Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali

ECB si prepara a vivere senza Bundesbank.

 

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.
2020-05-30.
ECB BCE

Germania. I tedeschi valutano la decisione della Corte Costituzionale.

Suprema Corte, ECB e Corte Costituzionale tedesca, ovvero il chaos.

Top German court says ECB bond buying scheme partially contravenes the law.

Germania. I Tedeschi sono diventati identitari sovranisti che si ribellano all’EU.

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«ECB prepares for the worst: life without the Bundesbank»

«The European Central Bank (ECB) is drafting contingency plans to carry out its multi-trillion bond-buying programme without the Bundesbank in case Germany’s top court forces the main participant in the scheme to quit»

«the ECB would launch an unprecedented legal action against the German central bank, its biggest shareholder, to bring it back into the programme»

«The moves would likely mark a moment of truth for the euro, testing Germany’s commitment to a currency it played the biggest role in creating and forcing it to tackle some deep-seated reservations within the country about ECB policies»

«a scenario in which the court bans the Bundesbank from taking part in the purchases.»

«In that case, the ECB, or less likely the other euro zone central banks, would take up the Bundesbank’s quota in the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and buy German bonds, the sources said»

«If other central banks buy Bunds, it would break the “no risk sharing” principle the Bundesbank insisted upon when the programme was launched in 2015, under which each national central bank buys its own government’s bonds and the risk is shared over the limited amount of debt bought by the ECB itself.»

«Bundesbank purchases of German sovereign debt, or Bunds, totalled just 628 million euros ($688 million) in April, or just 2.3% of the government bonds bought under the PSPP that month»

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Se la situazione dovesse evolversi come potrebbe, Bundesbank potrebbe non partecipare al Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP).

Ma senza il supporto politico e finanziario di Bundesbank, si attuerebbe de facto la frattura del blocco europeo, che farebbe sorgere contraddizioni ancora più ampie. Sedendo nel Consiglio Europeo, la Germania governerebbe una Ecb alla quale non partecipa, pur mantenendo in essa i suoi consiglieri.

L’unica idea partorita sarebbe una missione impossibile.

«each national central bank buys its own government’s bonds».

Ma le banche centrali degli stati non hanno risorse disponibili, né godono del signoraggio.

Si profilerebbe infine una situazione grottesca:

«buy German bonds».

L’Italia sarebbe quindi chiamata a comprare i Bund tedeschi.

Lasciamo i commenti ai Lettori.

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Exclusive: ECB prepares for the worst: life without the Bundesbank – sources.

The European Central Bank (ECB) is drafting contingency plans to carry out its multi-trillion bond-buying programme without the Bundesbank in case Germany’s top court forces the main participant in the scheme to quit, four sources told Reuters.

In this worst-case scenario, the ECB would launch an unprecedented legal action against the German central bank, its biggest shareholder, to bring it back into the programme, said the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The moves would likely mark a moment of truth for the euro, testing Germany’s commitment to a currency it played the biggest role in creating and forcing it to tackle some deep-seated reservations within the country about ECB policies.

Germany’s constitutional court has given the ECB until early August to justify its massive buying of government bonds or continue the scheme without the Bundesbank, which is supposed to carry out more than a quarter of the bond purchases.

Most of the sources expect the legal challenge from the court in Karlsruhe to be resolved by the Bundesbank itself by demonstrating that the policy was appropriate and addressing concerns about its side effects.

But staff at the ECB and the euro zone’s national central banks are preparing for what one source described as the “unbelievable”: a scenario in which the court bans the Bundesbank from taking part in the purchases.

In that case, the ECB, or less likely the other euro zone central banks, would take up the Bundesbank’s quota in the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and buy German bonds, the sources said.

They said such plans had not been finalised or officially discussed by the ECB’s Governing Council yet.

Spokesmen for the ECB and the Bundesbank declined to comment.

NO RISK SHARING?

If other central banks buy Bunds, it would break the “no risk sharing” principle the Bundesbank insisted upon when the programme was launched in 2015, under which each national central bank buys its own government’s bonds and the risk is shared over the limited amount of debt bought by the ECB itself.

The ECB has slowed down German bond purchases since the start of the coronavirus pandemic to focus its firepower on Italy, which has come under pressure in the bond market as the outbreak has savaged its already shaky public finances.

Bundesbank purchases of German sovereign debt, or Bunds, totalled just 628 million euros ($688 million) in April, or just 2.3% of the government bonds bought under the PSPP that month.

But even if the Bundesbank quits the scheme, leaving Bunds out is not an option given that they serve as the de facto euro zone benchmark for private investors thanks to their top-notch credit rating and ample availability.

Furthermore, cutting off Germany from the ECB’s flagship stimulus programme would invite speculation about a euro zone break up, which the ECB has been trying to quash since the euro crisis of 2010-12.

