Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Mondiale, Russia, Stati Uniti

National Intelligence Council. Il rapporto quadriennale.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-12-13.

Terra vista dallo Spazio 001

Il National Intelligence Council ha rilasciato il suo Report quadriennale

«Global Trends. Paradox Of Progress» ISBN 978-0-16-093614-2.

*

Punti chiave. Ricordiamo come la lettura del testo completo sarebbe necessaria per comprendere a fondo la portata di questa raccolta di frasi. Il testo completo conta 230 pagine, ma vale la pena di leggerle.

«Global growth will slow, just as increasingly complex global challenges impend»

*

«An ever-widening range of states, organizations, and empowered individuals will shape geopolitics»

*

«the emerging global landscape is drawing to a close an era of American dominance following the Cold War»

*

«Doing so domestically would be the end of democracy, resulting in authoritarianism or instability or both»

*

«erosion of norms for conflict prevention and human rights will encourage China and Russia to check US influence»

*

«raising the specter of drained welfare coffers and increased competition for jobs, and reinforcing nativist, anti-elite impulses»

*

«a restructuring of the global economy that leads to long periods of slow or no growth»

*

«the trends of rising nationalism, changing conflict patterns, emerging disruptive technologies, and decreasing global cooperation might combine to increase the risk of interstate conflict»

*

«growing public expectations but diminishing capacity of national governments open space for local governments and private actors, challenging traditional assumptions about what governing means»

*

«China will attempt to shift to a consumer-driven economy from  its longstanding export and investment focus»

*

«Populism will increase on the right and the left, threatening liberalism. Some leaders will use nationalism to shore up control»

*

«Managing global issues will become harder as actors multiply—to include NGOs, corporations, and empowered individuals—resulting in more ad hoc, fewer encompassing efforts.»

*

«Pechino, secondo il report, è destinata, insieme alla Russia, a scalzare definitivamente gli Stati Uniti dal ruolo di unica superpotenza mondiale. In quest’ottica anche l’Europa uscirebbe dalla sfera d’influenza americana per entrare in quella euroasiatica»

* * * * * * *

«Thinking about the future is vital but hard. Crises keep intruding, making it all but impossible to look beyond daily headlines to what lies over the horizon. In those circumstances, thinking “outside the box,” to use the cliché, too often loses out to keeping up with the inbox. That is why every four years the National Intelligence Council (NIC) undertakes a major assessment of the forces and choices shaping the world before us over the next two decades.

This version, the sixth in the series, is titled, “Global Trends: The Paradox of Progress,” and we are proud of it. It may look like a report, but it is really an invitation, an invitation to discuss, debate and inquire further about how the future could unfold. Certainly, we do not pretend to have the definitive “answer.”»

*

«Long-term thinking is critical to framing strategy. The Global Trends series pushes us to reexamine key assumptions, expectations, and uncertainties about the future. In a very messy and interconnected world, a longer perspective requires us to ask hard questions about which issues and choices will be most consequential in the decades ahead–even if they don’t necessarily generate the biggest headlines. A longer view also is essential because issues like terrorism, cyberattacks, biotechnology, and climate change invoke high stakes and will require sustained collaboration to address.»

*

«The Future Summarized.

We are living a paradox: The achievements of the industrial and information ages are shaping a world to come that is both more dangerous and richer with opportunity than ever before. Whether promise or peril prevails will turn on the choices of humankind. The progress of the past decades is historic—connecting people, empowering individuals, groups, and states, and lifting a billion people out of poverty in the process. But this same progress also spawned shocks like the Arab Spring, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and the global rise of populist, anti-establishment politics. These shocks reveal how fragile the achievements have been, underscoring deep shifts in the global landscape that portend a dark and difficult near future.

The next five years will see rising tensions within and between countries. Global growth will slow, just as increasingly complex global challenges impend. An ever-widening range of states, organizations, and empowered individuals will shape geopolitics. For better and worse, the emerging global landscape is drawing to a close an era of American dominance following the Cold War. So, too, perhaps is the rules-based international order that emerged after World War II. It will be much harder to cooperate internationally and govern in ways publics expect. Veto players will threaten to block collaboration at every turn, while information “echo chambers” will reinforce countless competing realities, undermining shared understandings of world events.

Underlying this crisis in cooperation will be local, national, and international differences about the proper role of government across an array of issues ranging from the economy to the environment, religion, security, and the rights of individuals. Debates over moral boundaries—to whom is owed what—will become more pronounced, while divergence in values and interests among states will threaten international security. It will be tempting to impose order on this apparent chaos, but that ultimately would be too costly in the short run and would fail in the long. Dominating empowered, proliferating actors in multiple domains would require unacceptable resources in an era of slow growth, fiscal limits, and debt burdens. Doing so domestically would be the end of democracy, resulting in authoritarianism or instability or both. Although material strength will remain essential to geopolitical and state power, the most powerful actors of the future will draw on networks, relationships, and information to compete and cooperate. This is the lesson of great power politics in the 1900s, even if those powers had to learn and relearn it. The US and Soviet proxy wars, especially in Vietnam and Afghanistan, were a harbinger of the post-Cold War conflicts and today’s fights in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia in which less powerful adversaries deny victory through asymmetric strategies, ideology, and societal tensions. The threat from terrorism will expand in the coming decades as the growing prominence of small groups and individuals use new technologies, ideas, and relationships to their advantage.

