Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord è un caso unico nella storia. Nato da nobile famiglia a metà del ‘700, ma zoppo, fu avviato alla carriera ecclesiastica. Non ne era proprio portato: gli piacevano potere, denaro e belle donne. Ma ad una famiglia potente ben poco può essere negato: nel 1789 è nominato vescovo. Venuta la rivoluzione, il nostro cacciò la tonaca alle ortiche e si dette alla politica, per la quale aveva una prodigiosa vocazione. In breve, scala tutta la gradinata del potere. Un tradimento fatto con perfetto tempismo si ritrovò dopo il colpo del 18 brumaio a fare il ministro degli esteri di Napoleone, non senza essersi portato dietro come souvenir tre milioni di franchi oro. Si defila a suo tempo da un Napoleone cadente e risorge come ministro degli esteri del ritornato Re Luigi XVIII. Sul letto di morte chiederà di essere reintegrato nella carica vescovile.
Insomma, Talleyrand era un virtuoso nella politica, specialmente quella estera.
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Salvini è una grande personalità, ma talune sottili smaliziature tipiche della politica estera sembrerebbero essergli sfuggite.
I russi hanno una millenaria tradizione di ossequio ai trattati stipulati: sono usualmente di larghissime vedute, ma sanno essere ostinatamente fedeli a quanto sottoscritto, costi quel che costi. Nel novero mondiale, la Russia è il partner più affidabile che ci sia, ma esige un rapporto paritetico. Nelle trattative sanno essere spudoratamente chiari: conoscono bene gli abissi degli animi umani. Sono cresciuti storicamente con i mongoli ad est, gli svedesi al nord, i polacchi ad ovest ed i turki al sud. Poi, chiunque abbia visitato la provincia russa di inverno, ben comprende la loro mentalità, molto simile a quella dei naviganti: il gelo, il ghiaccio e la neve assomigliano ad un oceano ove villaggi e città sono le isole alle quali attraccare. Dirigersi verso un villaggio oppure una città ha come presupposto che vi si sia accolti, pena la morte.
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I rapporti con le superpotenze dovrebbero sempre essere concordati in modo che non si prestino ad ambiguità alcuna.
Troppo spesso i capi di governo di piccole nazioni si dimenticano dello smisurato potere che le superpotenze traggono dall’avere servizi informativi allo stato dell’arte. Nei fatti, sanno tutto di tutti: di qui la necessità di giocare sempre a carte scoperte.
Ottimo l’aver ricevuto Mr Putin, ottimi i rapporti commerciali con la Cina, ottimi i viaggi a Washington: sono però tre direttrici divergenti.
A poche settimane di distanza dalla missione di Salvini negli Usa escono i nastri dell’incontro di Mosca. Lega scaricata dagli Usa o compromessa dalla Russia?
17 giugno. Matteo Salvini in missione negli Stati Uniti incontra il segretario di Stato Pompeo e il vicepresidente Pence, promettendo una svolta iper atlantista al governo e soprattutto alla politica estera del Carroccio. Tra le altre cose, il leader del Carroccio si allinea alla Casa Bianca su Venezuela, Iran, Cina e (almeno in parte) anche sulle sanzioni alla Russia.
4 luglio. Vladimir Putin in visita in Italia. Ricorda tramite interviste e dichiarazioni la sua vicinanza alla Lega, sostenendo allo stesso tempo che il sovranismo è morto. Ma secondo diverse fonti non tutto fila liscio.
10 luglio. Il sito d’informazione statunitense BuzzFeed pubblica alcune registrazioni e la trascrizione completa dell’incontro tra Gianluca Savoini, l'”ambasciatore” della Lega per i rapporti con la Russia, e altri italiani con uomini definiti “del Cremlino”.
La successione degli eventi è lì, sotto gli occhi, la mano (o l’orecchio) dietro la registrazione e la sua pubblicazione sono ancora nell’ombra. Ma è davvero difficile, difficilissimo, pensare che si tratti solo di un caso.
La sensazione, netta, è che la Lega sia finita in mezzo a un gioco più grande di lei in una storia dai contorni di spy story e messaggi più o meno criptati a livello geopolitico. Una storia che ricorda, pur con tutte le dovute differenze (e soprattutto ricordando che non esiste alcuna prova che del denaro sia effettivamente passato da Mosca alla Lega), quella dell’ex vicecancelliere austriaco Heinz-Christian Strache, costretto a dimettersi (con conseguente caduta del governo di Sebastian Kurz) a pochi giorni dalle elezioni europee dello scorso 26 maggio dopo la pubblicazione di un video che mostrava un suo incontro con una sedicente nipote di un oligarca vicino a Putin.
Una storia che magari non avrà conseguenze sul piano interno e sul governo Conte ma che ne avrà eccome sul ruolo internazionale della Lega e del suo leader Salvini.
Già, perché la pubblicazione di questa registrazione risalente all’ottobre 2018, proprio in questo momento, pregiudica i movimenti in materia di politica estera del Carroccio. Una politica estera, c’è da dire, spesso confusionaria. Prima era stato piazzato al Mise un convinto filocinese come Michele Geraci, fautore dell’accelerazione sul dossier Belt and Road, che ha portato all’adesione dell’Italia all’iniziativa strategica della Cina con la firma del memorandum alla presenza di Xi Jinping.
Subito dopo, anzi subito prima con una visita di Giancarlo Giorgetti negli States, la Lega aveva però cominciato a prendere le distanze dall’operazione di avvicinamento a Pechino, su imbeccata di Washington.
La missione di Salvini a Washington era servita proprio per rassicurare gli Usa e smarcarsi non solo dalla Cina ma anche dall’immagine di partito vicino (forse troppo) alla Russia di Vladimir Putin. Sembrava essere andata bene. Il vicepremier aveva espresso con forza una linea atlantista e trumpiana a livello geopolitico ed economico, tanto da assumere posizioni diverse da Mosca su alcuni dossier delicati come il Venezuela e l’Iran, oltre che sulla Cina.
Salvini sperava non solo di aver incassato l’appoggio di Donald Trump ma anche di potersi ergere a grande mediatore tra Washington e Mosca in un avvicinamento strategico auspicato da molti in funzione di contenimento dell’ascesa di Pechino.
Invece ecco gli audio di Savoini. Al di là della loro veridicità o meno, il segnale è chiaro. La Lega è stata sacrificata da Washington. O più probabilmente compromessa da Mosca.
Secondo diversi analisti, prima di “concedere” a Salvini il grado di partner strategico Trump vuole vedere le azioni concrete della Lega al governo su diversi dossier cari alla Casa Bianca, tra i quali il 5G e il riconoscimento di Guaidò. Il tutto a meno che non escano prove concrete del legame tra il Carroccio e Mosca, che dopo il Russiagate renderebbero di fatto “inutilizzabile” la Lega a Trump.
Dall’altra parte, la Russia di Putin potrebbe essere rimasta irritata dalla rotta sempre più atlantista di un partito che considera(va) amico. Ed ecco allora che le registrazioni, pubblicate dopo la visita di Putin a Roma, potrebbero essere anche interpretate come un soft (o sarebbe meglio dire hard) reminder: “Ricordatevi degli amici”.
Ma anche se non ci fossero dietro manine di Washington e Mosca e il timing fosse solo un caso, le conseguenze resterebbero le stesse. La svolta atlantista e trumpiana che Salvini voleva imporre alla sua Lega rischia di fallire. La stessa Russia avrà vita più difficile nei suoi rapporti con un’Unione europea che, se ce ne fosse stato bisogno, con l’atlantista pro Nato Ursula von der Leyen alla Commissione potrebbe assumere una posizione ancora più dura con Mosca con la benedizione dei paesi di Visegrad. E gli amici di Salvini a Visegrad, soprattutto i polacchi (ma non solo) ostili ai russi, potrebbero avere qualche imbarazzo a sviluppare legami con la Lega.
Insomma, una bella botta per una Lega che rischia davvero di restare un po’ più sola. E Salvini, se in un futuro più o meno prossimo vuole approdare a Palazzo Chigi, dovrà ricominciare tutto (o quasi) da capo sul fronte della sua politica estera.
«France said it will not accept a final G20 communique that does not mention the Paris climate change agreement, as President Emmanuel Macron hardened his position on climate change ahead of the G20 meeting.
Japanese media reported on Wednesday that leaders of the G20 top economies will call this week for the promotion of free trade to achieve strong global growth, as the United States and China seek to resume talks to resolve a bitter trade dispute.
In preparing a joint communique, Japan, the chair of the meetings, seeks common ground between the United States, which opposes language denouncing protectionism, and other nations, which want a stronger warning against the risk of trade tension.
However, France was adamant that any final G20 communique must also mention the 2016 Paris Climate Change agreement that was set up to protect the environment.»
La impressione netta sarebbe che anche questo G20 farà la fine dei precedenti.
«While the G20 was originally established in response to the global financial crisis, its core mission today is to establish economic fundamentals for realizing sustainable and inclusive growth of the global economy. From this perspective, first, the G20 discusses the impact of structural factors on the global economy, such as global imbalances and aging, in addition to monitoring major risks through surveillance of the global economy.
Second, the G20 discusses concrete actions for strengthening growth potential. We also discuss sustainable financing to promote Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in developing countries as well as promoting debt transparency and ensuring debt sustainability in low-income countries, in addition to promotion of the Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII), as well as measures that further reinforce the basis of sustainable development, including strengthening financial resilience against natural disasters such as disaster risk financing.
Third, in the areas of international taxation and finance, we take up issues of how to respond to economic and social structural changes brought by digitalization and globalization of the economy through technological innovation. This structural change has been radically changing the world’s economic and social landscape and business models. In order to harness this change for achieving sound growth, it is urgent to implement policy response in the area of internal taxation and finance, while avoiding harmful fragmentation of the global economic system.»