In the meantime, the ECB would probably launch an infringement procedure against the German central bank for failing to fulfil its obligation as a member of the Eurosystem if it has to stop buying bonds, the sources said.

If the Bundesbank then failed to comply, the ECB could take the matter to European Court of Justice (ECJ), in what would be the first such case since the euro was created in 1999.

The ECJ has already upheld the PSPP but its ruling was disregarded by Germany’s constitutional court, opening a further conflict German and European Union institutions.

So far, the German government has shown optimism that any such scenario can be avoided. Chancellor Angela Merkel told senior officials from her party earlier this month that the issue was “solvable” if the central bank explained the plan.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Bundesbank. Corretti gli ‘errori’, la Germania è in depressione da un anno.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-08-21.

Gufo_019__

In Destatis, l’Istituto tedesco di statistica vi è stata di recente una epurazione degli elementi liberal. Non totale, ma ragionevole. Una volta eliminati i menzogneri costituzionali ed essendo la voce di Frau Merkel sempre più debole, inizia ad emergere anche nei documenti ufficiali quella realtà così a lungo negata.

Quanto emerso ha obbligato Deutsche Bundesbank a prendere posizione.

«The Federal Statistical Office has conducted an in-depth review of all national accounts calculations and rebased them to the reference year 2015. This has resulted in new rates of change for real GDP as a whole in specific periods. There have also been smaller revisions more recently.»

«Therefore, the quarter-on-quarter results for the first two quarters of 2018 were revised down. In the first quarter, growth consequently totalled 0.1% (down from 0.4%), while it amounted to 0.4% in the second quarter (after 0.5%).»

«The quarter-on-quarter results for the third and fourth quarters of 2018, by contrast, were corrected upwards. They were -0.1% in the third quarter (instead of -0.2%) and 0.2% in the fourth quarter (up from 0.0%).»

«The result for the first quarter of 2019 remained unchanged at 0.4% (all rates seasonally and calendar-adjusted).»

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«Economic output in Germany dipped slightly in the second quarter of 2019. The Federal Statistical Office (also known as Destatis) announced that gross domestic product (GDP) – the value of all goods and services produced in Germany – fell by 0.1% in seasonally adjusted terms on the quarter»

«Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann described the recent slowdown as an economic “slump”»

«the weaknesses have so far been concentrated in industry and exports»

«Sales in construction and in the hotel and restaurant sector declined. Wholesale trade slid into the downturn afflicting industry»

«the downturn in industry accelerated somewhat due to a decrease in foreign demand. In particular, exports to the United Kingdom were weak in the second quarter »

«Meanwhile, the demand for cars, pent up by delivery bottlenecks last year, had largely been met at the start of 2019 and did not increase further in the second quarter»

«The Bundesbank economists write that this depressed private consumption»

«Demand also suffered from broad-based weakness. Against the backdrop of the sharp contraction in exports and ““in light of declining capacity utilisation and the subdued outlook for manufacturing, businesses probably held back on investing in new machinery and equipment,””»

«Economic activity could decline slightly again in the current quarter, the economists suggest»

«There are, they write, no signs yet of an end to the downturn in industry»

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Mala tempora currunt sed peiora parantur.

Le pesate parole di Cicerone suonano davvero come macigni.

Entrata in depressione, Bundesbank ne prognostica una lunga durata.

Questi dati emergenti suggeriscono che i piani del Governo tedesco, massimamente quelli sul ‘clima’, non troveranno risorse per essere finanziati.

Frau Merkel prese nel 2005 la Cdu al 46% e la ha ridotta al 26%.

Aveva preso una Germania economicamente prospera e la ha portata alla depressione.

«Le femmine stanno benissimo nella dirigenza degli avversari», come disse Mr Putin.


Deutsche Bundesbank. 2019-08-19. Monthly Report: Industry and exports responsible for economic slowdown

Economic output in Germany dipped slightly in the second quarter of 2019. The Federal Statistical Office (also known as Destatis) announced that gross domestic product (GDP) – the value of all goods and services produced in Germany – fell by 0.1% in seasonally adjusted terms on the quarter. At the start of 2019, the German economy was still showing growth of 0.4%. Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann described the recent slowdown as an economic “slump”. ““The domestic economy is still doing well; the weaknesses have so far been concentrated in industry and exports. International trade disputes and Brexit are important reasons behind this,”” Mr Weidmann said. The Bundesbank’s current Monthly Report states that the slight economic slowdown affected many sectors in Germany: “Sales in construction and in the hotel and restaurant sector declined. Wholesale trade slid into the downturn afflicting industry”, the Bank’s economists write. Only retail trade as well as some other services sectors are likely to have provided positive momentum.

