«Singapore è una città-Stato del sud-est asiatico, situata sull’estrema punta meridionale della penisola malese, 152 km a nord dell’equatore. Si sviluppa su un arcipelago formato da circa 60 isole, la più grande e principale delle quali è l’isola di Singapore che ospita la metropoli. A nord Singapore è separata dalla Malaysia dallo Stretto di Johor, a sud è separata dalle indonesiane isole Riau dallo Stretto di Singapore.
La città-Stato è il quarto principale centro finanziario del mondo ed è una delle principali città cosmopolite del globo, con un importante ruolo nel commercio internazionale e nella finanza. Il suo porto è tra i primi cinque per attività e traffico su scala mondiale. ….
Il 42% della popolazione è straniero, qui presente per lavoro o studio. I lavoratori stranieri costituiscono il 50% del settore dei servizi» [Fonte]
Il pil nominale 2018 ammontava a 361.109 miliardi Usd, mentre il pil ppa procapite era 100,344 Usd.
Dal gennaio 2019 la produzione industriale è in continua contrazione e si assesta a -8.0% anno su anno.
Le Filippine sono uno stato ancora in fascia povertà, ma che sta emergendo con un ritmo di crescita davvero sorprendente.
Se il pil ammontava a 76.262 miliardi Usd nel 2001, a fine 2018 era salito a 330.846 miliardi Usd: era salito 4.34 volte nel breve volgere di diciotto anni.
Similmente è salito il pil procapite, da 970 Usd a 3,102 Usd procapite. Si noti però come il pil ppa procapite sia 8,229 Usd.
Moody’s assegna alle Filippine un rating di Baa2, S&P di BBB+ e Ficht di BBB.
Per comparazione, questi sono i rating dell’Italia: Baa3, BBB, e BBB, rispettivamente.
* * * * * * *
Un aspetto di tale crescita che lascia sconcertati i cultori delle moderne teorie economiche è che un simile risultato è stato ottenuto non solo senza innalzare il debito pubblico, bensì riducendolo dal 61.55% al 39.92%.
Eppure le Filippine si sviluppano al ritmo medio superiore al 6% annuo, e questo risutlato è stato raggiunto senza la necessità che lo stato ‘stimolasse’ il sistema economico.
È bastato soltanto che Mr Duterte avesse riportato un po’ di legalità, ordine e disciplina, e cordiali rapporti con i vicini:
«on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit»
In fondo basta ben poco: solo un po’ di buona volontà.
«Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said Friday that the common interests between China and the Philippines far outweigh the differences in his meeting with visiting Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte.
Li said that China is willing to cooperate with the Philippines on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, and seek better synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Philippines’ “Build, Build, Build” program, so as to promote sustained, stable and healthy development of bilateral relations and cooperation.
Li said that the current situation in the South China Sea is generally stable and the countries in the region are living in peace.
China always acts with the greatest sincerity and is willing to work together with the Philippines and ASEAN countries to achieve the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea in the period when the Philippines serves as a coordinating country for China-ASEAN relations, said Li.
Li also expected joint efforts to promote offshore oil and gas development, and safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea and the region.»
«Gross Domestic Product of Philippines grew 6.2% in 2018 compared to last year. This rate is 5 -tenths of one percent less than the figure of 6.7% published in 2017.
The GDP figure in 2018 was $330,846 million, Philippines is number 39 in the ranking of GDP of the 196 countries that we publish. The absolute value of GDP in Philippines rose $17,251 million with respect to 2017.
The GDP per capita of Philippines in 2018 was $3,102, $113 less than in 2017, when it was $2,989. To view the evolution of the GDP per capita, it is interesting to look back a few years and compare these data with those of 2008 when the GDP per capita in Philippines was $1,941.
If we order the countries according to their GDP per capita, Philippines is in 132th position, its population has a low level of affluence compare to the 196 countries whose GDP we publish.
Here we show you the progression of the GDP in Philippines. You can see GDP in other countries in GDP and see all the economic information about Philippines in Philippines’s economy.»
«The national debt increased in Philippines
In 2017 Philippines public debt was 125,240 million dollars, has increased 6,223 million since 2016.
This amount means that the debt in 2017 reached 39.92% of Philippines GDP, a 0.89 percentage point rise from 2016, when it was 39.03% of GDP.
If we check the tables we can see the evolution of Philippines debt. It has risen since 2007 in global debt terms, when it was 78,244 million dollars although it has fallen as a percentage of GDP, when it amounted to 52.39%.
According to the last data point published, Philippines per capita debt in 2017 was 1,194 dollars per inhabitant. In 2016 it was 1,153 dollars, afterwards rising by 41 dollars, and if we again check 2007 we can see that then the debt per person was 882 dollars .
The position of Philippines, as compared with the rest of the world, has worsened in 2017 in terms of GDP percentage. Currently it is country number 66 in the list of debt to GDP and 63 in debt per capita, out of the 186 we publish.
In this page we show you the progression of the public debt in Philippines. You can see debt in other countries in Public debt and see all the information about Philippines in economy of Philippines.»
Chiunque abbia un qualche rudimento di storia dovrebbe aver ben presente la peste antonina, che dal 160 al 180 quasi dimezzò la popolazione dell’impero romano, dando la stura al suo declino: senza persone non esiste impero che tenga.
L’imperatore Marco Aurelio ebbe a dire che “la pestilenza attorno a lui era meno letale della menzogna, del comportamento maligno e della mancanza di vera comprensione“, ma sul letto di morte sentenziò: “Perché piangete voi per me, e non pensate piuttosto alla pestilenza ed alla morte comune?“
La denatalità è diventata in poco meno di tre decenni quello che Elon Musk ed il fondatore di Alibaba Jack Ma hanno definito essere una ‘crisi umanitaria’.
«”Most people think we have too many people on the planet, but actually, this is an outdated view,” Musk said on a panel with Ma in Shanghai in August. “I think that the biggest problem the world will face in 20 years is population collapse — not explosion, collapse.” …. The speed of population decreasing is going to speed up. Now you called it a collapse. I agree with that,” Ma said.».
