Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo

Italia. Export -4.2%, extra Ue -8.1%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-22.

2020-01-20__Istat 001

L’ottimismo del governo è francamente irritante.

«- A novembre 2019 si stima una flessione congiunturale delle esportazioni (-4,2%) e una variazione nulla delle importazioni. Il calo congiunturale dell’export è da ascrivere in particolare all’ampia diminuzione delle vendite verso i mercati extra Ue (-8,1%), mentre quella verso l’area Ue è più contenuta (-0,9%).

– Nel trimestre settembre-novembre 2019 rispetto al precedente si rileva un aumento delle esportazioni (+1,4%) e una lieve contrazione delle importazioni (-0,6%).

– A novembre 2019 la diminuzione su base annua dell’export è pari a -3,2% e coinvolge sia l’area extra Ue (-3,7%) sia i paesi dall’area Ue (-2,7%). La diminuzione tendenziale dell’import (-5,9%) è principalmente determinata dal forte calo registrato per i mercati extra Ue (-10,6%), mentre per i paesi dell’area Ue la flessione è meno ampia (-2,7%).

– Tra i settori che contribuiscono maggiormente alla diminuzione tendenziale dell’export nel mese di novembre si segnalano mezzi di trasporto, autoveicoli esclusi (-23,7%), macchinari e apparecchi n.c.a. (-5,5%), metalli di base e prodotti in metallo, esclusi macchine e impianti (-5,1%) e computer, apparecchi elettronici e ottici (-11,5%). In aumento, su base annua, le esportazioni di articoli farmaceutici, chimico-medicinali e botanici (+22,4%), articoli in pelle, escluso abbigliamento, e simili (+5,9%) e articoli di abbigliamento, anche in pelle e in pelliccia (+3,0%).

– Su base annua, i paesi che contribuiscono in misura più ampia alla flessione delle esportazioni nazionali sono Stati Uniti (-10,5%), Spagna (-10,8%), Germania (-4,5%), Regno Unito (-8,7%) e Cina (-15,5%), mentre si registra un incremento delle vendite verso Svizzera (+11,4%), Francia (+2,5%), Giappone (+17,8%), Belgio (+9,2%) e Turchia (+13,3%).»

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L’Istat ha rilasciato il Report:

Commercio con l’estero e prezzi all’import dei prodotti industriali [pdf]

A novembre 2019 si stima una flessione congiunturale delle esportazioni (-4,2%) e una variazione nulla delle importazioni. Il calo congiunturale dell’export è da ascrivere in particolare all’ampia diminuzione delle vendite verso i mercati extra Ue (-8,1%), mentre quella verso l’area Ue è più contenuta (-0,9%).

Nel trimestre settembre-novembre 2019 rispetto al precedente si rileva un aumento delle esportazioni (+1,4%) e una lieve contrazione delle importazioni (-0,6%).

A novembre 2019 la diminuzione su base annua dell’export è pari a -3,2% e coinvolge sia l’area extra Ue (-3,7%) sia i paesi dall’area Ue (-2,7%). La diminuzione tendenziale dell’import (-5,9%) è principalmente determinata dal forte calo registrato per i mercati extra Ue (-10,6%), mentre per i paesi dell’area Ue la flessione è meno ampia (-2,7%).

Tra i settori che contribuiscono maggiormente alla diminuzione tendenziale dell’export nel mese di novembre si segnalano mezzi di trasporto, autoveicoli esclusi (-23,7%), macchinari e apparecchi n.c.a. (-5,5%), metalli di base e prodotti in metallo, esclusi macchine e impianti (-5,1%) e computer, apparecchi elettronici e ottici (-11,5%). In aumento, su base annua, le esportazioni di articoli farmaceutici, chimico-medicinali e botanici (+22,4%), articoli in pelle, escluso abbigliamento, e simili (+5,9%) e articoli di abbigliamento, anche in pelle e in pelliccia (+3,0%).

Su base annua, i paesi che contribuiscono in misura più ampia alla flessione delle esportazioni nazionali sono Stati Uniti (-10,5%), Spagna (-10,8%), Germania (-4,5%), Regno Unito (-8,7%) e Cina (-15,5%), mentre si registra un incremento delle vendite verso Svizzera (+11,4%), Francia (+2,5%), Giappone (+17,8%), Belgio (+9,2%) e Turchia (+13,3%).

Nei primi undici mesi del 2019, l’aumento su base annua dell’export (+2,1%) è trainato dalle vendite di articoli farmaceutici, chimico-medicinali e botanici (+25,8%), prodotti alimentari, bevande e tabacco (+6,3%), articoli in pelle, escluso abbigliamento, e simili (+9,2%) e articoli di abbigliamento, anche in pelle e in pelliccia (+6,8%).

Si stima che il surplus commerciale a novembre 2019 aumenti di 897 milioni di euro (da +3.975 milioni a novembre 2018 a +4.872 milioni a novembre 2019). Nei primi undici mesi dell’anno l’avanzo commerciale raggiunge +47.909 milioni (+83.331 milioni al netto dei prodotti energetici).

Nel mese di novembre 2019 si stima che l’indice dei prezzi all’importazione cresca dello 0,6% rispetto al mese precedente e diminuisca del 2,1% in termini tendenziali.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Putin, Russia

Russia. Riserve Valutarie salite a 557.5 mld Usd.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-17.

2020-01-18__Russia Riserve

Russia. Riserve Valutarie salite ancora a 548.7 miliardi Usd.

Russia. Riserva Valutarie salite a 546.6 mld Usd. Erano 466.9 mld il primo dell’anno.

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Mr Putin deve aver avuto per antenata una formica parsimoniosa ed oculata.

Se ad inizio anno 2019 le riserve valutarie russe valevano 466.9 miliardi Usd, al 12 dicembre sono salite a 546.6 miliardi: sono aumentate di 79.7 miliardi. Adesso sono arrivate a 557.5 miliardi Usd.

È incredibile la capacità di risparmio della Federazione Russa.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Germania. Pil yoy +0.6%. Comparazione con la Cina.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-15.

2020-01-15__Germania Pil

Paragoni e comparazioni sono sempre amari.

Germania. Spd al 12.5%. Sembrerebbe essere impossibile, eppure lo è.

Germania. Mappa della miseria. 22.7% a Brema, 21.1% nella Ruhr.

Germania. Produzione auto -9%, export auto -13%.

Germania. PMI da più di un anno sotto il 50. Oggi 43.7.

Germania. Popolazione. Classi di età. Destatis. Dati cimiteriali.

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Cina. Produzione Industriale +6.2% yoy. 2019-12-26

Cina. Ha concesso più prestiti a stati esteri di IMF e World Bank.

Cina. Uno dei primi esportatori mondiali di autovetture. +32% in cinque anni.

* * *

Mentre in Germania la produzione automobilistica decresce del -9%, la Cina si sta avviando ad essere il principale produttore mondiale. Mentre in Germania la produzione industriale è in calo, la Cina registra un +6.2%.

In quella che fu la prospera Germania, il numero delle persone che vivono nella fascia della miseria è salito al 21.1% della Ruhr.

Mentre la Cina ha un pil Q3 annualizzato del +6.0%, la Germania deve accontentarsi di un misero +0.6%. E le sta andando di lusso che consuma ancora le scorte.

Le comparazioni potrebbero proseguire in un lungo quanto mesto elenco.

La Germania sta soffrendo non per una crisi economica mondiale, bensì per una sua crisi strutturale e politica.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Eurostat. Reddito Netto Mediano di 1,409 euro al mese.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-15.