«International trade and investment are important engines of growth, productivity, innovation, job creation and development. The current development surrounding international trade are negatively affecting the prospects of global economy and trade. The G20 members, covering more than 80% of global GDP, have responsibility for resolving this situation. The G20 Ministerial Meeting on Trade and Digital Economy, held in Tsukuba city on June 8 and 9 focuses on the following issues:
– Dialogue on Current International Trade Developments
– A Sound Business Environment that Promotes Market-driven Investment Decisions
– Promotion of Trade and Investment that Contribute to Sustainable and Inclusive Growth
– WTO Reform, Recent Developments in Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements
– Interface between Trade and Digital Economy (joint session with the Ministerial Meeting on Digital Economy)
The rule-based multilateral trading system is at a critical juncture. In order to restore the confidence in the multilateral trading system, it is imperative to maintain and strengthen the momentum of WTO reform. At the Buenos Aires Summit, G20 Leaders expressed their “support [to] the necessary reform of the WTO to improve its functioning”, and agreed to review its progress at the Osaka Summit. Based on this, the Japanese presidency will take the lead in discussions in order to provide further political momentum to the WTO reform.
Furthermore, based on the discussions that took place in the past G20 summits, we continue to discuss the issue of the steel excess capacity which is a global issue that requires collective response under the Japanese presidency. In this context, the Global Forum for Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC), which was established in 2016 based on the agreement at the G20 Hangzhou Summit, continues the process of information-sharing on members’ production capacities and support measures, as well as the review process based on the provided information.»
«Under the past presidencies, G20 discussion has focused on how innovation, including digitalization, drives the economic growth and enhance productivity, while also shedding light on the importance of addressing its impact on labour market, skills, and digital divide. The Japanese presidency proposes focusing on the crucial role played by data in the 21st century economic system. …. »
Climate change, which is becoming more serious as seen by the frequent occurrence of disasters due to extreme climate all over the world in recent years, poses immediate challenges that require concerted actions by the international community. To address climate related challenges in a global scale under the framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, it is necessary to accelerate “a virtuous cycle of environment and growth” and aim to create a paradigm shift which promotes business-led innovation. To facilitate such efforts, it will be essential to create a number of innovations in the field of climate change and apply them in society. G20 members are focusing on discussing issues such as innovation, finance mobilization, and collaborating with non-state actors, together with addressing traditional major topics including mitigation, adaptation and climate finance.
Energy G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth is held on 15 to 16 June 2019 in Karuizawa, Nagano. Regarding energy, while attaching importance on energy transitions in accordance with each country’s own circumstances, discussions at the Ministerial Meeting and the G20 Osaka Summit focuses on accelerating innovation such as hydrogen and Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS) as a major impetus for a virtuous cycle of environmental and growth, mobilizing private finance for innovation, and improving business environment for dissemination of innovative technologies. In addition, building upon the outcomes of the discussion on energy during the previous Presidencies, various energy-related issues are comprehensively discussed.
Environment (Marine Plastic Litter)
Marine plastic litter, which has been attracting global attention in recent years, is an urgent challenge, given that it harms the marine ecosystem and impacts our health. In order to resolve this problem, measures to address this issue need to be taken by all countries, including emerging economies. G20 members are discussing how to prevent the discharge of plastic litter into the ocean and facilitate innovation in order to intensify global efforts on this issues at the “G20 Ministerial Meeting on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth” and the G20 Osaka Summit.»
«In 2019, the world is celebrating 60 years of the Antarctic Treaty, which was signed by 12 countries on December 1, 1959»
«For six decades, the Antarctic Treaty and its related agreements, known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), have successfully ensured peace and devoted the whole continent to science»
«The ATS proved to be resilient, but also has not seen any significant development since the 1990s, when the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol) was adopted to ban mining in Antarctica»
«China, a contracting party to the Antarctic Treaty, has become one so-called “challenger,”»
«There are seven claimants in the Antarctic – Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, and United Kingdom»
«Moreover, according to Article XII, although the Antarctic Treaty may be modified or amended at any time, unanimous agreement of the contracting parties must be achieved to do so»
«Therefore China, as a consultative party of the Antarctic Treaty, is entitled to raise a review conference that might end the mining ban in 2048»
«This is a legitimate question that perhaps sits at the heart of concerns about China’s “real” interests in Antarctica. China began its first Antarctic expedition in 1983, then gradually expanded its presence in the continent and adjacent waters. So far, China has four Antarctic stations (Great Wall, Zhongshan, Taishan Summer Camp, and Kunlun/Dome A), with a fifth station being built on the Ross Sea Ice Shelf, to be completed in 2022. In addition, China’s second ice-breaker, M/V Xue Long 2 will start its first polar voyage in late 2019.»
«Chinese interests could combine science, resources (e.g., fisheries or bioprospecting), tourism, shipping, and national pride»
«China is paying attention to Antarctic krill, the last untouched marine living resource on the planet.»
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Spesso delle cose importanti non se ne parla: che vada bene, le si danno per scontate.
Al momento attuale, uno sfruttamento minerario dell’Antartide avrebbe un senso economico solo se intervenissero sostanziali progressi tecnologici nel settore estrattivo di materie prime molto rare.
Ma nel contempo non potrebbe essere negata l’importanza strategica militare dell’Antartide.
Reviewing China’s activities and commitments under the 60-year-old Antarctic Treaty.
In 2019, the world is celebrating 60 years of the Antarctic Treaty, which was signed by 12 countries on December 1, 1959. For six decades, the Antarctic Treaty and its related agreements, known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), have successfully ensured peace and devoted the whole continent to science. The ATS proved to be resilient, but also has not seen any significant development since the 1990s, when the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol) was adopted to ban mining in Antarctica. The ATS is now facing a number of challenges, such as climate change.
China, a contracting party to the Antarctic Treaty, has become one so-called “challenger,” at least according to Western narratives. In this piece, I review the relations between China and the ATS in order to answer some of the most pressing questions being raised over Beijing’s intentions.
Is China going to make a territorial claim in Antarctica?
Highly unlikely. There are seven claimants in the Antarctic – Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, and United Kingdom. In addition, Marie Byrd Land in West Antarctica is left unclaimed. One of the key articles in the Antarctic Treaty is Article IV, which provides that “no new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.”
China ratified the Antarctic Treaty in 1983 and gained consultative status with voting rights in the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties meeting as of 1985. It is an obligation under international law that the Chinese government must support the Antarctic Treaty. China cannot simply make a claim, not without withdrawing from the Antarctic Treaty first. In “China’s Antarctic Activities,” the first Chinese government white paper on Antarctica, published in May 2017, it is reaffirmed that “the Chinese Government is in persistent support of the purposes and gist of the Antarctic Treaty, and has been committed to safeguarding the stability of the ATS.”
Moreover, according to Article XII, although the Antarctic Treaty may be modified or amended at any time, unanimous agreement of the contracting parties must be achieved to do so. It is a mission impossible for China to persuade all other consultative parties so as to amend the Article IV to facilitate any potential claim.
Will China start mining in Antarctica in the near future?
Also improbably. Led by late Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, the Madrid Protocol was enacted in 1991 and entered into force in 1998. Article 7 states that “any activity relating to mineral resources [in Antarctica], other than scientific research, shall be prohibited.” China ratified the Madrid Protocol in 1998, which means, from an international law perspective, that Beijing will adhere to this mining ban. As more proof, when China hosted the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting for the first time in 2017, then-Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Yesui reiterated China’s desire to support the mining ban.
Nevertheless, Article 25 does provide an opportunity to review the operation of the Madrid Protocol 50 years from the date of entry into force of this Protocol. Therefore China, as a consultative party of the Antarctic Treaty, is entitled to raise a review conference that might end the mining ban in 2048. But bear in mind that any modification or amendment will require agreement by more than three-fourths of all Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties.
In the foreseeable future, it is not commercially viable to conduct mining in Antarctica. Unless there is a game changer, either a significant advancement of mining technology or a discovery of minerals that are essential for the world’s economy but cannot be mined somewhere else, it is difficult to predict that China will openly violate its commitment under the Madrid Protocol and start mining in a continent far away from home.
If China has no concrete plan to claim and/or mine, why are they actively expanding their presence in Antarctica?
This is a legitimate question that perhaps sits at the heart of concerns about China’s “real” interests in Antarctica. China began its first Antarctic expedition in 1983, then gradually expanded its presence in the continent and adjacent waters. So far, China has four Antarctic stations (Great Wall, Zhongshan, Taishan Summer Camp, and Kunlun/Dome A), with a fifth station being built on the Ross Sea Ice Shelf, to be completed in 2022. In addition, China’s second ice-breaker, M/V Xue Long 2 will start its first polar voyage in late 2019.
As the world’s second largest economy, China now naturally has interests in almost every part of the world, be it outer space, the deep seabed, the Arctic, or Antarctica. Chinese interests could combine science, resources (e.g., fisheries or bioprospecting), tourism, shipping, and national pride. Chinese activities in Antarctica in particular seem to be designed to make sure China will not be left out should there be any possible opportunity in Antarctica in the future.
For example, China is paying attention to Antarctic krill, the last untouched marine living resource on the planet. The Chinese catch in Antarctic waters is very low at the moment. However, China sees the potential of krill fisheries under the current management of the Commission for the Conservation of Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and is interested in increasing its krill fishing in the Southern Ocean. This could be the root of the stalemate of the process to establish marine protected areas in Antarctica.
What if China disregards international law in Antarctica as it did in the South China Sea?
When comparing Chinese practices in the South China Sea and Antarctica, one needs to understand that the South China Sea is one of China’s core interests, where the Chinese government has consistently made territorial claims. Antarctica is neither a core interest, nor the site of claimed Chinese territory. It is fair to say that there is no evidence China has broken any rule under the ATS yet.
Still, China’s refusal to participate in the South China Sea arbitration initiated by the Philippines no doubt generated a negative image of China’s attitude toward international law. Further, it raised the question of consistency in Chinese practice of international law. Nevertheless, that was a unique political decision largely driven by China’s unpreparedness, inexperience, and mistrust of dispute settlement mechanisms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Apart from stonewalling the South China Sea arbitration, Chinese responses to a large extent have been trying to interpret the existing international law of the sea in favor of Chinese positions. For example, the Chinese Society of International Law published a 500-page critical study of the South China Sea arbitration awards in May 2018. The critical study is completely meaningless from a legal point of view, but it did showcase China’s willingness and capacity to engage with the law of the sea.
In the end, is there anything other countries, such as Australia, can do to ease their mind regarding Chinese activities in Antarctica?
Yes, Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty authorizes each consultative party to undertake inspections of others’ stations in Antarctica. This is an option other countries, especially claimants, could pursue. For example, Australia could request inspections of Chinese stations in the Australian Antarctic Territory (including Zhongshan, Taishan, and Kunlun).