Mentre la peste antonina colpiva la gente indipendentemente dall’età, causando quindi un decremento bilanciato tra le classi di età, la denatalità riduce la numerosità della popolazione falcidiando il numero dei giovani, da cui in breve perdita della numerosità della forza lavoro, non più in grado di accudire e mantenere gli anziani. Questo sarà il dramma nel dramma.
«These dire projections are shared by demographers who argue that the world’s population will virtually stop growing by the end of this century, due in large part to falling global fertility rates.»
«For three decades, China operated the “one-child” policy of population control. This was abandoned in 2016 in favor of a two-child policy to boost the labor force.»
«But average fertility rates keep falling, even as restrictions are lifted.»
«In 2016, after the one-child policy was abandoned, there were 17.86 million births. This dropped to 17.2 million in 2017 and 15.2 million in 2018 – the third-lowest rate since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.»
«Much of China’s astonishing economic growth of the past four decades has been fueled by a young labor force, but this too is in rapid decline, while the elderly population is dramatically increasing.»
«In China in 2017, the ratio was six workers in the 20-64 age bracket supporting one senior citizen at least 65 years old. This will decline to 2.0 workers in 2039 and 1.6 in 2050.»
«No social security net, no family security and a pension crisis — this will evolve into a humanitarian catastrophe. As women …. will be the main victims of population control»
«Average fertility rates in Taiwan and Hong Kong from 2001 to 2018 were 1.14 and 1.07 respectively. These areas all fall within China’s cultural sphere.»
* * * * * * *
Su questo settore si assiste ad un crescendo di pubblicazioni.
«Business leaders and analysts see the global population declining in the next century, and China will be badly affected. The Asian nation is well-advised to make precautions soon to avoid a humanitarian crisis»
«Childless employees under the age of 40 could pay a percentage of their wages into a fund for newborn babies. If they were to have two children, they would be entitled to parental benefits; should they have just one child, they would be entitled to a refund of their contributions only after reaching the legal retirement age»
«Seven million people will soon be getting a pension from their companies and the state. But half of Japan’s retired generation has to survive on the state pension alone — an average of 2.7 million yen, or 15,000 euros a year. ….
The figures such as the gross domestic product show that Japan is a rich country. But not everybody shares these riches. The older the people get the bigger the differences between the poor and the rich become, between those people who were able to save and those who needed the money to live. That means that there are poor people who have to work their whole life regardless of their age»
«The head of the International Monetary Fund has praised Asian nations for their efforts toward economic expansion and poverty reduction. But she warned that an increasingly aging population might become a huge obstacle.»
Una delle tristi eredità dell’ideologia libera socialista è il considerare la persona umana come un mero strumento economico. È un classico errore logico, ove una verità parziale è assunta come se fosseverità generale.
L’essere umano ha sicuramente anche una sua dimensione economica, ma questa non estingue la globalità della persona: esiste la mente, il sentimento, la volontà, il libero arbitrio.
Non solo. Esistono sicuramente dei diritti, ma questi corrispondono e traggono origine da ben precisi doveri. Non esisteono diritti senza i relativi doveri.
Nell’aderire ad una Collettività, la persona ne ricava alcuni diritti, per esempio, quello di essere tutelato nella sua esistenza fisica, ma nel contempo si carica di oneri e doveri.
Per sussistere, per continuare a vivere, la Collettività ha bisogno che siano generati costantemente nuovi membri: in caso contrario si destina alla estinzione. Ma scopo primario di una persona incardinata in una Collettività è quello di mantenerla in vita: quindi, di figliare.
Il fatto, possibile, che una persona sterile abbia generato ricchezze in nulla concorre a mantenere in vita la Collettività: senza nascite, questa può solo morire, anche se fosse straricca.
Sorge poi il problema del perché un giovane dovrebbe farsi carico di vecchi che non hanno figliato e che non siano suoi parenti: ne ha già più che a sufficienza di dover pensare ai suoi, sempre poi che lo voglia fare.
Nei fatti, il problema della procreazione è pertinente più la Weltanschauung che l’economia. Ma una vera politica familiare si contraddistingue non tanto dalle facilitazioni economiche, quanto piuttosto dall’aver strutturato l’istituto familiare in modo robusto, ponendo seri limiti alla sua disgregazione. Poi, che dire? La politica della regolazione delle nascite, anticoncezionali ed aborto, sono proprio l’opposto di ciò che serve a ristabilire gli equilibri generazionali.
Se è ragionevole che dei genitori ambiscano a dare ai figli quanto meglio possano, sarebbe altrettanto ragionevole constatare che mica tutti siano tenuti a frequentare la Yale University, andare a lezione di flauto trasverso, oppure fare le ferie girando il mondo. Si potrebbe benissimo vivere da persone normali.
Da ultimo, ma non certo per ultimo, l’ideologia liberal socialista individua nella religione un nemico mortale. Ma senza religione viene a mancare la visione del trascendente e, con essa, la speranza. È una cultura dell’immanente, priva di visione futura, che trova nel suicidio l’unico sbocco coerente.
Nel 2001 l’Indonesia aveva un pil di 174.507 miliardi Usd ed un pil procapite di 834 Usd.
A fine 2018 il pil era salito a 1,022.450 miliardi ed il pil procapite si attestava a 3,871 Usd.
In diciotto anni il pil è cresciuto di un po’ più di cinque volte: un risultato di tutto rilievo.
Adesso inizia ad ambire a qualcosa ancora di meglio.
«Indonesia is the largest nickel ore producer in the world, followed by the Philippines.»
«Indonesia has brought forward a nickel ore export ban by two years and will stop delivering low-grade ore from January 2020.»
«Under the new policy, ore containing less than 17pc nickel will not be allowed to be exported from 1 January next year»
«the three-month nickel contract traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME) surged to $17,800/t on 30 August, gaining $1,525/t on the day, and up by $5,680/t or 47pc since the beginning of July. The three-month nickel price is at its highest since 18 September 2014»
«The export ban was initially planned to take effect from 2022 but the Indonesian government has changed its plans after months of discussions, to speed up the development of the domestic nickel refining and smelting industry»
«In the past few years, Indonesia has implemented policies to encourage the development of value-added refining industries in the country, which would generate more income than ore exports»
«According to the ministry, 11 nickel smelters have been built and 25 are under construction.»
