(1) the security of the United States is dependent on the ability of the domestic industrial base to supply materials and services for the national defense and to prepare for and respond to military conflicts, natural or man-caused disasters, or acts of terrorism within the United States;
(2) to ensure the vitality of the domestic industrial base, actions are needed—
(A) to promote industrial resources preparedness in the event of domestic or foreign threats to the security of the United States;
(B) to support continuing improvements in industrial efficiency and responsiveness;
(C) to provide for the protection and restoration of domestic critical infrastructure operations under emergency conditions; and
(D) to respond to actions taken outside of the United States that could result in reduced supplies of strategic and critical materials, including energy, necessary for national defense and the general economic well-being of the United States; ….
measures to improve the domestic industrial base for national defense; …. (C) the development of domestic productive capacity to meet …. (i) essential national defense needs that can result from emergency conditions; and …. (ii) unique technological requirements».
In ossequio a questa legge il Presidente Trump ha emesso questo Ordine Esecutivo:
«Regarding the proposed acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation by China venture Capital Fund Corporation limited»
«By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (section 721), 50 U.S.C. 4565, it is hereby ordered as follows»
«There is credible evidence that leads me to believe that …. together with Merger Sub, Acquisition Company, Capital Investment, CBFI, and Yitai, the Purchasers), through exercising control of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation, a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware (Lattice), might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States»
«The proposed acquisition of Lattice by the Purchasers (the proposed transaction) is prohibited, and any substantially equivalent transaction, whether effected directly or indirectly by the Purchasers, through the Purchasers’ shareholders or shareholders’ immediate, intermediate, or ultimate foreign person beneficial owners, or through the Purchasers’ subsidiaries, is also prohibited»
* * * * * * *
La Lattice Semiconductor Corporation è una società relativamente piccola, 784 dipendenti e giro di affari di 366 milioni.
«Lattice Semiconductor Corporation is an American manufacturer of high-performance programmable logic devices (FPGAs, CPLDs, & SPLDs). Founded in 1983, the company employs about 700 people and has annual revenues of around $300 million, with Darin Billerbeck as the chief executive officer. The Oregon-based company is the number three ranked company in world market share for field programmable gate array (FPGA) devices, and number two for CPLDs & SPLDs. The company went public in 1989 and is traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange under the symbol LSCC.» [Fonte]
La società ha avuto un passato tumultuoso, ivi compresa una bancarotta nel luglio 1987, con un impressionante numero di acquisizioni e cessioni, nonché cambi di proprietà.
«In April 2016, Tsinghua Holdings said in a U.S. filing that it accumulated a roughly 6 percent stake in Lattice Semiconductor through share purchased on the open market».
Nell’aprile 2016 la Tsinghua Holdings aveva pubblicamente dichiarato di essere in possesso del 6% delle azioni della Lattice Semiconductor Corporation.
«Tsinghua Holdings Corp., Ltd. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tsinghua University, itself a public university of China. The company was established as an in-house asset management company for Tsinghua’s subsidiaries that were established in 1990s by the technology transfer of research to business.» [Fonte]
Ma la Tsinghua Holdings Corp., Ltd. non è una società qualsiasi.
Ha un total assets di 207 miliardi di Yuan, e questo sarebbe il meno.
La Tsinghua Holdings Corp., Ltd. è di proprietà della Tsinghua University, che ne detiene il 100% del capitale.
Essa ha innumerevoli sussidiarie, tra le quali spicca la Unisplendor, “to doing large-scale software development for municipal and provincial governments across China, constructing infrastructure for highways, and producing scanners, laptops and digital cameras”
Ma la Tsinghua University è una università cinese alquanto differente dalle altre. Essa infatti appartiene sì al Ministero dell’Educazione, ma il proprietario finale del tutto è lo State Council of China. Non lo stato cinese, come per le altre università, bensì il Governo della Cina, dal quale dipendono strettamente i servizi informativi.
Sotto la passata Amministrazione Obama una succursale dei servizi segreti cinesi si era comprata una parte del capitale di una industria strategica per la difesa degli Stati Uniti. Di lì accedeva al know-how di tutto il settore tecnologico.
Ci voleva il cambio di amministrazione per rendersi conto del fatto.
