Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Ppe-Fidesz. Divorzio probabile. Molti già a caccia dei 13 seggi ungheresi.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-20.

Facciabuco. Morte stava aspettando

Il parlamento europeo è in continuo rimescolamento, e non solo per i nuovi conteggi dovuti alla Brexit: gli europarlamentari sono davvero inquieti.

«Sono 73 gli eurodeputati britannici che dovranno fare le valigie entro la fine di gennaio, cambiando così la composizione del Pe, che passerà dagli attuali 751 seggi a 705»

Dopo la Brexit, il Ppe dovrebbe avere 187 eurodeputati, l’Id 76 ed Ecr 62, sempre che nel frattempo non si evidenzino diaspore. Ci sono anche 27 eurodeputati non iscritti ad alcun gruppo, che potrebbero accasarsi.

«Le strade di Viktor Orban e del Partito Popolare Europeo sembrano sempre più destinate a dividersi»

«Nuovi motivi di tensione tra il leader dell’Ungheria e il partito più rappresentato all’interno del Parlamento europeo sono scaturiti dopo il voto sulla risoluzione di condanna contro Polonia e Ungheria per la “violazione sistematica dei valori fondamentali” in relazione al “deterioramento” di democrazia e stato di diritto»

«Il PPE ha infatti votato la risoluzione di condanna contro Varsavia e Budapest, quindi anche contro l’alleato Viktor Orban, che con il suo partito Fidesz fa parte del gruppo dei popolari »

«Almeno per adesso, visto che un gruppo di “saggi” dovrebbe decidere, pare a febbraio, se la sospensione di Fidesz dal PPE diventerà espulsione oppure no»

«il partito di Orban sarebbe stato anche duramente attaccato durante la concitata riunione della vigilia del voto sulla risoluzione, così come accaduto durante il dibattito»

«E si apre già la sfida per conquistare i 13 seggi che il partito ungherese porta in dote nella formazione dell’Europarlamento uscita dalle elezioni dello scorso 26 maggio»

* * * * * * *

Se Orban abbandonasse il Ppe, questo gruppo scenderebbe a 171 deputati. Se Fidesz confluisse in Id, questi salirebbe a 89 seggi, se invece confluisse in Ecr, questo gruppo salirebbe a 75 eurodeputati.

In ogni caso i sovranisti identitari salirebbero a 151 eurodeputati, diventando così il secondo gruppo, poiché S&D è sceso a 148 membri.

Un ragionevole sommovimento.

*


Tensione PPE-Fidesz, Meloni favorita nel derby con Salvini per accogliere Orban

Le strade di Viktor Orban e del Partito Popolare Europeo sembrano sempre più destinate a dividersi. Nuovi motivi di tensione tra il leader dell’Ungheria e il partito più rappresentato all’interno del Parlamento europeo sono scaturiti dopo il voto sulla risoluzione di condanna contro Polonia e Ungheria per la “violazione sistematica dei valori fondamentali” in relazione al “deterioramento” di democrazia e stato di diritto. 

Il PPE ha infatti votato la risoluzione di condanna contro Varsavia e Budapest, quindi anche contro l’alleato Viktor Orban, che con il suo partito Fidesz fa parte del gruppo dei popolari. Almeno per adesso, visto che un gruppo di “saggi” dovrebbe decidere, pare a febbraio, se la sospensione di Fidesz dal PPE diventerà espulsione oppure no. Secondo fonti di Affaritaliani.it, il partito di Orban sarebbe stato anche duramente attaccato durante la concitata riunione della vigilia del voto sulla risoluzione, così come accaduto durante il dibattito.

Sembra dunque avvicinarsi sempre di più l’uscita di Fidesz dal PPE. E si apre già la sfida per conquistare i 13 seggi che il partito ungherese porta in dote nella formazione dell’Europarlamento uscita dalle elezioni dello scorso 26 maggio. Una sfida che potrebbe aprire anche un “derby” italiano tra Lega e Fratelli d’Italia. Durante la campagna elettorale delle Europee, Matteo Salvini si era più volte sbilanciato sulla possibilità di collaborare direttamente con Orban a livello europeo all’interno del gruppo Identità e Democrazia di cui fa parte il Carroccio. Proposte, a dire la verità, respinte, con il leader ungherese che aveva scelto di restare all’interno del PPE.

Ma, in realtà, la favorita a vincere questo “derby” sembra essere Giorgia Meloni. La leader di FdI ha più volte incontrato Orban, accogliendolo tra l’altro anche ad Atreju. Il gruppo dei Conservatori e Riformisti, di cui fa parte FdI, sarebbe l’approdo più naturale per Fidesz in caso di uscita o di espulsione dal PPE. Nel gruppo ECR siedono infatti i polacchi di Pis di Kaczynski, grande alleato di Orban. E la linea in materia di politica estera, meno ondivaga rispetto a quella della Lega, potrebbe favorire il partito della Meloni.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Europarlamento. Brexit. Gruppo Sovranista 76 (+3), Grüne 67 (-7), S&D 148 (-6).

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-19.

2020-01-17__Europarlamento 001

Lo avevamo preannunciato il 6 gennaio.

Europarlamento. Sorpasso del Gruppo Sovranista su quello Verde.

«Un sorpasso del gruppo sovranista su quello dei Verdi a Strasburgo. L’uscita del Regno Unito dall’Unione europea avrà delle immediate ricadute sul Parlamento europeo scompaginando gli equilibri tra i Paesi e tra le famiglie politiche dell’Eurocamera, una delle prime istituzioni europee a mostrare gli effetti della Brexit»

«Sono 73 gli eurodeputati britannici che dovranno fare le valigie entro la fine di gennaio, cambiando così la composizione del Pe, che passerà dagli attuali 751 seggi a 705»

«I restanti 27 seggi verranno invece ripartiti per 14 paesi, fra cui l’Italia che guadagnerà tre eurodeputati»

* * *

Adesso sono stati pubblicati i dati definitivi.

Boost for Right in post-Brexit EU Parliament

The composition of the European Parliament will tilt towards the right as the centre-right European People’s Party and the far-right Identity and Democracy will gain seats in the post-Brexit assembly.

Meanwhile, the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), the liberal Renew Europe, and the Greens will lose a total of 24 seats.

As UK MEPs leave at the end of January, 73 seats will be up for grabs: 27 of those seats will be re-distributed among 14 member states.

The new assembly will have an overall total of 705 MEPs (with one Catalan MEP not having yet taken his seat).

The remaining 46 seats will be available for potential EU enlargements and for any possible future creation of a transnational lists.

Based on a decision back in 2018 on how to redistribute the seats, taking into account member states’ populations, France and Spain gain five seats, Italy and the Netherlands get three, Ireland will have two more MEPs, and Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia, Estonia, Poland and Romania will have one extra each from 1 February.

In 10 countries, new MEPs have already been formally elected, but not yet designated. In Spain, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark only the lists from which the additional members will come have been officially announced, and their EP party-affiliation confirmed.

According to figures published by the European parliament’s think tank on Tuesday (14 January), and based on information gathered from parliamentary groups, the ID will overtake the Greens as the fourth-largest group in the European parliament.

And the European People’s Party (EPP) will gain five seats, with MEPs from Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Slovakia.

The centre-right group is already the largest in the parliament, and will now surge to a total of 187 seats.

The S&D will in total lose six MEPs as key British Labour party deputies leave, but will be joined by four new MEPs from Spain, France, Romania and Croatia. They will have a new total of 148 seats.