«The policy also aims to preserve existing proven nickel ore reserves, estimated at 698mn t, which will only meet demand for seven years if no new reserves are found»
«As the Chinese stainless steel industry relies heavily on Indonesia’s nickel ore as feedstock to produce nickel pig iron (NPI), the ban will have a severe impact on NPI supply in China.»
«Indonesia exported 20.72mn t of nickel ore and ferro-nickel last year. The majority of this, 19.9mn t, was delivered to China to feed the country’s stainless steel industry, trade data show.»
Gli impianti di raffinazione del nickel sono costosi e complessi, ma è del tutto ragionevole che l’Indonesia ambisca di incrementare il numero di quelli già esistenti sul suo territorio. L’export dei lingotti è infatti molto meno oneroso rispetto al minerale grezzo e la tecnologia resta in patria. Poi, così facendo, si installa un’industria produttiva e si generano posti di lavoro a grado di qualificazione medio – alto.
Certo, i cinesi dovranno fare buona faccia a cattiva sorte.
Indonesia has brought forward a nickel ore export ban by two years and will stop delivering low-grade ore from January 2020, the ministry of energy and mineral resources said today.
Under the new policy, ore containing less than 17pc nickel will not be allowed to be exported from 1 January next year.
“We have signed the regulation, which is essentially about terminating nickel export incentives for smelter builders as of 1 January 2020,” director-general Bambang Gatot Ariyono said.
Ahead of the announcement on the ministry website this morning, the three-month nickel contract traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME) surged to $17,800/t on 30 August, gaining $1,525/t on the day, and up by $5,680/t or 47pc since the beginning of July. The three-month nickel price is at its highest since 18 September 2014.
The export ban was initially planned to take effect from 2022 but the Indonesian government has changed its plans after months of discussions, to speed up the development of the domestic nickel refining and smelting industry.
In the past few years, Indonesia has implemented policies to encourage the development of value-added refining industries in the country, which would generate more income than ore exports.
According to the ministry, 11 nickel smelters have been built and 25 are under construction.
The policy also aims to preserve existing proven nickel ore reserves, estimated at 698mn t, which will only meet demand for seven years if no new reserves are found.
As the Chinese stainless steel industry relies heavily on Indonesia’s nickel ore as feedstock to produce nickel pig iron (NPI), the ban will have a severe impact on NPI supply in China.
Indonesia is the largest nickel ore producer in the world, followed by the Philippines. Indonesia exported 20.72mn t of nickel ore and ferro-nickel last year. The majority of this, 19.9mn t, was delivered to China to feed the country’s stainless steel industry, trade data show.
But some Chinese stainless steel producers have already set up operations in Indonesia.
Integrated Chinese-owned stainless steel producer Tsingshan operates a 3mn t/yr mill in Indonesia and also owns nickel and chrome mines in the country.
And Chinese producer Delong Holdings’ Indonesian joint venture Dexin Steel was due to become operational this year.
Nickel is one of the key materials in stainless steel production and the industry accounts for about 70pc of global nickel consumption. It is also increasingly important for the battery industry as nickel is a key component in lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles.
«GDP rises 2% in Indonesia in second quarter
Gross Domestic Product of Indonesia grew 1.3% in the first quarter of 2019 compared to the previous quarter. This rate is 1 -tenth of one percent higher than the figure of 1.2% published in the forth quarter of 2018.
The year-on-year change in GDP was 5.1%,,there is no change since last quarter. less than the 5.1% recorded in the first quarter of 2019.
The GDP figure in the first quarter of 2019 was $211,568 million, Indonesia is number 15 in the ranking of quarterly GDP of the 50 countries that we publish.
Indonesia has a quarterly GDP per capita, of $910, $88 higher than the same quarter last year, it was. If we order the countries according to their GDP per capita, Indonesia is in 49th position. According to this parameter, its population has a low level of affluence compare to the 50 countries whose quarterly GDP we publish.
Here we show you the progression of the GDP in Indonesia. You can see GDP in other countries in GDP and see all the economic information about Indonesia in Indonesia’s economy.»
Ci si sarebbe stupiti fortemente se la guerra valutaria e commerciale in corso tra Stati Uniti e Cina non avesse coinvolto anche tutte le altre nazioni, specie quelle dell’Unione Europea e del sud – est asiatico.
Sulla attuale situazione proprio nel sud – est asiatico la Bbc ha pubblicato un interessante report che riportiamo in calce, senza le figure che avrebbero occupato troppo spazio.
Nel novero, però, la situazione della South Korea sembrerebbe essere una delle più colpite.
«Concerns swirled earlier this year that South Korea could slip into recession. But it managed to avoid that outcome after huge government spending helped the economy swing back to growth in the second quarter.
Gross domestic product grew 1.1% in the three months to June compared with the previous quarter, when South Korea posted its sharpest contraction since the global financial crisis. In July, the country’s central bank cut rates for the first time in three years.
Much of the pain has been caused by faltering tech exports, driven by the global electronics slowdown. That trade is crucial to South Korea, since electronics account for around 30% of the country’s exports. A simmering trade battle with Japan is adding more uncertainty to South Korea’s growth prospects.»
Uno dei problemi della South Korea è legato al fatto che
«the global electronics slowdown»
«electronics account for around 30% of the country’s exports»
Ciò che un anno fa sarebbe stato considerato una eresia economica si è puntualmente verificato: il mercato dell’elettronica inizia a contrarsi, ma questo settore reggeva oltre il 30% dell’export della South Korea.
A ciò si aggiungano i danni del duello in atto con il Giappone.
«A trade spat between Japan and South Korea threatens to spill beyond their borders, posing potential risks to consumer electronics supplies around the world.
The row stems from export restrictions Tokyo imposed on certain industrial materials that Seoul needs to make semiconductors and display screens.
Japan has also warned tougher trade curbs could be on the way.
The moves have drawn anger from South Korea, and earlier this month President Moon Jae-in described the situation as an “unprecedented emergency” for his country’s economy.
On Tuesday, officials from Seoul will bring the dispute to a meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) General Council.
They hope to convince the international community that Japan has violated global trading rules, and the measures should be rescinded.
The simmering dispute is seen as the latest example of countries using trade as a weapon in diplomatic battles.