Regarding the proposed acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation by China venture Capital Fund Corporation limited.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (section 721), 50 U.S.C. 4565, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Findings. (a) There is credible evidence that leads me to believe that (1) Canyon Bridge Merger Sub, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware (Merger Sub); (2) Merger Sub’s parent companies Canyon Bridge Acquisition Company, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware (Acquisition Company), Canyon Bridge Capital Investment Limited, an entity organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands (Capital Investment), and Canyon Bridge Fund I, LP (CBFI), a limited partnership organized under the laws of Delaware; and (3) CBFI’s limited partner Yitai Capital Limited, a company organized under the laws of Hong Kong (Yitai), and Yitai’s parent company China Venture Capital Fund Corporation Limited, a corporation organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China (CVCF and, together with Merger Sub, Acquisition Company, Capital Investment, CBFI, and Yitai, the Purchasers), through exercising control of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation, a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware (Lattice), might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States; and
(b) Provisions of law, other than section 721 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), do not, in my judgment, provide adequate and appropriate authority for me to protect the national security in this matter.
Sec. 2. Actions Ordered and Authorized. On the basis of the findings set forth in section 1 of this order, considering the factors described in subsection 721(f) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as appropriate, and pursuant to my authority under applicable law, including section 721, I hereby order that:
(a) The proposed acquisition of Lattice by the Purchasers (the proposed transaction) is prohibited, and any substantially equivalent transaction, whether effected directly or indirectly by the Purchasers, through the Purchasers’ shareholders or shareholders’ immediate, intermediate, or ultimate foreign person beneficial owners, or through the Purchasers’ subsidiaries, is also prohibited.
(b) The Purchasers and Lattice shall take all steps necessary to fully and permanently abandon the proposed transaction not later than 30 days after the date of this order, unless such date is extended by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) for a period not to exceed 90 days, on such conditions as CFIUS may require. Immediately upon completion of all steps necessary to terminate the proposed transaction, the Purchasers and Lattice shall certify in writing to CFIUS that such termination has been effected in accordance with this order and that all steps necessary to fully and permanently abandon the proposed transaction have been completed.
(c) From the date of this order until the Purchasers and Lattice provide a certification of termination of the proposed transaction to CFIUS pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, the Purchasers and Lattice shall certify to CFIUS on a weekly basis that they are in compliance with this order and include with that certification a description of all efforts to permanently abandon the proposed transaction and a timeline for projected completion of remaining actions necessary to effectuate the abandonment.
(d) Any transaction or other device entered into or employed for the purpose of, or with the effect of, avoiding or circumventing this order is prohibited.
(e) The Attorney General is authorized to take any steps necessary to enforce this order.
Sec. 3. Reservation. I hereby reserve my authority to issue further orders with respect to the Purchasers or Lattice as shall in my judgment be necessary to protect the national security of the United States.
Sec. 4. Publication and Transmittal. (a) This order shall be published in the Federal Register.
(b) I hereby direct the Secretary of the Treasury to transmit a copy of this order to the parties to the proposed transaction named in section 1 of this order.
«Germany has put all major arms exports to Turkey on hold, stepping up the ongoing dispute between the two countries. The decision prompted a swift reaction from Ankara, with Turkey’s EU Minister Ömer Çelik telling reporters on Sept. 12 that it weakens Ankara’s fight against terrorism and makes Europe more vulnerable.»
«German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Sept. 12 rejected a total ban on arms exports to NATO ally Ankara,saying that such sales had already been restricted somewhat, but Turkey remained a key ally in the fight against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
Merkel told broadcaster NDR that Germany would decide on arms sales requests from Turkey on a case-by-case basis. She also said she saw no reason to impose a travel warning for Germans travelling to Turkey, but said Berlin would keep its options open.»
«Turkey has signed a controversial deal with Russia to arm its forces with Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles»
«President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said a deposit had already been paid»
«The deal is thought to be worth $2.5bn (£1.9bn). Turkey has the second-largest army in Nato»
«The alliance reacted sceptically to the decision, saying the system was not compatible with its equipment.»
«Turkey’s decision has both practical and political significance. Inevitably it will be seen as a further sign of Ankara’s gradual estrangement from its Western allies»
«Turkey has been in the market for new air defences for some time. Four years ago it flirted with the idea of buying a Chinese system. But after pressure from its Nato allies it backed away from the deal.»
«On regional policy Ankara and Moscow are more closely aligned.»
«Nato has not been informed about the details of any purchase»
«Germany’s Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, said Berlin would put all arms exports to Turkey on hold due to the deteriorating relationship between the two nations»
«Relations between the two countries have deteriorated»
* * * * * * *
Su questo argomento abbiamo già parlato in diverse occasioni.
