Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Cina, Finanza e Sistema Bancario

Cina. 11 trilioni Usd di bond. 1.3 trilioni in scadenza entro un anno. – Bloomberg.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-20.

2018-06-12__Cina_Bond__001

I mercati finanziari delle grandi potenze economiche ci hanno abituato a trattare cifre da capogiro, che difficilmente mente umana può comprendere appieno.

Il mercato cinese dei bond ammonta ad undici trilioni di dollari americani, e di questi 1.3 trilioni Usd va in scadenza entro dodici mesi.

Nulla da stupirsi se gli investitori stiano domandandosi, alcuni anche in modo accorato, se potranno mai rivedere indietro i soldi impiegati.

Non solo.

Se è vero che a differenza dell’occidente gran parte del debito cinese è stato contratto per finanziare attività produttive, che una volta avviate rendono economicamente, sarebbe altrettanto vero che la guerra sui dazi potrebbe danneggiare almeno alcuni settori, mettendoli in difficoltà con la refusione.

«Given the massive size of the market — now more than $11 trillion, with a further half trillion or so in dollar bonds — it was always going to be a delicate transition»

*

«Potential refinancing of $1.3 trillion looms in coming year»

*

«China’s efforts to connect the world’s third-biggest bond market with the international financial system are hitting dual headwinds — a climb in global borrowing costs, and the country’s own campaign to reduce financial leverage»

*

«The dynamics have contributed to defaults by 12 bond issuers in 2018 through June 4, after 18 for the whole of 2017, according to Fitch Ratings»

*

«But with about 8.2 trillion yuan ($1.3 trillion) of domestic corporate and local-government securities due to mature in the coming 12 months, it’s an open question whether China is prepared to let chips fall where they may»

*

«Authorities started shifting away from the old model of implicit guarantees for practically all debt securities in 2014, allowing defaults for the first time»

*

«Where would the lines be drawn on who goes bust?»

*

«As the U.S. Federal Reserve keeps raising interest rates, and China’s monetary overseers pursue a separate campaign to rein in shadow banking, the coming year may prove decisive in shifting investors away from relying on assumptions of state support — instead forcing them to value bonds based on how likely they are to get their money back.»

*

«Better differentiation between borrowers based on their risk has been long absent in China»

*

«Despite its size, the near-absence of defaults in China’s market until relatively recently was one quirk that kept it out of sync with the rest of the world»

* * * * * * *

Se è vero che i default in Cina sono stati eventi del tutto rari, è altrettanto vero che il passato potrebbe non riproporsi nel futuro. Né è detto che la Cina si astenga dall’usare i default come arma finanziaria.

La Fed ha già iniziato, e proseguirà, ad aumentare i tassi di interesse, e questo fatto potrebbe spostare molte risorse finanziarie dallo yuan al dollaro americano.

Poi, che sia in corso una guerra economica e finanziaria dovrebbe essere sotto gli occhi di tutti, ed in guerra diventa lecito utilizzare anche armi altamente distruttive.

Riassumendo, nessuna idea catastrofista, ma un caldo suggerimento ad usare sana prudenza: nella vita non si sa mai.


Bloomberg. 2018-06-10. China’s $11 Trillion Bond Market Tested by Rising Defaults

– Local idiosyncracies challenge global funds eyeing China

– Potential refinancing of $1.3 trillion looms in coming year

*

China’s efforts to connect the world’s third-biggest bond market with the international financial system are hitting dual headwinds — a climb in global borrowing costs, and the country’s own campaign to reduce financial leverage.

The dynamics have contributed to defaults by 12 bond issuers in 2018 through June 4, after 18 for the whole of 2017, according to Fitch Ratings. Firms from JPMorgan Chase & Co. to Fidelity International are warning to prepare for more. But with about 8.2 trillion yuan ($1.3 trillion) of domestic corporate and local-government securities due to mature in the coming 12 months, it’s an open question whether China is prepared to let chips fall where they may.

Authorities started shifting away from the old model of implicit guarantees for practically all debt securities in 2014, allowing defaults for the first time. The idea: tap market discipline to punish inefficient companies and encourage a more productive capital allocation. Given the massive size of the market — now more than $11 trillion, with a further half trillion or so in dollar bonds — it was always going to be a delicate transition. Where would the lines be drawn on who goes bust? A global-standard credit-ratings industry could hardly be engineered overnight. And who would staff credit-research teams and risk-control desks? Not to mention creating a derivatives market to hedge risks.

Great Wall of Maturities

A total of 8.2 trillion yuan of bonds are set to mature next 12 months

And with China’s door at its most open yet to overseas investors, the global spotlight is shining like never before on these securities.

“The pace is so much faster today, that’s one of the things that’s missed from many investors” looking at China’s capital markets, said Brendan Ahern, chief investment officer at Krane Funds Advisors, which is expanding its line of fixed income products as China’s bond market opens. “If you have to take your eye off China, it moves so quickly that it’s way ahead of you.”

As the U.S. Federal Reserve keeps raising interest rates, and China’s monetary overseers pursue a separate campaign to rein in shadow banking, the coming year may prove decisive in shifting investors away from relying on assumptions of state support — instead forcing them to value bonds based on how likely they are to get their money back.

And about time too, says Ashley Perrott, the Singapore-based head of pan-Asia fixed income at UBS Asset Management. Better differentiation between borrowers based on their risk has been long absent in China.

“It had to happen if they’re going to become a more mature market,” Perrott said. Despite its size, the near-absence of defaults in China’s market until relatively recently was one quirk that kept it out of sync with the rest of the world. There are many more that have made it idiosyncratic.

Annunci
Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Mondiale, Stati Uniti, Trump

Trump, Fbi, Corney ed Hillary Clinton. Punto di vista cinese. – China Org.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-19.

Pechino-Cina

«China.org.cn
China Internet Information Center

China.org.cn offers broad access to up-to-date news about China, with searchable texts of government position papers and a wealth of basic information about Chinese history, politics, economics and culture.

The authorized government portal site to China, China.org.cn is published under the auspices of the State Council Information Office and the China International Publishing Group (CIPG) in Beijing.»

* * *

«Errors found in handling of Clinton email probe»

*

«Ex-FBI Director James Comey deviated from norms of the agency and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in handling the probe of Hillary Clinton’s use of private email server»

*

«Comey’s decisions during the 2016 U.S. presidential election race were not driven by political bias to help either side»

*

«report found that Comey was insubordinate when making some key decisions with regard to the probe of Clinton’s email use while she was secretary of state, including his public announcement in July 2016 that there would be no charges against Clinton»

*

«The former FBI chief was accused of violating DOJ policy by revealing days before the election that the agency was examining new materials possible relevant to the Clinton probe»

*

«Comey tweeted that he respects the Inspector General’s office and the “conclusions are reasonable”»

* * * * * * *

Come da consolidata abitudine, China Org usa parole misurate e pacate, riportando i fatti senza commento alcuno.

Ma il fatto stesso che abbia riportato la notizia nella finestra destra ed il titolo come articolo di spalla rende bene l’idea dell’importanza annessa alla notiza.


China Org. 2018-06-15. Errors found in handling of Clinton email probe

Ex-FBI Director James Comey deviated from norms of the agency and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in handling the probe of Hillary Clinton’s use of private email server, according to an internal report released on Thursday.

The report, conducted by Inspector General Michael Horowitz, also concluded that Comey’s decisions during the 2016 U.S. presidential election race were not driven by political bias to help either side.