Durer Albrecht. Quattro cavallieri dell'Apocalisse. 1498.

Eurostat ha pubblicato un esteso report sulla distribuzione del reddito netto dei cittadini europei.

Significativamente, ha usato come indicatore centrale il valor mediano, ossia la soglia al di sotto ed al di sopra della quale giace la metà dei casi totali considerati. Nel caso del reddito netto, il valor mediano indica il valore di reddito al di sotto del quale vive metà della popolazione.

Il median equivalised  net income nell’Europa valeva nel 2017 16,909 euro, ossia 1,409 euro al mese. Sembrerebbe non essere un valore molto confortante.

La Germania, paese una volta economicamente più prospero nel continente, ha un reddito mediano netto di 21,920 euro, ossia 1,827 euro al mese.

Si tenga presente come la soglia di povertà si di circa 1,600 euro al mese.

L’Europa sta velocemente entrando nella società della miseria.

Già in Francia la situazione sta diventando esplosiva, ma le rivolte hanno la caratteristica di essere altamente contagiose.

* * * * * * *

«This article is part of a set of statistical articles that formed Eurostat’s flagship publication, Living conditions in Europe – 2018 edition»

«Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the total output of an economy; from the perspective of living conditions, GDP may also be calculated as the sum of primary incomes that are distributed by resident producer units (in the form of wages, rents, interest and profits).»

«When a country’s population is taken into account, GDP per capita provides both a convenient measure of average incomes and of the living standards enjoyed by the inhabitants living in a specific economy, as well as (when adjusted to take account of price differences between countries — through the use of purchasing power parities (PPPs) — a measure for comparisons of living standards across countries»

«It is therefore preferable to base any analysis of income distributions on micro data sources, in other words, statistical surveys for a representative sample of actual households, rather than aggregate macroeconomic measures»

«Such surveys allow an analysis of median income levels or the distribution of income across socio-economic strata of the population»

«In order to take into account differences in household size and composition and thus enable comparisons of income levels, the concept of equivalised disposable income may be used. It is based on expressing total (net) household income in relation to the number of ’equivalent adults’, using a standard (equivalence) scale»

«1. Median equivalised net income»

«The EU-28 average was PPS 16 748»

«In 2017, median equivalised net income varied considerably across the EU Member States, ranging from PPS 5 239 in Romania to PPS 28 820 in Luxembourg»

«2. Trends for top and bottom 20 % of incomes diverge»

«Across all 28 EU Member States, the top 20 % of the population with the highest national net disposable incomes (the top quintile) accounted for at least one third of total income, a share that rose highest to 46.0 % in Bulgaria in 20»

«By contrast, the bottom 20 % of the population with the lowest incomes together accounted for less than one tenth of all income, except in Czechia (10.3 %) and Finland (10.0 %)»

«3. Median disposable income in the EU-28 is still rising»

«In 2017, median equivalised net income (hereafter referred to as median disposable income) averaged PPS 16 748 in the EU-28. Across the EU Member States, it ranged from PPS 28 820 in Luxembourg to PPS 5 239 in Romania»

«Map 1 reveals the highest levels of median disposable (more than PPS 22 000) income recorded in central countries of the EU, in particular in Austria (PPS 23 334) and Luxembourg (PPS 28 820), but also in Norway (PPS 28 875), Switzerland (PPS 27 602) and Iceland (PPS 22 193). By contrast, median disposable incomes were often lower in peripheral countries, levels of income of less than PPS 9 000 were recorded in Hungary (PPS 8 364), Bulgaria (PPS 7 517) and Romania (PPS 5 239). Low values were also recorded in Turkey, Serbia and North Macedonia»

«In 2017, EU-28 median disposable income was almost 70 % higher for people with a high level of educational attainment (PPS 22 626) when compared with the level of income for people with a low level of educational attainment (PPS 13 460)»

«4. Median disposable income fell in real terms in two EU Member States»

« Median disposable incomes fell, in real terms, in 2 of the 28 EU Member States. A reduction occurred in Belgium (-1.8 %), while the decline observed in Sweden was relatively small (less than 1.0 %).»

«Between 2016 and 2017, by far the highest increases in real disposable incomes (more than 5 %) were recorded in Romania (13.1 %) and Bulgaria (14.1 %), followed by Croatia (6.6 %).»

«5. The top 20 % of earners shared almost two fifths of the total disposable incomes»

«In 2017, some 38.6 % of the total disposable income in the EU-28 could be attributed to people in the top 20 % of the income distribution, while people in the bottom quintile of the income distribution received a 7.8 % share of total disposable income»

«In 2017, the top 20 % of the highest earners in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Spain and Greece received more than 40.0 % of the total disposable income within their respective economies in 2017»

«6. Income mobility appeared to slow»

«When considering developments over time and comparing results for 2011 with those for 2017, it was commonplace to find that both upward and downward income mobility was reduced. Upward income mobility affected 17.8 % of the EU-28 population in 2011, a share that had fallen to 15.8 % by 2017. In a similar vein, the share of the EU-28 affected by downward income transitions was 17.2 % in 2011, a share that had fallen to 15.1 % by 2017»

* * * * * * *

Eurostat. Living conditions in Europe – income distribution and income inequality

Data extracted in January 2019. Planned article update: May 2020.

*

This article is part of a set of statistical articles that formed Eurostat’s flagship publication, Living conditions in Europe – 2018 edition. Each article helps to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date summary of living conditions in Europe, presenting some key results from the European Union’s (EU’s) statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) , which is conducted across EU Member States, EFTA and candidate countries.

Policy context

Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the total output of an economy; from the perspective of living conditions, GDP may also be calculated as the sum of primary incomes that are distributed by resident producer units (in the form of wages, rents, interest and profits). When a country’s population is taken into account, GDP per capita provides both a convenient measure of average incomes and of the living standards enjoyed by the inhabitants living in a specific economy, as well as (when adjusted to take account of price differences between countries — through the use of purchasing power parities (PPPs) — a measure for comparisons of living standards across countries.

Nevertheless, GDP per capita is a relatively simple, aggregate measure and in order to have a more detailed picture of living conditions, it is pertinent to analyse the distribution (rather than average levels) of household income. A number of different statistical measures are available for this purpose, including household disposable income, in other words, the total income that households have at their disposal for spending or saving. While the aggregated level of household disposable income is available from national accounts and might be used for a general analysis of the household sector, this indicator lacks any distributional dimension. It is therefore preferable to base any analysis of income distributions on micro data sources, in other words, statistical surveys for a representative sample of actual households, rather than aggregate macroeconomic measures. Such surveys allow an analysis of median income levels or the distribution of income across socio-economic strata of the population.

In order to take into account differences in household size and composition and thus enable comparisons of income levels, the concept of equivalised disposable income may be used. It is based on expressing total (net) household income in relation to the number of ’equivalent adults’, using a standard (equivalence) scale. Eurostat uses a ’modified OECD scale’ which gives a weight to each member of a household (and then adds these up to arrive at an equivalised household size), taking into account the number of persons in each household and the age of its members (more details are provided in the glossary). Total disposable household income, derived as the sum of the income received by every member of the household and by the household as a whole, is divided by the equivalised household size to determine the equivalised disposable income attributed to each household member.

The median of the equivalised disposable income distribution is typically used in the EU as a key measure for analysing standards of living within each economy. It is simply the income level that divides the population into two groups of equal size: one encompassing half the population with a level of disposable income above the median, and the other half with a level of disposable income below the median. The use of the median (in contrast to the arithmetic mean) avoids any potential distortion that may be caused by the existence of extreme values, such as a few extremely rich households that may raise the arithmetic mean.

