Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Stati Uniti

Usa. La piccola e media industria non usa la robotica. Un mito svanito.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-08-22.

Saker - Falconetto Sacro 007

La robotizzazione delle catene di produzione aveva suscitato grandi attese ed anche grandi apprensioni.

Ma di norma i sogni non si concretizzano in una qualche realtà, lasciando stupefatti ed angustiati gli incauti sognatori.

Significativo quanto è accaduto in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka. Inaugurata la prima fabbrica automatizzata. Crollo di un mito.

Pur avendo un pil ppa procapite di 13,113 Usd Int, lo Sri Lanka ha costruito una fabbrica quasi completamente automatizzata.

Questa realtà evidenzia bene quanto sia irrealistico il pensiero di molti che il sud est asiatico produca molto solo perché darebbe emolumenti da fame.

Il punto cardine, duro da comprendersi, è che gli investimenti, anche quelli nella robotica, rispettano in un mercato abbastanza libero il criterio di ottimizzare il rapporto benefici/costi, in una visione onnicomprensiva del problema.

Nella contabilità dei costi, quello del personale addestrato all’uso dei robot è una voce che incide molto. E spesso codesta tipologia di personale è quasi introvabile.

* * * * * * *

«The robot apocalypse is hard to find in America’s small and mid-sized factories»

«When researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology visited Rich Gent’s machine shop, they were asked to find robots to see how automation was spreading to America’s small and medium-sized factories»

«In big factories — when you’re making the same thing over and over, day after day, robots make a whole lot of sense …. But not for us»

«Even as some analysts warn that robots are about to displace millions of blue-collar jobs in the US industrial sector, the reality of small tasks like Gent’s is very different»

«Of the 34 companies with 500 or fewer employees in Ohio, Massachusetts and Arizona that the MIT researchers visited in their project, only one had purchased a large number of robots in the past five years»

«At all the other Ohio plants he studied, he found only one robot he had bought in the past five years»

«We had a roboticist on our research team, as we expected to find robots»

«Most of the machines we saw were from before the 1990s»

«Most had also purchased other types of advanced machinery – such as computer-guided cutting machines and inspection systems. But not robots»

«This is bad news for the US economy»

«Automation is a key to increasing productivity, which keeps US operations competitive»

«Yet small and medium-sized manufacturers remain the backbone of American industry, often at large manufacturers churning out the parts needed to keep assembly lines running»

«These small and medium-sized manufacturers are also a major source of relatively good jobs – accounting for 43% of all manufacturing workers»

«→→ One obstacle for small companies is finding the skilled workers needed to operate the robot ←←»

* * * * * * *

La temuta, e bramata, apocalisse indotta dalla robotica non alberga nella piccola e media industria americana.

I ricercatori del Massachusetts Institute of Technology ne sono rimasti stupiti e sconvolti.

Evidentemente non si erano presi cura di analizzare i dati disponibili, prima di lanciare questa ricerca.

Poniamoci allora una domanda.

Se l’industria che assorbe il 43% della manopera totale necessiterebbe di “skilled workers”, quale senso avrebbe favorire l’immigrazione incontrollata?

I sogni cozzano sempre con la dura realtà fattuale.

*


The robot apocalypse is hard to find in America’s small and mid-sized factories

Cleveland, Aug 2 (Businesshala) – When researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology visited Rich Gent’s machine shop, they were asked to find robots to see how automation was spreading to America’s small and medium-sized factories. was expected.

He didn’t.

“In big factories — when you’re making the same thing over and over, day after day, robots make a whole lot of sense,” said Gent, who along with his brother is a 55-year-old founded by his great-grandfather. The employee company runs the Gent Machine Company. , “But not for us.”

Even as some analysts warn that robots are about to displace millions of blue-collar jobs in the US industrial sector, the reality of small tasks like Gent’s is very different.

Of the 34 companies with 500 or fewer employees in Ohio, Massachusetts and Arizona that the MIT researchers visited in their project, only one had purchased a large number of robots in the past five years—and that was an Ohio company acquired by a had gone. Japanese multinational company that invested money for new automation.

At all the other Ohio plants he studied, he found only one robot he had bought in the past five years. In Massachusetts he found one company that had bought two, while in Arizona he found three companies that had added a handful.

Anna Waldman-Brown, a PhD student working on the report with MIT professor Suzanne Berger, said she was “surprised” by the lack of machines.

“We had a roboticist on our research team, as we expected to find robots,” she said. Instead, at one company, she said, managers showed her a computer they had recently installed in a corner of the factory – which allowed workers to note down their daily production figures on a spreadsheet, rather than To write that information in a paper notebook.

“Most of the machines we saw were from before the 1990s,” he said, adding that many installed new computer controllers to upgrade older machines—a common practice in these tight-lipped operations. Most had also purchased other types of advanced machinery – such as computer-guided cutting machines and inspection systems. But not robots.

Robots are just one type of factory automation, which encompasses a wide range of machines used to move and manufacture goods, including conveyor belts and labeling machines.

Nick Pinkston, CEO of Volition, a San Francisco company that makes software used by robotics engineers to automate factories, said smaller companies lack the cash to take risks on new robots. “They think of the capital payment period as three months, or six – and it all depends on the contract” with the consumer who is ordering the parts to be made by machine.

This is bad news for the US economy. Automation is a key to increasing productivity, which keeps US operations competitive. Since 2005, US labor productivity has grown at an average annual rate of just 1.3% – down from the post-World War II trend of more than 2% – and the average has fallen even more since 2010.

Researchers have found that larger firms are on average more productive and pay higher wages than their smaller counterparts, a deviation that is at least attributed to the industry giants’ ability to invest heavily in cutting-edge technologies.

Yet small and medium-sized manufacturers remain the backbone of American industry, often at large manufacturers churning out the parts needed to keep assembly lines running. If they lag behind in terms of technology, it can have an impact on the entire sector. These small and medium-sized manufacturers are also a major source of relatively good jobs – accounting for 43% of all manufacturing workers.

Robot’s Limits

One obstacle for small companies is finding the skilled workers needed to operate the robot. Ryan Kelly, head of a group promoting new technology to manufacturers inside the Association for Manufacturing Technology, said, “There is a lot of amazing software that is making robots easier to program and rearrange – but almost enough to do that job. The people are not.”

To be sure, robots are spreading to more corners of the industrial economy, not as quickly as MIT researchers and many others had hoped. Last year, for the first time, most robots ordered by companies in North America were not destined for automotive factories—a change partly attributed to the development of cheaper and more flexible machines. They are the type of machines that are especially needed in small tasks.

And it looks like some robots will take over more tasks as they become more capable and affordable. One example: their rapid proliferation in e-commerce warehouses in recent years.

