Debito ‘sostenibile’ che diventa ‘insostenibile’. – Bloomberg.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-11-05.

«The sustainable debt market has become unsustainable»

«The European Union has offered its first social bond—as in the middle initial of ESG: environmental, social, and governance—in a two-part, 17 billion euro ($20.2 billion) sale»

«Investors were ravenous. When all was said and done, the offering was oversubscribed 14 times over. Orders blew past 233 billion euros, making it likely the biggest debt sale ever»

«It’s easily double the previous record demand of 108 billion euros for Italian debt in June.»

«There are a number of reasons EU’s social bond was in such high demand. For one, it carries the bloc’s AAA credit rating»

«A 14-times-oversubscribed sustainable debt offering also indicates a market that’s structurally underserved»

«This, to me, is an unsustainably low supply of sustainable debt. It creates the possibility that buyers will take their debt appetites elsewhere, no matter how green or sustainable their intentions»

«Sustainable debt issuance exceeded $560 billion last year, and has already reached $460 billion and beyond in 2020»

«Right now, almost all sustainable debt is B-rated or higher, meaning that its issuers are generally seen as low credit risks»

«At much greater scale, though, we should expect to see a wider range of credit ratings»

«bundles of speculative-grade loans, sliced into different tranches, with the lower-rated portions suffering the first losses to protect payments to those invested in the top layer»

«A much bigger market might give some investors pause, as over-securitization was a major part of the 2008-9 global financial crisis»

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Cerchiamo di sintetizzare, anche a costo di essere molto riduttivi.

– Questi ‘social bonds’ dell’Unione Europea hanno ricevuto una richiesta quattordici volte superore all’offerta perché emessi da una entità con rating tripla A: AAA.

– Tuttavia la massa dei ‘social bonds’ è emessa da entità con rating ben inferiore, il cui mercato subirà per forza di cose la concorrenza delle emittenti con rating elevati

«A much bigger market might give some investors pause, as over-securitization was a major part of the 2008-9 global financial crisis»

– È questa una situazione non sostenibile nel tempo.

*

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The Sustainable Debt Market Has Become Unsustainable.

The European Union has offered its first social bond—as in the middle initial of ESG: environmental, social, and governance—in a two-part, 17 billion euro ($20.2 billion) sale. Investors were ravenous. When all was said and done, the offering was oversubscribed 14 times over. Orders blew past 233 billion euros, making it likely the biggest debt sale ever. It’s easily double the previous record demand of 108 billion euros for Italian debt in June.

There are a number of reasons EU’s social bond was in such high demand. For one, it carries the bloc’s AAA credit rating. It’s also the EU’s first joint debt offering since the bloc agreed to its pandemic recovery deal. The fact that it’s a social bond—the fastest-growing segment of sustainable debt, the asset class that also includes the trillion-dollar green bond market—is important. How is it important? Well, it’s complicated.  

It’s certainly not a bad sign for sustainable finance that demand for a AAA-rated social bond exceeds supply by more than an order of magnitude. Nor is it bad for the bond issuer—demand well in excess of supply will bid prices up, resulting in a lower yield. It also gives new issuers significant incentive to offer their own sustainable debt, be they companies, supranational organizations such as the World Bank, or sovereign entities.

But I wouldn’t call this runaway demand a good sign, necessarily, either. A seller’s expensive price also runs the risk of being a buyer’s too-high price, for instance. A sustainable debt premium could actually price out some asset managers, who (rightly) have a mandate to seek the best bond fund performance for asset owners.

A 14-times-oversubscribed sustainable debt offering also indicates a market that’s structurally underserved. In theory, the EU could have sold not 17 billion euros of AAA-rated social bonds, but rather 200 billion. This, to me, is an unsustainably low supply of sustainable debt. It creates the possibility that buyers will take their debt appetites elsewhere, no matter how green or sustainable their intentions.

Sustainable debt issuance exceeded $560 billion last year, and has already reached $460 billion and beyond in 2020. The EU’s social bond sale indicates there’s sufficient demand for a market multiple times bigger than that. If the market becomes 10 times larger, we should look for it to replicate the instruments of the existing debt market—and that means securitization.