Key findings

Median equivalised net income

In 2017, median equivalised net income varied considerably across the EU Member States, ranging from PPS 5 239 in Romania to PPS 28 820 in Luxembourg. The EU-28 average was PPS 16 748. Note, these figures have been converted into purchasing power standards (PPS) — a unit that takes account of price-level differences between countries.

Median equivalised net income fell, in real terms, in 2 out of the 28 EU Member States in 2017 — they were Sweden and Belgium. A decrease was also noted in Switzerland, Norway and Turkey (for these three latest available 2016 data were compared against 2015 data).

Trends for top and bottom 20 % of incomes diverge

Across all 28 EU Member States, the top 20 % of the population with the highest national net disposable incomes (the top quintile) accounted for at least one third of total income, a share that rose highest to 46.0 % in Bulgaria in 2017. By contrast, the bottom 20 % of the population with the lowest incomes together accounted for less than one tenth of all income, except in Czechia (10.3 %) and Finland (10.0 %). Luxembourg recorded the biggest fall in income share (-1.4 %).

The S80/S20 income quintile share ratio is based on a comparison of the income received by the top quintile and that received by the bottom quintile of the population. In contrast, the Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income differs between a perfectly equal distribution (where each member of the population has exactly the same income) and full inequality (where a single person receives all of the income).

Distribution of income measured by Gini coefficient

Based on the Gini coefficient, Bulgaria and Lithuania (40.2 % and 37.6 %) experienced the highest levels of inequality in equivalised disposable income in the EU in 2017; note that high coefficients were also recorded in Turkey and Serbia (42.6 % and 37.8 %). The lowest levels of income inequality in EU Member States, using this measure, were recorded in Slovakia, Slovenia, and Czechia (less than 25 %).

Income inequality across different age groups

The EU-28 income quintile share ratio for elderly people (defined here as those aged 65 and over) was lower — at 4.1 in 2017 — than the average ratio for the whole population (5.1). This pattern was repeated across all of the EU Member States, except for Cyprus. Income distribution among the elderly was also relatively unequal (compared with the average for the whole population) in Iceland and Switzerland (2016 data).

Social transfers, the main instrument for the realisation of welfare policies, can play a major role by helping to reduce income inequalities

In 2017, social transfers reduced income inequality among the EU-28 population: the Gini coefficient for income (including pensions) was 51.7 % before social transfers and fell to 30.7 % after taking account of these transfers.

Income distribution

Median disposable income in the EU-28 is still rising

In 2017, median equivalised net income (hereafter referred to as median disposable income) averaged PPS 16 748 in the EU-28. Across the EU Member States, it ranged from PPS 28 820 in Luxembourg to PPS 5 239 in Romania.

Map 1 reveals the highest levels of median disposable (more than PPS 22 000) income recorded in central countries of the EU, in particular in Austria (PPS 23 334) and Luxembourg (PPS 28 820), but also in Norway (PPS 28 875), Switzerland (PPS 27 602) and Iceland (PPS 22 193). By contrast, median disposable incomes were often lower in peripheral countries, levels of income of less than PPS 9 000 were recorded in Hungary (PPS 8 364), Bulgaria (PPS 7 517) and Romania (PPS 5 239). Low values were also recorded in Turkey, Serbia and North Macedonia.

Among the population aged 18-64 years, those persons with a tertiary education degree (ISCED levels 5-8) consistently recorded higher levels of median disposable income than those persons who had completed either a low (ISCED levels 0-2) or medium (ISCED levels 3-4) level of educational attainment (see Figure 1).

In 2017, EU-28 median disposable income was almost 70 % higher for people with a high level of educational attainment (PPS 22 626) when compared with the level of income for people with a low level of educational attainment (PPS 13 460). The largest absolute income gaps between persons with low and high levels of educational attainment were recorded in Luxembourg, Malta, Belgium and Germany (more than PPS 10 000); this was also the case in Switzerland. By contrast, the gap in income levels between those people with high and low levels of educational attainment was considerably less in Romania, Hungary, Greece and Slovakia (less than PPS 6 000); this was also the case in Iceland (2016 data), Serbia and North Macedonia (2016 data).

2019-12-17__Eurostat Tavola 1

Median disposable income – changes over time

The EU-28’s median disposable income in nominal terms (in other words, without adjusting for inflation) rose by 2.3 % between 2016 and 2017 (see Table 1). In all EU Member States the income increased, most in Romania (13.1 %) and Bulgaria (13.9 %). Growth rates were lowest in Italy (1.8%), Finland (1.4%) and Greece (1.3%).

Median disposable income fell in real terms in two EU Member States.

After adjusting for inflation (using the harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP)), the development of median disposable incomes between 2016 and 2017 was relatively similar (which may reflect the still low levels of inflation recorded during the period under consideration). In fact, median disposable incomes rose in the EU-28 by 2.1 % in real terms (compared with a 2.3 % increase in nominal terms).

Median disposable incomes fell, in real terms, in 2 of the 28 EU Member States (see Figure 2). A reduction occurred in Belgium (-1.8 %), while the decline observed in Sweden was relatively small (less than 1.0 %). Disposable incomes also fell in Norway (-3.6 %), Switzerland (-1.8 %) and in Turkey (- 4.3 %). For these three countries, the latest available 2016 data were compared against 2015 data.

Between 2016 and 2017, by far the highest increases in real disposable incomes (more than 5 %) were recorded in Romania (13.1 %) and Bulgaria (14.1 %), followed by Croatia (6.6 %).

2019-12-17__Eurostat Tavola 2

The top 20 % of earners shared almost two fifths of the total disposable incomes

A more detailed analysis that focuses on income distribution is presented in Table 2. It is based on ordering the disposable incomes of individuals and then dividing these into quintiles (fifths), in other words, the top 20 % of the population with the highest incomes (referred to as the top or fifth income quintile) down to the 20 % of the population with the lowest incomes (referred to as the bottom or first income quintile).

In 2017, some 38.6 % of the total disposable income in the EU-28 could be attributed to people in the top 20 % of the income distribution, while people in the bottom quintile of the income distribution received a 7.8 % share of total disposable income.

In 2017, the top 20 % of the highest earners in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Portugal, Latvia, the United Kingdom, Spain and Greece received more than 40.0 % of the total disposable income within their respective economies in 2017. A similar situation was recorded also in Serbia and Turkey (2016 data). In most of the EU Member States, the share of the top 20 % of highest earners was within the range of 35.0 % – 40.0 %, although this fell to 34.9 % in Belgium, 33.5 % in Slovenia and 32.8 % in Slovakia.

At the other end of the income scale, people in the bottom quintile of the income distribution received less than 7.8 % (which was the EU-28 average) of total disposable income in 12 EU Member States, out of which in Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria (2016 break in time series) had 6% or less. Only in Finland and Czechia was the share at least ten percent (10.0 % and 10.3 %).

Decline in the share of total disposable income attributed to the bottom and top income quintiles

Between 2011 and 2017, the share of EU-28 disposable income that was accounted for by the bottom and top income quintiles was lower: The share of total income for those with the lowest incomes fell slightly from 7.9 % to 7.8%, while the share for top earners fell from 38.9 % to 38.6 %.