“There’s blame to be had on both sides,”»
* * *
Il punto è semplice:
«export restrictions Tokyo imposed on certain industrial materials that Seoul needs to make semiconductors and display screens».
Il sistema economico sudkoreano ha montato una serie di produzioni che dipendono nei fatti dalla possibilità di importare materia prima ovvero semilavorata, esponendosi così a dipendere dai fornitori di quei beni ed agli umori degli acquirenti.
La cosa in sé non sarebbe negativa, se però l’espansione del settore fossa stata tenuta meglio sotto controllo: un settore così dipendente dall’estero avrebbe dovuto essere bilanciato tramite una ampia diversificazione.
Adesso sono oltre sei mesi che l’export della South Korea scende mese dopo mese con variazioni yoy negative a due cifre percentuali.
Questa è una situazione non sostenibile nel tempo.
Rising fears about the health of the global economy have prompted talk of recession, spreading anxiety about jobs and growth.
The US-China trade war is casting a shadow over the world economy and warning signs of a looming downturn have flashed on financial markets.
Recession poses no immediate threat to the biggest economies in Asia, although they are slowing down. Yet some smaller economies in the region – including Hong Kong and Singapore – are definitely at risk.
They are what Louis Kuijs, head of Asia economics at Oxford Economics, calls the “innocent bystanders” in the trade fight between Washington and Beijing.
“These are small, open economies, where trade – and trade with China – is extremely important,” says Mr Kuijs.
Here’s a look at what’s driving the slowdown in Asia’s top economies, as well as the countries at risk of recession:
Growth in the world’s second-largest economy has been for easing for years. The latest figures show China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew 6.2% in the second quarter, its slowest pace since the early 1990s.
The trade war that has seen Washington impose tariffs on billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese goods is adding more strain.
It has hurt some Chinese firms, with roughly 20% of the country’s exports sent to the US. But perhaps more harmful to businesses is the lack of clarity over when the long-running dispute will end.
“The one thing that is affecting business plans is the uncertainty of the US-China trade war, probably more important than the tariffs,” says Mr Kuijs.
“The uncertainty is a major factor of [the concerns] we see globally.”
Beijing has taken a series of steps this year to support the economy, including tax cuts and infrastructure spending. For 2019, the government is targeting growth of between 6% and 6.5%.
Mr Kuijs points out that what happens to China matters a lot to the rest of Asia.
The slowdown there and the trade war have knocked business confidence in Japan, a country also grappling with softer global demand for its exports, such as electronic equipment and car parts.
But its latest economic figures were fairly upbeat. Preliminary data showed GDP increased 0.4% in the second quarter – beating an expected 0.1% rise – thanks to strong consumer spending.
Still, the world’s third-largest economy faces a threat to spending when a long-awaited sales tax increase is introduced in October.
“Conditions probably won’t remain as healthy as they are now, as domestic demand is set to weaken after the tax hike,” Capital Economics Japan economist Marcel Thieliant says.
Over in Asia’s third-largest economy, growth has faltered amid sluggish demand at home and weak investment. India’s latest quarterly GDP growth dropped to a five-year low of 5.8%. The next GDP reading, due 30 August, could be weaker still.
The country has relied on domestic consumption to spur its huge economy, but spending has slowed sharply.
Car sales are one troubling example. In July, passenger vehicle sales plunged 31%, the steepest monthly fall in nearly two decades. The sector has slashed jobs and cut production as sales dry up.
Economists at DBS and Capital Economics are among those expecting that third-quarter numbers, due out in November, will show Hong Kong has fallen into a technical recession, defined as two consecutive quarters of negative growth.
The trade-dependent city state has been hit by weak global demand, slowing growth in China and the trade war.
Singapore is reliant on high-tech exports – and softer demand for electronics around the world has darkened its economic outlook.
The economy shrank by 3.3% in the second quarter, on a seasonally adjusted annualised basis. That prompted the government to cut its growth forecasts for 2019 to between 0% and 1%.
Oxford Economics expects that third-quarter GDP numbers, due in October, will show a contraction, meaning that Singapore will enter a technical recession.
Mr Kuijs says the impact of the trade war on Hong Kong and Singapore is “larger than in China itself, even though no one is imposing any tariffs on these countries”.
Concerns swirled earlier this year that South Korea could slip into recession. But it managed to avoid that outcome after huge government spending helped the economy swing back to growth in the second quarter.
Gross domestic product grew 1.1% in the three months to June compared with the previous quarter, when South Korea posted its sharpest contraction since the global financial crisis. In July, the country’s central bank cut rates for the first time in three years.
Much of the pain has been caused by faltering tech exports, driven by the global electronics slowdown. That trade is crucial to South Korea, since electronics account for around 30% of the country’s exports. A simmering trade battle with Japan is adding more uncertainty to South Korea’s growth prospects.
Nel breve volgere di pochi anni la Cina ha costruito una serie di isole artificiali nel Mare Cinese del Sud. Adesso sta completando il loro armamento: dai supporti logistici aeroportuali, ai sistemi missilistici antiaerei ed antinave, missili da crociera ed aerei da guerra.
«The J-10 jets have a combat range of about 500 miles (740 kilometers), putting much of the South China Sea and vital shipping lands within reach»
La loro utilità dipende strettamente dalla tipologia del conflitto configurabile.
Nel corso di una guerra nucleare, essendo obiettivi fissi, sarebbero facilmente distrutti anche solo con il lancio di una testata nucleare balistica. Ma, ovviamente, una situazione di questo tipo vedrebbe coinvolte tutte le realtà militari in una reciproca distruzione.
Diversa la situazione nel caso di un problema militare locoregionale. Sicuramente una flotta allo stato dell’arte, quale quella americana, avrebbe la possibilità di penetrare il Mare Cinese del Sud, ma ciò avverrebbe pagando uno scotto severo. Se nel conflitto locale fosse invece coinvolta un’altra potenza locale, la supremazia cinese sarebbe schiacciante.
* * * * * * *
Una unica considerazione.
Anni fa, le isole artificiali non esistevano: adesso invece vi sono.
«China appears to be building reinforced aircraft hangars on reclaimed islands it controls in a disputed area of the South China Sea, according to a US think tank.
