Pubblicato in: Commercio, Geopolitica Asiatica

Bangladesh. Fatture dell’import +54% in cinque mesi.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-12-29.

2021-12-30__ Bangladesh's import payments 001

«Import bills in July-November swelled 53.74% year-on-year to $30.3 billion»

«With nations facing the pandemic funk, the settlement of Letters of Credit (LC), also known as actual import payments, in the corresponding period last year stood at $19.72 billion»

«Imports of yarn, capital machinery and intermediate goods had a major contribution to the bills, which means production lines are alive and kicking and there has been a strong consumer demand at home.»

«However, spiralling commodity prices in the international market and spiked shipping cost pushed up the import payments»

«In the first five months of this fiscal year capital machinery import saw 30% growth»

«During the period import growth of intermediate goods was 70%, chemical fertilizer 105%, yarn 103% and drugs and medicines more than 1,000%»

«In July-November, there had been around 13,779% rise in LCs opening for rice import as the government allowed bringing in the food staple from foreign markets»

2021-12-30__ Bangladesh's import payments 002

* * * * * * *

2021-12-30__ Bangladesh's import payments 003


Import bills rise 54% in five months

Bangladesh’s import payments surged by around 54% in the first five months of the current fiscal year compared to the corresponding period of last year – indicating a strong and steady economic recovery in keeping with a sharp fall in coronavirus infections.

Import bills in July-November swelled 53.74% year-on-year to $30.3 billion, according to the latest data of the Bangladesh Bank. With nations facing the pandemic funk, the settlement of Letters of Credit (LC), also known as actual import payments, in the corresponding period last year stood at $19.72 billion.

Imports of yarn, capital machinery and intermediate goods had a major contribution to the bills, which means production lines are alive and kicking and there has been a strong consumer demand at home.

However, spiralling commodity prices in the international market and spiked shipping cost pushed up the import payments.

In the first five months of this fiscal year capital machinery import saw 30% growth, the central bank’s latest data show. During the period import growth of intermediate goods was 70%, chemical fertilizer 105%, yarn 103% and drugs and medicines more than 1,000%.

In July-November, there had been around 13,779% rise in LCs opening for rice import as the government allowed bringing in the food staple from foreign markets. However, the upswing put a less significant $340 million mark to the bills.

At the same time, LCs opening for sugar increased by more than 100% and refined edible oil by 81%.

The country saw 31.86% fall in LC opening for onion, 1.35% for pulses and 8.92% for dairy items.

Pubblicato in: Armamenti, Geopolitica Asiatica, Geopolitica Militare

Giappone. Aumenta di 6.75 miliardi Usd il budget della difesa.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-12-01.

2021-11-30__Japan 001

«Producer prices in Japan rose by 8.0% yoy in October 2021, the most since January 1981, …. amid surging commodity prices. Cost surged further for petroleum & coal products (44.5% vs 32.4% in September), iron & steel (21.8% vs 18.1%), chemicals (14.1% vs 12.7%) and non-ferrous metals (31.4% vs 27.0%).» [Fonte]

* * * * * * *

«Japan plans to add $6.75 billion to its already record annual military spending in a rush to bolster air and maritime defenses as it becomes more concerned about threats posed by China and North Korea»

«Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government on Friday approved the outlay as part of a supplementary budget»

«While such additions to defense spending are common, the 774 billion yen that lawmakers will be asked to approve is the largest amount ever»

«As the security environment around Japan worsens at unprecedented speed, our urgent task is to accelerate the implementation of various projects»

«The cash injection will let Japan, three months earlier than planned, upgrade surface-to-air missile launchers on islands at the edge of the East China Sea and Patriot PAC-3 missile batteries elsewhere that are the last line of defense against any incoming North Korean warheads»

«China’s increasing pressure on Taiwan is causing jitters in Japan because Beijing’s control of the island would bring Chinese forces within around 100 kilometers (62 miles) of its territory and would threaten key maritime trade routes that supply Japan with oil and other goods»

«The extra spending will also let Japan more quickly acquire anti-submarine missiles, maritime patrol planes and military cargo jets»

* * * * * * *

Il Giappone è carico di problemi, tra i quali spicca la stagflazione.

Giappone. Demografia. Tassodi fertilità sceso a 1.34. È crisi devastante.

Giappone. Un vecchio ogni 1.8 giovani. Cina e Russia si leccano i baffi.

Giappone. 2021Q1. Pil -3.9% QoQ, Consumi Privati -6.0%.

Giappone. 2021Q1. Investimenti in impianti e macchiari -7.8 sul 2020Q1.

Giappone – PIL (Prodotto Interno Lordo) (Annuale) -3.0%. [2021-11-14]

* * * * * * *

Il Giappone non nutre fiducia che gli Stati Uniti li difendano in caso di aggressione, e Cina e Korea del Nord sono vicini scomodi, armati fino ai denti.

La conseguenza è semplice, ossia riarmarsi. Ma senza disporre di armi atomiche il suo potere deterrente sarà pur sempre misero.

Infine, a crisi demografica nel medio – lungo termine lavora tutto a favore della Cina, che alla fine occuperà delle isole spopolate.

* * * * * * *


Japan adds $6.75 billion to military budget in rush to bolster air and sea defenses

Tokyo (Reuters) Japan plans to add $6.75 billion to its already record annual military spending in a rush to bolster air and maritime defenses as it becomes more concerned about threats posed by China and North Korea.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government on Friday approved the outlay as part of a supplementary budget. While such additions to defense spending are common, the 774 billion yen that lawmakers will be asked to approve is the largest amount ever, according to Japan’s Ministry of Defense.

“As the security environment around Japan worsens at unprecedented speed, our urgent task is to accelerate the implementation of various projects,” the Defense Ministry said in its spending proposal.

Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force’s F-15 fighter jets, one of the country’s key defenses, fly during a review after the graduation ceremony of the National Defense Academy on March 22, 2020.

The cash injection will let Japan, three months earlier than planned, upgrade surface-to-air missile launchers on islands at the edge of the East China Sea and Patriot PAC-3 missile batteries elsewhere that are the last line of defense against any incoming North Korean warheads.

China’s increasing pressure on Taiwan is causing jitters in Japan because Beijing’s control of the island would bring Chinese forces within around 100 kilometers (62 miles) of its territory and would threaten key maritime trade routes that supply Japan with oil and other goods. It would also provide China with bases for unfettered access to the western Pacific.

The extra spending will also let Japan more quickly acquire anti-submarine missiles, maritime patrol planes and military cargo jets, the Defense Ministry said.