In un’epoca in cui vi sono superpotenze con arsenali atomici in grado di distruggere il mondo in pochi minuti, così come potenze locoregionale anche esse dotate di armamenti atomici, sia pure di livello inferiore, diventa essenziale il mantenimento degli equilibri tra i potenziali avversari.
Equilibri che devono essere preservati sia a livello degli armamenti effettivamente in linea, sia a livello di geopolitica, sia infine a livello delle alleanze.
La rottura degli equilibri, indipendentemente dalle cause che abbiano innescato il fenomeno, corre il concreto rischio di far sentire uno dei contendenti minacciato nella sua integrità, e di rispondere quindi con l’opzione militare.
L’incrinatura della Nato nei confronti della Turkia è evidente, e la Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel ne è causa efficiente.
Ella propugna una sua scala valoriale, in ossequio alla quale sembrerebbe disposta a disintegrare Unione Europea e Nato, scala valoriale che peraltro è condivisa quasi esclusivamente da lei. La sua opposizione alla Turkia è squisitamente ideologica.
Un vero politico coagula consensi, agglutina forze anche molto differenti, appiana gli attriti, stringe accordi non compromessi.
Da questo punto di vista Frau Merkel è un pericolo attuale alla pace.
Sappiamo bene che parlando di questi argomenti molte persone si lasciano trasportare dalle loro viscerali ideologie, emettendo giudizi tanto tranchant quanto utopici. Sono persone che a voce reclamano la pace ma nei fatti spianano la via al conflitto armato.
Turkey has signed a controversial deal with Russia to arm its forces with Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said a deposit had already been paid. The deal is thought to be worth $2.5bn (£1.9bn).
Turkey has the second-largest army in Nato. The alliance reacted sceptically to the decision, saying the system was not compatible with its equipment.
Turkey has been establishing closer links with Russia after its recent souring of ties with the US and Europe.
Mr Erdogan’s government objects to US military support for the YPG Syrian Kurdish rebels, who are linked to rebel Kurds in Turkey.
Russia says the S-400 system has a range of 400km (248 miles) and can shoot down up to 80 targets simultaneously, aiming two missiles at each one.
Russia deployed the S-400 at its air force base near Latakia in Syria in December 2015, after Turkish jets had shot down a Russian Su-24 warplane on the Syria-Turkey border.
That incident caused a diplomatic rift between Russia and Turkey, but President Erdogan later patched up his quarrel with President Vladimir Putin.
Tensions within Nato
A military adviser to Mr Putin, Vladimir Kozhin, said the S-400 contract with Turkey was “strictly compatible with our strategic interests”. “On that score, one can quite understand the reaction of some Western countries who are trying to put pressure on Turkey.”
Mr Erdogan, quoted by Turkey’s Hurriyet daily, voiced displeasure with unnamed Western partners who were “seeking enormous amounts of money” for military drones.
He said Turkey had killed 90 YPG “terrorists” in the past week with Turkish drones – developed because the Western ones were too expensive.
“We are responsible for taking security measures for the defence of our country,” he stressed.
The BBC’s Mark Lowen in Turkey says the missile deal is clearly a rebuff to Nato, after the US and Germany withdrew Patriot air defence batteries from Turkey.
In 2015, Turkey urged its Nato allies to keep those batteries positioned on the Turkish-Syrian border.
Speaking to AFP news agency, an unnamed Nato official said: “No Nato ally currently operates the S-400”. They added: “Nato has not been informed about the details of any purchase.”
Germany’s Foreign Minister, Sigmar Gabriel, said Berlin would put all arms exports to Turkey on hold due to the deteriorating relationship between the two nations.
Mr Gabriel’s counterpart in Ankara, Mevlut Cavusoglu, said the comments were inappropriate for a foreign minister.
Relations between the two countries have deteriorated since Turkey arrested a Turkish-German journalist in February as part of a crackdown on political opponents in the country.
Last month, President Erdogan called Germany’s ruling politicians “enemies of Turkey”.
Turkey is also angry with the US for not extraditing Fethullah Gulen, the Muslim cleric who, according to Mr Erdogan, organised the July 2016 coup plot by rogue Turkish officers. Mr Gulen denied any involvement.
