Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Mondiale, Medio Oriente, Putin, Russia

L’Unione economica eurasiatica accoglierà l’Iran dal febbraio 2018.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-12-19.

Russia's president Putin visits city of Yaroslavl

«The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is an economic union of states located primarily in northern Eurasia. The Treaty aiming for the establishment of the EAEU was signed on 29 May 2014 by the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, and came into force on 1 January 2015. Treaties aiming for Armenia’s and Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union were signed on 9 October and 23 December 2014, respectively. Armenia’s accession treaty came into force on 2 January 2015. Kyrgyzstan’s accession treaty came into effect on 6 August 2015. ….

The countries represent a market of some 183 million people and a combined GDP of around $4 trillion. ….

Russia has the 12th largest economy in the world by nominal GDP and the 6th largest by purchasing power parity. ….

The EAEU introduces the free movement of goods, capital, services and people and provides for common policies in macroeconomic sphere, transport, industry and agriculture, energy, foreign trade and investment, customs, technical regulation, competition and antitrust regulation.» [Fonte]

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E così l’Iran aderirà all’Unione economica eurasiatica. Ma siamo solo agli inizi.

«L’Unione eurasiatica potrebbe estendersi anche ad altri paesi che sono stati storicamente o culturalmente legati alla Russia, come la Finlandia, l’Ungheria, la Repubblica Ceca, la Bulgaria, la Cina e la Mongolia, che sarebbero uniti in un’unione federale dove il russo verrebbe usato come lingua di comunicazione e cooperazione economica.» [Fonte]

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Inutile dilungarsi sui dettagli protocollari, per quanto essi siano interessanti.

Il vero risultato è quello politico, che potremmo schematicamente riassumere nei seguenti punti.

– La Russia ha fatto transitare Siria ed Iran nella sua sfera di influenza politica, economica e militare.

– L’Occidente, e soprattutto gli Stati Uniti, hanno subito un severo smacco in Medio Oriente, prolegomeno alla perdita di influenza sia nel sud – est asiatico sia in Africa.

– Il blocco russo – asiatico si dimostra autoconsistente, coeso, in grado di vivere ed espandersi indipendentemente da quanto dica o faccia l’Occidente.

China’s CNPC weighs taking over Iran project if Total leaves – sources

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E mentre gli asiatici continuano a lavorare come castori intenti a costruirsi la diga, gli europei si accapigliano sulle regole da applicare alla ripartizione dei migranti e danno soddisfatti alle stampe il tratto dell’Unione sulla coltivazione dei broccoletti di Bruxelles, sintetizzato in undici volumi venduto quasi a diecimila euro.

Gli americani invece sono tutti intenti a farsi guerra a colpi di sexual harassment, tagliando così tutte le teste che fossero incorse nell’orrendo reato di essere accusati di aver guardato dentro una scollatura. La grande conquista dei liberal è che una denuncia, ancorché fatta ai media e non alla magistratura, è una sentenza passata in giudicato.

È giusto che scompaiano dalla scena politica.

Post Scriptum.

Se qualcuno incontrasse la Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel, glielo dica, per cortesia.


Aurora. 2017-12-15. L’Iran aderice all’Unione economica eurasiatica, addio Brzezinski

L’Iran aderisce all’Unione economica eurasiatica (UEE). All’inizio del prossimo anno, a febbraio secondo questo resoconto, l’Iran aderirà all’Unione e aprirà le porte alla Turchia per l’adesione entro la fine del 2018. Tra questa e la fine della guerra in Siria, non è difficile dichiarare la dottrina Brzezinski del caos centroasiatico guidato dagli Stati Uniti esalare gli ultimi respiri. L’Iran che infine aderisce all’UEE risponde a una serie di fattori, il più importante, la continua bellicosità degli Stati Uniti. Le sanzioni economiche estese all’Iran e al leader dell’UEE, la Russia, ha creato la necessità di un maggiore coordinamento su obiettivi economici e di politica estera. E crea la nuova realtà regionale che rimodellerà questo concetto per i prossimi cento anni.

La scommessa nucleare

Negli ultimi giorni dell’amministrazione Obama sembrava che l’obiettivo fosse placare l’Iran per fermarne la svolta verso Russia e Cina. Credo che fosse la forza trainante del negoziato di Obama sul controverso accordo nucleare. In effetti, Obama cercò di scambiare i miliardi congelati degli iraniani detenuti nelle banche occidentali con l’Iran ignorare la disintegrazione della Siria e conseguente disastro totale. Quando si pensa quanto siamo venali? Dopo aver sanzionato l’Iran economicamente, averne congelato i conti, impeditogli la comunicazione interbancaria coi clienti (rimozione dallo SWIFT), indotto l’iperinflazione per istigare il cambio di regime, avrebbe accettato di consegnare l’alleata Siria agli animali wahhabiti. In cambio avrebbe ripudiato la Russia e sarebbe stato grato per l’opportunità di riavere i soldi firmando un accordo che gli vietava di avere armi nucleari? Questa è la “logica” dei ritardati che guidavano la nostra politica estera sotto Obama. Quindi, ora, dopo aver visto Russia ed Esercito arabo siriano sconfiggere lo SIIL, l’Iran fa la mossa intelligente d’integrare l’economia, che ha bisogno di diversificazione ed investimenti, aderendo all’Unione economica che raggrupperà tutti gli interessi dell’Asia centrale lungo un percorso simile. Non c’è altro da dire. Non solo è morto Zbigniew Brzezinski, ma anche la sua strategia. Lasciamo Obama, Hillary Clinton, John McCain e i bambolotti dell’amministrazione di Bush il minorato prima di loro, buffoni raggirati ogni volta da Vladimir Putin, da Xi Jinping e dal Presidente iraniano Hassan Rouhani. E il mondo sarà perciò, presto un posto migliore.

Status di meraviglia

Tutto ciò che riguarda lo status quo degli ultimi trenta anni cambi. La Siria ha chiarito a tutti che gli Stati Uniti non sono infallibili. Di fatto, sono incompetenti militarmente e diplomaticamente. L’intervento russo ha evidenziato le vere radici del conflitto e quanto la nostra leadership mente, inganna e ruba per raggiungere i suoi caotici obiettivi regionali. Il presidente Trump cambia rotta a questa nave, ma è un processo lento e combattuto a tutti i livelli da chi aderisce ai dipartimenti della burocrazia. Ciò detto, l’ingresso dell’Iran nell’UEE a pieno titolo aprirà le porte a nuovi aderenti. La Russia corteggia tutti nella regione mentre l’UEE lavora sulle regole e costruisce l’organizzazione. L’adesione dell’Iran vedrà l’unione crescere rapidamente e contribuire a completare i progetti cinesi della Nuova Via della Seta. Facendo un ulteriore passo avanti, il quadro più ampio viene messo a fuoco con l’istituzione della New Development Bank, sfidando la Banca di sviluppo asiatica guidata dagli Stati Uniti, finanziando i progetti infrastrutturali. Con la raffica di grandi progetti annunciati di recente, compresa la nuova versione dell’IPI, gasdotto Iran/Pakistan/India, questo annuncio non è solo un colpo diplomatico per Putin e la Russia, ma piuttosto un fatto compiuto. Era sempre questione di quando, e non se, l’Iran aderiva all’UEE. E con esso a bordo, Paesi come India, Pakistan e Turchia possono aderirvi, sapendo di avere parità di condizioni su cui negoziare, smorzando animosità e dispute persistenti.

Picco USA

Come sottolineava Federico Pieraccini su Strategic Culture Foundation, anche le tensioni tra India e Cina si sono placate quando è diventato chiaro che gli Stati Uniti sotto Trump non sono disposti né possono mantenere il dominio sull’Asia centrale. “In questo senso, la mancanza d’interesse da parte dell’amministrazione Trump su alcune aree del globo è emblematica. Mentre la chimica tra Trump e Modi sembra buona, le tensioni tra India e Cina, accresciute dalle dispute sui confini, sembrano tuttavia essersi dissolte. In seguito al fallimento dei neocon nel dividere Russia e Cina, anche le tensioni di confine tra India e Cina sembrano ora estinguersi. Inoltre, in Ucraina, anche la decisione d’inviare armi a Kiev è stata minimizzata, e il Paese ora affronta un contro-golpe di Saakashvili (sì, ancora lui). L’Ucraina è un Paese in disordine che vive in prima persona le conseguenze della pessima posizione atlantista con la sua viziata politica anti-russa”. L’argomento di Pieraccini è che Trump è un mix di inettitudine e pragmatismo in politica estera. E questo mix ha portato all’attuale situazione, dove Stati Uniti, Israele e Arabia Saudita si agitano cercando di rimanere rilevanti. Non andrò così lontano, dato che questi Paesi hanno ancora una mano potente da giocare, se non altro per stabilizzare la maggior parte di ciò che hanno attualmente. E giocheranno tali carte fino in fondo per creare qualcosa che assomigli alla pace. Ma, l’Iran traccia una nuova strada, allontanandosi dalle ferite aperte dall’occidente, verso le opportunità che riposano in ogni altra direzione. Come ho detto recentemente, il quadro per un grande accordo in Medio Oriente è possibile. E l’adesione dell’Iran all’UEE è un forte indizio che vuole aderire alla maggiore economia mondiale da attore affidabile. Putin è diventato di fatto negoziatore degli alleati contro Israele e Trump, che s’impunta anche con Israele. Una volta che l’accordo sarà in vigore e Trump accetterà di rimuovere la presenza militare degli Stati Uniti dalla maggior parte della regione, allora si vedrà come apparirebbe il mondo senza conflitti istigati.

Annunci
Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Mondiale, Russia, Stati Uniti

National Intelligence Council. Il rapporto quadriennale.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-12-13.

Terra vista dallo Spazio 001

Il National Intelligence Council ha rilasciato il suo Report quadriennale

«Global Trends. Paradox Of Progress» ISBN 978-0-16-093614-2.

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Punti chiave. Ricordiamo come la lettura del testo completo sarebbe necessaria per comprendere a fondo la portata di questa raccolta di frasi. Il testo completo conta 230 pagine, ma vale la pena di leggerle.

«Global growth will slow, just as increasingly complex global challenges impend»

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«An ever-widening range of states, organizations, and empowered individuals will shape geopolitics»

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«the emerging global landscape is drawing to a close an era of American dominance following the Cold War»

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«Doing so domestically would be the end of democracy, resulting in authoritarianism or instability or both»

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«erosion of norms for conflict prevention and human rights will encourage China and Russia to check US influence»

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«raising the specter of drained welfare coffers and increased competition for jobs, and reinforcing nativist, anti-elite impulses»

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«a restructuring of the global economy that leads to long periods of slow or no growth»

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«the trends of rising nationalism, changing conflict patterns, emerging disruptive technologies, and decreasing global cooperation might combine to increase the risk of interstate conflict»

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«growing public expectations but diminishing capacity of national governments open space for local governments and private actors, challenging traditional assumptions about what governing means»

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«China will attempt to shift to a consumer-driven economy from  its longstanding export and investment focus»

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«Populism will increase on the right and the left, threatening liberalism. Some leaders will use nationalism to shore up control»

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«Managing global issues will become harder as actors multiply—to include NGOs, corporations, and empowered individuals—resulting in more ad hoc, fewer encompassing efforts.»