The additional military outlay comes after Kishida’s ruling party in October included a goal of almost doubling defense spending to 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in election pledges.

For decades the pacifist nation has stuck to a policy of keeping defense spending within 1% of GDP, easing concern both at home and overseas about any revival of the militarism that led Japan into World War II.

The additional spending plan approved by Kishida’s government on Friday also includes pre-payments to defense contractors for equipment to help them deal with coronavirus pandemic disruptions that have hurt their finances.

The proposed supplemental spending combined with defense outlays approved for the year to March 31 comes to about 1.3% of Japan’s GDP.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica Asiatica

Australia. La Banca Centrale ha perso il controllo sugli interessi del debito.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-10-31.

Australia 001

«The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) again declined to defend its 0.1% target for the key April 2024 bond, even though its yield was all the way up at 0.58%»

«The yield sky-rocketed to 0.75% while yields on three-year bonds recorded their biggest monthly increase since 1994»

«Australia’s central bank on Friday lost all control of the yield target key to its stimulus policy as bonds suffered their biggest shellacking in decades and markets howled for rate hikes as soon as April»

«An already torrid week for debt got even worse when the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) again declined to defend its 0.1% target for the key April 2024 bond, even though its yield was all the way up at 0.58%»

«Scenting capitulation, speculators sent the yield sky-rocketing to 0.75%»

«The only conclusion we can draw is that the YCC regime is about to be formally dumped at next week’s meeting»

«swaps have rates above 1% by year-end»

«With the economy now recovering again we believe that the conditions for the start of rate hikes will now be in place by late 2022»

«The RBA is hardly alone in being at odds with increasingly aggressive market pricing for early tightening»

«The European Central Bank on Thursday tried to push back against market hawks but with scant success, as bond yields jumped across the continent»

«Many central banks are conceding that global inflationary pressures look likely to be more lasting than first thought, given supply bottlenecks and surging energy prices»

* * * * * * *

Il governo australiano ha nutrito ambizioni politiche ed economiche smodate, impossibili da sostenersi.

I suoi litigi ideologici con la Cina sono costati ben cari.

Ma il mercato ha una forza tale da stritolare anche le banche centrali dei paesi mediamente potenti.

Adesso la Banca Centrale ha perso il controllo sugli interessi del debito, i quali si sono impennati, e verosimilmente tali rimarranno per lungo tempo.

* * * * * * *


Australia’s central bank loses yield control as bonds melt down.

– The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) again declined to defend its 0.1% target for the key April 2024 bond, even though its yield was all the way up at 0.58%.

– The yield sky-rocketed to 0.75% while yields on three-year bonds recorded their biggest monthly increase since 1994.

– All eyes were now on the RBA’s policy meeting on Nov.2 where investors were wagering

– it would call time on yield curve control (YCC).

* * *

Australia’s central bank on Friday lost all control of the yield target key to its stimulus policy as bonds suffered their biggest shellacking in decades and markets howled for rate hikes as soon as April.

An already torrid week for debt got even worse when the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) again declined to defend its 0.1% target for the key April 2024 bond, even though its yield was all the way up at 0.58%.

Scenting capitulation, speculators sent the yield sky-rocketing to 0.75% while yields on three-year bonds recorded their biggest monthly increase since 1994.

All eyes were now on the RBA’s policy meeting on Nov.2 where investors were wagering it would call time on yield curve control (YCC) and its guidance of no rate rises until 2024.

“The only conclusion we can draw is that the YCC regime is about to be formally dumped at next week’s meeting,” said Ben Jarman, a rate strategist at JPMorgan.

“If so this is a startling about-face,” he added. “Dropping YCC is a strong signal, so we bring forward our expectation for the first hike from late 2023 to Q4, 2022.”

Markets are already well ahead of him with futures pricing in a hike in the 0.1% cash rate to 0.25% as early as April, while swaps have rates above 1% by year-end.

Yields on three-year bonds surged to their highest since mid-2019 at 1.25%, bringing the rise for the week to a portfolio punishing 47 basis points. For the month, yields were up an astonishing 90 basis points likely leaving many investors deeply underwater.

                         Gone too far

Most analysts argue the market has got ahead of itself on hikes given annual wage growth in Australia of 1.7% is still far below the RBA’s desired level of 3% or more.

While core inflation data this week surprised on the high side at 2.1%, that is still only just in the RBA’s target band of 2-3% having been under it for almost six years. To average 2.5%, it would need to run above 3% for an equal period.

A Reuters poll of analysts found the median expectation was for a hike in the second quarter of 2023, though the risk was clearly for an earlier move.

Calling for a hike at all might seem odd given the economy almost certainly contracted sharply in the third quarter as coronavirus restrictions shut Sydney and Melbourne.

However, the country’s success in vaccinations has seen the lockdowns relaxed and consumer spending pick up. Data out Friday showed retail sales rebounded 1.3% in September after three months of steep losses, handily beating forecasts.

The job market has also proved resilient, leading analysts to predict an economic rebound this quarter.

“With the economy now recovering again we believe that the conditions for the start of rate hikes will now be in place by late 2022,” said Shane Oliver, chief economist at AMP Capital, who sees rates at 0.5% by the end of next year.

“While this will mean an increase in consumer and housing interest rates, the overall level of the cash rate will still be incredibly low and will be far from tight monetary conditions.”

The RBA is hardly alone in being at odds with increasingly aggressive market pricing for early tightening.

The European Central Bank on Thursday tried to push back against market hawks but with scant success, as bond yields jumped across the continent.

Many central banks are conceding that global inflationary pressures look likely to be more lasting than first thought, given supply bottlenecks and surging energy prices.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Commercio, Diplomazia, Geopolitica Asiatica

Myanmar. La Cina riannoda salde relazioni politiche ed economiche. Oceano Indiano.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-09-02.

2021-09-03__ Myanmar Cina 001

Negli ultimi trenta anni la Cina si è evoluta da paese misero a primaria potenza politica, militare ed economica.

La ricetta di simile sviluppo è semplice, financo banale: trattative bilaterali su base paritetica e nessuna interferenza negli affari interni dei paesi contraenti.

È l’esatto opposto di quanto propugna il credo liberal, che erge i suoi seguaci al rango di giudici universali inappellabili, che condannano e sanzionano chiunque non si sottometta alla loro ideologia.

Il risultato finale di tale visione del mondo è stata la débâcle in Afghanistan, che ha fatto perdere ogni credibilità nell’America e la ha declassata da grande potenza ad un mesto ruolo locoregionale.