Carmakers and other large companies still buy the majority of robots, said Jeff Bernstein, president of the Association for Advancing Automation, a trade group in Ann Arbor, Michigan. “But there is more than ever in small and medium-sized companies.”

Michael Tamasi, owner of AccuRounds in Avon, Massachusetts, is a small manufacturer that recently purchased a robot attached to a computer-controlled cutting machine.

“We are getting delivery of another machine in September – and hope to have a robotic arm attached to load and unload it.” But there are some tasks where the technology remains too rigid or simply not able to get the job done.

For example, Tamasi recently considered buying a robot to polish metal parts. But the complexity of the shape made it impossible. “And it was kind of slow,” he said. “When you think of robots, you think better, faster, cheaper – but it was the exact opposite.” And he still needed a worker to load and unload the machine.

For a company like Clevelands Gent, which makes parts for things like refrigerators, auto airbags and hydraulic pumps, the main barriers to getting robots are cost and uncertainty as to whether the investment will pay off, which in turn depends on plans and approach. . Customer.

And big customers can be fickle. Eight years ago, Gent signed a contract for Tesla Inc. (TSLA.O) to supply the fasteners used to hold battery packs together — and the electric-car maker soon became its biggest customer. But Gent never received assurances from Tesla that the business would continue long enough to justify buying robots that could be used to make fasteners.

“If we knew Tesla would last that long, we would certainly automate our assembly process,” said Gent, who said he looked at automating the line twice a year.

But he does not regret his caution. Earlier this year, Tesla informed Gent that it was pulling the business. “We are not bitter,” Gent said. “Just how it works.”

Gent spends heavily on new equipment relative to its small size — about $500,000 a year from 2011 to 2019. One purchase was a $1.6 million computer-controlled cutting machine that cut Tesla’s parts cycle time from 38 seconds to 7. Seconds – A huge gain in productivity that goes straight to Gent’s bottom line.

“We got another part to build on the machine,” Gent said.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale

Sri Lanka. Inaugurata la prima fabbrica automatizzata. Crollo di un mito.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-04-16.

Sri Lanka 001

«Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, island country lying in the Indian Ocean and separated from peninsular India by the Palk Strait. ….

Proximity to the Indian subcontinent has facilitated close cultural interaction between Sri Lanka and India from ancient times. ….

The distinctive civilization of Sri Lanka, with roots that can be traced back to the 6th century bce, is characterized by two factors: the preservation of Theravada Buddhism (the orthodox school of Buddhism having its literary traditions in the Pali language) and the development over two millennia of a sophisticated system of irrigation in the drier parts of the country. ….

In 1948, after nearly 150 years of British rule, Sri Lanka became an independent country, and it was admitted to the United Nations seven years later. The country is a member of the Commonwealth and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. ….

Variations of soil within Sri Lanka reflect the effects of climate, lithology, and terrain on the soil-forming processes. The climatic influences are reflected in the dominance of red-yellow podzolic soils (leached lateritic soils) in the Wet Zone and of reddish brown earths (nonlateritic loamy soils) in the Dry Zone. ….

Ethnic, religious, and linguistic distinctions in Sri Lanka are essentially the same. Three ethnic groups—Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim—make up more than 99 percent of the country’s population, with the Sinhalese alone accounting for nearly three-fourths of the people. ….

At independence Sri Lanka had a population of about 6.5 million, which by the early 1990s had increased to more than 17 million ….

The economy that evolved in Sri Lanka under British rule consisted of a modern sector, whose main component was plantation agriculture, and a traditional sector comprising subsistence agriculture. ….The country depended on imports for nearly three-fourths of its food requirements and almost all of its manufactured goods.» [Fonte]

Nel 2020 il pil ppa era 287,671 milioni Usd, essendo 13,113 Usd Int il pil ppa procapite.

«This year, GDP is set to contract due to the fallout from Covid-19. In 2021, the economy is expected to recover as restrictions ease and foreign demand rebounds. A possible prolonged downturn in the tourism sector and significant debt repayments due to take place next year, together with tight credit access, pose downside risks to the outlook. FocusEconomics panelists project the economy to grow 3.4% in 2021, which is up 0.5 percentage points from last month’s forecast. In 2022, our panel sees the economy growing 4.7%.» [Fonte]

* * * * * * *

«Sri Lanka has opened its first accredited and fully automated masks manufacturing facility in Kotugoda in the western part of the island country, with an investment of an estimated 830,000 U.S. dollars»

«the factory operated by Sensetronics Limited, will manufacture 3-ply and KN95 masks as the demand for such masks has increased amid the COVID-19 pandemic»

«The facility will provide the general public affordable and quality masks, while it is also expected to bring in foreign exchange through exports»

* * * * * * *

Questa notizia dovrebbe dare da pensare.

Pur avendo un pil ppa procapite di 13,113 Usd Int, lo Sri Lanka ha costruito una fabbrica quasi completamente automatizzata.

Questa realtà evidenzia bene quanto sia irrealistico il pensiero di molti che il sud est asiatico produca molto solo perché darebbe emolumenti da fame.

I veri nodi sono i governi e l’ipertrofia burocratica ed ideologica.

*


Sri Lanka opens its 1st automated mask manufacturing plant

COLOMBO, March 17 (Xinhua) — Sri Lanka has opened its first accredited and fully automated masks manufacturing facility in Kotugoda in the western part of the island country, with an investment of an estimated 830,000 U.S. dollars, local media reported Wednesday.

According to a statement, the factory operated by Sensetronics Limited, will manufacture 3-ply and KN95 masks as the demand for such masks has increased amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

The facility will provide the general public affordable and quality masks, while it is also expected to bring in foreign exchange through exports, the company said in a statement.

The factory was declared open by State Minister of Production, Supply and Regulation of Pharmaceutical Channa Jayasumana.

Sri Lanka’s Health Ministry has made it mandatory to wear masks and maintain social distance to prevent a further spread of the virus, and police have warned that anyone caught leaving their homes without masks will be fined or will face a jail term. Enditem

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Stati Uniti

Occidente. Banche Centrali. Si oppongono a ulteriori danni alla crescita. – Bloomberg.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-01-21.

2021-01-03__FED 013

Fed. Banca per i Regolamenti Internazionali. I Treasury non sono più titoli di riserva.

Cina. Rcep. Non enfatizzato, il vero obiettivo è il controllo del mondo.

«a group of countries for free trade, i.e. some 2.2 billion people, commanding some 30% of the world’s GDP»

«The RCEP is a massive instrument for dedollarizing, primarily the Asia-Pacific Region, and gradually the rest of the world»

«Much of the BRI infrastructure investments, or New Silk Road, may be funded by other currencies than the US dollar»

* * * * * * *

I liberal democratici si sono accorti che esiste la Cina, che esistono i paesi del sud – est asiatico, e che loro sono solo una parte oramai trascurabile del mondo: una enclave autoreferenziale.