Right now, almost all sustainable debt is B-rated or higher, meaning that its issuers are generally seen as low credit risks. At much greater scale, though, we should expect to see a wider range of credit ratings. If that happens, there’s the potential for sustainable collateralized loan obligations—“bundles of speculative-grade loans, sliced into different tranches, with the lower-rated portions suffering the first losses to protect payments to those invested in the top layer,” as Bloomberg’s Brian Chappatta describes them. ESG-themed CLOs already exist, though their “green” qualities are largely at the arranger’s discretion; there’s no regulation setting specific criteria, and volumes are quite small.

A much bigger market might give some investors pause, as over-securitization was a major part of the 2008-9 global financial crisis. But if it’s part of achieving the five- or 10-times greater scale that sustainable debt buyers are seeking, then a little speculation could be … well, sustainable.

Italia. Rating Fitch BBB negativo.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-02-08.

«Fitch ha confermato per l’Italia il rating BBB con outlook negativo, facendo riferimento a un debito pubblico che permane a un livello estremamente elevato con tendenza debole del Pil alla crescita, insieme a un ancora insufficiente miglioramento degli asset delle banche e a un permanere dell’incertezza politica con l’alta probabilità che l’attuale governo non completi la legislatura»

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Constatiamo come paesi quali il Brasile (BB-), la Federazione Russa (BBB), l’Indonesia (BBB), il Messico (BBB), il Sud Africa (BB+) e la Turkia (BB-) abbiano un rating superiore a quello italiano.

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Fitch conferma rating Italia BBB con outlook negativo

Fitch ha confermato per l’Italia il rating BBB con outlook negativo, facendo riferimento a un debito pubblico che permane a un livello estremamente elevato con tendenza debole del Pil alla crescita, insieme a un ancora insufficiente miglioramento degli asset delle banche e a un permanere dell’incertezza politica con l’alta probabilità che l’attuale governo non completi la legislatura.

Quanto agli interventi del Governo italiano, per Fitch riduzioni fiscali e investimenti pubblici non sono destinati a influenzare significativamente il Pil. Tempi lunghi ed esiti incerti invece, nella valutazione di Fitch, perché maturino gli effetti di interventi in materia di riduzione della spesa e di contrasto dell’evasione fiscale.

Croazia. Il rating sale al livello ‘investiment grade’. BBB.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-06-10.

Nel 2015 il pil croato era 49.5 miliardi Usd, ma a fine 2018 si era portato a 60.8 miliardi: una gran bella crescita.

Questo miglioramento della situazione economica trova adesso riscontro nel giudizio positivo che ne esprimono le società di rating.

«Fitch Ratings raised Croatia’s credit score to investment-grade level, making it the second major rating company to bring the Adriatic Sea country out of junk-bond status since March»

«The sovereign rating was upgraded by one notch to BBB-, with a positive outlook, from BB+»

«The move puts Croatia on par with Russia and fellow EU member Romania. S&P Global Ratings lifted Croatia to investment-grade status in March, while Moody’s Investors Service rates it at Ba2, with a positive outlook»

«The move puts Croatia on par with Russia and fellow EU member Romania. S&P Global Ratings lifted Croatia to investment-grade status in March, while Moody’s Investors Service rates it at Ba2, with a positive outlook»

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Il rating è una attribuzione variabile nel tempo, perché indica, o dovrebbe indicare, il grado di affidabilità dello strumento cui inerisce. Al variare della affidabilità varia di conserva il rating.

Nel caso di reddito fisso, solitamente si considera come soglia limite inferiore il rating BBB.

Questa soglia è altrettanto solitamente rispettata dagli investitori istituzionali, che non acquisiscono titoli di stato a rank inferiori, a tutela dei propri investimenti.

Questo è uno dei motivi di soddisfazione per la Croazia, e con lei per tutta la Unione Europea.

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Bloomberg. 2019-06-08. Croatia Gets Second Investment-Grade Rating as Fitch Follows S&P

– Credit rating raised one notch to BBB- with positive outlook

– Upgrade reflects fiscal tightening and falling debt levels

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Fitch Ratings raised Croatia’s credit score to investment-grade level, making it the second major rating company to bring the Adriatic Sea country out of junk-bond status since March.