Manufacturer: Almaz-Antey arms firm; Deployment: Hmeimim airbase near Latakia – entered service in Russia in 2007; Range: 400km (248 miles); Speed: up to 4.8km (3 miles) per second; Max target height: 30km – can track up to 80 targets simultaneously; Types of target: aircraft, cruise missiles, medium-range missiles, drones, other airborne surveillance systems. (Sources: RIA Novosti, Russian 1TV.ru)
– Long-range surveillance radar tracks objects and relays information to command vehicle, which assesses potential targets
– Target is identified and command vehicle orders missile launch
– Launch data are sent to the best placed launch vehicle and it releases surface-to-air missiles
– Engagement radar helps guide missiles towards target
Not a good choice for Nato
By Jonathan Marcus, BBC defence correspondent
Turkey’s decision has both practical and political significance. Inevitably it will be seen as a further sign of Ankara’s gradual estrangement from its Western allies.
Turkey has been in the market for new air defences for some time. Four years ago it flirted with the idea of buying a Chinese system. But after pressure from its Nato allies it backed away from the deal.
Choosing a Russian system which will be hard, if not impossible, to integrate into Nato’s wider air defence system makes little strategic sense.
It was not that long ago – November 2015 – that Turkey actually shot down a Russian warplane that it said had intruded into its airspace from Syria.
But since then much has changed. On regional policy Ankara and Moscow are more closely aligned. And Turkey’s internal policies are seen as increasingly repressive by many of its allies.
In Nato generally the only Russian equipment used is legacy hardware in the forces of former Warsaw Pact countries. Greece also has an earlier Russian air defence system that was first sold to Cyprus.
Al-Jahrah. Cimitero dei carri armati iracheni dopo la guerra del golfo. Si noti come molti di essi abbiano ricevuto un colpo che ha scamottato via la torretta. In gran parte sono stati neutralizzati dagli Apache.
«The Defense Acquisition Council (DAC), which approves big-ticket purchases, gave the green light to acquire six additional Apache helicopters after 22 were bought as part of a $2.5 billion deal in 2015»
«DAC approved procurement of six Apache helicopters along with associated equipment for the army totally about 4,168 crore rupees ($650 million)»
«It will be the first time the Indian army has received attack helicopters and it hopes to deploy the craft along India’s high-altitude frontiers — particularly its border in the east with regional rival China»
«India has increasingly turned to the United States and France, rather than traditional ally Russia, for its military hardware in recent years»
* * * * * * *
«The Boeing AH-64 Apache is an American four-blade, twin-turboshaft attack helicopter with a tailwheel-type landing gear arrangement and a tandem cockpit for a two-man crew. It features a nose-mounted sensor suite for target acquisition and night vision systems.
It is armed with a 30 mm (1.18 in) M230 chain gun carried between the main landing gear, under the aircraft’s forward fuselage. It has four hardpoints mounted on stub-wing pylons, typically carrying a mixture of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and Hydra 70 rocket pods. The AH-64 has a large amount of systems redundancy to improve combat survivability. ….
One of the revolutionary features of the Apache was its helmet mounted display, the Integrated Helmet and Display Sighting System (IHADSS) ….
The AH-64 was designed to perform in front-line environments, and to operate at night or day and during adverse weather conditions ….
Longbow-equipped Apaches can locate up to 256 targets simultaneously within 50 km (31 mi). ….
In 2014, it was announced that new targeting and surveillance sensors were under development to provide high-resolution color imagery to crews, replacing older low definition black-and-white imaging systems. ….
The AH-64 is adaptable to numerous different roles within its context as Close Combat Attack (CCA). In addition to the 30 mm M230E1 Chain Gun, the Apache carries a range of external stores and weapons on its stub-wing pylons, typically a mixture of AGM-114 Hellfire anti-tank missiles, and Hydra 70 general-purpose unguided 70 mm (2.756 in) rockets. One 18-aircraft Apache battalion equipped with Hellfire missiles is capable of destroying 288 tanks» [Fonte]
* * * * * * *
Alcune cose sarebbero da notarsi.
Da un punto di vista economico, l’elicottero Apache AH-64D ha un prezzo di listino di 65 milioni Usd. Sei Apache avrebbero dovuto costare 390 milioni. 260 milioni in pezzi di ricambio, armamento suppletivo, e munizionamento a scorta sembrerebbero essere un investimento giustificabile solo se a ridosso di una qualche operazione a breve termine, tenendo conto della rapida obsolescenza delle armi.
Dal punto di vista politico invece, si nota come l’India abbia iniziato a diversificare i fornitori, tra i quali rientra anche Israele.
Gli Apaches non sono esenti da critiche.