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«Pechino, secondo il report, è destinata, insieme alla Russia, a scalzare definitivamente gli Stati Uniti dal ruolo di unica superpotenza mondiale. In quest’ottica anche l’Europa uscirebbe dalla sfera d’influenza americana per entrare in quella euroasiatica»

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«Thinking about the future is vital but hard. Crises keep intruding, making it all but impossible to look beyond daily headlines to what lies over the horizon. In those circumstances, thinking “outside the box,” to use the cliché, too often loses out to keeping up with the inbox. That is why every four years the National Intelligence Council (NIC) undertakes a major assessment of the forces and choices shaping the world before us over the next two decades.

This version, the sixth in the series, is titled, “Global Trends: The Paradox of Progress,” and we are proud of it. It may look like a report, but it is really an invitation, an invitation to discuss, debate and inquire further about how the future could unfold. Certainly, we do not pretend to have the definitive “answer.”»

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«Long-term thinking is critical to framing strategy. The Global Trends series pushes us to reexamine key assumptions, expectations, and uncertainties about the future. In a very messy and interconnected world, a longer perspective requires us to ask hard questions about which issues and choices will be most consequential in the decades ahead–even if they don’t necessarily generate the biggest headlines. A longer view also is essential because issues like terrorism, cyberattacks, biotechnology, and climate change invoke high stakes and will require sustained collaboration to address.»

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«The Future Summarized.

We are living a paradox: The achievements of the industrial and information ages are shaping a world to come that is both more dangerous and richer with opportunity than ever before. Whether promise or peril prevails will turn on the choices of humankind. The progress of the past decades is historic—connecting people, empowering individuals, groups, and states, and lifting a billion people out of poverty in the process. But this same progress also spawned shocks like the Arab Spring, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and the global rise of populist, anti-establishment politics. These shocks reveal how fragile the achievements have been, underscoring deep shifts in the global landscape that portend a dark and difficult near future.

The next five years will see rising tensions within and between countries. Global growth will slow, just as increasingly complex global challenges impend. An ever-widening range of states, organizations, and empowered individuals will shape geopolitics. For better and worse, the emerging global landscape is drawing to a close an era of American dominance following the Cold War. So, too, perhaps is the rules-based international order that emerged after World War II. It will be much harder to cooperate internationally and govern in ways publics expect. Veto players will threaten to block collaboration at every turn, while information “echo chambers” will reinforce countless competing realities, undermining shared understandings of world events.

Underlying this crisis in cooperation will be local, national, and international differences about the proper role of government across an array of issues ranging from the economy to the environment, religion, security, and the rights of individuals. Debates over moral boundaries—to whom is owed what—will become more pronounced, while divergence in values and interests among states will threaten international security. It will be tempting to impose order on this apparent chaos, but that ultimately would be too costly in the short run and would fail in the long. Dominating empowered, proliferating actors in multiple domains would require unacceptable resources in an era of slow growth, fiscal limits, and debt burdens. Doing so domestically would be the end of democracy, resulting in authoritarianism or instability or both. Although material strength will remain essential to geopolitical and state power, the most powerful actors of the future will draw on networks, relationships, and information to compete and cooperate. This is the lesson of great power politics in the 1900s, even if those powers had to learn and relearn it. The US and Soviet proxy wars, especially in Vietnam and Afghanistan, were a harbinger of the post-Cold War conflicts and today’s fights in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia in which less powerful adversaries deny victory through asymmetric strategies, ideology, and societal tensions. The threat from terrorism will expand in the coming decades as the growing prominence of small groups and individuals use new technologies, ideas, and relationships to their advantage.

Meanwhile, states remain highly relevant. China and Russia will be emboldened, while regional aggressors and nonstate actors will see openings to pursue their interests. Uncertainty about the United States, an inward-looking West, and erosion of norms for conflict prevention and human rights will encourage China and Russia to check US influence. In doing so, their “gray zone” aggression and diverse forms of disruption will stay below the threshold of hot war but bring profound risks of miscalculation. Overconfidence that material strength can manage escalation will increase the risks of interstate conflict to levels not seen since the Cold War. Even if hot war is avoided, the current pattern of “international cooperation where we can get it”—such as on climate change—masks significant differences in values and interests among states and does little to curb assertions  of dominance within regions. These trends are leading to a spheres of influence world.

Nor is the picture much better on the home front for many countries. While decades of global integration and advancing technology enriched the richest and lifted that billion out of poverty, mostly in Asia, it also hollowed out Western middle classes and stoked pushback against globalization. Migrant flows are greater now than in the past 70 years, raising the specter of drained welfare coffers and increased competition for jobs, and reinforcing nativist, anti-elite impulses. Slow growth plus technology-induced disruptions in job markets will threaten poverty reduction and drive tensions within countries in the years to come, fueling the very nationalism that contributes to tensions between countries.

Yet this dreary near future is hardly cast in stone. Whether the next five or 20 years are brighter—or darker—will turn on three choices: How will individuals, groups, and governments renegotiate their expectations of one another to create political order in an era of empowered individuals and rapidly changing economies? To what extent will major state powers, as well as individuals and groups, craft new patterns or architectures of international cooperation and competition? To what extent will governments, groups, and individuals prepare now for multifaceted global issues like climate change and transformative technologies?»

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«Islands investigates a restructuring of the global economy that leads to long periods of slow or no growth, challenging both traditional models of economic prosperity and the presumption that globalization will continue to expand»

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«Orbits explores a future of tensions created by competing major powers seeking their own spheres of influence while attempting to maintain stability at home. It examines how the trends of rising nationalism, changing conflict patterns, emerging disruptive technologies, and decreasing global cooperation might combine to increase the risk of interstate conflict. This scenario emphasizes the policy choices ahead for governments that would reinforce stability and peace or further exacerbate tensions. It features a nuclear weapon used in anger, which turns out to concentrate global minds so that it does not happen again.»

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«Communities shows how growing public expectations but diminishing capacity of national governments open space for local governments and private actors, challenging traditional assumptions about what governing means. Information technology remains the key enabler, and companies, advocacy groups, charities, and local governments prove nimbler than national governments in delivering services to sway populations in support of their agendas. Most national governments resist, but others cede some power to emerging networks. Everywhere, from the Middle East to Russia, control is harder.»

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«As the paradox of progress implies, the same trends generating near-term risks also can create opportunities for better outcomes over the long term. If the world were fortunate enough to be able to take advantage of these opportunities, the future would be more benign than our three scenarios suggest. In the emerging global landscape, rife with surprise and discontinuity, the states and organizations most able to exploit such opportunities will be those that are resilient, enabling them to adapt to changing conditions, persevere in the face of unexpected adversity, and take actions to recover quickly. They will invest in infrastructure, knowledge, and relationships that allow them to manage shock—whether economic, environmental, societal, or cyber. Similarly, the most resilient societies will likely be those that unleash and embrace the full potential of all individuals—whether women and minorities or those battered by recent economic and technological trends.

They will be moving with, rather than against, historical currents, making use of the everexpanding scope of human skill to shape the future. In all societies, even in the bleakest circumstances, there will be those who choose to improve the welfare, happiness, and security of others—employing transformative technologies to do so at scale. While the opposite will be true as well—destructive forces will be empowered as never before—the central puzzle before governments and societies is how to blend individual, collective, and national endowments in a way that yields sustainable security, prosperity, and hope.»

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«Global Trends and Key Implications Through 2035

The rich are aging, the poor are not. Working-age populations are shrinking in wealthy countries, China, and Russia

but growing in developing, poorer countries, particularly in Africa and South Asia, increasing economic, employment,

urbanization, and welfare pressures and spurring migration. Training and continuing education will be crucial in developed and developing countries alike.

The global economy is shifting. Weak economic growth will persist in the near term. Major economies will confront

shrinking workforces and diminishing productivity gains while recovering from the 2008-09 financial crisis with high

debt, weak demand, and doubts about globalization. China will attempt to shift to a consumer-driven economy from  its longstanding export and investment focus. Lower growth will threaten poverty reduction in developing countries. Technology is accelerating progress but causing discontinuities. Rapid technological advancements will increase the pace of change and create new opportunities but will aggravate divisions between winners and losers. Automation and artificial intelligence threaten to change industries faster than economies can adjust, potentially displacing workers and limiting the usual route for poor countries to develop. Biotechnologies such as genome editing will revolutionize medicine and other fields, while sharpening moral differences.

Ideas and Identities are driving a wave of exclusion. Growing global connectivity amid weak growth will increase tensions within and between societies. Populism will increase on the right and the left, threatening liberalism. Some leaders will use nationalism to shore up control. Religious influence will be increasingly consequential and more authoritative than many governments. Nearly all countries will see economic forces boost women’s status and leadership roles, but backlash also will occur.

Governing is getting harder. Publics will demand governments deliver security and prosperity, but flat revenues, distrust, polarization, and a growing list of emerging issues will hamper government performance. Technology will expand the range of players who can block or circumvent political action. Managing global issues will become harder as actors multiply—to include NGOs, corporations, and empowered individuals—resulting in more ad hoc, fewer encompassing efforts.

The nature of conflict is changing. The risk of conflict will increase due to diverging interests among major powers,

an expanding terror threat, continued instability in weak states, and the spread of lethal, disruptive technologies. Disrupting societies will become more common, with long-range precision weapons, cyber, and robotic systems to target infrastructure from afar, and more accessible technology to create weapons of mass destruction.

Climate change, environment, and health issues will demand attention. A range of global hazards pose imminent and longer-term threats that will require collective action to address—even as cooperation becomes harder. More extreme weather, water and soil stress, and food insecurity will disrupt societies. Sea-level rise, ocean acidification, glacial melt, and pollution will change living patterns. Tensions over climate change will grow. Increased travel and poor health infrastructure will make infectious diseases harder to manage.

The Bottomline

These trends will converge at an unprecedented pace to make governing and cooperation harder and to change the nature of power—fundamentally altering the global landscape. Economic, technological and security trends, especially, will expand the number of states, organizations, and individuals able to act in consequential ways. Within states, political order will remain elusive and tensions high until societies and governments renegotiate their expectations of one another. Between states, the post-Cold War, unipolar moment has passed and the post-1945 rules based international order may be fading too. Some major powers and regional aggressors will seek to assert interests through force but will find results fleeting as they discover traditional, material forms of power less able to secure and sustain outcomes in a context of proliferating veto players.»

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Occhio della Guerra. 2017-12-10. Ecco come sarà il mondo nel 2035 secondo l’intelligence americana.

L’intelligence USA ha delineato come potrebbe essere il mondo nel 2035. Diciotto anni possono sembrare un lasso di tempo molto breve per poter osservare dei cambiamenti radicali. Eppure molti osservatori sono concordi nel ritenere i prossimi venti/trent’anni come i più rivoluzionari di tutta la storia del genere umano. Inoltre basta guardarsi alle spalle e osservare i cambiamenti avvenuti nei vent’anni precedenti, per verificare come tale lasso di tempo sia più che sufficiente per dei mutamenti radicali. Diciotto anni fa il mondo doveva ancora assistere al crollo delle Torri Gemelle, alla conseguente guerra al Terrore, agli interventi militari in Afghanistan, Iraq e Libia, nonché alla crisi finanziaria del 2008. Insomma cambiamenti sconvolgenti.

Il paradosso del progresso

Ci ha pensato ora il National Intelligence Council USA, organo strategico dell’intelligence USA, a mettere nero su bianco quello che potrebbe essere il mondo fra diciotto anni. Il documento, chiamato “Paradox of Progress” fa parte del più ampio progetto “Global Trends” che ogni cinque anni cerca di dare un’idea del futuro più prossimo. Il documento serve così al presidente americano di turno, all’inizio del suo mandato (o al rinnovamento di esso), per farsi un’idea migliore delle sfide che lo attendono.