The sovereign rating was upgraded by one notch to BBB-, with a positive outlook, from BB+, Fitch said on Friday, citing the European Union member’s efforts in lowering public debt, balancing the budget, and improving economic growth. The move puts Croatia on par with Russia and fellow EU member Romania. S&P Global Ratings lifted Croatia to investment-grade status in March, while Moody’s Investors Service rates it at Ba2, with a positive outlook.

“Fitch expects fiscal dynamics to remain on a positive trajectory over the medium term, underpinned by confidence in the authorities’ track record and commitment to continued fiscal consolidation, improvements in the fiscal framework and stable macroeconomic conditions,” it said in a statement.

Croatia has balanced the budget in recent years and slashed public debt faster than prescribed by Maastricht criteria, which Zagreb is trying to fulfill so it can join the euro area in the next decade. The economy is predicted to grow just under 3% this year. The efforts by the government of Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic have resulted in the country’s emerging out of junk status where it was demoted to in 2012 amid a record recession.

The nation exited the EU’s procedure on excessive economic imbalances in April. Central bank Governor Boris Vujcic said he expects Zagreb to send a letter of intent to join the ERM-2, the euro zone’s waiting room, by July.

Fitch forecast Croatia’s real GDP growth to average 2.4% in 2019-20, lower than the current BBB median of 3.1% but enough to finally return to the pre-crisis output level by 2020. Given modest planned public wage increases over the next two years, Fitch now expects inflation to average only 1% in 2019-20.

Finance Minister Zdravko Maric said in March that the government may hold a roadshow for international bond investors before the summer.

Dagong degrada i BTP a BB+, negative outlook. Spazzatura.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-05-24.

«Dagong Global Credit Rating (Chinese: 大公国际资信评估有限公司; pinyin: Dàgōng Guójì Zīxìn Pínggū Yǒuxiàn Gōngsī) is a credit rating agency based in China.

The company was established in 1994, following approval by the People’s Bank of China and the State Economic and Trade Division of the People’s Republic of China.

In May 2009, an agreement of mutual cooperation was signed with Xinhua news agency, reported as “promoting a national credit rating system”.

In June 2013, Dagong Europe Credit Rating was registered and received authorisation from the European Securities and Markets Authority as Credit Rating Agency. In the same year, it was recognised by the Joint Committee of the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, ESMA and EIOPA) as External Credit Assessment Institution operating in the European Union.

In July 2014, Dagong Global Credit Rating (Hong Kong) Co., Limited was granted a Type 10 License (Providing Credit Rating Services) by the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong.»

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«AAA:  Highest credit rating

AA:       Very High credit rating

A:          High credit rating

BBB:     Medium credit rating

BB:        Low medium credit rating

B:          Relatively low credit rating

CCC:     Low credit rating

CC:       Very low credit rating.

C:        Lowest credit rating. Issuer is unable to meet financial obligations and possibly in the process of bankruptcy.» [Fonte]

*              

E così Dagong ha ulteriormente declassato i titoli di stato italiani.

«L’agenzia cinese di rating Dagong, la più severa sul debito occidentale, ha classificato qualche giorno fa i titoli di Stato italiani come BB+, un livello che si trova al di sotto dell’investment grade e viene classificato come speculative grade, cioè spazzatura»

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I lunghi anni di governo delle sinistre sono stati deleteri.

Debito Pubblico a 2,302 mld. Detentori e calendario rinnovi.

Bene.

Adesso i titoli di stato italiani non potranno entrare nei portafogli delle realtà economiche e finanziarie cinesi, e con esse anche di molte istituzioni occidentali.

Ed il problema è sempre il solito, quello che molti si sgolavano che non esistesse: il debito delle pubbliche amministrazioni e la carenza di riforme strutturali.

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Dagong Downgrades the Sovereign Credit Ratings of Italy to BB+ with a Negative Outlook

Dagong Global Credit Rating Co., Ltd. (hereafter referred to as “Dagong”) has decided today to downgrade the local and foreign currency sovereign credit ratings of the Italian Republic (hereafter referred to as “Italy”) from BBB- to BB+, each with a negative outlook. Italy’s politics display a stronger right-wing tendency while it remains increasingly difficult to solve its long-standing structural problems. The debt-based economy stagnates and thereby keeps undermining the foundation of the country’s repayment sources, rendering it challenging to clear off the debt, and ultimately jeopardizing government solvency.