* * * * * * *

«China’s special envoy for Asian Affairs Sun Guoxiang visited Myanmar last week for talks with its military rulers, as a new route spanning the Southeast Asian nation opened up connecting Chinese trade flows to the Indian Ocean»

«As opposed to most Western countries that have condemned the army for ousting the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, China has taken a softer line and said its priorities are stability and not interfering in its neighbour»

«During his Aug. 21 to Aug. 28 visit, Sun met military ruler Min Aung Hlaing as well as foreign minister Wunna Maung Lwin and Minister for the Union Government Office Yar Pyae and “exchanged views with them on the political landscape in Myanmar”»

«We will work together with the international community to play a constructive role in Myanmar’s efforts to restore social stability and resume democratic transformation at an early date»

«China supported Myanmar working with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to implement a five-point consensus aimed at resolving the crisis and “opposes undue external intervention”»

«it was possible Myanmar’s other big neighbour India could decide to follow suit»

«China’s embassy in Myanmar announced the opening of the new trade route linking Yangon’s port on the Indian Ocean to the Chinese border province of Yunnan and by rail onwards to Chengdu in the southwestern province of Sichuan»

«Successful testing of the new Indian Ocean route is an important breakthrough in strengthening China-Myanmar trade relations»

* * * * * * *

Poter utilizzare il porto di Yangon, significa per la Cina disporre di un accesso sicuro sull’Oceano Indiano, a poco meno di mille kilometri di strada ferrata dal centro logistico di Chengdu. Accorcia di circa sette migliaia di kilometri la lunghezza delle rotte marittime con la Cina, evitando il passaggio attraverso lo stretto di Malacca, posto a 1,956 kilometri di distanza in linea di aria.

La Cina non si cura minimamente di cosa stiano pensano glio ccidentali. Proprio per nulla.

Non solo.

Per il Myanmar genera una occasione unica di generare posti di lavoro qualificati, qualificare il porto di Yangon, generano altresì un indotto di tutto rispetto economico.

Poi, a Cina aveva già provveduto a costruire una linea ferroviaria ad alta velocità tra Chengdu e Lincang.

Chinese High-Speed Rail Network Reaches Myanmar’s Border

«The opening of the Chengdu-Lincang line will further mainland Southeast Asia’s historic reorientation toward the north.

Lost among the torrent of disheartening news from Myanmar was a report on the official opening of a new rail line bringing China’s high-speed railway network to the country’s border with Myanmar. The recently completed railway runs from Chengdu, the capital of China’s Sichuan province, to Lincang, a prefecture-level city in Yunnan province opposite the town of Chinshwehaw in Myanmar’s Shan State. ….

the railway’s opening ceremony on August 25 that the border would function as an important node of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and would work to write a new chapter in the history of friendly “paukphaw” relations between Myanmar and China.

The new rail line is just the latest in a flurry of transport links that have bound Yunnan province, once a sparsely populated frontier region at the outer reaches of the Chinese empire, into China’s dense highway and rail network. It also reflects the long process of China’s deepening integration with Myanmar and the other nations of mainland Southeast Asia.»

*


China envoy visits Myanmar as new route to Indian Ocean opened.

China’s special envoy for Asian Affairs Sun Guoxiang visited Myanmar last week for talks with its military rulers, as a new route spanning the Southeast Asian nation opened up connecting Chinese trade flows to the Indian Ocean.

As opposed to most Western countries that have condemned the army for ousting the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, China has taken a softer line and said its priorities are stability and not interfering in its neighbour.

During his Aug. 21 to Aug. 28 visit, Sun met military ruler Min Aung Hlaing as well as foreign minister Wunna Maung Lwin and Minister for the Union Government Office Yar Pyae and “exchanged views with them on the political landscape in Myanmar”, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said on Tuesday.

“We will work together with the international community to play a constructive role in Myanmar’s efforts to restore social stability and resume democratic transformation at an early date,” Wang told a regular news briefing in Beijing, when asked about Sun’s trip.

China supported Myanmar working with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to implement a five-point consensus aimed at resolving the crisis and “opposes undue external intervention”, Wang said.

Opponents of Myanmar’s junta have accused China of supporting February’s military takeover that has sparked daily protests leading to hundreds of deaths and thousands displaced by fighting between the army and hastily formed militias.

Beijing has rejected such accusations and said it backs regional diplomacy on the crisis.

A spokesman for Myanmar’s National Unity Government made up of opponents of military rule did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the Chinese visit.

But members of the shadow government have previously urged countries to deal with them rather than the military.

“China seems to be endorsing the junta by the way it is conducting diplomacy,” said Sai Wansai, a political analyst from the Shan ethnic minority, who said it was possible Myanmar’s other big neighbour India could decide to follow suit.

Separately, China’s embassy in Myanmar announced the opening of the new trade route linking Yangon’s port on the Indian Ocean to the Chinese border province of Yunnan and by rail onwards to Chengdu in the southwestern province of Sichuan.

“Successful testing of the new Indian Ocean route is an important breakthrough in strengthening China-Myanmar trade relations,” the embassy said on its Facebook page.

Pubblicato in: Diplomazia, Geopolitica Asiatica, India

India. Colloqui formali ai massimi livelli con i Taleban in Doha, Qatar.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-09-02.

Afghanistan 002

«Indian foreign ministry said that India’s ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, met with the head of the Taliban’s political office, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, in Doha»

«Mittal and Stanikzai discussed the safety, security and early return of Indian nationals who are stranded in Afghanistan as well as New Delhi’s concerns around Afghanistan being used as a base for terrorism»

«There is a practical necessity of engaging with the Taliban given that it would be one of the most — if not the most — important political stakeholder in Afghanistan»

«The Taliban had requested the meeting, which took place at the Indian embassy in Doha»

«The Indian ambassador also raised New Delhi’s concerns around Afghanistan being used as a base for terrorism»

«Reports said that India has invested $3 billion in multiple infrastructure and trade projects and has undertaken over 400 projects in Afghanistan»

«India’s meeting with the Taliban was a “necessity” that was in some ways dictated by the evolving political realities in Afghanistan»

«Outreach at lower levels had already begun but this is the first official, explicitly-stated Indian outreach to the Taliban»

«China has also stepped up its diplomatic efforts to engage with the Islamist group»

«If eventually the Taliban succeed in bringing together an inclusive government, with various stakeholders, then there is no reason why India would not move forward with a new momentum in its engagement»

«the issue of recognizing the Taliban as the legitimate power in control of Afghanistan won’t emerge anytime soon»

* * * * * * *

È del tutto naturale che gli stati siano guardinghi nei confronti dei Taleban, osservando i loro comportamenti in politica estera.