While it is not possible to ask China to recognize any specific Antarctic claim, there are two avenues to secure Australia’s core interests in the Antarctic with China. First, after publishing its official Arctic Policy White Paper in January 2018, China’s Antarctic policy is shaping up. In the Arctic white paper, China states that it will firmly adhere to existing international law applicable in the Arctic, which paved the way for fruitful Chinese cooperation with Arctic states, in particular Russia and Nordic countries. Claimants could push China to declare in its future Antarctic white paper that China has no territorial claims in Antarctica. This is not against China’s policy position either, as noted above. But stating this outright will greatly ease the minds of all Antarctic claimants and enhance their trust to collaborate with China, e.g., through the Belt and Road Initiative.
Second, Australia could pursue specific reassurances at the bilateral level. For example, during then-Vice Premier Li Keqiang’s State Visit to Australia in 2009, then-Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd managed to achieve an Australia-China Joint Statement, which states “The two sides should respect and take into full consideration the core interests and major concerns of each other.” When the timing is right, perhaps the next Australia-China Joint Statement could further elaborate what those “core interests and major concerns” are – for example, China’s claims in the South China Sea and Taiwan, and the stability of the ATS for Australia.
Senzanubi è un’organizzazione che provvede su abbonamento report e dati.
Come attività collaterale, pubblica sul proprio sito degli abstract, la visione dei quali è aperta al pubblico pur essendo, per ovvi motivi, interdetta la pubblicazione di commenti, ai quali è riservato idoneo spazio nella collegata pagina Facebook.
Nonostante che questa trascorsa sia stata una settimana elettorale di grande importanza, un articolo pubblicato il 25 maggio, «Se non lo avessi visto con i miei occhi non lo avrei mai creduto possibile.» ha raggiunto ad oggi, tre giugno, ore 21, le 24,014 visioni, con un congruo numero di condivisioni.
Ringraziamo quindi i Signori Lettori della stima e della preferenza che ci hanno riservato.
È da un qualche tempo che stanno circolando disparati elenchi di persone che è riferito parteciperebbero alla 67° riunione della Bilderberg, in corso fino a domenica a Montreux.
Riportiamo quello che sembrerebbe essere il più attendibile, per dovere di cronaca. Notiamo come non compaiano personaggi provenienti dalla Cina, dalla Russia, dall’India, dall’Arabia Saudita e dal Giappone, solo per menzionare alcuni stati che pesano sullo scenrio mondiale.
Che per l’Italia siano presenti Matteo Renzi, Stefano Feltri e Lilli Gruber sembrerebbe attestare quanto valga l’Italia in simile consesso.
Il 67* incontro del gruppo Bilderberg si terrà da giovedì a domenica a Montreux, in Svizzera. Tra i partecipanti Jared Kushner, consigliere e genero di Trump, il re olandese Guglielmo Alessandro, il Presidente svizzero Ueli Maurer, i premier di Olanda ed Estonia, Mark Rutte e Juri Ratas, l’ex premier italiano Matteo Renzi, la leader Cdu Annegret Kramp Karrenbauer, il ministro delle Finanze francese Bruno Le Maire, la ministra della Difesa tedesca Ursula von der Leyen, il Presidente del Partito popolare spagnolo Pablo Casado, il Segretario generale della Nato Jens Stoltenberg, il Ceo Microsoft Satya Nadella, il Ceo Total Patrick Pouyanne‘, il Ceo Ryanair Michael O’Leary, il Ceo Credit Suisse Tidjane Thiam, la Presidente del Banco Santander Ana Botin, il Presidente del World Economic Forum Borge Brende, il Presidente della Goldman Sachs International Jose Manuel Barroso, il direttore dell’Economist Zanny Minton Beddoes, i giornalisti italiani Stefano Feltri e Lilli Gruber.
I temi in discussione saranno:
Un ordine strategico stabile;
Quale futuro per l’Europa?;
Cambiamenti climatici e sostenibilità;
Il futuro del capitalismo;
L’etica dell’intelligenza artificiale;
L’armonizzazione dei social media;
L’importanza dello spazio;
Fondato nel 1954, il Bilderberg Meeting è una conferenza annuale progettata per favorire il dialogo tra Europa e Nord America. Ogni anno, tra 120-140 leader politici ed esperti dell’industria, della finanza, del lavoro, del mondo accademico e dei media sono invitati a prendere parte al Meeting.
Circa due terzi dei partecipanti provengono dall’Europa e il resto dal Nord America; circa un quarto dalla politica e dal governo e il resto da altri campi. Il Bilderberg Meeting è un forum per discussioni informali su questioni importanti. Gli incontri si svolgono secondo la Chatham House Rule, che stabilisce che i partecipanti sono liberi di utilizzare le informazioni ricevute, ma l’identità degli oratori o di altri partecipanti non può essere rivelata.
Grazie alla natura privata del Meeting, i partecipanti prendono parte come individui piuttosto che in qualsiasi veste ufficiale, e quindi non sono vincolati dalle convenzioni del proprio ufficio o da posizioni prestabilite. In quanto tali, possono prendere tempo per ascoltare, riflettere e raccogliere idee. Non vi e’ alcun ordine del giorno dettagliato, non vengono proposte risoluzioni, non vengono votati e non vengono emesse dichiarazioni politiche.
von Clausewitz aveva argutamente detto come la guerra altro non sia che la prosecuzione dell’attività politica con metodi cruenti. Nella sua ottica, guerra e pace altro non sarebbero che due aspetti complementari di una stessa realtà.
Il postulato implicito sarebbe che tutta la realtà diviene nel tempo, muta sé stessa e le sue intercorrelazioni, determina la formazione di nuovi equilibri sottominando quelli vecchi. Quasi invariabilmente è in gioco l’acceso e la gestione del potere. Talora il vecchio potere collassa, e quello nuovo ne prende il posto quasi senza colpo ferire, almeno senza troppo spargimento di sangue, ma ciò non è la norma: queste evenienze sono storicamente rare.
Usualmente sono le armi a rimuovere il vecchio ed instaurare il nuovo.
In fondo, a ben pensarci, la guerra altro non sarebbe che il mezzo per addivenire ad una nuova pace ragionevolmente stabile, che sancisca i nuovi equilibri.
In questa ottica, le Coalizioni Europee anti-napoleoniche altro non sarebbero state che lo strumento bellico per lasciare una Francia grande, ma non immensa, in una Europa abbastanza equilibrata. Tranne poche guerra locali, questa realtà restò in piedi fino alla fine dell’ottocento. Servirono poi due guerre mondiali per affermare la nascita di nuovi equilibri.
Ma adesso lo scenario mondiale sembrerebbe essere mutato.
Se negli anni sessanta l’Occidente rendeva ragione di quasi il novanta percento del pil mondiale, nelle proiezioni dell’IMF al 2023 i paesi del G7 renderanno conto del 27.06% del pil ppa mondiale, mentre i Brics garantiranno il 35.90% dello stesso.
Governare l’Occidente non significa più governare il mondo, ed il mondo inizia a manifestare ampi segni di intolleranza verso l’Occidente.
Ma sarebbe severo errore estinguere il confronto nel mero comparto economico: la contrapposizione è invece tra due differenti Weltanschauung, tra due tradizioni di civiltà.
I paesi dell’est e del sud asiatico, e non solo loro, non condividono, ed avversano, i valori classici dell’Occidente. Non ne condividono etica e morale, e rigettano, perché alieno dalla loro tradizione culturale, il concetto di ‘democrazia’ che si estingua in un suffragio universale. La Cina è diventata un grande impero proprio perché non ha adottato questo sistema.
Cercando di andare alla radice, non sono tanto in discussione le radici religiose, culturali, sociali, artistiche e politiche dell’Occidente, quando piuttosto la sua deriva illuministica, sfociata quindi nel giacobinismo, nell’idealismo dialettico e storico, ed infine, attraverso molte tappe, nel’attuale ideologia liberal. È questa ultima che sta crollando e che cerca disperatamente di sopravvivere.
Davvero Autori quali Dostoevskij, Solov’ëv, Benson, Spengler ed Orwell avevano saputo guardare ben lontano.
Le ngo, ogn, non sono dei fini, bensì dei mezzi, e come tale possono essere usate in situazioni pacifiche così come in situazioni belliche. Hanno il grande vantaggio che le loro azioni non coinvolgono in orima persona gli stati che le finanziano, potendo quindi svolgere guerre per procura.
Ciò premesso, riproponiamo alla lettura questo articolo datato tre anni or sono: molti dei suoi contenuti si sono dimostrati essere fatti reali.
«Foreign-linked NGOs all across the world play an irreplaceable role in fomenting Hybrid Wars»
Al momento attuale, per moltissimi ambienti e persone, le guerre, ancorché pudicamente denominate ‘ibride’, sono di grande utilità, e quindi le attizzano e le fomentano con la massima cura possibile. Non potendo o volendo farle in prima persona, utilizzano l’esercito delle ngo.
Tuttavia la guerra è l’ultima ratio: non si sa mai come possa finire, ed il destino è spesso beffardo.
È una realtà della quale occorrerebbe prenderne atto.
Foreign-linked NGOs all across the world play an irreplaceable role in fomenting Hybrid Wars. The Law of Hybrid War states that these sorts of conflicts are manufactured identity clashes predicated on disrupting, controlling, or influencing multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects in key transit states by means of enacting Regime Tweaking, Regime Change, or Regime Rebooting (R-TCR). These three tactics could also be described as political concessions, a ‘peaceful’ or violent leadership transition, or a fundamentally altering of the state through such means as its pressured devolution into an easily manipulatable Identity Federation.
As for the sorts of identity conflicts that are expected to comprise Hybrid Wars, they can be categorized as being historical, ethnic, religious, socio-economic, and geographical (both in terms of political administrative and regional belonging). The catalyst for Hybrid War could be premeditated or happenstance, but in both instances, conflict scenarios are driven forward by the crucial public or discrete participation of foreign-linked (as in funded, managed, allied, etc.) NGOs, thereby justifying the reason why they’re being studied in this analysis alongside the latest trends in warfare.
Just about all foreign-linked NGOs (hereby referred to simply as NGOs) aside from those engaged purely in humanitarian work with the explicit permission and supervision of the host state engage in preconditioning the target population to accept constructed political narratives. These mostly focus on historical, social, and/or political themes which aim to shape the mindset of the audience and contribute to the formation of absolutely new identities (e.g. “Kosovars”) or reformat existing ones (e.g. from patriotism to nationalism, or inclusive citizenship to exclusive separatist longings).