The highly-anticipated report found that Comey was insubordinate when making some key decisions with regard to the probe of Clinton’s email use while she was secretary of state, including his public announcement in July 2016 that there would be no charges against Clinton.

The former FBI chief was accused of violating DOJ policy by revealing days before the election that the agency was examining new materials possible relevant to the Clinton probe, a decision that, as Clinton has argued, contributed to her loss in the race.

In addition, the report was highly critical of two FBI staff members who exchanged highly charged political messages, finding that their texts created the appearance of bias and cast cloud over the FBI.

“While we did not find that these decisions were the result of political bias on Comey’s part, we nevertheless concluded that by departing so clearly and dramatically from FBI and department norms, the decisions negatively impacted the perception of the FBI and the department,” the report read.

In response to the report, Comey tweeted that he respects the Inspector General’s office and the “conclusions are reasonable,” even though he disagreed with some of them. He said that “people of good faith” can see the “unprecedented situation differently.”

Comey was fired by President Donald Trump in May 2017, which led to the appointment of special counsel Robert Mueller, who is looking into whether the president obstructed justice in the Russia probe, among other things.

Trump has repeatedly criticized Comey for his handling of the Clinton probe and also targeted the FBI and the DOJ, which analysts say were intended to undermine the Mueller probe.

At the White House briefing Thursday, press secretary Sarah Sanders said the report is reaffirming Trump’s suspicions about the “political bias among some of the members of the FBI.”

Pubblicato in: Cina, Unione Europea

Asia alla conquista dell’Europa dell’Est.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-18.

 Ceec. 16 + 1. 0021

Con la Belt and Road Initiative (Bri) la Cina sta stendendo una rete infrastrutturale che collega la Cina sia a tutto il sud est asiatico sia all’Europa. Poi, lungo le strade e le strade ferrate si localizzano industrie che sono così in grado di veicolare a prezzi contenuti i propri prodotti. Quasi invariabilmente sono aziende cinesi, od a forte capitale cinese

È una iniziativa per la quale la Cina ha stanziato quasi 1,500 miliardi di dollari americani.

In particolare, la Cina sta concentrandosi sui paesi del Ceec.

Cina e Serbia. Belt and Road si approfonda nei Balcani.

Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern Countries.

China’s Bid To Buy Eastern Europe On The Cheap: The ’16+1′ Group

Cina. Ceec, un nome da imparare. Dazi ridotti dal 17.3% al 7.7%.

Ceec, China and Central and Eastern European Countries

Commentary: Less anxious, more active EU needed in China-CEE cooperation

* * * * * * *

Nota.

Illiberal nations” designa per l’articolista gli stati che non condividono l’ideologia liberal.

* * * * * * *

«A tale of two suitors: Chinese and Japanese investments in Central and Eastern Europe»

*

«By contrast, there is little discussion of Japanese investments in Europe other than general agreement that more of them would be welcome»

*

«The countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in particular enthusiastically welcome Chinese investments with little consideration about potential hidden economic and political costs, and put comparatively little effort in attracting more Japanese investments»

*

«U.S. National Security Strategy expressed concern that the initiative could allow China to gain “a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure.”»

*

«In April, 27 out of the 28 European Union (EU) member states – with the notable exception of Hungary – reportedly signed a document denouncing the BRI as a tool to hamper free trade and offer unfair advantage to Chinese companies»

*

«Central and Eastern Europe, the Achilles’ Heel of EU Unity?»

*

«Given the model and smaller size of their economies, the EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are more prone to welcome Chinese investments with fewer concerns about ulterior motives»

*

«However, their EU membership raises important stakes for the EU as a whole, including its political unity»

*

«U.S., EU and Japan …. These three partners share a similar goal to promote economic growth and political reforms that would enhance these countries’ resilience and unity in face of potential illiberal pressures»

*

«In contrast to their Chinese counterparts, Japanese companies have a much larger presence in the Czech Republic, but their operations are generally less visible to both the general public and policymakers. In recent years, only Asahi’s acquisition of Pilsner Urquell, the largest and most popular Czech brewery, got some limited media attention»

*

«China actually uses its broad multilateral framework known as the “16+1” as a venue to maximize its bilateral engagement with its partners through sideline meetings»

*

«Japan’s engagement with the Visegrád Group of countries which encompasses the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia is the only existing multilateral format of regional»

*

«On the other hand, the departure of the second net contributor to the EU budget will most likely result in fewer available funds in the new EU budget cycle of 2020-2026, making Chinese investments even more appealing»

*

«This may particularly be the case in countries like Romania, which have a poor track record of accessing EU funds»

*

«recent statements from French and German officials suggest that access to future funds may become conditional on respect of rule of law and fundamental values – a measure aimed to address the rising tide of populism in Central and Eastern Europe»

* * * * * * *

I paesi dell’est europeo e dei Balcani sono i grandi dimenticati dell’Unione Europea, che vi ha investito quattro spiccioli, dei quali ben pochi in infrastrutture.

Questo è accaduto sia per miopia strategica, sia per settarismo ideologico. Questi sono infatti stati che non intendono rinunciare al proprio retaggio religioso, storico, culturale, sociale ed artistico, l’abiura del quale sarebbe per l’attuale dirigenza dell’Unione Europea conditio sine qua non per ricevere fondi comunitari.

Ovviamente, tutti gli spazi politici ed economici lasciati liberi sono immediatamente occupati da altri, con tutte le conseguenze del caso.

Infine, non troviamo particolari critiche alla prudenza usata dai cinesi e dai giapponesi nel fare investimenti nei paesi dell’est europeo: é intuitivo che non vogliano forzare il sistema ed irritare possibili partner.


The Diplomat. 2018-06-10. East Asia Comes to Europe

A tale of two suitors: Chinese and Japanese investments in Central and Eastern Europe.

*

Mid-May marked the one-year anniversary since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s massive foreign policy initiative, held its first official Forum in Beijing. International reception of the initiative has been mixed, with the United States, Europe and Japan in particular expressing concerns about China’s possible ulterior motives, including in Europe. By contrast, there is little discussion of Japanese investments in Europe other than general agreement that more of them would be welcome. The countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in particular enthusiastically welcome Chinese investments with little consideration about potential hidden economic and political costs, and put comparatively little effort in attracting more Japanese investments.

Without naming the BRI directly, the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy expressed concern that the initiative could allow China to gain “a strategic foothold in Europe by expanding its unfair trade practices and investing in key industries, sensitive technologies, and infrastructure.” In April, 27 out of the 28 European Union (EU) member states – with the notable exception of Hungary – reportedly signed a document denouncing the BRI as a tool to hamper free trade and offer unfair advantage to Chinese companies. While previously seen as a source of economic benefits, today the EU and many of its member states share growing concerns over both the negative economic consequences (e.g. unwanted technological transfer, lowering standards) and political implications (e.g. European disunity) of Chinese engagement with Europe. In its turn, Japan would like to avoid a repeat of the 2017 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on the South China Sea – in which China used its investments in Hungary and Greece as leverage to weaken the EU statement on the final decision.

Central and Eastern Europe, the Achilles’ Heel of EU Unity?  

Given the model and smaller size of their economies, the EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are more prone to welcome Chinese investments with fewer concerns about ulterior motives. However, their EU membership raises important stakes for the EU as a whole, including its political unity. The specific case studies of Romania and the Czech Republic illustrate how Chinese and Japanese investments play out in these countries. Despite their difference in size, our analysis reveals many similarities between the two countries’ interactions with these international partners – and allowed us to draw a series of provisional conclusions.  