The key reasons for downgrading the sovereign credit ratings of Italy are below:

First, Italy’s highly vulnerable political ecology prevents the country from rebuilding its wealth creation ability. Following the parliamentary election in March 2018, it becomes more obvious that traditional parties wane while anti-establishment parties continue to expand. The highly divided voters and reduced representation of parties underscore the fragmentation of Italy’s political pattern, which leaves government formation hanging in the air. Given the changes to Italy’s current political spectrum, Dagong judges that it remains impossible to quickly settle the partisan disagreements while any ruling coalition out of the current political pattern can hardly reach a broad consensus, which might reverse any initial progress in structural reform and impede the fundamental improvements in economic growth.

Second, systemic banking crises remain, putting Italy’s credit ecology under pressure. Economic recovery has resumed banks’ profitability, although there still exists an eroding effect on the margins exerted by the low-rate environment. The slow pace of writing off bad debt hampers improvements in asset quality; meanwhile the non-performing loan ratio stands as high as 16.4%. Bad asset quality and a relatively wide capital gap cause some fragile banks to continue relying on government bailout funds in 2018, thus systemic risks within the banking sector are significant and threaten the stability of the financial system as the credit ecology comes under pressure.

Third, that Italy cannot throw off its dependence upon debt leads the country’s growth to extensively hover at a low level. In the near term, the recovery in domestic demand will be constrained by several factors including limited improvements in labor market reform, slower credit expansion, residents’ stronger saving tendencies, as well as uncertainties over the business environment. It is expected that in 2018 and 2019, Italy’s growth will drop to 1.2% and 1.0%. As a debt economy, in the long run Italy will be plagued by skill mismatch, weakened industrial international competitiveness, development quagmires facing small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as serious population aging, leading its growth potential to be consistently undermined. As a result, the country’s growth rate will average as low as 0.9% in the medium and long term.

Fourth, the tapering of fiscal consolidation worsens government repayment sources, thus government solvency continues declining. In the near term, the government’s strengthening of spending regulation alongside recent decline in interest expenses can somewhat reduce the dependence of the fiscal spending gap on debt financing. It is projected that in 2018 and 2019, the Italian general government’s fiscal deficit will be 1.7% and 1.3%, while financing needs over the same period will be as high as 40.2% and 37.9% of fiscal revenues, respectively. Hence, repayment sources are highly vulnerable while the structure of government repayment sources, as shored up by debt financing and heavily reliant on money issuance, is extremely insecure. Given the ongoing fiscal consolidation and the very low financing costs, it is forecasted that in 2018 and 2019, the ratio of Italian general government debt burden to fiscal revenues will decline down to 277.2% and 269.9% from a high level. However, government solvency diminishes due to its weak wealth creation ability, the continued accumulation of banks’ contingent liabilities, bleak political prospects obstructing the reform process, as well as the fact that it remains challenging to clear off heavy debt materially.

The short term will see an adverse impact on economic base, as exerted by uncertainty about the political ecology and weakness of the credit ecology. Meanwhile, the national economy cannot depart from the path of debt, which will continue hampering fiscal consolidation and weakening fragile repayment sources, thus placing government solvency under pressure. Therefore, Dagong assigns a negative local and foreign currency sovereign credit rating outlook for Italy in the following one to two years.

Russia. Situazione economica attuale. – Bloomberg

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-05-22.

La Russia sta uscendo da un lungo periodo di crisi.

L’International Monetary Fund riporta che a fine 2017 il pil ppa procapite si era assestato a 27.890 Usd.

Il pil nominale è passato dai 279 miliardi Usd del 2000 agli attuali 1,281.286 miliardi usd: si è quadruplicato.

Il salario netto mensile ppa è valutato essere 1,361 Usd, grosso modo come quello del Portogallo.

Sarebbe interessante notare come il consumo elettrico espresso in kWh pro capite sia 6,617, contro i 5,389 dell’Italia ed i 7,270 della Germania.

