Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

Usa. Liberal sulla brace per le leggi statali sulle modalità elettorali.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-09-03.

USA 18 Stati Regolamentati 001

«The doctrine is based in part on language in the U.S. Constitution that the “times, places and manner” of federal elections “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”»

Su questo argomento la Costituzione americana è inequivocabilmente chiara.

«times, places and manner of federal elections shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof»

Usa. Già 18 Stati hanno legiferato la regolamentazione delle procedure di voto. Ira dei liberal.

In quei diciotto stati per accedere al voto federale sarà necessario come minimo esibire un documento di identità e l’opzione del voto per corrispondenza dovrà essere esercitata di persona.

Così stando le cose, i liberal non possono fare altro che lamentarsi: in quegli stati non sarà più possibile portare al voto quelle frotte di popolo incontrollato che hanno determinato la loro vittoria elettorale nel 2020.

I liberal lo avevano denominato ‘diritto al voto’, mentre Mr Trump le aveva semplicemente chiamate ‘frodi elettorali’.

* * * * * * *

«U.S. liberals see dwindling legal options to challenge voting curbs»

«U.S. Supreme Court justices signaled an embrace of a once-marginal legal doctrine that largely gives state legislatures power to set election rules»

«If applied aggressively by the court, the “independent state legislature doctrine,” could further empower states to limit voting rights»

«The doctrine could limit the ability of courts to block voting rules that violate state law»

«The doctrine threatens another avenue for challenging election restrictions and maps as plaintiffs and voting rights advocates have increasingly turned to state courts for relief»

«The doctrine is based in part on language in the U.S. Constitution that the “times, places and manner” of federal elections “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”»

«Four of the Supreme Court’s six conservative justices appeared to lend weight to the doctrine during the flurry of litigation around the 2020 election»

«When you add all that together, it signals a very difficult road for voting rights litigation in the future»

«The court interpreted the constitution’s “times, places and manner” provision as referring not to a specific legislative body but instead to a state’s general authority to legislate on the issue»

«it could at a minimum threaten redistricting commissions in other states that were established via ballot initiatives»

* * * * * * *

Noi non sappiamo, né possiamo sapere, come potrebbero evolvere le cose, ma su questo argomento la posizione della Suprema Corta sembrerebbe essere granitica.

Intanto, le elezioni di midterm stanno avvicinandosi.

*



Analysis: U.S. liberals see dwindling legal options to challenge voting curbs

During the bitter legal battles over the 2020 presidential election, conservative U.S. Supreme Court justices signaled an embrace of a once-marginal legal doctrine that largely gives state legislatures power to set election rules.

If applied aggressively by the court, the “independent state legislature doctrine,” could further empower states to limit voting rights at a time when Republicans, emboldened by former President Donald Trump’s baseless claims of election fraud after his loss to Democratic President Joe Biden, are enacting new restrictions.

“It is a ticking time bomb,” said Rick Hasen, a professor at the University of California, Irvine School of Law.

The doctrine could limit the ability of courts to block voting rules that violate state law. It could also make it harder to challenge the drawing of electoral districts to entrench one political party in power – known as gerrymandering – and factor into lawsuits that arise in the heat of an election.

The doctrine threatens another avenue for challenging election restrictions and maps as plaintiffs and voting rights advocates have increasingly turned to state courts for relief. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, which implies the right to vote but does not explicitly grant it, most state constitutions expressly protect the right to vote.

“It would give the legislatures the authority to pass any voting rules they want without meaningful oversight, particularly under the state constitution,” said Josh Douglas, a voting rights expert at the University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law. This can undermine voting rights by letting legislators craft rules that help them win re-election, he added.

The doctrine is based in part on language in the U.S. Constitution that the “times, places and manner” of federal elections “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”

Four of the Supreme Court’s six conservative justices appeared to lend weight to the doctrine during the flurry of litigation around the 2020 election, when Republican lawmakers or officials sought to block lower court decisions allowing or requiring changes to election deadlines and other rules to account for the coronavirus pandemic.

In a Wisconsin case, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, agreeing with the court’s Oct. 26 decision to prevent an absentee ballot deadline extension, said in his opinion that “state courts do not have a blank check to rewrite state election laws for federal elections.”

Two days later, in a similar case from North Carolina, Justice Neil Gorsuch called it “egregious” that a state court and election officials “worked together to override a carefully tailored legislative response to COVID.”

Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Clarence Thomas raised similar concerns about the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to extend ballot deadlines.

                         ‘VERY DIFFICULT ROAD’

Given the court’s higher hurdles for proving violations of the federal Voting Rights Act, a law that prohibits racial discrimination in voting, or the U.S. Constitution, election law attorneys and voting rights advocates say they are concerned.

“When you add all that together, it signals a very difficult road for voting rights litigation in the future,” said Dale Ho, an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer.

The increasing rightward shift of the nine-member Supreme Court also raises questions whether it will overturn a 2015 ruling that narrowly upheld Arizona’s decision to establish an independent commission to draw congressional districts.

The court interpreted the constitution’s “times, places and manner” provision as referring not to a specific legislative body but instead to a state’s general authority to legislate on the issue.

Two of the justices in the majority in 2015, including the late liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who authored the decision, are no longer on the court.

“It’s a very open question whether, with the change in composition of the court: is that subject to overruling?” said University of Kentucky’s Douglas. If it is, it could at a minimum threaten redistricting commissions in other states that were established via ballot initiatives.

Michael Morley, a professor at Florida State University College of Law, who earlier this year published an article in support of the doctrine, said it is a misconception that it would let legislatures “run amok.”

Even without limits under state law, they would still be constrained by protections enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, he said.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

Texas. Corte Distrettuale Federale blocca la moratoria di Joe Biden.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-01-30.

Texas 001

I fatti sono semplici.

Joe Biden can quickly reverse many of Donald Trump’s immigration policies, experts say. Others will be more complicated.

Biden administration pauses deportations for 100 days and suspends “remain in Mexico” policy for asylum seekers

Ken Paxton files lawsuit challenging Biden administration’s pause on deportations

With a Democrat back in the White House, Texas Republicans prepare to go on offense

Federal judge temporarily blocks Biden’s 100-day deportation moratorium after Texas sues administration.

*

Nei quattro anni della passata Amministrazione, i giudici federali distrettuali liberal si son dati un gran da fare per bloccare sistematicamente i provvedimenti che erano stati emessi. Poi, dopo più di due anni, una Corte superiore aveva annullato le loro sentenze, ma l’effetto politico era stato raggiunto.

Cambiati i suonatori, la musica resta la stessa, ed i repubblicani hanno anche avuto modo di imparare dai liberal democratici come si conduce una simile guerra legale.

*


Cnbc. Federal judge temporarily blocks Biden’s pause on deportations after Texas challenge.

– A federal judge on Tuesday put a two-week hold on President Joe Biden’s effort to pause deportations from the U.S. for his first 100 days, delivering an early legal setback to the new president’s immigration agenda.

– U.S. District Judge Drew Tipton sided with the state of Texas, which argued that a Jan. 20 memorandum issued by acting Homeland Security Secretary David Pekoske freezing deportations is unlawful.

– Texas’ lawsuit is being led by the state’s attorney general, Ken Paxton, who has vowed to aggressively challenge the Biden administration in court. ….

U.S. District Judge Drew Tipton sided with the state of Texas, which is arguing that a Jan. 20 memorandum issued by acting Homeland Security Secretary David Pekoske freezing deportations is unlawful.

In an 18-page order, Tipton wrote that the Biden administration’s memorandum likely exceeds the administration’s authority, and that it may violate federal laws governing administrative procedure. ….

The memorandum, he wrote, “not only fails to consider potential policies more limited in scope and time, but it also fails to provide any concrete, reasonable justification for a 100-day pause on deportations.”

*


Federal judge temporarily blocks Biden’s 100-day deportation moratorium after Texas sues administration.

The deportation moratorium was part of a package of immigration-reform measures the new administration proposed on Inauguration Day.

A federal judge in Texas has temporarily blocked the Biden administration’s 100-day moratorium on deportations of some undocumented immigrants.

Federal Judge Drew Tipton on Tuesday issued the order after Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton sued President Joe Biden’s administration late last week alleging the moratorium is unconstitutional and violates an agreement between the Department of Homeland Security and Texas.

“Within 6 days of Biden’s inauguration, Texas has HALTED his illegal deportation freeze,” Paxton tweeted after the order. “*This* was a seditious left-wing insurrection. And my team and I stopped it.”

Tipton’s restraining order is effective for 14 days as the state’s case against the moratorium continues.

Paxton argued the state would face financial harm if undocumented immigrants were released into the state because of costs associated with health care and education, and said the moratorium would also lure others to come to Texas. Tipton, an appointee of former President Donald Trump who took the bench last year, agreed.

“Texas argues that ‘the categorical refusal to remove aliens ordered removable will encourage additional illegal immigration into Texas,’ thereby exacerbating its public service costs. Such injury is not, as a legal matter, purely speculative,” he wrote. “The Court finds that the foregoing establishes a substantial risk of imminent and irreparable harm to Texas.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, who filed a brief urging Tipton to deny Paxton’s request, decried the ruling in a statement and argued Biden’s move was legal.

“Paxton sought to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election by attempting to baselessly suppress votes; now he is attempting to force the Biden administration to follow Trump’s xenophobic policies,” said Kate Huddleston, attorney for the ACLU of Texas. “The administration’s pause on deportations is not only lawful but necessary to ensure that families are not separated and people are not returned to danger needlessly while the new administration reviews past actions.”

Biden’s proposed moratorium was signed just hours after he took his oath of office and was one of several immigration-related orders, which included a stop to border wall construction. The pause in removals was part a review and reset of enforcement policies within Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services agencies as the Biden administration “develops its final priorities,” according to a statement from the Department of Homeland Security.

The moratorium was to exclude any immigrant “suspected of terrorism or espionage, or otherwise poses a danger to the national security of the United States.” Those who entered after Nov. 1 and those who have voluntarily waived any rights to remain in the country, according to a DHS memo.

Paxton had also challenged the moratorium on the grounds that it violated an agreement signed by the Trump administration and Texas. The agreement requires the DHS to give notice to states before changing any immigration polices. The Biden administration questioned the validity of the agreements, which was signed just weeks before former President Trump left office.

“The federal government has plenary power over the enforcement of federal immigration law, and an outgoing administration cannot contract away that power for an incoming administration,” the federal attorneys said in a filing. But Tipton said his decision wasn’t based on those contracts.

“The issues implicated by that agreement are of such gravity and constitutional import that they require further development of the record and briefing prior to addressing the merits,” Tipton wrote.

During a hearing last Friday, the Biden administration indicated it would consider an immediate stop from the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals if the restraining order was granted, Huddleston said.

The Biden administration also inherited a pending legal challenge from Paxton’s office over an Obama-era program that has shielded tens of thousands of Texas’ undocumented immigrants from deportation. The 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, grants some undocumented immigrants a renewable, two-year work permit and a reprieve from deportation proceedings. Trump announced an end to the program in 2017 but the program has survived several legal challenges, including a 2020 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that ruled the administration did not properly wind down the policy. But Paxton’s lawsuit, filed in 2018, is a separate challenge that questions the legality of the program.

Despite Tuesday’s setback for Biden, his administration is reportedly planning to issue more executive orders on immigration this week on family reunification and the federal “public charge” rule for immigrants where a person could be denied a visa or green card if they received a government benefit.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti

Usa. Diventa possibile una nuova guerra civile.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-12-31.

Gettysburg 001

«Immortale odium et numquam sanabile vulnus.»

«the violence has become a new norm here.»


Negli ultimi anni l’occidente e soprattutto gli Stati Uniti hanno vissuto una vera e propria guerra civile, per il momento combattuta senza l’uso estensivo delle armi. Non si sottovalutino gli avvertimenti.

Il caso Floyd, cui seguirono settimane di guerriglia urbana cessate miracolosamente e totalmente poco prima delle elezioni, sono esempio di esercito guerrigliero provato sul campo e sempre pronto all’azione. Obiettivo il potere ottenuto con un colpo di stato

Stati Uniti. È in corso una guerra civile. Occorre prenderne atto.

Unione Europea che implode. La guerra civile in Svezia.

Trump. La guerra privata contro gli stati liberal. – Bloomberg.

Macron. ‘Rischio guerra civile in Europa’.

Trump e Suprema Corte. Clima da guerra civile. Il potere vero, quello che decide lo fa.

America. Guerra civile tra Puritani e Protestanti.

Guerra civile americana. Si avvicina lo scontro finale.

Trump. La guerra civile americana si avvia alla sua Gettysburg.

* * * * * * *

«Here we are: the disaster that has been predictable for the past 30 years is looming. The United States is heading inexorably toward secession and civil war»

«Since the demise of the USSR, the “American Empire” no longer had an existential enemy and therefore no reason to exist»

«the globalization of trade has destroyed the middle classes in the USA and in almost all of the West»

«the United States is on the brink of secession and civil war»

«We must stop interpreting the presidential election as a rivalry between Democrats and Republicans, whereas Donald Trump has never claimed to be a member of the Republican Party, which he stormed during his 2016 campaign»

«We must stop pretending that Donald Trump does not represent the majority of his fellow citizens when he was first elected president in 2016»

«Please read the US Constitution, it will only take you a few minutes. It recognizes the sovereignty of the Federated States, not of the People»

«In the United States, almost all laws are drafted by organized pressure groups, regardless of who is elected to Congress and the White House»

«Donald Trump would probably have won the 2020 election if the United States were a democracy, but he lost because it’s an oligarchy and the politicians don’t want him»

«The Jacksonians, supporters of democracy, have no choice but to take up arms to make their cause triumph, as the Second Amendment to their Constitution explicitly provides»

«In the original sense of the Second Amendment, the right of Americans to acquire and bear all manner of weapons of war is intended to enable them to rebel against a tyrannical government, as they did against the British monarchy»

«Texas is one of two states that formed an independent republic before joining the United States»

«The process of dissolution of the United States could be faster than that of the USSR»

* * * * * * *

Un problema di così vasta portata può essere proficuamente letto sotto molte angolature. Ne menzioneremo solo alcune.

– In tutto il mondo occidentale od occidentalizzato la visione conservatrice si oppone esistenzialmente a quella liberal democratica e/o socialista. Ma la forza elettorale delle due componenti è virtualmente eguale. A ciò conseguono vittorie elettorali per un ben piccolo margine, con lunghi strascichi rancorosi. I presidenti eletti non hanno il pieno governo delle situazioni ed hanno una opposizione interna volta più a denigrarli ed ostacolarli che a stabilire una linea politica estera efficiente per il bene della nazione.

– Il pressoché costante ribaltamento delle linee politiche ad ogni tornata elettorale rende semplicemente impossibile stabilire e perseguire un indirizzo stabile nel tempo, fattore che è punto di forza del sistema politico russo e cinese. Progetti strategici, quali il Rcep cinese o l’Unione Economica Euroasiatica russa, sarebbero impossibili in America.

– Ma allo stallo americano corrisponde il dinamismo orientale: il Rcep assomma il 40% del pil ppa mondiale, due volte quello degli Stati Uniti e quattro volte quella europeo.