First, despite the media hype surrounding Chinese investments of tens and even hundreds of millions of dollars, these promises have been slow to materialize. Estimates vary, but according to the Financial Times, the Czech Republic and Romania ranked at the top of China’s total CEE infrastructure investments for 2012-2016, after Bosnia, but there is no evidence that the $5.5 billion China promised to Romania and the Czech Republic has materialized in concrete projects. By contrast, Japan has been a constant and reliable presence in the economic landscape of these countries.

Second, existing Chinese and Japanese investments generally concentrate in complementary economic sectors, with no indication of direct competition between the two investors. Whereas Japanese often invest into development of greenfield and brownfield projects which fit into value-chain of their technology corporations, Chinese focus more in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in different fields and infrastructural development.

Finally, host countries see Brexit as an opportunity for more Japanese investments – although the feeling is not fully reciprocated for now. Indeed, some of our interviews with officials from the region suggest they would welcome more Japanese investments, but are still struggling to convince the famously risk-averse investors to expand operations in these relatively newer markets.

Even though in its early stages, the implementation of the BRI has raised the profile of China in the region even further. The prospect of the BRI implementation presents the U.S., EU and Japan with an opportunity to reconsider their engagement with the region. These three partners share a similar goal to promote economic growth and political reforms that would enhance these countries’ resilience and unity in face of potential illiberal pressures.

The Case of Romania

“I can think of many examples of successful Japanese investments in Romania, but nothing for China right off the top of my head,” a high-ranking Romanian diplomat said during one of our interviews. This statement synthesizes the situation in the country.

In recent years, the Romanian political class and public-opinion have embraced the idea of Chinese investments with great enthusiasm. “China is on a shopping spree in Europe […] and could potentially invest hundreds of billions of Euros in Romania,” one of Romania’s main TV channels said in November 2017. The same article noted that more than 20 “giant” Chinese companies visited Romania to scout possible future business ventures. The delegation showed particular interest in energy projects, despite limited progress over more than 5 years in investments in the 3rd and 4th  reactors of the country’s only nuclear power plant, in Cernavodă. Other still-to-materialize projects in the energy field include the 2012 Sinovel deal to develop a 1.2GW in wind energy and the 2013 Ming Yang decision to invest 500 million Euro (about $588 million) to build a 200MW wind turbine project in 2013 and turn the country into the hub for Chinese wind power turbines in Europe. The few investments that actually materialized are much smaller in scope and nature, including the 40 million Euro invested by the China Tobacco International Europe Company in a factory in Buzău, and the 20 million Euro invested by a Chinese company to build bikes in Hunedoara.

By contrast, Japan’s presence in Romania has garnered less media visibility, but has been more consistent. Japanese investors began operating in Romania in earnest in the early 2000s; as of last year, it was the largest Asian investor in the country. More than 150 Japanese companies created approximately 40,000 jobs on the local market. Investments are concentrated in the automotive sector, but there is growing interest in other sectors, including the IT industry. In addition to business investments, Japan gained a lot of appreciation for its Official Development Assistance (ODA) loans that helped build or modernize important infrastructure projects, such as the shipment terminal in the port of Constanţa, gas and thermal energy products, roads and railroads. After becoming an EU member state in 2007, Romania is no longer eligible for ODA, but it is still finalizing a final loan received under this umbrella for a metro connection between the main train station and the Bucharest-Otopeni international airport.

The Case of the Czech Republic

China became the top foreign policy priority of both the Czech president and Social Democratic coalition government as early as 2012-2013. The goal was to attract Chinese investments and increase Czech exports to the East Asian country. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Prague in March 2016 included the signature of agreements worth 7.39 billion Euro by 2020. In reality, the total amount of Chinese investment reached cumulative amount of only 23 billion Czech koruna (0.9 billion Euro or $1.1 billion) in 2017.

CEFC China Energy is responsible for the vast majority of investments in the Czech Republic – and all those investments came in the form of M&As. Allegedly one of the biggest Chinese private companies, CEFC has acquired stakes in several Czech companies in different fields, including: 9.9 percent share in J&T Financial Group, 49.9 percent in the biggest private airline Travel Service; majority stakes in the Florentinum office buildings in Prague, the Lobkowicz Group brewery, ŽĎAS mechanical engineering company; and minority stakes in Médea Group and Empresa Media (which owns the Barrandov TV channel where Czech President gives long weekly interviews). CEFC’s Chairman, Ye Jianming, was recently detained in China, and the company was largely taken over by a state-owned mammoth CITIC. Its representatives promptly made a trip to Prague and reassured national political representatives that its operations will continue in the country, but it is unlikely its expansion will incorporate other segments.

Apart from CEFC, there are other investors such as TV producer Changhong, active already since mid-2000s, or Xi’an Shaangu Power which acquired Ekol, a turbine manufacturer.

In contrast to their Chinese counterparts, Japanese companies have a much larger presence in the Czech Republic, but their operations are generally less visible to both the general public and policymakers. In recent years, only Asahi’s acquisition of Pilsner Urquell, the largest and most popular Czech brewery, got some limited media attention.  

All in all, Japan has been active on the Czech market since the 1990s. Around 250 Japanese companies currently operate there, mostly in the automotive industry and its supply chain. A significant proportion of companies have been engaged into greenfield or brownfield investments. Japanese companies employ more almost 50,000 people and, according to investment promotion agency CzechInvest, Japan is the second largest investor in the Czech Republic. The cumulative amount of Japanese investments amounted to 3.6 billion Euro as of 2016. The largest investment is represented by a joint factory of Toyota Motor Corporation and Peugeot Citroën.

Multilateral Engagement

The two actors have separate multilateral formats for political engagement to promote their economic investments.

China actually uses its broad multilateral framework known as the “16+1” as a venue to maximize its bilateral engagement with its partners through sideline meetings. Each member country hosts visible annual summits by rotation, and have leading roles in particular sectors, such as Romania in the case of energy and the Czech Republic on healthcare. Our preliminary findings indicate there have been few concrete results of their leadership. The EU has become increasingly wary of this format and, for the first time in the history of the forum, the European Commission sent an observer to the November 2017 meeting in Budapest. China brushes off the EU’s concerns as unsubstantiated, with the Chinese Ambassador to the EU going to great lengths to stress his country’s support of European unity via op-eds and speeches addressed to European audiences. At the same time, China is reportedly playing with the idea of reducing the frequency of summits from yearly to once every two years.

Japan does not have a similarly holistic or visible approach to the region. Japan’s engagement with the Visegrád Group of countries which encompasses the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia is the only existing multilateral format of regional. Diplomats in Tokyo privately say they are moderately satisfied with this format known as the “V4+Japan,” although they indicated it is increasingly difficult to raise rule of law concerns relevant to the business investment climate. The rest of the country’s engagement with the CEE countries is by and large bilateral – and, in cases like Romania’s, relatively recent. In this sense, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Bucharest in January 2018, the first of a sitting Japanese Prime Minister in the country’s history, could lead to the consolidation of further ties, and Romania’s support on international issues like the North Korean nuclear threat.

The Brexit Factor

The decision of the second largest economy in the EU to leave the Union following the so-called Brexit referendum in 2016 raises important stakes for the CEE countries. On the one hand, these countries hope to host Japanese companies that may need to relocate from the UK to continental Europe because of Brexit. A participant to an event on the V4+Japan co-hosted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs earlier this year noted that the countries in the region are already competing more or less openly to fill that role. For example, following the first visit of a Czech Prime Minister to Tokyo in 12 years, the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade had a round of negotiations in 2017 with its Japanese counterpart on the possibility of becoming a more important gate for Japanese businesses coming to the EU. Similarly, then-Romanian commerce minister Ilan Laufer said during his visit to Tokyo in September 2017 that his country should also be considered an attractive destination for Japanese investors in light of Brexit.  