Per la sua redazione l’analisi si è servita di una dettagliata raccolta dati e di proiezioni basate sull’osservazione dell’evoluzione economica, sociale e tecnologica su scala planetaria degli ultimi anni. Un approccio scientifico per quanto la previsione del futuro non possa essere materia di scienza esatta. Tuttavia lo studio fatto dall’intelligence USA arriva addirittura al punto di prevedere quelli che potrebbero essere titoli di giornale in specifiche date.

La Cina si espanderà fino al largo delle Hawaii.

Ecco che il 3 febbraio del 2019 alcuni giornali scriveranno: “La Cina compra un’isola disabitata dell’arcipelago Fiji per costruire una base militare a 3.150 miglia dalle Hawaii per 850 milioni di dollari”. Pechino, secondo il report, è destinata, insieme alla Russia, a scalzare definitivamente gli Stati Uniti dal ruolo di unica superpotenza mondiale. In quest’ottica anche l’Europa uscirebbe dalla sfera d’influenza americana per entrare in quella euroasiatica.

Droni assassini e lavoratori sempre più flessibili.

Il 13 marzo del 2019 invece si titola che “Il Messico mette al bando i droni per uso privato dopo l’ultimo tentativo di assassinio”. La tecnologia, secondo il report, ha dunque preso il sopravvento e l’utilizzo dei droni diventerà nei prossimi anni disponibile al grande pubblico. Il report denuncia in particolare come tali droni diventeranno facilmente reperibili anche per la criminalità organizzata, che potrà usare queste silenziose zanzare meccaniche al posto dei più riconoscibili sicari. Se saranno i droni a “sporcarsi le mani”, il lavoro delle forze di sicurezza del futuro diventerà sempre più impegnativo e difficile.

Il 17 settembre del 2021 è invece il turno della “rivolta dei gig workers a Londra”. I “gig workers” sono i lavoratori della cosiddetta “gig economy”. Si tratta di lavoratori senza stipendio fisso che lavorano solo “su richiesta (on demand)”. Lavoratori in proprio che svolgono attività temporanee. Secondo l’intelligence USA, infatti, lo sviluppo tecnologico creerà un ulteriore disequilibrio economico, modificando radicalmente la piramide lavorativa conosciuta dopo la Prima Rivoluzione Industriale. Così lo sviluppo progressivo di Intelligenza Artificiale andrà a sostituire il capitale umano in numerosi comparti, contribuendo allo sviluppo appunto della figura del lavoratore “su richiesta”.

C’è ottimismo per il futuro dell’Africa.

Se il futuro dei lavoratori dipendenti sembra a tinte fosche, pare invece che il 2035 rappresenti per il Terzo Mondo  un’opportunità di rivalsa. Nel documento redatto dall’intelligence USA si fa riferimento infatti a una rivoluzione energetica dell’Africa, che porterà il Continente ad una progressiva autosufficienza. Un traguardo raggiunto grazie allo sviluppo di pannelli solari e batterie fatte in casa facilmente reperibili a basso prezzo. A ciò si aggiunge poi la diffusione della tecnologia di desalinizzazione dell’acqua che contribuirà a stabilizzare la produzione alimentare africana.

Conflitti per acqua e cibo.

Per il resto del mondo invece i problemi legati all’acqua e allo sfruttamento del suolo diventeranno di primaria importanza. Ben 21 delle 37 sorgenti d’acqua più grandi al mondo sono attualmente sfruttate in maniera “insostenibile” e se la tecnologia non porterà un miglioramento a questo, secondo l’ intelligence USA, vi sarà un crescendo di conflitti. Stesso discorso vale per la terra, sfruttata oggi ad un ritmo quaranta volte più veloce rispetto alla naturale rigenerazione del suolo. Quest’analisi lucida arriva da una fonte più che autorevole e mette in guardia l’attuale presidenza americana rispetto ai rischi maggiori per la società contemporanea. Starà ora alla Casa Bianca interpretare al meglio gli avvertimenti lanciati dalla propria intelligence. 

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica Mondiale

Macron in visita nel Burkina Faso. Per poco lo accoppano. Incidente diplomatico.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-11-29.

201711-29__Macron__macron-2-copertina

«Un gay psicopatico che odia la Francia»

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«Come tutti gli psicopatici crede solo nei suoi propositi. Macron non ama la Francia, ama solo se stesso e non combatterà per i cittadini francesi» [http://www.gay.it/]

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Episodi di questo tipo bollano a fuoco l’autore.

Sarebbe persino inutile commentare con le pesanti e severe parole del caso: sarebbe sufficiente leggersi i resoconti.

«la prima volta di Emmanuel Macron in Africa da presidente si è risolta in una gaffe pesantissima, ai limiti dell’incidente diplomatico»

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«Durante un incontro con gli studenti a Ouagadougou, capitale dell’ex colonia Burkina Faso, l’inquilino dell’Eliseo, per invitarli a superare la visione di una Francia paternalista alla quale chiedere soccorso nella difficoltà, li ha esortati, con toni un po’ bruschi, a “non trattarlo come se fosse il presidente del Burkina Faso”»

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«Mi parlate come se io fossi ancora la potenza coloniale ma io non voglio occuparmi dell’elettricità nelle università del Burkina Faso! È il compito del vostro presidente»

Christian Kaboré, Presidente del Burkina Faso, inizialmente reagisce con un sorriso e poi si alza, lasciando la sala.

Ma Mr Macron lo incalza:

«Ecco se ne va… Ma no resta qui… Niente, è andato a riparare l’aria condizionata»

* * *

Interpellato dai ragazzi sul traffico di rifugiati:

«Chi sono i trafficanti? Chiedetevelo, voi che siete giovani africani. Siete da non credere. Chi sono i trafficanti? Sono africani, amici miei. Non i francesi. Ognuno comprenda questa responsabilità. Mostratemi un francese, un belga o un tedesco che ha compiuto traffici tra la Nigeria e la Libia. Non esiste. Oggi in Africa ci sono Africani che rendono schiavi altri africani. Questa è la realtà. E ci sono europei che approfittano della miseria in Africa. In entrambi i casi si tratta di crimini inaccettabili. E li stiamo combattendo entrambi»

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«diffusi casi di abusi sessuali compiuti dai militari transalpini di stanza in Africa, abusi che hanno spesso visto come vittime bambini.»

* * *

«You speak to me like I‘m a colonial power, but I don’t want to look after electricity in Burkina Faso. That’s the work of your president»

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«I am from a generation that doesn’t come to tell Africans what to do»

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«French military out of Burkina»

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Macron publicly ‘humiliates’ Burkina Faso president as French leader’s Africa trip goes wrong

«”It is the work of the president [of Burkina Faso],” he said, pointing at president Roch Marc Christian Kabore, who was listening to Macron’s speech from the same stage.

At this point, Kabore suddenly stood up and left the room. “He’s leaving… Stay there! So, he went to repair the air conditioning,” »

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Macron embarrasses Burkina Faso’s President Kabore: ‘He left to fix the AC’

«“I do not want to pay attention to the problem of electricity, this is what the president should be doing …he is leaving … stay here, he has left to fix the air conditioning system”»

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«The French leader also referred to his comments that prompted controversy in July, when he suggested that it’s a problem when African women have “seven or eight children.”»

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La diplomazia è l’arte del colloquiare, dello stare a sentire, sempre con amabile garbo, mantenendo sempre il completo controllo di sé stessi. Il diplomatico è una persona amabile, con la quale si può parlare di tutto, alla ricerca di accordi duraturi ed equi.

Intemperanze di questo genere fanno in un baleno il giro del mondo ed alienano in modo definitivo chi le ha perpetrate.

Noi comprendiamo bene come la sindrome da astinenza possa alterare profondamente le manifestazioni caratteriali, ma di capi di governo rottamati perché inidonei a reggere quel ruolo ne abbiamo visto un gran numero.

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Non tutto il male viene per nuocere.

Come nel caso di Herr Schulz e di Frau Merkel, anche Mr Macron sta suicidandosi con le sue stesse mani, e con lui la sua bislacca visione dello stato europeo, e con il suo sussiegoso ed altero comportamento.

Ci si guardi bene dal fermarlo. Mai fermare i suicidi.

Nota.

Mr Putin e Mr Xi se la stanno sghignazzando della grossa. Aiutare l’elezione di Mr Macron è stato uno dei loro capolavori.


Agi. 2017-11-28. Il viaggio di Macron in Africa è cominciato con una gaffe devastante

Mentre prosegue placido il lungo viaggio di Paolo Gentiloni nel continente nero, la prima volta di Emmanuel Macron in Africa da presidente si è risolta in una gaffe pesantissima, ai limiti dell’incidente diplomatico. Durante un incontro con gli studenti a Ouagadougou, capitale dell’ex colonia Burkina Faso, l’inquilino dell’Eliseo, per invitarli a superare la visione di una Francia paternalista alla quale chiedere soccorso nella difficoltà, li ha esortati, con toni un po’ bruschi, a “non trattarlo come se fosse il presidente del Burkina Faso”, dopo che alcuni di loro si erano lamentati delle pessime condizioni del loro ateneo. “

Mi parlate come se io fossi ancora la potenza coloniale ma io non voglio occuparmi dell’elettricità nelle università del Burkina Faso! È il compito del vostro presidente”, dice Macron, indicando l’omologo locale Christian Kaboré, che inizialmente reagisce con un sorriso e poi si alza, lasciando la sala. “Ecco se ne va… Ma no resta qui… Niente, è andato a riparare l’aria condizionata”, fa Macron.

Un umorismo che non è stato apprezzato dagli utenti dei social, che hanno parlato di “arroganza”, immaturità” e “mancanza di rispetto”. Di certo questa vena sarcastica era ancora ignota a chi era abituato al compassato Macron visto finora nei consessi europei.

L’inquilino dell’Eliseo aveva poi perso la pazienza quando, in precedenza, era stato interpellato dai ragazzi sul traffico di rifugiati: “Chi sono i trafficanti? Chiedetevelo, voi che siete giovani africani. Siete da non credere. Chi sono i trafficanti? Sono africani, amici miei. Non i francesi. Ognuno comprenda questa responsabilità. Mostratemi un francese, un belga o un tedesco che ha compiuto traffici tra la Nigeria e la Libia. Non esiste. Oggi in Africa ci sono Africani che rendono schiavi altri africani. Questa è la realtà. E ci sono europei che approfittano della miseria in Africa. In entrambi i casi si tratta di crimini inaccettabili. E li stiamo combattendo entrambi”. Più che il contenuto delle affermazioni, piuttosto realistiche, colpisce quanto il presidente francese si sia mostrato a corto del suo consueto aplomb, a partire dal linguaggio del corpo.

La delegazione francese accolta da bombe e pietre

Va detto che la visita non era iniziata proprio benissimo. Prima dell’arrivo della delegazione francese, due terroristi incappucciati avevano tirato una bomba a mano che trasportava truppe francesi, mancando il bersaglio e colpendo tre civili. Macron ha poi cercato di minimizzare: “È solo una granata, non dimenticate i morti che la vostra gente ha dovuto soffrire ieri e nelle settimane e nei mesi scorsi”. In seguito, il convoglio della delegazione è stato accolto da lanci di pietre, mentre gli studenti manifestavano di fronte all’università dove Macron avrebbe parlato chiedendo il ritiro dei soldati francesi dal loro Paese. “Dovreste solo ringraziare i soldati francesi”, ha poi detto Macron agli studenti. La rabbia degli africani non è però alimentata da generiche “proteste contro l’imperialismo” ma anche dai diffusi casi di abusi sessuali compiuti dai militari transalpini di stanza in Africa, abusi che hanno spesso visto come vittime bambini. 