The liberal Renew Europe group will haemorrhage 17 seats as UK’s Liberal Democrats leave – but will gain six MEPs from Denmark, Ireland, Spain, France and the Netherlands.

The far-right ID will become the fourth-largest group. They did not have any UK MEPs, but will receive three more seats from France, Italy and the Netherlands, increasing their overall number to 76.

The Greens, in sinking to the fifth-largest group in the parliament with 68 seats (with one MEP being unable to take up his seat), lose 11 MEPs but gain four from France, Finland, Austria and Sweden.

The European Conservatives and Reformists, which has been the home for the UK Conservatives and recently some Brexit Party MEPs, will lose seven seats and gain three, according to the parliament’s unofficial projection.

New MEPs will come from Spain, Italy and Poland.

According to a parliament source, it remains to be seen if the new Dutch MEP from the Forum von Democratie will join the ECR, which the right-wing populist party has been aligned with in the EU since it first entered the European parliament last year.

The radical left of European United Left/Nordic Green Left will lose one seat with the departure of a Sinn Fein MEP from Northern Ireland.

The non-attached members will lose 27 colleagues from the short-lived Brexit Party of Nigel Farage.

But this slight tilt toward the right does not mean a significant increase for eurosceptic forces.

The EPP and S&D and Renew total decreases from 444 to 432 seats.

The eurosceptic-populist bloc of ID, ECR, and non-attached members (mostly from eurosceptic parties, such as Italy’s Five Star Movement, Greece’s Golden Dawn, Hungary’s Jobbik) will decrease from 191 to 165 MEPs.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Unione Europea. PPE che inizia a sgretolarsi anche lui.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-18.

Unione Europea 999

Unione Europea. Solo quel povero tapino di Zingaretti le concede credito.

Europarlamento. Sorpasso del Gruppo Sovranista su quello Verde.

«Il Ppe, nella sua forma attuale, non interessa al mio partito Fidesz»

«Voglio cambiare il Ppe o iniziare una nuova forza democristiana europea»

«il Ppe sta perdendo influenza e cambiando la sua linea in direzione liberale, socialista, centrista»

«La domanda per noi è se abbiamo abbastanza forza per cambiare la linea sbagliata del Ppe, o se dovremmo cercare una nuova collocazione»

* * * * * * *

Viktor Orbán meets the press.

«Hardly a surprise, the Hungarian PM told reporters that he stood ready to run for prime minister during the country’s next parliamentary elections in 2022. ….

Realising that the anti-migration propaganda will no longer be enough for reelection, however, the Hungarian PM also announced other notable goals and measures, including eliminating poverty and carrying out healthcare reform, with the latter being the most complicated issue in the country, one that has remained largely untouched by previous governments ….

Responding to a question on the possibility of a conservative-green coalition after 2022, similar to that sworn in this week in Austria, Mr Orbán said that most of the Green politicians in Hungary were “watermelons: greens outside and reds inside.” ….

Since Mr Orbán’s party was suspended from the European People’s Party (EPP), the alliance of European conservative parties and the largest bloc in the European Parliament, the Hungarian PM has been struggling to keep its EU-level influence and remain part of the conservative European family that has been wary of Fidesz’s undemocratic practices, corruption and attacks against the rule of law. ….

Mr Orbán said that he is not interested in the current version of the EPP as “it is losing influence, positions, because it is heading in the wrong – liberal, socialist and centrist – direction. ….

Donald Tusk, the EPP’s new president, has already hinted at expulsion unless Fidesz makes a gesture towards Europe and decides to abandon its autocratic policies, something which is rather unlikely to happen in practice ….

Should Fidesz no longer be a member of the EPP, the party could join the eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) led by Poland’s ruling Law and Justice party (PiS).»

* * * * * * *

Ci si prepari, dunque: a breve termine la composizione dei gruppi parlamentari nell’europarlamento potrebbe variare ed anche in modo sostanziale.

*


Ungheria: Orban, ‘o cambiamo il Ppe o andiamo altrove’

‘Sta perdendo influenza e cambiando la sua linea’.

“Il Ppe, nella sua forma attuale, non interessa al mio partito Fidesz. Voglio cambiare il Ppe o iniziare una nuova forza democristiana europea”. Lo ha detto il premier Viktor Orban durante l’unica conferenza stampa che concede ogni anno. Secondo il premier ungherese, il Ppe sta perdendo influenza e cambiando la sua linea “in direzione liberale, socialista, centrista”, in un modo che non è accettabile per il Fidesz, che sta cercando una nuova collocazione.

“La domanda per noi è se abbiamo abbastanza forza per cambiare la linea sbagliata del Ppe, o se dovremmo cercare una nuova collocazione”, ha detto. Il Ppe dovrà decidere ai primi di febbraio la sorti del Fidesz, sospeso nell’anno scorso perché la sua politica non rispetta i valori europei e lo stato di diritto.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Ungheria. Produzione Industriale +3.6% anno su anno.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-18.

2020-01-10__Ungheria produzione Industriale

«The Hungarian Industrial Output is a useful indicator of the economy because it is more current compared to the GNP and reported every month. Total Industrial Production includes Mining,Manufacturing, and Energy but it excludes transportation, services, and agriculture which is included in GNP. Industrial Production is generally more volatile than GNP. Changes in the volume of the physical output of the nation’s factories, mineand utilities are measured by the index of industrial production. The figure is calculated as a weighted aggregate of goods and reported in headlines as a percent change from previous months.

A higher than expected reading should be taken as positive/bullish for the HUF , while a lower than expected reading should be taken as negative/bearish for the HUF.»

*

Non sono i risultati del settembre 2019 (+12%) né del novembre 2019 (+11.1%), ma l’Unione Europea e la Germania sarebbero più che felici se questi dati fossero i loro. L’Ungheria risente della stasi produttiva europea.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

L’Italia starebbe molto meglio fuori dalla Ue’

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-17.

Unione Europea 013

«L’Italia starebbe molto meglio fuori dell’Unione europea: parola di Donald Trump, che in una intervista rilasciata al programma della emittente radiofonica britannica Lbc parlando di Brexit torna a rispolverare l’ipotesi di una Italexit»

«il presidente americano per la prima volta in assoluto ipotizza l’uscita del nostro Paese non solo dall’euro ma dall’Unione europea di cui e’ uno degli stati fondatori»

«Anche l’Italia e altri Paesi – aggiunge il presidente americano – starebbero molto meglio senza l’Unione europea. Ma se questi Paesi vogliono rimanere nella Ue, va bene»

«Ma sappiate …. che in Europa governano persone con le quali è molto difficile negoziare, mentre con me sarebbe tutto più facile: faremmo subito un grande accordo commerciale»

* * * * * * *

Ogni cosa ha i suoi tempi per attuarsi.

Unione Europea. Dal primo gennaio colpo di grazia all’industria automobilistica.

Unione Europea che galoppa verso la irrilevanza politica internazionale.

Europarlamento. Sorpasso del Gruppo Sovranista su quello Verde.

Svezia. ‘Number of young adults given treatment for psychiatric illness has risen by 70%.

ECB. Lagarde inizia a fare marcia indietro. La Green Economy non le compete. …..

Eurozona. Ecb. Riserve Valutarie ancora in calo a 808.04 miliardi euro.

* * * * * * *

Sono in molti a considerare l’Unione Europea come una pesante palla al piede dell’Italia, coercita da una congerie di leggi, norme e regolamenti manati da euroburocrati tesi a salvaguardare gli interessi di Francia e Germania.

Sono quelle persone che guardano gli inglesi che con la Brexit se ne sono usciti sbattendo la porta.