Fa davvero specie che alla fine persino un bastione liberal come Bloomberg inizi a prenderne atto.

Nel corso di un breve articolo, cita il trionfo cinese per ben tre volte consecutive.

«Vexed Central Banks Brace for More Damage to Growth»

«China GDP set to show economic strength at end of 2020»

«Resurgent coronavirus outbreaks will vex central bankers on five continents this week as they weigh the threat of more damage to growth against the hope that mass vaccinations will reopen economies»

«Institutions meeting from Tokyo to Frankfurt to Ottawa are pondering the prospect of another lost quarter amid renewed lockdowns to contain the pandemic»

«But with rates of infection spiraling higher, and new restrictions on activity being imposed throughout the world, Lagarde and her colleagues at global monetary authorities can only hope that the tantalizingly slow pace of global immunizations will pick up and finally start to dent the impact of the coronavirus»

«That sentiment is likely to be shared throughout the plethora of central banks due to meet in the coming days …. Aside from the ECB, they include institutions in Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine»

«Yellen …. she’ll also be tasked with helping to sell President-elect Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion stimulus package»

«While the Bank of Canada isn’t likely to make any major changes to policy this week, the economy’s weak start to 2021 may be tempting officials to add some more stimulus to the mix»

«With much of Europe now in the grip of lockdowns as tough as the initial restrictions imposed at the onset of the coronavirus crisis, the ECB’s first meeting of 2021 on Thursday will allow policy makers to assess the impact of their new round of stimulus unveiled in December»

«The reports due for manufacturing and services in January are predicted by economists to show another round of deterioration»

*

«Millions of Mexicans are jobless, underemployed or out of the labor force»

«GDP data on Monday for the fourth quarter and full year are set to confirm China as the only major world economy to have expanded last year»

* * * * * * *

Il 2021 si profila come un anno ben duro. Sia il primo sia il secondo trimestre saranno verosimilmente trimestri di lockdown, con severe ripercussioni sui sistemi economici occidentali.

Ma i 1,900 miliardi di stimoli promessi dal’Amministrazione Biden metteranno sotto pressione la Fed. Aumenteranno la quota di bond detenuti dalla Fed, incoraggeranno gli altri paesi a dimettere i pochi dollari ancora detenuti com riserva.

Per l’intanto, si prenda atto che

Fed. Banca per i Regolamenti Internazionali. I Treasury non sono più titoli di riserva.

*


Vexed Central Banks Brace for More Damage to Growth: Eco Week.

China GDP set to show economic strength at end of 2020

Weekly take on events in the world economy and their fallout

*

Resurgent coronavirus outbreaks will vex central bankers on five continents this week as they weigh the threat of more damage to growth against the hope that mass vaccinations will reopen economies.

Institutions meeting from Tokyo to Frankfurt to Ottawa are pondering the prospect of another lost quarter amid renewed lockdowns to contain the pandemic. Most are likely to maintain current ultra-loose policy settings without committing to more easing as they keep a wary eye on the path of the disease, while crossing fingers on its eventual eradication.

Like many of her counterparts, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde put a brave face on the outlook last week, insisting that forecasts released in December are still “plausible.” She emphasized how previous uncertainties, such as the U.S. elections, the Brexit trade deal and the start of vaccinations, have eased.

But with rates of infection spiraling higher, and new restrictions on activity being imposed throughout the world, Lagarde and her colleagues at global monetary authorities can only hope that the tantalizingly slow pace of global immunizations will pick up and finally start to dent the impact of the coronavirus.

That sentiment is likely to be shared throughout the plethora of central banks due to meet in the coming days. Aside from the ECB, they include institutions in Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine.

Elsewhere in the world economy, Chinese GDP will show the economy’s strength at the end of 2020, and Janet Yellen is set to move a step closer to becoming the U.S.’s first female Treasury secretary.

Click here for what happened last week and below is our wrap of what is coming up in the global economy.

U.S. and Canada

The holiday-shortened week in the U.S. will kick off Tuesday with Yellen’s confirmation hearing as Treasury secretary before the Senate Finance Committee, where she’ll also be tasked with helping to sell President-elect Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion stimulus package.

The week will feature three reports on the state of the housing market in an otherwise light economic calendar. U.S. homebuilder confidence is forecast to remain near a record level on Wednesday, while housing starts on Thursday may climb to a fresh high and Friday’s existing home sales report also is projected to show a robust reading.

While the Bank of Canada isn’t likely to make any major changes to policy this week, the economy’s weak start to 2021 may be tempting officials to add some more stimulus to the mix.

Europe, Middle East, Africa

With much of Europe now in the grip of lockdowns as tough as the initial restrictions imposed at the onset of the coronavirus crisis, the ECB’s first meeting of 2021 on Thursday will allow policy makers to assess the impact of their new round of stimulus unveiled in December.

Officials are trying to gauge if another economic contraction is imminent, and purchasing manager indexes due the day after their meeting will give them an initial clue. The reports due for manufacturing and services in January are predicted by economists to show another round of deterioration.

The U.K.’s PMIs will reveal the impact of post-Brexit trade disruptions on sentiment and activity since the country left the European Union’s customs arrangements at the start of this month, as well as the effects of continuing lockdowns. Other British reports due include inflation, retail sales and public-finance data.

Central bankers in Norway and Ukraine are forecast to keep rates unchanged, as are their colleagues in South Africa, though some analysts project more easing to support the economy after the government announced stricter Covid-19 lockdown measures.

Turkey’s central bank Governor Naci Agbal is expected to keep the nation’s benchmark interest rate at 17%, after a cumulative 675 basis points in increases since he took office in November. The hikes have stabilized the lira, but it remains to be seen whether they’ll be sufficient to contain inflation.

Asia

GDP data on Monday for the fourth quarter and full year are set to confirm China as the only major world economy to have expanded last year. Economists will zero in on December statistics for a pulse check on the recovery, with retail sales growth expected to quicken.

Early trade data from South Korea will offer a glimpse of how record virus cases are affecting global demand at the start of the year.

While the Bank of Japan is expected to keep its main policy on hold, Governor Haruhiko Kuroda could provide hints on what’s in store in a planned policy review. Japan’s consumer prices — already falling at the fastest pace in a decade — are expected to drop further in figures out Friday.

Latin America

Colombia on Monday reports retail sales, manufacturing and economic activity for November, which taken as a whole should be consistent with a gradual recovery from a record recession.

Next up, Brazil posts its December economic activity figures along with a January reading on inflation after an acceleration last year. Against this backdrop, the country’s central bankers will likely keep the key rate at a record low, while sounding ever more hawkish in their post-decision statement.