NGOs work alongside new and traditional media outlets in disseminating these ideas and multiplying the effect that they have in altering their audience’s consciousness so as to promote the organization and its patrons’ predetermined objectives in fostering weaponized identity separateness. False, disreputable, and/or questionable “facts” are usually circulated among the information-media-academia triangle of communities and sympathetic operatives in order to spread new mythologies that resultantly socio-engineer the targeted demographics’ mentalities through the crafted illusion that “authoritative voices” are endorsing them.
The seeds of new and/or historically debunked ideologies such as Liberalism and Nazism are planted in the minds of the audience and watered with a steady stream of supportive information designed to increase their appeal and build the foundation for the forthcoming anti-government gambit. After becoming indoctrinated with Liberalism, for example, one might become more susceptible to playing the role of a “useful idiot” and aggressively demonstrating against their government, while believers in Nazism and World War II-era “nationalism” might become emboldened to carry out hateful provocations against their historical ‘enemies’.
Both categories of ideological imprinting are thus equally useful in promoting set political objectives within the targeted state, with the promoted foundation being dependent on what the exact end game conflict is envisioned to be. Liberalism is more amenable to the formation of new identities for separatist purposes, whereas Nazism (or “extreme nationalism” to generalize) has a role to play in generating furious anti-government hate and provoking interstate conflict (e.g. Croatian Ustasha obsessively trying to destabilize Bosnia and the Serbian Province of Vojvodina).
NGOs must receive their money somehow, and aside from panhandling (or “canvassing for donations” as they term it) in the streets for some extra pocket cash, most of them receive the bulk of their funding from one of three main sources:
The US government funds organizations such as the “National Endowment For Democracy” (self-described in 1991 as openly doing what the CIA used to covertly pull off 25 years before then) in order to behave as public-private intelligence fronts abroad, blending professional operative experience with a civilian “plausible deniability”.
Certain companies may have an interest in independently deploying their own NGOs, whether to lobby on behalf of their commercial interests or to agitate against their opponents, with this potentially escalating to the level of putting R-TCR (Regime – Tweaking, Change, Reboot) pressure on one or another government for these purposes.
“Private” donors such as George Soros and the Saudi Princes operate the Soros Foundation and “Islamic charities” respectively (the latter being the first large-scale weaponized worldwide NGO network during the 1980s Afghan War period), with their organizations having spread all across the globe by this point and sometimes working to promote their shadowy interests hand-in-hand with selected government clients.
Each of these three different sources provide seed funding and training to their on-the-ground proxies, with the desire being that they’ll succeed in cultivating a community of fifth and sixth columnists to aid with their goals. Organizational training and organizing techniques are pivotal because of how strongly they influence a group’s effectiveness, since at the end of the day, it’s usually just the small core membership that truly counts since their affiliated cohorts and civilians are either volunteers or low-cost temporary expenses.
NGOs are also very useful to their patrons because they function as middlemen facilitators in giving bribes and conveying blackmail to different private individuals (e.g. journalists) and political figures, and if they operate in a ‘laissez faire’ environment, then they could also valuably partake in different scales of money laundering activities to these ends or in support of their backers’ pecuniary interests. Even if they get caught, the single degree of separation that they “plausibly” enjoy from their sponsors due to their allegedly “independent” status is enough to insulate their supporters from any “official” blame.
NGOs have learned to employ local faces and personnel for staffing their foreign offices, understanding that this helps to deflect any immediate criticism of their foreign ties as well as confuse naïve ‘investigative reporters’ who only superficially look at the passports of the people working there in drawing their determinations. In reality though, this policy is actually less about obscuring the said NGOs links to abroad than it is about duping the populace that they plan on interacting with, since dedicated sleuths are usually successful at uncovering the financial, communication, and personal connections that link an investigated organization to a foreign entity.
Regular individuals on the street, however, might not have any idea that their fellow citizen passing out anti-government fliers and encouraging them to join a protest might be in the employ of foreign entities, even if some of the group’s staff themselves aren’t even aware of this. The disingenuity that comes with tricking people into joining an activity or organization due to the fact that the foreign ties behind it are deliberately obscured proves that the initiative’s backers knowingly accept that locals would likely shy away from these sorts of things if they knew that they were sponsored from abroad. Because many of them otherwise have no idea about this, however, they’re more susceptible to being misled into participating.
Along the lines of NGO figureheads, it should relatedly be mentioned that the leaders of the eventual anti-government government are sometimes pastors (Zimbabwe), monks (Myanmar, the Tibet Autonomous Region), or students (‘traditional’ Color Revolutions), all of which have an international reputation as being seemingly innocuous and harmless. No matter if this was actually true before The Event (the specifics of which will be described soon) or not, the fact is that the moment that these purportedly peaceful actors begin aggressively demonstrating against the government, provoking conflict with the police and military, and sometimes even attacking law enforcement officers and public & private property, they’ve forfeited their right to be responded to in a non-violent fashion, thus justifying the authorities’ decisive (and sometimes heavy-handed) crowd control techniques.
These figureheads also play another complementary role as well, and it’s to promote their presumably peaceful reputations through collusive media channels that have an interest in portraying these individuals as “calm pro-democracy protesters” so as to selectively edit and deliberately misreport their provoked clashes with the authorities as being the result of an “unpopular and power-hungry dictatorship killing its own people”. Never mind that none of this is factually true, but it’s the purposeful misperception that counts because of the ease with which such manufactured narratives can quickly blow a local, regional, or national event completely out of proportion in order to rapidly turn it into an “international crisis” that prompts foreign governments to put much-publicized pressure on the targeted state.
The one tactic that all politically affiliated NGOs (whether openly stated or secretly of this disposition) end up pursuing is to eventually put pressure on their host government in a bid to make it more “democratic”. The reason why “democracy” is such an obsession for these organizations and their backers doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with its inherent ‘normative’ qualities (most often of the Western iteration of this ideology), but with its convenient structure in regularly phasing out leadership cycles. Western-influenced ‘democracies’ have predictable election cycles which are understood in the Theory of Hybrid War as representing nothing more than ‘peaceful’ opportunities for regime change, ergo the frantic activity that NGOs engage in before, during, and immediately after this time. Western ‘democracy’ is also marked by the inseparable political culture of lobbyists (legal bribers) and commercially driven mainstream media outlets, which makes it all the much easier for foreign actors and their local NGO pawns to interfere with the ‘democratic’ process and hijack it in the direction of their aims.
If elections don’t result in the desired outcome that the NGOs and their international backers are seeking, or if the next electoral cycle isn’t for a few years and these actors grow impatient and/or believe that the window for achieving their political ends might close by that time, then they’ll conspire to engineer an Event that puts pressure on the government to embark on R-TCR under the omnipresent threat of Hybrid War. Examples of the type of pressure that could be brought to bear against the authorities are election-related drama, corruption scandals (possibly sparked by NSA-‘leaked’ wiretaps and/or documents like Brazil’s ‘Constitutional Coup’ and the failed Macedonian Hybrid War attempt), disruptive ‘civil society’ movements (e.g. Armenia’s “Electric Yerevan”), and the politicization of controversial deals (e.g. Ukraine’s EU Association Agreement) that attempt to force a new or early round of elections.
If the government doesn’t tweak, change, or reboot after experiencing the ‘peaceful’ Color Revolution coercion that the foreign interests and their NGO foot soldiers try to ‘democratically’ force upon it, then the foreign government(s) behind the charade might take the decision to commence Hybrid War by transitioning the Color Revolution to an Unconventional War. It’s not always guaranteed that this will be the case, since sometimes certain Color Revolution disturbances aren’t fully backed up by their foreign sponsors and NGO network and are instead test probes for assessing structural vulnerabilities, responses, and other sorts of valuable intelligence that could come in handy in a future R-TCR scenario that’s more determinately supported for these purposes. After all, if the state is strong enough to defend against this asymmetrical attack using Democratic Security measures and/or the future insurgency lacks the long-term viability to sustain a successful R-TCR Hybrid War campaign (perhaps if an effective “Lead From Behind” regional arrangement can’t be constructed in time), then the foreign backers might pull out their support for the unrest and wait until another future opportunity could be engineered at a more decisive moment.
Making The Leap
When the Color Revolution undergoes the phased transition into Hybrid War by evolving into an Unconventional War, there’s a lot of the former behind-the-scenes structural arrangement that simply stays the same but under a different name. Many of the NGO networks and their personnel transition into armed insurgents or provide the fighters with informational, organizational, logistical, and/or material support.
Although the tactics of R-TCR have changed, the principle still remains the same, though with a noticeable and less covert influx of foreign assistance (insurgents, weapons) in pursuit of these ends.
Not all foreign-linked NGOs and their workers might partake in these openly seditious activities, but it’s a fair bet that many of them will to some extent or another, since after all, the only difference between the Color Revolutionaries and their Unconventional Warfare counterparts are the means which they’re willing to employ in achieving their shared goal, with ‘each hand washing the other’ in carrying out complementary tasks to this end.
Hybrid War is the latest form of aggression being waged by unipolar forces against the emerging Multipolar World Order, and the indirect way in which it’s practiced shields the perpetrator from immediate repercussions and thus increases the attractiveness of this stratagem. Seeing as how the reliance on Hybrid War as a foreign policy instrument shows no signs of realistically abating for the foreseeable future due to the novel and cost-effective nature in which it’s applied, there’s a pressing urgency to understand every facet in which it’s fought, ergo the pertinence in exposing the pivotal role that NGOs play in this process.
Remembering that Hybrid Wars are premised on the outside instigation and subsequent manipulation of identity conflict in a targeted transit state along the route of a prominent multipolar transnational connective infrastructure project, then it’s much easier to conceptualize the function that hostile foreign-linked NGOs have in putting this sequence of ‘controlled chaos’ into motion. These groups are tasked with provoking a sense of identity separateness among the population, a socially engineered sentiment which the organizers envision will eventually turn patriotic citizens into anti-government sympathizers.