Satellite photographs taken in late July show the construction of hangars on Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief reefs in the Spratly chain of islands and some have already been completed, according to a report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
Although no military aircraft have been spotted, each of the three small islands would soon have enough hangar space for 24 fighter jets, plus three to four larger planes, the think tank said. …. The hangars, in three different sizes, could accommodate any plane used by China’s air force, the think tank said. …. These include the J-11 and Su-30 fighters, H-6 bombers, the H-6U refuelling tanker and the air force’s largest aircrafts –the Y-20 and Il-76 transport planes.»
«A satellite image obtained by CNN shows China has deployed at least four J-10 fighter jets to the contested Woody Island in the South China Sea, the first known deployment of fighter jets there since 2017.
The image was taken Wednesday and represents the first time J-10s have been seen on Woody or any Chinese-controlled islands in the South China Sea, according to ImageSat International, which supplied the image to CNN.
The deployment comes as tensions remain high in the South China Sea and Chinese President Xi Jinping prepares to meet United States President Donald Trump at the G-20 summit in Japan next week.
Analysts who looked at the satellite photo for CNN said both the placement of the planes out in the open and accompanying equipment is significant and indicates the fighter jets were on the contested island for up to 10 days.
“They want you to notice them. Otherwise they would be parked in the hangars,” said Peter Layton, a former Royal Australian Air Force officer and fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute. “What message do they want you to take from them?”
Carl Schuster, a former director of operations at the US Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center, said the deployment is designed to “demonstrate it is their territory and they can put military aircraft there whenever they want.”
“It also makes a statement that they can extend their air power reach over the South China Sea as required or desired,” Schuster said.
The J-10 jets have a combat range of about 500 miles (740 kilometers), putting much of the South China Sea and vital shipping lands within reach, Schuster said.
The four planes are not carrying external fuel tanks, the analysts said. That suggests they were to be refueled on the island, so the plan may be to keep them there awhile. ….
The Paracels sit in the north-central portion of the 1.3 million-square-mile South China Sea. They are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan, but have been occupied by China since 1974, when Chinese troops ousted a South Vietnamese garrison.
The past several years have seen Beijing substantially upgrade its facilities on the islands, deploying surface-to-air missiles, building 20 hangars at the airfield, upgrading two harbors and performing substantial land reclamation, according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.
Woody Island has served as a blueprint for Beijing’s more prominent island-building efforts in the Spratly chain to the south, AMTI said in a 2017 report.»
«China has deployed military aircraft to a third outpost in a disputed South China Sea island chain, a move which will alarm rivals who believe Beijing has ramped up its military presence in the region.
The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative published images showing a military aircraft, a Shaanxi Y-8, at Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands.
The plane was “designed as a military transport aircraft, but some variants are used for maritime patrol or signals intelligence,” said the think tank, which is part of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
The photographs reveal the first deployment of military aircraft on the island, which hosts one of three runways in the strategically important Spratlys. Military aircraft have now landed on all three of the airstrips, the AMTI said.
The organisation said that a naval patrol aircraft landed at Fiery Cross Reef two years ago, while two Xian Y-7 military transport aircraft were seen on Mischief Reef in January.»
«China has built some islands in the South China Sea. Can it protect them?
During World War II Japan found that control of islands offered some strategic advantages, but not enough to force the United States to reduce each island individually. Moreover, over time the islands became a strategic liability, as Japan struggled to keep them supplied with food, fuel and equipment. The islands of the SCS are conveniently located for China, but do they really represent an asset to China’s military? The answer is yes, but in an actual conflict the value would dwindle quickly. ….
China has established numerous military installations in the South China Sea, primarily in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. In the Spratlys, China has built airfields at Subi, Mischief and Fiery Cross, along with potential missile, radar and helicopter infrastructure at several smaller formations. In the Paracels, China has established a significant military installation at Woody Island, as well as radar and helicopter facilities in several other areas. China continues construction across the region, meaning that it may expand its military presence in the future. The larger bases (Subi, Mischief, Fiery Cross and Woody Island) have infrastructure necessary for the management of military aircraft, including fighters and large patrol craft. These missiles, radars and aircraft extend the lethal reach of China’s military across the breadth of the South China Sea. ….
Several of the islands serve as bases for SAM systems (including the HQ-9, with a range of 125 miles, and perhaps eventually the Russian S-400) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). These missiles serve to make the South China Sea lethal for U.S. ships and aircraft that do not have stealth capabilities, or that do not enjoy a layered air-defense system. The SAM installations, buoyed by networks of radars, can effectively limit the ability of enemy aircraft to enter their lethal zone without significant electronic-warfare assistance. The GLCMs can add another set of launchers to China’s A2/AD network, although not necessarily with any greater effectiveness than missiles launched from subs, ships or aircraft.»
«The Chinese navy has two carriers. Another is under construction. Beijing’s fleet could possess as many as six aircraft carriers by the mid-2030s, experts told state media. They could be a mix of conventional and nuclear-powered vessels.
Even the smallest Chinese carrier displaces around 60,000 tons of water, making it twice as big as South Korea’s own, future flattop»
«The South Korean joint chiefs of staff decided on July 12, 2019 to acquire an assault ship capable of operating fixed-wing aircraft, Defense News reported. The vessel presumably would embark vertical-landing F-35B stealth fighters»
«South Korea is getting an aircraft carrier. The vessel could help Seoul’s navy to compete with its main rivals, the Chinese and Japanese fleets.»
«Seoul for years has mulled a purchase of F-35Bs to complement the country’s land-based F-35As»
«“The plan of building the LPH-II ship has been included in a long-term force buildup plan,” a spokesman for the joint chiefs told Defense News, using an acronym for “landing platform helicopter.”»
«“Once a preliminary research is completed within a couple of years, the shipbuilding plan is expected to be included in the midterm acquisition list,”»
«The new LPH will displace around 30,000 tons of water, roughly twice as much as the South Korean navy’s two LPH-Is displace. The older assault ships embark only helicopters. A 30,000-ton vessel easily could operate a dozen or more F-35Bs plus other aircraft.»
«The $6-billion acquisition include three Aegis destroyers armed with ballistic-missile interceptors and three submarines equipped with their own launchers for land-attack missiles.»
«The new ships could help Seoul’s navy to expand beyond its current, largely coastal mission. The main threat to South Korea is North Korea, specifically the North’s huge force of artillery that in wartime quickly could demolish Seoul and endanger millions of people.»