On the other hand, the departure of the second net contributor to the EU budget will most likely result in fewer available funds in the new EU budget cycle of 2020-2026, making Chinese investments even more appealing. This may particularly be the case in countries like Romania, which have a poor track record of accessing EU funds. Furthermore, recent statements from French and German officials suggest that access to future funds may become conditional on respect of rule of law and fundamental values – a measure aimed to address the rising tide of populism in Central and Eastern Europe. This proposed measure is not welcomed in the Czech Republic either.

Another indirect benefit of Brexit is that it has enhanced political will to conclude the EU-Japan FTA, known as the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). In a 2017 survey by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 70.4 percent of the Japanese companies operating in the CEE countries indicated that they intend to use the EPA to enhance economic ties and investments between Japan and the region.  

Policy Recommendations

This year marks the 15th anniversary of the EU-China and EU-Japan strategic partnerships, a good landmark for all sides to reassess their relations. This reevaluation should pay special attention to the role the CEE countries and their specific set of challenges, ranging from their comparatively lower economic development, smaller markets, and problems with corruption, inefficiency, and rule of law.

Given the strategic importance of the region, the U.S. should try to become actively engaged in discussions about these relations, or to at least take these developments into close considerations when assessing its own engagement with the region. By coordinating and tailoring their approach carefully, the U.S., EU and Japan could advance their broader strategic goals effectively.

First, they could encourage economic investments in these countries. While their respective wallets may not be as deep as the BRI budget, these three Western partners hold the advantage of operating according to the highest standards. For example, the power of the “Made in Japan” brand is still very strong in the CEE countries, in contrast to more skepticism about the quality of Chinese projects. “Japan has a stellar reputation” in the region, a Romanian diplomat gushed, only to later lament that they are hard to attract.  

Second, they should make sure that the Chinese investments in Europe are in full compliance with free trade rules in general, and EU rules in particular. For example, the adoption of a proposed EU-wide screening mechanism for foreign investments would be a step in the right direction. The three Western partners should also promote their operations in the CEE countries more actively, since the general public and many decision makers are often not aware of their importance. The end result would be greater willingness of national policymakers to accommodate their investment needs, and not fall under the spell of lofty Chinese promises.

Third, they should coordinate efforts to promote rule of law and fundamental values in a region where populism is on the rise. Japan in particular may find it difficult to address these issues at first given its current limited emphasis. Both Japan and the EU have insisted they support a rules-based liberal international order that benefit their economic and political interests – and their credibility stands a strong test in this part of Europe. With China’s genuine commitment to these values still under question, Western partners need to convince that “they are in it for the long run” when it come to their relations with the CEE countries.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Devoluzione socialismo

Hong Kong. Edward Leung condannato a sei anni per rivolta. – Aljazeera.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-16.

Homg Kong - Macau 001

Sono ben pochi gli storici ed i politologi che non riconoscano ad Abraham Lincoln ed al Governo di Washington la capacità giuridica di aver condotto la guerra di secessione tra gli Stati Uniti d’America e gli Stati Confederati. Nessuno stato sovrano può tollerare una secessione, specie poi se armata.

Ben differente la scissione del 1° gennaio 1993 della allora Cecoslovacchia in Repubblica Ceka e Slovacchia: questo scorporo fu votato regolarmente in parlamento, di comune accordo tra le parti.

Similmente, in uno stato sovrano gli Elettori, ossia la società civile, si esprime alle elezioni secondo leggi e costumanze locali: quindi la maggioranza governa e la minoranza si adegua. La minoranza ha il diritto / dovere di far sentire la sua voce e le sue motivazioni in parlamento, attraverso i media, professando le proprie convinzioni, ma rimanendo pur sempre nell’alveo della legalità.

In uno stato la società civile non ha bisogno alcuno di ricorrere alla piazza, specie poi se in forma violenta.

L’uso della violenza mette immediatamente dalla parte del torto, indipendentemente dalle ragioni addotte.

«Hong Kong’s leading independence activist was jailed for six years on Monday for rioting and assaulting police, one of the city’s harshest sentences against a democracy activist in recent years»

Questa frase è incorretta.

Non esiste, non può né deve esistere, un “democracy activist” che sia “rioting and assaulting police“.

*

«About 130 people, mostly police, were injured when masked protesters tossed bricks and set rubbish cans alight to vent their anger against what they saw as mainland Chinese encroachment on the city’s autonomy and freedoms»

*

Chiunque definisca “freedoms” il fare una manifestazione dove i dimostranti mascherati lanciano mattoni e feriscono qualcosa come 130 persone, per di più poliziotti, è ben fuori strada: questa non è ‘democrazia‘ bensì criminalità organizzata.

E sei anni di condanna sono pena davvero mite e lieve.


Aljazeera. 2018-06-11. Hong Kong jails top activist Edward Leung for six years

Edward Leung sentenced to six years in prison for rioting and assaulting police officer during 2016 street protests.

*

Hong Kong’s leading independence activist was jailed for six years on Monday for rioting and assaulting police, one of the city’s harshest sentences against a democracy activist in recent years.

Edward Leung, one of the leaders of a movement advocating for Hong Kong‘s independence from China, had earlier been found guilty of rioting in a 2016 overnight protest that turned violent.

He had pleaded guilty to assaulting a police officer. The 27-year-old was sentenced to one year in jail on that count, with the two terms to be served concurrently.

About 130 people, mostly police, were injured when masked protesters tossed bricks and set rubbish cans alight to vent their anger against what they saw as mainland Chinese encroachment on the city’s autonomy and freedoms.

Handing down his jail term, Judge Anthea Pang said Leung actively participated in the riots and described his actions as “wanton and vicious”.

The 2016 protest began as a seemingly innocuous rally to protect illegal hawkers from health inspectors but it quickly morphed into an outpouring of anger against authorities in Hong Kong and Beijing.

At the forefront of the clashes were young “localists”, a term coined for radical groups promoting a split from mainland China which grew out of the failure of massive pro-democracy rallies in 2014 to win concessions from Beijing on political reform.

At the time, Leung was the head of localist group Hong Kong Indigenous and a rising star on the political scene as the fledgling independence movement gathered momentum, infuriating Beijing.

Pang said the protesters appeared to be “sincere, earnest but wrong-headed people” with strong convictions.

They “will stop at nothing to impose those views” on society, she said, which Hong Kong cannot tolerate as it poses “extremely great danger”.

About 130 people, mostly police, were injured when masked protesters tossed bricks and set rubbish cans alight to vent their anger against what they saw as mainland Chinese encroachment on the city’s autonomy and freedoms.

Handing down his jail term, Judge Anthea Pang said Leung actively participated in the riots and described his actions as “wanton and vicious”.

The 2016 protest began as a seemingly innocuous rally to protect illegal hawkers from health inspectors but it quickly morphed into an outpouring of anger against authorities in Hong Kong and Beijing.

At the forefront of the clashes were young “localists”, a term coined for radical groups promoting a split from mainland China which grew out of the failure of massive pro-democracy rallies in 2014 to win concessions from Beijing on political reform.

At the time, Leung was the head of localist group Hong Kong Indigenous and a rising star on the political scene as the fledgling independence movement gathered momentum, infuriating Beijing.

Pang said the protesters appeared to be “sincere, earnest but wrong-headed people” with strong convictions.