Initial Recovery

Millions of Mexicans are jobless, underemployed or out of the labor force

Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.

Rounding out the week, Mexico unemployment data for December will see the jobless rate still well above the 2020 low even as millions of working-age Mexicans have fallen out of the labor force. On Friday, the mid-month reading of inflation will put it near the 3% target, probably a bit too fast for Banxico to consider policy easing just yet.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Unione Europea

Unione Europea e dazi. Critica quelli americani ed applica il 48.5% sulle biciclette cinesi.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-06-13.

2019-06-12__Biciclette__001

La posizione dell’attuale Commissione Europea sui dazi è ambivalente.

Se da una parte condanna con la massima forza i dazi americani sui prodotti europei, d’altra parte applica lei stessa dazi anche severi nei confronti degli altri.

La contraddizione è lampante.

«L’Unione europea sarebbe pronta a prorogare per altri cinque anni i dazi antidumping sulle biciclette cinesi»

«senza parità di condizioni, i produttori cinesi invaderebbero il mercato in Ue»

«Le biciclette cinesi, sottoposte a misure antidumping dal 1993, sono attualmente soggette a dazi del 48,5%»

«Le misure riguardano anche le biciclette da Cambogia, Filippine, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia e Pakistan, anche se con alcune esenzioni»

* * * * * * *

Se sia del tutto naturale che uno stato tuteli le proprie produzioni industriali, per esempio, applicando dazi sulle omologhe produzioni estere, resta invero ambiguo considerare giusti quelli imposti ed iniqui quelli subiti.

È dal 1993 che l’Unione Europea applica dazi del 48.5% sulle biciclette prodotte in oriente: Cina, Cambogia, Filippine, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia e Pakistan. Troviamo coerente che questi stati se ne lamentino.

Sembrerebbe essere alquanto ipocrita sostenere il principio della libera circolazione delle merci e poi comportarsi in modo difforme.

Nella realtà, il vero spinoso problema risiede nel fatto che i costi di produzione nell’Unione Europea sono decisamente maggiori di quelli riscontrabili in molti altri paesi.

È questo un problema strutturale che un giorno o l’altro dovrà ben essere affrontato.


Ansa. 2019-06-12. Cina: Ue verso proroga dazi su biciclette per altri 5 anni

Ebma, misure antidumping essenziali a tutela industria europea .

L’Unione europea sarebbe pronta a prorogare per altri cinque anni i dazi antidumping sulle biciclette cinesi. Lo apprende ANSA da fonti vicine al dossier. L’esecutivo Ue avrebbe infatti completato una revisione, avviata a giugno 2018, delle misure antidumping nei confronti dei produttori di biciclette cinesi, concludendo che l’intervento di Pechino sui costi di produzione distorce la concorrenza, e qualsiasi revoca dei dazi porterebbe a un boom di importazioni in Europa. I risultati conclusivi dell’indagine saranno resi noti a settembre e, se i Ventotto concorderanno con la Commissione, i dazi saranno rinnovati per altri cinque anni.

Un provvedimento ritenuto “essenziale” dal segretario generale dell’associazione europea dei produttori di bici (Ebma), Moreno Fioravanti, che ritiene che “senza parità di condizioni, i produttori cinesi invaderebbero il mercato in Ue” in regime di dumping, mettendo in crisi l’industria europea. Le biciclette cinesi, sottoposte a misure antidumping dal 1993, sono attualmente soggette a dazi del 48,5%. Le misure riguardano anche le biciclette da Cambogia, Filippine, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Indonesia e Pakistan, anche se con alcune esenzioni. 

Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Militare, Geopolitica Mondiale, Stati Uniti

Cina – Sri Lanka. Belt and Road e basi navali. – NYT e China Org.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-07-15.

2018-07-06__Cina_Porti__001

Il The New York Times dedica un mastodontico articolo ai rapporti tra Cina a Sri Lanka: la sua lettura è parte integrante di questo articolo.

Questo articolo è stato espressamente citato da un editoriale di China Org, organo di stampa del Governo cinese.

«China will continue to work with Sri Lanka to actively implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries and continuously promote the pragmatic cooperation under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiatives»

*

«A spokesperson in the Embassy said that China has always been pursuing a friendly policy toward Sri Lanka, firmly supporting the latter’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and opposing any country’s interference in the internal affairs of the island country»

*

«continuously promote the pragmatic cooperations under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiatives following the “golden rule” of “extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits,”to better benefit the two countries and the two peoples,”»

*

«The spokesperson further said that the Embassy had noticed the recent New York Times’ article as well as the clarifications and responses by various parties from Sri Lanka, saying the article is full of political prejudice and completely inconsistent with the fact»

*

«The New York Times article published on June 25, accused China of acquiring a port in southern Sri Lanka to be used for military purposes. It however has drawn flak from Sri Lankan leaders, who have stated that the article fell under the “fake news” category»

* * * * * * *

La presa di posizione del Governo cinese riassume in poche righe i concetti base che ispirano la sua politica estera.

– “pragmatic cooperation“: nei rapporti internazionali bilaterali la Cina promuove una cooperazione sociale ed economica al di fuori di ogni possibile schema mentale ideologico o preconcetto. I partner si accettano senza tentativo alcuno di modificarne tradizioni e comportamenti. Cooperazione implica un reciproco guadagno da questo rapporto: “to better benefit the two countries and the two peoples …. shared benefits“.

– “firmly supporting the latter’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and opposing any country’s interference in the internal affairs of the island country“. Per meglio chiarire il concetto, Cina Org ricorda il rispetto della indipendenza, della sovranità, della integrità territoriale, ed infine la assoluta non interferenza degli affari interni dei paesi. In altri termini, l’esatto opposto del modo di pensare e comportarsi degli occidentali ed in particolar modo degli europei.

– “accused China of acquiring a port in southern Sri Lanka to be used for military purposes“. China Org riporta in modo molto diplomatico come questa notizia sia stata smentita dallo Sri Lankan. Non avendo detto nulla la China, si potrebbe dedurre che se le cose evolvessero, la essa non si opporrebbe.

* * * * * * *

Larga quota delle merci cinesi attraversano lo Stretto di Malacca  e si dirigono in gran parte sulla rotta per Suez. È semplicemente evidente come il controllo dello spazio marittimo del nord Oceano Indiano sia essenziale per i cinesi.

Una ultima precisazione a nostro parere importante.

L’articolo edito dal The New York Times è mastodontico, inusitatamente lungo e dettagliato: da al problema del dominio dell’Oceano Indiano la corretta importanza strategica. Dopo il Mare Cinese Meridionale gli Stati Uniti corrono il serio rischio di perdere anche il controlla navale dell’Oceano Indiano.