«The economy’s in decent shape and oil prices are up»

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«Sanctions? What Sanctions?»

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«Russia’s stock market has brushed off the U.S restrictions and is making record highs again»

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«S&P Global Ratings in February lifted the sovereign back into investment grade, at BBB-, and it has not revised its view since»

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«Moody’s Investors Service, which has a Ba1 rating with a positive outlook»

*

«Economic stability, higher oil and commodity prices, lower interest rates and the weaker ruble all contributed to a broad picture of corporate health»

* * * * * * * *

La situazione sembrerebbe essere abbastanza tranquilla da un punto di vista economico, ma vi sarebbero anche possibilità di scossoni politici.

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→ Bloomberg. 2018-05-17. What Sanctions? Russian Markets Are Over It

The economy’s in decent shape and oil prices are up.

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The stronger dollar may have taken its toll on Turkey and Argentina but there is one notable exception to the stresses plaguing emerging markets – Russia.

Investors have largely shrugged off the shock from U.S. Treasury sanctions being imposed for the first time on specific Russian companies, notably aluminum producer United Co. Rusal. The MOEX Russia Index, the country’s benchmark, just hit a record high. 

Sanctions? What Sanctions?

Russia’s stock market has brushed off the U.S restrictions and is making record highs again

The creditworthiness of Russia took a knock, but in the greater scheme of things it is just a blip. S&P Global Ratings in February lifted the sovereign back into investment grade, at BBB-, and it has not revised its view since. Moody’s Investors Service, which has a Ba1 rating with a positive outlook, said April 19 that Russia’s economy can weather the new sanctions.

Just a Little Bump

The cost of insuring for a Russian default jumped 35 bps on the sanctions crisis but has since recovered half of that

Another Moody’s report on Wednesday said Russian corporate liquidity “remains strong.” Economic stability, higher oil and commodity prices, lower interest rates and the weaker ruble all contributed to a broad picture of corporate health.

Holding Pattern

The ruble has recouped only some of its losses from the sanctions crisis as renewed dollar strength weighs against it

Central Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina said soon after the U.S. announced sanctions that “systemic measures” weren’t needed to support the ruble, and she was right. Though the Russian currency has not recovered much from its sharp selloff, it has at least stabilized. And that has enabled the CBR to resume its normal practice of buying about $200 million a day in dollars to rebuild its currency reserves.

Back To The Plan

It is not all sunshine and roses. Russia has yet to respond to the American measures in a meaningful way, and there’s scope for President Vladimir Putin to escalate tensions. There is still a bill rumbling through nation’s parliament, the Duma, which would impose counter-sanctions on Western countries and companies. Though some of the more extreme elements have already been watered down, officials could ratchet them back up. 

The U.S. Treasury could also opt for a wide interpretation of sanctions violations that would catch parties not named in its April statement, such as banks. As I have argued, it’s easy to see how the taint of the new edict can spread. So far this hasn’t happened, but it can’t be ruled out. 

Russia’s economy grew 1.3 percent in the first quarter, at the low end of the central bank’s forecasts. It’s not a disaster – it’s up from 0.9 percent in the fourth quarter, and in line with the slower pace of expansion seen in Europe. The sanctions came at the start of the current period, but that doesn’t need to imply a slower pace of growth, as some analysts argue. The oil price rise will take a lot, perhaps all, of the sting out of their impact.

The Russian economy has come a long way. Inflation and interest rates were both at 17 percent three years ago, and they’re now at 2.4 percent and 7.25 percent. The CBR had forecast rates to become neutral this year, which it says is toward the upper end of its 6-7 percent range, but it is now a crossroads. The weaker ruble looks to have stayed its hand from further reductions at its April 27 meeting, and it could also hold steady at its June 15 policy decision. 

That shouldn’t bother stock markets. It’s more complicated for fixed income. The central bank’s expectations for its key rate didn’t account for the drop in the ruble and the gain in oil. And these factors, and the surprising strength of wage growth, look likely to stoke a probable rebound in inflation. This is a problem the bank can set aside for now. 

Most of the world has been throwing rocks at Russia for months now. Its markets seem largely immune, and if politics remain as – relatively – peaceful and calm as this, stocks can keep climbing. With a price to earnings ratio of 8.6 percent, on a value basis, the MOEX Russia Index looks hard to beat. 