Nella scelta del partner strategico, tra Unione Europea e Stati Uniti questi ultimi si profilano essere ben più vantaggiosi.

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Trump: ‘L’Italia starebbe molto meglio fuori dalla Ue’

Intervista su Brexit con Farage: ‘Ma se vuol restare, bene così’

L’Italia starebbe molto meglio fuori dell’Unione europea: parola di Donald Trump, che in una intervista rilasciata al programma della emittente radiofonica britannica Lbc parlando di Brexit torna a rispolverare l’ipotesi di una Italexit. Nel corso della conversazione col suo amico Nigel Farage, leader degli euroscettici d’Oltre Manica, il presidente americano per la prima volta in assoluto ipotizza l’uscita del nostro Paese non solo dall’euro ma dall’Unione europea di cui e’ uno degli stati fondatori. Un intervento a gamba tesa nell’agone politico italiano gia’ in fibrillazione. Un’uscita che rischia a questo punto di rinfocolare le velleita’ antieuropeiste di molti proprio nel momento in cui, con il nuovo governo Conte, Roma si era riposizionata nel campo della Ue, riprendendo la via di un dialogo piu’ serrato e collaborativo con Bruxelles, a partire dal delicatissimo dossier della manovra economica. Commentando con il leader del Brexit Party l’ultimo rinvio del divorzio tra il Regno Unito e la Ue, Trump ha quindi deplorato il fatto che dopo ormai tanto tempo dal referendum Londra sia ancora “trattenuta nell’Unione Europea”. Uno stallo che impedisce di iniziare a trattare quello che per il tycoon sarebbe una grande accordo commerciale tra Stati Uniti e Gran Bretagna.

“Siete bloccati dalla Ue – afferma il tycoon – come lo sono altri Paesi. Anche l’Italia e altri Paesi – aggiunge il presidente americano – starebbero molto meglio senza l’Unione europea. Ma se questi Paesi vogliono rimanere nella Ue, va bene”. “Ma sappiate – conclude il suo ragionamento il tycoon – che in Europa governano persone con le quali è molto difficile negoziare, mentre con me sarebbe tutto più facile: faremmo subito un grande accordo commerciale”. Il tema di una possibile Italexit non e’ mai stato nell’agenda dei colloqui tra Washington e Roma, men che meno negli ultimi faccia a faccia che il presidente americano ha avuto in piu’ di un’occasione con il presidente del consiglio Giuseppe Conte, con il quale ha un ottimo rapporto, e all’inizio del mese con il presidente della repubblica Sergio Mattarella ricevuto alla Casa Bianca. Lo stesso dicasi dei colloqui avuti tra il ministro degli esteri Luigi Di Maio e Mike Pompeo in occasione della recente visita del segretario di stato americano in Italia.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Germania. Ordini alle fabbriche -1.3% mom.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-16.

2020-01-09__Germania_Ordini Fabbroche 001

Prosegue oramai da più di un anno la contrazione degli ordinativi alle fabbriche.

* * * * * * *

Germania. Piano anti-recessione da 500 mld, di debiti.

Germania. Produzione auto -9%, export auto -13%.

Germania. Per il dodicesimo mese consecutivo la produzione industriale in negativo.

Germania. Produzione manifatturiera. -21.3% in sette mesi. È in depressione.

«Manufacturing Production in Germany decreased 4.10 percent in May of 2019 over the same month in the previous year. Manufacturing Production in Germany averaged 1.46 percent from 1992 until 2019, reaching an all time high of 15.50 percent in February of 2011 and a record low of -24.10 percent in April of 2009.»

* * * * * * *

È davvero molto facile tenere accorati discorsi zeppi di paroloni altisonanti che toccano il cuore delle persone, elargendo infine promesse eterne ma non mantenibili.

I numeri saranno freddi, molti potranno porgerli con commenti partigiani, ma hanno il vantaggio di essere indiscutibili.

La Germania è in recessione mentre il resto del mondo sta crescendo: quindi, il problema è tedesco, non degli altri.

Frau Merkel ha fallito quello che dovrebbe essere lo scopo di ogni governante: rendere prospera la propria nazione.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Germania. Pil yoy +0.6%. Comparazione con la Cina.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-15.

2020-01-15__Germania Pil

Paragoni e comparazioni sono sempre amari.

Germania. Spd al 12.5%. Sembrerebbe essere impossibile, eppure lo è.

Germania. Mappa della miseria. 22.7% a Brema, 21.1% nella Ruhr.

Germania. Produzione auto -9%, export auto -13%.

Germania. PMI da più di un anno sotto il 50. Oggi 43.7.

Germania. Popolazione. Classi di età. Destatis. Dati cimiteriali.

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Cina. Produzione Industriale +6.2% yoy. 2019-12-26

Cina. Ha concesso più prestiti a stati esteri di IMF e World Bank.

Cina. Uno dei primi esportatori mondiali di autovetture. +32% in cinque anni.

* * *

Mentre in Germania la produzione automobilistica decresce del -9%, la Cina si sta avviando ad essere il principale produttore mondiale. Mentre in Germania la produzione industriale è in calo, la Cina registra un +6.2%.

In quella che fu la prospera Germania, il numero delle persone che vivono nella fascia della miseria è salito al 21.1% della Ruhr.

Mentre la Cina ha un pil Q3 annualizzato del +6.0%, la Germania deve accontentarsi di un misero +0.6%. E le sta andando di lusso che consuma ancora le scorte.

Le comparazioni potrebbero proseguire in un lungo quanto mesto elenco.

La Germania sta soffrendo non per una crisi economica mondiale, bensì per una sua crisi strutturale e politica.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Unione Europea. Fondo Ue di transizione verde. Italia pagherà per la Germania.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-15.

Unione Europea

È inutile abolire l’Unione Europea: nei fatti non conta più nulla.


*

Frau Ursula von der Leyen aveva paragonato il Green Deal al progetto americano di sbarco sulla luna.  Avrebbe dovuto diventare una ‘pietra miliare’ nella storia dello sviluppo umano.

Mai il mondo avrebbe visto un progetto più grandioso, ad immortale gloria delle mente che lo avevano concepito.

«Il nuovo Fondo europeo per la transizione verso un’economia verde partirà con uno stanziamento di base di 7,5 miliardi e dal 2021 permetterà di finanziare con risorse pubbliche “la modernizzazione” di grandi impianti industriali e “la bonifica di siti contaminati” – come potrebbe essere per l’ex Ilva – senza violare le regole Ue sugli aiuti di Stato»

«La Commissione Ue propone che il nuovo fondo (Fte) sia accessibile “a tutti gli Stati membri” e rientri all’interno delle politiche di coesione. Il fondo potrà contare su 7,5 miliardi di euro di risorse fresche per il 2021-2027»

«A questo stanziamento si aggiungeranno i cofinanziamenti nazionali e le risorse che gli Stati dovranno trasferire dai fondi per lo sviluppo regionale (Fesr) e sociale (Fse+)»

«Secondo l’esecutivo europeo, grazie a questo meccanismo in sette anni potranno essere mobilitati fondi pubblici “fra i 30 e i 50 miliardi”»

* * * * * * *

Cerchiamo di ragionare.

Herr Timmermans aveva a suo tempo richiesto 1,300 (milletrecento) miliardi per il Green Deal. Era la cifra considerata quella minima per far transitare l’Unione Europea ad una felice isola verde nell’universo.