There were 15 EU Member States that reported a falling share of total disposable income being attributed to the lowest income quintile over the period 2011-2017; note that there was a break in time series in Estonia (2014), Bulgaria and the Netherlands (2016). By contrast, there were 9 Member States where the share of the lowest income quintile rose and four where it remained unchanged. The share of the bottom income quintile increased most in Croatia (0.5 pp), followed by Finland and Poland (0.4 pp each). Large increases were recorded also in North Macedonia (1.8 pp) and Turkey (0.5 pp).

At the other end of the spectrum, in 15 EU Member States the share of disposable income attributed to the top income quintile fell between 2011 and 2017, while the share of disposable income accounted for by the top income quintile rose in 13 Member States. The share of disposable income accounted for by the top income quintile rose by more than 2.0 pp in Luxembourg and Lithuania, with a peak of 4.4 pp recorded in Bulgaria. By contrast, the share of the top income quintile fell by more than 1.0 pp in Croatia, Portugal, Poland, Romania and France, with the biggest decline recorded in Slovakia (- 2.3 pp).

2019-12-17__Eurostat Tavola 3

Around 15 % of the EU-28 population moved more than one income decile on the income ladder

This next section analyses the share of the population who experience fluctuations in their economic wellbeing from one year to the next, by studying the proportion of people that move up/down the income ladder receiving a higher or lower level of income.

The analysis is based on how people’s disposable income moves over a three-year period in relation to a set of income deciles — these are similar to income quintiles but instead of ranking the disposable incomes of individuals and then dividing these into fifths, the ranking is divided into tenths; as such, the highest decile refers to the top 10 % of the population with the highest incomes. It is important to note that upward or downward income transitions may occur as a result of direct changes in an individual’s financial situation (more or less income), but may also result from aggregate changes across the whole economy. For example, an individual may see their income frozen, while there is a more general increase in incomes across the remainder of the population and as a result that individual may move to a lower income decile (even if their income remains unchanged). It is also important to consider that these measures of income mobility reflect not only changes in income but also other dynamic aspects of labour markets (such as the demand for labour, unemployment levels, flexible working patterns, job (in)security, etc.). The measures also reflect the changes in family composition — given the indicator is based on equivalised disposable income attributed to each household member.

These remarks notwithstanding, around 15 to 16 % of the EU-28 population moved either upwards or downwards on the income ladder by more than one income decile during the three-year period prior to 2017 (see Table 3).

Among the EU Member States, more than one fifth (20.5 %) of the population in Greece made an upward transition of more than one income decile in the three years prior to 2017, while an even higher share was recorded in Hungary (22.6 %). By contrast, in the three years prior to 2017, at least one fifth of the population in Bulgaria (20.6 %, 2016 break in time series), Poland (20.5 %) and Hungary (20.4 %) experienced a downward transition of more than one income decile.

Income mobility appeared to slow

When considering developments over time and comparing results for 2011 with those for 2017, it was commonplace to find that both upward and downward income mobility was reduced. Upward income mobility affected 17.8 % of the EU-28 population in 2011, a share that had fallen to 15.8 % by 2017. In a similar vein, the share of the EU-28 affected by downward income transitions was 17.2 % in 2011, a share that had fallen to 15.1 % by 2017. Upward income mobility was reduced at a particularly fast pace in Lithuania (-10.1 pp over 2011 to 2016), Ireland (-6.3 pp over 2011 to 2015) and Latvia (-5.0 pp), while downward income mobility was reduced at a relatively fast pace in Romania (-5.0 pp), Ireland (-6.6 pp over 2011 to 2015), and Lithuania (-10.9 pp over 2011 to 2016).

There were relatively few examples of increases in income mobility in 2017 (compared with 2011). This may reflect, at least to some degree, the impact of the global financial and economic crisis on the earlier reference period, with a higher share of the population exposed to fluctuating income levels during the crisis. That said, the share of the population who moved upward by more than one income decile (during the three years prior to the survey) rose by at least 1.0 pp in Finland (1.0 pp), Slovakia (1.6 pp; 2011-2016) and Hungary (3.4 pp). There were also several examples where a growing share of the population was exposed to the risk of falling incomes between 2011 and 2017. Some 19.3 % of the population in Croatia reported a downward transition of more than one income decile during the three years prior to the survey in 2017; this was 1.3 pp higher than the corresponding share from 2013 (18.0 %). Similar results were recorded for Austria — where the share of the population experiencing a downward transition grew by 1.2 pp — and Slovakia (up 0.9 pp; 2011-2016).

Impact of social transfers on income

This next section compares the situation for disposable income before and after social transfers to assess the impact and redistributive effects of welfare policies. These transfers cover assistance that is given by central, state or local institutional units and include, among others, pensions, unemployment benefits, sickness and invalidity benefits, housing allowances, social assistance and tax rebates.

Social transfers led to median disposable income rising by PPS 4 777 in the EU-28

Figure 4 shows the overall impact of social transfers; this information is split between transfers for pensions and other transfers, for example, social security benefits and social assistance that have the aim of alleviating or reducing the risk of poverty.

In 2017, median disposable income in the EU-28 was PPS 4 777 higher as a result of social transfers (pensions included), and was PPS 1 268 higher if pensions are excluded from the analysis.

Among the EU Member States, there were considerable variations in the contribution made by social transfers to median disposable income in 2017. The largest transfers were observed in Luxembourg, where social transfers (including pensions) raised the median disposable income by PPS 10 070. Social transfers (including pensions) were also relatively high in Austria (PPS 7 310) and France (PPS 6 608), as well as in Norway (PPS 7 195; 2016 data).

A somewhat different pattern emerges if pensions are excluded from the analysis: in 2017, social transfers (excluding pensions) of above PPS 2 000 were recorded in Luxembourg (PPS 3 125), Sweden (PPS 2 747), Denmark (PPS 2 473) and Ireland (PPS 2 428).

It is interesting to compare the level of social transfers across the EU Member States including and excluding pensions. In Denmark and Estonia, social transfers including pensions were only around 1.7 times as high as social transfers excluding pensions in 2017. However, in Greece the same ratio was much higher, as the value of social transfers including pensions was 8.7 times higher than social transfers excluding pensions. The next highest ratios were recorded in Romania and Portugal where transfers including pensions were next to 6 times as high as transfers excluding pensions.

2019-12-17__Eurostat Tavola 4

Social transfers were often targeted at nuclear families

Across the EU-28, median disposable income before social transfers was higher (PPS 14 086 in 2017) for persons living in nuclear households comprising two or more adults with dependent children than for the other two types of household. This is shown in Table 4 (PPS 10 628 for those living in households with two or more adults without dependent children and was PPS 8 426 for those living in households composed of a single person with dependent children); note this analysis includes pensions.

This pattern held across each of the EU Member States, except for Slovakia, where those living in households with two or more adults without dependent children had a slightly higher level of disposable income (PPS 8 825 in 2017) than those living in households composed of two or more adults with dependent children (where median disposable income was PPS 583 lower).

The impact of social transfers was considerable, as the level of median disposable income for those living in EU-28 households composed of two or more adults without children rose to PPS 18 815 in 2017, some 77.0 % higher than before social transfers (PPS 10 628). For comparison, social transfers led to a 50.4 % increase in the median disposable income of those people living in households composed of a single person with dependent children. The impact of social transfers was considerably lower for those people living in households composed of two or more adults with dependent children (up 15.3 %).

The re-distributive impact of social transfers generally resulted in the highest levels of median disposable income (after social transfers) being recorded for those people living in households that were composed of two or more adults without dependent children. This pattern held across all but two of the EU Member States in 2017; the only exceptions were Denmark and Estonia— where the highest levels of median disposable income were recorded for people living in households composed of two or more adults with dependent children.