*

Da un punto di vista storico o l’occidente si rassegna alla devoluzione infelice, oppure attua dei colpi di stato per insediare governi forti.

*

Civil War Becomes Inevitable In The USA.

Here we are: the disaster that has been predictable for the past 30 years is looming. The United States is heading inexorably toward secession and civil war.

Since the demise of the USSR, the “American Empire” no longer had an existential enemy and therefore no reason to exist. The attempt by George H. Bush (the father) and Bill Clinton to give the country a new life with the globalization of trade has destroyed the middle classes in the USA and in almost all of the West. The attempt of George W. Bush (son) and Barack Obama to organize the world around a new form of capitalism – financial this time – has been bogged down in the sands of Syria.

It is too late to turn the tide. Donald Trump’s attempt to abandon the American Empire and refocus the country’s efforts on its domestic prosperity has been sabotaged by the elites acquired to the puritanical ideology of the “Pilgrim Fathers”. As a result, the moment so feared by Richard Nixon and his election adviser Kevin Philipps has arrived: the United States is on the brink of secession and civil war.

What I am writing is not a fantasy, but the analysis of many observers in the United States and around the world. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has just declared Donald Trump’s election fraud appeal inadmissible, not on legal grounds, but because “it would open Pandora’s box.

In fact, contrary to the misrepresentation of events that dominates the international press, either the outgoing president’s appeals are judged in law and he is obviously right, or they are judged in politics and proving him right will provoke civil war. But the conflict is already too far advanced. Judging him politically in defiance of the law will also provoke civil war.

We must stop interpreting the presidential election as a rivalry between Democrats and Republicans, whereas Donald Trump has never claimed to be a member of the Republican Party, which he stormed during his 2016 campaign. He is not an enlightened man, but a successor to President Andrew Jackson (1829-37). Yes, ideologically, the latter prefigured the “Southerners,” the “Confederates.

We must stop pretending that Donald Trump does not represent the majority of his fellow citizens when he was first elected president in 2016, when he has just helped thousands of candidates win local elections in his name, and when he has just won millions more votes than in 2016.

No one in Europe seems to dare to see what is happening in front of us, because everyone clings to the idea of a United States that is a paragon of democracy. Please read the US Constitution, it will only take you a few minutes. It recognizes the sovereignty of the Federated States, not of the People. Its main designer, Alexander Hamilton, said it and wrote in the Federalist Papers: its purpose is to establish a regime comparable to the British monarchy without aristocracy, certainly not a democracy.

This constitution lasted two centuries only because of the compromise of the First Ten Amendments (Bill of Rights). But in this age of globalization of information, everyone can see that the dice are loaded. This system is certainly tolerant, but oligarchic. In the United States, almost all laws are drafted by organized pressure groups, regardless of who is elected to Congress and the White House. The political staff is just a smokescreen that hides the real Power. Every decision of every politician is noted by these groups and directories compiling their docility are published every year.

The Europeans, who want to represent the United States as a democratic nation, keep claiming that the presidential election is a matter for the electorate. This is absolutely false. The constitution does not provide for the election of the federal president in the second degree by the people, but by an electoral college appointed by the governors. Over time, governors have ended up holding elections in their states before choosing the members of the Electoral College. Some have agreed to include it in their local constitutions, but not all. In the end, the federal Supreme Court doesn’t care, as it did when George W. Bush v. Al Gore was appointed 20 years ago. It explicitly stated that the potential election rigging that had taken place in Florida was not within its jurisdiction.

In that context, Donald Trump would probably have won the 2020 election if the United States were a democracy, but he lost because it’s an oligarchy and the politicians don’t want him.

The Jacksonians, supporters of democracy, have no choice but to take up arms to make their cause triumph, as the Second Amendment to their Constitution explicitly provides. In the original sense of the Second Amendment, the right of Americans to acquire and bear all manner of weapons of war is intended to enable them to rebel against a tyrannical government, as they did against the British monarchy. This is the meaning of the compromise of 1789, which the majority of them considered to have been broken.

General Michael Flynn, the short-lived National Security Advisor, has just called for the suspension of the constitution and the introduction of martial law to prevent civil war. The Pentagon, whose head was replaced a month ago by the outgoing president in favour of friends of the general, is standing by.

Donald Trump, meanwhile, announced that he will appear before the Texas court that will rule on local election fraud. Texas is one of two states that formed an independent republic before joining the United States. But when it joined, it retained a right to opt out. In 2009, then Governor Rick Perry threatened to secede. This idea is still going strong. Today, the local Congress is expected to decide on Representative Kyle Biedermann’s proposal for an independence referendum.

The process of dissolution of the United States could be faster than that of the USSR. It was studied at the time in Moscow by Professor Igor Panarin. Demographics have changed since then and have been analyzed by Colin Woodard. The country would then be split into 11 separate states on a cultural basis.

To these problems are added the complaints against the legislatures of some 20 states that passed laws during the Covid-19 outbreak governing elections in a manner contrary to their own constitutions. If these appeals, which are legally founded, are successful, they will have to annul not only the presidential election, but all local elections (parliamentary, sheriffs, prosecutors, etc.). It will not be possible to verify the alleged facts in Texas and elsewhere until the Federal Electoral Council meeting. Texas and other states with similar appeals, as well as those that will have to annul the election, will therefore not be able to participate in the nomination of the next President of the United States. In such a case, the only substitution procedure that applies is for the new Congress, in which the Puritans are in the minority and the Jacksonians are in the majority.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti, Trump

Facebook e la Maggioranza Silenziosa. Come monitorarla e comprenderla.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-09-02.

Maggioranza Silenziosa 001

«Listen, liberals.»

«The result is a kind of parallel media universe that left-of-center Facebook users may never encounter, but that has been stunningly effective in shaping its own version of reality»

«Maybe Mr. Trump’s “silent majority,” in other words, only seems silent because we’re not looking at their Facebook feeds.»

«A few caveats, before my Democratic readers jump off the nearest pier.»

* * * * * * *


In tutti gli stati esiste una Maggioranza Silenziosa la quale, per definizione, si esprime quasi di controvoglia, sommessamente. Nessuna manifestazione di piazza, che anzi essa aborrisce, amante dell’ordine e del legale, sostanzialmente ancorata ad un sano buon senso, ben radicata nel suo retaggio religioso storico, sociale, etnico.

Le minoranze riottose, urlanti, trovano eco nei media liberal, ma portano ben pochi voti e ne fanno fuggire molti di più: la Maggioranza Silenziosa invece conta milioni di Elettori, e pesa ben di più.

Orbene, il The New York Times sostiene che Facebook sia il mezzo mediatico attraverso il quale si esprime la Maggioranza Silenziosa, e verosimilmente potrebbe aver ragione.

* * * * * * *


«What if Facebook is the Real ‘Silent Majority’?»

«Right-wing influencers are dominating the political discussion on Facebook, raising questions about whether it will translate into electoral success in November»

«Listen, liberals»

«If you don’t think Donald Trump can get re-elected in November, you need to spend more time on Facebook.»

«Every morning, one of the first browser tabs I open is CrowdTangle — a handy Facebook-owned data tool that offers a bird’s-eye view of what’s popular on the platform»

«Most days, the leader board looks roughly the same: conservative post after conservative post, with the occasional liberal interloper»

«It’s no secret that, despite Mr. Trump’s claims of Silicon Valley censorship, Facebook has been a boon to him and his allies, and hyperpartisan Facebook pages are nothing new»

«The result is a kind of parallel media universe that left-of-center Facebook users may never encounter, but that has been stunningly effective in shaping its own version of reality»

«Inside the right-wing Facebook bubble, President Trump’s response to Covid-19 has been strong and effective, Joe Biden is barely capable of forming sentences, and Black Lives Matter is a dangerous group of violent looters»

«Mr. Trump and his supporters are betting that, despite being behind Mr. Biden in the polls, a “silent majority” will carry him to re-election»

«Maybe Mr. Trump’s “silent majority,” in other words, only seems silent because we’re not looking at their Facebook feeds.»

«The conservative commentator Ben Shapiro has gotten 56 million total interactions on his Facebook page in the last 30 days. That’s more than the main pages of ABC News, NBC News, The New York Times, The Washington Post and NPR combined»

«Facebook posts by Breitbart, the far-right news outlet, have been shared four million times in the past 30 days, roughly three times as many as posts from the official pages of every Democratic member of the U.S. Senate combined»

«The most-shared Facebook post containing the term “Black Lives Matter” over the past six months is a June video by the right-wing commentators The Hodgetwins, which calls the racial justice movement a “damn lie.”»

«The second most-shared Black Lives Matter post? A different viral video from The Hodgetwins, this one calling the movement a “leftist lie.”»

«Terrence K. Williams, a conservative comedian and Trump supporter, has averaged 86,500 interactions per Facebook post in August, more than twice as many as Joe Biden, the Democratic presidential nominee, who has averaged 39,000 interactions per post»

«A few caveats, before my Democratic readers jump off the nearest pier.»

«As of 2019, 70 percent of American adults used Facebook, and 43 percent of Americans got news on the platform, according to the Pew Research Center»

«The reason right-wing content performs so well on Facebook is no mystery. The platform is designed to amplify emotionally resonant posts, and conservative commentators are skilled at turning passionate grievances into powerful algorithm fodder»

«ecosystem might be a useful reality check for Democrats who think Mr. Biden will coast to victory in November»

«Controversy wins. Negative beats positive.»

* * * * * * *

Tiriamo le somme.

Cercare di tenersi informati in modo ragionevolmente obiettivo implica il conoscere un buon numero di fonti, meglio se attendibili, ma sicuramente anche quelle che sostengono idee non congeniali.

Anzi, di norma è ben più utile cercare di capire mentalità e mezzi dell’avversario, che passare il tempo ad esaltare i propri.

Questo è il principali handicap dei media liberal: sono letti quasi esclusivamente dai loro seguaci, come se gli atri non esistessero.

*


What if Facebook Is the Real ‘Silent Majority’?

Right-wing influencers are dominating the political discussion on Facebook, raising questions about whether it will translate into electoral success in November.

Listen, liberals. If you don’t think Donald Trump can get re-elected in November, you need to spend more time on Facebook.

Since the 2016 election, I’ve been obsessively tracking how partisan political content is performing on Facebook, the world’s largest and arguably most influential media platform. Every morning, one of the first browser tabs I open is CrowdTangle — a handy Facebook-owned data tool that offers a bird’s-eye view of what’s popular on the platform. I check which politicians and pundits are going viral. I geek out on trending topics. I browse the previous day’s stories to see which got the most reactions, shares and comments.

Most days, the leader board looks roughly the same: conservative post after conservative post, with the occasional liberal interloper. (If you want to see these lists for yourselves, you can check out @FacebooksTop10, a Twitter account I created that shows the top 10 most-interacted-with link posts by U.S. Facebook pages every day.)

It’s no secret that, despite Mr. Trump’s claims of Silicon Valley censorship, Facebook has been a boon to him and his allies, and hyperpartisan Facebook pages are nothing new. (In fact, my colleague John Herrman wrote about them four years ago this month.)

But what sticks out, when you dig in to the data, is just how dominant the Facebook right truly is. Pro-Trump political influencers have spent years building a well-oiled media machine that swarms around every major news story, creating a torrent of viral commentary that reliably drowns out both the mainstream media and the liberal opposition.

The result is a kind of parallel media universe that left-of-center Facebook users may never encounter, but that has been stunningly effective in shaping its own version of reality. Inside the right-wing Facebook bubble, President Trump’s response to Covid-19 has been strong and effective, Joe Biden is barely capable of forming sentences, and Black Lives Matter is a dangerous group of violent looters.

Mr. Trump and his supporters are betting that, despite being behind Mr. Biden in the polls, a “silent majority” will carry him to re-election. Donald Trump Jr., the president’s oldest and most online son, made that argument himself at the Republican National Convention this week. And while I’m not a political analyst, I know enough about the modern media landscape to know that looking at people’s revealed preferences — what they actually read, watch, and click on when nobody’s looking — is often a better indicator of how they’ll act than interviewing them at diners, or listening to what they’re willing to say out loud to a pollster.

Maybe Mr. Trump’s “silent majority,” in other words, only seems silent because we’re not looking at their Facebook feeds.

“We live in two different countries right now,” said Eric Wilson, a Republican digital strategist and digital director of Marco Rubio’s 2016 campaign. Facebook’s media ecosystem, he said, is “a huge blind spot for people who are up to speed on what’s on the front page of The New York Times and what’s leading the hour on CNN.”

To be sure, Facebook is not the only medium where right-wing content thrives. Millions of Americans still get their news from cable news and talk radio, where conservative voices have dominated for years. Many pro-Trump Facebook influencers also have sizable presences on Twitter, YouTube and other social networks.

But the right’s dominance on Facebook, specifically, is something to behold. Here are just a few data points I pulled from CrowdTangle this week:

– The conservative commentator Ben Shapiro has gotten 56 million total interactions on his Facebook page in the last 30 days. That’s more than the main pages of ABC News, NBC News, The New York Times, The Washington Post and NPR combined. (Data from a different firm, NewsWhip, showed that Mr. Shapiro’s news outlet, The Daily Wire, was the No. 1 publisher on Facebook in July.)

– Facebook posts by Breitbart, the far-right news outlet, have been shared four million times in the past 30 days, roughly three times as many as posts from the official pages of every Democratic member of the U.S. Senate combined.

– The most-shared Facebook post containing the term “Black Lives Matter” over the past six months is a June video by the right-wing commentators The Hodgetwins, which calls the racial justice movement a “damn lie.” The second most-shared Black Lives Matter post? A different viral video from The Hodgetwins, this one calling the movement a “leftist lie.” (The Hodgetwins also have the 4th, 6th, and 12th most shared posts.)

– Terrence K. Williams, a conservative comedian and Trump supporter, has averaged 86,500 interactions per Facebook post in August, more than twice as many as Joe Biden, the Democratic presidential nominee, who has averaged 39,000 interactions per post. (Mr. Trump outdoes them both, naturally, with an average of 92,000 interactions per post.)

A few caveats, before my Democratic readers jump off the nearest pier.

These figures include only posts on public pages, in public groups, and by verified accounts, and they don’t include Facebook ads, where the Biden campaign has been outspending the Trump campaign in recent weeks. Counting Facebook interactions doesn’t tell you how someone felt about a post, so it’s possible some conservative posts are being hate-shared by liberals. And Facebook has argued that engagement isn’t the same thing as popularity.

“These points look mostly at how people engage with content, which should not be confused with how many people actually see it on Facebook,” Joe Osborne, a Facebook spokesman, said in a statement. Mr. Osborne added that “when you look at the content that gets the most reach across Facebook, it’s not at all as partisan as this reporting suggests.” (Facebook does not disclose this type of data publicly, except once in a while in response to my tweets.)

Democrats aren’t totally absent from Facebook’s upper echelon. Ridin’ With Biden, a pro-Biden page started in April by the founders of the liberal Facebook page Occupy Democrats, has quadrupled its following over the past three months, and routinely gets more engagement than Breitbart and other right-wing heavy-hitters. Individual posts by Bernie Sanders, Barack Obama and other prominent Democrats have broken through in recent weeks.