The NGO networks and local personnel that participate in this foreign-assisted scheme and aspire to disrupt, control, or influence these aforementioned infrastructure projects through varying degrees of R-TCR pressure against the authorities usually transition into insurgents and other forms of asymmetrical threats when their failed Color Revolution tactics begin phasing into an enhanced Unconventional Warfare form. Since foreign-linked NGOs are the vanguard forces spearheading the latest iteration of Hybrid War all across the world, it’s in the best interests of every responsible government to place supervisory checks and operative restrictions on these groups in order to neuter their offensive capabilities and ensure national security.
Lo sviluppo economico cinese non sarebbe stato possibile senza la possibilità di acquisire prodotti energetici a costi contenuti.
Se questa affermazione è vera per il passato, altrettanto lo sarebbe per il futuro: senza energia a basso costo sarebbe impossibile ogni qualsivoglia produzione industriale, tanto meno poi incrementarla.
Sarebbe impossibile comprendere la complessa politica estera cinese senza tener presente quanto ambisca a mantenere rapporti cordiali con i paesi produttori di petrolio.
«China imported 43.73 million tons of crude in April, or 10.68 million barrels a day»
«That’s the most in figures going back to 2010»
«The record purchases are mostly due to large volumes of Iranian oil arriving in China before the expiration of the waivers»
«An estimated 1.7 million barrels a day of refining capacity was taken offline for maintenance in April, the most during the March-May peak season»
«While no country-by-country breakdown of the Chinese figures for April is available yet, observed crude exports from Iran to China rose to 806,452 barrels a day in March»
«It normally takes 22 days for Iranian cargoes to arrive in China, so shipments are likely to drop significantly for May arrivals as observed exports from the Islamic Republic fell 67 percent in April from March»
* * * * * * * *
Al di à delle frasi di rito su clima ed alternative, superenfatizzate dai media occidentali, la Cina ha già approntato grandi piani energetici.
«La Westinghouse Electric Corporation è una società leader nel settore dell’energia atomica con sede in Pennsylvania che ha ideato il reattore AP1000, l’unica unità nucleare al mondo di terza generazione ad acqua pressurizzata (PWR), il cui primo esemplare ha iniziato a funzionare nella provincia di Zhejiang, sita nella Cina orientale, e più precisamente a Sanmen.
Mercoledì 25 aprile , infatti, è cominciato il caricamento del combustibile atomico del reattore numero 1 di quello che sarà un impianto rivoluzionario in quanto a dotazioni di sicurezza; caricamento che sarà completato entro l’estate e che porterà alla totale attivazione della centrale entro la fine di quest’anno.
La centrale di Sanmen avrà una potenza complessiva di 7,5 Gw e fa parte di un progetto della Spic, la State Power Investment Corporation ovvero una delle prime 5 compagnie cinesi nel campo delle costruzioni energetiche, che prevede la costruzione di altre 3 centrali di questo tipo: un’altra sempre nel distretto di Zhejiang, e due ad Haiyang, nella provincia di Shandong.»
È in ogni caso evidente come lo sviluppo della motorizzazione, sia a scopi commerciali sia a scopi familiari, necessiti di derivati distillati dal petrolio, mentre il riscaldamento urbano dipende in larga quota dal gas naturale.
Fatti questi che dovrebbero rendere intelleggibile la geopolitica energetica mondiale cinesa, a partire dai suoi rapporti con l’Iran.
China’s crude imports climbed to a record last month as a drive to stock up on Iranian oil before exemptions from U.S. sanctions expired on May 2 offset the effect of maintenance shutdowns by local refiners.
– China imported 43.73 million tons of crude in April, or 10.68 million barrels a day, according to Bloomberg calculations based on data from General Administration of Customs in Beijing. That’s the most in figures going back to 2010.
– The record purchases are mostly due to large volumes of Iranian oil arriving in China before the expiration of the waivers, according to Michal Meidan, an analyst with London-based industry consultant Energy Aspects Ltd. An estimated 1.7 million barrels a day of refining capacity was taken offline for maintenance in April, the most during the March-May peak season.
– The start-up of a mega refinery at Dalian by Hengli Group also boosted imports, according to Li Li, an analyst at Shanghai-based commodities researcher ICIS-China.
– While no country-by-country breakdown of the Chinese figures for April is available yet, observed crude exports from Iran to China rose to 806,452 barrels a day in March, the highest in six months, according to tanker-tracking data compiled by Bloomberg.
– It normally takes 22 days for Iranian cargoes to arrive in China, so shipments are likely to drop significantly for May arrivals as observed exports from the Islamic Republic fell 67 percent in April from March.
«Nel 2018, l’economia cinese si è mantenuta complessivamente stabile, mostrando nel frattempo qualche miglioramento»
«Il tasso di crescita è stato del 6,6% annuo, al primo posto tra le prime cinque economie del mondo, contribuendo per il 30% della crescita globale»
«Il commercio estero cinese ha sfondato la soglia di 30 mila miliardi di renminbi, con un incremento relativo del 9,7%»
«Sono stati 13 milioni e 600 mila i nuovi posti di lavoro creati e più di 13 milioni e 800 mila i residenti rurali usciti dalla soglia di povertà»
«Da oltre cinque anni, la costruzione della nuova Via della Seta procede dal particolare al generale, avanzando nella pratica e crescendo con la cooperazione»
«Ad oggi sono già 123 i paesi e 29 le organizzazioni internazionali che hanno sottoscritto con la Cina accordi di vario genere nell’ambito dell’iniziativa»
«Gli scambi commerciali tra la Cina e i paesi lungo questa nuova arteria commerciale hanno superato la quota di 6000 miliardi di dollari.»
«La Cina sostiene il principio della partecipazione di tutti alla discussione, alla realizzazione e alla condivisione della proposta nel promuovere la cooperazione internazionale sul tema, avanzando nello spirito della Via della Seta i concetti della cooperazione nella pace, dell’inclusione nell’apertura, nella vicendevole conoscenza e nel reciproco guadagno»
«Lo scorso anno il valore degli scambi commerciali bilaterali [Cina – Italia] ha raggiunto quota 54 miliardi e 23 milioni di dollari, stabilendo un nuovo primato storico, mentre il complesso degli investimenti nelle due direzioni ha superato il valore di 20 miliardi di dollari.»
* * * * * * *
La Cina sta seguendo la direttiva di Realpolitik che le è connaturata e che a suo tempo Mr Deng Xiaoping aveva ribadito con forza: i rapporti commerciali non devono essere condizionati da visioni ideologiche e nessuno deve permettersi di sindacare la politica interna degli stati.
Negli ultimi cinque anni la Nuova Via della Seta ha comportato interscambi per 6,000 miliardi di dollari americani. Mentre nei confronti dell’Unione Europea la Cine sembrerebbe ricercare prevalentemente rapporti bilaterali, nei confronti dei paesi europei ex est l’approccio è rappresentato dal Ceec, ovvero il 16 + 1.
«The 16+1 format is an initiative by the People’s Republic of China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU Member States and 5 Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia) in the fields of investments, transport, finance, science, education, and culture»
La attuale eurodirigenza uscente ha dei grandi problemi di rapporto diplomatico e politico con la Cina. Il giornale della confindustria tedesca ne ha recentemente preso atto in un lungo e dettagliato editoriale.
«“L’Ue e la Cina sono partner economici strategici ma anche concorrenti. …. parole del vicepresidente della Commissione Jyrki Katainen, …. “L’Unione europea e la Cina si sono impegnate a costruire un partenariato strategico globale, ma in Europa – si legge in un documento della Commissione – è sempre più diffusa la sensazione che l’equilibrio tra le sfide e le opportunità associate alla Cina si sia modificato”. La Cina “è al tempo stesso – vi si legge – un partner di cooperazione con obiettivi strettamente allineati a quelli dell’Ue, un partner di negoziato con cui l’Unione deve trovare un equilibrio di interessi, un concorrente economico che ambisce alla leadership tecnologica e un rivale sistemico che promuove modelli di governance alternativi”.»
«…. considerando che la situazione dei diritti umani in Cina ha continuato a peggiorare, con un’intensificazione dell’ostilità del governo nei confronti del dissenso pacifico, della libertà di espressione e di religione e dello Stato di diritto; che gli attivisti della società civile e i difensori dei diritti umani sono arrestati, processati e condannati sulla base di capi d’imputazione vaghi come quello di “sovvertire il potere dello Stato” e di “scatenare liti e provocare problemi”, e che spesso sono detenuti in isolamento in località ignote, senza alcun accesso a cure mediche o all’assistenza legale; che i difensori dei diritti umani e gli attivisti sono trattenuti, talvolta, in “sorveglianza residenziale in un luogo designato”, un sistema utilizzato per impedire a queste persone qualsiasi contatto, e che durante tale detenzione sono spesso segnalati torture e maltrattamenti; che la Cina continua a negare la libertà di espressione e la libertà di informazione, e sono stati incarcerati molti giornalisti, blogger e voci indipendenti; che, nel suo quadro strategico sui diritti umani e la democrazia, l’UE si è impegnata a far sì che i diritti umani, la democrazia e lo Stato di diritto siano promossi in tutti i settori della sua azione esterna, senza eccezioni, ponendo i diritti umani al centro delle sue relazioni con tutti i paesi terzi, ivi compresi i suoi partner strategici; che i vertici UE-Cina devono essere impiegati per ottenere risultati concreti nell’ambito dei diritti umani, segnatamente il rilascio dei difensori dei diritti umani, degli avvocati e degli attivisti incarcerati;»
Vedremo come la nuova Commissione Europea si relazionerà con la Cina: quella uscente avrebbe voluto imporre alla Cina condizioni di interferenza con i suoi problemi politici interni, cosa che la Cina né vuole né può accettare. Di qui lo stallo delle trattative.
Qualche tempo fa, con l’avvenuta apertura delle Due Sessioni cinesi, lo sguardo di tutto il mondo si è concentrato su Pechino. Ho visto che anche la stampa italiana ha dedicato ampio spazio a questo evento. Non sono mancati dell’evento resoconti accurati e bene illustrati, ma allo stesso tempo c’è stato chi ha espresso preoccupazione per l’andamento dell’economia cinese, sollevando obiezioni nel merito della cooperazione sino-italiana, soprattutto per quanto riguarda l’iniziativa OBOR (One Belt One Road).
