Brexit. Sorprese dall’analisi della stratificazione del voto.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2016-12-10.

 

Il British Election Study ha rilasciato il database completo relativo all’analisi stratificata del voto inglese al brexit. Gli archivi sono disponibili sia in formato SPSS sia in formato STATA. I dati compressi hanno una estensione di circa due gigabyte.

Bes mette anche a disposizione un ragionevole riassunto.

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Nota importante. Nel lessico politico angloamericano, i “liberals” sono i così detti ‘progressisti‘ e si collocano a sinistra, opponendosi ai conservatori, che costituiscono la destra. Negli Stati Uniti i liberals si identificano con i democratici. Tratto comune a tutte le svariate sfumature di liberals è la condivisione del socialismo ideologico.

Si faccia grande attenzione! Anche in Europa il termine “liberals” indica progressisti, socialisti ideologici. Non solo, spesso anche nell’italiano corrente, la traduzione “liberale” è usata con quel significato.

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«the foundations of the Leave campaign’s success rested on the support it secured from three distinct groups of voters:

– Economically deprived, anti-immigration (12% of the population, 95% voted Leave).

– Affluent Euro-sceptics (23% of the population, 75% Voted Leave).

– Older working classes (16% of the population, 73% voted Leave).»

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«Together these last three categories encapsulate 51 per cent of the UK’s population»

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«The EU Referendum attracted a set of voters, who had not voted in the 2015 General Election»

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«People were more likely to follow the position of the newspaper they read than the political party with which they identify»

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«The Referendum attracted a group of ‘new voters’ who did not participate in the 2015 General Election. A majority (60%) of this group voted Leave»

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«voters who chose Leave, broken down by a range of objective characteristics.

–  Those with no formal education qualifications (78%) or whose highest qualifications are CSEs or O-levels (61%)

–  Those with an income of less than £1,200 per month (66%)

–  Those in social housing provided by a local authority (70%) or housing association (68%)»

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«The groups most likely to vote Leave were:

– Those finding it difficult to manage financially (70%) or just about getting by (60%)

– Those who believed Britain has got a lot worse in the last ten years (73%)

– Those who think things have got worse for them rather than other people (76%)

– Those who perceive themselves as working class (59%)

– Those who see themselves as English rather than British (74%) or more English than British (62%)»

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«The papers with the highest proportion of Leave votes were the Sun and Express (both 70%),

the Mail (66%) and the Star (65%). The other newspaper where the majority of the readership voted Leave was the Telegraph, though the proportion was lower (at 55%).»

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«According to the British Election Study, the vast majority who said immigration (88%) or sovereignty (90%) was the most important issue voted Leave, compared to a small minority (15%) who said it was the economy.»

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Conclusioni.

Il “Leave” è stato supportato dalla componente medio – inferiore per istruzione e reddito della categoria produttiva.

Il “Leave” è stato supportato dalla componente al lavoro, essendo minoritario solo nella fascia sotto i 34 anni.

Tre i fatti nuovi di grande rilevanza.

1. Prima le persone si son fatte un’idea del problema, poi hanno individuato il giornale che esprimeva quella idea, quasi ignorando gli altri. I media sono stati quasi ininfluenti nell’orientamento del voto.

2. Sovranità nazionale ed immigrazione hanno sostenuto oltre il 90% di coloro che hanno votato “Leave“.

3. Attaccamento alla sovranità nazionale, rigetto di ulteriori fenomeni immigratori, disaffezione alle classiche visioni politiche e volontà di farsi sentire sono motivazioni caratteristiche di tutto il corpo elettorale dell’Europa, non solo di quello del Regno Unito. I dati del NatCen sono quasi identici agli omologhi rilevati in Spagna, Francia, Olanda, Germania, Austria, Italia.

 

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→ The Telegraph. 2016-12-08. Brexit: Middle class liberals were only social group to emphatically back Remain, analysis shows

Middle class liberals were the only section of society to wholeheartedly support remaining in the EU according to a wide-ranging analysis by social research institute NatCen.

The study incorporated responses from 37,000 people and represents the most detailed insight yet into who the typical Brexit voter was.

NatCen identified five subgroups of the population in order to interpret their data: middle class liberals; younger, working class Labour voters; affluent Eurosceptics; the older working classes; and those who are economically deprived and anti-immigration.