They “will stop at nothing to impose those views” on society, she said, which Hong Kong cannot tolerate as it poses “extremely great danger”.

‘Fishball Revolution’

Leung looked calm throughout the hearing and waved at supporters – some of whom reacted emotionally to the sentence – before being led away.

Two other protesters were sentenced alongside Leung to seven years and three and a half years in prison.

At least 16 people have already been jailed over the clashes, with terms of up to four years and nine months for a man convicted of rioting and arson. Unlike Leung, none were known activists.

Police fired warning shots in the air as the unrest worsened and scores of people including officers were injured, with dozens arrested.

The protests were dubbed the “Fishball Revolution” after one of the city’s best-loved street snacks.

The defence said Leung, who pleaded not guilty, had no intention to riot but wanted to “protect Hong Kong culture”.

Multiple pro-democracy activists who want a greater say in how the city is run but do not push for full independence have been prosecuted on protest-related charges over the largely peaceful 2014 Umbrella Movement.

Leung is the first leading activist advocating full independence to come to court.

He was previously barred from standing in legislative elections due to his support for independence as Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing government cracks down on any advocacy of a split.

Leung resigned as spokesman of Hong Kong Indigenous and left the group in December last year.

The government’s squeeze on independence campaigners has seen several activists barred from standing for office and others ejected from Hong Kong’s partially elected legislature.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Stati Uniti, Trump

Trump. Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China. – White House

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-16.

Washington. White House. 001

«My great friendship with President Xi of China and our country’s relationship with China are both very important to me»

*

«Trade between our nations, however, has been very unfair, for a very long time»

*

«This situation is no longer sustainable»

*

«China has, for example, long been engaging in several unfair practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual property and technology.  These practices, documented in an extensive report published by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on March 22, 2018, harm our economic and national security and deepen our already massive trade imbalance with China.»

*

«In light of China’s theft of intellectual property and technology and its other unfair trade practices, the United States will implement a 25 percent tariff on $50 billion of goods from China that contain industrially significant technologies.»

*

«This includes goods related to China’s Made in China 2025 strategic plan to dominate the emerging high-technology industries that will drive future economic growth for China, but hurt economic growth for the United States and many other countries»

*

«The United States can no longer tolerate losing our technology and intellectual property through unfair economic practices.»

*

Sicuramente un provvedimento che lascerà il segno.


White House. 2018-06-15. Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China

My great friendship with President Xi of China and our country’s relationship with China are both very important to me.  Trade between our nations, however, has been very unfair, for a very long time.  This situation is no longer sustainable.  China has, for example, long been engaging in several unfair practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual property and technology.  These practices, documented in an extensive report published by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on March 22, 2018, harm our economic and national security and deepen our already massive trade imbalance with China.

In light of China’s theft of intellectual property and technology and its other unfair trade practices, the United States will implement a 25 percent tariff on $50 billion of goods from China that contain industrially significant technologies.  This includes goods related to China’s Made in China 2025 strategic plan to dominate the emerging high-technology industries that will drive future economic growth for China, but hurt economic growth for the United States and many other countries.  The United States can no longer tolerate losing our technology and intellectual property through unfair economic practices.

These tariffs are essential to preventing further unfair transfers of American technology and intellectual property to China, which will protect American jobs.  In addition, they will serve as an initial step toward bringing balance to the trade relationship between the United States and China.

The United States will pursue additional tariffs if China engages in retaliatory measures, such as imposing new tariffs on United States goods, services, or agricultural products; raising non-tariff barriers; or taking punitive actions against American exporters or American companies operating in China.





2018-06-16__Usa-Cina__001

2018-06-16__Usa-Cina__002

Pubblicato in: Cina, Problemia Energetici, Russia

Russia – Cina. Accordo per costruire reattori nucleari di nuova generazione.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-15.

Cina. Centrali atomiche. 001

La Cina è un paese da oltre un miliardo e trecento milioni di abitanti: nel breve volgere di trenta anni è passata da un paese misero ad essere la prima potenza economica mondiali, se misurata come pil ppa.

Di questi tempi ha varato un grandioso progetto per fare emergere dalla povertà nella fascia della classe media circa seicento milioni di persone. Si delinea quindi un mercato interno di dimensioni quasi eguali a quelle di tutto l’occidente considerato assieme.

Cina ed emersione dalla povertà rurale.

*

A parte il carbone, la Cina non dispone di significative quantità di energetici estrattivi, ed infatti è il maggiore importatore mondiale di petrolio e gas naturale.

Dimenticate Russia, Arabia, Iran, Opec. È la Cina che fa i prezzi del petrolio.

*

Per queste considerazioni la Cina ha come passo obbligato il dotarsi di una consistente quantità di centrali atomiche.

Cina. Centrali elettriche nucleari. 37 reattori attivi, 60 in costruzione, 179 programmati.

* * * * * * *

«China’s nuclear industry has grown from its experience importing technology sold by foreign companies hoping to benefit from booming demand in the world’s largest energy consumer»

*

«The nation’s ambitions to build out its nuclear power industry at home, and sell its own technology abroad, is beginning to overcome cost overruns and tighter regulations.»

*

«Deal signed in Beijing to build four Rosatom-designed reactors. Nations set to build two VVER-1200s at Xudabao, two at Tianwan»

*

«China has agreed to pursue building next-generation nuclear reactors designed by Russia’s Rosatom Corp., the latest player seeking a boost for its new technology from China’s embrace of atomic power»

*

«The agreements are worth more than 20 billion yuan ($3.1 billion) and total construction costs could exceed 100 billion yuan, according to China National Nuclear Corp., adding it’s the biggest nuclear pact ever between the two countries»

*

«As part of the agreements signed Friday, the countries will seek to build two Russian VVER-1200 units at the Xudabao power plant in China’s Liaoning province and two more at Tianwan in Jiangsu, according to a statement from Moscow-based Rosatom»

* * * * * * * *

Questa notizia dovrebbe dare da pensare a molti.

Sul mercato mondiale l’occidente è rappresentato soltanto dalla Westinghouse Electric Co., la quale però sta vincendo sempre meno commissioni e virtualmente è impossibilitata a costruire reattori in patria. In una situazione del genere i suoi prodotti diventano presto obsoleti e poco competitivi.

Se è vero che la Korea del Sud riesce ancora a reggere sul mercato del nucleare, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare come sia specializzata in reattori atomici di bassa – media potenza. Un’offerta che può soddisfare molte esigenze locoregionali, ma non certo le richieste energetiche della Cina.

A parte il fatto che i reattori della Rosatom siano allo stato dell’arte, in pratica sono gli unici acquistabili sul mercato e con solide garanzie della manutenzione.

La prima centrale nucleare in Egitto a firma russa

La politica nucleare di Putin tra Nordafrica e Medio Oriente

Nucleare: Intesa tra Russia e Sud Africa per la costruzione di nuovi reattori nucleari (9,6 GW)

* * * * * * *

L’occidente ha abbandonato per motivazioni ideologiche un settore altamente strategico nelle mani dei russi e dei cinesi.

È stato dissipato un know-how di difficile e costosa acquisizione con una leggerezza difficilmente comprensibile.


Bloomberg. 2018-06-09. Russia Joins China’s Race for Next-Generation Nuclear Reactors

– Deal signed in Beijing to build four Rosatom-designed reactors

– Nations set to build two VVER-1200s at Xudabao, two at Tianwan

*

China has agreed to pursue building next-generation nuclear reactors designed by Russia’s Rosatom Corp., the latest player seeking a boost for its new technology from China’s embrace of atomic power.