A comparison of median disposable income before and after social transfers reveals that most governments chose to direct the greatest share of their support — in the form of social transfers — towards households with two or more adults without dependent children. For example, the median disposable income among those people living in this type of household in Greece rose from PPS 3 312 to PPS 9 692 as a result of social transfers (an increase of 293 %). Social transfers also resulted in median disposable incomes doubling, or more, for those people living in households with two or more adults without dependent children in Luxembourg, Portugal, Belgium, France, Italy, Slovenia and Spain. A similar situation was recorded in Serbia.

In Ireland and the United Kingdom, social transfers were targeted more towards single-parent households

There were two exceptions to this pattern, where the impact of social transfers was felt more by those people living in households composed of a single person with dependent children. In particular, median disposable income in Ireland rose by 268.9 % in 2017 as a result of social transfers for single-parent households (compared with a 63.0 % increase for people living in a household composed of two or more adults without dependent children, and a 15.4 % increase for people living in households with two or more adults with dependent children). The redistributive impact of social transfers was also felt most by single-parent households in the United Kingdom (where incomes rose by 244.2 % in 2017 as a result of social transfers).

In absolute terms, the highest increases in income were recorded for people living in Luxembourg in households with two or more adults without dependent children; they saw their income rise in 2017 by PPS 22 287 as a result of social transfers. There were also considerable increases in incomes for people living in this type of household in France, Belgium, Austria, Finland and Sweden, as social transfers resulted in median disposable income rising by more than PPS 10 000 in 2017.

Median disposable incomes for people living in single-parent households rose by PPS 8 554 as a result of social transfers in the United Kingdom and by PPS 8 512 in Ireland.

Income inequality

As noted above, while median disposable income provides a measure of average living standards, devoid of the potential distortion of aggregate measures such as GDP per capita, it still fails to offer a complete picture as it does not capture the distribution of income within the population and thereby does little to reflect economic inequalities.

The Gini coefficient

The Gini coefficient is a leading indicator that is used to measure income inequality. The Gini coefficient may range from 0, corresponding to perfect equality (in other words, income is equally distributed among every individual in a given society) to 100, corresponding to perfect inequality (in other words, when all of the income is received by a single person); thus, a lower Gini coefficient reflects a more egalitarian distribution of income.

In 2017, the Gini coefficient for the EU-28 was 30.7 %. The highest income disparities among the EU Member States (with a Gini coefficient of at least 35.0 % — as shown by the darkest orange shade in Map 2) were recorded in Bulgaria and Lithuania. A second group of countries, with a Gini coefficient above the EU-28 average (in the range of 31.0 % – 34.5 %) comprised Estonia, Italy, Romania, the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Latvia. At the other end of the range, income was more evenly distributed in Slovakia, Slovenia, Czechia, Finland and Belgium, as well as Iceland and Norway, where the Gini coefficient was 26.0 % or less.

The S80/S20 income quintile share ratio

Income inequalities within countries may also be illustrated through the income quintile share ratio, which is calculated as the ratio between the income received by the top quintile and the income received by the bottom quintile. High values for this ratio suggest that there are considerable disparities in the distribution of income between upper and lower income groups.

In 2017, the income quintile share ratio for the EU-28 was 5.1 (see Figure 5); this signifies that, on average, the income received by the top 20 % of the population with the highest incomes was more than five times as high as the income received by the 20 % of the population with the lowest incomes.

The income quintile share ratio ranged from a low of 3.4 in Slovenia and Czechia, and 3.5 in Finland and Slovakia to a value between 6.0 – 7.0 in Greece, Latvia, Romania and Spain, peaking at 7.3 in Lithuania and 8.2 in Bulgaria.

The distribution of income was more often more equitable among the older generations

On the basis of the same measure, elderly people (aged 65 and over) in the EU-28 experienced less income inequality than the whole population, as their income quintile share ratio was 4.1 in 2017. This pattern of a more equitable distribution of income among the elderly (compared with the total population) was evident in the vast majority of EU Member States, the only exceptions being Cyprus (4.7 % vs 4.6 %) and Slovenia (where the ratio was identical, 3.4 %). Income inequality was also slightly higher among the elderly in Switzerland and Iceland (both 2016 data).

Impact of social transfers on inequalities

The effect of European welfare systems, in other words, pensions and other social transfers, in addressing income inequality can be demonstrated by comparing Gini coefficients before and after social transfers, to provide a quantitative assessment of their redistributive impact.

n 2017, the EU-28 Gini coefficient for median disposable income before social transfers (pensions included) was 51.7 %, which fell to 30.7 % after social transfers. The impact of pensions and other social transfers on income inequality was particularly large in Portugal, Greece and Germany — where the Gini coefficient fell around 25 points —, while the largest impact was recorded in Sweden where the coefficient was reduced by 29.6 points (see figure 6).

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

Federal Reserve Atlanta. Gdp Q4 yoy +2.3%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-12.

Woman walks past the Federal Reserve in Washington

«GDPNow is not an official forecast of the Atlanta Fed. Rather, it is best viewed as a running estimate of real GDP growth based on available data for the current measured quarter»

«Latest forecast: 2.3 percent — January 10, 2020»

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Vivessimo in un mondo serio, Mr Trump dovrebbe essere insignito con il Premio Nobel per l’Economia.

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La Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ha rilasciato la migliore stima previsionale in tempo reale del Pil americano, anno su anno.

«The growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) is a key indicator of economic activity, but the official estimate is released with a delay. Our GDPNow forecasting model provides a “nowcast” of the official estimate prior to its release by estimating GDP growth using a methodology similar to the one used by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

GDPNow is not an official forecast of the Atlanta Fed. Rather, it is best viewed as a running estimate of real GDP growth based on available data for the current measured quarter. There are no subjective adjustments made to GDPNow—the estimate is based solely on the mathematical results of the model.

Recent forecasts for the GDPNow model are available here. More extensive numerical details—including underlying source data, forecasts, and model parameters—are available as a separate spreadsheet. You can also view an archive of recent commentaries from GDPNow estimates.

                         Latest forecast: 2.3 percent — January 10, 2020

The GDPNow model estimate for real GDP growth (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the fourth quarter of 2019 is 2.3 percent on January 10, unchanged from January 7 after rounding. After this morning’s release of the employment report by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the wholesale trade report from the U.S. Census Bureau, the nowcasts of fourth-quarter real personal consumption expenditures growth and fourth-quarter real gross private domestic investment growth decreased from 2.4 percent and -2.5 percent, respectively, to 2.3 percent and -2.7 percent, respectively.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Diplomazia, Medio Oriente

Oro. Schizzato a 1,553.25. Più che paura sembrerebbe terrore.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-03. h 16:30.

2020-01-03__Gold 001

Nel gennaio 2019 l’oro era quotato attorno ai 1,200 euro l’oncia.

A giugno le quotazioni erano salite a 1,330.

Oggi sono schizzate da 1,513.38 fino a 1,553.25.

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Nessuno intende generalizzare alcunché: tuttavia questo è un chiaro segno di quanta tensione vi sia sui mercati a seguito degli eventi politici, i sbocchi dei quali sembrerebbero essere impredicibili.

Di certo, senza forze armate efficienti è impossibile fare la minima politica estera.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Cina

Cina. Ridotte le riserve obbligatorie delle banche. Liberati 115 miliardi.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-03.