And political campaigners have pointed out, correctly, that being popular on the internet isn’t a guarantee of electoral success. (“Retweets don’t vote,” as an experienced Democratic operative once told me.) In addition, Facebook’s older, more conservative user base may not reflect what’s happening on platforms like Instagram and TikTok, which draw a younger crowd.

Still, the platform’s sheer scale makes it vital to understand. As of 2019, 70 percent of American adults used Facebook, and 43 percent of Americans got news on the platform, according to the Pew Research Center. (Those numbers may have increased because of the pandemic.) We know that the company’s product decisions can make or break political movements, move fringe ideas into the mainstream, or amplify partisan polarization. Registering four million voters before the November election, as Facebook has said it would do, could be a decisive force all on its own. (Typically, higher turnout benefits Democrats, but given what we know about the media diets of hyperactive Facebook users, who knows?)

The reason right-wing content performs so well on Facebook is no mystery. The platform is designed to amplify emotionally resonant posts, and conservative commentators are skilled at turning passionate grievances into powerful algorithm fodder. The company also appears willing to bend its rules for popular conservative influencers. Recent reports by BuzzFeed News and NBC News, based on leaked documents, found that Facebook executives had removed “strikes” from the accounts of several high-profile conservative pages that had shared viral misinformation in violation of the company’s rules.

Over the past few years, I’ve come to view my daily Facebook data-dive as a kind of early-warning system — a rough gauge of what’s grabbing America’s attention on any given day, and which stories and perspectives will likely break through in the days to come.

And looking at Facebook’s lopsided political media ecosystem might be a useful reality check for Democrats who think Mr. Biden will coast to victory in November.

After all, Mr. Trump’s surging popularity showed up online before it showed up in any polls in 2016. And even though much about Facebook, and American politics, has changed in the past four years, the basic laws of social media physics still apply. Controversy wins. Negative beats positive. All attention looks good to an algorithm.

Brad Parscale — the digital director of Mr. Trump’s 2016 campaign — told “60 Minutes” that of everything Mr. Trump did that year, the thing that actually moved the needle was Facebook.

“Facebook was the method,” Mr. Parscale said. “It was the highway which his car drove on.”

That highway is still open. And right now, the fastest cars on it have MAGA bumper stickers.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Ideologia liberal, Stati Uniti

Liberal democratici. I rantoli di superba rabbia impotente. – Cnn.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-06-26.

Durer Albrecht. Quattro cavallieri dell'Apocalisse. 1498.

«Nullo martiro, fuor che la tua rabbia, Sarebbe al tuo furor dolor compìto» (Dante)

Se per i credenti il termine ‘inferno‘ significa la privazione di Dio, per tutti gli esseri umani, credenti o meno, si riduce ad una situazione nella quale la propria volontà è negata ed impotente.

Questo è substrato di un odio viscerale, di un’ira furibonda che rode mente e cuore, nella constatazione della propria inadeguatezza a mutare le cose.

Dal punto di vista umano, molte persone sperimentano già su questa terra quello che poi sarà il loro inferno definitivo.

Pensate ad un essere superbo.

La superbia è una esagerata stima di sé e dei proprî meriti (reali o presunti), che si manifesta esteriormente con un atteggiamento altezzoso e sprezzante e con un ostentato senso di superiorità nei confronti degli altri. Ma questa condizione degenera quasi invariabilmente in un qualcosa di molto peggio. Si dilata in una considerazione talmente alta di sé stessi da giungere al punto di stimarsi come principio e fine del proprio essere: l’uomo si crede di essere dio.

Successo e denaro sono ottimi concimi della superbia, e la serva piaggeria adulatrice dei clientes porta a perdere completamente la percezione del reale.

Ma non ci si illuda che il superbo sia felice. Tutt’altro.

La sua vita è un continuo rodersi cuore, mente e fegato perché gli altri non riconoscono la sua immensità: lo contraddicono, lo ostacolano, tramano contro di lui. In altri termini, gli altri non si sottomettono ai suoi voleri, contrastano la sua volontà.

Se è vero che il superbo si percepisce onnipotente, sarebbe altrettanto vero che gli altri gli negano codesto attributo: di qui l’odio mortale verso gli altri, rei di non riconoscere l’immensa superiorità.

Ma sono ira, rabbia, odio impotenti, perché non aiutano ad imporre il proprio volere, anzi, si rivelano per quello che sono. Sono i tormenti caratteristici dei superbi. Ed iniziano già in questa vita terrea, che il superbo fa di tutto per rendersela più odiosa il possibile.

* * * * * * *

I liberal democratici sono tutto tranne che umili: sono la quintessenza della superbia incarnata negli esseri umani. Non paghi di essersi saziati dei frutti dell’Albero del bene e del male hanno infatti tentato l’attacco all’Albero della Vita: già, nel giardino dell’Eden c’erano entrambi.

È stata proprio la loro superbia a condurli alla disfatta elettorale del 2016, impostando la propria campagna elettorale su di una candidata boriosamente piena di sé stessa, che aveva proposto, imposto, un programma che ben poco aveva di politico o di economico. Era in buona sostanza un’etica di vita, l’etica liberal.

Come tutti i superbi, dopo la confitta addossarono agli ‘altri‘ la colpa della disfatta e presero in odio quello che era stato il vincitore della competizione, scatenandogli contro una campagna mediatica personale mai vista nella storia.

La maggiore conseguenza di quella débâcle fu la perdita del controllo della Corte Suprema.

Fino a quando la Suprema Corte sentenziava 5 a 4 a favore delle tesi giuridiche liberal la osannavano come l’apice della giustizia. Adesso che la Suprema Corte sentenzia 5 a 4 a favore delle tesi giuridiche repubblicane la odiono, la deridono, cercano i ogni modo di affossarla, anche vagheggiando di aumentare il numero dei giudici immettendovi gente di provata fede liberal.

Calunniano sottilmente i giudici che non si sono asserviti ai loro voleri.

* * * * * * *

L’accluso articolo è un capolavoro di volontà contrariata, di odio globale ribollente di ira e rabbia malcelate: è un pezzo degno di un trattato di psichiatria, ove il delirio di onnipotenza si associa ed alimenta il delirio di persecuzione.

Non ci si stupisca se, nel caso, in America ci saranno brutti fatti di sangue: l’odio è violento per sua natura.

*


In Supreme Court census case, chief justice’s priorities are colliding

Two of Chief Justice John Roberts’ top priorities are on a collision course as the Supreme Court nears a pivotal decision this week on the Trump administration’s design for the 2020 census.

Roberts has repeatedly declared that he wants the public to see the court as a nonpartisan institution, even though polarizing cases have often divided it between the five justices appointed by Republican presidents and the four appointed by Democrats.

Roberts over the years has shown he’s uneasy with decisions on big cases that routinely align the court, in effect, along those party lines — an instinct that was most notably evident when he joined with the court’s four Democratic-appointed justices to mostly preserve the Affordable Care Act in 2012. “We do not sit on opposite sides of an aisle, we do not caucus in separate rooms, we do not serve one party or one interest, we serve one nation,” Roberts insisted in a speech last October.

But on cases affecting the core electoral interests of the two parties — like the decision impending this week on whether the Trump administration can add a citizenship question to the 2020 census — Roberts has conspicuously deviated from that pattern. He has repeatedly joined in 5-4 Supreme Court decisions that align all the Republican-appointed justices against all the Democratic-appointed ones on cases that set the underlying rules of political competition, from campaign finance to voting rights. And on those cases, critics say, he has consistently voted with the other GOP-appointed justices to produce rulings that benefit the Republican Party’s electoral interests.

“One thing Roberts has been consistent about is his willingness to take extreme stances to undermine long-standing rules of democracy,” says Michael Waldman, president of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University, a group that advocates for expanded voting rights. “We all are impressed by his institutionalism and his deftness at steering the Supreme Court away from making it such a central partisan topic, such as in the ACA case. The democracy issues are where the court has been most aggressive, and he has not been a temporizing swing vote but an ardent activist.”

The census case, Department of Commerce v. New York, crystallizes these issues even more than the earlier electoral decisions in Roberts’ tenure because his role on the court has changed. With the retirement of Anthony Kennedy, a President Ronald Reagan appointee who often functioned as the court’s swing vote, and his contentious replacement last year by the more reliably conservative Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Roberts has become the closest thing to a swing vote on the court, legal analysts agree. That means a party-line decision supporting the Trump administration on the census case would more clearly bear his stamp — and thus more directly undercut his attempts to portray the court as nonpartisan.

Richard Hasen, a law professor at the University of California at Irvine who specializes in election law, says that “historically … it has been mostly true” that Roberts has consistently voted to uphold the GOP’s core interests in cases that affect the rules of politics. But, Hasen says, “He’s in a different position now. He’s been the chief justice for a decade but only now is he a swing justice and only now is he on a court when all the conservatives are Republicans and all the liberals are Democrats.”

Citing the formulation in the recent biography of Roberts by CNN legal analyst Joan Biskupic, Hasen says the census case “will be a great test … of which Roberts is going to show up: the movement conservative Roberts or the pragmatic instituitionalist Roberts.”

Roberts has spoken very little in public about specific court decisions, but in his appearance at the University of Minnesota last October, he suggested that the focus on 5-4 decisions that split the court along partisan lines was misplaced. The press, he said, portrays such decisions “more in a political way somebody must think is more readily understandable. From the court perspective, I would like to see the sentence that causes people to split this way (so) a reasonable person could see why there’s two sides to that story.”

Roberts also said he tries to ignore criticism of his decisions (“the good thing about life tenure is that it doesn’t really bother you much”) and doesn’t look back wondering whether he decided cases incorrectly. “I will give the same answer because it’s the true one, and I always worry it will sound harsh or something, but the answer is no,” he said.

1.1.1           A ruling of huge consequence

The census decision due this week has potentially huge implications for the partisan — and racial — balance of political power over the next decade. The Trump administration is seeking to add a question that would, for the first time, ask all Americans whether they are American citizens. A wide variety of experts, including within the Census Bureau itself, have warned that the question could discourage minority groups, particularly Hispanics, from responding to the census.

The nonpartisan Urban Institute recently noted that changes in how the census is administered — particularly an increased reliance on internet responses and reduced emphasis on home visits — could swell the undercount of minorities. Adding a citizenship question to those changes, especially in an atmosphere of intense political tension over immigration, could produce “an undercount of a magnitude we haven’t seen in a decade or two or more,” says Diana Elliott, a senior research associate at the institute.

Specifically, the Urban Institute projected that a census including the citizenship question could undercount Hispanics nationwide by 3.5%, while slightly overcounting whites and also significantly undercounting African Americans and more modestly missing Asian Americans.

That could undercount the population in heavily diverse states including California, Texas, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Florida and Georgia while leading to overcounts in mostly white states including Vermont, West Virginia, Maine, New Hampshire and Montana, the group calculated.

In the 2020 reapportionment that will be based on the census results, such an undercount could shift congressional seats — and Electoral College votes — from diverse states mostly within the Sun Belt (particularly California, Texas, Arizona and Florida) toward more predominantly white states mostly across the Rust Belt (Ohio, Minnesota and Montana are among the states that have been projected as possible winners).

Just as important, an undercount of minorities could shift the balance of political power within states. With less recorded population, heavily minority areas would lose representation when states draw new districts after 2020 for state legislative and congressional seats.

In several states, Republicans are discussing proposals to draw legislative and congressional districts based not on total population but the number of citizens in each area. That approach — if ultimately passed in states and upheld by the Supreme Court — would tilt power even more dramatically away from areas with large Hispanic populations toward mostly white communities. Recently discovered hard drives from a deceased GOP redistricting specialist, Thomas Hofeller, showed that obtaining the data required to implement such a citizen-based redistricting system was one reason he urged the Trump administration to include a citizenship question in the census.

For all these reasons, experts such as Waldman believe the census case could rival the long-term impact of the other two landmark Roberts-era cases affecting the ground rules of politics: the 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision eviscerating campaign finance restrictions, and the Shelby County v. Holder decision, decided six years ago Tuesday, which severely retrenched the Voting Rights Act.

“The census case ranks up there with Citizens United and Shelby County in tilting the rules of American politics,” he says.

Both of those earlier landmark cases were decided on 5-4 votes, with Roberts voting with an all-Republican majority each time. At the time Citizens United was decided, the court’s partisan and ideological balance was less regimented than today. That decision featured Roberts and four other Republican-appointed justices outvoting three justices appointed by Democrats and John Paul Stevens, a Gerald Ford appointee, who often voted with the court’s liberal bloc.

By the time of the Shelby County decision in 2013, Elena Kagan, appointed by President Barack Obama, had replaced Stevens and the court had settled into its current ideological and partisan alignment, though with different members. On that decision, Roberts joined four other Republican appointees to outvote the four Democratic appointees.

Each of these rulings brought huge changes to American politics.

Citizens United, which defined political spending as speech, opened the door to a rapid expansion in “dark money” super PAC spending.

Shelby County had an even more seismic effect. That decision, written by Roberts, effectively invalidated the provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act that required states with histories of discrimination to receive federal approval (“preclearance”) for changes in their election laws. With that provision stripped away, Republican-controlled states across the country have stampeded to impose new restrictions on voting, such as limiting early and absentee voting and requiring more stringent proof of identity to cast a ballot.

1.1.2           Other 5-4 election decisions

Roberts has joined 5-4 court decisions that have produced outcomes mostly favored by Republicans on an array of other election-related topics. “If he’s got fears of seeming partisan, he’s managed to compartmentalize,” says Waldman. “He seems to always have a benefit for one party over another.”

Last June, the court upheld an Ohio law that aggressively purged voters from the rolls if they had not participated in recent elections, again on a 5-4 vote that pit all of the GOP-appointed justices against all of the Democratic-appointed ones.

That same month the same alignment rejected a challenge of Republican-drawn Texas redistricting maps for the state Legislature and Congress made on the grounds that they discriminated against Hispanics.

In yet another 5-4 split, the court’s four Democratic-appointed justices last June signaled openness to establishing rules to limit partisan gerrymandering but were unable to attract a fifth vote from any of the court’s Republican-appointed justices. The court is due to decide a new round of gerrymandering cases this week.

Back in 2011, Roberts likewise wrote an opinion in which the five GOP-appointed justices outvoted the four Democratic appointees to invalidate an Arizona election law that provided extra funds to candidates who accepted public financing and faced big-spending opponents.

In 2014, Roberts wrote an opinion for the other four GOP-appointed justices invalidating federal limits on total contributions from individuals in an election cycle.

In 2015, Roberts and three other GOP-appointed justices voted to strike down an Arizona law establishing an independent commission to draw congressional district lines, but the court’s liberals prevailed when Kennedy joined them to uphold the law. With Kennedy now replaced by Kavanaugh, legal experts say it’s less certain that this court will continue to allow independent redistricting commissions, which nearly 20 states have now adopted.