Il piano del budget settennale di Herr Timmermans fu clamorosamente bocciato. L’Unione Europea non ha denaro alcuno e Mrs Lagard aveva messo le mani avanti dichiarando che l’Ecb non c’entra nulla con il Green Deal: ci pensassero i singoli stati.

E così il Green Deal si trovò ad essere finanziato con 7.5 miliardi in sette anni, ossia con poco pi di un miliardo ogni anno. Ma essendo 27 gli stati efferenti l’Unione, sarebbero in termini medi poco più di trenta milioni all’anno per ogni singolo stato. Un po’ poco per sbarcare sulla luna, e ben poco per sanare il territorio ex Ilva.

Ma da quel guazzabuglio di parola emergerebbe che gli stati avrebbero la possibilità di stornare fondi ad altro scopo attribuiti sul Green Deal. Parole suadenti come la mela offerta a Biancaneve. La Germania ne farebbe la parte del leone, seguita dalla famelica Francia.

Risultato: l’Italia paga e la Germania intasca.

*


Green deal: Ue apre ad aiuti per casi come l’Ilva.

Martedì arriva la proposta per il Fondo Ue di transizione verde.

Il nuovo Fondo europeo per la transizione verso un’economia verde partirà con uno stanziamento di base di 7,5 miliardi e dal 2021 permetterà di finanziare con risorse pubbliche “la modernizzazione” di grandi impianti industriali e “la bonifica di siti contaminati” – come potrebbe essere per l’ex Ilva – senza violare le regole Ue sugli aiuti di Stato. E’ quanto emerge dalla bozza delle proposte che la Commissione europea presenterà martedì prossimo di cui l’ANSA ha preso visione. 

La Commissione Ue propone che il nuovo fondo (Fte) sia accessibile “a tutti gli Stati membri” e rientri all’interno delle politiche di coesione. Il fondo potrà contare su 7,5 miliardi di euro di risorse fresche per il 2021-2027. A questo stanziamento si aggiungeranno i cofinanziamenti nazionali e le risorse che gli Stati dovranno trasferire dai fondi per lo sviluppo regionale (Fesr) e sociale (Fse+). Il meccanismo alla base della proposta prevede che per ogni euro ricevuto dal Fte, i Paesi trasferiscano “da un minimo di 1,5 a un massimo di 3 euro” provenienti dagli altri fondi Ue. Secondo l’esecutivo europeo, grazie a questo meccanismo in sette anni potranno essere mobilitati fondi pubblici “fra i 30 e i 50 miliardi”. Lo strumento rientrerà in un più ampio Meccanismo per la transizione verde che ambisce ad attirare investimenti pubblici e privati per 100 miliardi. La Commissione chiede che siano i Paesi a “identificare i territori” bisognosi del sostegno del Fte, che in Italia coincideranno con le Province (categorizzate tecnicamente come NUTS 3), e a redigere piani di transizione territoriale ad hoc. Il Fte potrà finanziare anche “investimenti produttivi in aziende diverse dalle Pmi”, quando “sono necessari per l’attuazione dei piani di transizione territoriali”.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Eurostat. Reddito Netto Mediano di 1,409 euro al mese.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-15.

Durer Albrecht. Quattro cavallieri dell'Apocalisse. 1498.

Eurostat ha pubblicato un esteso report sulla distribuzione del reddito netto dei cittadini europei.

Significativamente, ha usato come indicatore centrale il valor mediano, ossia la soglia al di sotto ed al di sopra della quale giace la metà dei casi totali considerati. Nel caso del reddito netto, il valor mediano indica il valore di reddito al di sotto del quale vive metà della popolazione.

Il median equivalised  net income nell’Europa valeva nel 2017 16,909 euro, ossia 1,409 euro al mese. Sembrerebbe non essere un valore molto confortante.

La Germania, paese una volta economicamente più prospero nel continente, ha un reddito mediano netto di 21,920 euro, ossia 1,827 euro al mese.

Si tenga presente come la soglia di povertà si di circa 1,600 euro al mese.

L’Europa sta velocemente entrando nella società della miseria.

Già in Francia la situazione sta diventando esplosiva, ma le rivolte hanno la caratteristica di essere altamente contagiose.

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«This article is part of a set of statistical articles that formed Eurostat’s flagship publication, Living conditions in Europe – 2018 edition»

«Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the total output of an economy; from the perspective of living conditions, GDP may also be calculated as the sum of primary incomes that are distributed by resident producer units (in the form of wages, rents, interest and profits).»

«When a country’s population is taken into account, GDP per capita provides both a convenient measure of average incomes and of the living standards enjoyed by the inhabitants living in a specific economy, as well as (when adjusted to take account of price differences between countries — through the use of purchasing power parities (PPPs) — a measure for comparisons of living standards across countries»

«It is therefore preferable to base any analysis of income distributions on micro data sources, in other words, statistical surveys for a representative sample of actual households, rather than aggregate macroeconomic measures»

«Such surveys allow an analysis of median income levels or the distribution of income across socio-economic strata of the population»

«In order to take into account differences in household size and composition and thus enable comparisons of income levels, the concept of equivalised disposable income may be used. It is based on expressing total (net) household income in relation to the number of ’equivalent adults’, using a standard (equivalence) scale»

«1. Median equivalised net income»

«The EU-28 average was PPS 16 748»

«In 2017, median equivalised net income varied considerably across the EU Member States, ranging from PPS 5 239 in Romania to PPS 28 820 in Luxembourg»

«2. Trends for top and bottom 20 % of incomes diverge»

«Across all 28 EU Member States, the top 20 % of the population with the highest national net disposable incomes (the top quintile) accounted for at least one third of total income, a share that rose highest to 46.0 % in Bulgaria in 20»

«By contrast, the bottom 20 % of the population with the lowest incomes together accounted for less than one tenth of all income, except in Czechia (10.3 %) and Finland (10.0 %)»

«3. Median disposable income in the EU-28 is still rising»

«In 2017, median equivalised net income (hereafter referred to as median disposable income) averaged PPS 16 748 in the EU-28. Across the EU Member States, it ranged from PPS 28 820 in Luxembourg to PPS 5 239 in Romania»

«Map 1 reveals the highest levels of median disposable (more than PPS 22 000) income recorded in central countries of the EU, in particular in Austria (PPS 23 334) and Luxembourg (PPS 28 820), but also in Norway (PPS 28 875), Switzerland (PPS 27 602) and Iceland (PPS 22 193). By contrast, median disposable incomes were often lower in peripheral countries, levels of income of less than PPS 9 000 were recorded in Hungary (PPS 8 364), Bulgaria (PPS 7 517) and Romania (PPS 5 239). Low values were also recorded in Turkey, Serbia and North Macedonia»

«In 2017, EU-28 median disposable income was almost 70 % higher for people with a high level of educational attainment (PPS 22 626) when compared with the level of income for people with a low level of educational attainment (PPS 13 460)»

«4. Median disposable income fell in real terms in two EU Member States»

« Median disposable incomes fell, in real terms, in 2 of the 28 EU Member States. A reduction occurred in Belgium (-1.8 %), while the decline observed in Sweden was relatively small (less than 1.0 %).»

«Between 2016 and 2017, by far the highest increases in real disposable incomes (more than 5 %) were recorded in Romania (13.1 %) and Bulgaria (14.1 %), followed by Croatia (6.6 %).»