Tuttavia, a nostro sommesso parere, l’articolo del NYT non riporta quella che è l’attuale posizione politica e militare degli Stati Uniti, bensì cosa e come ne pensano i liberal democratici. Opinione che deve essere valutata con cura, ma che non è al momento al governo dell’America.


China Org. 2018-07-01. China to continue promoting pragmatic cooperation with Sri Lanka under Belt and Road: Chinese embassy

China will continue to work with Sri Lanka to actively implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries and continuously promote the pragmatic cooperation under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiatives, the Chinese Embassy in Sri Lanka said in a statement Saturday.

A spokesperson in the Embassy said that China has always been pursuing a friendly policy toward Sri Lanka, firmly supporting the latter’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and opposing any country’s interference in the internal affairs of the island country.

“Despite any interference from a third party, China would like to work together with Sri Lanka to actively implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, and concentrate unwaveringly on our fixed goals, continuously promote the pragmatic cooperations under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiatives following the “golden rule” of “extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits,” to better benefit the two countries and the two peoples,” the spokesperson said.

The spokesperson further said that the Embassy had noticed the recent New York Times’ article as well as the clarifications and responses by various parties from Sri Lanka, saying the article is full of political prejudice and completely inconsistent with the fact.

The New York Times article published on June 25, accused China of acquiring a port in southern Sri Lanka to be used for military purposes. It however has drawn flak from Sri Lankan leaders, who have stated that the article fell under the “fake news” category.


The New York Times. 2018-07-01. How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port

HAMBANTOTA, Sri Lanka — Every time Sri Lanka’s president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, turned to his Chinese allies for loans and assistance with an ambitious port project, the answer was yes.

Yes, though feasibility studies said the port wouldn’t work. Yes, though other frequent lenders like India had refused. Yes, though Sri Lanka’s debt was ballooning rapidly under Mr. Rajapaksa.

Over years of construction and renegotiation with China Harbor Engineering Company, one of Beijing’s largest state-owned enterprises, the Hambantota Port Development Project distinguished itself mostly by failing, as predicted. With tens of thousands of ships passing by along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, the port drew only 34 ships in 2012.

And then the port became China’s.

Mr. Rajapaksa was voted out of office in 2015, but Sri Lanka’s new government struggled to make payments on the debt he had taken on. Under heavy pressure and after months of negotiations with the Chinese, the government handed over the port and 15,000 acres of land around it for 99 years in December.

The transfer gave China control of territory just a few hundred miles off the shores of a rival, India, and a strategic foothold along a critical commercial and military waterway.

The case is one of the most vivid examples of China’s ambitious use of loans and aid to gain influence around the world — and of its willingness to play hardball to collect.

The debt deal also intensified some of the harshest accusations about President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative: that the global investment and lending program amounts to a debt trap for vulnerable countries around the world, fueling corruption and autocratic behavior in struggling democracies.

Months of interviews with Sri Lankan, Indian, Chinese and Western officials and analysis of documents and agreements stemming from the port project present a stark illustration of how China and the companies under its control ensured their interests in a small country hungry for financing.

  • During the 2015 Sri Lankan elections, large payments from the Chinese port construction fund flowed directly to campaign aides and activities for Mr. Rajapaksa, who had agreed to Chinese terms at every turn and was seen as an important ally in China’s efforts to tilt influence away from India in South Asia. The payments were confirmed by documents and cash checks detailed in a government investigation seen by The New York Times.

  • Though Chinese officials and analysts have insisted that China’s interest in the Hambantota port is purely commercial, Sri Lankan officials said that from the start, the intelligence and strategic possibilities of the port’s location were part of the negotiations.

  • Initially moderate terms for lending on the port project became more onerous as Sri Lankan officials asked to renegotiate the timeline and add more financing. And as Sri Lankan officials became desperate to get the debt off their books in recent years, the Chinese demands centered on handing over equity in the port rather than allowing any easing of terms.

  • Though the deal erased roughly $1 billion in debt for the port project, Sri Lanka is now in more debt to China than ever, as other loans have continued and rates remain much higher than from other international lenders.

Mr. Rajapaksa and his aides did not respond to multiple requests for comment, made over several months, for this article. Officials for China Harbor also would not comment.

Estimates by the Sri Lankan Finance Ministry paint a bleak picture: This year, the government is expected to generate $14.8 billion in revenue, but its scheduled debt repayments, to an array of lenders around the world, come to $12.3 billion.

“John Adams said infamously that a way to subjugate a country is through either the sword or debt. China has chosen the latter,” said Brahma Chellaney, an analyst who often advises the Indian government and is affiliated with the Center for Policy Research, a think tank in New Delhi.

Indian officials, in particular, fear that Sri Lanka is struggling so much that the Chinese government may be able to dangle debt relief in exchange for its military’s use of assets like the Hambantota port — though the final lease agreement forbids military activity there without Sri Lanka’s invitation.

“The only way to justify the investment in Hambantota is from a national security standpoint — that they will bring the People’s Liberation Army in,” said Shivshankar Menon, who served as India’s foreign secretary and then its national security adviser as the Hambantota port was being built.

An Engaged Ally

The relationship between China and Sri Lanka had long been amicable, with Sri Lanka an early recognizer of Mao’s Communist government after the Chinese Revolution. But it was during a more recent conflict — Sri Lanka’s brutal 26-year civil war with ethnic Tamil separatists — that China became indispensable.

Mr. Rajapaksa, who was elected in 2005, presided over the last years of the war, when Sri Lanka became increasingly isolated by accusations of human rights abuses. Under him, Sri Lanka relied heavily on China for economic support, military equipment and political cover at the United Nations to block potential sanctions.

The war ended in 2009, and as the country emerged from the chaos, Mr. Rajapaksa and his family consolidated their hold. At the height of Mr. Rajapaksa’s tenure, the president and his three brothers controlled many government ministries and around 80 percent of total government spending. Governments like China negotiated directly with them.

So when the president began calling for a vast new port development project at Hambantota, his sleepy home district, the few roadblocks in its way proved ineffective.

From the start, officials questioned the wisdom of a second major port, in a country a quarter the size of Britain and with a population of 22 million, when the main port in the capital was thriving and had room to expand. Feasibility studies commissioned by the government had starkly concluded that a port at Hambantota was not economically viable.

“They approached us for the port at the beginning, and Indian companies said no,” said Mr. Menon, the former Indian foreign secretary. “It was an economic dud then, and it’s an economic dud now.”

But Mr. Rajapaksa greenlighted the project, then boasted in a news release that he had defied all caution — and that China was on board.

The Sri Lanka Ports Authority began devising what officials believed was a careful, economically sound plan in 2007, according to an official involved in the project. It called for a limited opening for business in 2010, and for revenue to be coming in before any major expansion.