Underscoring the partisan stakes, the case against the citizenship question was brought by a coalition of 17 Democratic-controlled states, the District of Columbia, more than a dozen cities and the US Conference of Mayors; 17 Republican-controlled states have filed legal briefs supporting the administration.

So far, three federal district courts have decided against the Trump administration’s decision to add the citizenship question, ruling that the Commerce Department choice to include it violated federal procedures for reaching such a decision. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross initially said he sought to add the citizenship question at the request of the Justice Department — ostensibly to improve enforcement of the Voting Rights Act. But court testimony has shown that he asked the department to make that request, and consulted with anti-immigration hard-liners in the administration in his decision.

“In the census case it’s really hard to come up with a straight-faced argument in the face of evidence that while the Trump administration said they were doing this to protect Hispanic voters they were actually doing it to hurt Hispanic voters,” says Hasen. “If they are going to turn a blind eye to that … that’s a sign that this is a very partisan court. This should be a 9-0 decision (against the question).”

With the disclosure of the Hofeller memos, the court could punt on the decision and send it back to lower courts to consider the new evidence — though most observers consider that unlikely since the Trump administration has insisted it must prepare the census forms by this summer.

Beyond its immediate partisan implications, the census case stands at the forward edge of a racial dynamic that may increasingly embroil the court over the coming decade. As I’ve written, the five-member Republican-appointed majority was confirmed by GOP senators — who represent the parts of America least touched by the demographic changes that are hurtling the US toward a future in which minorities will constitute most of the under-18 population as soon as 2020 and a majority of the overall population around 2043, according to census projections.

If the five GOP-appointed justices authorize a census question that dilutes the political clout of minorities, it would be only one of many decisions that could pit them against the interests of America’s growingly diverse population. Those same justices have displayed much skepticism about other programs, such as affirmative action in education or constraints on law enforcement’s use of race in decision-making, that most minority leaders consider essential to their communities.

Waldman says the census case illustrates how the five Republican-appointed justices could set rules for politics in the years ahead — on issues from redistricting to voting rights — that constrain the influence of the growing minority population, which mostly supports Democrats, and thus help Republicans retain power.

“What it means is the Supreme Court will have an even bigger thumb on the scale for the rules of politics, and it becomes a perpetual motion machine … changing the rules of politics to help elect more Republican officials, who appoint more Republican judges,” Waldman says.

Roberts has left no doubt that one of his greatest fears is that the court he leads will be perceived as nothing more than exactly that kind of cog in the Republican political machine. The explosive decision due this week will test whether that fear is enough to dissuade him from adding Department of Commerce v. New York to Citizens United and Shelby County in his legacy of landmark 5-4 party-line court rulings that have rewritten the rules of competition between Republicans and Democrats.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Unione Europea. I sovranisti potrebbero vincere pur senza maggioranza….

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-05-25.

Gufo_019__

Cerchiamo di ragionare, nei limiti del possibile.

Se i liberal socialisti europei si stanno dando questo gran da fare nella campagna elettorale, ricorrendo anche a metodi impropri,

Austria. Il problema si complica di non poco. Voto di fiducia.

E ti pareva!! La Commissione Elettorale UK indaga il Brexit Party. Solo quello.

è solo perché hanno una paura livida di perdere.

Basta solo focalizzare e razionalizzare cosa significhi politicamente il termine ‘perdere‘.

Sotto la condizione che le prospezioni elettorali trovino riscontro nei risultati che usciranno dalle urne, e che nel caso dell’Australia avevano grandemente sopravalutato le sinistre, e sotto la speranza che non si debba assistere a grossolani brogli elettorali, come successe in Austria durante le elezioni politiche, sia il partito Popolare Europeo sia il Partito Socialista Europeo dovrebbero perdere una gran quota di seggi. La perdita dovrebbe aggirarsi tra gli ottanta ed i centoventi seggi.

Difficili proclamare vittoria quando si perdano seggi, ed in quota non certo trascurabile.

Poi, i voti persi da qualche altra parte andranno bene, mica che possano sublimare nel nulla.

Politico riporta a 254 il numero degli europarlamentari definiti come ‘euroscettici.

I parlamentari euroscettici sarebbero quindi il 33.8% del totale, giusto un po’ sopra la soglia del 30%, ossia dei 225 seggi.

*

Questa soglia è importante, ed a seguito ne vedremo i motivi.

«The European Parliament elections this May have been described as a make-or-break moment for the future of the European project – and for good reason»

*

«With plans to form a populist united front, Eurosceptic parties need only capture one-third of parliamentary seats to bring EU governance to a crawl»

*

«Will the European Parliament elections this May result in a political revolution?»

*

«Populist and nationalist parties certainly hope so. They are promising not just to overturn the Brussels establishment, but also to end the free movement of people, lift sanctions against Russia, abandon NATO, eschew future trade deals, reverse policies to combat climate change, and abolish gay marriage.»

*

«populist parties could significantly outperform current polls.»

*

«Moreover, the ECFR study finds that even with a parliamentary minority, a Eurosceptic party grouping could severely curtail the EU’s ability to address voters’ concerns, and could threaten its fundamental governing principles»

*

«For example, with just one-third of parliamentary seats, populists could block sanctions against member states that violate EU rules and the rule of law.»

*

«The EU is currently pursuing such measures against both the Law and Justice (PiS) party’s government in Poland and Orbán’s government in Hungary»

*

«Populist insurgents could also derail EU budget negotiations, and even precipitate an EU “government shutdown”, by blocking the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework if they garner an absolute majority»

*

«With a blocking minority or control of certain parliamentary committees, Eurosceptics might also be able to stand in the way of international trade deals and appointments to the European Commission»

*

«The risk, then, is not so much that populists will capture a parliamentary majority and overturn everything on day one, but that they will have some representation in the European Commission and secure a large enough minority to bring EU policymaking to a crawl»

*

Ricapitoliamo le preoccupazioni dei liberal socialisti europei.

– con solo un terzo dei seggi parlamentari, i populisti potrebbero bloccare le sanzioni contro gli Stati membri che violassero le regole liberal dell’UE e lo stato di diritto;

– potrebbero anche far deragliare i negoziati sul bilancio dell’UE;

– potrebbero bloccare il quadro finanziario pluriennale 2021-2027;

– con una minoranza di blocco o con il controllo di alcune commissioni parlamentari, gli euroscettici potrebbero anche essere in grado di ostacolare gli accordi commerciali internazionali e le nomine alla Commissione europee.

*

Sufficit.


European Council on Foreign Relations.

How Europe’s populists can win by losing

The European Parliament elections this May have been described as a make-or-break moment for the future of the European project – and for good reason. With plans to form a populist united front, Eurosceptic parties need only capture one-third of parliamentary seats to bring EU governance to a crawl.

Will the European Parliament elections this May result in a political revolution? Populist and nationalist parties certainly hope so. They are promising not just to overturn the Brussels establishment, but also to end the free movement of people, lift sanctions against Russia, abandon NATO, eschew future trade deals, reverse policies to combat climate change, and abolish gay marriage.

Many of these ideas have long been included in Eurosceptic fringe parties’ election programmes. But a major survey of the EU’s 27 national political theatres, led by Susi Dennison and Pawel Zerka of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), that will be published next week, shows that voters could be more responsive to such proposals this year than in the past.

In the past, European elections have been predominantly national, low-turnout, and low-stakes affairs. But those days are over. The campaign season has already become a transnational, pan-European event. While American populist agitator Steve Bannon is attempting to  a coalition of right-wing nationalist governments, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini have  a populist alliance that marries the anti-austerity left with the anti-migration right. Orbán and Salvini’s goal is to capture EU institutions and reverse European integration from within. They envision nothing less than a re-founding of the West on illiberal values.

Moreover, voter turnout this year will most likely be far higher than the usual 20-40 percent. Just as the Brexiteers managed to mobilise 3m Britons who generally abstain from voting, continental populists could attract Europeans who feel as though mainstream parties have forgotten about them. If these voters turn out while supporters of moderate leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron stay home, populist parties could significantly outperform current polls.

Moreover, the ECFR study finds that even with a parliamentary minority, a Eurosceptic party grouping could severely curtail the EU’s ability to address voters’ concerns, and could threaten its fundamental governing principles. For example, with just one-third of parliamentary seats, populists could block sanctions against member states that violate EU rules and the rule of law. The EU is currently pursuing such measures against both the Law and Justice (PiS) party’s government in Poland and Orbán’s government in Hungary.

Populist insurgents could also derail EU budget negotiations, and even precipitate an EU “government shutdown”, by blocking the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework if they garner an absolute majority. With a blocking minority or control of certain parliamentary committees, Eurosceptics might also be able to stand in the way of international trade deals and appointments to the European Commission.

Populists who win parliamentary seats will also be eager to weaken EU foreign policy, either through the power of the purse or amendments to policy resolutions. Given that many European populist parties have financial ties to the Kremlin, the goal will be to water down sanctions against Russia. Beyond that, populists also seek to frustrate environmental-policy efforts such as the Paris climate agreement.

The risk, then, is not so much that populists will capture a parliamentary majority and overturn everything on day one, but that they will have some representation in the European Commission and secure a large enough minority to bring EU policymaking to a crawl. That, in turn, will prevent the enforcement of EU rules, strengthen nationalist governments, and further undermine European voters’ confidence in EU governing institutions. The illiberal governments in Budapest, Warsaw, and Rome would be free to violate EU rules with impunity.

Moreover, the European Parliament elections coincide with a widespread political realignment within EU member states. Thus, for populists and moderates alike, electoral success in May could translate into success at the national level. Estonia and Slovakia will hold general elections before the European Parliament elections, and Belgium and Denmark will hold elections later in the year. In each case, populist parties could ascend to power as coalition partners.

Making matters worse, pro-European parties appear to be falling into the trap laid by these anti-European parties. Across Europe, liberals, Greens, and many left-wing parties are approaching the election as a fight between cosmopolitans and communitarians – between globalism and patriotism. This political framing is more likely to help the insurgent Eurosceptics than anyone else.

Nothing is lost yet. But to avoid a rout, pro-Europeans must stop behaving in ways that confirm the populists’ stereotypes of them as supporters of the status quo in Brussels. That means offering an up-front, honest critique of the EU’s shortcomings while avoiding the wrong kind of polarisation, particularly on issues where they do not have the support of a clear majority.

At the same time, pro-Europeans need to start deploying “wedge” issues of their own. For example, on the crucial question of migration, it is clear that Orbán’s and Salvini’s interests are not even particularly aligned. While Orbán wants to keep all migrants out, Salvini has called for asylum seekers arriving in Italy to be distributed throughout the EU. Pro-Europeans should be pointing out these contradictions to voters in Hungary and Italy.

Putting aside his other current difficulties, Macron at least is aware of the populist trap. In his speech last November commemorating Armistice Day, he described patriotism as the opposite of nationalism, thus repudiating the narrative that true patriots oppose “globalists”. But he has done little to show how his politics can make “left-behind voters” feel safe from globalisation and European integration.

In theory, at least, Macronism still represents the best pro-European alternative to atavistic nationalism. But to avert a populist revolution this May, Macron and other leaders will have to reach beyond their own close circle of cosmopolitan elites. Otherwise, they will have fallen into the Eurosceptics’ trap.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Giustizia, Ideologia liberal, Trump

Trump. 16 stati ricorrono in tribunale contro l’ordine di costruzione del muro.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-02-22.

2019-02-22__Trump__001

Trump dichiara l’emergenza. Ma la vera notizia non è questa.

Il Presidente Trump ha emanato un Ordine in cui dichiara emergenza al confine con il Messico ed ordina la costruzione di un muro. Questo tipo di provvedimento si era reso necessario dopo che il Congresso aveva più volte negato al Presidente i fondi per la costruzione.

La risposta dei liberal democratici è stata molto rapida.

California, New York are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon e Virginia, tutti stati americani con governatori democratici hanno presentato istanza alla Corte Federale del Distretto di San Francisco per bloccare lo stato di emergenza dichiarato dal presidente Trump al confine con il Messico, con la seguente motivazione:

«Contrary to the will of Congress, the president has used the pretext of a manufactured ‘crisis’ of unlawful immigration to declare a national emergency and redirect federal dollars appropriated for drug interdiction, military construction and law enforcement initiatives toward building a wall on the United States-Mexico border»

Qui si può leggere l’intero documento.

L’istanza è stata nominalmente presentata da Xavier Becerra, un politico e avvocato statunitense di origini messicane, membro del Partito Democratico e deputato al Congresso per lo stato della California dal 1993 al 2017. È Procuratore generale della California dal 2017.

Manco a dirlo, questa istanza è stata presentata alla Federal District Court in San Francisco.Tale Corte dispone di 21 giudici, dei quali diciotto sono liberal democratici e solo tre sono repubblicani: in poche parole la sentenza è già scritta ed alla fine ne verrà investita la Corte Suprema.

2019-02-22__Trump__002

* * * * * * *

Prosegue spietata la guerra civile americana che contrappone i liberal democratici alla Amministrazione Trump.

Siamo arrivati, finalmente si potrebbe dire, allo scontro finale.

Mr Trump ha già un contenzioso in attesa di giudizio presso la Suprema Corte:

Trump, Lib Dem, Suprema Corte e Census. Un duello all’ultimo sangue.

Ricordiamo che tale ricorso verte in buona sostanza sulla possibilità di voto che negli stati a governatorato democratico è concessa agli immigrati clandestini illegali, cui si oppone l’Amministrazione Trump. Nei fatti, il potere politico dei democratici affonda le sue radici proprio negli immigrati illegali, stimati essere, in via del tutto riduttiva, almeno 6.5 milioni.

*

Nessuno potrebbe al momento predire come evolveranno le cose: possiamo solo dire che una vittoria del Presidente Trump annienterebbe il potere politico ed economico dei liberal democratici.

Si resta tuttavia con la bocca amara, molto amara, al dover constatare quanto i liberal democratici siano determinati ad usare la giustizia come un gruppo di fuoco politico.

Il giudizio se costruire o meno il muro è di natura politica.

Ci si pensi bene. Giudici nominati non eletti saranno chiamati ad esprimere un giudizio politico che almeno pro tempore potrebbe essere vincolante per l’intera nazione. Questa è dittatura, non certo democrazia.

La tanto millantata divisione dei poteri è disattesa proprio da coloro che ogni giorno se ne sciacquano la bocca e vorrebbero tener lezione a tutto il mondo.

* * *

«The States of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Attorney General Dana Nessel on behalf of the People of Michigan (collectively, “Plaintiff States”), bring this action to protect their residents, natural resources, and economic interests from President Donald J. Trump’s flagrant disregard of fundamental separation of powers principles engrained in the United States Constitution. Contrary to the will of Congress, the President has used the pretext of a manufactured “crisis” of unlawful immigration to declare a national emergency and redirect federal dollars appropriated for drug interdiction, military construction, and law enforcement initiatives toward building a wall on the United States-Mexico border. This includes the diversion of funding that each of the Plaintiff States receive. Defendants must be enjoined from carrying out President Trump’s unconstitutional and unlawful scheme. ….