«5. The top 20 % of earners shared almost two fifths of the total disposable incomes»

«In 2017, some 38.6 % of the total disposable income in the EU-28 could be attributed to people in the top 20 % of the income distribution, while people in the bottom quintile of the income distribution received a 7.8 % share of total disposable income»

«In 2017, the top 20 % of the highest earners in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Spain and Greece received more than 40.0 % of the total disposable income within their respective economies in 2017»

«6. Income mobility appeared to slow»

«When considering developments over time and comparing results for 2011 with those for 2017, it was commonplace to find that both upward and downward income mobility was reduced. Upward income mobility affected 17.8 % of the EU-28 population in 2011, a share that had fallen to 15.8 % by 2017. In a similar vein, the share of the EU-28 affected by downward income transitions was 17.2 % in 2011, a share that had fallen to 15.1 % by 2017»

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Eurostat. Living conditions in Europe – income distribution and income inequality

Data extracted in January 2019. Planned article update: May 2020.

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This article is part of a set of statistical articles that formed Eurostat’s flagship publication, Living conditions in Europe – 2018 edition. Each article helps to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date summary of living conditions in Europe, presenting some key results from the European Union’s (EU’s) statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) , which is conducted across EU Member States, EFTA and candidate countries.

Policy context

Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the total output of an economy; from the perspective of living conditions, GDP may also be calculated as the sum of primary incomes that are distributed by resident producer units (in the form of wages, rents, interest and profits). When a country’s population is taken into account, GDP per capita provides both a convenient measure of average incomes and of the living standards enjoyed by the inhabitants living in a specific economy, as well as (when adjusted to take account of price differences between countries — through the use of purchasing power parities (PPPs) — a measure for comparisons of living standards across countries.

Nevertheless, GDP per capita is a relatively simple, aggregate measure and in order to have a more detailed picture of living conditions, it is pertinent to analyse the distribution (rather than average levels) of household income. A number of different statistical measures are available for this purpose, including household disposable income, in other words, the total income that households have at their disposal for spending or saving. While the aggregated level of household disposable income is available from national accounts and might be used for a general analysis of the household sector, this indicator lacks any distributional dimension. It is therefore preferable to base any analysis of income distributions on micro data sources, in other words, statistical surveys for a representative sample of actual households, rather than aggregate macroeconomic measures. Such surveys allow an analysis of median income levels or the distribution of income across socio-economic strata of the population.

In order to take into account differences in household size and composition and thus enable comparisons of income levels, the concept of equivalised disposable income may be used. It is based on expressing total (net) household income in relation to the number of ’equivalent adults’, using a standard (equivalence) scale. Eurostat uses a ’modified OECD scale’ which gives a weight to each member of a household (and then adds these up to arrive at an equivalised household size), taking into account the number of persons in each household and the age of its members (more details are provided in the glossary). Total disposable household income, derived as the sum of the income received by every member of the household and by the household as a whole, is divided by the equivalised household size to determine the equivalised disposable income attributed to each household member.

The median of the equivalised disposable income distribution is typically used in the EU as a key measure for analysing standards of living within each economy. It is simply the income level that divides the population into two groups of equal size: one encompassing half the population with a level of disposable income above the median, and the other half with a level of disposable income below the median. The use of the median (in contrast to the arithmetic mean) avoids any potential distortion that may be caused by the existence of extreme values, such as a few extremely rich households that may raise the arithmetic mean.

Key findings

Median equivalised net income

In 2017, median equivalised net income varied considerably across the EU Member States, ranging from PPS 5 239 in Romania to PPS 28 820 in Luxembourg. The EU-28 average was PPS 16 748. Note, these figures have been converted into purchasing power standards (PPS) — a unit that takes account of price-level differences between countries.

Median equivalised net income fell, in real terms, in 2 out of the 28 EU Member States in 2017 — they were Sweden and Belgium. A decrease was also noted in Switzerland, Norway and Turkey (for these three latest available 2016 data were compared against 2015 data).

Trends for top and bottom 20 % of incomes diverge

Across all 28 EU Member States, the top 20 % of the population with the highest national net disposable incomes (the top quintile) accounted for at least one third of total income, a share that rose highest to 46.0 % in Bulgaria in 2017. By contrast, the bottom 20 % of the population with the lowest incomes together accounted for less than one tenth of all income, except in Czechia (10.3 %) and Finland (10.0 %). Luxembourg recorded the biggest fall in income share (-1.4 %).

The S80/S20 income quintile share ratio is based on a comparison of the income received by the top quintile and that received by the bottom quintile of the population. In contrast, the Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income differs between a perfectly equal distribution (where each member of the population has exactly the same income) and full inequality (where a single person receives all of the income).

Distribution of income measured by Gini coefficient

Based on the Gini coefficient, Bulgaria and Lithuania (40.2 % and 37.6 %) experienced the highest levels of inequality in equivalised disposable income in the EU in 2017; note that high coefficients were also recorded in Turkey and Serbia (42.6 % and 37.8 %). The lowest levels of income inequality in EU Member States, using this measure, were recorded in Slovakia, Slovenia, and Czechia (less than 25 %).

Income inequality across different age groups

The EU-28 income quintile share ratio for elderly people (defined here as those aged 65 and over) was lower — at 4.1 in 2017 — than the average ratio for the whole population (5.1). This pattern was repeated across all of the EU Member States, except for Cyprus. Income distribution among the elderly was also relatively unequal (compared with the average for the whole population) in Iceland and Switzerland (2016 data).

Social transfers, the main instrument for the realisation of welfare policies, can play a major role by helping to reduce income inequalities

In 2017, social transfers reduced income inequality among the EU-28 population: the Gini coefficient for income (including pensions) was 51.7 % before social transfers and fell to 30.7 % after taking account of these transfers.

Income distribution

Median disposable income in the EU-28 is still rising

In 2017, median equivalised net income (hereafter referred to as median disposable income) averaged PPS 16 748 in the EU-28. Across the EU Member States, it ranged from PPS 28 820 in Luxembourg to PPS 5 239 in Romania.

Map 1 reveals the highest levels of median disposable (more than PPS 22 000) income recorded in central countries of the EU, in particular in Austria (PPS 23 334) and Luxembourg (PPS 28 820), but also in Norway (PPS 28 875), Switzerland (PPS 27 602) and Iceland (PPS 22 193). By contrast, median disposable incomes were often lower in peripheral countries, levels of income of less than PPS 9 000 were recorded in Hungary (PPS 8 364), Bulgaria (PPS 7 517) and Romania (PPS 5 239). Low values were also recorded in Turkey, Serbia and North Macedonia.

Among the population aged 18-64 years, those persons with a tertiary education degree (ISCED levels 5-8) consistently recorded higher levels of median disposable income than those persons who had completed either a low (ISCED levels 0-2) or medium (ISCED levels 3-4) level of educational attainment (see Figure 1).

In 2017, EU-28 median disposable income was almost 70 % higher for people with a high level of educational attainment (PPS 22 626) when compared with the level of income for people with a low level of educational attainment (PPS 13 460). The largest absolute income gaps between persons with low and high levels of educational attainment were recorded in Luxembourg, Malta, Belgium and Germany (more than PPS 10 000); this was also the case in Switzerland. By contrast, the gap in income levels between those people with high and low levels of educational attainment was considerably less in Romania, Hungary, Greece and Slovakia (less than PPS 6 000); this was also the case in Iceland (2016 data), Serbia and North Macedonia (2016 data).

2019-12-17__Eurostat Tavola 1

Median disposable income – changes over time

The EU-28’s median disposable income in nominal terms (in other words, without adjusting for inflation) rose by 2.3 % between 2016 and 2017 (see Table 1). In all EU Member States the income increased, most in Romania (13.1 %) and Bulgaria (13.9 %). Growth rates were lowest in Italy (1.8%), Finland (1.4%) and Greece (1.3%).

