricoverati con 634 decessi. La curva cumulativa dei casi è in ascesa esponenziale.

Ma le cifre ufficiali rappresentano solo una minima parte del contagio. I tamponi sono effettuati solo sui ricoverati ed i decessi si riferiscono solo agli spedalizzati.

Quanto la situazione sia drammatica sarebbe ben attestato dal fatto che i sei forni crematori di Lima non riescono a smaltire le salme, centinaia delle quali sono state messe in celle frigorifere di emergenza.

«We as a hospital have a capacity for only six bodies, …. Daily we have been seeing 13 to 16 bodies crowded on the first floor»

«video showing at least four dead bodies covered in white or black covers in a hospital corridor»

«the number of dead had exceeded the capacity of the hospital as there was only space for six bodies in the mortuary»

«We have now contracted a freezer, a refrigerated container to store the bodies while they come to collect them for cremation, …. The 100-body freezer has been in operation since Monday»

«Even the cremation of remains has become an issue, with Lima’s six crematoriums already exceeding capacity»

Ma il dramma consiste anche nella straordinaria carenza dei farmaci e dei sussidi medicali.

«We have to use three masks throughout the month, so we re-use»

«The government has also been gradually increasing the amount of tests, which totaled over 155,000»

Dovrebbe essere evidente che avendo eseguito un numero davero molto basso di tamponi, i casi di contagio ufficialmente dichiarati siano pochi.

«Ciro Maguiña, vice dean of the Peruvian Medical College, said 237 doctors nationwide had been infected to date, with nine in intensive care using mechanical respirators. One doctor had died. Those numbers do not include nurses or other health workers»

* * *

Ma la situazione è forse meglio espressa dalla fuga dalla capitale.

Peru: riot police block highway as people attempt to flee amid lockdown

«Riot police in Peru have blockaded a major highway and fired teargas into crowds of people attempting to flee the capital city and return on foot to their rural hometowns as the country’s strict coronavirus lockdown entered its sixth week ….

Poor Peruvians have been trying to leave Lima since last week, many saying they had to choose between hunger or homelessness in the city or risking exposure to Covid-19 as they attempt to return home ….

Here in Lima there are no longer any jobs, there is no longer any way to pay for food, we do not have any more savings ….

The number of patients is close to exceeding the capacity of the health service ….

More than 70% of Peruvians work in the unregulated economy, according to the country’s statistics institute»

Ma che la situazione sia ben più grave di quanto ammesso è evidenziato anche dalle sommosse per il cibo.

Hunt For Food By Peru’s Poor During Pandemic

«During the COVID-19 pandemic, Peru’s poorest citizens are struggling to find food. ….

walking about 2 miles (3 kilometers) to a market where they ask for food. The merchants give them potatoes, meat bones and overripe fruit that nobody wants to buy. …. But these days the merchants are refusing to give them as much food, if any at all, because their sales have fallen amid the pandemic and strict measures that have kept people at home and shuttered the restaurants that would buy their goods. ….

The pandemic has spotlighted the wide gap between rich and poor in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America, and economists say a looming recession worse than any since World War II could push the continent’s long-suffering poor into even more dire circumstances»

* * * * * * *

Gran parte dei soggetti che si recano in ospedale con i sintomi classici da infezione da coronavirus è rimandata alle proprie abitazioni perché i posti letto sono esauriti.

In conclusione, è netta la impressione che l’epidemia da Covid-19 sia in Perù molto più severa di quanto non si voglia ammettere.

*


In Peru, bodies mount and masks are reused with region’s second highest coronavirus cases.

“We have to use three masks throughout the month, so we re-use,” said a nurse. “Where I work, colleagues have caught the disease.”

LIMA, Peru—Peru’s hospitals are straining to deal with a rapid rise in the number of COVID-19 infections, with bodies being kept in hallways, masks being repeatedly reused, and protests breaking out amongst medical workers concerned over their safety.

Peru has the second highest number of cases in South America after Brazil, despite a tough lockdown aimed at halting the spread of the coronavirus.

Confirmed numbers have risen sharply in recent days, passing 17,000 on Tuesday, double the figure from just one week ago. Almost 500 people have died.

“We as a hospital have a capacity for only six bodies,” Deisy Aguirre, leader of the nurses union at the Maria Auxiliadora hospital in Lima, told Reuters outside the hospital on Monday. “Daily we have been seeing 13 to 16 bodies crowded on the first floor.”

The health ministry says it expects patient numbers to peak within days or in the following week.