Nel merito di ciò, vorrei esprimere alcune opinioni personali. Alcune sfide attendono l’economia cinese, ma il suo andamento positivo sul lungo periodo non cambia. Nel 2018, l’economia cinese si è mantenuta complessivamente stabile, mostrando nel frattempo qualche miglioramento. Il tasso di crescita è stato del 6,6% annuo, al primo posto tra le prime cinque economie del mondo, contribuendo per il 30% della crescita globale. Il commercio estero cinese ha sfondato la soglia di 30 mila miliardi di renminbi, con un incremento relativo del 9,7%. Sono stati 13 milioni e 600 mila i nuovi posti di lavoro creati e più di 13 milioni e 800 mila i residenti rurali usciti dalla soglia di povertà. Sullo sfondo di un’economia globale complessivamente priva di vigore, questi risultati ottenuti dalla Cina non possono mutare. Nella relazione di governo delle due Assemblee, l’obiettivo di crescita per quest’anno è stato fissato al 6,0–6,5%. Trovo che si tratti di una decisione oggettiva, basata sull’attuale congiuntura economica interna ed esterna al Paese, oltre che di una scelta obbligata per un’economia cinese che punta verso alti standard di sviluppo.
L’economia cinese è vasta, solida e sta sviluppando in fretta nuovi processi e nuovi modelli di gestione. Di fronte alla congiuntura di quest’anno, più complessa e severa, svilupperemo attivamente le nostre eccellenze, continuando ad intensificare le riforme strutturali sul lato della domanda e ad allargare la nostra apertura all’estero, a promuovere un modello di sviluppo guidato dall’innovazione, ad accelerare l’avvicendamento tra energie vecchie e nuove. Inoltre, il Governo spera di stimolare ancora la vitalità dell’economia e del mercato cinesi con misure concrete quali politiche finanziarie e monetarie ragionate, l’abbassamento delle imposte e il contenimento delle spese. Siamo certi di vincere queste sfide e queste difficoltà, realizzando gli obiettivi di crescita fissati e contribuendo ancora allo sviluppo stabile e salutare dell’economia globale.
La cooperazione sino-italiana è vantaggiosa per entrambi i paesi e le prospettive della Via della Seta ampie ed estese. L’iniziativa OBOR non è uno strumento geopolitico, ma un’importante occasione per promuovere l’integrazione regionale e realizzare lo sviluppo di tutti. Da oltre cinque anni, la costruzione della nuova Via della Seta procede dal particolare al generale, avanzando nella pratica e crescendo con la cooperazione. Ad oggi sono già 123 i paesi e 29 le organizzazioni internazionali che hanno sottoscritto con la Cina accordi di vario genere nell’ambito dell’iniziativa. Gli scambi commercia-li tra la Cina e i paesi lungo questa nuova arteria commerciale hanno superato la quota di 6000 miliardi di dollari. Una serie di progetti fondamentali dell’iniziativa OBOR è realizzata ed in funzione, giovando concretamente a diversi popoli. La Cina sostiene il principio della partecipazione di tutti alla discussione, alla realizzazione-ne e alla condivisione della proposta nel promuovere la cooperazione internazionale sul tema, avanzando nello spirito della Via della Seta i concetti della cooperazione nella pace, dell’inclusione nell’apertura, nella vicendevole conoscenza e nel reciproco guadagno. Tutto ciò ha poco o nulla a che fare con il “disegno egemonico” e la “trappola del debito” di cui qualcuno si diletta a parlare.
Attualmente l’andamento della cooperazione tra i nostri Paesi nell’ambito dell’iniziativa OBOR è molto positivo. Lo scorso anno il valore degli scambi commerciali bilaterali ha raggiunto quota 54 miliardi e 23 milioni di dollari, stabilendo-do un nuovo primato storico, mentre il complesso-so degli investimenti nelle due direzioni ha superato il valore di 20 miliardi di dollari. La cooperazione in settori come le infrastrutture portuali, le reti 5G, lo sviluppo di mercati in paesi terzi è in fase di ascesa. Il prossimo mese si terrà in Cina il secondo summit per la coopera-zione internazionale alla Via della Seta. Questo sarà un’altra ricca occasione per permettere ai diversi paesi di incontrarsi con le rispettive strategie e di intensificare la cooperazione effettiva. Poco tempo indietro, il premier Conte ha dichiarato che interverrà personalmente a questo evento in Cina, fatto che accogliamo con grande apprezzamento.
Quest’anno ricorre il quindicesimo anniversario del partenariato strategico tra i nostri Paesi, mentre il prossimo ricorreranno i cinquant’anni dallo stabilimento delle relazioni diplomatiche. Proprio in questo momento storico, il presidente Xi Jinping si appresta a compiere una visita di stato in Italia. Si tratterà del secondo viaggio in Italia di un Capo di Stato cinese in quasi dieci anni e della prima volta per Xi Jinping da quando ricopre questo incarico. Durante la visita, il Presidente discorrerà con i leader italiani dell’amicizia tra i nostri Paesi, per promuovere la cooperazione ed assistere alla firma di una serie di importanti accordi bilaterali. Inoltre, i due paesi rilasceranno una dichiarazione congiunta a stabilire le linee guida per lo sviluppo futuro delle relazioni sino-italiane, fissandone la direzione. Una visita storica che porterà con sé un’occasione storica. Spero che, con l’impegno condiviso delle Parti, esse riescano a coglierla, per approfondire la tradizionale amicizia sino-ita-liana, promuovendo a un livello più alto la cooperazione reciprocamente vantaggiosa tra i nostri Paesi ed arricchendo ancora e meglio i nostri Popoli.
The following is the full text of an action plan on the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization, on March 28.
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More than two millennia ago the diligent and courageous people of Eurasia explored and opened up several routes of trade and cultural exchanges that linked the major civilizations of Asia, Europe and Africa, collectively called the Silk Road by later generations. For thousands of years, the Silk Road Spirit－”peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit”－has been passed from generation to generation, promoted the progress of human civilization, and contributed greatly to the prosperity and development of the countries along the Silk Road. Symbolizing communication and cooperation between the East and the West, the Silk Road Spirit is a historic and cultural heritage shared by all countries around the world.
In the 21st century, a new era marked by the theme of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit, it is all the more important for us to carry on the Silk Road Spirit in face of the weak recovery of the global economy, and complex international and regional situations.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October of 2013, he raised the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (hereinafter referred to as the Belt and Road), which have attracted close attention from all over the world. At the China-ASEAN Expo in 2013, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang emphasized the need to build the Maritime Silk Road oriented toward ASEAN, and to create strategic propellers for hinterland development. Accelerating the building of the Belt and Road can help promote the economic prosperity of the countries along the Belt and Road and regional economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations, and promote world peace and development. It is a great undertaking that will benefit people around the world.
The Belt and Road Initiative is a systematic project, which should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all, and efforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road. The Chinese government has drafted and published the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road to promote the implementation of the Initiative, instill vigor and vitality into the ancient Silk Road, connect Asian, European and African countries more closely and promote mutually beneficial cooperation to a new high and in new forms.
Complex and profound changes are taking place in the world. The underlying impact of the international financial crisis keeps emerging; the world economy is recovering slowly, and global development is uneven; the international trade and investment landscape and rules for multilateral trade and investment are undergoing major adjustments; and countries still face big challenges to their development.
The initiative to jointly build the Belt and Road, embracing the trend toward a multipolar world, economic globalization, cultural diversity and greater IT application, is designed to uphold the global free trade regime and the open world economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation. It is aimed at promoting orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of markets; encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve economic policy coordination and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards; and jointly creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all. Jointly building the Belt and Road is in the interests of the world community. Reflecting the common ideals and pursuit of human societies, it is a positive endeavor to seek new models of international cooperation and global governance, and will inject new positive energy into world peace and development.
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multitiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries. The connectivity projects of the Initiative will help align and coordinate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road, tap market potential in this region, promote investment and consumption, create demands and job opportunities, enhance people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and mutual learning among the peoples of the relevant countries, and enable them to understand, trust and respect each other and live in harmony, peace and prosperity.
China’s economy is closely connected with the world economy. China will stay committed to the basic policy of opening-up, build a new pattern of all-around opening-up, and integrate itself deeper into the world economic system. The Initiative will enable China to further expand and deepen its opening-up, and to strengthen its mutually beneficial cooperation with countries in Asia, Europe and Africa and the rest of the world. China is committed to shouldering more responsibilities and obligations within its capabilities, and making greater contributions to the peace and development of mankind.
The Belt and Road Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
The Initiative is open for cooperation. It covers, but is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road. It is open to all countries, and international and regional organizations for engagement, so that the results of the concerted efforts will benefit wider areas.
The Initiative is harmonious and inclusive. It advocates tolerance among civilizations, respects the paths and modes of development chosen by different countries, and supports dialogues among different civilizations on the principles of seeking common ground while shelving differences and drawing on each other’s strengths, so that all countries can coexist in peace for common prosperity.
The Initiative follows market operation. It will abide by market rules and international norms, give play to the decisive role of the market in resource allocation and the primary role of enterprises, and let the governments perform their due functions.
The Initiative seeks mutual benefit. It accommodates the interests and concerns of all parties involved, and seeks a conjunction of interests and the “biggest common denominator” for cooperation so as to give full play to the wisdom and creativity, strengths and potentials of all parties.
The Belt and Road Initiative is a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity and a road toward peace and friendship by enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening all-around exchanges. The Chinese government advocates peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit. It promotes practical cooperation in all fields, and works to build a community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility featuring mutual political trust, economic integration and cultural inclusiveness.
The Belt and Road run through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European economic circle at the other, and encompassing countries with huge potential for economic development. The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.
On land, the Initiative will focus on jointly building a new Eurasian Land Bridge and developing China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors by taking advantage of international transport routes, relying on core cities along the Belt and Road and using key economic industrial parks as cooperation platforms. At sea, the Initiative will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the Belt and Road. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor are closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and therefore require closer cooperation and greater progress.
The Initiative is an ambitious economic vision of the opening-up of and cooperation among the countries along the Belt and Road. Countries should work in concert and move toward the objectives of mutual benefit and common security. To be specific, they need to improve the region’s infrastructure, and put in place a secure and efficient network of land, sea and air passages, lifting their connectivity to a higher level; further enhance trade and investment facilitation, establish a network of free trade areas that meet high standards, maintain closer economic ties, and deepen political trust; enhance cultural exchanges; encourage different civilizations to learn from each other and flourish together; and promote mutual understanding, peace and friendship among people of all countries.