Median disposable income fell in real terms in two EU Member States.

After adjusting for inflation (using the harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP)), the development of median disposable incomes between 2016 and 2017 was relatively similar (which may reflect the still low levels of inflation recorded during the period under consideration). In fact, median disposable incomes rose in the EU-28 by 2.1 % in real terms (compared with a 2.3 % increase in nominal terms).

Median disposable incomes fell, in real terms, in 2 of the 28 EU Member States (see Figure 2). A reduction occurred in Belgium (-1.8 %), while the decline observed in Sweden was relatively small (less than 1.0 %). Disposable incomes also fell in Norway (-3.6 %), Switzerland (-1.8 %) and in Turkey (- 4.3 %). For these three countries, the latest available 2016 data were compared against 2015 data.

Between 2016 and 2017, by far the highest increases in real disposable incomes (more than 5 %) were recorded in Romania (13.1 %) and Bulgaria (14.1 %), followed by Croatia (6.6 %).

2019-12-17__Eurostat Tavola 2

The top 20 % of earners shared almost two fifths of the total disposable incomes

A more detailed analysis that focuses on income distribution is presented in Table 2. It is based on ordering the disposable incomes of individuals and then dividing these into quintiles (fifths), in other words, the top 20 % of the population with the highest incomes (referred to as the top or fifth income quintile) down to the 20 % of the population with the lowest incomes (referred to as the bottom or first income quintile).

In 2017, some 38.6 % of the total disposable income in the EU-28 could be attributed to people in the top 20 % of the income distribution, while people in the bottom quintile of the income distribution received a 7.8 % share of total disposable income.

In 2017, the top 20 % of the highest earners in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Spain and Greece received more than 40.0 % of the total disposable income within their respective economies in 2017. A similar situation was recorded also in Serbia and Turkey (2016 data). In most of the EU Member States, the share of the top 20 % of highest earners was within the range of 35.0 % – 40.0 %, although this fell to 34.9 % in Belgium, 33.5 % in Slovenia and 32.8 % in Slovakia.

At the other end of the income scale, people in the bottom quintile of the income distribution received less than 7.8 % (which was the EU-28 average) of total disposable income in 12 EU Member States, out of which in Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria (2016 break in time series) had 6% or less. Only in Finland and Czechia was the share at least ten percent (10.0 % and 10.3 %).

Decline in the share of total disposable income attributed to the bottom and top income quintiles

Between 2011 and 2017, the share of EU-28 disposable income that was accounted for by the bottom and top income quintiles was lower: The share of total income for those with the lowest incomes fell slightly from 7.9 % to 7.8%, while the share for top earners fell from 38.9 % to 38.6 %.

There were 15 EU Member States that reported a falling share of total disposable income being attributed to the lowest income quintile over the period 2011-2017; note that there was a break in time series in Estonia (2014), Bulgaria and the Netherlands (2016). By contrast, there were 9 Member States where the share of the lowest income quintile rose and four where it remained unchanged. The share of the bottom income quintile increased most in Croatia (0.5 pp), followed by Finland and Poland (0.4 pp each). Large increases were recorded also in North Macedonia (1.8 pp) and Turkey (0.5 pp).

At the other end of the spectrum, in 15 EU Member States the share of disposable income attributed to the top income quintile fell between 2011 and 2017, while the share of disposable income accounted for by the top income quintile rose in 13 Member States. The share of disposable income accounted for by the top income quintile rose by more than 2.0 pp in Luxembourg and Lithuania, with a peak of 4.4 pp recorded in Bulgaria. By contrast, the share of the top income quintile fell by more than 1.0 pp in Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Romania and France, with the biggest decline recorded in Slovakia (- 2.3 pp).

2019-12-17__Eurostat Tavola 3

Around 15 % of the EU-28 population moved more than one income decile on the income ladder

This next section analyses the share of the population who experience fluctuations in their economic wellbeing from one year to the next, by studying the proportion of people that move up/down the income ladder receiving a higher or lower level of income.

The analysis is based on how people’s disposable income moves over a three-year period in relation to a set of income deciles — these are similar to income quintiles but instead of ranking the disposable incomes of individuals and then dividing these into fifths, the ranking is divided into tenths; as such, the highest decile refers to the top 10 % of the population with the highest incomes. It is important to note that upward or downward income transitions may occur as a result of direct changes in an individual’s financial situation (more or less income), but may also result from aggregate changes across the whole economy. For example, an individual may see their income frozen, while there is a more general increase in incomes across the remainder of the population and as a result that individual may move to a lower income decile (even if their income remains unchanged). It is also important to consider that these measures of income mobility reflect not only changes in income but also other dynamic aspects of labour markets (such as the demand for labour, unemployment levels, flexible working patterns, job (in)security, etc.). The measures also reflect the changes in family composition — given the indicator is based on equivalised disposable income attributed to each household member.

These remarks notwithstanding, around 15 to 16 % of the EU-28 population moved either upwards or downwards on the income ladder by more than one income decile during the three-year period prior to 2017 (see Table 3).

Among the EU Member States, more than one fifth (20.5 %) of the population in Greece made an upward transition of more than one income decile in the three years prior to 2017, while an even higher share was recorded in Hungary (22.6 %). By contrast, in the three years prior to 2017, at least one fifth of the population in Bulgaria (20.6 %, 2016 break in time series), Poland (20.5 %) and Hungary (20.4 %) experienced a downward transition of more than one income decile.

Income mobility appeared to slow

When considering developments over time and comparing results for 2011 with those for 2017, it was commonplace to find that both upward and downward income mobility was reduced. Upward income mobility affected 17.8 % of the EU-28 population in 2011, a share that had fallen to 15.8 % by 2017. In a similar vein, the share of the EU-28 affected by downward income transitions was 17.2 % in 2011, a share that had fallen to 15.1 % by 2017. Upward income mobility was reduced at a particularly fast pace in Lithuania (-10.1 pp over 2011 to 2016), Ireland (-6.3 pp over 2011 to 2015) and Latvia (-5.0 pp), while downward income mobility was reduced at a relatively fast pace in Romania (-5.0 pp), Ireland (-6.6 pp over 2011 to 2015), and Lithuania (-10.9 pp over 2011 to 2016).

There were relatively few examples of increases in income mobility in 2017 (compared with 2011). This may reflect, at least to some degree, the impact of the global financial and economic crisis on the earlier reference period, with a higher share of the population exposed to fluctuating income levels during the crisis. That said, the share of the population who moved upward by more than one income decile (during the three years prior to the survey) rose by at least 1.0 pp in Finland (1.0 pp), Slovakia (1.6 pp; 2011-2016) and Hungary (3.4 pp). There were also several examples where a growing share of the population was exposed to the risk of falling incomes between 2011 and 2017. Some 19.3 % of the population in Croatia reported a downward transition of more than one income decile during the three years prior to the survey in 2017; this was 1.3 pp higher than the corresponding share from 2013 (18.0 %). Similar results were recorded for Austria — where the share of the population experiencing a downward transition grew by 1.2 pp — and Slovakia (up 0.9 pp; 2011-2016).

Impact of social transfers on income

This next section compares the situation for disposable income before and after social transfers to assess the impact and redistributive effects of welfare policies. These transfers cover assistance that is given by central, state or local institutional units and include, among others, pensions, unemployment benefits, sickness and invalidity benefits, housing allowances, social assistance and tax rebates.