«The navy currently possesses three of the Sejong the Great-class destroyers that it acquired between 2008 and 2012. «The 11,000-ton-displacement destroyers are among the most heavily-armed in the world and boast 128 vertical missile cells for SM-3 air-defense missiles and Hyunmoo-3C cruise missiles.»
* * * * * * *
Nell’Asia dell’est e del sud est è in corso da tempo un riarmo di notevole consistenza.
Se quello cinese è adeguato ad una potenza locoregionale con malcelate ambizioni globali, gli altri stati stanno attentamente ponderano soprattutto la loro difesa.
Le attuali rivalità nippo-koreane sembrerebbero essere solo formali.
I punti nevralgici sarebbero essere la North Korea, per la sua impredicibile politica, e la Cina, per la sua prevedibile ambizione marittima.
Sotto sotto, ci sarebbe anche da valutare l’ipotesi di una volontà di portare la cantieristica sudkoreana allo stato dell’arte.
Earlier this week, South Korea announced its intention to include a medium-sized aircraft carrier in its naval expansion plans. The decision to construct the ships comes at a time of high tension with Japan, and takes place more generally in context of accelerated Japanese and Chinese aircraft carrier construction. Reportedly, the ship will displace 30,000 tons, making it somewhat larger than the Japanese Izumos. Designing the ship from the keel up to operate the F-35B may also remedy the need for the compromises that required extensive refitting in the Japanese ships.
Such a vessel would lock South Korea into the acquisition of the F-35B, except in the unlikely event that South Korea developed its own advanced STOVL fighter aircraft. The ROK has already agreed to acquire the F-35A, although it has also pursued a related project for a fifth-generation fighter. There is no indication that the KFX fighter would have STOVL capabilities, however. Presumably, the construction of this carrier would put to bed rumors about refitting the Dokdo-class to operate the F-35B, a plan that would have seriously strained the smaller vessels.
Although South Korea has never constructed a military vessel of this size, the shipbuilding industry is sufficiently sophisticated that upsizing from the Dokdos should not present any serious challenges. It is fair to say that Japan is unlikely to share the design characteristics of the Izumos. However, the Spanish Juan Carlos and the Italian Cavour and Trieste could provide ready models if South Korean shipbuilders sought the advice of their European counterparts.
Indeed, this new ship will join a growing family of vessels, including the Juan Carlos, the Izumo, the Cavour, and the Trieste, intended to operate the F-35B as their primary combat capability. The Turkish Anadolu (based on the Juan Carlos) was intended for the same purpose, but Turkey has been excluded from the F-35B project. The large American amphibious warships of the Wasp and America classes also operate the F-35B, as do the British Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. The South Korean decision may provide additional ammunition to advocates of refitting the Canberra class amphibs (yet again based on the Spanish Juan Carlos) to carry the Joint Strike Fighter.
The timing of the announcement of the decision to build this vessel resonates uncomfortably with the renewal of tensions with Japan over World War II history, but competition with Tokyo probably remains mostly in the arena of prestige. This decision may also reflect increasing confidence that South Korea’s primary security problems do not involve North Korea. Fighters launched from carriers aren’t intrinsically worth more than fighters launched from land bases, although the presence of a carrier would complicate North Korean targeting problems. More likely, however, South Korea envisions using the ship in a blue water role, contributing to multi-national military and humanitarian operations, and safeguarding ROK interests in the distant abroad.
Whether this spurs additional construction on the part of Japan is an open, interesting question. Notwithstanding the diplomatic irritation that has resurfaced over the past months, Japan does not seem to regard South Korea as a meaningful security threat, or as a competitor for prestige. If happier relations return, the two navies could share lessons learned, and perhaps even act in concert to manage regional security affairs.
The South Korean joint chiefs of staff decided on July 12, 2019 to acquire an assault ship capable of operating fixed-wing aircraft, Defense News reported. The vessel presumably would embark vertical-landing F-35B stealth fighters.
South Korea is getting an aircraft carrier. The vessel could help Seoul’s navy to compete with its main rivals, the Chinese and Japanese fleets.
The South Korean joint chiefs of staff decided on July 12, 2019 to acquire an assault ship capable of operating fixed-wing aircraft, Defense News reported. The vessel presumably would embark vertical-landing F-35B stealth fighters.
Seoul for years has mulled a purchase of F-35Bs to complement the country’s land-based F-35As.
“The plan of building the LPH-II ship has been included in a long-term force buildup plan,” a spokesman for the joint chiefs told Defense News, using an acronym for “landing platform helicopter.”
“Once a preliminary research is completed within a couple of years, the shipbuilding plan is expected to be included in the midterm acquisition list,” the spokesman added.
The new LPH will displace around 30,000 tons of water, roughly twice as much as the South Korean navy’s two LPH-Is displace. The older assault ships embark only helicopters. A 30,000-ton vessel easily could operate a dozen or more F-35Bs plus other aircraft.
Acquiring a carrier represents “a symbolic and meaningful step to upgrade the country’s naval capability against potential threats posed by Japan and China,” Kim Dae-young, an analyst with the Seoul-based Korea Research Institute for National Strategy, told Defense News.
The new flattop is part of a wider naval buildup in South Korea. The South Korean government on April 30, 2019 approved plans to acquire new destroyers and submarines for the country’s fast-growing navy.
The $6-billion acquisition include three Aegis destroyers armed with ballistic-missile interceptors and three submarines equipped with their own launchers for land-attack missiles.
The new ships could help Seoul’s navy to expand beyond its current, largely coastal mission. The main threat to South Korea is North Korea, specifically the North’s huge force of artillery that in wartime quickly could demolish Seoul and endanger millions of people.
But looking beyond the North Korean threat, South Korea clearly has ambitions to develop a far-sailing “blue-water” navy.
The South Korean navy in 2019 operates 68 major warships including 16 submarines, 12 destroyers, 13 frigates, 13 corvettes and 14 amphibious warfare ships. The fleet also includes scores of patrol boats, mine-warfare vessels and auxiliaries.
The three new Sejong the Great-class destroyers and three new Dosan An Chang-Ho-class submarines apparently will expand the fleet rather than replace older vessels.