DBRS declassa l’Italia. Persa l’ultima “A”.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-01-14.

C’è ben poco da dire.

Ciò che conta sono i risultati, non le parole.

Ed il risultato è che ora l’Italia è in serie B.

Chi è al Governo?

Non ci si venga a dire che la colpa è dei cambiamenti climatici.

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L’ECB pubblica e tiene aggiornato un database intitolato:

«List of eligible marketable assets»

È l’elenco, enorme, smisuratamente enorme, dei titoli accettati come collaterale.

Basta che abbiano un rating decente, e tutto va bene.

Già: avere un rating decente.

Mica che sia facile per questa povera Italia.

«le difficoltà che stanno affrontando le banche europee non sono legate a una mancanza di liquidità. Di questa ce n’è fin troppa. Ad esempio, come ricorda Bankitalia, il collaterale depositato in Bce dalle banche italiane eccede del 40% quanto necessario a ottenere i prestiti Bce.»

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«E allora dove sta il problema? Potrebbe essere più politico che tecnico»

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«L’Italia perde la sua ultima A nella valutazione del debito. Il downgrade a BBB con “trend” stabile deciso dalla canadese Dbrs, la più piccola delle agenzie di classificazione internazionale, segna il definitivo ingresso del nostro Paese in “seconda divisione”. Prima della società canadese, la retrocessione era già stata sancita dai tre colossi del settore: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s e Fitch. La prima con una classificazione di BBB-, la seconda di Baa2 e la terza di BBB+.»

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«La decisione di Dbrs non giunge dunque inaspettata, soprattutto dopo la caduta del Governo Renzi, ma avrà immediate conseguenze perché finirà per influenzare il modo in cui la Bce calcola la rischiosità degli asset che le banche italiane danno in garanzia all’istituto di Francoforte in cambio dei prestiti»

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«Convenzionalmente, la Bce calcola la rischiosita’ di questi asset in base al rating più alto assegnato dalle 4 principale agenzie e dunque, nel caso dell’Italia, faceva riferimento a quell’ultima A assegnata da Dbrs. Con il downgrade di questa sera la banca centrale europea dovrà scendere di un gradino e, di conseguenza, aumentare il cosiddetto “haircut”, ovvero la trattenuta effettuata sul valore dei titoli di Stato dati in garanzia dalle banche per prestiti ricevuti» [Stampa]

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About DBRS.

«DBRS is an independent, privately held, globally recognized credit ratings agency with offices in Toronto, New York, London, Chicago and Mexico City. We strive to differentiate ourselves from competitors through a more pragmatic rather than mechanistic approach, in-depth research and unequalled mandate execution.

Founded in 1976, we are a rapidly growing, international ratings agency with deep roots in Canada. Our four decades of experience and strong track record provide the foundation for us to seek out new opportunities and to make targeted investments that align with our core ratings operations. We don’t seek to have scale in all markets, but when we choose to enter a new market segment, we strive to become a leading player known for trusted ratings, opinions and products.

Our approach and our size as the world’s fourth-largest ratings agency allow us to be nimble enough to respond to customers’ needs in their local markets, but large enough to provide the necessary expertise and resources they require. We build meaningful relations, which contribute to a convincing value proposition for both issuers and investors to choose us a globally accepted alternative to other ratings agencies.

At DBRS, we rate more than 2,400 issuer families and nearly 50,000 securities worldwide.»

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→ Sole 24 Ore. 2017-01-14. Ecco perché la decisione di Dbrs sul rating è così importante

Gli scaramantici possono aggiungere ai market mover del giorno – la pronuncia da parte dell’agenzia canadese Dbrs sul rating dell’Italia – il fatto che questa decisione sia arrivata di “venerdì 13”. Ma più della numerologia conta la sostanza dei fatti. Si tratta di una decisione non da poco perché da essa dipende quanto “costerà”, in termini di garanzie, alle banche chiedere in prestito liquidità alla Bce. Cerchiamo di capire perché.