«While effective in combat, the AH-64 also presented serious logistical complications. Findings reported in 1990 stated “maintenance units could not keep up with the Apache’s unexpectedly high work load… To provide spare parts for combat operations, the U.S. Army unofficially grounded all other AH-64s worldwide; Apaches in the theater flew only one-fifth of the planned flight-hours» [Fonte]
Gli Apache sono un sistema d’arma allo stato dell’arte. Durante la Guerra del Golfo, pur avendo svolto per problemi tecnici solo un quinto delle missioni preventivate, hanno concorso a distruggere un numero impressionante di carri armati avversari.
Resta un ragionevole dubbio.
L’esercito iracheno aveva armamenti obsoleti e quasi nessun mezzo di contrasto contraereo: per gli Apache è stato una sorta di tiro al bersaglio.
Sono in molti ad essere dubbiosi sulla loro reale capacità operativa qualora dovessero affrontare un esercito armato allo stato dell’arte, con batterie missilistiche terra aria di breve raggio. Un elicottero in volo è un bersagli relativamente statico. Sarebbe difficile pensare ad un attacco in forze di carri armati senza che sia stata loro assicurata la protezione contraerea.
NEW DELHI (Reuters) – India on Thursday cleared the purchase of six more Boeing Co (BA.N) Apache helicopters in a deal worth close to 42 billion rupees ($654.6 million), a defence ministry official said.
The order follows India’s purchase of 22 Apache and Chinook helicopters from Boeing in 2015.
Thursday’s deal, approved by the government’s Defence Acquisition Council, includes the helicopters and associated equipment, spares, training, weapons and ammunition.
The Defence Acquisition Council, chaired by the defence minister, also cleared an order for gas turbine engines – worth an estimated 4.9 billion rupees – for two ships currently under construction in Russia, the official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
India approved a $650 million purchase of six attack choppers Thursday from US aviation giant Boeing, officials said, as it boosts its military might amid border tensions with China and Pakistan.
The Defense Acquisition Council (DAC), which approves big-ticket purchases, gave the green light to acquire six additional Apache helicopters after 22 were bought as part of a $2.5 billion deal in 2015.
Two Defense Ministry sources told AFP on the condition of anonymity that the deal was approved exclusively for the army, without providing further details including a date for delivery.
“DAC approved procurement of six Apache helicopters along with associated equipment for the army totally about 4,168 crore rupees ($650 million),” an official told AFP by text message. The initial batch of 22 Apaches — equipped with Hellfire and Stinger missiles — replaced the Indian Air Force’s aging fleet.
Soon after the first Apache acquisition, the army put in a separate request for a fleet of at least 39, one of the officials told AFP. It will be the first time the Indian army has received attack helicopters and it hopes to deploy the craft along India’s high-altitude frontiers — particularly its border in the east with regional rival China.
New Delhi and Beijing are locked in a tense impasse over a strategic Himalayan plateau where hundreds of Indian and Chinese soldiers have been squaring off against each other for more than three months.
India — the world’s largest defense importer — has been investing tens of billions in updating its Soviet-era military hardware to counter long-standing territorial disputes with its nuclear-armed neighbors.
India has signed several big-ticket defense deals since Prime Minister Narendra Modi stormed to power in 2014. In April, it signed a military deal with Israel worth nearly $2 billion, which includes an advanced defense system of medium-range surface-to-air missiles, launchers and communications technology. India has increasingly turned to the United States and France, rather than traditional ally Russia, for its military hardware in recent years
«America’s unmanned dominance has been contested by China’ ambitious drive to be the leading force in drone development and distribution»
«China is increasingly becoming a potent player in the unmanned game. …. China is developing a new generation of UUVs, aimed at pinpointing the location of U.S. submarines in the depths of Pacific waters»
«In another advance for China, two months ago, news broke that China is aiming to develop a sea-skimming drone, a drone-bomber, or drone “warthog” capable of tearing across the water just half a meter above the surface — well below radar coverage»
«In addition to its phantom profile, the advanced concept carries with it a 1,000 kilgram payload, packing enough explosive power to significantly damage an entire U.S. flattop»
«Will this be China’s second, aircraft killer after the Dong-Feng 21? …. China’s new system would be far more economically viable to deploy and operate than the DF-21. …. A U.S. carrier task force could be quickly overwhelmed by an aerial armada of these new deadly weapon units steaming at high speeds directly toward it»
* * * * * * * *
La storia degli armamenti evidenzia l’alternanza di fasi nelle quali predominano le armi di attacco seguite da fasi nelle quali dominano quelle da difesa.