The first major loan it took on the project came from the Chinese government’s Export-Import Bank, or Exim, for $307 million. But to obtain the loan, Sri Lanka was required to accept Beijing’s preferred company, China Harbor, as the port’s builder, according to a United States Embassy cable from the time, leaked to WikiLeaks.

That is a typical demand of China for its projects around the world, rather than allowing an open bidding process. Across the region, Beijing’s government is lending out billions of dollars, being repaid at a premium to hire Chinese companies and thousands of Chinese workers, according to officials across the region.

There were other strings attached to the loan, as well, in a sign that China saw strategic value in the Hambantota port from the beginning.

Nihal Rodrigo, a former Sri Lankan foreign secretary and ambassador to China, said that discussions with Chinese officials at the time made it clear that intelligence sharing was an integral, if not public, part of the deal. In an interview with The Times, Mr. Rodrigo characterized the Chinese line as, “We expect you to let us know who is coming and stopping here.”

In later years, Chinese officials and the China Harbor company went to great lengths to keep relations strong with Mr. Rajapaksa, who for years had faithfully acquiesced to such terms.

In the final months of Sri Lanka’s 2015 election, China’s ambassador broke with diplomatic norms and lobbied voters, even caddies at Colombo’s premier golf course, to support Mr. Rajapaksa over the opposition, which was threatening to tear up economic agreements with the Chinese government.

As the January election inched closer, large payments started to flow toward the president’s circle.

At least $7.6 million was dispensed from China Harbor’s account at Standard Chartered Bank to affiliates of Mr. Rajapaksa’s campaign, according to a document, seen by The Times, from an active internal government investigation. The document details China Harbor’s bank account number — ownership of which was verified — and intelligence gleaned from questioning of the people to whom the checks were made out.

With 10 days to go before polls opened, around $3.7 million was distributed in checks: $678,000 to print campaign T-shirts and other promotional material and $297,000 to buy supporters gifts, including women’s saris. Another $38,000 was paid to a popular Buddhist monk who was supporting Mr. Rajapaksa’s electoral bid, while two checks totaling $1.7 million were delivered by volunteers to Temple Trees, his official residence.

Most of the payments were from a subaccount controlled by China Harbor, named “HPDP Phase 2,” shorthand for Hambantota Port Development Project.

China’s Network

After nearly five years of helter-skelter expansion for China’s Belt and Road Initiative across the globe, Chinese officials are quietly trying to take stock of how many deals have been done and what the country’s financial exposure might be. There is no comprehensive picture of that yet, said one Chinese economic policymaker, who like many other officials would speak about Chinese policy only on the condition of anonymity.

Some Chinese officials have become concerned that the nearly institutional graft surrounding such projects represents a liability for China, and raises the bar needed for profitability. President Xi acknowledged the worry in a speech last year, saying, “We will also strengthen international cooperation on anticorruption in order to build the Belt and Road Initiative with integrity.”

In Bangladesh, for example, officials said in January that China Harbor would be banned from future contracts over accusations that the company attempted to bribe an official at the ministry of roads, stuffing $100,000 into a box of tea, government officials said in interviews. And China Harbor’s parent company, China Communications Construction Company, was banned for eight years in 2009 from bidding on World Bank projects because of corrupt practices in the Philippines.

Since the port seizure in Sri Lanka, Chinese officials have started suggesting that Belt and Road is not an open-ended government commitment to finance development across three continents.

“If we cannot manage the risk well, the Belt and Road projects cannot go far or well,” said Jin Qi, the chairwoman of the Silk Road Fund, a large state-owned investment fund, during the China Development Forum in late March.

In Sri Lanka’s case, port officials and Chinese analysts have also not given up the view that the Hambantota port could become profitable, or at least strengthen China’s trade capacity in the region.

Ray Ren, China Merchant Port’s representative in Sri Lanka and the head of the Hambantota port’s operations, insisted that “the location of Sri Lanka is ideal for international trade.” And he dismissed the negative feasibility studies, saying they were done many years ago when Hambantota was “a small fishing hamlet.”

Hu Shisheng, the director of South Asia studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, said that China clearly recognized the strategic value of the Hambantota port. But he added: “Once China wants to exert its geostrategic value, the strategic value of the port will be gone. Big countries cannot fight in Sri Lanka — it would be wiped out.”

Although the Hambantota port first opened in a limited way in 2010, before the Belt and Road Initiative was announced, the Chinese government quickly folded the project into the global program.

Shortly after the handover ceremony in Hambantota, China’s state news agency released a boastful video on Twitter, proclaiming the deal “another milestone along the path of #BeltandRoad.”

A Port to Nowhere

The seaport is not the only grand project built with Chinese loans in Hambantota, a sparsely populated area on Sri Lanka’s southeastern coast that is still largely overrun by jungle.

A cricket stadium with more seats than the population of Hambantota’s district capital marks the skyline, as does a large international airport — which in June lost the only daily commercial flight it had left when FlyDubai airline ended the route. A highway that cuts through the district is traversed by elephants and used by farmers to rake out and dry the rice plucked fresh from their paddies.

Mr. Rajapaksa’s advisers had laid out a methodical approach to how the port might expand after opening, ensuring that some revenue would be coming in before taking on much more debt.

But in 2009, the president had grown impatient. His 65th birthday was approaching the following year, and to mark the occasion he wanted a grand opening at the Hambantota port — including the beginning of an ambitious expansion 10 years ahead of the Port Authority’s original timeline.

Chinese laborers began working day and night to get the port ready, officials said. But when workers dredged the land and then flooded it to create the basin of the port, they had not taken into account a large boulder that partly blocked the entrance, preventing the entry of large ships, like oil tankers, that the port’s business model relied on.

Ports Authority officials, unwilling to cross the president, quickly moved ahead anyway. The Hambantota port opened in an elaborate celebration on Nov. 18, 2010, Mr. Rajapaksa’s birthday. Then it sat waiting for business while the rock blocked it.

China Harbor blasted the boulder a year later, at a cost of $40 million, an exorbitant price that raised concerns among diplomats and government officials. Some openly speculated about whether the company was simply overcharging or the price tag included kickbacks to Mr. Rajapaksa.

By 2012, the port was struggling to attract ships — which preferred to berth nearby at the Colombo port — and construction costs were rising as the port began expanding ahead of schedule. The government decreed later that year that ships carrying car imports bound for Colombo port would instead offload their cargo at Hambantota to kick-start business there. Still, only 34 ships berthed at Hambantota in 2012, compared with 3,667 ships at the Colombo port, according to a Finance Ministry annual report.

“When I came to the government, I called the minister of national planning and asked for the justification of Hambantota Port,” Harsha de Silva, the state minister for national policies and economic affairs, said in an interview. “She said, ‘We were asked to do it, so we did it.’ ”

Determined to keep expanding the port, Mr. Rajapaksa went back to the Chinese government in 2012, asking for $757 million.