Il primo punto da capire è che quando una banca commerciale europea chiede un prestito di liquidità alla banca delle banche, la Banca centrale europea, lo fa dando in pegno un collaterale. Una garanzia. Un po’ come quando una famiglia chiede un mutuo e dietro quel prestito la banca chiede in garanzia l’ipoteca sulla casa. I titoli di Stato italiani sono una delle garanzie che le banche possono dare alla Bce per chiedere la liquidità. Sono accettati dalla Bce e, in più, alle banche italiane può far comodo dato che in portafoglio ne detengono un controvalore superiore ai 400 miliardi di euro.

Ma quanto valgono i titoli di Stato italiani per la Bce? Quanta liquidità può prestare alle banche in cambio di un BoT o BTp? Il punto è questo. Perché dal valore attribuito dalla Bce dipende anche la trattenuta sul prestito, tecnicamente chiamata nelle stanze di Francoforte haircut. Il valore attribuito dalla Bce dipende a sua volta dal rating che il Paese che emette quel titolo governativo può esibire. Sebbene vi siano numerose agenzie di rating al mondo, la Bce prende in considerazione il giudizio di quattro agenzie: le americane S&Poor’s e Moody’s, la francese Fitch e la canadese Dbrs. Per la Bce non è importante che tutte e quattro le agenzie abbiano un giudizio “A” per applicare le condizioni di miglior favore, ovvero il minor taglio possibile sul prestito. È sufficente una “A” tra le quattro agenzie.

Ecco perché il giudizio di Dbrs – il downgrade era prevedibile perché ad agosto l’agenzia aveva aperto una procedura di revisione del rating con outlook negativo – era molto atteso. Dbrs era rimasta l’unica agenzia (delle quattro monitorate dalla Bce) ad avere un giudizio mite sull’Italia: “A-low”. Bastava un notch, un solo gradino in giù, e anche Dbrs si sarebbe unita al giudizio delle altre tre sorelle del rating che da diverso tempo hanno fatto scendere l’Italia dal livello “A” in “Serie B”. E così è stato.

Questa bocciatura, quindi, aumenterà la trattenuta che la Bce chiederà sui titoli di Stato italiani dati in pegno dalle banche quando chiedono liquidità.

Se sei al piano “A” e dai un BoT come garanzia la Bce ne trattiene solo lo 0,5%. Ma se retrocedi in serie “B” la Bce ne trattiene il 6%. Così, se dai in garanzia un BTp nel primo caso la trattenuta è al 6%, mentre nel secondo più che raddoppia al 13%.

Ovviamente la decisione non riguarda teoricamente solo le banche italiane ma tutte quelle che hanno in portafoglio titoli governativi italiani e che intendono darli in garanzia per ottenere finanziamenti dalla Bce.

Secondo i calcoli di Rabobank- che risalgono allo scorso agosto – le banche italiane attualmente hanno prestiti presso la Bce per 142 miliardi di euro. Il downgrade da parte di Dbrs dovrebbe aumentare le garanzie necessarie per sostenere questo prestito di circa 10 miliardi.

Gli esperti, comunque, sono divisi sull’impatto di un eventuale downgrade. Perché, come ci raccontiamo da tempo, le difficoltà che stanno affrontando le banche europee non sono legate a una mancanza di liquidità. Di questa ce n’è fin troppa. Ad esempio, come ricorda Bankitalia, il collaterale depositato in Bce dalle banche italiane eccede del 40% quanto necessario a ottenere i prestiti Bce.

Va poi detto che i titoli di Stato italiani sono solo una fetta di un’enorme lista di titoli eligible, quelli accettati in garanzia dalla Bce.

E allora dove sta il problema? Potrebbe essere più politico che tecnico. Un downgrade non fa piacere a nessuno. Lo scorso agosto, quando aveva appreso dell’apertura della procedura di revisione da parte di Dbrs, il Tesoro in una nota non aveva nascosto la sua irritazione: «La nostra opinione è che ci sia una violazione delle regole e stiamo valutando se ci sono le condizioni per contestare la decisione di rivedere il rating al di fuori del normale calendario di pre-annunciato».