A plan to build four Russian units was among four deals signed Friday during a ceremony in Beijing attended by presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. The agreements are worth more than 20 billion yuan ($3.1 billion) and total construction costs could exceed 100 billion yuan, according to China National Nuclear Corp., adding it’s the biggest nuclear pact ever between the two countries. China will finance the reactor construction, Rosatom Chief Executive Officer Alexey Likhachev said after the ceremony.

China’s nuclear industry has grown from its experience importing technology sold by foreign companies hoping to benefit from booming demand in the world’s largest energy consumer. The nation’s ambitions to build out its nuclear power industry at home, and sell its own technology abroad, is beginning to overcome cost overruns and tighter regulations.

The nation signaled in March it would end a multiyear freeze on new reactor construction this year, and a month later approved the fuel-loading of Westinghouse Electric Co.’s AP1000 in Zhejiang province’s Sanmen and French-designed EPR in Guangdong’s Taishan. That paves the way for startups within months, which would be the first successful operations globally for units of their kind.

Russian Reactors

As part of the agreements signed Friday, the countries will seek to build two Russian VVER-1200 units at the Xudabao power plant in China’s Liaoning province and two more at Tianwan in Jiangsu, according to a statement from Moscow-based Rosatom.

China already uses some of Russia’s older technology. Two VVER-1000 units at Tianwan started in 2007, and a third was connected to the grid in December, Rosatom said.

“Tianwan has been a testing ground for Russian nuclear technology,” said Snowy Yao, an analyst at China Securities International Finance Holding Co. “China looks willing to try out all the latest designs before endorsing a winner.”

The two countries also on Friday signed deals for the supply of equipment, fuel and services for the CFR-600 fast reactor pilot project developed by state-owned CNNC, as well as the supply of generator parts for China’s lunar exploration program.

China previously signed a contract with Westinghouse to build two units at Xudabao, according to a World Nuclear Association report in October 2016. They were among six AP1000 reactors planned for the site, it said. A Beijing-based Westinghouse spokesman declined to comment Friday.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Commercio, Geopolitica Mondiale, India

Cina. New Silk Road. Qualche difficoltà nel sud-est asiatico.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-12.

2018-06-06__Cina. New Silk Road__001

Il Progetto Belt and Road è un piano a livello mondiale: si propone di costruire quasi ovunque nei paesi sottosviluppati infrastrutture di base: acquedotti, reti fognarie, centrali elettriche e relativa rete di distribuzione, strade, autostrade e ferrovie. Lungo il decorso di queste nuove arterie di comunicazione risulta essere conveniente impiantare realtà produttive, collegate in modo decente con il resto del mondo.

L’intero progetto sarebbe valutabile attorno ai 1,500 miliardi di dollari americani, 580 dei quali da spendersi entro il 2020.

La Cina si propone molti obbiettivi.

L’appoggio politico ed economico fornito a paese poveri, se porto con garbo, costituisce materiale cementante i rapporti. Permette di stabilire rapporti cordiali e di reciproca utilità, destinati ad incrementarsi nel tempo via via che questi paesi poveri entrano in una fascia di almeno relativo benessere.

Il progetto cinese è strategico: se sia vero che interessano anche i risultati immediati, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare come gli obbiettivi reali siano sul lungo termine. In linea generale potremmo dire tra venti – trenta anni.

Se è vero che il progetto Belt and Roda, di cui il Silk Road è una componente, mira ad aiutare le economie al momento misere ad emergere, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare che i cinesi intendono averne gestione diretta, anche perché i soldi sono i loro. Un caso paramount è la concessione degli appalti, in cui le ditte cinesi sono invariabilmente preferite a discapito di quelle occidentali.

Belt and Road. La Cina rigetta il rapporto C4ADS. Gli Usa fuori dagli appalti: sono liberal.

Cina. Grande Muraglia contro la Germania. – Handelsblatt.

Questa posizione cinese, peraltro ben capibile, è anche facilitata dalle posizioni occidentali, che legano la possibilità collaborativa delle proprie imprese a vincoli che rispecchiano la proprio particolare concezione etica e morale. Che poi le imprese sgattaiolino anche in modo rocambolesco è un altro paio di maniche, ma senza l’ombrello protettivo di una diplomazia aperta ed efficiente le imprese occidentali risultano essere fortemente penalizzate.

Confindustria tedesca ha definito il sistema cinese come una nuova Grande Muraglia eretta contro di lei.

Il nodo è che a cambiare non sarà certo la Cina: l’Occidente dovrebbe cambiare registro se intende lavorare nel progetto Belt and Road.

Poi, vi sono anche tutti i problemi di rapporti diplomatici con i paesi con i quali la Cina sta collaborando.

Con alcuni paesi questi sono chiari e facili, con altri alquanto tribolati.

Per esempio, la Cina ha ancora in essere un contenzioso territoriale con l’India, la quale non vede poi troppo di buon occhio il prorompente sviluppo economico cinese: il suo concreto timore è quello di restare accerchiata politicamente ed economicamente.

Altri paesi si stanno rendendo conto che, pur essendo il Progetto Belt and Road gigantesco quanto mai munifico, verosimilmente avrebbero potuto contrattare condizioni migliori. Questo è per esempio il caso del Myanmar.

Da ultimo, ma non certo per ultimo, il mondo inizia finalmente a rendersi conto a rendersi conto che, proseguendo su questo trend, tra due decenni la Cina sarà egemone a livello mondiale, evenienza questa che non tutti sono disposti ad accettare.

«The economic corridor did not play an important role in Indian development plans, whereas the Chinese attached great significance to it»

*

Ci si pensi bene.

La Cina cura i propri interessi, pur avendo sempre molta attenzione a fare guadagnare anche gli altri: ma tra i due darà sempre priorità agli interessi cinesi.


Deutsche Welle. 2018-06-04. China’s New Silk Road faces resistance from India, partners

The highly ambitious Belt and Road Initiative promises to fortify China as an economic superpower. But negotiations around the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor are proving contentious.

*

China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the New Silk Road project, has been featured prominently in the media ever since President Xi Jinping initiated the program in 2013. China has been touting the BRI as the 21st century’s biggest project. By 2020, China plans to have invested €500 billion ($580 billion) into it.

Judging by some ecstatic media reports, one might assume that thousands of cargo trains are already barreling from China to Europe, and that millions of containers are being handled at ports along the New Silk Road. In reality, however, the BRI faces some severe and partially self-inflicted problems — as the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor demonstrates.   

The BCIM is one of six planned economic corridors that China wants to promote in the context of the BRI. Initially, however, the BCIM started out as an independent subregional initiative pursued by China’s southwestern Yunnan province. Back then, it was not part of China’s large-scale BRI program.

In 1991, Yunnan established the BCIM Forum. Researchers and experts met to discuss the opportunities and risks involved in creating a direct land route between Kolkata and Kunming. They identified a number of potential benefits: The world’s most populous countries would be connected, a wealth of natural resources south of the Himalayas could be exploited, and hitherto isolated regions — chiefly India’s seven northeastern states, which depend on the Siliguri Corridor to for access to the rest of the country — could be integrated into the global economy. The political scientist Khriezo Yhome, from India’s Observer Research Foundation (ORF) think tank, even expressed hopes that the project could reduce competition between India and China and thereby contribute to peace and stability.

A BCIM Forum in 2013 brought few concrete results. That was mainly because of India’s reluctance to recognize the summit as an official intergovernmental meeting. So, the BCIM Forum remained little more than a place for academics and other experts to engage in dialogue, as the sociologist Patricia Uberoi, who works at the Institute of Chinese Studies in New Delhi, told DW. Uberoi participated in and contributed to the BCIM talks for many years.