On Monday, dozens of health workers protested in front of the Maria Auxiliadora hospital, holding banners decrying a lack of protective equipment such as masks.

A doctor at the protest who declined to give his name provided video showing at least four dead bodies covered in white or black covers in a hospital corridor.

Susana Oshiro, the hospital’s director, told Reuters that at some point the number of dead had exceeded the capacity of the hospital as there was only space for six bodies in the mortuary.

“We have now contracted a freezer, a refrigerated container to store the bodies while they come to collect them for cremation,” she said. The 100-body freezer has been in operation since Monday, she added.

Even the cremation of remains has become an issue, with Lima’s six crematoriums already exceeding capacity.

Edgar González, head of Lima’s Santa Rosa crematorium, told Reuters by telephone that before the pandemic they cremated 10 bodies a day and now they are cremating up to 30.

Peru reported its first case of coronavirus on March 6 and it took 25 days to add 1,000 infections. Fourteen days later it reached 10,000 cases, official data show.

The government has also been gradually increasing the amount of tests, which totaled over 155,000 as of Tuesday, one of the highest levels in the region.

In Latin America, only Brazil has more confirmed cases, with over 40,000. Chile is third, with over 10,000.

Rosmini Ayquipa, another nurse from the María Auxiliadora hospital, told Reuters workers had had to wear the same masks for several days due to a shortage.

“We have to use three masks throughout the month, so we re-use and re-use it and what has happened? Where I work, colleagues have caught the disease,” she said.

Oshiro, the hospital director, said the complaint related to N95 type masks, which she said everyone wanted to use but which were only given to personnel involved in the treatment of COVID-19 patients. Everyone else has surgical masks, she said.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says limited re-use of masks is generally acceptable, though not all types of masks can be reused and they should be discarded when “soiled, damaged, or hard to breathe through.”

Reuters could not confirm how many workers had become sick at the María Auxiliadora hospital.

However, Ciro Maguiña, vice dean of the Peruvian Medical College, said 237 doctors nationwide had been infected to date, with nine in intensive care using mechanical respirators. One doctor had died. Those numbers do not include nurses or other health workers.

President Martín Vizcarra has acknowledged that the country’s hospitals are already close to capacity. He has taken steps to increase intensive care units and the number of hospital beds.

“In the next few days we are going to have an increase in the capacity of care with ventilators arriving,” he said in a news conference on Monday.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica America Latina., Materie Prime

Cina. Sta investendo massicciamente in Bolivia e Columbia. La guerra del Litio.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-03-03.

Bolivia 001

«La Bolivia è molto ricca, si dice che abbia il 70% delle riserve di questa risorsa essenziale per produrre le nuove batterie. E tutti sappiamo che il mondo sta avviando un cambiamento energetico»


«Bolivia, is a country located at South America, it has an area of 1,098,580 Km2, and it may be considered a large country.

Bolivia, with a population of 11,353,142 people, it is ranked at 80º position by population of 196 countries and it has a low population density, 10 people per km2.

The capital is Sucre and its currency is Bolivians

Bolivia is holding the 95 position by nominal GDP. Its national debt in 2017 was 19,374 millions of dollars, ( 51.26% debt-to-GDP ratio) and its public debt per capita is 1,731$ dollars per inhabitant.

The last annual rate of CPI published in Bolivia was on July of 2019 and it was 1.9%.

In terms of the human development index (HDI) of Bolivia, which is the index used by the United Nations to measure the progress of a country, was 0.693 points in 2017, leaving it in 118th place in the table of 189 countries published.

If the reason to visit Bolivia are business, you must know it’s in the 156th of the Doing Business ranking , which provides objective measures of business regulations for local firms» [Country Economy]

Nel 2018 il pil ppa procapita ammontava a 7,873.2 Usd, dato il basso costo della vita. In venti anni ha quintuplicato il pil.

2020-02-26__Bolivia_Gdp__001

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Il vero tesoro racchiuso in Bolivia è il litio, e la Bolivia fa parte con l’Argentina ed il Cile del così detto ‘Triangolo del Litio’. Le sue scorte e la sua produzione coprono il 70% dell’attuale fabbisogno mondiale.

Chi governasse, de iure oppure de facto, la Bolivia assumerebbe un ruolo egemone mondiale.

È del tutto ovvio come la Cina desideri avere ottimi rapporti con la Bolivia, la finanzi largamente, e stia comprando molte sue aziende. Di converso, è altrettanto ovvio come il mondo occidentale, liberal socialista, avversi questa operazioni con termini anche molto ingiuriosi.