«most of the countries would be waiting and watching as to what the Taliban actually do on the ground»

Ma sarebbe altrettanto naturale almeno il semplice prendere atto della loro esistenza ed iniziare ad avviare colloqui sui temi di reciproco interesse.

La Realpolitik presenta sempre dei vantaggi reciproci.

*


India holds first formal talks with the Taliban in Qatar

–  Indian foreign ministry said that India’s ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, met with the head of the Taliban’s political office, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, in Doha.

– It was the first time an Indian diplomat formally met the group and marked a drastically different approach from New Delhi compared to when the Taliban were last in power in the 1990s.

– Mittal and Stanikzai discussed the safety, security and early return of Indian nationals who are stranded in Afghanistan as well as New Delhi’s concerns around Afghanistan being used as a base for terrorism.

– “There is a practical necessity of engaging with the Taliban given that it would be one of the most — if not the most — important political stakeholder in Afghanistan,” said Harsh Pant at the Observer Research Foundation.

* * *

India announced its first formal diplomatic meeting with the Taliban on Tuesday — their first official talks since the group seized power in Afghanistan as the U.S. withdrew its forces from there.

The Indian foreign ministry said India’s ambassador to Qatar, Deepak Mittal, met with the head of the Taliban’s political office, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai. The Taliban had requested the meeting, which took place at the Indian embassy in Doha, according to the ministry.

Mittal and Stanikzai discussed the safety, security and early return of Indian nationals who are stranded in Afghanistan as well as travel prospects for Afghan minorities who want to visit India, the Ministry of External Affairs said.

The Indian ambassador also raised New Delhi’s concerns around Afghanistan being used as a base for terrorism.

“The Taliban Representative assured the Ambassador that these issues would be positively addressed,” the foreign ministry said.

Days before Tuesday’s meeting, Indian media reported that Stanikzai said the Taliban wanted to continue Afghanistan’s political, economic and cultural ties with India. It was reportedly the first time a member of the Taliban leadership spoke about the future of India-Afghanistan relations since the group captured Kabul.

The Taliban’s return to power would likely impact Afghanistan’s neighbors, amid rising concerns of regional instability, refugee inflows and the prospect of Afghanistan becoming a haven for terrorist activities again.

New Delhi did not have diplomatic relations with the Taliban when they were last in power in the 1990s, in part because of the militant group’s ties to Pakistan.

But India had forged close ties with the U.S.-backed civilian government in Kabul over the last two decades and provided Afghanistan with development assistance. Reports said that India has invested $3 billion in multiple infrastructure and trade projects and has undertaken over 400 projects in Afghanistan.

Analysts say India’s commitments and the recent shift in power has left New Delhi in a tough strategic state.

‘Practical necessity’

India’s meeting with the Taliban was a “necessity” that was in some ways dictated by the evolving political realities in Afghanistan, said Harsh Pant, head of the strategic studies program at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

“There is a practical necessity of engaging with the Taliban given that it would be one of the most — if not the most — important political stakeholder in Afghanistan,” Pant told CNBC. “Outreach at lower levels had already begun but this is the first official, explicitly-stated Indian outreach to the Taliban.”

India reportedly made efforts in June to engage with the Taliban as the U.S. withdrawal deadline loomed. China has also stepped up its diplomatic efforts to engage with the Islamist group.

“If eventually the Taliban succeed in bringing together an inclusive government, with various stakeholders, then there is no reason why India would not move forward with a new momentum in its engagement,” Pant said.

He said the issue of recognizing the Taliban as the legitimate power in control of Afghanistan won’t emerge anytime soon.

“For the foreseeable future, it would largely be an engagement to assess where Taliban might be going with their agenda,” Pant said.

“I think most of the countries would be waiting and watching as to what the Taliban actually do on the ground.”

Pubblicato in: Cina, Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica Asiatica, Stati Uniti

Cina vs Usa. Gli alleati degli Stati Uniti in Asia orientale contro una linea dura sulla Cina.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-08-17.

Pollo allo Spiedo 001

Tempi grami per la Harris-Biden Administration.

«U.S. Allies in East Asia do not support a hardline on China»

«Biden would adopt a less confrontational approach to relations with China. They have been disappointed»

«Early steps by the new American administration toward China seemed to be a continuation of President Trump’s hardline policies»

«the new secretary of state echoed the charge of his predecessor that China was engaged in genocide against the Uighurs in Xinjiang. The tariff barriers on bilateral trade have been left in place»

«that competition is now the principal driver in the bilateral relationship. For much of the last 50 years, the U.S. was confident that China’s growing wealth and power did not threaten the U.S.’ vital interests and their differences could be managed by diplomacy and engagement»

«The U.S. is seeking to adjust to an international situation in which it is no longer the sole superpower»

«This is not so much because of a decline in power, but because other countries have risen to major power status and China, of course, is the first and foremost example of that»

«A new multipolar world is emerging»

«→→ At the same time, there is no question that the social and political polarization that has been a prominent feature of the U.S.’ domestic scene over the last half decade has damaged the international image of the U.S. and the perception of its reliability as a great power ←←»

«China, in turn, in a remarkably short period of time, has regained the wealth and military strength that are the attributes of major powers»

«Of particular importance for US-China Relations, the administration has reaffirmed that it will adhere to one-China policy and that it does not support independence for Taiwan, and it is also seeking a pattern of regular consultations between Beijing and Washington»

«However, the reality is less positive»

«President Biden needs congressional support for his domestic programs and congressional attitudes toward China are hostile»

«A hardline American approach to China does not mesh well with the interests of US allies and friends in East Asia who do not wish to see the region polarized»

«In other words, the U.S. that tries to work with our friends and allies will discover that they do not support a hardline approach to China»

* * * * * * *

Il problema è semplice.

La Cina è cresciuta, e sta continuando a crescere sia economicamente, sia politicamente, sia militarmente.

Nei rapporti esteri, massimamente con gli Stati Uniti, reclama relazioni inter pares, nel pieno rispetto dell’altrui sovranità nazionale, senza ingerenza alcuna nei fatti interni.

In carenza di questi requisiti, sarà sempre un dialogo tra sordi.

Ma adesso anche i tradizionali alleati degli Stati Uniti nel sud est asiatico stanno disimpegnandosi da questa politica estera americana: per loro i rapporti politici ed economici con la Cina sono assurti a grande importanza, e non possono essere più a lungo ignorati.