Social transfers led to median disposable income rising by PPS 4 777 in the EU-28

Figure 4 shows the overall impact of social transfers; this information is split between transfers for pensions and other transfers, for example, social security benefits and social assistance that have the aim of alleviating or reducing the risk of poverty.

In 2017, median disposable income in the EU-28 was PPS 4 777 higher as a result of social transfers (pensions included), and was PPS 1 268 higher if pensions are excluded from the analysis.

Among the EU Member States, there were considerable variations in the contribution made by social transfers to median disposable income in 2017. The largest transfers were observed in Luxembourg, where social transfers (including pensions) raised the median disposable income by PPS 10 070. Social transfers (including pensions) were also relatively high in Austria (PPS 7 310) and France (PPS 6 608), as well as in Norway (PPS 7 195; 2016 data).

A somewhat different pattern emerges if pensions are excluded from the analysis: in 2017, social transfers (excluding pensions) of above PPS 2 000 were recorded in Luxembourg (PPS 3 125), Sweden (PPS 2 747), Denmark (PPS 2 473) and Ireland (PPS 2 428).

It is interesting to compare the level of social transfers across the EU Member States including and excluding pensions. In Denmark and Estonia, social transfers including pensions were only around 1.7 times as high as social transfers excluding pensions in 2017. However, in Greece the same ratio was much higher, as the value of social transfers including pensions was 8.7 times higher than social transfers excluding pensions. The next highest ratios were recorded in Romania and Portugal where transfers including pensions were next to 6 times as high as transfers excluding pensions.

2019-12-17__Eurostat Tavola 4

Social transfers were often targeted at nuclear families

Across the EU-28, median disposable income before social transfers was higher (PPS 14 086 in 2017) for persons living in nuclear households comprising two or more adults with dependent children than for the other two types of household. This is shown in Table 4 (PPS 10 628 for those living in households with two or more adults without dependent children and was PPS 8 426 for those living in households composed of a single person with dependent children); note this analysis includes pensions.

This pattern held across each of the EU Member States, except for Slovakia, where those living in households with two or more adults without dependent children had a slightly higher level of disposable income (PPS 8 825 in 2017) than those living in households composed of two or more adults with dependent children (where median disposable income was PPS 583 lower).

The impact of social transfers was considerable, as the level of median disposable income for those living in EU-28 households composed of two or more adults without children rose to PPS 18 815 in 2017, some 77.0 % higher than before social transfers (PPS 10 628). For comparison, social transfers led to a 50.4 % increase in the median disposable income of those people living in households composed of a single person with dependent children. The impact of social transfers was considerably lower for those people living in households composed of two or more adults with dependent children (up 15.3 %).

The re-distributive impact of social transfers generally resulted in the highest levels of median disposable income (after social transfers) being recorded for those people living in households that were composed of two or more adults without dependent children. This pattern held across all but two of the EU Member States in 2017; the only exceptions were Denmark and Estonia— where the highest levels of median disposable income were recorded for people living in households composed of two or more adults with dependent children.

A comparison of median disposable income before and after social transfers reveals that most governments chose to direct the greatest share of their support — in the form of social transfers — towards households with two or more adults without dependent children. For example, the median disposable income among those people living in this type of household in Greece rose from PPS 3 312 to PPS 9 692 as a result of social transfers (an increase of 293 %). Social transfers also resulted in median disposable incomes doubling, or more, for those people living in households with two or more adults without dependent children in Luxembourg, Portugal, Belgium, France, Italy, Slovenia and Spain. A similar situation was recorded in Serbia.

In Ireland and the United Kingdom, social transfers were targeted more towards single-parent households

There were two exceptions to this pattern, where the impact of social transfers was felt more by those people living in households composed of a single person with dependent children. In particular, median disposable income in Ireland rose by 268.9 % in 2017 as a result of social transfers for single-parent households (compared with a 63.0 % increase for people living in a household composed of two or more adults without dependent children, and a 15.4 % increase for people living in households with two or more adults with dependent children). The redistributive impact of social transfers was also felt most by single-parent households in the United Kingdom (where incomes rose by 244.2 % in 2017 as a result of social transfers).

In absolute terms, the highest increases in income were recorded for people living in Luxembourg in households with two or more adults without dependent children; they saw their income rise in 2017 by PPS 22 287 as a result of social transfers. There were also considerable increases in incomes for people living in this type of household in France, Belgium, Austria, Finland and Sweden, as social transfers resulted in median disposable income rising by more than PPS 10 000 in 2017.

Median disposable incomes for people living in single-parent households rose by PPS 8 554 as a result of social transfers in the United Kingdom and by PPS 8 512 in Ireland.

Income inequality

As noted above, while median disposable income provides a measure of average living standards, devoid of the potential distortion of aggregate measures such as GDP per capita, it still fails to offer a complete picture as it does not capture the distribution of income within the population and thereby does little to reflect economic inequalities.

The Gini coefficient

The Gini coefficient is a leading indicator that is used to measure income inequality. The Gini coefficient may range from 0, corresponding to perfect equality (in other words, income is equally distributed among every individual in a given society) to 100, corresponding to perfect inequality (in other words, when all of the income is received by a single person); thus, a lower Gini coefficient reflects a more egalitarian distribution of income.

In 2017, the Gini coefficient for the EU-28 was 30.7 %. The highest income disparities among the EU Member States (with a Gini coefficient of at least 35.0 % — as shown by the darkest orange shade in Map 2) were recorded in Bulgaria and Lithuania. A second group of countries, with a Gini coefficient above the EU-28 average (in the range of 31.0 % – 34.5 %) comprised Estonia, Italy, Romania, the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Latvia. At the other end of the range, income was more evenly distributed in Slovakia, Slovenia, Czechia, Finland and Belgium, as well as Iceland and Norway, where the Gini coefficient was 26.0 % or less.

The S80/S20 income quintile share ratio

Income inequalities within countries may also be illustrated through the income quintile share ratio, which is calculated as the ratio between the income received by the top quintile and the income received by the bottom quintile. High values for this ratio suggest that there are considerable disparities in the distribution of income between upper and lower income groups.

In 2017, the income quintile share ratio for the EU-28 was 5.1 (see Figure 5); this signifies that, on average, the income received by the top 20 % of the population with the highest incomes was more than five times as high as the income received by the 20 % of the population with the lowest incomes.

The income quintile share ratio ranged from a low of 3.4 in Slovenia and Czechia, and 3.5 in Finland and Slovakia to a value between 6.0 – 7.0 in Greece, Latvia, Romania and Spain, peaking at 7.3 in Lithuania and 8.2 in Bulgaria.

The distribution of income was more often more equitable among the older generations

On the basis of the same measure, elderly people (aged 65 and over) in the EU-28 experienced less income inequality than the whole population, as their income quintile share ratio was 4.1 in 2017. This pattern of a more equitable distribution of income among the elderly (compared with the total population) was evident in the vast majority of EU Member States, the only exceptions being Cyprus (4.7 % vs 4.6 %) and Slovenia (where the ratio was identical, 3.4 %). Income inequality was also slightly higher among the elderly in Switzerland and Iceland (both 2016 data).

Impact of social transfers on inequalities

The effect of European welfare systems, in other words, pensions and other social transfers, in addressing income inequality can be demonstrated by comparing Gini coefficients before and after social transfers, to provide a quantitative assessment of their redistributive impact.

n 2017, the EU-28 Gini coefficient for median disposable income before social transfers (pensions included) was 51.7 %, which fell to 30.7 % after social transfers. The impact of pensions and other social transfers on income inequality was particularly large in Portugal, Greece and Germany — where the Gini coefficient fell around 25 points —, while the largest impact was recorded in Sweden where the coefficient was reduced by 29.6 points (see figure 6).