«Così, dopo tante fatiche – partner privati che accettino le condizioni di pubblica utilità imposte da Morales non sono stati facili da trovare -, nel dicembre 2018 è nata una joint-venture fra la compagnia Yacimientos de Litio Boliviano (Ylb) e la società tedesca Aci System Alemania GmbH, la quale avrebbe promesso investimenti per oltre un miliardo di dollari nell’industrializzazione del settore (la Germania, infatti, punta a fabbricare batterie per auto elettriche, nell’industria Daimler, Ndr). Inoltre, nel febbraio del 2019, è nata un’altra compartecipazione, questa volta con la società cinese Tbea Group Co. Ltd, che ha accettato di dare vita ad una società mista (col 51% in mano allo Stato boliviano) e di mettere circa 2,3 miliardi di dollari come capitale di investimento iniziale.»

Ma la Germania ha fatto il ruggito del topo.

Bolivia scraps joint lithium project with German company

The Bolivian government has issued a decree overturning a massive joint lithium project with southern German firm ACISA. The project is considered vital for the German auto industry’s plans to develop electric batteries.

The Bolivian government has cancelled a joint partnership with Germany’s privately owned ACI Systems Alemania (ACISA) to develop a massive lithium project.

Residents in the city of Potosi, where the joint venture had planned to build a factory for electric vehicle batteries and a lithium hydroxide plant, have been protesting since early October against the project. Organized by the Potosi Civic Committee, protesters say the project would not benefit local communities.

Potosi Department Governor Carlos Cejas said Sunday he had received a decree from the government of President Evo Morales to overturn a previous decree permitting the project, Bolivian state news agency ABI reported.

ACISA did not immediately comment on the news.

No reason was provided for the decision, but Cejas accused “agitators” from inside and outside the state of undermining development in the region.

It comes as Morales is facing deadly unrest and calls for a new election after he was named winner of the October 20 election for a fourth term. Ahead of the election, Morales had blamed the opposition for organizing the protests against the lithium project to undermine his government.

*

«China’s interest in what the International Monetary Fund ranks as South America’s fastest-growing economy is deepening»

«Within the last three months, China’s Zijin Mining Group Co Ltd bought a gold mine in Colombia, and a consortium led by China Harbor Engineering Co won a contract to build the Bogota metro system»

«Colombia’s President Ivan Duque made an official visit to Beijing in July 2019 to bolster Chinese demand for his country’s agricultural products and encourage continued Chinese investment in the Andean nation»

«While the two countries appear to be growing closer, Colombia has not signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since 2013, the multibillion-dollar initiative – designed to help the Asian giant partner with countries around the world through trade and various infrastructure projects – has drawn in 19 Latin American nations but not Colombia»

«In just four years, the presence of Chinese companies has quadrupled in Colombia, increasing from 20 to around 80 companies»

«La Federazione Internazionale per i Diritti Umani (IFHR) ha condotto un’indagine che evidenzia un modello di violazioni dei diritti umani e ambientali commesse dalle aziende cinesi in America Latina»

«Some see Zijin Mining Group Co Ltd’s purchase of a gold mine in Colombia as a brave investment given the mine’s troubled past»

* * * * * * *

L’occidente usa armi spuntate. Accusa la Cina di non rispettare i diritti umani dei boliviani, per voce dell’Ifhr: reato punibile con la sedia elettrica nei paesi liberal, ma di cui la Bolivia ed i Cinesi se ne curano poco o punto, anche per il fatto che l’accusa è infondata.

Resta il fatto che la Cina ha approntato una collaborazione economica di ampio respiro ed ha fatto cacciar via a pedate i tedeschi, che stanno ululando alla luna tutto il loro disappunto.

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China’s strong push into Colombia

Chinese companies bought Colombian gold mines – and are building Bogota’s new metro system and much more.

China‘s interest in what the International Monetary Fund ranks as South America’s fastest-growing economy is deepening. Within the last three months, China’s Zijin Mining Group Co Ltd bought a gold mine in Colombia, and a consortium led by China Harbor Engineering Co won a contract to build the Bogota metro system. 

Colombia‘s President Ivan Duque made an official visit to Beijing in July 2019 to bolster Chinese demand for his country’s agricultural products and encourage continued Chinese investment in the Andean nation.

“[Duque] is the first Colombian president that has visited China during his first year as president. This means a lot because if you visit a country in your first year, it means that it is a priority for your government,” Juan Felipe Roldan, a lawyer who specialises in Chinese firms operating in Colombia, told Al Jazeera. “We believe it is going to strengthen Colombian relationships a lot.”