Reuters. 2017-11-28. Macron’s promise of new France-Africa ties raises heckles

Ouagadougou (Reuters) – France’s President Emmanuel Macron told African youths on Tuesday that he belonged to a new generation of French leaders who would build partnerships with the continent rather than tell it what to do.

But a youth protest against him, stones pelting one of his delegation’s vehicles and a botched grenade attack on French troops hours before his arrival in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou showed the hostility that still lingers after decades of an often tense France-Africa relationship.

Macron was also subjected to rowdy student questions at the university after his speech in Ouagadougou, and was sometimes left fruitlessly hushing as he struggled to get his answers heard above the crowd.

In his speech, peppered with references to African nationalists such as Nelson Mandela and Burkina’s revolutionary leader Thomas Sankara, Macron promised a break with a past in which France often seemed to call the shots to former colonies.

“I am from a generation that doesn’t come to tell Africans what to do,” Macron said, prompting applause.

“I am from a generation for whom Nelson Mandela’s victory is one of the best political memories.”

The 39-year-old is on a three-day visit to Burkina Faso, Ghana and Ivory Coast aimed at boosting cooperation in education, the digital economy and migration.

“I will be alongside those who believe that Africa is neither a lost continent or one that needs to be saved,” he said.

The grenade attack missed the French soldiers but wounded three civilians hours before Macron arrived. No group claimed responsibility.

Stones were thrown at a delegation convoy, however Macron was far away from it at a meeting with his Burkina counterpart, Roch Marc Kabore in the presidential palace.

Dozens of local youths clashed with security forces in the center of the capital throwing stones. Police responded with teargas. Protesters burnt T-shirts with images of Macron and carried slogans including “Down with new-colonialism” and “French military out of Burkina”.

BREAK WITH PAST?

It was not the first time a French president has promised to break with past French politics on the continent.

Macron’s predecessor Francois Hollande declared while visiting Senegal in 2012 that “the time of La Francafrique is over”, referring to a shadowy network of diplomats, soldiers and businessmen who manipulated African leaders for decades after independence.

But it comes at a tense time, when French troops are being sucked deeper into a years-long battle to quell Islamist militancy in the Sahel region.

France has 4,000 troops deployed there, and there are mixed feelings about their presence – highlighted in a bitter row between France and Mali over the deaths of 11 Malian troops being held captive by Islamist militants in a French air strike.

The French are pinning their hopes on the so-called G5 Sahel force being set up by regional country’s with French and American backing. It launched a campaign on Oct. 28 amid growing unrest in the desert reaches of the region, where jihadists allied to al Qaeda or inspired by Islamic State roam undetected.

Macron earlier told journalists G5 had been too slow to get established.

He said he would call for greater co-operation between Europe and Africa to tackle human trafficking and he touted a European initiative to rescue African migrants from being enslaved in Libya.

The exchange with heckling students was typical Macron, who during his presidential campaign often managed to turn initially hostile crowds in his favor by answering questions head on.

“You speak to me like I‘m a colonial power, but I don’t want to look after electricity in Burkina Faso. That’s the work of your president,” he retorted to one hostile questioner.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Geopolitica Militare, Geopolitica Mondiale

Cina. BeiDou. La via digitale della seta. Il dominio del mondo.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-11-26.

Pechino-Cina

«If you want to get rich, first build a road»

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«In 2013 President Xi Jinping revived this ancient endeavour, with the aim of linking China with Asia, Africa, eastern Europe, Russia and the Middle East»

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«In 2018 the new Silk Road will get a digital dimension. China will extend coverage of its home-grown satellite-navigation system to the 60-plus countries along the belt and road»

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«By 2020 China aims to compete directly with America’s Global Positioning System (GPS), and expand its services globally with a network of 35 satellites»

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«BeiDou connects the unconnected»

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«The UN says that 62% of people in the Asia-Pacific region are not currently online»

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«In addition to over $1trn in planned belt and road investments, China is spending an estimated $25bn on BeiDou.»

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«More than 30 countries have signed agreements to embed BeiDou domestically»

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«BeiDou, which is under military control, enables China to end its dependence on America’s GPS.»

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«Now China can deploy BeiDou-guided conventional strike weapons »

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Mentre l’Occidente investe gran parte dei bilanci statali in welfare e benefit, stipendi e vitalizi, la Cina investe cifre colossali in infrastrutture, dalle quali si attende anche un congruo ritorno economico, duraturo nel tempo.

È semplicemente evidente che alla fine il modello cinese è quello destinato a vincere. Con tutte quelle che saranno le ovvie conseguenze. Infatti sta semplicemente accerchiando l’Occidente.

Due elementi da mettere in evidenza.

«BeiDou connects the unconnected»

Già: ed i paesi che l’Occidente aveva snobbato saranno forse ingrati verso i cinesi?

«BeiDou, which is under military control»

Si è avvisati.

Tra tre anni la Cina disporrà di un sistema sia civile sia militare di geolocalizzazione: questo era l’elemento cardine per permettere il passaggio da potenza locoregionale a mondiale.

Poi non ci si stupisca più di tanto se alla fine la Cina esercitasse il potere che sta pazientemente costruendo.


The Economist. 2017-11-22. A digital Silk Road. BeiDou, China’s rival to GPS, goes global

Over 2,000 years ago the Silk Road carried goods, services and ideas across the Eurasian continent. In 2013 President Xi Jinping revived this ancient endeavour, with the aim of linking China with Asia, Africa, eastern Europe, Russia and the Middle East. His “belt-and-road” initiative (overland and maritime respectively) involves ambitious plans for ­infrastructure.


In 2018 the new Silk Road will get a digital dimension. China will extend coverage of its home-grown satellite-navigation system to the 60-plus countries along the belt and road. By 2020 China aims to compete directly with America’s Global Positioning System (GPS), and expand its services globally with a network of 35 satellites. 


By the start of 2018 what China is calling BeiDou (its term for the Big Dipper) will have nearly 30 satellites, narrowing its accuracy to well below ten metres. That still leaves it behind GPS, which can pinpoint positions to a metre or less. But it is catching up and aims eventually to surge ahead.


Improvements mean faster, more efficient broadcasting. Navigation services will also get a boost. And BeiDou connects the unconnected. The UN says that 62% of people in the Asia-Pacific region are not currently online. Expanding coverage will be costly. In addition to over $1trn in planned belt and road investments, China is spending an estimated $25bn on BeiDou. 


More than 30 countries have signed agreements to embed BeiDou domestically. Many authorise China to build ground stations, which improve BeiDou’s accuracy and reliability. On top of this, China has a three-year plan to invest in information infrastructure projects worth a combined $174bn, including the development of fibre-optic cables for high-speed internet.


Already, more than 150m Chinese smartphones, or 20% of the market, are equipped with BeiDou, and over 40,000 fishing vessels use it to communicate. Some 20m bicycles and motorcycles employ its positioning services. BeiDou-enabled services were worth more than $25bn in 2015; this is expected to double by 2020. A sub-industry of BeiDou-compatible chips, antennas and products aimed at the mass market has also formed. 


Economic development is only part of the point. BeiDou, which is under military control, enables China to end its dependence on America’s GPS. Now China can deploy BeiDou-guided conventional strike weapons. As well as autonomy, the system brings the prestige of fielding one of the world’s four global navigation satellite systems (Europe, America and Russia manage the other three). 


Critics worry about two things. China’s secrecy is a concern, especially when something goes wrong with the satellites. And, as with the rest of the belt-and-road initiative, China’s lopsided assumption of financial risk could cause problems if the returns are lacklustre. 


Still, the government is committed to the plan. As the Chinese proverb goes, “If you want to get rich, first build a road.” In 2018, that means a digital highway, too.

Pubblicato in: Agricoltura, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Geopolitica Mondiale, Russia

Putin. Dal controllo del petrolio a quello del grano.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-11-15.

2017-11-15__Putin_Grano__001

La vera grande difficoltà intrinseca ad ogni discorso economico è la complessità del sistema nella sua generalità.

Se sicuramente la comprensione è facilitata dal ragionare su di un argomento per volta, alla fine arriva sempre il momento in cui si resta obbligati a considerare la situazione nel suo insieme.

Questo momento riserva sorprese anche molto grandi, e spesso non molto piacevoli.

Un elemento che considerato a sé stante sarebbe sembrato della massima importanza, nel quadro di una visione globale potrebbe diventare secondario, financo privo di valore.

Sarebbe davvero ingenuo pensare che i diversi elementi non interagiscano di loro, esattamente come sarebbe ingenuo pensare che gli effetti seguano leggi lineari.

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Nel rudimentale immaginario collettivo, la Russia è vista quasi esclusivamente come potenza militare oppure come potenza energetica. Due aspetti reali e concreti, che certo non estinguono la realtà russa. Non solo. L’uso delle risorse naturale non è il fine di una nazione, bensì un mezzo per portare avanti le proprie strategie, sempre che, ovviamente, quelle nazioni possano concedersi governi in grado di avere visioni strategiche e strutture organizzative in grado di perseguirle in modo coerente.

In questa ottica i governi occidentali sono severamente penalizzati dal troppo frequente ricorso alle urne. Generalmente parlando, ogni quattro o cinque anni mutano gli orientamenti strategici, condannandosi alla marginalizzazione.

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2017-11-15__Putin_Grano__002

«Russia, a leading exporter of crude oil for decades now, is increasingly dominating another critical global commodity. Its output of wheat has surged in recent years as good growing conditions boost farmers’ profits, allowing them to reinvest in better seeds and equipment»

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«About half the countries in the world import wheat from Russia»

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«Some of the biggest buyers are situated a short distance away, in the Middle East and North Africa, but demand comes from as far away as Mexico and Indonesia»

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«This season’s shipments are expected to be up more than 40 percent from just three years ago»

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«What’s the allure of Russian grain? It’s cheap»

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«tractors made by U.S. firm Deere & Co. and Germany’s Claas KGaA roll across Russian farms, and crops are sprayed with pesticides made by Monsanto Co. and Syngenta AG.»

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«Now forecast as the top wheat shipper, Russia saw its share of the export market jump from less than 1 percent in 2000 to an estimated 18 percent this season»

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«Russian grain typically doesn’t meet strict quality requirements set by key buyers Algeria and Saudi Arabia, for example, and it’s cheaper for Brazil to buy from suppliers within the Mercosur free-trade bloc.»

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«Transforming its farm industry will still leave Russia a long way from competing in the global corn, sugar or meat markets in the way it does with wheat»

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«The nation struggles to compete in corn because the government bans genetically modified seeds that make growing the crop more profitable in other countries»

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Cerchiamo di riassumere, sintetizzando.

– L’umanità necessita di un alto numero di materia prime, di commodities, che sono indispensabili: il cibo è prioritario su tutto.

– Se è strategico per una nazione raggiungere una ragionevole autosufficienza alimentare, altrettanto stratetico è il dominare e controllare i mercati mondiali: da questo punto di vista la produzione agricola è una arma, ed anche molto efficiente.

– Il grano russo è prodotto a prezzi di circa la metà di quello occidentale. Seguire il mercato delle commodities, ossia quei beni le caratteristiche dei quali non differiscono per sito di produzione, può essere anche fuorviante, se gli indici considerati prendano in esame solo la componente produttiva occidentale.