Countries along the Belt and Road have their own resource advantages and their economies are mutually complementary. Therefore, there is a great potential and space for cooperation. They should promote policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds as their five major goals, and strengthen cooperation in the following key areas:
Enhancing policy coordination is an important guarantee for implementing the Initiative. We should promote intergovernmental cooperation, build a multilevel intergovernmental macro policy exchange and communication mechanism, expand shared interests, enhance mutual political trust, and reach new cooperation consensus. Countries along the Belt and Road may fully coordinate their economic development strategies and policies, work out plans and measures for regional cooperation, negotiate to solve cooperation-related issues, and jointly provide policy support for the implementation of practical cooperation and large-scale projects.
Facilities connectivity is a priority area for implementing the Initiative. On the basis of respecting each other’s sovereignty and security concerns, countries along the Belt and Road should improve the connectivity of their infrastructure construction plans and technical standard systems, jointly push forward the construction of international trunk passageways, and form an infrastructure network connecting all subregions in Asia, and between Asia, Europe and Africa step by step. At the same time, efforts should be made to promote green and low-carbon infrastructure construction and operation management, taking into full account the impact of climate change on the construction.
With regard to transport infrastructure construction, we should focus on the key passageways, junctions and projects, and give priority to linking up unconnected road sections, removing transport bottlenecks, advancing road safety facilities and traffic management facilities and equipment, and improving road network connectivity. We should build a unified coordination mechanism for whole-course transportation, increase connectivity of customs clearance, reloading and multimodal transport between countries, and gradually formulate compatible and standard transport rules, so as to realize international transport facilitation. We should push forward port infrastructure construction, build smooth land-water transportation channels, and advance port cooperation; increase sea routes and the number of voyages, and enhance information technology cooperation in maritime logistics. We should expand and build platforms and mechanisms for comprehensive civil aviation cooperation, and quicken our pace in improving aviation infrastructure.
We should promote cooperation in the connectivity of energy infrastructure, work in concert to ensure the security of oil and gas pipelines and other transport routes, build cross-border power supply networks and power-transmission routes, and cooperate in regional power grid upgrading and transformation.
We should jointly advance the construction of cross-border optical cables and other communications trunk line networks, improve international communications connectivity, and create an Information Silk Road. We should build bilateral cross-border optical cable networks at a quicker pace, plan transcontinental submarine optical cable projects, and improve spatial (satellite) information passageways to expand information exchanges and cooperation.
Investment and trade cooperation is a major task in building the Belt and Road. We should strive to improve investment and trade facilitation, and remove investment and trade barriers for the creation of a sound business environment within the region and in all related countries. We will discuss with countries and regions along the Belt and Road on opening free trade areas so as to unleash the potential for expanded cooperation.
Countries along the Belt and Road should enhance customs cooperation such as information exchange, mutual recognition of regulations, and mutual assistance in law enforcement; improve bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of inspection and quarantine, certification and accreditation, standard measurement, and statistical information; and work to ensure that the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement takes effect and is implemented. We should improve the customs clearance facilities of border ports, establish a “single-window” in border ports, reduce customs clearance costs, and improve customs clearance capability. We should increase cooperation in supply chain safety and convenience, improve the coordination of cross-border supervision procedures, promote online checking of inspection and quarantine certificates, and facilitate mutual recognition of Authorized Economic Operators. We should lower non-tariff barriers, jointly improve the transparency of technical trade measures, and enhance trade liberalization and facilitation.
We should expand trading areas, improve trade structure, explore new growth areas of trade, and promote trade balance. We should make innovations in our forms of trade, and develop cross-border e-commerce and other modern business models. A service trade support system should be set up to consolidate and expand conventional trade, and efforts to develop modern service trade should be strengthened. We should integrate investment and trade, and promote trade through investment.
We should speed up investment facilitation, eliminate investment barriers, and push forward negotiations on bilateral investment protection agreements and double taxation avoidance agreements to protect the lawful rights and interests of investors.
We should expand mutual investment areas, deepen cooperation in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries, agricultural machinery manufacturing and farm produce processing, and promote cooperation in marine-product farming, deep-sea fishing, aquatic product processing, seawater desalination, marine biopharmacy, ocean engineering technology, environmental protection industries, marine tourism and other fields. We should increase cooperation in the exploration and development of coal, oil, gas, metal minerals and other conventional energy sources; advance cooperation in hydropower, nuclear power, wind power, solar power and other clean, renewable energy sources; and promote cooperation in the processing and conversion of energy and resources at or near places where they are exploited, so as to create an integrated industrial chain of energy and resource cooperation. We should enhance cooperation in deep-processing technology, equipment and engineering services in the fields of energy and resources.
We should push forward cooperation in emerging industries. In accordance with the principles of mutual complementarity and mutual benefit, we should promote in-depth cooperation with other countries along the Belt and Road in new-generation information technology, biotechnology, new energy technology, new materials and other emerging industries, and establish entrepreneurial and investment cooperation mechanisms.
We should improve the division of labor and distribution of industrial chains by encouraging the entire industrial chain and related industries to develop in concert; establish R & D, production and marketing systems; and improve industrial supporting capacity and the overall competitiveness of regional industries. We should increase the openness of our service industry to each other to accelerate the development of regional service industries. We should explore a new mode of investment cooperation, working together to build all forms of industrial parks such as overseas economic and trade cooperation zones and cross-border economic cooperation zones, and promote industrial cluster development. We should promote ecological progress in conducting investment and trade, increase cooperation in conserving eco-environment, protecting biodiversity, and tackling climate change, and join hands to make the Silk Road an environment-friendly one.
We welcome companies from all countries to invest in China, and encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in infrastructure construction in other countries along the Belt and Road, and make industrial investments there. We support localized operation and management of Chinese companies to boost the local economy, increase local employment, improve local livelihoods, and take social responsibilities in protecting local biodiversity and eco-environment.
Financial integration is an important underpinning for implementing the Belt and Road Initiative. We should deepen financial cooperation, and make more efforts in building a currency stability system, investment and financing system and credit information system in Asia. We should expand the scope and scale of bilateral currency swap and settlement with other countries along the Belt and Road, open and develop the bond market in Asia, make joint efforts to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS New Development Bank, conduct negotiation among related parties on establishing Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) financing institution, and set up and put into operation the Silk Road Fund as early as possible. We should strengthen practical cooperation of China-ASEAN Interbank Association and SCO Interbank Association, and carry out multilateral financial cooperation in the form of syndicated loans and bank credit. We will support the efforts of governments of the countries along the Belt and Road and their companies and financial institutions with good credit-rating to issue Renminbi bonds in China. Qualified Chinese financial institutions and companies are encouraged to issue bonds in both Renminbi and foreign currencies outside China, and use the funds thus collected in countries along the Belt and Road.
We should strengthen financial regulation cooperation, encourage the signing of MOUs on cooperation in bilateral financial regulation, and establish an efficient regulation coordination mechanism in the region. We should improve the system of risk response and crisis management, build a regional financial risk early-warning system, and create an exchange and cooperation mechanism of addressing cross-border risks and crisis. We should increase cross-border exchange and cooperation between credit investigation regulators, credit investigation institutions and credit rating institutions. We should give full play to the role of the Silk Road Fund and that of sovereign wealth funds of countries along the Belt and Road, and encourage commercial equity investment funds and private funds to participate in the construction of key projects of the Initiative.
People-to-people bond provides the public support for implementing the Initiative. We should carry forward the spirit of friendly cooperation of the Silk Road by promoting extensive cultural and academic exchanges, personnel exchanges and cooperation, media cooperation, youth and women exchanges and volunteer services, so as to win public support for deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
We should send more students to each other’s countries, and promote cooperation in jointly running schools. China provides 10,000 government scholarships to the countries along the Belt and Road every year. We should hold culture years, arts festivals, film festivals, TV weeks and book fairs in each other’s countries; cooperate on the production and translation of fine films, radio and TV programs; and jointly apply for and protect World Cultural Heritage sites. We should also increase personnel exchange and cooperation between countries along the Belt and Road.
We should enhance cooperation in and expand the scale of tourism; hold tourism promotion weeks and publicity months in each other’s countries; jointly create competitive international tourist routes and products with Silk Road features; and make it more convenient to apply for tourist visa in countries along the Belt and Road. We should push forward cooperation on the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road cruise tourism program. We should carry out sports exchanges and support countries along the Belt and Road in their bid for hosting major international sports events.
We should strengthen cooperation with neighboring countries on epidemic information sharing, the exchange of prevention and treatment technologies and the training of medical professionals, and improve our capability to jointly address public health emergencies. We will provide medical assistance and emergency medical aid to relevant countries, and carry out practical cooperation in maternal and child health, disability rehabilitation, and major infectious diseases including AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. We will also expand cooperation on traditional medicine.
We should increase our cooperation in science and technology, establish joint labs (or research centers), international technology transfer centers and maritime cooperation centers, promote sci-tech personnel exchanges, cooperate in tackling key sci-tech problems, and work together to improve sci-tech innovation capability.
We should integrate existing resources to expand and advance practical cooperation between countries along the Belt and Road on youth employment, entrepreneurship training, vocational skill development, social security management, public administration and management and in other areas of common interest.
We should give full play to the bridging role of communication between political parties and parliaments, and promote friendly exchanges between legislative bodies, major political parties and political organizations of countries along the Belt and Road. We should carry out exchanges and cooperation among cities, encourage major cities in these countries to become sister cities, focus on promoting practical cooperation, particularly cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and create more lively examples of cooperation. We welcome the think tanks in the countries along the Belt and Road to jointly conduct research and hold forums.
We should increase exchanges and cooperation between nongovernmental organizations of countries along the Belt and Road, organize public interest activities concerning education, healthcare, poverty reduction, biodiversity and ecological protection for the benefit of the general public, and improve the production and living conditions of poverty-stricken areas along the Belt and Road. We should enhance international exchanges and cooperation on culture and media, and leverage the positive role of the Internet and new media tools to foster harmonious and friendly cultural environment and public opinion.
The world economic integration is accelerating and regional cooperation is on the upswing. China will take full advantage of the existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms to push forward the building of the Belt and Road and to promote the development of regional cooperation.