“The buying of [the mining firm] Continental Gold by a Chinese company is a reflection of what is going on in the Colombia market right now regarding Chinese investors,” Roldan said. “Colombia is becoming more and more attractive.”

While the two countries appear to be growing closer, Colombia has not signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since 2013, the multibillion-dollar initiative – designed to help the Asian giant partner with countries around the world through trade and various infrastructure projects – has drawn in 19 Latin American nations but not Colombia. And yet, that could change. Roldan says China’s recent large-scale projects in the South American country suggest Colombia my join the BRI.

Colombia’s strategic value to China

In just four years, the presence of Chinese companies has quadrupled in Colombia, increasing from 20 to around 80 companies, according to documents provided to Al Jazeera by ProColombia.

The Economic & Commercial Counselor for the Chinese Embassy in Bogota Dong Wei told Al Jazeera that China is pleased more Chinese companies are investing in and operating in Colombia. “Colombia is strategically important in the region and is the only country in South America that connects the [Pacific and Atlantic] oceans and is politically and economically stable.”

This year will mark the 40th anniversary of diplomatic ties between China and Colombia. Economic relations between the two countries started picking in the late 1990s.

ProColombia data shows Chinese direct investment in Colombia went from almost nothing in 1994 to a height of $55.7m in 2016 and since then routinely hovers around $30m annually.

Areas of concern

The International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) conducted an investigation that points to a pattern of human and environmental rights violations committed by Chinese companies in Latin America. IFHR is a coalition of more than 20 human rights organisations. Its report, released in 2018, slammed Chinese firms for not complying with international standards and for a reported lack of accountability for human rights violations in countries where they operate, including Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia.

The report alleges Chinese companies operating in Latin America “failed to implement environmental consultation processes aimed at the general population, as set out in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Nor did they follow processes of free, prior, and informed consultation with indigenous groups meeting the standards established in Convention 169 of the ILO and in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”

Chinese officials deny those allegations, and say China’s companies abide by host-country laws and commonly accepted standards.

“The Chinese government always demands and guides Chinese companies to maintain an operation that complies with laws and regulations abroad, and for years has published several regulatory documents in regards to this,” said Wei.

Last year, Beijing enacted new regulations governing how its companies should operate outside of China. The new rules call on companies to follow the host country’s standards. They also require Chinese firms to conduct environmental assessments before beginning operations and to consult local stakeholders and people most likely to be impacted by a project.

“It will be an interesting test to see if Chinese companies really follow those guidelines or if it’s empty rhetoric,” said David Castrillon, a research professor on China-related issues at Bogota’s Externado University.

Risky business

Some see Zijin Mining Group Co Ltd’s purchase of a gold mine in Colombia as a brave investment given the mine’s troubled past. Continental Gold’s operations are situated in the small town of Buritica, in Colombia’s central northwestern Antioquia region. Last year, four Continental Gold workers were killed by gunmen within a few weeks. One of them was shot near Buritica, and the others were murdered at a different exploration site.

Al Jazeera made several requests to Zijin Mining Group Co Ltd for comment about the company’s future work in Colombia, but by the time of publication, had received no response.

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La geopolitica del litio in Bolivia.

Il freschissimo caso del caos scatenato in Bolivia potrebbe essere foriero di un messaggio imprescindibile nella disamina delle vicende globali: le questioni economiche, spesso, si celano dietro a determinate scelte politiche, che si tratti di spinte endogene, di collaborazioni fra le parti o di operazioni eterodirette. L’espressione del “Seguire i soldi” è entrata nell’uso comune, e non incidentalmente: basti ricordare che il magistrato Giovanni Falcone la adoperò nei riguardi della mafia, celatasi sempre dietro la pista del denaro.

Ora, per quel che riguarda La Paz, una considerazione impossibile da non prendere in esame è – infatti – quella della presenza, nel sottosuolo boliviano, di numerosi e prosperi giacimenti di litio: un metallo alcalino, il più leggero del mondo, depositario di un soprannome metaforico ed emblematico. Come il petrolio è l’oro nero e l’acqua è l’oro blu, così il litio è l’oro bianco. Ed è cosa ben nota che, nel corso della storia, l’uomo abbia sempre avuto una qual certa ossessione per l’oro, di qualsivoglia fattezze esso fosse fatto.