Un caso classico è stata l’introduzione della mitragliatrice, che ha conferito agli eserciti terrestri un’arma di difesa micidiale, quasi insormontabile. Fino alla fine della prima guerra mondiale la mitragliatrice ha condizionato una situazione di sostanziale stallo tra le forze opposte. Questa fase fu superata con la introduzione del carro armato, strumento bellico contro cui la mitragliatrice svolge al massimo un ruolo psicologico.
Al momento attuale sembrerebbe che le armi di difesa anti – nave stia iniziando a prendere il sopravvento sul potere offensivo, del tutto non indifferente, montato sulle navi da guerra.
Un fattore che trova una sempre maggiore considerazione è quello legato al costo degli armamenti.
Le navi da guerra, specie poi le porterei, sono molto onerose essendo i costi nell’ambito dei miliardi. Al contrario, i sistemi d’arma anti – nave sono economici, si parla di cifre che variano dai 50,000 Usd fino a circa il milione. La disparità dei costi si aggiunge alla efficienza di questi sistemi.
Tutte queste considerazioni trovano però valore sotto la condizione che le telecomunicazioni siano in grado di funzionare anche in zone operative nelle quali operino avversare tecnologicamente avanzati. Un drone teleguidato ha infatti capacità operativa sotto la condizione che il sistema di telecomando funzioni anche quando fosse disturbato dall’avversario.
Is this the next “carrier killer” in China’s arsenal?
China was dubbed an “emerging force” in drone warfare in and called a “rising drone power” by 2015. In four short years, its status has gone from “new” to “leading” on multiple fronts in the drone domain. One of those fronts is the application of (militarized) drone technology in sea operations. For over a decade, the United States was the undisputed leader in unmanned development and deployment in East Asia. From the Grey Eagles deployed in South Korea to Global Hawks flying from Japan, and more recently tests with the X-47B, the Sea Hunter USV, and a generation of UUVs under development that should enable U.S. attack submarines to discover other potential underwater enemies more quickly than in previous years.
Yet America’s unmanned dominance has been contested by China’ ambitious drive to be the leading force in drone development and distribution. In prior articles, we argued that China is increasingly becoming a potent player in the unmanned game. Recently, in The Diplomat, Steven Stashwick described how China is developing a new generation of UUVs, aimed at pinpointing the location of U.S. submarines in the depths of Pacific waters.
In another advance for China, two months ago, news broke that China is aiming to develop a sea-skimming drone, a drone-bomber, or drone “warthog” capable of tearing across the water just half a meter above the surface — well below radar coverage. In addition to its phantom profile, the advanced concept carries with it a 1,000 kilgram payload, packing enough explosive power to significantly damage an entire U.S. flattop. Will this be China’s second, aircraft killer after the Dong-Feng 21?
The drone’s speed and below-the-radar-coverage translates into a potentially deadly reduction in reaction time for whatever lies in its sights. The detection-speed metric would probably afford the target vessel less than a minute to defend itself, presenting a looming threat for even the most advanced warships. The U.S. Navy (USN) could still rely on its Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) technology, which can project existing naval sensory ranges through E-2D coordination. The Hawkeye aircraft, operating some 25,000-30,000 above a warship, can act as the task force’s eyes, possibly detecting incoming attackers from a distance of several hundred kilometers. Such coordinated defensive action can put a much-needed cushion of time between the run-up to attack and the prosecution of an assault against America’s naval giants. Yet for other nations, this “warthog” poses a new lethal treat.
With an estimated range of 900 miles, it certainly stretches China’s capabilities to project power from its shores – that’s two to three times the range of a conventional cruise missile or what are colloquially called “sea skimmers.” China’s drone-missile hybrid can be launched from a land-based military installation and dart out to sea. Using its onboard radar technology, the unit would seek out an enemy target and execute a strike much like an advanced cruise missile. However, the hybrid would carry with it a lower price tag than a conventional cruise missile and would therefore by far more expendable than its pure missile counterpart. In this, China’s new system would be far more economically viable to deploy and operate than the DF-21.
Yet most striking in this development is China turning from the development of UAVs for aerial purposes toward unmanned systems aimed at tasks in the maritime realm. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF) increasingly becoming main military actors, and the South China Sea, East China Sea, and general naval expansion as centers of military attention, China appears poised to steer its R&D regarding new (unmanned) military systems in the direction of systems that would benefit operations in the naval realm.