The Chinese agreed again. But this time, the terms were much steeper.

The first loan, at $307 million, had originally come at a variable rate that usually settled above 1 or 2 percent after the global financial crash in 2008. (For comparison, rates on similar Japanese loans for infrastructure projects run below half a percent.)

But to secure fresh funding, that initial loan was renegotiated to a much higher 6.3 percent fixed rate. Mr. Rajapaksa acquiesced.

The rising debt and project costs, even as the port was struggling, handed Sri Lanka’s political opposition a powerful issue, and it campaigned heavily on suspicions about China. Mr. Rajapaksa lost the election.

The incoming government, led by President Maithripala Sirisena, came to office with a mandate to scrutinize Sri Lanka’s financial deals. It also faced a daunting amount of debt: Under Mr. Rajapaksa, the country’s debt had increased threefold, to $44.8 billion when he left office. And for 2015 alone, a $4.68 billion payment was due at year’s end.

Signing It Away

The new government was eager to reorient Sri Lanka toward India, Japan and the West. But officials soon realized that no other country could fill the financial or economic space that China held in Sri Lanka.

“We inherited a purposefully run-down economy — the revenues were insufficient to pay the interest charges, let alone capital repayment,” said Ravi Karunanayake, who was finance minister during the new government’s first year in office.

“We did keep taking loans,” he added. “A new government can’t just stop loans. It’s a relay; you need to take them until economic discipline is introduced.”

The Central Bank estimated that Sri Lanka owed China about $3 billion last year. But Nishan de Mel, an economist at Verité Research, said some of the debts were off government books and instead registered as part of individual projects. He estimated that debt owed to China could be as much as $5 billion and was growing every year. In May, Sri Lanka took a new $1 billion loan from China Development Bank to help make its coming debt payment.

Government officials began meeting in 2016 with their Chinese counterparts to strike a deal, hoping to get the port off Sri Lanka’s balance sheet and avoid outright default. But the Chinese demanded that a Chinese company take a dominant equity share in the port in return, Sri Lankan officials say — writing down the debt was not an option China would accept.

When Sri Lanka was given a choice, it was over which state-owned company would take control: either China Harbor or China Merchants Port, according to the final agreement, a copy of which was obtained by The Times, although it was never released publicly in full.

China Merchants got the contract, and it immediately pressed for more: Company officials demanded 15,000 acres of land around the port to build an industrial zone, according to two officials with knowledge of the negotiations. The Chinese company argued that the port itself was not worth the $1.1 billion it would pay for its equity — money that would close out Sri Lanka’s debt on the port.

Some government officials bitterly opposed the terms, but there was no leeway, according to officials involved in the negotiations. The new agreement was signed in July 2017, and took effect in December.

The deal left some appearance of Sri Lankan ownership: Among other things, it created a joint company to manage the port’s operations and collect revenue, with 85 percent owned by China Merchants Port and the remaining 15 percent controlled by Sri Lanka’s government.

But lawyers specializing in port acquisitions said Sri Lanka’s small stake meant little, given the leverage that China Merchants Port retained over board personnel and operating decisions.

When the agreement was initially negotiated, it left open whether the port and surrounding land could be used by the Chinese military, which Indian officials asked the Sri Lankan government to explicitly forbid. The final agreement bars foreign countries from using the port for military purposes unless granted permission by the government in Colombo.

That clause is there because Chinese Navy submarines had already come calling to Sri Lanka.

Strategic Concerns

China had a stake in Sri Lanka’s main port as well: China Harbor was building a new terminal there, known at the time as Colombo Port City. Along with that deal came roughly 50 acres of land, solely held by the Chinese company, that Sri Lanka had no sovereignty on.

That was dramatically demonstrated toward the end of Mr. Rajapaksa’s term, in 2014. Chinese submarines docked at the harbor the same day that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan was visiting Colombo, in what was seen across the region as a menacing signal from Beijing.

When the new Sri Lankan government came to office, it sought assurances that the port would never again welcome Chinese submarines — of particular concern because they are difficult to detect and often used for intelligence gathering. But Sri Lankan officials had little real control.

Now, the handover of Hambantota to the Chinese has kept alive concerns about possible military use — particularly as China has continued to militarize island holdings around the South China Sea despite earlier pledges not to.

Sri Lankan officials are quick to point out that the agreement explicitly rules out China’s military use of the site. But others also note that Sri Lanka’s government, still heavily indebted to China, could be pressured to allow it.

And, as Mr. de Silva, the state minister for national policies and economic affairs, put it, “Governments can change.”

Now, he and others are watching carefully as Mr. Rajapaksa, China’s preferred partner in Sri Lanka, has been trying to stage a political comeback. The former president’s new opposition party swept municipal elections in February. Presidential elections are coming up next year, and general elections in 2020.

Although Mr. Rajapaksa is barred from running again because of term limits, his brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the former defense secretary, appears to be readying to take the mantle.

“It will be Mahinda Rajapaksa’s call. If he says it’s one of the brothers, that person will have a very strong claim,” said Ajith Nivard Cabraal, the central bank governor under Mr. Rajapaksa’s government, who still advises the family. “Even if he’s no longer the president, as the Constitution is structured, Mahinda will be the main power base.”

Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Mondiale, Politica Mondiale

Cina. Xiamen. Brics Plus alla conquista del mondo.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-30.

Pechino-Cina

Abbiamo già riferito del Simposio di Quanzhou e del programma Belt and Road.

Cina. Quanzhou. I Brics decidono cosa farsene dell’Occidente.

Russia, Cina e Stati Uniti. Venezuela. I venezuelani sono comparse.

Belt and Road Forum. L’alternativa a Davos ed al G20.

Obor. Progetto cinese su di un terzo del pil mondiale, per ora.

Brics. Il Summit di settembre a Xiamen. Ripudio dell’Occidente.

Cina. Banche Cinesi e Belt and Road. Yuan come valuta internazionale.

Filippine. La situazione analizzata dal punto di vista cinese. Xinhua.

*

Cina. Inversione di rotta. Inizia la riduzione del debito.

*

I Brics crescono ogni giorno che passa.

Da un punto di vista meramente economico, se si considera il pil per potere di acquisto, il mondo genera 108,036,500 milioni Usd, la Cina 17,617,300 (16.31%) e gli Stati Uniti 17,418,00 (16.12%). L’Eurozona rende conto di 11,249,482 (10.41%) ed il Gruppo dei G7 di 31.825,293 (29.46%). Però i Brics conteggiano un pil ppa di 32,379,625 Usd, ossia il 29.97% del pil ppa mondiale. I Brics valgono come i paesi del G7.