Il litio si configura, nella contemporaneità, come un metallo estremamente prezioso, in quanto esso viene adoperato in ioni per fare le batterie ricaricabili dei telefoni cellulari, dei tablet, persino delle macchine elettriche: con un ottimo rapporto peso/potenza, esso non disperde la carica. Il suo mercato è amplissimo, la sua richiesta è molto alta, come ben più alto degli anni scorsi è diventato il suo prezzo. Senza considerare che anche la ricerca scientifica si sta prodigando nei confronti dell’usufrutto di questo materiale: il Premio Nobel per la Chimica dell’anno 2019 è andato al gruppo di lavoro composto da John B. Goodenough, M. Stanley Whittingham ed Akira Yoshino, proprio per lo sviluppo delle batterie ricaricabili di litio.

Per ciò stesso, è auto-evidente che esistano dei grossi interessi economici dietro al mercato del litio, in tutte le sue fasi: ricerca, estrazione, trasporto, lavorazione, vendita. Essendo che la Bolivia è un Paese ricchissimo di questo materiale, andare in profondità in tale questione garantisce la possibilità di apprendere e comprendere meglio il panorama politico ed economico che si staglia impenitente dietro agli scontri nello Stato latino-americano.

L’abbondanza di litio in Sud America

Il litio, perciò, assume un’importanza strategica non indifferente, come poc’anzi è stato accennato. L’80% delle quantità mondiali di litio si trova in America Latina, ed ancora più precisamente in un triangolo di giacimenti fra Cile, Argentina e Bolivia. I quali sono, rispettivamente a questi tre Paesi: Salar de Atacama, Salar del Hombre Muerto, Salar de Uyuni (vicino alla famosa Potosì, dove i “conquistadores” spagnoli scoprirono nel XVII secolo un enorme giacimento di argento).

Il The Economist, ancora nel 2017, nel suo articolo Una battaglia per la supremazia nel triangolo del litio. La corsa all’oro bianco, aveva confrontato gli approcci dei tre Paesi a questa loro risorsa.

– In Cile, il litio si estrae in grande abbondanza, con facilità ed a buon prezzo, anche se il governo – nonostante le sue ultra-trentennali simpatie liberiste e filo-occidentali – lo ha sottoposto ad un severo controllo, trattandosi di una “risorsa strategica”. Una particolarità che, in ogni caso, non impedisce e non ha impedito affatto l’intervento privato: a provvedervi sono infatti l’americana Albermarle e la cilena SQM, con 70mila tonnellate all’anno vendute (un terzo del fabbisogno mondiale).

– In Argentina, il governo degli anni passati di Mauricio Macrì ha aperto le porte agli investimenti diretti esteri, annullando di fatto tutte le rigorose barriere che l’amministrazione Kirchner aveva posto, in ragione di fare in modo che le multinazionali non si arricchissero spropositatamente alle spalle della popolazione e delle sue risorse. Invece, l’ideologia più liberale di Macrì – oggi sconfitto alle elezioni e sostituito dai peronisti – ha attirato molti attori internazionali, che si sono presi la scena ed hanno sfruttato le proprie competenze per velocizzare ed rendere efficiente l’estrazione;

– In Bolivia, soltanto le imprese statali, od a maggioranza statale (compartecipate da privati stranieri), possono estrarre il litio, in ragione del fatto che l’obiettivo del governo di Evo Morales (appena destituito, dopo le proteste della destra e gli ammutinamenti di polizia ed esercito) desiderava il controllo su una risorsa primaria del Paese.

Il materiale grezzo  del litio deve essere separato dai cloruri di sodio, potassio e magnesio, affinché possa essere utilizzato per le batterie di tutto il mondo. Le tecnologie da adottare sono avanzate e necessitano di conoscenze; l’industria sta progredendo sempre più rapidamente verso un cambio di paradigma; l’impatto ambientale necessita e merita di essere tenuto in considerazione, trattandosi – in tutti questi casi – di realtà naturali e paesaggistiche notevoli (quelle in cui si trovano le risorse del succitato metallo alcalino): tutti fattori infattibili da escludere nell’anatomizzazione della questione litio.

La geopolitica del litio

A riguardo, nel 2015 a Buenos Aires è stato pubblicato da Editorial El Colectivo un insieme di studi, a cura di Bruno Fornillo, dal titolo Geopolitica del litio. Una raccolta esemplificativa di tutto il circuito che si cela dietro a questo metallo alcalino: traiettoria e morfologia del mercato mondiale, prospettive sul futuro dell’oro bianco, il processo scientifico alla base e la rispettiva lavorazione, l’industria dell’estrazione, la coesione fra politica e produzione, le normative statali e provinciali, ecosistema e territorialità, organizzazione e strategie comunitarie, vulnerabilità e così via. Così, infatti, ne ha parlato nel suo saggio Julián Zícari, professore all’Università della capitale argentina: “La disputa globale sulle risorse naturali ci impone la necessità di pensare a come stabilire i legami tra gli attori economici, politici ed istituzionali, da diverse prospettive. Cioè, per capire come e perché diversi gruppi e attori entrano in conflitto, non possiamo ignorare come vengono ad intrecciarsi anche le diverse strutture di cui fanno parte. Quali i diversi scenari che devono affrontare in ciascun caso”.