2013’s Turning point

Everything changed with the K2K car rally from Kolkata to Kunming. After Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited India in May 2013, he and his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, issued a joint statement saying that “encouraged by the successful BCIM Car Rally of February 2013 between Kolkata and Kunming, the two sides agreed to … initiating the development of a BCIM Economic Corridor.”

“By issuing this joint declaration,” Uberoi said, “the BCIM Economic Corridor became an official governmental project.” However, India and China had different expectations. “The economic corridor did not play an important role in Indian development plans, whereas the Chinese attached great significance to it.”

At the meeting, it was agreed to author a joint report on how to progress on the economic corridor project, based on four reports written by the individuals states. This was never realized, however, mainly because Myanmar lacks the resources to go ahead with the project, Uberoi said: “Myanmar said it needs more time. The process, started in 2013, still has not been completed and is way behind schedule.”

Competition — not cooperation

In addition to some states’ lack of resources, persistent mistrust and competition between India and China continue to pose a problem. In 2017, tensions came to the fore with the Doklam border standoff.

“India has repeatedly explained that the BCIM project is part of its ‘Look East’ policy,” Uberoi said. Since 1990, that has been all about connecting India with Southeast Asia in order to strength its own position — and weaken China’s.

The BCIM Forum started as a subregional initiative pursued by Yunnan and other western provinces. “But then Beijing took control over the initiative,” Uberoi said, “putting the commission in charge that also oversees the BRI.” Once China’s National Development and Reform Commission took over in 2015 — and began talking about the BCIM Economic Corridor along with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is hotly contested by India — it had become apparent that the BCIM initiative had been integrated into China’s wider BRI program. That is understandable from China’s perspective: It’s a means of maximizing its influence. But it did not go down well in India. “A new emphasis was lent to the BCIM project when China made it part of its Belt and Road program,” Uberoi said. Now, India feels disadvantaged. From the outset, officials in New Delhi have stressed that India does not want to be included in China’s ambitious BRI program. And they have remained resolute on this matter.

A missed opportunity

Uberoi said it was unfortunate that China had appropriated the BCIM initiative. She argues that the numerous cultural, ethnic, and social commonalities shared by China’s Yunnan province, northern Myanmar, northern Bangladesh and northeastern India can be better utilized and integrated through a regional initiative than through a project run out of Beijing. “Much will depend on whether local authorities will be involved,” she said. “If the initiative were coordinated by Yunnan province, it would not be seen as a big threat,” she added. “That way, at least China’s central government would not be in charge.”

It would be good, Uberoi said, if other projects emerge that are less under China’s control. Initiatives supported by international donors, for instance, would be less humiliating for India. Currently, India’s northeastern regions are set to lose out; many development projects are on hold given the current situation.

Officials in India, meanwhile, must realize that China has already created facts on the ground, Uberoi said: “If India wants to establish a land connection to Myanmar and Southeast Asia, it will be confronted with Chinese infrastructure inside Myanmar.” As an example, she cited an oil and gas pipeline leading from the Bay of Bengal, via Myanmar’s Rakhine state, to the Chinese city of Kunming. Some strategists have expressed hopes of countering China’s north-south pipeline by establishing a link running from east to west. But it’s too late for that. “You can’t turn back the clocks,” Uberoi said.  

Pubblicato in: Cina, Stati Uniti, Trump

Cina. Commento ufficiale al G7 ed a cosa ha fatto Mr Trudeau.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-11.

Pechino-Cina

China Internet Information Center

«China.org.cn offers broad access to up-to-date news about China, with searchable texts of government position papers and a wealth of basic information about Chinese history, politics, economics and culture.

The authorized government portal site to China, China.org.cn is published under the auspices of the State Council Information Office and the China International Publishing Group (CIPG) in Beijing.»

*

Riportiamo il commento ufficiale del Governo cinese sulle vicende del G7, ed in particolare sul comportamento di Mr Justin Trudeau. Si consideri che usualmente questi commenti sono scritti in linguaggio diplomatico, comprensibile bensì ovattato.

I contenuti esposti sono tali che ogni ulteriore commento sarebbe inappropriato.

«Trudeau’s statements are “amateurish” and “sophomoric” only “for domestic consumption»

*

White House blasts Trudeau over G7 statements

Two senior White House officials on Sunday blasted Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau over his earlier statements during the just concluded Group of Seven (G7) summit.

Trudeau announced on Saturday that all G7 members had endorsed the joint communique; however, he noted that the U.S. tariffs are “insulting” and Canada “will not be pushed around.”

The remarks have enraged U.S. President Donald Trump. He tweeted hours later that he had instructed U.S. representatives not to endorse the G7 joint communique “based on Justin’s false statements at his news conference, and the fact that Canada is charging massive Tariffs to our U.S. farmers, workers and companies.”

Saying Trudeau is “dishonest & weak,” he also threatened “tariffs on automobiles flooding the U.S. Market!”

Also in response, Larry Kudlow, director of the White House’s National Economic Council, said on Sunday in an interview with CNN that Trudeau betrayed Trump with “polarizing” statements on U.S. trade policy.

He added that Trudeau’s statement risked making Trump look weak before his meeting with Kim Jong Un, the top leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in Singapore.

“He really kind of stabbed us in the back,” he said, adding Trump “is not going to let a Canadian prime minister push him around on the eve of this … he is not going to permit any show of weakness on the trip to negotiate with North Korea.”

Saying Trudeau’s statements are “amateurish” and “sophomoric” only “for domestic consumption,” Kudlow said it was Trudeau’s remarks that had prompted Trump to pull out of the joint communique.

“He held a press conference and he said the U.S. is insulting. He said that Canada has to stand up for itself. He says that we are the problem with tariffs. The non-factual part of this is – they have enormous tariffs,” Kudlow said. “Don’t blame Trump. It was Trudeau who started blasting Trump after he left, after the deals had been made.”

Trump’s trade adviser Peter Navarro also lashed out on Sunday at Trudeau’s statements, saying they represent “bad faith.”

“There is a special place in hell for any for leader that engages in bad faith diplomacy with President Donald J. Trump and then tries to stab him in the back on the way out the door and that’s what bad-faith Justin Trudeau did with that stunt press conference, that’s what weak, dishonest Justin Trudeau did,” Navarro told “Fox News Sunday.”

Trump “did the courtesy to Justin Trudeau to travel up to Quebec for that summit. He had other things, bigger things, on his plate in Singapore. … He did him a favor and he was even willing to sign that socialist communique. And what did Trudeau do as soon as the plane took off from Canadian airspace? Trudeau stuck our president in the back. That will not stand,” he noted.

Trump’s decision to withdraw his support for the communiqué has drawn sharp criticism from Germany on Sunday.

“In a matter of seconds, you can destroy trust with 280 Twitter characters,” German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said when asked about Trump’s decision. “We have seen this with the climate agreement or the Iran deal.”

Canada’s Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland spoke against the United States over its tariffs on steel and aluminum on Friday during the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Charlevoix, Quebec.

“Canada will not change its mind when it comes to the illegal and absolutely unjustified application of tariffs on steel and aluminum, not only coming from Canada, but on the steel and aluminum sold by all the G7 allies who are assembled here, to the United States,” Freeland said in a news conference at the summit.

Noting the U.S. imposition of tariffs was officially stated as a national security consideration, Freeland said: “We are very clear that Canada does not pose a national security threat to the United States. On the contrary, as part of the U.S. law, we are part of the national defense base of the United States.”