Un downgrade non fa piacere a nessuno. Tanto meno all’Italia, che nonostante negli ultimi 10 anni di crisi sia stata “costretta” a generare record di avanzi primari (mentre la maggior parte degli altri Paesi reagiva alla crisi ampliando il deficit fiscale), resta ancora la terza economia dell’Eurozona.

Moody’s taglia l’outlook di sette banche italiane.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2016-12-10.

 

Due giorni or sono Moody’s rivedeva l’outlook italiano da stabile a negativo.

–  Moody’s degrada l’Italia a Baa2, outlook ‘negativo’. 2016-12-08

Difficile dar loro torto.

Ieri sera sempre Moody’s ha variato a “negativo” l’outlook di sette grandi banche nazionali.

Resta difficile poter distinguere quanto abbia influito sui loro rating la situazione italiana.

Banca Generali ha mantenuto l’outlook stabile. Ufficialmente

«riflette soprattutto la diversificazione di business del Gruppo al di fuori dell’Italia».

Si constata però come molte delle banche con outlook declassato abbiano consistenti attività estere, che a quanto potrebbe sembrare non starebbero andando così bene come è riferito.

Si noti anche come un rating Baa3 oppure Ba1 non sia per nulla entusiasmante, perchè preclude a molti istituzionali la possibilità di investire in titoli emessi da tali istituti.

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→ Adnk. 2016-12-09. Banche, Moody’s taglia l’outlook di 7 istituti: da stabile a negativo

Moody’s conferma il rating ma abbassa l’otulook da stabile a negativo per sette istituti finanziari italiani, sulla scia del taglio delle prospettive sul debito sovrano dell’Italia del 7 dicembre. E’ quanto si legge in un comunicato dell’agenzia di rating. Le banche colpite sono: Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca IMI, Fca Bank, Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, Credito Emiliano, Credit Agricole Cariparma e Cassa Depositi e Prestiti.

Moody’s ha confermato il rating IFS di Assicurazioni Generali a Baa1. E’ la stessa società del Leone a sottolinearlo. Contestualmente, Moody’s ha confermato il rating degli strumenti di debito emessi o garantiti da Generali (Baa2 senior debt; Baa3 senior subordinated debt; Ba1(hyb) junior subordinated debt). L’outlook è stabile.

Moody’s ha dichiarato che la conferma dei rating di Generali, con outlook stabile “riflette soprattutto la diversificazione di business del Gruppo al di fuori dell’Italia”. L’agenzia di rating ha inoltre aggiunto che “questa forte diversificazione geografica contribuisce ampiamente a mantenere stabile l’outlook del Gruppo Generali nonostante l’outlook negativo dell’Italia”.

 

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→ Rai News. 2016-12-09. Moody’s taglia outlook a sette banche.

23.22 L’agenzia Moody’s conferma il rating ma abbassa l’outlook da stabile a negativo per 7 banche. L’agenzia spiega che la scelta riflette la decisione già presa per il rating italiano venerdì. Gli istituti sono Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca Imi, Fca Bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Credito Emiliano, Crédit Agricole Cariparma e Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. Moody’s ha tagliato poi l’outlook da stabile a negativo di UnipolSai mentre ha confermato l’outlook stabile per Generali.

Moody’s degrada l’Italia a Baa2, outlook ‘negativo’.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2016-12-08.

 

 

Bahrain, Maurizius, Tailandia precedono l’Italia con Baa1.

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Bulgaria, Colombia, Filippine, Spagna, Sud Africa, Trinitad e Tobago precedono l’Italia con Baa2 positivo.

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Mettiamoci l’anima in pace. «Dopo di me, il diluvio!»

L’Italia è una repubblica delle banane, o, almeno, di quelle poche banane rimaste dopo le tasse del Governo.

Chiunque abbia ancora qualche banana in tasca, fugga a gambe levate (portandosi dietro la banana, ovviamente).

 

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→ Ansa. 2016-12-07. Moody’s taglia outlook Italia a negativo

L’agenzia Moody’s rivede al ribasso le prospettive per l’Italia, tagliando l’outlook a ‘negativo’ da ‘stabile’. Lo afferma Moody’s in una nota, confermando il rating ‘Baa2’. A pesare sono i lenti progressi nelle riforme, le cui prospettive sono ulteriormente diminuite con la vittoria del no al referendum.