Infatti, il litio costituisce, teoreticamente e fattualmente, il materiale attraverso il quale vi potrà essere l’auspicata transizione verso energie pulite: una vera e propria metamorfosi di paradigma energetico. Secondo Fornillo, come riportato dall’Agi, la vera partita da giocare al giorno d’oggi è sulle conoscenze, piuttosto che sulla quantità. Per quanto, comunque, l’individuazione dei maggiori giacimenti sia già stata effettuata e sia attualmente la vera coordinatrice mondiale della contesa. Si può leggere infatti di nuovo nel saggio di Zícari: “Problemi come la sovranità delle risorse e le ambizioni di sviluppo ed industrializzazione sono collegati a problemi di controversie ambientali e territoriali, al ruolo del capitale transnazionale. Esse chiedono di definire quale tipo di paradigma di crescita economica adottare, o comunque di che tipo sia il legame tra i diversi livelli del governo (nazionale, provinciale, municipale, regionale), senza contare quei problemi relativi alla distribuzione del surplus, alla ricerca scientifica ed alla struttura del mercato mondiale. Tutti questi argomenti vengono generalmente analizzati separatamente, indipendentemente dal fatto che ciò che accade in un campo finisce per influenzare gli altri, i quali si ritrovano ad essere fortemente correlati tra loro”.

Il territorio boliviano in cui giace l’oro bianco

Quanto appena mostrato con brillantezza ed eloquenza dal professore argentino è un esatto specchio della situazione del litio in Bolivia. In particolar modo, di Salar de Uyuni, la più grande distesa salina del mondo, ad oltre 3.600 metri di altezza ed estesa per più di 10mila chilometri quadrati: un piccolo paradiso in terra, che vanta una naturalezza incontaminata di spessore ed un’affluenza turistica importante. Un luogo nel quale, tuttavia, potrebbe presto irrompere con maggiore presenza e pressione l’industria dell’oro bianco: laddove oggi, invece, è sì presente, ma con minori impatto e rilevanza.

Un notevole reportage di National Geographic, a cura di Robert Draper e Cédric Gerbehaye, risalente al 2018, mostra quali siano le caratteristiche della piana salina e del meccanismo di estrazione del litio. Illustrato ai due ospiti niente di meno che dall’oramai ex vice-presidente della Bolivia, Álvaro Garcìa Linera. Un’illustrazione che ha mostrato anche le caratteristiche del territorio e dei suoi abitanti e lavoratori, i quali sono sempre stati i più preoccupati affinché una fiorente industria dovesse evitare di danneggiare le loro plurisecolari abitudini ed i loro plurisecolari paesaggi, nei quali le comunità indigene praticano per lo più agricoltura ed allevamento.

Un long-read su Nueva Sociedad risalente al 2013 e scritto da Juliana Ströbele-Gregor, dal titolo Il progetto statale del litio in Bolivia. Aspettative, sfide e dilemmi, illustrava già con chiarezza le implicazioni dell’industria dell’oro bianco nel Paese sudamericano. Esistono, infatti, questioni di disuguaglianza a livello globale, nazionale, regionale e locale di cui il governo avrebbe dovuto tenere conto: un tentativo nobilmente portato avanti dal presidente Evo Morales, che ha guidato il Paese sin dal 2006 e nel quale è riuscito a ridurre la povertà, a diminuire lo scarto fra le varie classi sociali, ed a migliorare le condizioni di vita di tutte le fasce della popolazione.

Soprattutto, avendo scelto di abbandonare il modello neo-liberale che sino ad allora era stato condotto innanzi, e che aveva fagocitato la ricchezza in favore dei più abbienti, condannando agli stenti il resto del Paese. Il litio, e tutto ciò che lo riguarda, era rientrato perfettamente in questo progetto e processo: le fasi di industrializzazione e commercializzazione avrebbero dovuto essere dirette a livello statale, per garantire equità e dignità dei risultati verso la popolazione. Ad esempio, verso gli indigeni boliviani, che con Morales erano letteralmente andati al governo. Tali risultati sono giunti, si sono implementati, ma – a livello economicistico – sono stati numericamente scarsi rispetto alle possibilità della Bolivia: una considerazione da cui, in effetti, sono nate le aperture politiche a compartecipazioni estere.