Banca Centrale Cina

I cinesi negli ultimi trenta anni hanno accumulato enormi riserve valutarie: questo fenomeno non è solo visibile a livello statale ma anche nel sistema bancario, che per legge deve detenere una ben definita quota di riserve.

Modificando con prudenza e sagacia il valore della percentuale delle riserve bancarie, la banca centrale si è costruita uno strumento di modulazione del credito quanti mai duttile ed operativo a premuta di pulsante: gli effetti dell’uso di un simile strumento sono quasi istantanei e non intaccano il margine di manovra della banca centrale.

Ma tutto questo è possibile perché in passato la quota destinata a riserva bancaria era molto elevata: dalle riserve si può allora attingere, per il semplice motivo che ci sono.

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«China’s central bank said on Wednesday it was cutting the amount of cash that all banks must hold as reserves, releasing around 800 billion yuan ($114.91 billion) in funds to shore up the slowing economy»

«La banca centrale cinese ha deciso di tagliare i requisiti delle riserve per le banche, liberando così circa 114 miliardi di dollari per sostenere il credito e spronare l’economia in rallentamento. La People Bank of China taglierà il coefficiente di riserva (RRR) il prossimo 6 gennaio di 50 punti base, riducendo l’ammontare di liquidità che le banche devono detenere. Abbassando tale indice vengono liberate risorse per il credito alle piccole e medie imprese»

«The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) said on its website it will cut banks’ reserve requirement ratio (RRR) by 50 basis points, effective Jan. 6. The move would bring the level for big banks down to 12.5%.»

«The PBOC has now cut RRR eight times since early 2018 to free up more funds for banks to lend as economic growth slows to the weakest pace in nearly 30 years»

«Many investors had expected Beijing to announce more support measures soon»

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Se, come sembrerebbe, in questo mese di gennaio Stati Uniti e Cina trovassero un accordo almeno iniziale sul problema dei dazi, la situazione si stabilizzerebbe.

L’incertezza è infatti uno dei maggiori ostacoli nella pianificazione di un progetto industriale.

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Cina, la banca centrale taglia le riserve e libera 114 miliardi

La banca centrale cinese ha deciso di tagliare i requisiti delle riserve per le banche, liberando così circa 114 miliardi di dollari per sostenere il credito e spronare l’economia in rallentamento. La People Bank of China taglierà il coefficiente di riserva (RRR) il prossimo 6 gennaio di 50 punti base, riducendo l’ammontare di liquidità che le banche devono detenere. Abbassando tale indice vengono liberate risorse per il credito alle piccole e medie imprese.

La banca centrale nel 2019 è già intervenuta tre volte per ridurre il coefficiente e sostenere l’economia cinese che, lo scorso anno, è cresciuta al tasso più lento degli ultimi tre decenni. L’agenzia di stampa statale Xinhua ha dichiarato che l’ultimo taglio “compenserà gli impatti della domanda di cassa” in vista del Festival di Primavera di fine gennaio. Il raffreddamento della domanda interna e una lenta guerra commerciale con gli Stati Uniti hanno contribuito al rallentamento dell’economia. Washington e Pechino il mese scorso hanno annunciato la “Fase Uno” dell’intesa sui dazi, dopo quasi due anni di guerra commerciale. L’accordo commerciale sarà firmato a metà gennaio, ha detto Trump martedì, annunciando che andrà in Cina per colloqui continui.

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China cuts banks’ reserve ratios again, frees up $115 billion to spur economy

China’s central bank said on Wednesday it was cutting the amount of cash that all banks must hold as reserves, releasing around 800 billion yuan ($114.91 billion) in funds to shore up the slowing economy.

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) said on its website it will cut banks’ reserve requirement ratio (RRR) by 50 basis points, effective Jan. 6. The move would bring the level for big banks down to 12.5%.

The PBOC has now cut RRR eight times since early 2018 to free up more funds for banks to lend as economic growth slows to the weakest pace in nearly 30 years.

Many investors had expected Beijing to announce more support measures soon. While recent data has shown signs of improvement, and Beijing and Washington have agreed to de-escalate their long trade war, analysts are unsure if either will prove sustainable and forecast growth will cool further this year.

“The RRR cut will help boost investor confidence and support the economy, which is gradually steadying,” said Wen Bin, an economist at Minsheng Bank in Beijing, who also expects another cut in China’s new loan prime rate (LPR) this month.

Premier Li Keqiang raised expectations of an imminent RRR cut in a speech in late December, saying authorities were considering more measures to lower financing costs for smaller companies, including broad-based and “targeted” RRR reductions aimed at helping more vulnerable parts of the economy.

Freeing up more liquidity now would also reduce the risks of a credit crunch ahead of the long Lunar New Year holidays later this month, when demand for cash surges. Record debt defaults and problems at some smaller banks have already added to strains on China’s financial system.

The PBOC said it expects total liquidity in the banking system to remain stable ahead of the Lunar New Year.

Of the latest funds released, small and medium banks would receive roughly 120 billion yuan, the central bank said, stressing that it should be used to fund small, local businesses.

The PBOC said lower reserve requirements will reduce banks’ annual funding costs by 15 billion yuan, which could reduce pressure on their profit margins from recent interest rate reforms. Last week, it said existing floating-rate loans will be switched to the new benchmark rate starting from Jan. 1 as part of a broader effort to lower financing costs.

Analysts at Nomura had forecast the PBOC would deliver a system-wide 50 bps cut in the RRR before the holidays, together with an added reduction for some smaller banks.

Analysts say the U.S-China Phase one trade deal, expected to be signed this month, will relieve only some of the pressure weighing on the Chinese economy, which has also been weighed down by sluggish domestic and global demand, slowing investment and weakening business confidence.

China plans to set a lower economic growth target of around 6% in 2020, relying on increased state infrastructure spending to ward off a sharper slowdown, policy sources said. Growth has cooled from 6.8% in 2017 to 6% in the third quarter of 2019, the slowest since the early 1990s.

MORE POLICY EASING SEEN

Smaller, private firms have been particularly hard hit as regulators clamped down on riskier types of financing and debt.

Despite Beijing’s urging, commercial banks have been reluctant to lend to such firms as they are considered bigger credit risks than state-owned firms.

In recent months, China has also started to make modest cuts in major policy lending rates to lower corporate financing costs, with more expected in the new year.

Tang Jianwei, a senior economist at Bank of Communications in Shanghai, expects two to three RRR cuts this year and a further 25-30 bps reduction in the loan prime rate.

But officials have repeatedly pledged not to resort to “flood-like” stimulus like that in past economic downturns, which left a mountain of debt and stoked fears of property market bubbles.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

ECB. Lagarde inizia a fare marcia indietro. La Green Economy non le compete. …..

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-12-29.

2019-12-30__Lagarde 001

Christine Lagarde a Nicolas Sarkozy: “Usami come vuoi”, lettera-zerbino della direttrice del Fmi

«”Usami per il tempo che ti serve”. Ha fatto scalpore in Francia la lettera trovata dagli investigatori il 20 marzo scorso, scritta da Christine Lagarde, direttrice del Fondo monetario internazionale, all’ex presidente francese Nicolas Sarkozy. Il Corriere della Sera definisce lo stile del manoscritto, trovato nell’abitazione parigina della Lagarde durante una perquisizione per lo scandalo Tapie-Crédit Lyonnais, “a metà strada tra Cinquanta sfumature di grigio e Fantozzi”.