We should strengthen bilateral cooperation, and promote comprehensive development of bilateral relations through multilevel and multichannel communication and consultation. We should encourage the signing of cooperation MOUs or plans, and develop a number of bilateral cooperation pilot projects. We should establish and improve bilateral joint working mechanisms, and draw up implementation plans and road maps for advancing the Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, we should give full play to the existing bilateral mechanisms such as joint committee, mixed committee, coordinating committee, steering committee and management committee to coordinate and promote the implementation of cooperation projects.
We should enhance the role of multilateral cooperation mechanisms, make full use of existing mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN Plus China (10+1), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), China-Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Dialogue, Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation, and Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) to strengthen communication with relevant countries, and attract more countries and regions to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative.
We should continue to encourage the constructive role of the international forums and exhibitions at regional and subregional levels hosted by countries along the Belt and Road, as well as such platforms as Boao Forum for Asia, China-ASEAN Expo, China-Eurasia Expo, Euro-Asia Economic Forum, China International Fair for Investment and Trade, China-South Asia Expo, China-Arab States Expo, Western China International Fair, China-Russia Expo, and Qianhai Cooperation Forum. We should support the local authorities and general public of countries along the Belt and Road to explore the historical and cultural heritage of the Belt and Road, jointly hold investment, trade and cultural exchange activities, and ensure the success of the Silk Road (Dunhuang) International Culture Expo, Silk Road International Film Festival and Silk Road International Book Fair. We propose to set up an international summit forum on the Belt and Road Initiative.
China’s Regions in Pursuing Opening-Up
In advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, China will fully leverage the comparative advantages of its various regions, adopt a proactive strategy of further opening-up, strengthen interaction and cooperation among the eastern, western and central regions, and comprehensively improve the openness of the Chinese economy.
Northwestern and northeastern regions. We should make good use of Xinjiang’s geographic advantages and its role as a window of westward opening-up to deepen communication and cooperation with Central, South and West Asian countries, make it a key transportation, trade, logistics, culture, science and education center, and a core area on the Silk Road Economic Belt. We should give full scope to the economic and cultural strengths of Shaanxi and Gansu provinces and the ethnic and cultural advantages of the Ningxia Hui autonomous region and Qinghai province, build Xi’an into a new focus of reform and opening-up in China’s interior, speed up the development and opening-up of cities such as Lanzhou and Xining, and advance the building of the Ningxia Inland Opening-up Pilot Economic Zone with the goal of creating strategic channels, trade and logistics hubs and key bases for industrial and cultural exchanges opening to Central, South and West Asian countries. We should give full play to Inner Mongolia’s proximity to Mongolia and Russia, improve the railway links connecting Heilongjiang province with Russia and the regional railway network, strengthen cooperation between China’s Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces and Russia’s Far East region on sea-land multimodal transport, and advance the construction of an Eurasian high-speed transport corridor linking Beijing and Moscow with the goal of building key windows opening to the north.
Southwestern region. We should give full play to the unique advantage of Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region as a neighbor of ASEAN countries, speed up the opening-up and development of the Beibu Gulf Economic Zone and the Pearl River-Xijiang Economic Zone, build an international corridor opening to the ASEAN region, create new strategic anchors for the opening-up and development of the southwest and mid-south regions of China, and form an important gateway connecting the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. We should make good use of the geographic advantage of Yunnan province, advance the construction of an international transport corridor connecting China with neighboring countries, develop a new highlight of economic cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion, and make the region a pivot of China’s opening-up to South and Southeast Asia. We should promote the border trade and tourism and culture cooperation between Tibet autonomous region and neighboring countries such as Nepal.
Coastal regions, and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. We should leverage the strengths of the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, west coast of the Taiwan Straits, Bohai Rim, and other areas with economic zones boasting a high level of openness, robust economic strengths and strong catalytic role, speed up the development of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, and support Fujian province in becoming a core area of the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. We should give full scope to the role of Qianhai (Shenzhen), Nansha (Guangzhou), Hengqin (Zhuhai) and Pingtan (Fujian) in opening-up and cooperation, deepen their cooperation with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and help to build the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Big Bay Area. We should promote the development of the Zhejiang Marine Economy Development Demonstration Zone, Fujian Marine Economic Pilot Zone and Zhoushan Archipelago New Area, and further open Hainan province as an international tourism island. We should strengthen the port construction of coastal cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhanjiang, Shantou, Qingdao, Yantai, Dalian, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Quanzhou, Haikou and Sanya, and strengthen the functions of international hub airports such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. We should use opening-up to motivate these areas to carry out deeper reform, create new systems and mechanisms of open economy, step up scientific and technological innovation, develop new advantages for participating in and leading international cooperation and competition, and become the pacesetter and main force in the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly the building of the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. We should leverage the unique role of overseas Chinese and the Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions, and encourage them to participate in and contribute to the Belt and Road Initiative. We should also make proper arrangements for the Taiwan region to be part of this effort.
Inland regions. We should make use of the advantages of inland regions, including a vast landmass, rich human resources and a strong industrial foundation, focus on such key regions as the city clusters along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, around Chengdu and Chongqing, in central Henan province, around Hohhot, Baotou, Erdos and Yulin, and around Harbin and Changchun to propel regional interaction and cooperation and industrial concentration. We should build Chongqing into an important pivot for developing and opening up the western region, and make Chengdu, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Nanchang and Hefei leading areas of opening-up in the inland regions. We should accelerate cooperation between regions on the upper and middle reaches of the Yangtze River and their counterparts along Russia’s Volga River. We should set up coordination mechanisms in terms of railway transport and port customs clearance for the China-Europe corridor, cultivate the brand of “China-Europe freight trains,” and construct a cross-border transport corridor connecting the eastern, central and western regions. We should support inland cities such as Zhengzhou and Xi’an in building airports and international land ports, strengthen customs clearance cooperation between inland ports and ports in the coastal and border regions, and launch pilot e-commerce services for cross-border trade. We should optimize the layout of special customs oversight areas, develop new models of processing trade, and deepen industrial cooperation with countries along the Belt and Road.
China in Action
For more than a year, the Chinese government has been actively promoting the building of the Belt and Road, enhancing communication and consultation and advancing practical cooperation with countries along the Belt and Road, and introduced a series of policies and measures for early outcomes.
High-level guidance and facilitation. President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang have visited over 20 countries, attended the Dialogue on Strengthening Connectivity Partnership and the sixth ministerial conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, and met with leaders of relevant countries to discuss bilateral relations and regional development issues. They have used these opportunities to explain the rich contents and positive implications of the Belt and Road Initiative, and their efforts have helped bring about a broad consensus on the Belt and Road Initiative.
Signing cooperation framework. China has signed MOUs of cooperation on the joint development of the Belt and Road with some countries, and on regional cooperation and border cooperation and mid-and long-term development plans for economic and trade cooperation with some neighboring countries. It has proposed outlines of regional cooperation plans with some adjacent countries.
Promoting project cooperation. China has enhanced communication and consultation with countries along the Belt and Road, and promoted a number of key cooperation projects in the fields of infrastructure connectivity, industrial investment, resource development, economic and trade cooperation, financial cooperation, cultural exchanges, ecological protection and maritime cooperation where the conditions are right.
Improving policies and measures. The Chinese government will integrate its domestic resources to provide stronger policy support for the Initiative. It will facilitate the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China has proposed the Silk Road Fund, and the investment function of the China-Eurasia Economic Cooperation Fund will be reinforced. We will encourage bank card clearing institutions to conduct cross-border clearing operations, and payment institutions to conduct cross-border payment business. We will actively promote investment and trade facilitation, and accelerate the reform of integrated regional customs clearance.
Boosting the role of cooperation platforms. A number of international summits, forums, seminars and expos on the theme of the Belt and Road Initiative have been held, which have played an important role in increasing mutual understanding, reaching consensus and deepening cooperation.
Embracing a Brighter Future Together
Though proposed by China, the Belt and Road Initiative is a common aspiration of all countries along their routes. China is ready to conduct equal-footed consultation with all countries along the Belt and Road to seize the opportunity provided by the Initiative, promote opening-up, communication and integration among countries in a larger scope, with higher standards and at deeper levels, while giving consideration to the interests and aspirations of all parties. The development of the Belt and Road is open and inclusive, and we welcome the active participation of all countries and international and regional organizations in this Initiative.
The development of the Belt and Road should mainly be conducted through policy communication and objectives coordination. It is a pluralistic and open process of cooperation which can be highly flexible, and does not seek conformity. China will join other countries along the Belt and Road to substantiate and improve the content and mode of the Belt and Road cooperation, work out relevant timetables and road maps, and align national development programs and regional cooperation plans.
China will work with countries along the Belt and Road to carry out joint research, forums and fairs, personnel training, exchanges and visits under the framework of existing bilateral, multilateral, regional and subregional cooperation mechanisms, so that they will gain a better understanding and recognition of the contents, objectives and tasks of the Belt and Road Initiative.
China will work with countries along the Belt and Road to steadily advance demonstration projects, jointly identify programs that accommodate bilateral and multilateral interests, and accelerate the launching of programs that are agreed upon by parties and ready for implementation, so as to ensure early harvest.
The Belt and Road cooperation features mutual respect and trust, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, and mutual learning between civilizations. As long as all countries along the Belt and Road make concerted efforts to pursue our common goal, there will be bright prospects for the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, and the people of countries along the Belt and Road can all benefit from this Initiative.
Nearly two billion voters in 50 countries around the world will head to the polls this year to elect their leaders.
Some of the biggest elections include India – the world’s largest democracy with 800 million eligible voters, Indonesia – 187 million registered voters and Nigeria – 84 million registered voters.
Here’s how different voting systems work around the world»
Questi sono gli stati europei.
2019-02-27: Paesi Bassi;
Questi sono stati di interesse mondiale:
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In quasi tutti i paesi che andranno alle elezioni i sondaggi elettorali non indicano un partito, ovvero una coalizione, chiaramente egemone. Di conseguenza potrebbero accadere anche ribaltamento delle linee politiche ed economiche finora seguite.
Questa asserzione sembrerebbe essere particolarmente attuale negli stati europei, i capi di stato o di governo dei quali siedono a pieno diritto nel Consiglio Europeo, massimo organo direzionale dell’Unione Europea. Molti di questi stati hanno governi minoritari ovvero coalizioni in via di disgregazione.