Of these five key segments the only group that emphatically backed a Remain vote was the middle class liberals, 92 per cent of whom voted to stay in the EU.

The younger, working class Labour voters subgroup also backed Remain but were far more split on their decision, with 61 per cent voting Remain and 39 per cent Leave.

Three quarters of the affluent Eurosceptics subgroup voted Leave, as did a similar proportion of the older working classes group, while 95 per cent of the economically deprived, anti-immigration segment voted for Brexit.

Together these last three categories encapsulate 51 per cent of the UK’s population.

Brexit appealed to the politically disenfranchised

The findings also found that Brexit was far more popular among voters who didn’t vote in the 2015 general election than those who did.

Of the people who didn’t vote in 2015, three in five voted for Brexit compared to 49 per cent of those who did vote in 2015.

In a further sign that the politically disenfranchised chose to vote for Brexit, 58 per cent of people who agreed with the statement that “politicians do not listen to people like me” opted to Leave.

These findings will come as a blow to those trying to argue that the EU appeals to more people than the supposed metropolitan liberal elite.

Similarly 59 per cent of people self-identifying as being working class voted to leave as did seven out of 10 people living in socially rented accommodation.

Kirby Swales, Director of Survey Research at NatCen said: “There are many reasons behind the outcome of the EU Referendum, but a key factor in the Leave campaign’s success was that they managed to galvanise a wide-ranging group of people.

“This included a group of politically disengaged people and this goes some way to explaining why many polls underestimated the leave vote: their models simply did not account for these new voters.

“Alongside this, the Referendum signalled a move away from traditional left-right politics and towards voting according to underlying political attitudes. Whether this is a one-off change for a once in a lifetime decision, or is the start of a step-change in the political landscape remains to be seen.”

The research also shows that only those earning £3,701 or more per month chose to stay in the EU overall and that the 18-34 age group was the only one to have backed Remain.

Just over a third of Labour voters voted to leave the EU although 13 per cent of Labour supporters said they didn’t know where their MPs stood on the issue of Brexit.

As many as 58 per cent of Conservative supporters voted to Leave the EU while, curiously, one in 50 Ukip supporters actually voted for Remain.

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→ What UK Thiks. 2016-12-08. Understanding the Leave Vote: What Tipped The Balance?

Six months on from the EU Referendum, today we publish a new analysis paper that looks at the question ‘Who voted Leave and why?’. The paper uses new data from NatCen’s mixed mode random probability panel as well as the extensive evidence available in the British Election Study internet panel.

The paper reveals that the foundations of the Leave campaign’s success rested on the support it secured from three distinct groups of voters:

– Economically deprived, anti-immigration (12% of the population, 95% voted Leave).

– Affluent Euro-sceptics (23% of the population, 75% Voted Leave).

– Older working classes (16% of the population, 73% voted Leave).

So rather than simply being based on the support of the ‘left nehind’, the success of the Leave vote was underpinned by its ability to draw together a broad- based coalition.

It was clearly a very close vote, and so the obvious question is to ask what whether it could have gone the other way. What tipped the balance? In our report, we draw out four likely candidates:

Low turnout amongst Remain supporters. The Remain vote softened during the campaign – 19% of those who said in May they would vote Remain did not end up voting at all.

The impact of ‘new voters’ The EU Referendum attracted a set of voters, who had not voted in the 2015 General Election, and they were more likely to vote Leave.

Countering the argument on economic risks. It is clear that the public were less clear about the impact of leaving the EU on the economy than they were on its implications for immigration and sovereignty. The Leave campaign’s messages resonated more strongly with the public.

‘Not following the party line’. Leave secured support amongst the supporters of all political parties, and was just as successful amongst those on the ‘left’ as those on the ‘right’. People were more likely to follow the position of the newspaper they read than the political party with which they identify.

So although there had been a slow burn of growing Euroscepticism in the years leading up to the referendum, a particular set of circumstances helped tip the balance in favour of Leave.

It remains to be seen if the divisions highlighted in the Referendum heal or continue to drive and disrupt politics in Britain. Into this mix, it will also be interesting to see if the newly engaged voters from disadvantaged backgrounds continue to vote and, if so, which party captures their support.