La scelta di Morales verso l’apertura

Le operazioni sono state per lungo tempo condotte unicamente da imprese statali boliviane, nell’ottica politicamente socialista di non dover dipendere da potenze straniere per la propria produzione e la propria sussistenza: tuttavia, ciò ha implicato un loro ridotto raggio d’azione, mancando le competenze tecniche per aumentare l’estrazione, la produzione e la vendita quindi, secondo i parametri stabiliti dal governo.

Per questi motivi, la Bolivia ha consentito l’arrivo di investimenti stranieri: l’obiettivo di lungo termine di voler diventare il primo produttore mondiale di litio (superando così la concorrenza delle vicine Cile ed Argentina e della lontana Australia) è stato dichiarato senza mezzi termini. Divenire una novella Arabia Saudita dell’oro bianco, ma usufruire delle entrate per continuare a sviluppare il socialismo indigeno di Morales nel rispetto dell’ambiente. Lo ha dichiarato all’inizio dell’anno 2019 Garcìa Linera: “La Bolivia di ieri era quella dell’arretratezza, della povertà assoluta e della stagnazione; la Bolivia di oggi guarda al progresso che, con grande entusiasmo, sta creando benessere. Abbiamo smesso di essere un Paese povero per diventare un Paese a reddito medio. Ci sono ancora molti bisogni, ma abbiamo fatto passi da gigante e, se continueremo su questo trend di progressi, in circa 8 anni avremo un reddito simile a quello del Cile o dell’Argentina. Queste sono conquiste di tutti boliviani perché il cambiamento è stato fatto grazie alla lotta di tutta la popolazione del Paese”.

Così, dopo tante fatiche – partner privati che accettino le condizioni di pubblica utilità imposte da Morales non sono stati facili da trovare -, nel dicembre 2018 è nata una joint-venture fra la compagnia Yacimientos de Litio Boliviano (Ylb) e la società tedesca Aci System Alemania GmbH, la quale avrebbe promesso investimenti per oltre un miliardo di dollari nell’industrializzazione del settore (la Germania, infatti, punta a fabbricare batterie per auto elettriche, nell’industria Daimler, Ndr). Inoltre, nel febbraio del 2019, è nata un’altra compartecipazione, questa volta con la società cinese Tbea Group Co. Ltd, che ha accettato di dare vita ad una società mista (col 51% in mano allo Stato boliviano) e di mettere circa 2,3 miliardi di dollari come capitale di investimento iniziale.

Accordi che, mutando profondamente il quadro interno, invero hanno suscitato più di qualche criticità fra le popolazioni indigene della società boliviana che abitano quei territori, non sicure dei risultati che potranno venire a loro. Ricardo Augirre Ticona, presidente del consiglio comunale di Llica (in Salar de Uyuni), ha infatti dichiarato: “Ci rendiamo conto che quando lo stabilimento lavorerà a pieno ritmo sarà un’impresa multimilionaria. Il dubbio è se qualcosa arriverà a noi. Le persone che dovrebbero trarne principalmente beneficio sono gli abitanti della zona in cui si svolge la produzione. E non si tratta solo di denaro contante. Dovrebbero istituire qui una facoltà di chimica, o delle borse di studio, perché i giovani possano avere un futuro”.

Geopolitica del litio nella caduta di Morales

Tuttavia, questi accordi sul litio potrebbero presto mutare, in quanto l’insurrezione contro Morales e la fuga del Presidente in Messico hanno già dato una virata alla situazione boliviana. Infatti, egli era stato rieletto al quarto mandato, nonostante il trattamento un po’ fuori dalle righe dei dettami della costituzione, e nonostante avesse dato poco conto alla situazione degli incendi nell’Amazzonia del suo Paese. Il che gli ha tolto credibilità agli occhi di diversi dei suoi sostenitori.

Tuttavia, l’accusa di brogli è stato il perfetto casus belli: la polizia e le forze armate si sono ribellate a lui, così dapprima egli ha convocato nuove elezioni e poi, minacciato fisicamente e con un mandato di cattura, ha scelto l’esilio all’estero. La leader dell’opposizione di destra Jeanine Anez si è auto-proclamata presidente. La situazione, nel frattempo, rimane incandescente e magmatica, con la maggioranza della popolazione comunque dalla parte di Morales, e scesa in strada contro l’opposizione ed il colpo di mano dell’esercito.