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff States respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their favor, and grant the following relief:

  1. Issue a judicial declaration that the Executive Actions’ diversion of federal funds toward construction of a border wall is unconstitutional and/or unlawful because it: (a) violates the separation of powers doctrine; (b) violates the Appropriations Clause; and (c) exceeds congressional authority conferred to the Executive Branch and is ultra vires;

  2. The States of California and New Mexico seek a judicial declaration that Defendants violated NEPA and the APA and further seek an order enjoining DHS, requiring it to comply with NEPA and the APA—including preparing an EIS—before taking any further action pursuant to the Executive Actions;

  3. Permanently enjoin Defendants from constructing a border wall without an appropriation by Congress for that purpose;

  4. Permanently enjoin Defendants from diverting federal funding toward construction of a border wall; and

  5. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.»


The New York Times. 2019-02-20. 16 States Sue to Stop Trump’s Use of Emergency Powers to Build Border Wall

WASHINGTON — A coalition of 16 states, including California and New York, on Monday challenged President Trump in court over his plan to use emergency powers to spend billions of dollars on his border wall.

The lawsuit is part of a constitutional confrontation that Mr. Trump set off on Friday when he declared that he would spend billions of dollars more on border barriers than Congress had granted him. The clash raises questions over congressional control of spending, the scope of emergency powers granted to the president, and how far the courts are willing to go to settle such a dispute.

The suit, filed in Federal District Court in San Francisco, argues that the president does not have the power to divert funds for constructing a wall along the Mexican border because it is Congress that controls spending.

Xavier Becerra, the attorney general of California, said in an interview that the president himself had undercut his argument that there was an emergency on the border.

“Probably the best evidence is the president’s own words,” he said, referring to Mr. Trump’s speech on Feb. 15 announcing his plan: “I didn’t need to do this, but I’d rather do it much faster.”

The lawsuit, California et al. v. Trump et al., says that the plaintiff states are going to court to protect their residents, natural resources and economic interests. “Contrary to the will of Congress, the president has used the pretext of a manufactured ‘crisis’ of unlawful immigration to declare a national emergency and redirect federal dollars appropriated for drug interdiction, military construction and law enforcement initiatives toward building a wall on the United States-Mexico border,” the lawsuit says.

Congress is on its own separate track to challenge the president’s declaration. The House of Representatives, now controlled by Democrats, may take a two-prong approach when it returns from a recess. One would be to bring a lawsuit of its own.

Lawmakers could also vote to override the declaration that an emergency exists, but it is doubtful that Congress has the votes to override Mr. Trump’s certain veto, leaving the courts a more likely venue.

Joining California and New York are Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon and Virginia. All have Democratic governors but one — Maryland, whose attorney general is a Democrat — and most have legislatures controlled by Democrats.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Germania. Il deep state sta abbracciando la causa di AfD.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-09-27.

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«In the United States the term “deep state” is used in Republican and conservative political messaging to describe a conspiracy theory of influential decision-making bodies believed to be within government who are relatively permanent and whose policies and long-term plans are unaffected by changing administrations. The term is often used in a critical sense vis-à-vis the general electorate to refer to the lack of influence popular democracy has on these institutions and the decisions they make as a shadow government» [Fonte]

*

Il quadro riassuntivo pubblicato dal Sonntagsfrage Bundestagswahl sembrerebbe essere eloquente. Quattro scietà di sondaggi, Emnid, Forsa, Infratest dimap ed Insa valutano la Unione, Cdu/Csu al 28% e la Spd attorno al 17%. Nel converso, AfD si collocherebbe tra il 16% ed il 18%.

Ma questi valori assumono vividi connotati quando siano considerati nel loro sviluppo storico: in partiti tradizionale stanno crollando mentre AfD continua imperterrita a crescere.

2018-09-24__Germania__Sondaggi.

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Per anni i partiti tradizionali hanno volutamente ignorato AfD, al punto di non rispondere alle loro interpellanze parlamentari, fatto questo visto e constatato dalla stragrande maggioranza dei tedeschi che seguono la televisione. Fatto di inaudita gravità: AfD siede al Bundestag perché eletta dai Cittadini.

I liberal socialisti hanno caricato AfD di ogni sorta di insultante nequizia, i media si sono scatenati come cani idrofobi, ma nulla ha fermato il loro crollo e la crescita di AfD.

Adesso, di fronte allo spettro delle elezioni in Hessen ed in Baviera, nonché poi di quelle per il rinnovo del parlamento europeo, i liberal socialisti iniziano a pensare a cosa sia andato male.

AfD è l’unico partito di opposizione in Germania, e su di esso confluiscono anche i voti di frange estremiste, che peraltro non trovano albergo nelle strutture del partito.

Lo Spiegel inizia a chiedersi per quale motivazioni tanta gente comune abbia abbandonato i partiti tradizionali per confluire in AfD.

* * *

«is the AfD merely indicative of the very vitality of the German political system?»

*

«The March Through the Institutions»

*

«Ten active and former police officers represent the AfD in various parliaments. One of those is former Chief Superintendent Martin Hess. He used to be responsible for training new officers in the town of Böblingen, just southwest of Stuttgart, and today represents the AfD on the Internal Affairs Committee in parliament. Another is Wilko Möller, a member of the federal police who once worked for the Federal Criminal Police Office and for the Chancellery»

*

«But perhaps the most prominent bridge-builder between the far-right and the police is Rainer Wendt, head of the 94,000-member German Police Union (DPolG), one of two prominent unions for German law-enforcement officers»

*

«The AfD may also be over-represented in the German military»

*

«But almost 90 percent of the troops are men, and a higher than average share of them come from eastern German states or are members of the German minority in Russia who have moved to Germany»

*

«AfD deputy head Georg Pazderski is a retired colonel in the General Staff while the AfD floor leaders in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Rhineland-Palatinate are all former soldiers»

*

«It’s not surprising, then, that the AfD seeks to present itself as the party of the military, though its expertise on issues pertaining to the military is limited»

*

«Hohmann had only three questions»

*

«The first was why the European Union flag stood in the middle of the hall instead of the German flag»

*

«Then Hohmann criticized the practice of addressing soldiers as “Soldatinnen und Soldaten,” a German-language convention to include both women and men»

*

«Finally, the AfD member wanted to know if paratroopers were still based in Altenstadt since he had once served there. The answer: Yes, they’re still there.»

*

«Slowly but surely, the AfD is also advancing into areas that possess even more powerful weapons than the military: the media and the world of culture»

*

«As the third-largest group in German parliament, the AfD has access to a number of administrative bodies, from the Holocaust memorial in Berlin to the Stasi Records Agency, which administers the vast number of files kept by the East German secret police on its own citizens»

*

«For example, for the board of the Magnus Hirschfeld Foundation, which fights for gay rights, the AfD chose Nicole Höchst, who believes that homosexuals have an abnormal inclination to pedophilia.»

*

«Most important to the AfD, however, would appear to be access to the publicly funded media platforms. It is here, after all, that the party believes its greatest opponents are employed. AfD representatives already sit on the boards of four public broadcasters. They are also represented on six state media boards that monitor programming on private broadcasters»

*

Volenti o nolenti, AfD è presente ed anche molto vitale.

Larga parte dei corpi dello stato, polizia ed esercito, guardano questo partito politico con malcelata simpatia: anche loro sono convinti che la Germania debba seguire il proprio retaggio religioso, culturale, sociale, politico, abbandonando con disgusto le ideologie liberal e socialiste, che sono contro natura.

Gli aderenti ad AfD ed il loro Elettorato è tutto tranne quello che i liberal cercano di dipingere: sono semplicemente persone che non condividono quelle ideologie e che vogliono mandare in pensione gli attuali governanti. Se ci si pensasse bene, questo altro non sarebbe che l’usuale rinnovamento democratico.

«many “people in the media” support Merkel’s policies. “I would like to expel them from positions of responsibility.”»

*

«But established political parties must also be willing to accommodate the entire spectrum of opinion in a democracy. Merkel’s refugee policies offended many voters. And because the SPD simply went along with her, the AfD enjoyed increasing levels of support. Indeed, these two establishment parties have made things easy for the AfD.»

Già.

Germania ed immigrazione. Un sondaggio boccia malo modo il Governo.

Gli Elettori tedeschi non ne vogliono più sapere di Frau Merkel e dei suoi sodali socialisti, delle loro balzane ideologie, dell’immigrazione illegale e degli inni agli lgbt.

Se gli egemoni non ci arrivassero da soli a capire una cosa così semplice, ci penseranno gli Elettori.


Spiegel. 2018-09-22. How the Alternative for Germany Has Transformed the Country

Founded only five years ago, the Alternative for Germany has grown from a marginal party to a game-changer in federal and state politics — and become ever more radical. Is it a testament to the strength of German democracy, or a threat to it?

*

For three hours every month, they set up shop right next to the flower stand. There are only four people, a table and an umbrella from which a blue T-shirt hangs. It’s emblazoned with the party’s logo and the words, “Nobody’s perfect, but Brandenburgers come pretty damn close.” Here, at the weekly farmers market in Woltersdorf, a 40-minute drive by car from Berlin, Kathi Muxel, the district chair of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party for the Oder-Spree region, says: “We’re the only ones who come here, even if there’s no upcoming election. People appreciate that.”

Several times a week, AfD adherents plant their umbrella somewhere in the area. Some take the day off from work, while others are self-employed and can set their own schedule. They wait for the people to show up — and they always do — and then they talk. They bring up their annoyance with expensive street lights in the town of Neuzelle, or the planned move of the recycling center in the Berlin suburb Erkner, or the “federal government’s dishonesty” when it spoke of a mob attack in Chemnitz. After all, they say, there were reports that no mob attacks actually took place at all.

Being ever-present, talking — and not to mention listening — was also part of the AfD strategy during federal elections last September. And it worked. The party scored 22.1 percent of the vote here in the eastern German state of Brandenburg, putting it only slightly behind Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). It’s possible that Alexander Gauland, the candidate for the Oder-Spree electoral district, was responsible for some of that success. But what has been decisive is the proximity to ordinary voters that the AfD has cultivated. And it’s not only here that the far-right populists are firmly rooted, but in many other places around the country as well.

Political upheavals rarely happen overnight. They begin slowly, and then one morning you wake up and find yourself in another country. The small group that gathered on the evening of Feb. 6, 2013, in a Protestant community center in the town of Oberursel near Frankfurt, had no idea that by founding a new political party called the Alternative for Germany they would trigger something bigger. Who would have thought that a retired senior government official, a conservative newspaper columnist and a numbers-loving economics professor would changed the face of German politics?

Unprecedented Success

And who would have thought that the AfD of Alexander Gauland, Konrad Adam and Bernd Lucke would become a big-tent party of its own — at least in parts of eastern Germany — within just a few years? Or that it would win almost a hundred seats in the federal parliament with its pledge to “hunt down” Chancellor Angela Merkel? Or that its party leaders would one day march through the streets of Chemnitz alongside far-right extremists, like they did on Sept. 1, 2018?

The AfD stands for an unprecedented political success, but also for a history of radicalization. Like any new party, breaking taboos is the AfD’s lifeblood, but its shift to the right has continued unabated. And anyone who has stood in the party’s way has gotten steamrolled. First it hit Lucke, the well-behaved co-founder and former party head; he was overthrown by the much more politically shrewd Frauke Petry.

When Petry herself became too powerful, Alexander Gauland pushed her aside. His tweed jackets may lend him an air of amiability and scholarship, but in reality he has few inhibitions about sealing pacts with far-right extremists. In that regard, it’s no coincidence that Gauland is the only person from that founding meeting in Oberursel who still holds sway over the party today.

No other party leader stands as much for the AfD’s split personality as Gauland. A former senior official in the state government in Hesse, in western Germany, Gauland lives in a dignified Potsdam neighborhood filled with mansions. He can speak intelligently about Prussian history — and then, without missing a beat, claim that the Nazi era was but a “speck of bird shit” on German history.

“We’re a thorn in the side of a political system that has become outdated,” Gauland told the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung earlier this month. He wants to drive out anyone who played a role in what he calls the “Merkel System,” including people in the media, and he has called for a “peaceful revolution.”

But a revolution against what?

In January, Harvard professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt published a book titled, “How Democracies Die.” In it, they write that in the decades since the end of the Cold War, liberal systems haven’t been overthrown through force and military coups alone. More than anything else, democracy has been undermined non-violently through the election of anti-democratic politicians.

The book was written in light of Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S., but Germany, too, seems to be on the verge of a turning point. By the end of this year, the AfD is likely to hold seats in every state legislature in Germany. And it has already put forward one of its own — a conspiracy theorist who predicts the imminent collapse of the euro — to chair the budget committee in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, which oversees annual government spending of 350 billion euros ($411 billion).

A Turning Point

The AfD was the strongest party in the eastern state of Saxony in the last Bundestag elections, and across the east, it has now become such a force that the CDU has been compelled to express what would have been unfathomable not too long ago: the possibility of governing together with the far-left Left Party.

The unrest in Chemnitz in August marked a turning point for the AfD. There, the party joined a phalanx of agitators and neo-Nazis, with the AfD’s Thuringia state chapter leader Björn Höcke marching side-by-side with an activist from Pegida — the anti-Islam and anti-immigrant group — who has multiple criminal convictions on his record.

For years, politics in Germany had been shaped by the old polarity between left and right. But those days are over. The question of identity now seems to be more important, which seemingly scrambles the party system. Sahra Wagenknecht of the Left Party is creating a new movement called “Aufstehen,” German for “Stand Up,” that she hopes will be a magnet for voters who would like to see a bigger welfare state and fewer immigrants. The move places additional pressure on the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), which has fluctuated between a culture of welcoming refugees and warnings of a loss of control since the refugee crisis. The business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP), meanwhile, has morphed into a law and order party. And the only thing still holding the CDU and Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, together is the fear of losing power. The only parties that seem to be profiting from the new political complexities are the Greens and the AfD.

So, how to deal with a party that fulminates against the mainstream with such abandon while at the spreading its own tentacles further into the center of society, into government offices, the armed forces, the media and the cultural world?

Should the party be fought as a threat to democracy? Or is the AfD merely indicative of the very vitality of the German political system?

The March Through the Institutions

One of the paradoxes of the AfD is that even though it rails against the establishment like no other party, its members are firmly anchored in that system. Many federal police officers, who felt the most tangible effects of the chaos during the refugee crisis in 2015, are likely to be receptive to the notion that Germany lost control of its borders at the time. Dieter Romann, the president of the Federal Police force, is one of the chancellor’s fiercest critics — and he makes no secret of his opinion.

Ten active and former police officers represent the AfD in various parliaments. One of those is former Chief Superintendent Martin Hess. He used to be responsible for training new officers in the town of Böblingen, just southwest of Stuttgart, and today represents the AfD on the Internal Affairs Committee in parliament. Another is Wilko Möller, a member of the federal police who once worked for the Federal Criminal Police Office and for the Chancellery. He is now in the leadership of the AfD’s state chapter in Brandenburg.

But perhaps the most prominent bridge-builder between the far-right and the police is Rainer Wendt, head of the 94,000-member German Police Union (DPolG), one of two prominent unions for German law-enforcement officers. Wendt isn’t just fond of giving interviews to the right-wing weekly newspaper Junge Freiheit, but he also speaks regularly to the magazine Compact, which is even further out on the extremist fringe.