A second striking feature is how the development of unmanned systems is slowly moving toward the development of armed, next-generation unmanned systems. Unarmed systems could still be used in the maritime realm, and indeed China has deployed them to its new bases in the South China Sea, but their survivability in any possible conflict will be limited, or even non-existent due to a lack of defense capabilities. The development of sea-skimming drones exemplifies China’s desire to weaponize its current, and especially its next, generation of unmanned systems slated for East Asia waters and the Pacific. Such systems, moreover, would complement China’s larger A2/AD naval strategy, which aims to prevent the U.S. Navy and other allied naval forces from operating safely within the first island chain.
Furthermore, the drone-missile hybrid paves the way for near-future military applications with the basis for building on the concept of drone swarming in a unique unmanned domain. A U.S. carrier task force could be quickly overwhelmed by an aerial armada of these new deadly weapon units steaming at high speeds directly toward it. In expansive waters, the threat level posed through the application of this lethal devise is high enough, but when prosecuted in tight littoral regions such as the Taiwan Strait or waters adjacent South Korea and even Japan, evading the weapons could be tricky business.
L’argomento è delicato quanto pruriginoso ed importante. Capendolo si comprendono i triboli tedeschi e soprattutto francesi, nonchè molte dinamiche interne la così detta Unione Europea.
La lettura dei link e degli allegati è indispensabile per comprendere l’articolo.
Per un certo quale lasso di tempo Mr Macron è diventato l’idolo di moda della sinistra liberal europea.
In Francia Mr Hollande era riuscito nell’improba fatica di disintegrare il partito socialista riducendolo dal 61% all’8%, ma a quel punto erano scese direttamente in campo la massoneria francese e la Banca Rothschild, presentando il proprio candidato alla Presidenza francese: Emmanuel Macron.
Quasi onnipotenti quando l’Occidente negli anni sessanta costituiva il 90% del pil mondiale, sempre potenti, ma decisamente ridimensionati, oggi che l’Occidente conta poco più del 40% del pil mondiale e, soprattutto, evidenzia una grossolana frattura tra Usa ed Europa di Mr Macron e Frau Merkel.
Il Qatar è il più grande esportatore di gas naturale liquefatto (LNG), e rifornisce di gas naturale tutta la penisola araba. Grande finanziatore del terrorismo islamico in Medio Oriente ed in Europa, è paese amico di chiunque gli permetta di fare buoni affari. Esiste, è forte e potente: sarebbe impossibile non tenerne conto.
«United Arab Emirates — Qatar on Wednesday signed a €5 billion euro (U.S. $5.9 billion) deal to purchase seven naval vessels from Italy»
«despite a blockade from neighboring countries»
«Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani announced the defense deal at a joint news conference in Doha with Italian Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano»
«Qatar, which is the world’s largest liquefied natural gas exporter, and other energy rich Gulf Arab states are among the world’s biggest spenders on military equipment»
«Qatar also hosts the hub for U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria»
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La posizione del Qatar è quella tipica di ogni paese arabo: tiene il piede in un buon numero di scarpe nella concreta speranza di guadagnarci su qualcosa. Gli arabi sono persone pratiche. Gli Occidentali, specie europei, stentano a comprendere che l’islam è politica, non religione.
Se il Qatar ospita comandi e truppe americane impegnate nella lotta contro il terrorismo in Medio Oriente, nel contempo finanzia in modo sostanzioso i terroristi stessi. È lavoro che genera lavoro. Accettato dalla Realpolitk, è avversato dagli ideologi.
In buona sostanza l’Europa, recependo le istanze di Frau Merkel, aveva posto come conditio sine qua non per fornire armamenti ai Paesi del Medio Oriente. LEuropa voleva anche la loro completa accettazione dei ‘valori‘ patrocinati dalla Bundeskanzlerin e del così detto ‘buon governo‘, così come esso è definito dai liberals. In parole povere, i tedeschi e l’Unione gradirebbero che gli arabi si convertissero all’lgbt, diventassero femministi, indicessero elezioni ed eleggessero governanti tedeschi oppure si dimettessero in massa e si facessero sostituire da femmine educate in Europa alla scuola liberal. Questa la loro risposta:
«We will not cause any more problems for the German government with new requests for weapons»
Mr Macron aveva mosso Cielo, terra ed inferi per avere questa commissione del Qatar per i cantieri Stx. Ma non ce la ha fatta. Non gliela hanno voluta dare. Adesso dovrebbe essere evidente che la potenza reale di Mr Macron e dei suoi mandanti è stata ampiamente sopravalutata.