– La Russia ha il grande vantaggio nel poter stabilire prezzi politici, ed usualmente i grandi contratti sono stilati nell’ambito di accordi internazionali bilaterali, evitando il confronto con il mercato globale.

– Non solo. Un governo accentrato e snello, dotato di effettivo potere decisionale, può coordinare in modo particolarmente efficiente prezzi e disponibilità delle materie prime prodotte per l’estero: li vede non parcellizzati, bensì come un tutto unico.

– Da questo punto di vista il Chicago Board of Trade, classico mercato del frumento, pur restando di primaria importanza, ha perso molto del suo passato valore quando si considerino gli equilibri alimentari mondiali.


Bloomberg. 2017-11-13. How an Oil Giant (Russia) Came to Dominate Wheat

Russia, a leading exporter of crude oil for decades now, is increasingly dominating another critical global commodity. Its output of wheat has surged in recent years as good growing conditions boost farmers’ profits, allowing them to reinvest in better seeds and equipment. As low oil prices hurt the ruble, making grain more alluring for overseas buyers, Russia grabbed more of the wheat-export market from major shippers like the U.S. This is particularly welcome news for Russia as it tries to cut its dependence on agricultural imports, after it banned imports of some western foods in retaliation to sanctions imposed over the annexation of Crimea.

  1. Who’s buying Russian wheat?

About half the countries in the world import wheat from Russia. Some of the biggest buyers are situated a short distance away, in the Middle East and North Africa, but demand comes from as far away as Mexico and Indonesia. Russia’s top customer, Egypt, depends on Russian wheat to feed its people, while No. 2 buyer Turkey uses the grain to make flour it then exports. This season’s shipments are expected to be up more than 40 percent from just three years ago.

  1. What’s the allure of Russian grain?

It’s cheap. Gluts from years of bumper harvests depressed prices, which are also kept down by the short shipping routes from the Black Sea — the hub for the bulk of Russia’s supply — to Middle Eastern and African buyers. More recently, poor crops made grain from North America and Australia less attractive to some of their traditional markets in Asia, opening up the door for Russian wheat.

  1. How did Russia become a wheat export king?

Russia’s wheat exports began to surge at the start of this century, after Soviet-era collective farms gave way to private ownership of rich soils and farmers gained access to the latest international technology. Now, tractors made by U.S. firm Deere & Co. and Germany’s Claas KGaA roll across Russian farms, and crops are sprayed with pesticides made by Monsanto Co. and Syngenta AG. Helped by state support, farmers’ costs can be as little as half those of major competitors, so Russia can afford to keep planting even when prices tumble.

  1. What does Russian dominance mean for world markets?

Now forecast as the top wheat shipper, Russia saw its share of the export market jump from less than 1 percent in 2000 to an estimated 18 percent this season. During the same period, the U.S. share was cut almost in half. Bigger Russian harvests have added to the global glut and pushed prices in Chicago to near a decade low, prompting American farmers to plant the least winter wheat in a century last year. Russia’s dominance also gives it the power to shake up world markets. Benchmark prices surged almost 50 percent in 2010 as Russia banned exports, following a drought.

  1. Can Russia keep tightening its grip on exports?

Harvests may keep setting records — weather permitting — but there are signs the country’s ports and railways are starting to creak under the pressure of so many exports. Plus, Russia has struggled to crack some markets. Russian grain typically doesn’t meet strict quality requirements set by key buyers Algeria and Saudi Arabia, for example, and it’s cheaper for Brazil to buy from suppliers within the Mercosur free-trade bloc. Russia has made inroads in Asia, but high shipping costs will likely limit how much it sends there.

  1. Can Russia replicate its success with other foodstuff?

Transforming its farm industry will still leave Russia a long way from competing in the global corn, sugar or meat markets in the way it does with wheat. It’s now self-sufficient in producing sugar, but output costs are too high for large-scale exporting. Plus, Russia isn’t equipped to adequately handle shipments in containers, the world’s preferred way to haul white sugar. The nation struggles to compete in corn because the government bans genetically modified seeds that make growing the crop more profitable in other countries. Widespread African swine fever in Russia’s agricultural regions prevents significant pork exports.

The Reference Shelf

– A report on the revival of Russian agriculture by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

– Climate change helped Russia become a food-supply superpower, writes Bloomberg View’s Leonid Bershidsky.

– Ukraine is among the nations struggling to keep up in wheat.

– Duke University research on Russia’s wheat economy and its influence on the Middle East’s food security.

– An analysis of Russian agricultural potential by Sara Menker, founder and CEO of Gro Intelligence.

– A report by the Australian Export Grains Innovation Center on implications for Australia of Russia’s wheat expansion.

– The United Nations’ Food & Agriculture Organization’s country profile on Russia.

 

Pubblicato in: Cina, Commercio, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Geopolitica Mondiale, Stati Uniti, Trump

Cina ed Usa firmano accordi bilaterali per 250 miliardi di dollari.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-11-10.

 2017-11-10__Xi_Trump__001

Poniamoci una domanda e cerchiamo di rispondere, anche se la risposta sarebbe davvero molto complessa: a cosa servono i Governi ed i Capi dello stato?

Sicuramente servono a preservare la pace internazionale e domestica, frutto dell’esercizio di giuste costumanze e decisioni, di rapporti intrinsecamente corretti ed equi.

Altra importante componente è la conservazione del potere di acquisto della valuta ed una osservanza ragionevole dei rapporti giuridici ed economici, nel rispetto sostanziale della libertà umana.

Infine, un buon governo innalza il potere di acquisto della popolazione: non si chiedono miracoli impossibili, ma ogni anno diminuisca il numero delle persone indigenti, lasciando anche che i benestanti migliorino ed i ricchi continuino ad arricchirsi.

È da considerarsi buono il governo che abbassa le tasse.

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Se a prima vista quanto detto sembrerebbe essere banale, uno sguardo alla storia ci permetterebbe di dire che governi del genere sono una rarità.

Esattamente come si resterebbe stupiti dal dover constatare che risultati del genere siano stati ottenuti anche, e soprattutto, da sistemi di governo profondamente differenti da quelli attuali in Occidente.

Ci si rende conto quanto un simile approccio euristico possa anche urtare la sensibilità di alcuni, ma alla fin fine tutto è giudicabile sulla base dei risultati conseguiti. I mezzi usati diventano immediatamente trasparenti.

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«Two-way investment is gaining steam»

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«Bilateral trade surged to 519.6 billion U.S.dollars in 2016 from 2.5 billion dollars in 1979 when the two countries established diplomatic ties»

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«We also welcome U.S. companies and financial institutions to participate in the ‘Belt and Road Initiative»

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«Chinese and U.S. companies signed deals worth more than 250 billion U.S. dollars during President Donald Trump’s state visit to China»

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«China and the United States have huge potential in reciprocal economic and trade cooperation, Xi sai»

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«China and the United States are highly complementary rather than competitive»

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«Deals include purchases of Boeing aircraft, Ford automobiles, U.S. soybeans and joint development of liquified natural gas in Alaska»

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«The two sides should uphold the principles of equality and mutual benefit, mutual understanding and accommodation, and handle disputes through dialogue and consultation»

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Il Presidente Trump ha fatto ciò che avrebbe dovuto fare ogni capo di stato degno di tale nome: rafforzare i legami economici e commerciali e portare a casa contratti vantaggiosi per ambo le parti.

E così è stato: accordi per 250 miliardi sono un ottimo risultato.

Come si vede, la strada degli accordi bilaterali è ben più proficua di quella dei trattati commerciali locoregionali.

Solo per fare un esempio pratico:

Boeing committed to forging closer partnership with China for common development

«According to Boeing’s 2017 China Current Market Outlook, China will need to purchase more than 7,240 new airplanes valued at 1.1 trillion U.S. dollars over the next 20 years, he said.»

Avere un mercato sicuro per venti anni e stimabile a circa 1,100 miliardi di dollari non è cosa da poco. E questo riguarda solo la Boeing.

L’accordo per il gas naturale liquefatto ha una stima ancora superiore a quello della Boeing.

Delfin taps China for US floating LNG plant

«Delfin Midstream, developing the first floating facility to export U.S. natural gas, has sealed a preliminary 15-year sales deal with city gas distributor China Gas Holdings ….

unnamed Chinese banks to fund its ambitious $8 billion as the current global supply overhang in liquefied natural gas (LNG)»

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La White House ha voltato pagina.


Xinuanet. 2017-11-09. Chinese, U.S. companies sign over 250 bln USD business deals

BEIJING, Nov. 9 (Xinhua) — Chinese and U.S. companies signed deals worth more than 250 billion U.S. dollars during President Donald Trump’s state visit to China.

Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday revealed the figure after he and President Trump witnessed the signing of the agreements.

China and the United States have huge potential in reciprocal economic and trade cooperation, Xi said.

Deals include purchases of Boeing aircraft, Ford automobiles, U.S. soybeans and joint development of liquified natural gas in Alaska.

Being the world’s biggest developing economy and developed economy, China and the United States are highly complementary rather than competitive, Xi said when meeting with business delegates from both countries.

“We are willing to expand imports of energy and farm produce from the United States, deepen service trade cooperation. We hope the U.S. side will increase exports of civil technology products to China. We will continue to encourage Chinese companies to invest in the United States. We also welcome U.S. companies and financial institutions to participate in the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’,” he said.

Given the rapid growth of bilateral trade, it’s unavoidable to have friction, said Xi. The two sides should uphold the principles of equality and mutual benefit, mutual understanding and accommodation, and handle disputes through dialogue and consultation, he said.

Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to opening up and reform and said China will not close its door to the world, and it will only become more and more open.

Overseas-invested companies, including the U.S.-invested firms, will enjoy a more open, transparent and standard market environment in China, he said.

Xi said China’s economic outlook will look bright for a long time. The Chinese economy has been transitioning from a phase of rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development with improving economic structure. It has the foundation, condition and impetus to sustain the good momentum.

China is the United States’ largest trading partner while the U.S. is China’s second largest. Bilateral trade surged to 519.6 billion U.S.dollars in 2016 from 2.5 billion dollars in 1979 when the two countries established diplomatic ties.

Over the past decade, U.S. exports to China increased 11 percent annually on average, while China’s exports to the United States only rose 6.6 percent.

China holds a surplus in goods trade with the United States while the United States maintains service trade surplus with China.

Two-way investment is gaining steam. Jobs created by Chinese-invested firms across America had jumped ninefold since 2009 to 140,000 last year, according to a recent report by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and Rhodium Group.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Mondiale, Problemia Energetici, Russia, Stati Uniti

Putin. Rosneft come strumento geopolitico.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-11-02.

Raffineria 010

Mr Putin sta utilizzando Rosneft come grimaldello per cercare di penetrare aree strategiche che in passato dipendevano dagli Stati Uniti.

Ovviamente, ogni operazione ha i suoi pro ed i suoi contro.

Rosneft. Роснефть. Chi la possiede e chi la comanda.

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«Russia is increasingly wielding oil as a geopolitical tool, spreading its influence around the world and challenging the interests of the United States»

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«The strategy faces a crucial test this week in Venezuela, a Russian ally that must come up with a billion dollars to avert defaults on its debts»

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«Russia has been making a flurry of loans and deals all centered on the Venezuelan oil business, money that could make the difference between the government’s collapse and its survival. In return, Moscow is getting a strategic advantage in Washington’s backyard»

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«Moscow, through the state oil giant Rosneft, is trying to build influence in places where the United States has stumbled or power is up for grabs. Its efforts are also driven out of necessity, as American and European sanctions have forced Rosneft to find new partners and investments elsewhere»

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«The company, which Russia has long relied on to finance its government and social programs, has been pushing deeply into politically sensitive countries like Cuba, China, Egypt and Vietnam, as well as tumultuous places where American interests are at stake»

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«It is wielding economic and political sway in northern Iraq, by making big oil and natural-gas deals in Kurdish territory. And it is angling to bid for control of Iranian oil fields as tensions between Tehran and Washington escalate»

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«They really give the Russian government unbelievable leverage on questions of importance to the United States»

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«Over the past three years, Russia and Rosneft have provided Caracas with $10 billion in financial assistance, helping Venezuela stave off default at least twice under the weight of as much as $150 billion in debt.»