“Canada has already raised cases at the WTO and at NAFTA, and we will retaliate,” she said. “But we say that with great sadness.”

Last week, Canada hit back at Trump administration by announcing retaliatory tariffs on up to 16.6 billion Canadian dollars (12.8 billion U.S. dollars) worth of U.S. steel and aluminum as well as a diverse list of other products. Those countermeasures are set to take effect on July 1.

James Brander, an international trade expert at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, said Freeland’s comments were meaningful.

“I think she is outlining Canada’s actual position and is outlining actual steps that have been taken and are being taken,” he told Xinhua in an interview.

G7 includes the seven leading industrialized countries of Britain, the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Unione Europea

Cina e Slovenia. Laboratorio di supercalcolo in Ljubljana.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-06.

Slovenia

Giusto un anno or sono avevamo dato l’annuncio:

Supercalcolatori cinesi. Ora sono i primi al mondo.

Cina. Il suo primo supercalcolatore interamente made in China.

*

Il problema è semplicissimo.

Fino a qualche anno fa l’Occidente era l’unico posto dove poter trovare una ditta che vendesse chiavi in mano un supercalcolatore funzionante.

Adesso la realtà ha cambiato volto.

Non solo i cinesi sono riusciti a progettare e costruire il loro primo supercalcolatore interamente made in China, ma questo surclassa i supercalcolatori occidentali ed è anche in libera vendita.

La Silicon Valley ha semplicemente perso il primato mondiale. Certo, sicuramente c’è ancora ed in molti settori è leader, ma il fatto che stia perdendo colpi è sotto gli occhi di tutti. In questo settore l’Unione Europea è totalmente assente.

*

Il metodo per giudicare è triviale.

Invece che stare a considerare i mirabolanti annunci di ciò che sarà prodotto in un futuro più o meno lontano, basta scorrere i listini di ciò che sia acquistabile immediatamente. La differenza tra promesso ed acquistabile è davvero molto grande.

Significativa è la scelta della Slovenia come partner scientifico della Cina.

«Arctur is the leading service provider of supercomputing in Central Eastern Europe, striving to bring innovative and user-friendly IT solutions to businesses, state and public institutions»

Quella Europa dell’est negletta da parte dell’Unione Europea, che questa eurodirigenza sta spingendo nelle braccia dei cinesi: è stata ed è una scelta strategica profondamente errata. Poi non ci si stupisca dei mutamenti politici in atto.


Cina Org. 2018-05-29. Slovenian-Chinese supercomputing lab launched in Ljubljana

A Slovenian-Chinese virtual laboratory for high-performance computing was launched on Monday at the Ljubljana Faculty of Computer and Information Science, the first project of a memorandum on multi-year cooperation between the two countries’ scientists.

This memorandum was signed in Beijing last April by the faculty, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese supercomputer manufacturer Sugon and Slovenia’s Arctur as part of an achievement of the Slovenian-Chinese economic cooperation commission.

The cooperation will among other things focus on additional support for the Orange program, developed by the bioinformatics laboratory at the Ljubljana faculty, according to the Slovenian Press Agency STA.

Orange is a tool for data analytics with a user-friendly interface, which is intended to be additionally supported by data analytics with supercomputer performance.

One of the main goals is to develop new methods and a program system for the detection of patterns in large quantities of biomedical data and climate data from computer simulations.

Citing the Slovenian Public Administration Minister Boris Koprivnikar, the STA report said the results of research will be used to eliminate concrete issues faced by science, industry and modern society as a whole.

A part of the Orange program is already being developed for Slovenian drug maker Lek to enable it to develop biopharmaceuticals faster.

Arctur is the leading service provider of supercomputing in Central Eastern Europe, striving to bring innovative and user-friendly IT solutions to businesses, state and public institutions, research institutions and NGOs.

According to Arctur director Tomi Ilijas, the STA said, the importance of the cooperation with Sugon is huge.

While it is very demanding to maintain the exascale-class computers developed by Sugon due to high electricity consumption, this technology is very useful as it takes research and development to another level, Ilijas said.

Sugon vice-president Ying Guo said the project made Arctur the European centre for Sugon, from which all Europe-related activities would be coordinated.

Pubblicato in: Amministrazione, Cina, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Unione Europea. Più poliziotti che delinquenti. – Eurostat

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-06.

2018-05-22__Eurostat__001

Eurostat ha rilasciato l’aggiornamento del database Personnel in the criminal justice system by sex – number and rate.

Sono dati che danno da pensare. Sono aggiornati a tutto il 2015.

I dati relativi alla concentrazione sulla popolazione sono espressi per unità ogni 100,000 residenti.

*

Per paragone, nella Repubblica Popolare Cinese vi sono 147 unità delle forze dell’ordine ogni 100,000 abitanti, citando volutamente un fonte malevola.

* * *

Giudici.

2018-05-22__Eurostat__002

In Italia vi sono 6,496 giudici, contro i 20,301 in Germania, 5,720 in Francia, 5,096 nel Regno Unito, 1,271 in Svizzera.

Considerando la concentrazione ogni 100,000 abitanti, in Italia abbiamo 10.68 giudici, in Germania 25.14, in Francia 8.6, nel Regno Unito 8.84, in Svizzera 15.98.

Per comparazione, in Polonia sono 26.20, in Ungheria 28.82, in Scozia 4.74.

* * *

Forze dell’ordine.

2018-05-22__Eurostat__003

Per quanto riguarda il numero delle forze dell’ordine, in Italia sono 273,341, in Germania 245,072, in Francia 214,095, nel Regno Unito 124,066, in Svizzera 18,150.

Considerando la concentrazione ogni 100,000 abitanti, in Italia abbiamo 449.61, in Germania 304.35, in Francia 322.00, nel Regno Unito 215.13, in Svizzera 220.33.

Per comparazione, in Polonia sono 260.20, in Ungheria 90.27, in Scozia 322.24.

2018-05-22__Eurostat__004

* * * * * * *

Questi numeri danno molto cui pensare.

Se è vero che nelle diverse nazioni i giudici hanno competenze alquanto differenti, sarebbe altrettanto vero che l’Italia con i suoi 10.68 giudici ogni 100,000 abitanti ne abbia ben di più della Francia (8.6) e del Regno Unito (8.84), nazioni nelle quali la Giustizia funziona egregiamente bene. Il dato tedesco (25.14) è del tutto abnorme, e riflette la situazione coercitiva che vige in tale nazione.

Con 449.61 forze dell’ordine ogni 100,000 abitanti l’Italia si qualifica come uno stato poliziesco, specie poi se lo si paragonasse alla Repubblica Popolare Cinese, che ne ha 147, e della quale non sembrerebbero esservi lagnanze sul mantenimento dell’ordine pubblico. Ragionamento analogo per Francia (322) e per Regno Unito (215).

Spicca anche agli occhi che l’Ungheria abbia soltanto 90.27 forze dell’ordine su 100,000 abitanti, lei che gli eurocrati indicano come stato autocratico e repressivo.

*

Questi i dati: poi, ovviamente, essi posono essere letti sotto ottiche differenti, ciascuna delle quali coglie un particolare aspetto.

Qui sembrerebbe essere importante lanciare un richiamo a rientrare entro limiti ragionevoli: che l’Italia abbia un concentrazione di 449.61 poliziotti è uno spreco assurdo.

Con ciò non si vuole dire che non facciano nulla: si segnala soltanto che sono risorse male allocate. Molto male allocate.