La lettera è senza data, ma è stata scritta con tutta probabilità quando la Lagarde era ministro delle Finanze e Sarkozy presidente della Repubblica. Le Monde ne ha pubblicato ieri il contenuto, mostrando al mondo un’immagine molto “sottomessa” della Lagarde. Il testo, infatti, recita così:

Caro Nicolas,

molto brevemente e rispettosamente:

Sono al tuo fianco per servire te e i tuoi progetti per la Francia

Ho fatto del mio meglio e posso aver fallito, qualche volta. Te ne chiedo perdono

Non ho ambizioni politiche personali e non desidero diventare un’ambiziosa servile come molti di coloro che ti circondano: la loro lealtà è recente e talvolta poco durevole

Usami per il tempo che serve a te, alla tua azione e al tuo casting

Se mi usi, ho bisogno di te come guida e come sostegno: senza guida, rischio di essere inefficace; senza sostegno, rischio di essere poco credibile.

Con la mia immensa ammirazione, Christine L.»

* * * * * * *

Questo è il ritratto che da di sé stessa Mrs Christine Lagarde.

Commissione Europea ed europarlamento hanno messo a capo dell’Ecb uno spaventapasseri, piantato lì nel campo.

«senza guida, rischio di essere inefficace; senza sostegno,

rischio di essere poco credibile»

Ma per fortuna di Mrs Lagarde nel consiglio dell’Ecb siede anche quel bravo uomo di Herr Weidmann, mite, mansueto, remissivo, titubante su quanti cucchiaini di zucchero mettere nella tazza del caffè, ma roccioso sui problemi bancari e valutari.

Mr Weidmann ha adottato la Lagarde. Consigliare i dubbiosi è opera di misericordia spirituale.

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Una cosa sono le promesse elettorali, ma una totalmente differente le azioni intraprese una volta conseguita l’ambita carica.

Non è dato di sapere cosa e come si siano detti i governatori delle banche centrali riuniti in un meeting discreto, totalmente informale. Ma a quanto si sussurra nei corridoi ed alle macchinette del caffè  molti governatori, specie poi quelli che contano, hanno informalmente ricordato a Mrs Christine Lagarde della defenestrazione di Praga.

Mrs Lagarde è sempre stata persona ragionevole: tra l’essere cacciata giù dalla finestra del ventottesimo piano e fare marcia indietro ha optato per conservare sul collo la sua testolina impreziosita dall’opera del parrucchiere personale.

«Sono i governi, piuttosto che la Bce attraverso l’incentivo degli acquisti di bond, ad essere in prima linea sugli investimenti nella green economy: a dirlo in una lettera ad alcuni europarlamentari è la presidente della BCe Christine Lagarde»

«facendo un parziale dietrofront dopo aver suggerito in precedenza che la politica monetaria potrebbe svolgere un ruolo chiave»

«Ridurre gli incentivi agli investimenti inquinanti, e premiare invece tecnologie e modelli di business più sostenibili è in primo luogo un compito dei governi democraticamente eletti e delle autorità pubbliche»

* * * * * * *

Orbene.

Adesso dovrebbe essere chiaro che l’Ecb non supporterà il Green Deal europeo.

Herr Timmermans è il grande perdente, e con lui l’ala liberal socialista europea. Timmermans aveva sperato di poter fare l’aedo a Mrs Lagarde, ma quella invece, da brava femminuccia, si è scelta il padrone più potente.

Ne vedremo delle belle.

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Lagarde: governi, non Bce, in prima linea su green economy

Le misure fiscali sul carbone sono lo strumento ottimale

Sono i governi, piuttosto che la Bce attraverso l’incentivo degli acquisti di bond, ad essere in prima linea sugli investimenti nella green economy: a dirlo in una lettera ad alcuni europarlamentari è la presidente della BCe Christine Lagarde, facendo un parziale dietrofront dopo aver suggerito in precedenza che la politica monetaria potrebbe svolgere un ruolo chiave.

Ridurre gli incentivi agli investimenti inquinanti, e premiare invece tecnologie e modelli di business più sostenibili”è in primo luogo un compito dei governi democraticamente eletti e delle autorità pubbliche”, scrive Lagarde. “Le misure fiscali sul carbone sono lo strumento ottimale”.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Eurozona. Ecb. Riserve Valutarie ancora in calo a 808.04 miliardi euro.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-12-25.

2019-12-20__ECB Riserve

La Ecb ha pubblicato l’ammontare delle Riserve Valutarie a tutto il 2019-12-16: 808.04 miliardi di euro.

Il 16 settembre erano 836.50 miliardi euro.

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Le riserve totali di asset sono asset denominati in valuta estera, subito disponibili e controllate dalle autorità bancarie per il rispetto della bilancia dei pagamenti; l’intervento nei mercati per condizionale il tasso di cambio e per altri scopi collegati (come mantenere la fiducia nella valuta e nell’economia e fare da base per i prestiti esteri). Il dato mostra un quadro davvero completo su base mensile riguardo alle azioni a prezzo di mercato, transazioni, valute estere e rivalutazioni di mercato e altre variazioni di volumi.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Unione Europea

Riksbank Sweden Central Bank abbandona i tassi di interesse negativi.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-12-23.

201912-23__Svezia 001

Reduci dalla débâcle di Cop25, cui si è immediatamente accodata quella della bocciatura del bilancio settennale da loro presentato, i liberal socialisti sono obbligati adesso ad accettare un altro colpo letale alla ideologia da essi professata.

Con questo sobrio annuncio la Riksbank Sweden Central Bank annuncia la fine dell’era dei tassi di interesse negativi:

Riksbank warns of rising financial stability risks in Sweden

«Sveriges Riksbank warns financial stability risks in Sweden have increased since the spring due to higher risk-taking, driven by lower-for-longer interest rates. In its financial stability report, the Swedish central bank stresses “the slowdown in the global economy has contributed to expectations of continued very low interest rates in the years ahead”. In the face of ever lower returns, market participants may be encouraged to adopt riskier investment strategies. ….»

«Sweden’s central bank is this month expected to swim against the tide of global monetary policy by raising interest rates even as the Scandinavian country’s economy softens»

«In 2009, the Riksbank, the world’s oldest central bank, became the first to charge commercial banks to hold deposits rather than pay them interest »

«A manufacturing sentiment survey published on Monday showed the lowest activity reading since 2012, the latest in a series of gloomy economic data. Growth in the third quarter was weaker than the Riksbank expected, according to figures released on Friday, which showed the economy grew 0.3 per cent compared with the previous quarter and 1.6 per cent year on year»

«Growth in both the first and second quarters was revised downwards»

«The labour market is starting to cool. It’s not a crisis but we can see a cooling off in the economy»

«Despite this, the Riksbank is set to end its experiment with negative interest rates at its pre-Christmas meeting»

«It signalled the change in late October when the world’s oldest central bank warned that a prolonged period of sub-zero rates could lead to unspecified “negative effects”, and forecast a rise from minus 0.25 per cent to zero on December 19»

«Other major central banks — notably the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank — are persisting with unprecedentedly loose monetary policy despite growing criticism about the side effects, such as penalising prudent savers, supporting zombie companies that would otherwise collapse, damaging banks’ balance sheets and inflating bubbles in property markets»

«As low interest rates for extended periods create financial vulnerabilities, I would rather see a slightly higher policy rate than a lower one »

«Negative rates can have some weird effects …. pointing to declining bank profitability, difficulties for pension funds and savers, as well as increased risk appetite»

«The Riksbank said the decision on the repo rate will apply from 8 January 2020»

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Come era da aspettarsi, tutti gli economisti gli stipendi dei quali dipendono dal mantenere i tassi di interesse negativi sono insorti adducendo tutte le possibili scuse: corrispondere tassi attivi potrebbe portare a disastri cosmici, aumentare l’inquinamento, far venire la pellagra e, sicuramente, anche impotenza e piedi piatti.