La Harris-Biden Administration sembrerebbe sempre più autoescludersi da questo scacchiere in piena crescita.

* * * * * * *


U.S. Allies in East Asia Do Not Support a Hardline on China

When President Donald Trump lost the November 2020 presidential elections in the U.S., some people hoped that President Joe Biden would adopt a less confrontational approach to relations with China. They have been disappointed. Early steps by the new American administration toward China seemed to be a continuation of President Trump’s hardline policies. Shortly after the administration took office, the new secretary of state echoed the charge of his predecessor that China was engaged in genocide against the Uighurs in Xinjiang. The tariff barriers on bilateral trade have been left in place. Senior officials in the Biden administration bluntly stated that the U.S. engagement strategies toward China had failed and that competition is now the principal driver in the bilateral relationship. For much of the last 50 years, the U.S. was confident that China’s growing wealth and power did not threaten the U.S.’ vital interests and their differences could be managed by diplomacy and engagement. That is no longer the case. And the question is why. 

A starting point to understanding what has happened is to recognize that the U.S. and China are both in the midst of fundamental transitions that affect their respective places in the world. 

The U.S. is seeking to adjust to an international situation in which it is no longer the sole superpower. This is not so much because of a decline in power, but because other countries have risen to major power status and China, of course, is the first and foremost example of that. A new multipolar world is emerging. Not surprisingly, the U.S. is reluctant to give up the dominant position that it has occupied since the end of the Cold War and to accept the adjustments that it must make in order to establish a new equilibrium. At the same time, there is no question that the social and political polarization that has been a prominent feature of the U.S.’ domestic scene over the last half decade has damaged the international image of the U.S. and the perception of its reliability as a great power.

China, in turn, in a remarkably short period of time, has regained the wealth and military strength that are the attributes of major powers. This has altered the psychology of the Chinese people. This is what Zheng Bijian didn’t take into account when he came up with the concept of peaceful rise. The Chinese people now are demanding a more muscular foreign policy, consistent with China’s growing power. And this has changed Chinese behavior patterns, which have become more assertive. As a result, regional countries, including the U.S., are finding China’s assurances that it will rise peacefully and never bully its neighbors less and less credible.

These are two of the key background factors that have influenced the sharp plunge in the bilateral U.S.-China relationship, to the lowest depths in half a century. This has created a dangerous situation where missteps by either side or by both could plunge the world into an unprecedented crisis. I use the term unprecedented because China and the U.S. are both major nuclear powers. Confrontations between them are particularly dangerous, and repair work by both sides is vitally necessary. 

Fortunately, despite some superficial similarities, the Biden administration is fundamentally different from its predecessors. President Biden has more foreign policy and national security experience than any American president since the first President Bush 30 years ago. In contrast to the Trump administration, President Biden has appointed capable and experienced officials as secretary of state and national security advisor. These are officials who could sit down without talking points and talk for hours with Chinese counterparts about any issue in the world. Now this was totally missing in the last administration. The Biden administration is moving carefully, to iron out internal differences and adopt sustainable policies that will not simply reflect the whims of a woman. 

Of particular importance for US-China Relations, the administration has reaffirmed that it will adhere to one-China policy and that it does not support independence for Taiwan, and it is also seeking a pattern of regular consultations between Beijing and Washington. The recent consultations between US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng were marked by a barrage of charges by each side against the other.

However, if one reads carefully the public reports regarding the consultations, it is evident that there were constructive elements. According to the Chinese account of the meeting, Deputy Secretary Sherman called the US-China relationship as the most important bilateral relationship in the world, noted many times that the two sides have had contact with each other since President Biden was sworn in, expressed U.S.’ willingness to have open and candid contacts and dialogues with China, declared the U.S.’ hopes that the two countries could coexist peacefully, said that the U.S. has no intention of restricting Chinese development and does not want to contain China and would like to see China develop further, and noted that the two sides can engage in healthy competition, cooperate on climate change, drug control in international and regional hotspots, and strengthen crisis management capacity and avoid conflicts. American accounts of the meeting she had are consistent with the above statements. These are encouraging words that you would not have heard from the previous administration. 

However, the reality is less positive. President Biden needs congressional support for his domestic programs and congressional attitudes toward China are hostile. Changing these attitudes will be difficult but not impossible. A hardline American approach to China does not mesh well with the interests of US allies and friends in East Asia who do not wish to see the region polarized. In other words, the U.S. that tries to work with our friends and allies will discover that they do not support a hardline approach to China, and I think that will have an impact overtime. But as the first step, it would be useful for both China and the U.S. to tone down their rhetoric toward each other. Governments have the responsibility not only to formulate wise foreign policies, but to talk in ways that develop public support for those policies — and we are not doing that. We are talking publicly in ways that undermine the wise policy that we should be pursuing. So as a starter, let’s get our rhetoric under control and I hope that will have some chance to exchange views about other steps that could be taken.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica Asiatica, Senza categoria, Stati Uniti

Afganistan. La débâcle americana è peggio del Vietnam. È devoluzione dell’America.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-08-16.

Afganistan 001

La decisione di Joe Biden di abbandonare l’Afganistan esula dal fatto contingente: è la constatazione che gli Stati Uniti non sono più, ovvero non vogliono più, essere una grande potenza mondiale politica, economica e militare.

Per decenni hanno creduto di poter gestire le guerre per procura, e che la loro potenza aerea e marittima le consentissero di dominare il mondo.

Questo assunto si è dimostrato essere falso, incominciando dal Vietnam.

In Afganistan aviazione e marina non servono a nulla.

Non è questione il dibattito, sterile, su chi abbia avuto per primo l’idea di lasciare l’Afganistan: fatto sì è che Biden è fuggito da quel paese senza essersi prima assicurato uno stato ed un esercito locale degno di quel nome. La situazione era infatti diventata insostenibile. Il suo esercito femminilizzato ha perso la volontà di combattere ed i problemi economici e sociali in patria sono ingravescenti.

Ma questo è solo l’ultimo degli errori fatti.

Per motivazioni ideologiche hanno tentato di esportare un reggimento democratico in un paese la mentalità del quale gli è aliena: è un paese tribale e mussulmano. Un esperimento destinato a fallire per definizione.

È patognomonico il fatto che i media occidentali riportino non quanto accade in Afganistan dal punto di vista degli afgani, bensì cose ne pensa la loro ideologia: nessuno sforzo per cercare di capire quella mentalità.