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«Last year, Rosneft took a 49.9 percent stake in Citgo, the Venezuelan state oil company’s refining subsidiary in the United States, as collateral for a $1.5 billion loan to the Venezuelan company»

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«In April, Rosneft went further, providing a $1 billion advance payment for crude oil produced by the state oil company, crucial aid for it to make nearly $3 billion in payments to bondholders»

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«The Russian company resells about 225,000 barrels a day of Venezuelan oil, equivalent to 13 percent of Venezuela’s exports.»

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«Russia had already invested more than $4 billion over the past year in the Kurdistan oil fields. And Rosneft became the largest buyer of Kurdish oil as Western oil companies reduced their investments»

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Quello che sembrerebbe intravedersi, sarebbe una tela di ragno che avvolgerebbe gran parte dei paesi in difficoltà attuale, ma dotati di ampie riserve petrolifere, quali il Venezuela ed il Kurdistan.

Tuttavia questa sembrerebbe essere la punta di un iceberg, perfettamente integrata con il progetto cinese del Belt and Road.

Il blocco sino-russo sta facendo investimenti degni del massimo rispetto in paesi emergenti, senza condizionare gli aiuti elargiti a condizioni etiche o morali, ma solo a rapporti economici da considerarsi sul lungo termine.

Il pericolo concreto sarebbe quello che gli Stati Uniti un bel giorno potrebbero trovarsi isolati a livello mondiale, scalzati con quattro scudi da quelle che una volta erano sue sfere di influenza.

Una mutazione non solo di politica economica locoregionale, ma anche ben più ampia, tenendo conto che in sede delle Nazioni Unite votano anche paesini piccoli piccoli, e che il loro voto equivale a quello della Francia oppure della Germania.


The New York Times. 2017-10-29. Russia Uses Its Oil Giant, Rosneft, as a Foreign Policy Tool

Russia is increasingly wielding oil as a geopolitical tool, spreading its influence around the world and challenging the interests of the United States.

But Moscow risks running into trouble, as it lends money and makes deals in turbulent economies and shaky political climates.

The strategy faces a crucial test this week in Venezuela, a Russian ally that must come up with a billion dollars to avert defaults on its debts.

Russia has been making a flurry of loans and deals all centered on the Venezuelan oil business, money that could make the difference between the government’s collapse and its survival. In return, Moscow is getting a strategic advantage in Washington’s backyard.

President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela was all smiles this month on a visit to Moscow seeking fresh financial backing, thanking Vladimir V. Putin “for your support, both political and diplomatic.”

Moscow, through the state oil giant Rosneft, is trying to build influence in places where the United States has stumbled or power is up for grabs. Its efforts are also driven out of necessity, as American and European sanctions have forced Rosneft to find new partners and investments elsewhere.

The company, which Russia has long relied on to finance its government and social programs, has been pushing deeply into politically sensitive countries like Cuba, China, Egypt and Vietnam, as well as tumultuous places where American interests are at stake.

Rosneft is looking for deals around the eastern Mediterranean and Africa, areas of tactical importance beyond the energy picture. It is wielding economic and political sway in northern Iraq, by making big oil and natural-gas deals in Kurdish territory. And it is angling to bid for control of Iranian oil fields as tensions between Tehran and Washington escalate.

Rosneft is “trying to create opportunities that can be extremely valuable in geopolitical ways,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, an energy security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “They really give the Russian government unbelievable leverage on questions of importance to the United States.”

The new push by Rosneft follows a clampdown on Russia.

Rosneft, which is 50 percent owned by the Russian state, is led by Igor I. Sechin, a former deputy prime minister and a close Putin ally. After the Russian invasion of Crimea three years ago, the United States and Europe hit Mr. Sechin with sanctions.

Since then, Exxon Mobil and other Western oil companies have been prevented from using their technological expertise to help Rosneft develop deepwater, shale and Arctic oil and gas fields. That has forced Rosneft to go far and wide to find new oil fields to replace its reserves.

Rosneft’s biggest bet so far is Venezuela. Over the past three years, Russia and Rosneft have provided Caracas with $10 billion in financial assistance, helping Venezuela stave off default at least twice under the weight of as much as $150 billion in debt.

Russia is effectively taking China’s place as Venezuela’s principal banker. While President Hugo Chávez was in power, China lent Venezuela tens of billions of dollars for projects to be paid for with oil. But China quietly stopped making new loans, leaving Russia to fill the void.

Last year, Rosneft took a 49.9 percent stake in Citgo, the Venezuelan state oil company’s refining subsidiary in the United States, as collateral for a $1.5 billion loan to the Venezuelan company. The state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, or Pdvsa, used the money to pay its bills and keep its oil fields producing.

The deal was sharply criticized by members of Congress, who warned that an eventual Russian takeover of Citgo would threaten national security. Citgo operates about 4 percent of American refining capacity and has a sprawling network of pipelines and gas stations. And Caracas remains highly dependent on the American market, since few refineries outside the United States can process large quantities of low-quality Venezuela crude.

In April, Rosneft went further, providing a $1 billion advance payment for crude oil produced by the state oil company, crucial aid for it to make nearly $3 billion in payments to bondholders.

But Russia’s investments are not without risk. Venezuela’s oil fields are aging and in disrepair. Oil service companies have been withdrawing after years of partial payments for their work. And fresh American sanctions have largely prohibited long-term loan transactions with Pdvsa or investments in other new government debt, making Venezuela’s financial straits even more acute.

“Russia is the only country that can give Venezuela a lifeline to survive through the rest of the year,” said Francisco J. Monaldi, an energy policy analyst at Rice University. “China has the capacity but not the willingness to do it, and that’s why Venezuela is so desperate to get the Russian support. There is no other way out.”

Venezuela is now Rosneft’s second-largest source of crude, after Russia itself. The Russian company resells about 225,000 barrels a day of Venezuelan oil, equivalent to 13 percent of Venezuela’s exports.

More Venezuelan oil could soon flow to Russia. Rosneft is negotiating with the Venezuelan state oil company to trade its collateral in Citgo for stakes in oil fields, as a way to gain more reserves at bargain basement prices and avert any sanctions or other legal issues with Washington.

“There is absolutely a geopolitical element to these deals,” said Helima Croft, global head of commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets. “Rosneft acquires cheap acreage in Venezuela, but does it also expand Vladimir Putin’s influence in our backyard? Yes.”

Rosneft’s Venezuela model is also finding traction in the Middle East, where Russia is looking for ways to support the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, make friends in Iran and help drive a wedge between Turkey and the West.

In the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, Moscow is seeking influence with competing sides. It follows a Kurdish referendum favoring independence from Baghdad that both the United States and Turkey fear will bring more instability to the region.

Russia also formally opposes Kurdish independence. But that did not stop Rosneft from signing a $400 million deal with the Kurdistan regional government this month for oil field drilling rights.

Russia had already invested more than $4 billion over the past year in the Kurdistan oil fields. And Rosneft became the largest buyer of Kurdish oil as Western oil companies reduced their investments.

“For Russia to be able to play in and have influence over Kurdish politics is useful in Syria, and it’s useful as a counterpressure on Turkey as well,” said David L. Goldwyn, who was the State Department’s top energy diplomat in the first Obama administration.

Now, Rosneft is angling for stakes in coming Iranian oil field auctions even while Mr. Putin seeks energy and other deals with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s archrival.

All the wheeling and dealing appears to be at its most aggressive in Venezuela, where Moscow’s engagement is more risky.

The Venezuelan government says it has more than $9 billion in currency reserves, though much of that is gold that must be sent abroad to liquidate, a transaction that can take time.

The next major debt payment comes due on Thursday, for $1.2 billion, on a Pdvsa bond that is maturing. Flirting with default, the company scrambled to pay most but not all of a $1 billion bond due on Friday, while the country still owes $350 million more in payments that were due this month.

The American sanctions against Venezuela, declining production and recurring pipeline and port disruptions have prompted several refiners to turn to other Latin American countries for supplies.

Should there be a default and the Maduro government collapses, Russia and Rosneft could be left holding bad loans that a new government might not want to pay.

“Will Russia continue to fund Venezuela?” asked Siobhan Morden, Nomura Holdings’ head of Latin America fixed income strategy. “That is still a question. I don’t know.”

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Mondiale

1717 – 2017. Due trecentesimi anniversari passati in silenzio.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-11-02.

Pieta_de_Michelangelo_-_Vaticano

I primi anni del 1700 furono densi di avvenimenti che hanno condizionato la storia dell’Occidente.

Ne enucleiamo solo i due principali.

Risoluzione del problema turko.

L’Impero turko aveva costituito per quattrocento anni un severo pericolo per l’Occidente. Da una parte la sua presenza navale nel Mediterraneo, ridottasi quasi alla sola pirateria dopo la sconfitta di Lepanto del 1571, dall’altra la spinta militare volta alla conquista dei Balcani. Nel suo periodo di massima espansione, l’Impero turko arrivava in Ungheria.

Nel 1683 i turki arrivarono ad assediare Vienna, che fu liberata tra l’11 ed il 12 settembre dal’intervento dei polacchi di Re Sobieski e di una vasta coalizione di principi tedeschi. Il sultano fece strozzare il visir Kara Mustafa. Questa guerra era terminata con la Pace di Karlowitz del 1699: pace che in effetti era solo una tregua temporanea. L’Impero austriaco voleva risolvere la partita una volta per tutte.

La guerra riprese a breve, e questa volta l’imperatore austriaco aveva ingaggiato il miglior generale al momento disponibile: Eugenio di Savoia. Le ostilità ripresero nel 1716 ed Eugenio di Savoia penetrò strategicamente lo schieramento ottomano ottenendo con il suo coraggio personale una clamorosa vittoria a Petervaradino: 70,000 imperiali sconfissero 200,000 turki.

L’anno successivo, 1717, anno in cui ricordiamo nacque il 13 maggio la futura imperatrice Maria Teresa, Eugenio di Savoia cinse di assedio Belgrado ed in grandioso combattimento notturno, all’epoca evento rarissimo, sbaragliò in modo definitivo i turki. Quel 16 agosto segnò uno spartiacque storico: l’impero turko non avrebbe mai più preso l’iniziativa strategica.

La successiva pace di Passarowitz prese atto della situazione militare e l’Austria si espanse per tutta la regione balcanica. Per la prima volta nella sua storia, l’Impero Turko fu nominato per secondo in un trattato di pace,

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Ma se l’Europa avesse mai pensato che avrebbe potuto vivere in santa pace avrebbe dovuto presto ricredersi.

Debellato il nemico esterno, ecco nascere quello interno.

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Nasce lo stato nello stato.