Another example will be seen at the “Border Protection Conference” to be held by Compact in Munich at the end of September. That event will see Martin Sellner, a leading figure of the far-right extremist Identitarian Movement, take the stage — along with Police Chief Richard Graupner, who is a candidate for the AfD in Bavarian state elections to be held on October 14.

Union leader Wendt has demonstrated no qualms about adopting the rhetoric and ideology of the right wing, saying things like, for example, the macho behavior of young Muslims “is almost one of the genetic cornerstones of this culture.” In 2016, he paid a visit to the AfD group in Saxony state parliament, with AfD lawmakers afterwards crowing: “The DPolG and the AfD are fighting for the same goals on many, many issues.”

The AfD may also be over-represented in the German military. There are no reliable statistics, since the Bundeswehr, as Germany’s armed forces are known, are not permitted to ask troops about their political leanings. But almost 90 percent of the troops are men, and a higher than average share of them come from eastern German states or are members of the German minority in Russia who have moved to Germany. The AfD does particularly well in all three of those groups.

Military Background

There is another indication for the far-right party’s influence in the Bundeswehr: More than 13 percent of the 219 male AfD lawmakers in state and federal parliaments have a military background. In federal parliament alone, it is almost 20 percent. Either they used to serve as career soldiers or they are reserve officers.

AfD deputy head Georg Pazderski is a retired colonel in the General Staff while the AfD floor leaders in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Rhineland-Palatinate are all former soldiers.

At the official commemoration for German war dead held in the Reichstag on Nov. 19, the country’s official day of mourning, four representatives of the Social Democrats showed up, five from Merkel’s conservatives, one each from the Greens and the Left Party – and 38 from the AfD.

It’s not surprising, then, that the AfD seeks to present itself as the party of the military, though its expertise on issues pertaining to the military is limited. In late May, for instance, the Defense Ministry invited Bundeswehr experts from the Budget Committee to a meeting. Martin Hohmann, who was thrown out of the Christian Democrats in 2004 after delivering a virulently anti-Semitic speech, attended the meeting for the AfD.

Hohmann had only three questions. The first was why the European Union flag stood in the middle of the hall instead of the German flag. Fellow parliamentarian Tobias Lindner of the Green Party gave him a brief speech on the flag regulations applicable in public buildings in Germany. Then Hohmann criticized the practice of addressing soldiers as “Soldatinnen und Soldaten,” a German-language convention to include both women and men. Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen responded: “Mr. Representative, you wouldn’t appreciate being addressed as Ms. Representative Hohmann, would you?”

Intentional Provocation?

Finally, the AfD member wanted to know if paratroopers were still based in Altenstadt since he had once served there. The answer: Yes, they’re still there.

After that, Hohmann had no further questions.

Slowly but surely, the AfD is also advancing into areas that possess even more powerful weapons than the military: the media and the world of culture. As the third-largest group in German parliament, the AfD has access to a number of administrative bodies, from the Holocaust memorial in Berlin to the Stasi Records Agency, which administers the vast number of files kept by the East German secret police on its own citizens. When it comes to choosing its representatives for such bodies, the AfD sometimes seems to be intentionally trying to provoke. For example, for the board of the Magnus Hirschfeld Foundation, which fights for gay rights, the AfD chose Nicole Höchst, who believes that homosexuals have an abnormal inclination to pedophilia.

Most important to the AfD, however, would appear to be access to the publicly funded media platforms. It is here, after all, that the party believes its greatest opponents are employed. AfD representatives already sit on the boards of four public broadcasters. They are also represented on six state media boards that monitor programming on private broadcasters.

But the party wants more, as party head Gauland noted last week in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Unfortunately, he told the paper, many “people in the media” support Merkel’s policies. “I would like to expel them from positions of responsibility.”

If you ask Gauland exactly how he plans to implement his plan, he becomes evasive. “I never said journalists should be completely expelled from Germany,” he protests. “And ‘expel’ doesn’t imply the use of violence.” But essentially, he wants to “finally change the imbalance in the media to our advantage” — such that newsrooms are populated by fewer AfD opponents and more Merkel critics.

The AfD’s Two Faces

The AfD had a dazzling character from the very beginning — and it never differentiated between the middle class and the radicals, which is precisely what made it so successful. During the recent protests in Chemnitz, the actual AfD spectrum was in full view for the first time. Members of parliament with the party and top officials led a group of marchers that included not only local Chemnitz residents, but the xenophobic splinter group Pro Chemnitz, as well as hooligans, neo-Nazis and members of the identitarian movement. Two days later, a concert aimed at countering those protests attracted 65,000 people.

“We don’t want extremists and violent criminals within our ranks,” Thuringia AfD leader Höcke had previously posted on Facebook. But they came anyway, and they were even tolerated and assimilated. A repeat offender with multiple convictions was allowed to march right at the front. Meanwhile, Höcke gave a warm welcome to Lutz Bachmann, the frontman for the xenophobic Pegida marches in Dresden, whose logo had also adorned the AfD’s invitation to the rally.


Spiegel. 2018-09-22. Part 2.

One could say the AfD is a colorful party, but with a brown streak. It attracts classical conservatives and neoliberals as well as ethnonationalist “völkisch” ideologists, extremists and conspiracy theorists. A majority of party members may still dream of a more moderate-conservative Alternative for Germany, but at the fringe, especially in the east, the party is increasingly melding with extremist elements, and this process is in part being tolerated — and at times promoted — at the highest levels of the party.

Moderate members like Hamburg AfD chapter head Jörn Kruse, with an eye to the events in Chemnitz, may lament that it was a “serious mistake” that the party “was very openly doing things together with far-right extremist organizations.” But what good does that do as long as AfD supporters in Hamburg, Kruse’s hometown, regularly attend “Merkel Must Go” protests, where they mingle with members of the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) and the identitarian movement, as they did a few weeks back?

At the protest in the port city, Dennis Augustin, the head of the AfD’s chapter in the eastern state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, welcomed almost 200 demonstrators — from right-wing conservatives to far-right extremists, by saying: “Where are the Nazis supposed to be that everybody’s talking about?” Three men in the crowd raised their index fingers. “Here!” they shouted, laughing.

For the security authorities, the AfD’s recent mingling creates a delicate problem. It’s the job of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the country’s domestic intelligence agency, to investigate whether parties have exceeded the boundaries set in the German constitution and if they are seeking to overthrow the democratic system.

The question is: Does that apply to the AfD?

For the past three years, the same debate flares up after every scandalous statement made by an AfD official over whether the BfV should open an investigation into the party. For example, there was the time in 2015 when the then-head of the party’s youth wing, Markus Frohnmaier, who now has a seat in the Bundestag, announced, “When we get elected, we’re going to clean up, we’re going to clean house, we’re going to make politics about the people again, and only about the people.” Or the time when AfD leader Gauland dismissed the Holocaust as speck of “bird shit.”

‘Anti-Democratic Aspirations’

In June 2017, at a meeting in Düsseldorf, representatives of five state-level offices for the protection of the constitution concluded that some AfD members “are increasingly adopting far-right extremist language.” A BfV staffer of many years reports that the far-right extremist scene “is in constant contact” with AfD people. “What we’ve been hearing is pretty hardcore.”

The security agencies are viewing the influence of the “Patriotic Platform” (PP), an alliance of far-right extremist forces inside the AfD, with concern. A paper from the North Rhine-Westphalia state Office for the Protection of the Constitution that is also being circulated among other state branches argues that the group should be placed under official observation by security agencies across Germany. The paper states that there are “strong indications of anti-democratic aspirations.” It also states that well-known defectors from other far-right extremist organizations are members of the group’s board. “The purpose of PP is to exert influence on the AfD with its far-right extremist agenda and to thus shape policies,” the paper states.

But domestic intelligence officials agree, a few isolated comments aren’t enough to place the entire AfD under official observation.

In March, the heads of Germany’s state-level spy services decided to pass their findings on the AfD on to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The information will help decide whether to conduct monitoring nationally. A decisive meeting is scheduled for November.

Increasingly Inflammatory

Some agency heads feel that decision is taking too long. Earlier this month, the eastern state of Thuringia saw its BfV branch become the first in the country to begin a review of the party. The move was spurred by recent events in Chemnitz, where domestic intelligence agencies counted up to 2,500 far-right extremists at so-called “funeral march” protests organized by the AfD in the city after the murder of a 35-year-old resident. The two suspects in the case were migrants. But for agency head Stephan Kramer, the most important reason was the presence of the AfD’s Thuringia state chapter leader, Björn Höcke, at the protests. Höcke is notorious for his ethnonationalist views and statements.

Observers say Höcke has grown increasingly inflammatory during public appearances, even calling on police officers to disobey orders — otherwise, “the people” would hold them accountable after they take power. The review taking place in Thuringia is the preliminary stage before a full-on official observation by the domestic intelligence agency.

In the states of Bremen and Lower Saxony, the party’s youth wing, the Young Alternative (JA) has recently been observed by authorities due to its links to Germany’s identitarian movement, which is already the subject of surveillance. When police recently searched the apartment of Marvin Mergard, the vice president of JA’s Bremen state chapter, they confiscated all kinds of identitarian propaganda.

Interior ministers at the state and federal level from Merkel’s conservative party met on Friday, Sept. 7, to discuss the AfD. For now, officials in Bavaria want to refrain from monitoring the AfD or its subgroups, in part due to the legal risks of doing so. “We don’t want to give members of the AfD a martyr role, but we do want to take a closer look,” says Bavarian Governor Markus Söder. Authorities concede, however, that a number of AfD activists in the “low double-digits” are already being monitored in the state.

State intelligence officials likely feel compelled to push forward unilaterally because a coordinated approach with the federal government has been sluggish. Some state-level officials have even suspected the now-defunct chief of the federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Hans-Georg Maassen, of thwarting the AfD’s possible observation. Maassen was ousted from that position earlier this week and reassigned to the Interior Ministry over controversial comments he made in the wake of the Chemnitz riots. Even when the decision was made to monitor the identitarian movement, there was a feeling that Maassen had to “be hounded,” says one state intelligence head. Maassen has been accused of secretly harboring sympathies for the AfD. Colleagues who have known him for years dispute this.

It’s possible these rumors were fueled by meetings between Maassen, in his capacity as acting head of Germany’s domestic spy service, and Frauke Petry, a former leader of the AfD. Maassen, for his part, denies he advised the AfD in any way. Party leader Gauland, meanwhile, was enthused about Maassen’s alleged support. Just a few months ago, rumors had begun to circulate that one of the AfD’s members in parliament was a Russian spy. Maassen got involved — a highly unusual move for an intelligence agency head, though not technically against the rules — and gave the man the all-clear.

High Legal Hurdles

Despite the criticism, there are some entirely reasonable explanations for the deposed BfV president’s reservations. The legal hurdles for placing a democratically elected party under official observation are extremely high, for one. There must be clear evidence that the party’s “overall structure” runs counter to the constitutional order. Far-right extremists must also be proven to have “direct influence” over the party’s trajectory.

Torsten Voss, the head of the city state of Hamburg’s intelligence service, says he has perceived a shift within the party. “If we look at this on a national level, the AfD does appear to be rising toward the threshold for observation, but that hurdle hasn’t been crossed yet.”

The Path to the Top

The AfD’s success is based a mixture of favorable circumstances, happenstance and clever strategy. Most AfD people joined their party without any political background — and they didn’t have any experience writing press releases or position papers, let alone giving interviews.

Media coverage of the party, which initially focused politically on its opposition to the EU common currency, the euro, has been critical from the beginning. This led the party to concentrate on social media and direct contact with its fan base. Facebook live streams and tweets are an integral part of every AfD campaign, and any speech given in parliament is promptly disseminated via YouTube. Any time an AfD parliamentarian grills or attacks a colleague from another party, the confrontations are often immediately posted on social media — regardless of whether they were chided or applauded for their outburst. Many AfD members act civilized during parliamentary sessions, only to turn around and behave boorishly online. “Carefully planned provocations” are part of the party’s strategy, according to a paper issued by the AfD board in 2017. “The more nervously and unfairly the old parties govern, the better.”

The party’s media department in parliament already has 15 employees, including a “research team” that is tasked with “factually preparing” sensitive political topics like the Chemnitz riots, explains Jürgen Braun, a parliamentary secretary in the Bundestag for the AfD. The party’s supporters no longer believe the “mainstream media” are up to the task, making it easy for AfD politicians to dismiss critical reports as false or “inflammatory.”

The AfD’s rise also has to be viewed within the context of the European refugee crisis that unfolded in the fall of 2015. That summer, the AfD was still only polling at 5 percent nationally. The euro crisis that had once lent buoyancy to the party had died down and it seemed the party would become but a footnote in postwar German history, as had happened with the Pirate Party several years ago.

But Merkel then decided to keep the borders open for refugees and justified her decision with a moral imperative for which she hadn’t really been known up until that point. In western Germany, people initially greeted Merkel’s refugee policies and responded with what came to be known as a “welcoming culture,” in which people turned out en masse to volunteer and participate in relief efforts. But in the eastern parts of the country, Merkel encountered fierce resistance to her policies from the very beginning. In that sense, the AfD’s rise was no accident — and while it may be painful to say, it’s also a manifestation of a vibrant democracy. The Green Party rose in the 1980s to become a mainstream party in part because the conservative Christian Democrats and the center-left Social Democrats had ignored the environmental destruction that was happening for too long. And the AfD rose because Merkel swept aside the desire of many for control over Germany’s borders.

At the moment, much is being written about the electoral motives of eastern Germans, but most interpretations are based on psychological rather than political criteria. References are often made to the fact that life in the former East had been cut off from the outside world. It is also often pointed out that there is seeming resentment about developments in the east following reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the same time, there’s also another possible interpretation: Could it be that many eastern Germans are actually voting rationally?

A History of Discomfort

The history of the discomfort with eastern German voting habits can be traced back to the first free vote that took place there in 1990. Polls at the time suggested a win for the Social Democrats. The West German SPD chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt had been extremely popular, and many East German citizens had benefited from their Ostpolitik policies, which promoted detente with East Germany.

But a clear majority of East Germans first voted for the Alliance for Germany in 1990, which was largely comprised of conservative Christian Democrats. Later, they would vote for Helmut Kohl. This caused people on the left of the political spectrum to feel angry and insulted. People haven’t forgotten how, when asked about the reasons for the election results, SPD politician Otto Schily held a banana up to the camera — a disparaging reference to East Germans, who didn’t often get access to exotic fruits during communist times.

At the same time, if you strip away the emotional factor, it was a totally reasonable result. The people of East Germany wanted the deutsche mark as their currency and they wanted German unity. Kohl promised both — and kept his word.

But then the problems with the reconstruction and restructuring of the east began. Unemployment skyrocketed and Kohl soon became a figure of hate.

During the 1998 federal election campaign, Gerhard Schröder recognized his opportunity to win over a large number of voters in the east. His promise to make reconstruction of the east his top priority helped deliver the decisive votes he needed. As did his commitment to creating a foreign policy that had peace as its goal — a nod to the eastern Germans’ pacifist inclinations.