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«The rout of Afghan forces as Taliban fighters take one provincial city after another provides a stark answer to anyone wondering about the success of two decades of U.S.-led efforts to build a local army»

«Despite about $89 billion budgeted for training the Afghan army, it took the Taliban little more than a month to brush it aside»

«They now stand almost at the gates of Kabul»

«But still, there has been shock at the lack of resistance put up by many Afghan army units»

«because they believed defeat was unavoidable»

«Once morale goes, it spreads very quickly»

«American officers have long worried that rampant corruption, well documented in parts of Afghanistan’s military and political leadership, would undermine the resolve of badly paid, ill-fed and erratically supplied front-line soldiers – some of whom have been left for months or even years on end in isolated outposts»

«Would you give your life for leaders who don’t pay you on time and are more interested in their own future?»

«The defeat highlights the failure of the United States to create a fighting force in the image of its own highly professional military with a motivated, well-trained leadership, high-tech weaponry and seamless logistical support»

«But whether it was ever a realistic goal to create a Western-style army in one of the world’s poorest countries, with a literacy rate of 40% and a social and political culture far from the developed sense of nationhood underpinning the U.S. military, is an open question»

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Gli Stati Uniti stanno lentamente ma implacabilmente devolvendosi.

Certamente sono e rimarranno una grande potenza nucleare, ma il loro esercito rispecchia fedelmente la società americana.

Facciamoci infine una domanda. Chi ha finanziato, addestrato, armato e coperto politicamente il movimento talebano? Ebbene, costoro sono i veri vincitori.

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Taliban surge exposes failure of U.S. efforts to build Afghan army

Aug 15 (Reuters) – The rout of Afghan forces as Taliban fighters take one provincial city after another provides a stark answer to anyone wondering about the success of two decades of U.S.-led efforts to build a local army.

Despite about $89 billion budgeted for training the Afghan army, it took the Taliban little more than a month to brush it aside. Over the last few days, the insurgents have seized every major city in Afghanistan – from Kandahar in the south to Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, Herat in the west to Jalalabad in the east.

They now stand almost at the gates of Kabul.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani praised Afghan security and defense forces in a brief televised address on Saturday, saying they had “a strong spirit to defend their people and country.”

But still, there has been shock at the lack of resistance put up by many Afghan army units. Some abandoned their posts and others reached agreements with the Taliban to stop fighting and hand over their weapons and equipment.

In some instances, U.S. officials say, provincial governors asked security forces to surrender or escape, perhaps in order to avoid further bloodshed because they believed defeat was unavoidable.

Where deals were not cut, Afghan forces still appear to have melted away.

“Once morale goes, it spreads very quickly, and that is at least partly to blame,” a U.S. official said.

American officers have long worried that rampant corruption, well documented in parts of Afghanistan’s military and political leadership, would undermine the resolve of badly paid, ill-fed and erratically supplied front-line soldiers – some of whom have been left for months or even years on end in isolated outposts, where they could be picked off by the Taliban.

Over many years, hundreds of Afghan soldiers were killed each month. But the army fought on, without any of the airborne evacuation of casualties and expert surgical care standard in Western armies, as long as international backing was there. Once that went, their resolve evaporated.

“Would you give your life for leaders who don’t pay you on time and are more interested in their own future?” a second U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, asked.

It is an analysis shared by some in the Taliban movement itself.

One Taliban commander in the central province of Ghazni said the government forces’ collapse started as soon as U.S. forces started withdrawing “as they didn’t have any ideology except fleecing the Americans.”

“The only reason for this unexpected fall of provinces was our commitment and the withdrawal of U.S. troops,” he said.

‘REALISTIC’

The defeat highlights the failure of the United States to create a fighting force in the image of its own highly professional military with a motivated, well-trained leadership, high-tech weaponry and seamless logistical support.

On paper, Afghan security forces numbered around 300,000 soldiers. In reality, the numbers were never that high.

Dependent on a small number of elite Special Forces units that were shunted from province to province as more cities fell to the Taliban, the already high rate of desertion in the regular army soared.

As government forces started to fall apart, hastily recruited local militias, loyal to prominent regional leaders such as Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum in the northern province of Faryab or Ismail Khan in Herat, also rushed in to fight.

Western countries had long been wary of such militias. Though more in line with the realities of traditional Afghan politics where personal, local or ethnic ties outweigh loyalty to the state, they were also open to corruption and abuse and ultimately proved no more effective than conventional forces.

Dostum fled to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced and Khan surrendered to the insurgents.

But whether it was ever a realistic goal to create a Western-style army in one of the world’s poorest countries, with a literacy rate of 40% and a social and political culture far from the developed sense of nationhood underpinning the U.S. military, is an open question.

U.S. army trainers who worked with Afghan forces struggled to teach the basic lesson of military organization that supplies, maintaining equipment and ensuring units get proper support are key to battlefield success.

Jonathan Schroden, an expert at the CNA policy institute, who served as an advisor to U.S. central command CENTCOM and the U.S.-led international force in Afghanistan, said the Afghan army functioned as much as a “jobs program” as a fighting force “because it’s the source of a paycheck in a country where paychecks are hard to come by.”

But the chronic failure of logistical, hardware and manpower support to many units, meant that “even if they want to fight, they run out of the ability to fight in relatively short order.”

Afghan forces have been forced repeatedly to give up after pleas for supplies and reinforcements went unanswered, either because of incompetence or the simple incapacity of the system to deliver.

Even the elite Special Forces units that have borne the brunt of the fighting in recent years have suffered. Last month, at least a dozen commandos were executed by Taliban fighters in the northern province of Faryab after running out of ammunition and being forced to surrender.

Richard Armitage, the former U.S. diplomat who organized a flotilla of South Vietnamese Navy ships to carry some 30,000 refugees out of Saigon before it fell in April 1975, has watched as the threat of a similar disaster unfolds in Kabul.

As deputy Secretary of State under former President George W. Bush when the United States invaded in 2001, he was deeply involved in Afghanistan diplomacy. He said the Afghan army’s collapse pointed to the wider failures of two decades of international efforts.

“I hear people expressing frustration in the press that the Afghan army can’t fight a long fight,” he said. “I can assure you the Afghan army has fought, can fight and if it’s got a trigger and something comes out of the barrel, they can use it.”

“The question is, is this government worth fighting for?” he said.

Pubblicato in: Economia e Produzione Industriale, Geopolitica Asiatica, Materie Prime, Problemia Energetici

Indonesia. Carbone. Dice di volerlo dismettere e costruisce nuove centrali termiche.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-07-08.