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Malta mette nei triboli il rule-of-law dell’europarlamento.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-14.

Unione Europea 013

«While Poland’s government is escalating its rule of law crisis by introducing even more drastic measures against the country’s judges, another problem is looming over the EU’s commitment to upholding the rule of law: Malta»

«Ever since the murder of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia and the following investigation – or rather the lack of it, it seems clear that something is foul in the state of Malta»

«The European Parliament demanded that the EU Commission launches a rule of law dialogue, a first step towards an Article 7 procedure that could end in Malta losing voting rights in the EU»

«After two years of standstill, the inquiry jumpstarted last month with shocking revelations concerning the involvement of the members of the Maltese government and a swirl of questions regarding the role of prime minister Joseph Muscat, who declared that he will step down this month.»

«His innocence and his competence in overseeing law enforcement are in doubt»

«Yet, Malta’s problems are not easily comparable to those in Poland and Hungary. They are worse in some respects and better in others»

«It is not a matter of authoritarianism. It is worse, however, because weaknesses in its rule of law and serious problems with corruption at high government levels have resulted in the brazen murder of a journalist»

«On paper, the president appoints the judges and the chief justice of Malta on the basis of advice by the prime minister.

In reality, the president only rubberstamps the prime minister’s picks»

«Despite the recommendations from the EU and Council of Europe’s Venice Commission towards establishing a stronger mechanism towards ensuring checks and balances in judicial appointments, no independent body of judicial self-governance ensures that judges exercise of power over their own matters»

«In Portugal, former prime minister Jose Socrates is facing charges of corruption, even though his own party is in government»

«In the Czech Republic, prime minister Andrej Babis faces investigation»

«In contrast, in Poland, where virtually the entire law enforcement is centred around the minister of Jjustice Zbigniew Ziobro who is also the prosecutor general, investigations into alleged crimes and misdemeanours by politicians from the ruling party are initiated – and then, dropped»

«In Hungary, the misuse of EU’s taxpayers’ money by well-connected people has been pointed out by EU agencies but the Hungarian authorities have not charged any»

«The dialogue might seem as a light measure, but it in fact is the first step on the road to triggering the Article 7 procedure. …. One should not overuse it, as the possibility of ultimately depriving a member state of its vote in the Council is not something to be invoked lightly»

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Il problema è la nomina dei giudici.

Nella civilissima Germania, per esempio, la Corte Costituzionale è formato da sedici giudici eletti per metà dai membri del Bundestag e per metà dal Bundesrat. La durata della carica è fissata a 12 anni: termina comunque al raggiungimento dell’età di 68 anni.

In Germania non esiste un organo di autogoverno della magistratura affine al CSM italiano. La nomina dei magistrati addetti ai tribunali federali incombe così al Ministro federale competente in materia (Giustizia, Lavoro, Finanze, ecc.). I provvedimenti disciplinari contro giudici e procuratori federali possono essere assunti solo nel caso in cui, a seguito di una richiesta del Bundestag in tal senso, il Tribunale costituzionale abbia accertato un comportamento doloso del singolo magistrato, con decisione presa da almeno i 2/3 dei suoi componenti.

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Come si vede, i giudici in Germania sono tutti di nomina politica: ogni popolo ha le sue tradizioni anche per le istituzioni giuridiche. Non solo: la politica ha la potestà di rimuovere i giudici.

Ci si domanda, per quale motivo un simile criterio non possa essere seguito anche da altri stati afferenti l’Unione Europea.

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EuObserver. 2020-01-06. Maltese murder – the next rule-of-law crisis in EU?

While Poland’s government is escalating its rule of law crisis by introducing even more drastic measures against the country’s judges, another problem is looming over the EU’s commitment to upholding the rule of law: Malta.

Ever since the murder of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia and the following investigation – or rather the lack of it, it seems clear that something is foul in the state of Malta.

The European Parliament demanded that the EU Commission launches a rule of law dialogue, a first step towards an Article 7 procedure that could end in Malta losing voting rights in the EU.

It may be too early though.

After two years of standstill, the inquiry jumpstarted last month with shocking revelations concerning the involvement of the members of the Maltese government and a swirl of questions regarding the role of prime minister Joseph Muscat, who declared that he will step down this month.

His innocence and his competence in overseeing law enforcement are in doubt.

Yet, Malta’s problems are not easily comparable to those in Poland and Hungary. They are worse in some respects and better in others.

In contrast to Poland and Hungary, in Malta, no ruling party or government is trying to systematically subjugate the judiciary in order to exert political control over it.

It is not a matter of authoritarianism. It is worse, however, because weaknesses in its rule of law and serious problems with corruption at high government levels have resulted in the brazen murder of a journalist.

Where does that put the European Union? The current toolbox for preventing the backsliding of the rule of law assumes that the EU reacts to ‘systemic’ issues with the rule of law.

Malta has such issues, as the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe already pointed out in December 2018.

It stressed, in particular, the lack of proper checks and balances, stating that “Taking also into account the prime ministers strong position in judicial appointments (…), crucial checks and balances are missing.”

The prime minister holds the bulk of executive power with the president being more akin to his counterpart in Germany. On paper, the president appoints the judges and the chief justice of Malta on the basis of advice by the prime minister.

In reality, the president only rubberstamps the prime minister’s picks. Despite the recommendations from the EU and Council of Europe’s Venice Commission towards establishing a stronger mechanism towards ensuring checks and balances in judicial appointments, no independent body of judicial self-governance ensures that judges exercise of power over their own matters.

Size matters

Malta can solve its legal and institutional challenges, but there is a challenge, which it cannot solve – its size.

With a population just shy of 500,000, it is no bigger than a medium-sized city in Germany or the UK. And in politics, close connections count.

Networks, be it familial, friendly or professional, are dense. When we talk about the judiciary in Poland, we talk about 10,000 judges. Malta has 24 judges, 22 magistrates, and one chief justice.

You can gather the upper echelons of Malta’s three branches of government at a garden party. This level of proximity makes it even more imperative to strengthen institutional checks and balances.

A country that respects the rule of law can prosecute the powerful.

In Portugal, former prime minister Jose Socrates is facing charges of corruption, even though his own party is in government.

In the Czech Republic, prime minister Andrej Babis faces investigation.

In contrast, in Poland, where virtually the entire law enforcement is centred around the minister of Jjustice Zbigniew Ziobro who is also the prosecutor general, investigations into alleged crimes and misdemeanours by politicians from the ruling party are initiated – and then, dropped.

In Hungary, the misuse of EU’s taxpayers’ money by well-connected people has been pointed out by EU agencies but the Hungarian authorities have not charged anybody.

The sudden momentum behind the Galizia case may suggest that Malta can solve its issues by itself after all.

If the European Commission wants to wait a bit longer, it should, however, make it clear to Maltese partners that a swift resolution of criminal cases, together with an overall strengthening of checks and balances in line with the Venice Commission recommendations, is the only way to avoid the start of the pre-Article 7 dialogue.

The dialogue might seem as a light measure, but it in fact is the first step on the road to triggering the Article 7 procedure.

One should not overuse it, as the possibility of ultimately depriving a member state of its vote in the Council is not something to be invoked lightly.

But if Malta will find itself unable to handle the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia and will thus prove that its constitutional system has indeed eroded to the point where the country is unable to respect the rights of its citizens, entering a rule of law framework dialogue followed by the eventual triggering of the article 7 procedure against Malta would become unavoidable.