La dipartita politica di Morales è stata festeggiata in alcuni Paesi (gli Stati Uniti in primis), condannata in altri (come la Cina), e questo dà sicuramente una qual certa idea degli interessi in ballo in Bolivia. Oltreché dello scontro di potenze dietro a questo Stato, la cui ricchezza dell’oro bianco fa gola a molti, in special modo nel momento in cui il mercato dell’estrazione dello stesso dovesse essere liberalizzato: non incidentalmente, esso è già stato soprannominato il golpe del litio.

Pepe Mujica, il famosissimo ed amatissimo ex presidente dell’Uruguay, non ha dubbi sull’esecuzione e sull’andamento di questa dinamica: “In Bolivia c’è stato un colpo di Stato, senza fare troppi giri di parole, perché c’è stato un ultimatum dell’esercito”. Le cause potrebbero essere ricercate proprio nelle riserve di litio del Paese:

La Bolivia è molto ricca, si dice che abbia il 70% delle riserve di questa risorsa essenziale per produrre le nuove batterie. E tutti sappiamo che il mondo sta avviando un cambiamento energetico.

Si è detto antecedentemente come, al giorno d’oggi in particolar modo, le risorse energetiche costituiscano il vero “oro” da andare a cercare, rispetto al metallo più prezioso di tutti e per il quale, nei secoli passati, si sono fatte guerre, scorrerie e tanto altro. Di questo nuovo oro, il litio, che secondo gli analisti di Bloomberg sarà il vero protagonista del prossimo decennio, la Bolivia è piena. L’instabilità politica, e un’ideologia liberale e liberista con la quale trattare il mercato, sono elementi che possono contribuire a far propendere l’ago della bilancia in proprio favore.

Senza ombra di dubbio, il socialismo indigeno di Evo Morales – il quale, non a caso, era ed è vicino a Paesi come Nicaragua, Venezuela e Cuba, ma anche a Russia e Cina – non rientrava nell’asse a stelle e strisce, che ha sempre visto nell’America Latina il proprio “giardino di casa” (dalla Dottrina Monroe del 1823). La caduta del governo, e la possibilità di disfarsi degli accordi precedentemente intrapresi da quest’ultimo sul proprio oro bianco (con ricadute ambientali che potrebbero essere drammatiche), mescolano le carte in tavola. Lo scacchiere internazionale si sta smuovendo prepotentemente. Per ciò stesso, se ne deduce che anche per il litio, come per il petrolio, si agisce – con tutti i mezzi, per diversi fini – secondo geopolitica.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica America Latina.

Bolivia. Un paese in crescita, da tenersi d’occhio.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-07-28.

2019-07-23__Bolivia__001

«Bolivia, is a country located at South America, it has an area of 1,098,580 Km2, and it may be considered a large country.

Bolivia, with a population of 11,353,142 people, it is ranked at 80º position by population of 196 countries and it has a low population density, 10 people per km2.

The capital is Sucre and its currency is Bolivians

Bolivia is holding the 95 position by nominal GDP. Its national debt in 2017 was 19,377 millions of dollars, ( 50.89% debt-to-GDP ratio) and its public debt per capita is 1,731$ dollars per inhabitant.»

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Bolivia: GDP increases 4.2%

Gross Domestic Product of Bolivia grew 4.2% in 2018 compared to last year This rate is the same than the previous year.

The GDP figure in 2018 was $40,288 million, Bolivia is number 95 in the ranking of GDP of the 196 countries that we publish. The absolute value of GDP in Bolivia rose $2,230 million with respect to 2017.

The GDP per capita of Bolivia in 2018 was $3,549, $149 less than in 2017, when it was $3,400. To view the evolution of the GDP per capita, it is interesting to look back a few years and compare these data with those of 2008 when the GDP per capita in Bolivia was $1,695.

If we order the countries according to their GDP per capita, Bolivia is in 124th position, its population has a low level of affluence compare tothe 196 countries whose GDP we publish.

Here we show you the progression of the GDP in Bolivia. You can see GDP in other countries in GDP and see all the economic information about Bolivia in Bolivia’s economy.

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Quindici anni or sono, nel 2003, la Bolivia aveva un pil di 8.092 miliardi Usd, con un pil procapite di 918 Usd.

Quindici anni dopo il pil era cresciuto a 40.288 miliardi ed il pil procapite a 3,549 Usd.

Il debito pubblico è al 50%, in gran parte contratto per allestire opere infrastrutturali.