2021-07-08__ Indonesia Coal 001

Una buona parola amicale costa nulla, poi, si vedrà.

L’enclave liberal socialista occidentale ha dichiarato guerra al carbone e vorrebbe che tutto il mondo lo seguisse.

L’Indonesia a  parole va dicendo che entro il 2050 sarà totalmente green, ma per l’intanto costruisce numerose centrali a carbone per incrementare la propria produzione di corrente elettrica.

L’importante nella vita è essere persone pratiche.

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«The electricity generation capacity in Indonesia reached about 69.6 gigawatts in 2019»

«this capacity would not be sufficient for long and additional capacities must be created quickly»

«electricity consumption will increase from the current 270 terawatt hours to over 500 terawatt hours by 2027»

«Indonesia had been relying largely on coal and gas to meet its electricity demands»

«Both raw materials are available in great quantities, are dispatchable, and the corresponding power plants can be built cheaply»

«In 2020, coal mines were obliged to sell 25 percent of the production volume on the domestic market»

«the state-owned electricity supplier PLN received a maximum price of 70 U.S. dollars per ton of coal purchased»

«the minimum target of 550 million metric tons has been met and the demand for coal is expected to rise again due to a cold winter in China and the Chinese ban on Australian coal»

«At the same time, it’s building 21 GW of new coal plants that will have an operating life until 2065»

* * *

«Indonesia set its coal benchmark price higher in July at $115.35 per tonne»

«The price is 14.97% higher than June’s benchmark price»

«Indonesia’s state-owned utility says it will start shutting down coal-fired power plants and phase them all out by 2055»

«At the same time, it’s building 21 GW of new coal plants that will have an operating life until 2065»

«Indonesia says it will begin retiring coal-fired power plants for good — while still continuing to build more than a hundred new ones»

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Indonesia sets coal benchmark price at highest in a decade

Jakarta, July 5 (Reuters) – Indonesia set its coal benchmark price higher in July at $115.35 per tonne, an official document published by its energy and minerals ministry showed on Monday.

The price is 14.97% higher than June’s benchmark price and the highest since the $117.6 per tonne in May 2011, Refinitiv data showed.

The document did not show what accounted for the price jump. An energy ministry spokesman told Reuters that a statement will be issued later on Monday.

*

Indonesia to retire coal-fired power plants while also adding more

«Summary.

– Indonesia’s state-owned utility says it will start shutting down coal-fired power plants and phase them all out by 2055, amounting to 50 gigawatts of capacity.

– At the same time, it’s building 21 GW of new coal plants that will have an operating life until 2065 — a contradiction that activists say undermines the coal phase-out plan.

– The mixed message is the latest from a government that still doesn’t have a unified policy on a clean energy transition, and which continues to lavish generous subsidies and incentives on coal miners and power plant operators.

– Energy policy experts say the president needs to publicly weigh in on the issue, including declaring a deadline for Indonesia to achieve net-zero carbon emissions. ….

Indonesia says it will begin retiring coal-fired power plants for good — while still continuing to build more than a hundred new ones, in the latest mixed message from one of the last coal-friendly countries in the world»

* * *

Coal power industry in Indonesia – statistics & facts

The electricity generation capacity in Indonesia reached about 69.6 gigawatts in 2019. For a dynamic, emerging country, this capacity would not be sufficient for long and additional capacities must be created quickly. According to forecasts by the Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, electricity consumption will increase from the current 270 terawatt hours to over 500 terawatt hours by 2027.

                         Indonesia’s focus on natural resources.

Indonesia had been relying largely on coal and gas to meet its electricity demands. Both raw materials are available in great quantities, are dispatchable, and the corresponding power plants can be built cheaply. Furthermore, coal in particular can be used to promote Indonesia’s export business and support remote areas in their economic development. Coal mining has therefore been a cornerstone of politics and a likely target for government interventions. In 2020, coal mines were obliged to sell 25 percent of the production volume on the domestic market and the state-owned electricity supplier PLN received a maximum price of 70 U.S. dollars per ton of coal purchased.

                         Coal production outlook.

Not surprisingly, coal producers expected a thriving market in Indonesia. However, the coal industry has also been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and it is therefore unlikely that the coal output will have increased further in 2020. And yet, according to the Department of Energy, the minimum target of 550 million metric tons has been met and the demand for coal is expected to rise again due to a cold winter in China and the Chinese ban on Australian coal. A flourishing export market is important as around 70 to 75 percent of Indonesia’s coal production is exported abroad. The main export countries include China, India, Japan and South Korea. In 2018, about one third of the global coal exports was exported from Indonesia, making it the largest coal exporting country in world. However, the Indonesian energy program could turn the industry into an internal market. For that reason, and to achieve independence from the global market, several large Indonesian mining companies have expanded directly into the energy sector in order to become an integrated energy company that uses its own coal.

                         Coal’s impact on the environment.

On the other hand, the production of coal and especially electricity generation from coal does have an impact on the environment. Back in 2016, it was estimated that the emissions of carbon dioxide amounted to 4.6 billion metric tons in Southeast Asia. Taking current developments in Indonesia and other countries into account, not less, but more is to be expected.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Diplomazia, Geopolitica Asiatica

Giappone. L’occidente liberal si frantuma sul Myanmar.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-05-28.

2021-05-20__ G7 GDP (Statista) 001

«Japan should play a bridging role to Myanmar’s junta rather than following the Western policy of regime change»

«Japan must position itself as a bridge between the Tatmadaw and the United States and other democratic countries rather than blindly aligning itself with the Western policy of regime change»

«Japan must position itself as a bridge between the Tatmadaw and the United States and other democratic countries rather than blindly aligning itself with the Western policy of regime change»

«Myanmar’s huge development project of Thilawa Special Economic Zone development»

«Japan, a major aid donor with long ties to Myanmar, has not placed explicit sanctions against the Myanmar military, unlike other nations such as the United States and Britain.»

«The Japanese government did halt negotiations on new aid to Myanmar, but not existing aid projects»

«Leveraging its decades-long economic cooperation, Japan can now directly work with the Tatmadaw to reverse China’s geoeconomic influence»

«Any drastic move to cut ties with Myanmar’s military could result in China winning more influence»

«Chinese investment in Myanmar has surged in recent years, driven by Beijing’s “Belt and Road” infrastructure plan»

«Japan must realise its historic mission of guiding Myanmar’s military government in service of a free and open Indo-Pacific and remain unafraid even if its actions diverge from those of the U.S. and other democratic allies»

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Il problema è dannatamente semplice.