Since then, the SPD has been experiencing a dramatic decline in the east. The enormous voter migrations are usually accompanied by a kind of emotional buildup. The AfD’s clear position on a single issue is what makes it so attractive: Some East Germans see the party as a guarantor against Germany becoming a multicultural society. That’s all they expect from the AfD.

So, what can be done? The degree of helplessness the established parties are having in dealing with the AfD is illustrated by the fact that the various defense strategies they have adopted so far — everything from ignoring the party to co-opting its issues to attacking it — have failed.

The business-friendly Free Democrats (FDP) and the Green Party have had an easier time of it. The former succeeded in re-entering the Bundestag with its moderately-toned critique of Germany’s asylum policies. And the latter are so far removed ideologically from the AfD that they have no need to fear any political competition from the party.

Catch-All Parties at a Loss

The situation is far more difficult for the Social Democrats.

Ex-SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel famously called right-wing demonstrators a “pack,” but at the same time tried to engage in a dialogue with Pegida supporters “as private individuals.” Pegida is the acronym for Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West, an Islamophobic group that holds protests regularly in Dresden. Gabriel criticized the AfD as a party of the disenfranchised and he warned against underestimating people’s longing for identity and a political home in a 2017 interview with DER SPIEGEL.

The conservative Christian Democrats have taken a similar zigzag course — one in which even the basic question of whether the AfD is an opponent or an opportunity has not yet been clarified. The CDU’s own pollster, Matthias Jung, argued the latter case three years ago in an essay. Compared to the AfD, he wrote, Merkel’s CDU can present itself more credibly as a centrist power that is keen to implement political reforms.

But the Christian Democrats’ Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) has always viewed the AfD’s rise as a threat to its single-party rule in that state. Most recently, CSU parliamentary group leader Alexander Dobrindt had the idea of moving his party so far to the right rhetorically that the AfD could no longer outdo it without losing the mainstream, middle class wing of the party. But that plan got lost in the shuffle during the turmoil caused by the asylum dispute between the CSU and the CDU that nearly destroyed their political partnership at the national level.

Now, a general sense of bewilderment is prevailing.

The decisive question in dealing with the AfD is that of whether it will adhere to the rules of democracy in the longer term. The mere fact that the party represents unpleasant competition for the CDU, CSU and SPD does not, on its own, make it inherently detrimental to democracy.

A Threat to Democracy?

Harvard professors Levitsky and Ziblatt have developed a set of indicators they use to identify parties that will run for election, but then seek to disband the democratic order. One indicator is when a party “denies the legitimacy of opponents,” which is a clear feature of the AfD. No other party in parliament demonizes its opponents as aggressively as the AfD. Members of the party seem to have few inhibitions when it comes to their outrageous statements: Angela Merkel is a “dictator” who belongs in a “straitjacket” and wants to “swap out” the ethnic German population with foreigners.

Many examples can also be found in the AfD for the second criterion set by the Harvard researchers: A “readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including the media.” AfD chair Gauland’s interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is only the most recent example here. AfD people are also notorious for their admonitions that journalists must behave “fairly” or risk being “dragged out into the streets” as has happened in other “revolutions we have known.”

But open incitement of violence, the third criterion set by the Harvard researchers, is absent. Instead, AfD members tend to portray themselves as the victims of brute violence from the left. And when the AfD makes its own threats, it often uses convoluted wording, like Gauland’s recent demand that a German-Turkish SPD politician ought to be “disposed of in Anatolia.”

But the fourth indicator is the hardest to fulfill: “Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game.” After all, like other parties, the AfD was elected into federal and state parliaments and is even regarded by many of its supporters as the savior of democracy. One can say the AfD disregards the soft rules of democracy, including fairness in dealing with its opponents, truthfulness in argumentation and tolerance of other views and lifestyles.

So, what’s the verdict?

Levitsky and Ziblatt conclude in their book that autocrats are most successful when proponents of democracy and the democratic institutions don’t defend themselves rigorously enough. The Federal Republic of Germany was conceived as a democracy that should be capable of defending itself — in no small part because of its own difficult history. If the AfD continues to radicalize, it must be placed under official observation and ultimately banned.

But the means available to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution do not go far enough to fully safeguard democracy. Especially given that “no profound revelations can be expected” from the BfV, as former Bundestag President Norbert Lammert put it in his interview with DER SPIEGEL. It’s crucial that people in their everyday lives oppose far-right extremists when they shout their epithets. But established political parties must also be willing to accommodate the entire spectrum of opinion in a democracy. Merkel’s refugee policies offended many voters. And because the SPD simply went along with her, the AfD enjoyed increasing levels of support. Indeed, these two establishment parties have made things easy for the AfD.

In the regional election in October, Rainer Rahn wants to get elected to the state parliament in Hesse. He’s a conservative, retired, gray-haired physician who has nothing in common with demagogues like Höcke. His political path led Rahn from a voter initiative opposing aircraft noise at Germany’s biggest airport to the FDP party in Frankfurt to the AfD, which he joined back when economics professor Bernd Lucke was still formulating thoughtful critiques of the euro. Rahn isn’t a firebrand speaker, either, but he doesn’t need to be one.

“Voter sentiment is on our side,” says Rahn. “We don’t even really need to run an election campaign.”

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Germania. Il razzismo nei confronti di AfD non paga. – Deutsche Welle

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-09-21.

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Treccani definisce in modo compito il termine “razzismo”.

«Ideologia, teoria e prassi politica e sociale fondata sull’arbitrario presupposto dell’esistenza di razze umane biologicamente e storicamente «superiori», destinate al comando, e di altre «inferiori», destinate alla sottomissione, e intesa, con discriminazioni e persecuzioni contro di queste, e persino con il genocidio, a conservare la «purezza» e ad assicurare il predominio assoluto della pretesa razza superiore. ….

Più genericamente, complesso di manifestazioni o atteggiamenti di intolleranza originati da profondi e radicati pregiudizî sociali ed espressi attraverso forme di disprezzo ed emarginazione nei confronti di individui o gruppi appartenenti a comunità etniche e culturali diverse, spesso ritenute inferiori».

In Germania, come peraltro in quasi tutti gli stati afferenti l’Unione Europea, le formazioni politiche dei ‘lebbrosi’, populisti, sovranisti, eurocritici, etc, sono state, e lo sono tuttora, riguardate come correnti eretiche: persone con le quali nulla si vuole avere a che fare. Su di loro si sono riversati tutti gli epiteti ai quali i liberal socialisti danno un particolare senso dispregiativo. Non sono considerati essere avversari politici, bensì nemici da estirpare dalla faccia della terra.

Questo atteggiamento, derivante dal fatto di essere altamente ideologizzati ed alteramente superbi, convinti di essere gli unici depositari della verità, è stato causa efficiente del tracollo dei partiti tradizionali.

Nei fatti, i liberal socialisti sono intrinsecamente razzisti, esattamente come i nazionalsocialisti: emettono condanne inappellabili erga omnes, contro chiunque non condivida le loro idee.

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Questo atteggiamento mentale odioso ha però in sé stesso i germi della rovina.

I liberal socialisti europei, così come i liberal democratici americani, contumeliano e cercano di isolare gli avversari, li temono terrorizzati, ma nel cieco furore dell’oddio incorrono nell’errore più comune nella storia.

Le ideologie impediscono di comprendere come le opposizioni siano solo delle conseguenze, non le cause: sono solo ed esclusivamente epifenomeni, non sono le cause. Ma senza affrontare le cause, le conseguenze prosperano lussuriose.

I lebbrosi sovranisti non son sorti come funghi inattesi: sono il risultato dell’aver voluto imporre alla gente la Weltanschauung liberal: di aver fallito sia sul piano sociale sia su quello politico sia infine su quello economico.

Se le sinistre europee non si fossero incancrenite nel voler imporre leggi su temi etici e morali del tutto alieni ai Contribuenti Elettori, se non avessero spinto la burocratizzazione degli stati e dell’Unione ai limiti del grottesco, se non avessero attivamente patrocinato la sostituzione della popolazione europea con altre di importazioni, ma con radici religiose e culturali opposte, ad oggi sarebbero ancora saldamente al governo.

Per fortuna del mondo e della società civile, i liberal socialisti sono ideologicamente ottusi, e quindi si stanno castrando con le loro stese mani.

Il report di Infratest dimap riportato in fotocopia dovrebbe essere eloquente.

Non è AfD ad essere ascesa al 18% dei consensi, è la Unione, Cdu e Csu, ad aver perso 4.9 punti percentuali (dal 32.9% al 28%), ed è la Spd, che è scesa di 3.5 punti percentuali, dal 20.5% al 17%.

Senza tener conto di AfD, la Germania è ingovernabile: lo si voglia o meno.

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Deutsche Welle, organo ufficiale del Governo tedesco, di comprovato credo liberal socialista, è uscita con due articoli sulla questione di Herr Hans-Georg Maassen, esprimendosi come di esprimevano i gerarchi del nazionalsocialismo.

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German press review: Maassen promotion a win for the right

German media has criticized Angela Merkel’s government for promoting Hans-Georg Maassen to a deputy minister role. A number of editorials pointed out that the biggest winner will likely be Germany’s far-right AfD.

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National weekly paper Die Zeit said the message being sent by the German government’s promotion of Hans-Georg Maassan— current president of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency — to deputy head of the Interior Ministry was “unsettling.” It said Maassen, “a man who has triggered a unique crisis of trust, government and credibility should not be given a leadership position” in the Interior Ministry. Maassen “ran the business of right-wing populists,” the paper alleged, and with his “unproven accusation of ‘deliberate misinformation’ in Chemnitz, he has crossed the line to conspiracy theory” and “scratched the most important currency of democracy: trust.” 

Regional daily Mannheimer Morgen wrote that the whole fiasco “knows only one great profiteer: the Alternative for Germany party (AfD).” The paper said the AfD had turned Maassen into a martyr for its anti-refugee stance. “It is almost inconceivable that the CDU, CSU and SPD have given [Maassen] something of a new beginning,” the paper wrote. “If the grand coalition is brought to the brink of the abyss by a single appointment then one really has to worry about the stability of the government.”

A lousy act

“It’s a pretty lousy act that’s being performed on the governmental stage,” the Allgemeine Zeitung daily from Mainz said, adding that citizens were within their rights to ask if the government was going crazy. “What would have been the alternative? Breaking up the coalition? New elections? A minority government?” the paper asked. “We can’t avoid the fact that, in this crazy world, the political situation is getting increasingly tricky.”

Staggering from one crisis to the next

Although Maassen’s transfer kept tension within the government at bay, “the agreement reached by the CDU/CSU and SPD in the case of Maassen is not a good solution,” said the major regional daily Rheinische Post, warning that “new conflicts are inevitably going to arise.” The paper said the coalition “will continue to stagger from one crisis to the next” and that for the SPD, the replacement of Maassen was more than a practical call. “In the end, it was also a question of self-respect — this is why the SPD was prepared to pay such a high price,” the paper wrote.

Top spy, no. Deputy minister, yes?

Meanwhile, the local Flensburger Tageblatt newspaper questioned whether they had understood the situation correctly. “As head of the secret service, Maassen is unacceptable, but as deputy minister he is exactly the right fit? Who could be expected to understand that?” the paper said. “SPD leader Andrea Nahles said over the weekend that she could not trust this man, but she has no problem with the fact that Maassen is now allowed to work one level higher,” the paper continued before rounding up the events with the words: “In short: Big wave made, but in the end it folds yet again. After all, they want to stay in power. You can only shake your head.”

No saving face. Everyone has lost.

“Anyone who thought that the transfer of Maassen would save the face all those involved was mistaken,” the Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung said. “Everyone has lost: Horst Seehofer, who has to be accused of having only the Bavarian election in mind and constantly putting the coalition at risk. Angela Merkel, who is unable to restrain her adversary Seehofer and is partly to blame for the fact that Maassen is not being punished but praised,” the paper wrote, adding that “the supposed victory of SPD leader Andrea Nahles also has a sour taste.” The paper questioned how the SPD’s stubborn insistence on Maassen leaving the domestic intelligence agency would give a new profile to a party in decline. *

“In the end, this solution will above all promote political disenchantment, which the AfD will use to its advantage.”

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Molte sarebbero le considerazioni da fare.

– Herr Hans-Georg Maassen, capo dei servizi segreti tedeschi, aveva pubblicamente asserito che le prove addotte di violenze perpetrate a Chemnitz erano state manipolate ad arte per addossarne la colpa ad AfD.

– Più che indignarsi e strillare come dei Marktschreier, si sarebbe dovuto procedere alla verifica di quanto affermato da Herr Maassen. Ma evidentemente chi avrebbe dovuto eseguire i controlli, il Governo tedesco, aveva la coda di paglia e ben sapeva che Herr Maassen non si era messo al bando di essere piccionato in modo così banale: aveva semplicemente detto la verità.

– Immediatamente Herr Maassen era stato accusato di «ran the business of right-wing populists»: peccato mortale irredimibile secondo il credo religioso liberal socialista.

– I socialdemocratici, componente junior di Governo, avevano trapestato per avere la testa di Maassen.

«German government under fire over Maassen spy chief scandal».

Già: nella Germania attuale dire la verità genera scandalo

– Frau Merkel, al momento ancora Bundesanzlerin, lo avrebbe squartato vico per poi mangiarne il fegato, ma il suo potere attuale è di poco superiore a quello dello stradino ukraino che netta il pronao del Bundestag.

– La soluzione è stata di rimuoverlo dalla guida dell’intelligence domestica e promuoverlo a capo gabinetto del Ministro degli Interni, Herr Seehofer. Per alcuni una rimozione, per molti altri invece una gran bella promozione.

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German government under fire over Maassen spy chief scandal

Germania. Le cose vanno così bene che Merkel pensa di far fagotto.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Stati Uniti, Trump

Trump. Adesso le Corti Federali del 6th e del 7th circuito sono repubblicane.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-09-03.

Corti di Appello e Circuiti

«Trump’s appointees have tended to be unusually well credentialed and conservative. Republicans like to emphasize their academic and professional bona fides — the summa cum laudes, the Phi Beta Kappas, the Supreme Court clerks — and jokingly celebrate their “deep bench” of candidates. Democrats, for their part, prefer to focus on the appointees’ ideology» The New York Times.

Il Presidente Trump si avvia ad acquisire a repubblicani a lui fedeli tutti i centri decisionali che veramente contano negli Stati Uniti, tagliando così alla radice la possibilità di riscossa strategica dei liberal democratici. Ci saranno sicuramente battaglie di retroguardia, e Trump potrebbe anche perderne qualcuna, ma la guerra è vinta, le sue Midway e Kursk si sono già consumate.



Per facilitare la comprensione del problema sarebbe molto utile ripassare alcuni punti cardini della organizzazione della Giustizia negli Stati Uniti.

Trump. Supreme Court. Il chiodo nella carne dei democratici.