One-off effects had a dampening effect.

In the report, Bundesbank experts examine the causes of the GDP contraction in detail, and point out that the downturn in industry accelerated somewhat due to a decrease in foreign demand. In particular, exports to the United Kingdom were weak in the second quarter. A contributing factor to this, according to the Bundesbank’s economists, was the original Brexit date scheduled for the end of March. This resulted in substantial stockpiling in the United Kingdom over the winter months. This led to a countermovement in the second quarter. Furthermore, one-off effects that had supported economic activity in the first quarter had a distinctly dampening effect on the still intact domestic expansionary forces. Construction output declined steeply after posting a sharp increase during the first quarter due to favourable weather conditions. Meanwhile, the demand for cars, pent up by delivery bottlenecks last year, had largely been met at the start of 2019 and did not increase further in the second quarter. The Bundesbank economists write that this depressed private consumption.

Businesses likely held back on investing.

Demand also suffered from broad-based weakness. Against the backdrop of the sharp contraction in exports and ““in light of declining capacity utilisation and the subdued outlook for manufacturing, businesses probably held back on investing in new machinery and equipment,”” the Bundesbank’s experts write in their report. They point out that construction investment also fell. Private consumption is not likely to have exceeded the level of the strong preceding quarter by much. Government consumption may have provided the only meaningful boost to economic activity.

Economic activity could decline slightly again in the current quarter, the economists suggest. There are, they write, no signs yet of an end to the downturn in industry, adding: ““This could also gradually start to weigh on a number of services sectors.” “Leading labour market indicators painted a mixed picture. Industry further scaled back its hiring plans. By contrast, in the services sectors, except the wholesale and retail trade, and in construction, positive employment plans dominated.

Previous quarters revised.

The Federal Statistical Office has conducted an in-depth review of all national accounts calculations and rebased them to the reference year 2015. This has resulted in new rates of change for real GDP as a whole in specific periods. There have also been smaller revisions more recently. Therefore, the quarter-on-quarter results for the first two quarters of 2018 were revised down. In the first quarter, growth consequently totalled 0.1% (down from 0.4%), while it amounted to 0.4% in the second quarter (after 0.5%). The quarter-on-quarter results for the third and fourth quarters of 2018, by contrast, were corrected upwards. They were -0.1% in the third quarter (instead of -0.2%) and 0.2% in the fourth quarter (up from 0.0%). The result for the first quarter of 2019 remained unchanged at 0.4% (all rates seasonally and calendar-adjusted).

Pubblicato in: Demografia, Unione Europea

Deutsche Bundesbank. Si moltiplicano i segnali di un disastro annunciato.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-05-10.

Bundesbank 010

Le persone che in estate ammoniscono che entro qualche mese sarebbe arrivato l’autunno e quindi l’inverno sono quasi invariabilmente etichettate come cassandre. Se poi reiterano con il passare le tempo il loro avvertimento sono tacciati in malo modo: che vada bene la gente dice che si sta gridando al lupo! al lupo!, avendo così perso credibilità.

Poi, quando arriva l’inverno e trova tutti impreparati, allora chi aveva detto che sarebbe arrivato l’inverno ne è visto come causa efficiente: è colpa sua se alla fine l’inverno è arrivato.

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La situazione demografica tedesca diventa sempre più esplosiva ogni giorno che passa.

Germania. Incidenza economica del calo demografico. – Bloomberg.

Germania. Realtà geografica, non più umana, politica ed economica.

Germania. Summit in Cancelleria per l’allarme demografico.

Germania. 13 milioni di poveri e 330,000 famiglie con la luce tagliata

Germania. Le banche non son quasi più tedesche. Grazie Frau Merkel.

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Questo argomento sta diventando un ritornello spesso intonato da Bundesbank.

Demographic challenges in Germany

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«The population in Germany will age in the coming years and fall significantly in the future»

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«This will also have an impact on the labour market»

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«the number of people of working age, ie between the ages of 15 and 74, will drop by nearly 2.5 million by 2025»

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«the share of the population made up by older people aged between 55 and 74 will increase by 7 percentage points to roughly 40%.»

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«one million fewer people would be available to the labour market by 2025»

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«Even in the scenario with higher immigration, the demographic trend cannot be stopped in the long term»

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«Demographic change influences not only the total number of hours worked, but also labour productivity»

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«on account of the fact that older workers …. are more productive than younger ones»

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«in an ageing society, services, such as care for the elderly, gain in significance compared to the production of goods»

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L’immigrazione può sopperire alla mancanza di mano d’opera non qualificata, ma non vicaria quella specializzata ovvero i quadri superiori. Ma la vera carenza sarà proprio quella di operai specializzati e di quadri superiori.