“The new Aegis destroyers will be outfitted with an upgraded missile launch system which will allow them to intercept ballistic missiles,” Yonhap news agency reported. “They will also represent a marked upgrade in detection and tracking abilities.”
The navy currently possesses three of the Sejong the Great-class destroyers that it acquired between 2008 and 2012. The 11,000-ton-displacement destroyers are among the most heavily-armed in the world and boast 128 vertical missile cells for SM-3 air-defense missiles and Hyunmoo-3C cruise missiles.
At present the American-made SM-3 is most effective as a terminal- or boost-phase missile-interceptor, meaning it possess the speed, range and altitude performance to hit enemy ballistic missiles when they’re first launching or in their final seconds of flight.
But the U.S. Missile Defense Agency plans to modify the SM-3 and test it for the most difficult, mid-course-phase intercepts, when an interceptor must climb outside of the atmosphere. Exo-atmospheric interceptions require special sensors and other capabilities.
Among Asian powers, Japan is also equipping its destroyers with SM-3s for missile-defense missions.
South Korea however is unique in fitting its submarines with launchers for ballistic land-attack missiles. The 3,400-ton-displacement Dosan An Chang-Ho-class subs will come with vertical launchers that can fire Chonryong cruise missiles and Hyunmoo-2 ballistic missiles.
The boats’ land-attack capabilities could help Seoul to target Pyongyang’s 13,000 artillery pieces, potentially minimizing the damage that North Korea could inflict on the south.
More than 30 million people including hundreds of thousands of foreigners live within range of North Korea’s artillery. Barrages in the opening hours of a full-scale war could kill or injure 250,000 people, the U.S. Defense Department estimated.
The new submarines during wartime also would hunt North Korea’s own large but aging fleet of subs. Pyongyang operates around 70 undersea vessels, including around 20 Soviet-designed Romeo-class attack boats and scores of midget submarines.
South Korea’s carrier will sail into crowded seas. Japan’s cabinet on Dec. 18, 2018 approved a plan to modify the Japanese navy’s two, 27,000-ton-displacement Izumo-class helicopter carriers to embark F-35B stealth fighters.
The modifications should result in the Japanese fleet operating, for the first time since World War II, flattops with fixed-wing aircraft.
The Chinese navy has two carriers. Another is under construction. Beijing’s fleet could possess as many as six aircraft carriers by the mid-2030s, experts told state media. They could be a mix of conventional and nuclear-powered vessels.
Even the smallest Chinese carrier displaces around 60,000 tons of water, making it twice as big as South Korea’s own, future flattop.
Sarebbe sufficiente dare un’occhiata alla carta geografica.
Il Mare di Okhotsk è delimitato a nord dalle rive siberiane orientali, ad est dalla Penisola di Kamchacta che si protende verso sud per quasi mille kilometri, mentre ad ovest l’Isola di Sakhalin è disposta da nord a sud per quasi ottocento kilometri. Lo sbocco verso il mare libero dell’Oceano Pacifico è bloccato dalla catena di Isole Kurili. Chi abbia il controllo militare delle Kurili governa gli accessi al mare di Okhotsk.
Qualche nota aggiuntiva.
L’Isola di Sakhalin è ricchissima di giacimenti minerari: oro, argento, titanio, ferro e carbone. Negli ultimi anni sono stati individuati giacimenti di petrolio e gas naturale, che sembrerebbero essere tra i maggiori del mondo.
Le isole Kurili furono occupate dai russi negli ultimi giorni della seconda guerra mondiale e, finita la guerra, tutti i giapponesi abitanti nell’Isola di Sakhalin, quattrocentomila circa, furono deportati, mossa questa che si dimostrò essere lungimirante.
* * *
Se questi sono gli elementi geopolitici locoregionali, si dovrebbero considerare anche molti altri elementi internazionali. Anche se il Mare di Okhotsk è racchiuso prevalentemente da coste russe, attraverso gli Stretti Kurili potrebbe essere raggiunto da flotte di altre nazioni. È del tutto comprensibile che una simile opzione risulti essere sgradita ai russi.
Ecco quindi che Mr Putin ha deciso di rafforzare in modo significativo la presenza militare russa nelle Kurili.
«Russia said on Monday it had built new barracks for troops on a disputed chain of islands near Japan and would build more facilities for armored vehicles, a move likely to anger Tokyo after it urged Moscow to reduce its military activity there»
«The announcement, from the Ministry of Defence, said Moscow planned to shift troops into four housing complexes on two of the four disputed islands, known as the Southern Kurils in Russia and the Northern Territories in Japan, next week»
«Tokyo says it is concerned by what it regards as an unhelpful Russian military build-up on the islands – which has included warplane, missile defense and other deployments. Moscow, meanwhile, says it is perturbed by Japan’s roll-out of the Aegis Ashore U.S. missile system»
«In the meantime, Moscow is fortifying the islands»
«The Defence Ministry said on Monday it wanted troops and their families to move into the two new housing complexes on one of the four islands, Iturup (Etorofu in Japan), and into two others on the island of Kunashir (Kunashiri in Japan), on Dec. 25»
* * * * * * *
Questa fotografia delle Kurili illustra benissimo la mentalità russa, che accetta e non rinnega il proprio passato.
MOSCOW (Reuters) – Russia said on Monday it had built new barracks for troops on a disputed chain of islands near Japan and would build more facilities for armored vehicles, a move likely to anger Tokyo after it urged Moscow to reduce its military activity there.
The announcement, from the Ministry of Defence, said Moscow planned to shift troops into four housing complexes on two of the four disputed islands, known as the Southern Kurils in Russia and the Northern Territories in Japan, next week.
The news came after the Kremlin said Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe might visit Russia on Jan. 21 as the two countries step up a push to defuse the territorial dispute to allow them to sign a World War Two peace treaty, something the disagreement over the Pacific islands has long prevented.
There was no immediate reaction from Japan. Tokyo said in July it had asked Russia to reduce its military activity on the islands, a plea Moscow dismissed as unhelpful megaphone diplomacy at the time.
Soviet forces seized the four islands at the end of World War Two and Moscow and Tokyo both claim sovereignty over them. Diplomats on both sides have spoken of the possibility of reviving a Soviet-era draft agreement that envisaged returning two of the four islands as part of a peace deal.