I liberal degli stati occidentali ed occidentalizzati si credono investiti della missione di imporre la loro ideologia ad un mondo che proprio non ne vuole sapere. Reputano di essere i depositari della verità assoluta.

Solo che in altri tempi riassumevano gran parte del pil mondiale e dettavano legge, mentre ad oggi ne costituiscono poco più di un terzo: troppo poco per potersi imporre con lo strumento economico.

Non solo.

I liberal socialisti sono in declino ed il loro sistema economico sta devolvendosi, mentre quello dei paesi eurasiatici è in forte crescita, attirando investitori ed investimenti occidentali.

Cina. 2020. Investimenti esteri +81% YoY. Superano quelli negli Usa.

Foreign investment in China up 81 pct in 2020.

Cina. Abolite le restrizioni agli investimenti esteri nel settore energetico.

BlackRock anticipa l’apertura cinese alla finanza occidentale. 3.4 trilioni in tre anni.

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Giappone. Aprile21. Export +38.0%, Import +12.8%, aprile21 su aprile20.

Il Giappone esporta negli Usa per 1,276.134 milioni di Yen, mentre l’Asia raccoglie 4,156.211 milioni di Yen di esportazioni. L’Asia conta quindi poco meno di quattro volte gli Usa.

La scelta di campo sta diventando obbligatoria.

Però questa presa di posizione del Giappone rompe drammaticamente quello che una volta era il bastione dei G7, spezzando la unità di intenti del fronte liberal. E la riunione del G7 è imminente.

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Japan should not follow the Western policy on Myanmar – Diplomat op-ed

Japan should play a bridging role to Myanmar’s junta rather than following the Western policy of regime change, said a senior official at the Japan-Myanmar Association, which has strong ties with Myanmar’s military.

“I argue that Japan must position itself as a bridge between the Tatmadaw and the United States and other democratic countries rather than blindly aligning itself with the Western policy of regime change,” Yusuke Watanabe, the association’s secretary general, said in an opinion piece for the Diplomat magazine.

The Japan-Myanmar Association is a private group Yusuke Watanabe’s father and politician Hideo Watanabe launched to rally support for the wave of Japan’s investment in the Southeast Asian country. The association includes retired government bureaucrats and business executives and members of big Japanese companies.

A former cabinet minister Hideo Watanabe has long been Tokyo’s point man for economic relations, backing Myanmar’s huge development project of Thilawa Special Economic Zone development, and has a long track record of working closely with the junta, including junta leader Min Aung Hlaing.

Myanmar’s military overthrew the elected government on Feb. 1, citing alleged fraud in an election three months earlier, and has since waged a deadly crackdown which has killed hundreds and displaced tens of thousands of people.

Japan, a major aid donor with long ties to Myanmar, has not placed explicit sanctions against the Myanmar military, unlike other nations such as the United States and Britain.

The Japanese government did halt negotiations on new aid to Myanmar, but not existing aid projects.

“Leveraging its decades-long economic cooperation, Japan can now directly work with the Tatmadaw to reverse China’s geoeconomic influence,” Watanabe added, also warning of Russia’s growing influence in Myanmar.

Any drastic move to cut ties with Myanmar’s military could result in China winning more influence, a senior Japanese official told Reuters in February after the coup. read more

Chinese investment in Myanmar has surged in recent years, driven by Beijing’s “Belt and Road” infrastructure plan.

“Japan must realise its historic mission of guiding Myanmar’s military government in service of a free and open Indo-Pacific and remain unafraid even if its actions diverge from those of the U.S. and other democratic allies,” Watanabe said.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica Asiatica

Cambogia. 2021. Pil anno su anno stimato al 7.1%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-05-08.

Cambogia 004

La Cambogia è un paese misero, che però aveva raddoppiato il proprio pil nel volgere di dieci anni.

La crisi pandemica ha di fatto bloccato il turismo e gran parte delle attività industriali ed agricole.

Adesso si iniziano a vedere i primi segni di una ripresa.

2021-05-01__ Cambogia 001

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2021-05-01__ Cambogia 002

«Cambodia’s economy is forecast to grow 4 percent in 2021 and 5.5 percent in 2022»

«ADB [Asian Development Bank] said the Southeast Asian nation’s economy contracted by 3.1 percent in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic»

«industrial production is expected to rise 7.1 percent in 2021 and 7 percent in 2022»

«Agriculture is expected to grow by 1.3 percent in 2021»

«Services will recover more slowly, expanding by 3.3 percent in 2021 and 6.2 percent in 2022»

2021-05-01__ Cambogia 004

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ADB says Cambodia’s economy to rebound by 4 pct in 2021, higher next year.

Phnom Penh, April 29 (Xinhua) — Cambodia’s economy is forecast to grow 4 percent in 2021 and 5.5 percent in 2022, as the economic recovery in its major trading partners boosts demand for the kingdom’s exports, an Asian Development Bank (ADB) report has said.

ADB country director for Cambodia Sunniya Durrani-Jamal said the Southeast Asian nation’s economy contracted by 3.1 percent in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

“The government has responded quickly to the recent spike in cases, and we expect the economy to return to growth in 2021,” she said in a press statement on Wednesday.

“This will help increase household incomes, but not all sectors and regions will benefit equally, so it will be essential to closely monitor household welfare and the need for additional support,” she added.

According to the bank’s report, industrial production is expected to rise 7.1 percent in 2021 and 7 percent in 2022 on the back of a rebound in the garments, footwear, and travel goods sector, as well as growth in other light manufacturing such as electronics and bicycles.

Agriculture is expected to grow by 1.3 percent in 2021 and 1.2 percent in 2022, underpinned by higher crop production after last year’s flood damage, continued growth in aquaculture, and rising agriculture exports to China, it said.

Services will recover more slowly, expanding by 3.3 percent in 2021 and 6.2 percent in 2022, the report said, adding that efforts to contain a local outbreak of COVID-19 that began on Feb. 20 are dampening service sector activities.

Travel restrictions are expected to remain in place for most of 2021, which means tourism is not expected to boost services this year, it said. Real estate is expected to recover from last year’s contraction, in line with a similar trend for the construction industry.

“The uneven pace of the recovery across sectors will continue to put pressure on some households and firms this year, which will slow down the overall recovery,” Durrani-Jamal said.

“Key risks to the outlook include widening community outbreaks of COVID-19, slower than expected growth for Cambodia’s major trading partners such as the United States and EU, continued weakness in domestic demand, and stress on financial services and banking,” she added. Enditem