Al 2025, essendo andata in pensione la classe del baby-boom, serviranno circa 900,000 insegnati nelle scuole, 600,000 burocrati dell’amministrazione pubblica, 130,000 addetti alle banche ed alla gestione finanziaria.

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Molti assumono nei confronti del problema demografico una posizione fatalistica: “va  beh, vorrà dire che moriremo tutti“.

Questa posizione è infantilmente incorretta.

Il vero problema sarà il periodo di transizione, quando gli autoctoni saranno ancora numericamente presenti ma come pensionati, e la maggior quota della popolazione attiva sarà costituita da immigrati, che faranno loro vedere i sorci verdi. Perché mai dovrebbero lavorare per mantenere quella genia?

Né si pensi che questi fenomeni siano sconosciuti all’estero. La frase pronunciata da Mr Erdogan dovrebbe essere chiara:

«Fate almeno cinque figli, il futuro è vostro»

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Stranamente, nessuno sembrerebbe avere il coraggio di dire che l’unico rimedio al calo demografico degli autoctoni è che riprendano a proliferare. Non sarebbe politicamente corretto recepire i suggerimenti dati da Mr Erdogan ai turki residenti in Europa.

Nota.

Questi dati sono pubblici, e li conoscono, ed anche molto bene, sia negli Stati Uniti sia in Russia sia in Cina. La Germania pesa anche in ragione della sua popolazione.


Deutsche Bundesbank. 2017-05-06. Demographic change could weaken economic growth

The population in Germany will age in the coming years and fall significantly in the future. This will also have an impact on the labour market. For example, according to a projection in the Bundesbank’s April Monthly Report, the number of people of working age, ie between the ages of 15 and 74, will drop by nearly 2.5 million by 2025. The demographic-related fall in the labour supply will accelerate over time, according to Bundesbank experts. At the same time, the share of the population made up by older people aged between 55 and 74 will increase by 7 percentage points to roughly 40%.

Compared to a previous projection by the Bundesbank in 2012, the projection horizon has now been extended by five years to 2025. It is based on the current population projection of the Federal Statistical Office as well as the Bundesbank’s own assumptions concerning expected immigration in the coming years.

Growth could fall considerably by 2025

In the baseline scenario, the labour force potential, ie the available domestic labour supply over the medium term, is expected to be roughly the same in 2025 as it was in 2016. The labour force potential is initially likely to continue to increase until 2021, after which a significant fall is expected due to the baby-boomer generation exiting the labour market. Therefore, according to the Monthly Report, a steady growth in the labour force potential is not to be expected over the coming years.

Demographic change will also have an impact on trend economic growth in Germany. Bundesbank economists expect the German economy’s production potential to grow considerably more slowly in the coming years than of late. In the years 2011 to 2016, potential growth stood at nearly 1¼% on average. According to the projections, it could fall to just over ¾% per year on average between 2021 and 2025. The main driver of this change is the demographic-induced decline in the total number of hours worked, ie the labour input of all persons in employment.

Immigration unable to prevent fall in labour supply.

Two factors have thus far counteracted the projected drop in the labour supply. First, the participation of older people in the labour force has risen in recent years. Bundesbank economists expect this to continue in the coming years, too. However, they note that the further activation of domestic labour will probably exhaust any remaining potential. Second, the current high level of immigration is slowing the demographic-related trend.

The Bundesbank assumes there was net migration of around 500,000 people in 2016. According to the projection, this is expected to fall to 200,000 per year by 2025. This would mean a total of nearly 2½ million people coming to Germany, which would increase the labour force potential by nearly two million people. However, this projection is subject to a high degree of uncertainty. If immigration turned out to be only half as high as assumed in the baseline scenario, the labour force potential would already begin to fall in 2020. Cumulatively, one million fewer people would be available to the labour market by 2025, according to the Monthly Report. Even in the scenario with higher immigration, the demographic trend cannot be stopped in the long term. The fall in the labour supply would then merely be delayed, starting in 2023.

Demographics dampen labour productivity.

Demographic change influences not only the total number of hours worked, but also labour productivity. In the short term, productivity in an ageing society can, for example, be boosted on account of the fact that older workers, whose share of the labour force is set to increase in the coming years, are more productive than younger ones. However, according to the assessment of Bundesbank economists, in the medium to long term, demographic change is likely to have a rather dampening effect on productivity growth. This is partly because the labour productivity of older members of the workforce typically plateaus, hardly making any new gains. Furthermore, in an ageing society, services, such as care for the elderly, gain in significance compared to the production of goods. As, judging by experience, the productivity of service providers is lower than that of the production sector, ageing economies could exhibit lower macroeconomic productivity growth, at least during the demographic transition process, note the Bundesbank’s economists.