«Il 24 giugno 1717 fu ufficialmente fondata a Londra la Gran Loggia con lo scopo di federare le logge che operavano nel distretto di Londra senza collegamenti tra loro. Purtroppo non si sono conservati gli atti di quella fondazione, ma rimangono numerosissime attestazioni di questo evento storico che segnò formalmente la nascita di quella che poi fu chiamata la massoneria moderna, per distinguerla dalla muratoria delle antiche corporazioni. La riunione di fondazione si svolse nella birreria The Goose & Gridiron (“Oca e Griglia”), con la partecipazione di tre logge londinesi e una del Westminster, la stessa The Goose and Gridiron (“L’Oca e la Griglia”), The Crown (“La Corona”), The Apple Tree (“Il Melo”) e The Rummer and Grapes (“Il Calice e l’Uva”). I nomi di ogni loggia era infatti quello del locale presso cui si riuniva. La Goose and Gridiron era una birreria sul sagrato della Cattedrale di San Paolo (loggia ora denominata Lodge of Antiquity No. 2); la Crown una birreria all’incrocio tra Parker’s Lane e Drury Lane; la Apple-Tree una taverna in Charles Street, Covent Garden (loggia ora denominata Lodge of Fortitude and Old Cumberland No. 12); infine la Rummer and Grapes una taverna in Channel Row, Westminster (loggia ora denominata Royal Somerset House and Inverness Lodge No. IV).

A capo della gran loggia, con il titolo di gran maestro, fu eletto il gentiluomo Anthony Sayer. All’organismo direttivo appartenevano alcuni prestigiosi personaggi come il pastore anglicano John Theophilus Desaguliers (1683-1744), membro della Royal Society, brillante divulgatore delle teorie newtoniane e letterato ben introdotto nell’alta società londinese, Francis Scott duca di Buccleuch (1694-1751), scozzese e anche lui membro della Royal Society, Charles Lennox (1672-1723), primo duca di Richmond, primo duca di Lennox e duca d’Aubigny, figlio illegittimo del re d’Inghilterra Carlo II Stuart, lord John Montagu 2º duca di Montagu (1690-1749) membro della Royal Society, ed anche alcuni borghesi come il citato Sayer, il gentiluomo George Payne (c. 1685-1757). La contiguità ideale tra le corporazioni muratorie e le prime logge massoniche trova conferma nell’elaborazione delle Costituzioni dei Liberi Muratori del 1723; per la stesura del suo testo fu dato incarico al reverendo James Anderson, pastore presbiteriano, prendendo come riferimento ideale gli antichi manoscritti degli Statuti delle Corporazioni Muratorie allora conosciuti.

La funzione della gran loggia era quella di organizzare in modo centralizzato le varie logge. Infatti già nel 1725 si trovano, nelle minute della gran loggia, le adesioni di molte altre logge in Bath, Bristol, Norwich, Chichester, Chester, Reading, Gosport, Carmarthen, Salford, e Warwick, e un’embrionale provincial grand lodge nel Cheshire e nel Galles meridionale. La gran loggia si era ormai estesa ben oltre la città di Londra.

Le regole costitutive della prima gran loggia massonica furono date alla stampa il 17 gennaio 1723 per ordine del duca di Montagu, ex Gran Maestro, dopo che il manoscritto fu approvato in Gran Loggia e fu stampato per volontà della società raccomandandone l’uso nelle logge. I firmatarî furono Philip, duca di Wharton, Gran Maestro e Theophilus Desaguliers, Deputato (cioè vice) Gran Maestro.» [Fonte]

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Ci si pensi bene. La crisi attuale dell’Occidente è la crisi del pensiero massonico, la crisi del metodo sincretico. La crisi del sistema di reggimento dei popoli basato sul suffragio universale.

Questo era egemone il secolo scorso, quando l’Occidente rendeva conto della quasi totalità dell’economica mondiale ed era politicamente stabile. Ora che è in crisi, in Occidente risulta quasi impossibile formare governi basati su larghe maggioranze omogenee.

Ad oggi, l’economica occidentale rende conto di circa il 30% dell’economia mondiale, ed è in regresso. Chi anche riuscisse a governare l’Occidente non sarebbe più il padrone del mondo, ma solo una componente, importante quanto si voglia, ma una componente.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Mondiale

North Korea. Bombe? Missili? Sanzioni? Non pigliamoci in giro.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-10-25.

2017-10-27__Korea_North__001

Lo spettro di una Korea del Nord dotata di missili balistici e di armamento atonico in grado di minacciare il mondo è stato oltremodo utile a permettere che nelle elezioni anticipate giapponesi il governo Abe abbia ottenuto la maggioranza qualificata per poter cambiare la costituzione.

A breve vedremo il Giappone riarmarsi e dotarsi verosimilmente di armamento atomico e relativi vettori balistici: era nella logica della cose.

A questo punto la Korea del Nord non serve più. Non fa più notizia.

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Con perfetto sincronismo, la Cnn è uscita con un poderoso articolo:

Statues and ammunition: North Korea’s Africa connections.

«North Korea’s illicit African connections»

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L’articolo è troppo esteso per poterlo riportare.

Sono decenni che la Korea del Nord intrattiene simpaticissimi rapporti con numerosi stati africani, offrendo loro consulenze nel settore degli armamenti e relativi munizionamenti in cambio di tutto ciò che l’Occidente non vorrebbe darle.

Lo vende ai paesi africani, talora persino lo dona, e questi lo rimettono al destinatario finale: la Korea del Nord: semplice, ne vero?

La sanzioni servono solo alle persone che proprio non sanno regolarsi da sole.

Era ed è il segreto di Pulcinella. Il Danaus plexippus lo sbandiera ai quattro venti nelle sue migrazione americane.

L’articolista liberal democratico della Cnn ne parla con accorato dolore, quasi fosse una candida orsolina che parlasse di uno stupro di massa. L’unica viola mammola che nulla sapeva.

Sicuramente dolore ne prova, eccome. Bolla con estrema forza la Namibia, da dove recentemente i liberal democratici sono stati sfrattati. Per incanto, da brava gente, quelli della Namibia sono diventati discoli impenitenti. E pure omofobi.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Geopolitica Mondiale

Cina si è già conquistata gran parte del mondo.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-10-13.

2017-10-12__AidData China foreign aid__001

La Cina sta sviluppando una rete di relazioni internazionali del tutto impensate ed impensabili per gli occidentali. Ciò che sta costruendo con paziente lungimiranza è un qualcosa che sfugge gli schemi della logica occidentale o, almeno, degli attuali governanti dell’Occidente.

2017-10-12__AidData China foreign aid__003

Cina. Quanzhou. I Brics decidono cosa farsene dell’Occidente.

Cina. Banche Cinesi e Belt and Road. Yuan come valuta internazionale.

Brics. Il Summit di settembre a Xiamen. Ripudio dell’Occidente.

Cina. Inversione di rotta. Inizia la riduzione del debito.

Cina. Xiamen. Brics Plus alla conquista del mondo.

Obor. Progetto cinese su di un terzo del pil mondiale, per ora.

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Cina. Consolida il suo impero in Africa.

Prosegue e si allarga la rivolta all’impèrio mondiale. Gambia.

Kenyatta: Gay rights is a non-issue for Kenya

Rifugiati. Uganda un milione in un anno, e tutti zitti.

Cina ed Africa. Una politica di rapporti internazionali paritetici.

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2017-10-12__Cina_001

«The vast majority (93%) of US financial aid fits under the traditional definition of aid that’s agreed upon by all Western industrialised countries. That aid is given with the main goal of developing the economic development and welfare of recipient countries. At least a quarter of that money represents a direct grant, not a loan that needs to be repaid.»

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«In contrast, only a small portion (21%) of the money that China gives to other countries can be considered as traditional aid. And the rest of that money? The “lion’s share” of that money is given in commercial loans that have to be repaid to Beijing with interest. “China wants to get attractive economic returns on its capital,”»

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«There is evidence that China’s no-strings loans have had an effect on the entire global lending system, forcing traditional donors to stop placing so many requirements on receiving countries. Using AidData’s database, economist Diego Hernandez revealed that China’s role as a major lender has boosted competition between traditional donors.»

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2017-10-12__Cina_002

«”When an African country is also assisted by China,” he writes, “the World Bank provides fewer conditions attached to its loans”. For every 1% increase in Chinese aid, Hernandez found the World Bank lessened its typical demands for things like market liberalisation or economic transparency by 15%.»

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«Critics have long charged that “rogue aid” from China allows some countries to avoid democratic reforms because they can simply turn to China for aid, dodging the scrutiny of traditional Western donors.»

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«Cambodia is a recent example; independent newspapers and western NGOs have been shuttered, as Cambodian leaders’ strengthening ties with China embolden them to turn away from Washington’s demands to hold fair elections.»

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«Xiaojun Li studied how Chinese aid has changed countries in Africa, arguing that democratic reforms have slowed as the developing countries concluded they could bypass the political demands of Western donors by turning to Chinese aid.»

2017-10-12__Cina_003

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Cerchiamo di operare una rapida sintesi.

«There is evidence that China’s no-strings loans have had an effect on the entire global lending system, forcing traditional donors to stop placing so many requirements on receiving countries»

– La Cina persegue una politica estera di rapporti bilaterali paritetici, ove le due parti ritengono la propria identità, usi e costumi senza interferenza alcuna, mentre il terreno collaborativo è quello economico. Nel converso, l’Occidente ammette alle relazioni estere solo quegli stati che si impegnano a condividerne i valori. Senza condivisione dei valori etici, morali e politici occidentali non sono concessi fondi di finanziamento.

– L’Occidente eroga fondi in gran parte tramite organizzazioni internazionali, mentre la Cina finanzia in proprio e per il 79% nella forma di prestiti. Mentre i fondi occidentali sono per lo più fondi di gestione, i prestiti erogati dai cinesi sono finalizzati ad investimenti produttivi: questi generano quindi reddito locale, permettono l’ammortamento dell’investimento e la resa finale del prestito. Sono presiti sui quali si richiedono interessi perché sono investimenti produttivi, che alla fine restano di proprietà del paese aiutato.

– Mentre l’Occidente non si è mai curato di finanziare infrastrutture, se non in quota trascurabile, i cinesi prediligono questa tipologia di investimento: il progetto Belt and Road, Obor, è un classico esempio. Il progetto Obor coinvolge paesi per un terzo del pil mondiale e le infrastrutture, strade ferrate, strade, acquedotti, centrali elettriche e così via sono elementi basilari per ogni possibile sviluppo economico.

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Le differenze tra Occidente ed Oriente in questo settore sono evidenti e stridenti.

Nulla da stupirsi che l’approccio cinese surclassi quello occidentale e si sia conquistato il mondo. Per correr dietro le proprie ubbie, l’Occidente ha regalato il mondo alla Cina.


Abc News. 2017-10-11. Report: China catching up to US in foreign aid flow.