President Vladimir Putin and Abe have held numerous face-to-face meetings to try to make progress.
But tensions have remained high. Tokyo says it is concerned by what it regards as an unhelpful Russian military build-up on the islands – which has included warplane, missile defense and other deployments. Moscow, meanwhile, says it is perturbed by Japan’s roll-out of the Aegis Ashore U.S. missile system.
Russian politicians say they fear Japan might agree to deploy U.S. missile facilities on the islands if it ever got any of them back and that Moscow could only countenance a deal if it received a cast-iron guarantee that ruled out such a scenario.
In the meantime, Moscow is fortifying the islands.
The Defence Ministry said on Monday it wanted troops and their families to move into the two new housing complexes on one of the four islands, Iturup (Etorofu in Japan), and into two others on the island of Kunashir (Kunashiri in Japan), on Dec. 25.
It said troops were moved into two such similar facilities last year with three more barracks planned for 2019.
“Also on both islands we have modern and heated storage facilities for weapons and armored vehicles,” the ministry said in a statement, adding that more such facilities were planned.
La storia insegna come si possano ottenere risultati migliori sfruttando gli errori dell’avversario rispetto all’affrontarlo di petto: procedura meno costosa e ben più efficiente. Richiede solo pazienza e vigile attesa.
Così, mentre negli Stati Uniti si assiste non tanto ad una competizione per poter governare il paese quanto piuttosto ad una guerra civile volta all’eliminazione dell’avversario politico vissuto come un nemico, mentre l’Unione Europea si sta lentamente ma inesorabilmente disintegrando e l’asse franco germanico evidenzia quanto sia inconsistente causa la debolezza interna di Mr Macron e l’uscita di scena di Frau Merkel, la Cina di Mr Xi sta procedendo nei suoi piani di piccoli passi per il controllo del mondo.
Se è vero che le Filippine siano un paese ancora in fase di emersione economica, se è vero che presenta molte contraddizioni, sarebbe altrettanto vero prendere atto della sua posizione strategica nel chiudere il Mare Cinese del Sud agli accessi oceanici.
Per la Cina due sono gli obiettivi strategici.
– Assicurarsi il pieno controllo politico, commerciale e militare del Mare Cinese del Sud;
– Assicurarsi corridoi navigabili altamente sicuri tra questo mare e l’Oceano Pacifico.
La vera posta in gioco è la concreta possibilità di trasformare la Cina da potenza locoregionale a superpotenza mondiale. Non è certo un piano da attuarsi a breve termine, magari con azioni di forza: i risultati sono attesi tra anni, ma dovranno essere stabili, duraturi nel tempo.
L’Occidente ha trattato duramente le Filippine, e questa per reazione hanno iniziato a guardarsi attorno.
«Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in the Philippines for a state visit on Tuesday, aiming to advance strategic gains made under a Manila leadership that has favored Beijing in the hope of receiving billions of dollars of loans and investment»
«Xi’s visit comes two years after Philippine counterpart Rodrigo Duterte declared he was reorienting his foreign policy away from the United States and toward China, despite decades of mistrust and bitter maritime disputes with Beijing.»
«Xi praised Duterte and described ties as being “a rainbow after the rain” and repeatedly called for the “proper handling” of rows over the South China Sea.»
«But Duterte’s style of handling has frustrated nationalists, who say he has been submissive in refusing to criticize China’s military buildup, or seek its compliance with a 2016 arbitration award that invalidated its claim to almost the entire waterway»
«Public opinion is largely supportive of Duterte’s presidency but surveys consistently show reservations about his China policy and disdain for the United States.»
* * * * * * * *
Occorrerebbe fare molta attenzione a non valutare gli eventi sulla scorta di quanto scrivono i media liberal, i quali odiano Mr Duterte per averli cortesemente messi all’uscio e per aver iniziato una ampia bonifica del commercio e spaccio di droghe nel suo paese.
Non sempre le mogli separate parlano ben dell’ex partner.
MANILA (Reuters) – Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in the Philippines for a state visit on Tuesday, aiming to advance strategic gains made under a Manila leadership that has favored Beijing in the hope of receiving billions of dollars of loans and investment.
Xi’s visit comes two years after Philippine counterpart Rodrigo Duterte declared he was reorienting his foreign policy away from the United States and toward China, despite decades of mistrust and bitter maritime disputes with Beijing.
In a commentary in Monday’s Philippine Star newspaper, Xi praised Duterte and described ties as being “a rainbow after the rain” and repeatedly called for the “proper handling” of rows over the South China Sea.
But Duterte’s style of handling has frustrated nationalists, who say he has been submissive in refusing to criticize China’s military buildup, or seek its compliance with a 2016 arbitration award that invalidated its claim to almost the entire waterway.
Public opinion is largely supportive of Duterte’s presidency but surveys consistently show reservations about his China policy and disdain for the United States.
A Social Weather Stations survey released late on Monday showed 84 percent of Filipinos felt it was wrong not to oppose China’s militarization of its manmade islands, and 86 percent believed it was right to strengthen the Philippine military, especially the navy.
The poll of 1,200 people conducted in late September also showed trust in the United States remained “very good”, but China was considered “poor”.
A small protest was held outside China’s embassy in Manila on Tuesday.
Asked on Tuesday about the survey, presidential spokesman Salvador Panelo, said Duterte’s strategy was to avoid a potential “inferno” of conflict while reaping the rewards of improved business.
“They are not aware of the real geopolitics in the region. The president is a very cautious diplomat,” Panelo told news channel ANC.
“Rather than provoke, he’d rather talk with them and get some trade relations that will benefit this country.”
Panelo accepted that those benefits, including $24 billion of pledged loans and investments, were yet to materialize, but said Duterte was not scared to speak up.
“This is the best time for the president to exert pressure on the Chinese president,” he said. “Knowing the man, he’ll do that, he’s that kind of person.”
Duterte has heaped praise on Xi for his support for his infrastructure program, although just three of dozens of such planned projects have broken ground.
Some analysts say Duterte risks appearing as if he has been duped into making concessions.
Other Philippine experts say delays in securing Chinese credit could be a blessing given the potential debt burden, echoing a warning delivered by U.S. Vice President Mike Pence.