Di conseguenza, la voce dell’Occidente vale nel mondo al massimo per il 29.46%, ma quella degli Stati Uniti vale solo il 16.12% e quella dell’Eurozona uno scarno 10.41%.

Il pil ppa rende bene l’idea, ma non è l’unico modo di conteggiare. Secondo altre metodiche i Brics varrebbero il 25% dell’economia mondiale e renderebbero conto del 50% della crescita dei sistemi economici. Un risultato molto simile al 29.97%.

Il pil ppa rende conto del reale potere di acquisto.

* * * * * * *

Brics. Il Summit di settembre a Xiamen. Ripudio dell’Occidente.

Cina. Banche Cinesi e Belt and Road. Yuan come valuta internazionale.

Filippine. La situazione analizzata dal punto di vista cinese. Xinhua.

 *

La Cina sta per lanciare il progetto Brics Plus.

The Valdai Discussion Club. 2017-07-19. BRICS-Plus: Alternative Globalization in the Making?

«Given that the BRICS is a unique grouping that is present in all key regions and continents of the developing world, it could serve as a platform for expanding South-South cooperation and economic integration across a wide range of areas. In this regard, rather that seeking to expand core membership, the BRICS+ construct is first and foremost about a different approach to economic integration and a different technology of how alliances are structured globally.»

The Valdai Discussion Club. 2017-07-19. BRICS Plus: New Technology, New Vision for Economic Integration

*

The Times of India. 2017-05-09. China wants ‘BRICS plus’ to include ‘friendly’ countries

The Quint. 2017-08-23. BRICS-Plus? Or a BRICS-Minus Modi Summit in Xiamen?

First Post. 2017-06-20. China says proposed ‘BRICS Plus’ will enhance cooperation with other countries, will not become military alliance

China Daily. 2017-04-17. ‘BRICS Plus’ can become new integration model for world economy

China Org. 2017-03-26. The BRICS-Plus paradigm

* * * * * *

«China will host the ninth BRICS annual summit in the southeastern coastal city of Xiamen, Fujian Province, from September 3 to 5»

*

«the growing impact of the association of emerging countries on the world»

*

«The actions of the BRICS members have a global impact rather than just being restricted to the five member countries»

*

«Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China would explore the expansion modalities for “BRICS Plus” and build a wider partnership by holding dialogues with other major developing countries»

*

«Currently, the BRICS group has five member countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – and potential new members such as Mexico, Pakistan and Sri Lanka»

*

«This governance approach could provide a reference point for other countries with some adaptations to meet varying national conditions …. various options for governance suited to their own situation»

*

«to discuss good practices of domestic governance as well as new approaches to global governance»

* * * * * * *

Cerchiamo di ragionare, nei limiti del possibile.

– Quanto a potere di spesa, al momento i Brics valgono come i paesi del G7;

– Già ora i Brics Plus sarebbero il blocco economico più grande del mondo;

– Prendendo atto del tasso di crescita, tra dieci anni, che passano presto, saranno il blocco economico capace di imporre le proprie regole al mondo, relegando l’Occidente a ruolo subalterno;

– Il “governance approach” dei Brics è esattamente l’opposto di quello occidentale o, più esattamente, di quello liberal e socialista ideologico, che esce storicamente battuto, in declino;

– I Brics hanno un obiettivo dichiarato, ossia quello di proporre, ed imporre de facto, il proprio “new approaches to global governance“.

* * * * * * *

Il modello di governo offerto dai cinesi tende a rispettare e valorizzare le singole identità statali, e questa è la carta vincente. Propone, non impone. Esattamente l’opposto della visione liberal. L’opposto di quanto nell’Unione Europea stanno cercando di fare Frau Merkel e Mr Macron. È immune da pruriti ideologici ed avversa la visione etica e morale dei liberal.

Distruggendo il proprio retaggio religioso, storico, culturale e sociale l’Occidente che abbatte le statue dei suoi grandi, che è ossessionato da ogni possibile perversione sessuale assunta a traguardo di civiltà, non fa altro che spianare la strada all’innalzamento dei Brics e della Cina.

Se non fosse fantapolitica, si dovrebbe concludere che i liberal democratici ed i socialisti ideologici europei siano al soldo della Russia e della Cina.

Nota.

L’articolo citato di China Org usa il termine “socialismo” secondo l’accezione cinese del termine, non secondo quella occidentale: si evitino le confusioni.


China Org. 2017-08-23. Huang Youyi: BRICS influence beyond five countries

“With improved cooperation, improved economy and shared solutions for fighting world challenges, BRICS will further expand its influence in the next decade,” predicted a Chinese expert on Thursday during a seminar in southeastern China.

Huang Youyi, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and executive vice president of the Translators Association of China, foresaw the growing impact of the association of emerging countries on the world stage during an interview with China.org.cn on the sidelines of the BRICS Seminar on Governance that opened Aug. 17 in Quanzhou, Fujian Province.

“The actions of the BRICS members have a global impact rather than just being restricted to the five member countries,” said Huang, pointing out that more countries were showing interest in the mechanism and would like to learn from each country’s successful development models.

As many as 160 people from government agencies, business circle and the academia in the BRICS nations and over 10 countries outside the bloc joined the seminar to discuss good practices of domestic governance as well as new approaches to global governance, leading to openness, inclusiveness, mutual benefits and win-win output.

Earlier this year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China would explore the expansion modalities for “BRICS Plus” and build a wider partnership by holding dialogues with other major developing countries and organizations, so as to turn BRICS into the world’s most influential platform for South-South cooperation.

Currently, the BRICS group has five member countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – and potential new members such as Mexico, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The seminar in Quanzhou, in Huang’s words, “fully reflects the BRICS spirit as well as China’s position of common consultation and win-win resolution”, with people from different parts of the world, including Africa, Asia and Latin America, coming together to exchange ideas and explore various options for governance suited to their own situation.

Explaining China’s approach to domestic governance, Huang said that, after many trials and tribulations and more than 100 years of experience, only in the last decades had the nation managed to find a path suitable to its own conditions, namely, the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, able to carry out reforms and meet various important goals.

This governance approach could provide a reference point for other countries with some adaptations to meet varying national conditions, he added.

Besides the domestic approach, China’s global governance style has met with strong support, with its ideas like building a community of shared future for mankind, inclusive development and common consultation gaining popularity worldwide.

This, Huang argued, was proved by the sheer number of international participants in and outside the BRICS mechanism attending the Quanzhou seminar.

“The idea of ‘BRICS Plus’ does sound attractive,” he added.

Before the organization, as expected, includes more members, he believed there would be all kinds of forums as well as annual meetings held under the BRICS mechanism involving the participation of more people outside of the five countries.

China will host the ninth BRICS annual summit in the southeastern coastal city of Xiamen, Fujian Province, from September 3 to 5, as the country takes the rotating chair of the influential bloc.