E poi. Chi mai si potrebbe fidare di Mr Macron?
A nessuno è sfuggito come l’intero progetto sia finanziato da Deutsche Bank, in passato di proprietà tedesca. Così i sudditi di Frau Merkel avranno il privilegio di finanziare un progetto da cui la Bundeskanzlerin si è auto esclusa per difendere la propria Weltanschauung, trascinando Mr Macron con lei.
Confermare Mr Macron e Frau Merkel nelle loro rispettive fedi ideologiche è stato un capolavoro psicologico di Mr Tillerson, potentemente aiutato da Mr Putin. I superbi alla fine credono sia vero quanto dicono loro gli adulatori.
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — Qatar on Wednesday signed a €5 billion euro (U.S. $5.9 billion) deal to purchase seven naval vessels from Italy, a reminder of the small Gulf state’s purchasing power despite a blockade from neighboring countries.
Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani announced the defense deal at a joint news conference in Doha with Italian Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano. They did not provide more details on the deal, saying only that it underscored the countries’ ongoing defense cooperation.
Qatar, which is the world’s largest liquefied natural gas exporter, and other energy rich Gulf Arab states are among the world’s biggest spenders on military equipment. The deals signed over the years with the U.S. and European allies have helped cement bilateral ties, but have also made the diplomatic fallout around Qatar all the more politically sensitive. Qatar also hosts the hub for U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria.
The dispute erupted in early June when the four countries of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain cut diplomatic ties and transport links with Qatar. Saudi Arabia also sealed shut Qatar’s only land border, impacting a significant source of food imports, and barred it from using its airspace, which has forced Qatar’s flagship carrier to take longer routes over Iran.
The crisis has prompted a flurry of international visits and meetings to try and resolve the crisis.
Earlier this week, the quartet said they would be open to dialogue with Qatar if it accepts their demands to change its policies in the region first. They also insisted that Qatar comply with a sweeping list of 13 demands as well as six broader principles that center around cracking down on terrorism financing.
In remarks at the news conference Wednesday, Al Thani insisted that any talks respect Qatar’s sovereignty and said his country has never put forth conditions for dialogue. He also appeared to dismiss the quartet’s latest comments that Qatar comply with their demands.
The Qatari government has inked a $5.9 billion U.S. deal with its Italian counterpart for four corvettes, an amphibious landing platform dock (LPD) and two offshore patrol vessels.
Qatar had negotiated the purchase in June 2016. Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri is the principal shipbuilder, but Qatar’s ships will also be equipped with electronics and armaments from Leonardo and MBDA, respectively. The latter two firms are to receive a $1.13 billion contract to fit the new ships. The complete naval program also includes 15 years of after-sale maintenance and support work.
Notes & Comments:
Like Qatar Emiri Army and Qatari Emiri Air Force, the Qatari Emiri Naval Forces (QENF)’s modernization-track is steered towards both qualitative improvements as well as capability and quantitative expansion. The QENF’s present fleet comprises of fast attack craft and patrol boats meant for guarding its littoral seas and policing its exclusive economic zone. However, its future fleet will not only augment its patrol force (through two new OPVs), the four corvettes will provide a vastly changed warfighting capability.
Qatar’s forthcoming corvettes will be multi-mission combatants capable of anti-ship warfare (AShW), anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). With a hull length of over 100 metres, Doha intends to configure the corvettes with (likely) a Leonardo KRONOS (Naval or Grand Naval) active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar paired with the MBDA Aster 30 Block-1 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM), which has a range of in-excess of 100 km. Qatar is also procuring MICA-VL short-range SAMs which offer a range of 20 km, potentially to augment the Aster 30s on the corvettes and/or to equip the OPVs. The AShW element will center on the 180 km-range Exocet MM40 Block-3 anti-ship missiles (AShM).
The LPD is expected to be a variant of the 9,000-ton LPD Fincantieri had built for the Algerian Navy, the Kalaat Beni-Abbes. The Kalaat Beni-Abbes has a crew of 160 and can ferry 400 soldiers, 15 main battle tanks or 30 light-armoured vehicles with three medium-weight utility helicopters on its flight deck. This LPD will provide Qatar with an expeditionary element that it can apply for humanitarian and disaster relief and coalition support missions.