Attention to Chinese financing has increased as Beijing promotes its “Belt and Road Initiative,” a multibillion-dollar initiative to expand China’s trade links with Asia, Africa and the Middle East by building ports, roads and other facilities.
About 23 percent of Chinese spending met the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s definition of aid, or “official development assistance,” which requires at least 25 percent of a transfer to be a grant. By contrast, 93 percent of U.S. spending qualifies as aid.
The bulk of Beijing’s financing appears to be export credits and other measures aimed at promoting Chinese exports or other goals, which produced little measurable growth in recipient economies, according to Parks. He said such “official finance” doesn’t count as development assistance but is part of the OECD’s broader definition of aid.
“The lion’s share of the portfolio is really not delivering, at least on average, any significant economic growth benefits for its partner countries,” said Parks.
That leaves Beijing room to have a positive impact by shifting spending to development assistance, he said.
“There still is a lot of scope for them to learn and adapt,” said Parks.
The portion of Chinese financing that qualifies as aid “substantially improves economic growth,” according to the report. It said results were comparable to the impact of U.S.- and other Western-financed projects.
“I thought that was a pretty important finding and an encouraging one,” said Parks.
The 5-year-old project used a computerized system to look for information from more than 15,000 sources including news reports, Chinese government offices, ministries of other countries and academic reports. Its data cover 4,304 projects in 138 countries and territories.
China doesn’t participate in global aid reporting systems. It released some figures in 2011 and 2014 but gave few details and none about individual countries.
AidData released its first report in 2013 focusing on Chinese financing to Africa. Parks said its data have been used by other scholars to launch more than 100 research projects.
“AidData is the most comprehensive source of information on China’s lending for development projects,” said David Dollar, an economist at the Brookings Institution in Washington and former World Bank country director in Beijing, in an email.
“The data show that China’s lending is indiscriminate with respect to governance. Some big borrowers have poor rule of law, such as Venezuela, Angola and Pakistan,” Dollar wrote. “The overall pattern of lending indicates that it is demand-driven by which countries want to borrow rather than by a Chinese master plan.”
Parks said the data show more Chinese finance goes to countries that vote with Beijing at the United Nations. He said that “might not look good,” but a similar analysis of U.S. and other Western donors shows they act the same way.
“In a sense, Beijing has taken a page out of the playbook of traditional Western donors,” said Parks. “That doesn’t comport with the ‘rogue donor’ narrative that China is somehow inferior or different.”
Parks said the project didn’t try to measure whether Chinese aid undercuts environmental or other standards by giving an alternative to more stringent conditions on Western aid.
But a separate study published this year by researcher Diego Hernandez of Heidelberg found the World Bank attached “significantly fewer conditions” to loans if recipients also had aid available from China.
“New donors might be perceived as an attractive financial option to which the World Bank reacts by offering credits less restrictively in order to remain competitive,” wrote Hernandez.


The Washington Post. 2017-10-11. China treats its foreign aid like a state secret. New research aims to reveal it.

Since the turn of the century, China has become an unavoidable global provider of foreign assistance, funding everything from opera houses in Algeria to tobacco farms in Zimbabwe.

Try to find in-depth data about these projects, however, and you are mostly out of luck. China treats its foreign assistance budget like a state secret, refusing to work with international bodies that try to coordinate and quantify foreign development funding.  In part due to this paucity of information, a reputation has spread among Western critics that China is a “rogue donor” — one that lavishes illiberal regimes with cash to plunder raw materials for its own growth.

An ambitious new research project released this week challenges that assumption by producing the first-ever global data set on Chinese overseas development spending between 2000 and 2014. Brad Parks, the executive director of AidData, a research lab at the College of William & Mary, said it took five years for a team of nearly 100 scholars and research assistants from all over the world to piece together data from 15,000 distinct information sources covering 4,300 projects in 140 different countries and territories.

“What we’re about to release is the most comprehensive and detailed source of project information about China’s global development footprint ever,” Parks said. The end result is so unique, he said, that they’ve even had some inquiries from Chinese officials about using it.

AidData’s research offers a picture of a rising financial giant that is challenging even the biggest donor nations. China provided $354.4 billion in official funding around the world between 2000 and 2014 — not far off the amount spent by the United States in the same period, $394.6 billion. In some counties, the two nations looked like competitors, with China sometimes usurping the United States to become the preeminent donor.

The research also turns some widespread assumptions about Chinese foreign assistance on their heads. In a previously released project, AidData was able to show when you look at Chinese aid that matches the strict, internationally agreed-upon definition — official development assistance, also known as ODA — it does not appear to be motivated by acquiring natural resources or propping up Beijing-friendly authoritarians.

“China is well known for funding a number of governments with poor governance such as Venezuela, Angola, Iran, and Pakistan,” said David Dollar, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who was the U.S. Treasury’s economic and financial emissary to China between 2009 and 2013. “[However,] these are balanced by large amounts of lending to countries with relatively good governance: Brazil, India, Indonesia, and the East African states. China’s lending seems to be indifferent to governance.”

The data set suggests Chinese aid is instead generally motivated by two interests: the need level of the recipient country and the broader foreign policy aims of China. AidData found African countries that vote with China at the United Nations get an average bump of 86 percent in aid from Beijing.

“The criteria for China to provide foreign aid is not the nature of the government, but the convergence of interests,” said Yun Sun, an expert on Chinese funding who is with the Stimson Center in Washington. “That need could be political, commercial, or even reputational.”

AidData’s research also shows the lions share’s of China’s global development spending is not official aid but rather distributed via “other official flows,” or OOF. This bracket of funding includes huge deals, like the enormous loans given to Russian oil companies in 2009, in which the motivation is clearly commercial.

“ODA and OOF really need to be considered separately,” Park said. “If the country is rich in natural resources, if it trades a lot with China and if it is credit worthy, it tends to get a lot of OOF.” China’s widespread funding of more commercially minded projects is what sets it apart from Western donors, who have largely moved away from loans toward grants. “China is operating to its own rules,” Park said.

AidData’s research has shown when Chinese funding is similar to ODA, it boosts economic growth in recipient countries just like Western aid. If a country is on the receiving end of such a Chinese aid project, it will see 0.4 percent average growth two years after the project is committed — a similar rate of growth to aid from the United States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (and notably higher than aid from the World Bank).

“If you just read a random sampling of media reports about Chinese development project, you will hear about individual projects where the project was reportedly a white elephant project,” Parks said. When it comes to ODA at least, “we just don’t really see any evidence. it doesn’t seem to be systematically true.”

As China enters the fourth year of its ambitious international infrastructure project, widely known as “One Belt, One Road,” understanding how it spends its money abroad will probably prove more and more important. Whether China will offer a more opaque view of its foreign assistance in the future remains unclear — experts say Beijing remains skeptical of transparency, at least in part due to a tradition of secrecy.

Austin Strange, a PhD candidate at Harvard University who worked with AidData, said numerous Chinese officials have been briefed on the project over the past five years, and at least some have professed an interest in getting better “fine-grained data” to inform their own work.


Bbc. 2017-10-11. China’s secret aid empire uncovered

China has a long list of state secrets – how many people it puts to death every year, and even the birthdays of its top leaders. But now, overseas researchers have uncovered another Chinese state secret: how much money Beijing gives in aid to other countries.

Not very long ago, China was a foreign aid recipient. Now, it rivals the United States as one of the world’s largest donors, through traditional development aid or through financial loans.

For the first time, a large group of researchers outside China have compiled a major database detailing virtually all of China’s financial money flow to recipient countries. Citing more than 5,000 projects found across 140 countries, it reveals that China and the US rival each other in terms of how much they offer to other countries.

However, “they spend those budgets in radically different ways. And the different compositions of those portfolios have far-reaching consequences”, explains Brad Parks, the project’s chief researcher.

He heads the AidData research lab at the College of William & Mary in Virginia, which teamed up with other researchers at Harvard University and the University of Heidelberg in Germany to complete the research.

How did they uncover the secret?

The AidData team had to develop its own methodology to answer the questions that weren’t provided by the Chinese government. They tracked money flows from China to recipient countries using news reports, official embassy documents and aid and debt information from China’s counterparts.

Piece by painstaking piece, the information came together to draw a relatively complete picture of where Chinese aid is going and what impact it’s having.

“We think the methodology has revealed the known knowable universe,” Brad Parks says. “If the Chinese government really wants to conceal something, we won’t necessarily pick it up.” But if there are sizeable money transfers going from China to a recipient country, “word is going to get out”, he adds.

How does China hand out money?

One major finding from the study: China and the US, the world’s biggest donor, have handed out similar amounts of money in the years covered in the database, but the countries distribute that money in radically different ways.

The vast majority (93%) of US financial aid fits under the traditional definition of aid that’s agreed upon by all Western industrialised countries. That aid is given with the main goal of developing the economic development and welfare of recipient countries. At least a quarter of that money represents a direct grant, not a loan that needs to be repaid.

In contrast, only a small portion (21%) of the money that China gives to other countries can be considered as traditional aid. And the rest of that money? The “lion’s share” of that money is given in commercial loans that have to be repaid to Beijing with interest.

“China wants to get attractive economic returns on its capital,” Brad Parks explains.

And what does that money achieve?

The team’s other major finding: when China gives out traditional aid, the recipient countries reap impressive economic rewards. For a long period, there were suspicions that Chinese aid projects were only set up to benefit China; infrastructure projects built by imported Chinese workers, for instance, that did little to improve the lives of people on the ground. However, this research shows that China is just as capable of managing development aid projects as Western donors.

Which countries are getting China’s money?

Since 2000, African countries have captured a large slice of the aid and loans given by China.

However, China’s wealth is distributed to points across the globe, from hospitals in Senegal to ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In 2014, the most recent year covered by AidData, Russia topped the recipient list, followed by Pakistan and Nigeria.

In contrast, the US list in 2014 was topped by Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by Pakistan.

Politics plays a big part in how both China and the US decide to spend their money. Earlier studies by the researchers behind AidData show that both Beijing and Washington tend to offer money to countries which support them at the United Nations.

But for China, economics play a key role: the AidData researchers found Beijing is often focused on promoting Chinese exports or market rate loans where China wants to get the loan repaid with interest.

The North Korea factor

China is often cited as the main source of aid propping up the fragile North Korean economy. But the AidData researchers tracked down just 17 Chinese projects in North Korea over the 14-year period, totalling a measly $210m.

Brad Parks calls North Korea “an informational black hole”, admitting that it’s the only recipient country that truly evaded the researchers. To a large extent, the vast amounts of money and other kinds of aid that China is believed to give North Korea fall outside the global financial system.

Why is China’s money so attractive?

In the 1960s to the 1990s, Western countries offered high-interest market-rate loans to developing countries. However, that strategy misfired when recipient countries could not begin to repay the interest on the debts they had acquired. Outrage ensued and the Western aid model was overhauled.

“There was a shared principle that we should not be offering market-rate loans to developing countries,” Brad Parks says. “And now, here comes China, enter stage left. They’re not part of that coalition. They haven’t been socialised to that principle and they’re very willing and able to provide loans near or at market rate.

“Increasingly, countries that don’t want to go the IMF for a bailout when they’re in trouble, they will go to China instead.”

Will China continue to loan out money?

So far, the data shows that the countries that receive China’s market-rate loans are not suffering economically, but they aren’t experiencing economic growth either. Researchers fear that could change in 10 or 15 years, when countries build up debts because they can’t repay the money they will owe to Beijing. At that point, China might have to rethink things.

“They may very well 10 years from now, or 15 years from now, encounter the same problems that Western donors and creditors encountered when loans are not getting repaid,” Brad Parks explains. “If and when that point of reckoning occurs, then perhaps Beijing will revisit how it structures these loans.”

Already, researchers have uncovered signs that China’s starting to shift its approach to lending, researcher Xiaojun Li from the University of British Columbia says. Increasingly, Beijing is lending through multilateral institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China’s answer to the World Bank.

Why does it matter if China becomes a big global lender?

There is evidence that China’s no-strings loans have had an effect on the entire global lending system, forcing traditional donors to stop placing so many requirements on receiving countries. Using AidData’s database, economist Diego Hernandez revealed that China’s role as a major lender has boosted competition between traditional donors.

“When an African country is also assisted by China,” he writes, “the World Bank provides fewer conditions attached to its loans”. For every 1% increase in Chinese aid, Hernandez found the World Bank lessened its typical demands for things like market liberalisation or economic transparency by 15%.