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Da che mondo è mondo chi imprestasse denaro vorrebbe avere due certezze:

– essere rifuso allo scadere del prestito;

– percepire nel tempo di vita del prestito di un interesse ragionevole ed allineato al libero mercato.

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I tassi negativi sono stati una gran bella pensata dei liberal.

Il cliente paga per lasciare liquidità in deposito.

E siccome nessuno è così folle da perseguire un’azione del genere, gli stati emettono leggi che obbligano la gente a far ciò, pena severe sentenze.

Così operando gli stati hanno avuto un lungo lasso di tempo per emettere titoli di stato a tassi negativi, con un certo quale sollievo dell’erario. I governi avrebbero dovuto utilizzare codesto tempo per mettere in opera riforme strutturali, cosa che non fecero: il debito è come la droga.

Ma ogni azione ha sempre degli effetti collaterali, che in questo caso la Riksbank pudicamente denomina “negative effects”.

Le banche vivono imprestando il denaro raccolto riscuotendone quindi gli interessi: se si obbligano i clienti a pagare per mantenere denaro liquido in conto corrente e le banche a concedere prestiti ad interessi negativi il sistema bancario e finanziario dapprima si bloccano e quindi falliscono.

Questo è quanto sta accadendo nell’Unione Europea.

* * * * * * *

La Riksbank è la prima banca centrale a ribellarsi a questa situazione contro natura.

Adesso l’equilibrio è rotto. L’attesa è quella di un transitorio tumultuoso. Molto turbolento.

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Sweden backs away from negative rates despite softening economy

Sweden’s central bank is this month expected to swim against the tide of global monetary policy by raising interest rates even as the Scandinavian country’s economy softens. A manufacturing sentiment survey published on Monday showed the lowest activity reading since 2012, the latest in a series of gloomy economic data. Growth in the third quarter was weaker than the Riksbank expected, according to figures released on Friday, which showed the economy grew 0.3 per cent compared with the previous quarter and 1.6 per cent year on year. Growth in both the first and second quarters was revised downwards. “It’s bad timing to hike rates now,” said Christina Nyman, former deputy head of the Riksbank’s monetary policy department and now chief economist at lender Handelsbanken. “The labour market is starting to cool. It’s not a crisis but we can see a cooling off in the economy.” Despite this, the Riksbank is set to end its experiment with negative interest rates at its pre-Christmas meeting. It signalled the change in late October when the world’s oldest central bank warned that a prolonged period of sub-zero rates could lead to unspecified “negative effects”, and forecast a rise from minus 0.25 per cent to zero on December 19. Other major central banks — notably the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank — are persisting with unprecedentedly loose monetary policy despite growing criticism about the side effects, such as penalising prudent savers, supporting zombie companies that would otherwise collapse, damaging banks’ balance sheets and inflating bubbles in property markets.

Sweden’s rising house prices were flagged as a potential financial risk by the ECB in a recent report — Swedish household indebtedness is one of the highest in Europe at 180 per cent of household income, having risen from 120 per cent in the past 20 years. The Riksbank said in October that if negative rates became the norm “the behaviour of agents may change and negative effects may arise”. Deputy governor Cecilia Skingsley said: “As low interest rates for extended periods create financial vulnerabilities, I would rather see a slightly higher policy rate than a lower one.” But the minutes from the central bank’s October meeting showed that several members stressed they saw no “intrinsic value” in moving away from negative rates. Some Swedish business leaders and economists also oppose the impending policy U-turn, arguing that the economy needs more help, not less. Sweden is a small, open economy, heavily exposed to the recent weakness in the eurozone economy through manufacturing exports. The unemployment rate has been steadily increasing for much of the past 18 months, while inflation has dropped from an annual expansion in prices of 2.2 per cent in May to 1.6 per cent in October.

All this has led many economists and analysts to question the Riksbank’s justification for raising rates, especially when its counterparts at the ECB and US Federal Reserve are cutting. “It’s too late,” said Sanna Arnfjorden Wadstrom, who runs her own business in central Sweden and is also head of the Swedish industry association, Sinf. “It’s strange they are raising rates now. They have locked themselves in.” The Riksbank moved its main repo rate below zero for the first time in early 2015 as it struggled to get inflation anywhere near its 2 per cent target. Sweden’s economy expanded by 4.4 per cent that year and remained strong for the next two years as inflation gradually ticked up, leading some economists to question why the Riksbank failed to normalise monetary policy then, rather than waiting until now when signs of weakening are proliferating. “In the back of their minds, they know they could have raised interest rates earlier. But they’ve backed themselves into a corner,” said David Oxley, senior Europe economist at Capital Economics in London.

Several economists said they failed to see a strong justification for the move back to zero — where the Riksbank forecasts rates will stay for several years to come — with some wondering if it is simple unease at the prospect of a lengthy period at negative levels. Ms Nyman said: “It’s not clear why they want to hike.” Mr Oxley argued that the concerns about the consequences of negative rates for other economies failed to ring true in Sweden. “Negative rates can have some weird effects,” he acknowledged, pointing to declining bank profitability, difficulties for pension funds and savers, as well as increased risk appetite. But, he added, “none of those effects seem to be very large in Sweden”. Instead, he claimed, the likely rate rise suggested that the Riksbank was at the limits of what monetary policy can achieve; the bank already owns close to half of Sweden’s government bond market through its programme of quantitative easing. “They are the first monetary authority to throw the towel in and admit they’re pretty much out of ammunition and what ammunition they have, they don’t want to use,” he added.

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A Pioneer of Negative Rates Pauses the Experiment

Sweden’s central bank, the first to apply negative rates on deposits, moves key rate back up to zero

«Sweden’s central bank, one of the pioneers in wielding negative interest rates, became the first to end that policy Thursday, a move closely watched by other institutions that have resorted to what was supposed to be a radical and short-lived measure. 

In 2009, the Riksbank, the world’s oldest central bank, became the first to charge commercial banks to hold deposits rather than pay them interest. In 2015, it lowered its key policy rate below zero, following a similar move by the European Central Bank the year before.»

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Swedish central bank ends pioneering era of subzero rates

Sweden’s central bank has ended a five-year experiment of keeping its benchmark interest rate below zero, a policy that other countries have also adopted to try to improve economic growth.

The country’s central bank, called the Riksbank, said Thursday it had decided to raise its benchmark interest rate to zero from -0.25%, where it had been cut in 2015, amid signs that inflation has been picking up.

The bank said inflation has been close to its official target of 2% since the start of 2017, and assessed “the conditions are good for inflation to remain close to the target going forward.”

The bank said the rate was “expected to remain at 0% in the coming years.” The repo rate is the rate at which commercial banks can borrow or deposit money at the Swedish central bank.

The Riksbank set a world first in the summer of 2009, when it cut another key interest rate, its deposit rate, below zero. It then lowered the repo rate below zero in 2015.

Other central banks, including the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan, have also cut rates below zero.

The use of negative rates has drawn global scrutiny as critics warn they can distort financial markets, potentially sowing the seeds of another financial crisis. Low rates, which help make borrowing cheaper and can stimulate the economy, also make it harder to save, which can mean people will have to work longer to build up enough retirement money.

The Riksbank said the decision on the repo rate will apply from 8 January 2020.