«La Corte suprema degli Stati Uniti d’America (in inglese: Supreme Court of the United States, a volte abbreviato SCOTUS) è stata istituita il 24 settembre 1789 come la più alta corte federale degli Stati Uniti. È l’unico tribunale specificamente disciplinato dalla Costituzione. I membri della Corte sono 9: un presidente, Chief Justice of the United States, e otto membri, gli Associates Justices, nominati a vita. ….

La principale funzione svolta dalla Corte suprema è quella di giudice della costituzionalità delle leggi statali e federali (cosiddetto judicial review).

In questo senso la corte è l’interprete autentico della Costituzione, e anzi proprio in virtù di questa alta rappresentatività, usufruisce della teoria dei poteri impliciti per operare talora al di sopra delle competenze delle corti dei singoli stati federali.» [Fonte]

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Trump ed il nodo della Supreme Court.

«In a season of Democratic Party frustration and anger, Donald Trump’s nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the US Supreme Court Tuesday night is a particularly bitter pill to swallow»

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Subito sotto la Corte Suprema si collocano le Corti Federali dei Circuiti, delle quali segue sintetica descrizione.

Trump. Nomine dei giudici federali nel primo circuito.

Ecco degli stralci dal Il sistema giuridico negli Stati Uniti d’America, edito da Uniroma1.

«Il Potere Giudiziario Federale

Il potere giudiziario federale è un ramo completamente separato ed autonomo. Il potere giudiziario ha il compito di interpretare e stabilire la costituzionalità delle leggi federali e di risolvere le controversie riguardanti tali norme.
La Costituzione garantisce l’indipendenza del potere giudiziario stabilendo che:

– i giudici federali, nominati secondo l’art. III della Costituzione, possono restare in carica a vita e possono essere destituiti solo in seguito a “impeachment” e solo qualora il Congresso abbia accertato atti di tradimento, corruzione, o altri gravi reati a loro carico;

– la retribuzione dei giudici federali nominati secondo l’art. III della Costituzione non può essere ridotta durante la loro permanenza in carica: dunque, né il Presidente, né il Congresso hanno alcuna facoltà di ridurre lo stipendio dei giudici federali. Queste due salvaguardie consentono ad un organo giudiziario indipendente di deliberare senza vincoli imposti da influenze politiche o passioni popolari.

L’art. III della Costituzione stabilisce, altresì, che il potere giudiziario degli Stati Uniti è affidato ad una Corte Suprema ed a tanti tribunali di ordine inferiore quanti il Congresso stabilirà all’occorrenza.»

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«La Struttura dei Tribunali Federali (vedi suddivisione 5.1, 5.2 e 5.3)

Salvo alcune eccezioni di rilievo, la competenza dei tribunali federali si estende ad un’ampia varietà di casi. Gli stessi giudici federali si occupano di procedimenti civili e penali, di controversie che rientrano nel settore del diritto pubblico e privato, di cause riguardanti persone fisiche, giuridiche ed organismi governativi, di ricorsi in appello a seguito di provvedimenti di enti amministrativi e di questioni regolate dalla legge o dal diritto consuetudinario (equity).

Non esistono corti costituzionali separate, dal momento che ogni tribunale ha competenza in merito alla costituzionalità delle leggi federali e di altri atti dello Stato cui si faccia riferimento nel corso dei procedimenti istituiti davanti ad esso. In linea di principio, i tribunali federali sono competenti a giudicare i casi che riguardano il governo degli Stati Uniti o i suoi rappresentanti, la Costituzione degli Stati Uniti o le leggi federali, oppure controversie tra Stati o tra gli Stati Uniti e i governi stranieri.

5.1) Tribunali di Prima Istanza

I tribunali distrettuali sono i principali tribunali di prima istanza nel sistema giudiziario federale. Essi hanno competenza per quasi tutti i tipi di procedimenti federali. Ogni distretto giudiziario federale comprende un tribunale fallimentare che opera all’interno di una sua sezione. Esistono, inoltre, due tipi speciali di tribunali di prima istanza che hanno competenza su tutto il territorio nazionale per alcune materie specifiche. Il Tribunale del Commercio Internazionale si occupa appunto dei casi che riguardano il commercio internazionale e la normativa doganale. Il Tribunale degli Stati Uniti per i Ricorsi Federali è competente, invece, per le controversie riguardanti gli appalti del governo federale, l’appropriazione di beni privati da parte dello stesso governo e per una serie di altri ricorsi di natura economica nei confronti del governo. I procedimenti davanti ai tribunali di prima istanza sono condotti da un solo giudice, singolarmente o con l’appoggio di una giuria, composta da cittadini e incaricata di accertare i fatti del caso.
La Costituzione prevede il diritto alla giuria in molte tipologie di casi, tra i quali:

– tutti i processi penali per reati gravi;

– i procedimenti per i quali il Congresso ha espressamente previsto il ricorso alla giuria.

5.2) Le Corti di Appello

I distretti giudiziari sono organizzati in circuiti regionali, in ciascuno dei quali è presente una Corte d’Appello. Ognuna di esse giudica i ricorsi provenienti dai tribunali distrettuali appartenenti al proprio circuito e da alcuni enti amministrativi federali. Inoltre, la Corte d’Appello federale ha competenza su tutto il territorio nazionale in merito ad alcuni casi specifici, tra i quali quelli relativi alle leggi sui brevetti e quelli sui quali si sono pronunciati i Tribunali per il Commercio Internazionale e il Tribunale per i Ricorsi Federali.

Il diritto all’appello si applica a tutti i procedimenti sui quali si è pronunciato un tribunale distrettuale con una decisione definitiva. Le Corti d’Appello sono di regola composte da tre giudici.»

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Ricapitoliamo.

Il controllo della Corte Suprema è fondamentale, perché essa può bloccare con giudizio inappellabile qualsiasi iniziativa intrapresa negli Stati Uniti, a partire da quelle del Presidente, del Senato e della Camera, per finire alle sentenze emesse dalle Corti di livello inferiore. Questo organo giudiziario, composto da giudici nominati a vita, è il vero e proprio centro di potere degli Stati Uniti.

Le Corti Federali dei Circuiti soggiacciono sicuramente ai dettami della Corte Suprema, ma nell’attesa che questa si esprima le loro sentenze possono essere emesse erga omnes, ossia con effetti su tutta la federazione. Sarebbe sufficiente pensare al chaos generato dalle sentenze sulla immigrazione illegale emesse dai giudici del nono Circuito, sentenze poi annullate dalla Corte Suprema, ma a quasi un anno di distanza. Ed un anno costituisce un lasso di tempo inenarrabilmente lungo.

Orbene, Mr Trump ha cambiato la composizione delle Corti Federali di Appello del 6th e del 7th Circuito: la maggioranza dei giudici è ora repubblicana, motivo per cui i liberal democratici non potranno più usarle come gruppi di fuoco sul governo federale. I giudici di rimpiazzo sono giovanissimi, quindi la composizione non varierà se non, forse, tra qualche decennio.

«Trump has replaced 24 judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals in his first congressional term»

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«While the nation’s attention was on the Supreme Court, Trump and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell quietly have cranked out dozens of conservative judges to fill in the lower courts, and there are more on the way»

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«Two other courts, the Eighth and the Eleventh, may flip as well»

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«The Sixth Circuit Court covers parts of Kentucky, Michigan, Tennessee, and Ohio»

2018-08-31__Corti Federali. 6th Circuito

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«The Seventh Circuit Court covers parts of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana»

2018-08-31__Corti Federali. 7th Circuito

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«The Trump administration also focused on placing conservative justices on the typically-liberal courts, like the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to ensure that there are dissenting opinions to increase the likelihood that the Supreme Court will review their rulings»

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Ciò detto, a questo punto potrebbe essere illuminante rileggere questo articolo già pubblicato:

Trump. La guerra privata contro gli stati liberal. – Bloomberg. 

Questo grandioso piano di annientamento alla radice dei liberal democratici denuncia una visione generale e strategica ben fuori dal comune.


Ijr. 2018-08-30. Trump Flipped Two Federal Court Circuits from Liberal to Conservative ― And Looks Like More to Come

While all eyes were on President Donald Trump’s Supreme Court nominee, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, the president has quietly flipped two federal court circuits — and it looks like two more are on the way. 

Trump’s first big court win came from his appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch. Many conservatives were thrilled; many liberals were not. Both sides were very loud about it, though. Now, the same thing is happening for nominee, Judge Kavanaugh

While the nation’s attention was on the Supreme Court, Trump and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell quietly have cranked out dozens of conservative judges to fill in the lower courts, and there are more on the way. 

In fact, on Tuesday the Senate will be voting on seven more Trump-appointed judges to fill vacancies at various levels of the federal court system. 

Trump has replaced 24 judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals in his first congressional term, according to the New York Times. To compare, former President Barack Obama only approved 15 judges in his first congressional term. 

These 24 judges that Trump appointed have flipped two courts from liberal to conservative — the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 

The Sixth Circuit Court covers parts of Kentucky, Michigan, Tennessee, and Ohio. The Seventh Circuit Court covers parts of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana. 

But those two courts might not be the only two circuit courts that Trump flips. Two other courts, the Eighth and the Eleventh, may flip as well. 

The Trump administration also focused on placing conservative justices on the typically-liberal courts, like the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to ensure that there are dissenting opinions to increase the likelihood that the Supreme Court will review their rulings. 

Between Justice Gorsuch, the likely appointment of Judge Kavanaugh, and the dozens of judges they have approved to fill in the lower courts, Trump and McConnell have shaped the judiciary for a generation — and it’s only the president’s first congressional term. 


The New York Times. 2018-08-30. How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts

Thanks to ruthless discipline — and a plan long in the making — the G.O.P is carrying out a sweeping transformation of the federal judiciary.

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Donald F. McGahn, the White House counsel, stood in the gilded ballroom of Washington’s Mayflower Hotel last November to address the annual meeting of the Federalist Society. He seemed humbled, even a bit awed to be delivering the Barbara K. Olson Memorial lecture, named after the conservative lawyer who died in the Sept. 11 attacks. Noting some of the legal giants who gave the Olson lecture in years past, McGahn reflected, “You hear names like Scalia, Roberts and Gorsuch and then me; one of those names really is different than the rest.” Unlike previous speakers — to say nothing of many of those to whom he was now speaking — McGahn, himself a member of the Federalist Society, hadn’t attended an Ivy League law school; he went to Widener University, a “second tier” law school in Pennsylvania. He had never held a tenured professorship or boasted an appellate practice, much less a judgeship, that required him to think deeply about weighty constitutional issues; he specialized in the comparably mundane and technical field of campaign finance and election law. “But here we are,” McGahn said to the audience, almost apologetically. In 2015, Donald Trump hired McGahn to be the lawyer for his long-shot presidential campaign. Then, after Trump shockingly won the election, he tapped McGahn, who had proved his talent and loyalty during the campaign, to be White House counsel. Trump, in other words, had made McGahn’s wildest dreams come true. Now, McGahn told the Federalist Society, Trump was going to make their wildest dreams come true, too.

The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, as it is officially known, has played a crucial role in putting conservative jurists on the bench. As White House counsel, McGahn is responsible for helping Trump select his judicial nominees. And, as he explained in his speech that November afternoon, he had drawn up two lists of potential judicial appointments. The first list consisted of “mainstream folks, not a big paper trail, the kind of folks that will get through the Senate and will make us feel good that we put some pragmatic folks on the bench.” The second list was made up of “some folks that are kind of too hot for prime time, the kind that would be really hot in the Senate, probably people who have written a lot, we really get a sense of their views — the kind of people that make some people nervous.” The first list, McGahn said, Trump decided to “throw in the trash.” The second list Trump resolved “to put before the U.S. Senate” for a confirmation vote. The president, McGahn assured his audience, was “very committed to what we are committed to here, which is nominating and appointing judges that are committed originalists and textualists.”

As White House counsel, McGahn has exercised an unprecedented degree of control over judicial appointments. In previous White Houses, both Republican and Democrat, judicial nominations were typically crowdsourced among officials from different parts of the administration. Under George W. Bush, for instance, there was a judicial-selection committee made up of people from the offices of the White House counsel, political affairs and legislative affairs, as well as officials from the Justice Department. This tended to produce a leveling effect. “You killed nominees by committee,” says one Republican involved in judicial confirmations. Under Trump, the job belongs exclusively to the White House Counsel’s Office, with McGahn and his deputy, Robert Luther, and about 10 associate counsels identifying and then scrutinizing candidates. This process is unique in White House history. Instead of engaging in the typical legislative horse-trading for nominating judges — promising a senator, for instance, that the president will support the nomination of the lawyer who served as the senator’s campaign-finance chairman in exchange for a yes vote on the administration’s agriculture bill — the Trump White House has given the counsel’s office near-absolute authority. In a White House known for chaos and dysfunction, the counsel’s office, under McGahn, is generally viewed as an island of competence. “The White House is like a Dante’s ‘Inferno’-strange comedy,” says one leading conservative lawyer who requested anonymity for fear of reprisal, “but the people in the counsel’s office are like the A-Team.” That many of the lawyers in the counsel’s office are also Federalist Society members — as elite Republican lawyers today often are — has given McGahn a handy rebuttal to the complaint that Trump has outsourced his judicial-selection process to the group. “Frankly,” McGahn has said, “it seems like it’s been insourced.”

While Trump has lagged behind other presidents in political appointments, the streamlining of the judicial-selection process has helped him deliver a historic number of judges to the federal bench. In 2017, the Senate confirmed 12 of Trump’s appeals court picks — the most for any president in his first year in office. This year, the Senate has already confirmed 12 appellate judges and, according to a Republican Judiciary Committee aide, hopes to confirm at least four more. The White House refers to every new batch of judicial appointees Trump selects as “waves” — in early June, it announced the “Fifteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees”— as if they’re soldiers landing on the beaches of Normandy.

Trump’s appointees have tended to be unusually well credentialed and conservative. Republicans like to emphasize their academic and professional bona fides — the summa cum laudes, the Phi Beta Kappas, the Supreme Court clerks — and jokingly celebrate their “deep bench” of candidates. Democrats, for their part, prefer to focus on the appointees’ ideology. “If someone had said or written something half as controversial as these Trump nominees, they never would have been picked by President George W. Bush,” says Kristine Lucius, a former Democratic Senate Judiciary Committee aide and now the executive vice president for policy at the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. “What once would have been disqualifying” — a nominee’s stated views on contraception or gay rights or consumer protection — “is now motivating this president.” Or perhaps, the nominees’ views are what’s motivating many conservatives to go along with Trump’s presidency — which is what’s motivating Trump.

When it comes to Trump’s judicial appointments, the public has been understandably focused on the Supreme Court, with first Neil Gorsuch and now Brett Kavanaugh receiving most of the attention. When one of Trump’s lower-court nominees has managed to penetrate public consciousness, it has usually been an outlier, like Brett Talley, whom Trump picked last year for an Alabama Federal District Court judgeship. Talley, who had never tried a case and whom the American Bar Association rated unanimously “not qualified,” ultimately withdrew his nomination after it was discovered that he was a member of a ghost-hunting group and had apparently defended the honor of the early Ku Klux Klan on an Alabama Crimson Tide football fan message board.