Meanwhile, states remain highly relevant. China and Russia will be emboldened, while regional aggressors and nonstate actors will see openings to pursue their interests. Uncertainty about the United States, an inward-looking West, and erosion of norms for conflict prevention and human rights will encourage China and Russia to check US influence. In doing so, their “gray zone” aggression and diverse forms of disruption will stay below the threshold of hot war but bring profound risks of miscalculation. Overconfidence that material strength can manage escalation will increase the risks of interstate conflict to levels not seen since the Cold War. Even if hot war is avoided, the current pattern of “international cooperation where we can get it”—such as on climate change—masks significant differences in values and interests among states and does little to curb assertions  of dominance within regions. These trends are leading to a spheres of influence world.

Nor is the picture much better on the home front for many countries. While decades of global integration and advancing technology enriched the richest and lifted that billion out of poverty, mostly in Asia, it also hollowed out Western middle classes and stoked pushback against globalization. Migrant flows are greater now than in the past 70 years, raising the specter of drained welfare coffers and increased competition for jobs, and reinforcing nativist, anti-elite impulses. Slow growth plus technology-induced disruptions in job markets will threaten poverty reduction and drive tensions within countries in the years to come, fueling the very nationalism that contributes to tensions between countries.

Yet this dreary near future is hardly cast in stone. Whether the next five or 20 years are brighter—or darker—will turn on three choices: How will individuals, groups, and governments renegotiate their expectations of one another to create political order in an era of empowered individuals and rapidly changing economies? To what extent will major state powers, as well as individuals and groups, craft new patterns or architectures of international cooperation and competition? To what extent will governments, groups, and individuals prepare now for multifaceted global issues like climate change and transformative technologies?»

*

«Islands investigates a restructuring of the global economy that leads to long periods of slow or no growth, challenging both traditional models of economic prosperity and the presumption that globalization will continue to expand»

*

«Orbits explores a future of tensions created by competing major powers seeking their own spheres of influence while attempting to maintain stability at home. It examines how the trends of rising nationalism, changing conflict patterns, emerging disruptive technologies, and decreasing global cooperation might combine to increase the risk of interstate conflict. This scenario emphasizes the policy choices ahead for governments that would reinforce stability and peace or further exacerbate tensions. It features a nuclear weapon used in anger, which turns out to concentrate global minds so that it does not happen again.»

*

«Communities shows how growing public expectations but diminishing capacity of national governments open space for local governments and private actors, challenging traditional assumptions about what governing means. Information technology remains the key enabler, and companies, advocacy groups, charities, and local governments prove nimbler than national governments in delivering services to sway populations in support of their agendas. Most national governments resist, but others cede some power to emerging networks. Everywhere, from the Middle East to Russia, control is harder.»

*

«As the paradox of progress implies, the same trends generating near-term risks also can create opportunities for better outcomes over the long term. If the world were fortunate enough to be able to take advantage of these opportunities, the future would be more benign than our three scenarios suggest. In the emerging global landscape, rife with surprise and discontinuity, the states and organizations most able to exploit such opportunities will be those that are resilient, enabling them to adapt to changing conditions, persevere in the face of unexpected adversity, and take actions to recover quickly. They will invest in infrastructure, knowledge, and relationships that allow them to manage shock—whether economic, environmental, societal, or cyber. Similarly, the most resilient societies will likely be those that unleash and embrace the full potential of all individuals—whether women and minorities or those battered by recent economic and technological trends.

They will be moving with, rather than against, historical currents, making use of the everexpanding scope of human skill to shape the future. In all societies, even in the bleakest circumstances, there will be those who choose to improve the welfare, happiness, and security of others—employing transformative technologies to do so at scale. While the opposite will be true as well—destructive forces will be empowered as never before—the central puzzle before governments and societies is how to blend individual, collective, and national endowments in a way that yields sustainable security, prosperity, and hope.»

*

«Global Trends and Key Implications Through 2035

The rich are aging, the poor are not. Working-age populations are shrinking in wealthy countries, China, and Russia

but growing in developing, poorer countries, particularly in Africa and South Asia, increasing economic, employment,

urbanization, and welfare pressures and spurring migration. Training and continuing education will be crucial in developed and developing countries alike.

The global economy is shifting. Weak economic growth will persist in the near term. Major economies will confront

shrinking workforces and diminishing productivity gains while recovering from the 2008-09 financial crisis with high

debt, weak demand, and doubts about globalization. China will attempt to shift to a consumer-driven economy from  its longstanding export and investment focus. Lower growth will threaten poverty reduction in developing countries. Technology is accelerating progress but causing discontinuities. Rapid technological advancements will increase the pace of change and create new opportunities but will aggravate divisions between winners and losers. Automation and artificial intelligence threaten to change industries faster than economies can adjust, potentially displacing workers and limiting the usual route for poor countries to develop. Biotechnologies such as genome editing will revolutionize medicine and other fields, while sharpening moral differences.

Ideas and Identities are driving a wave of exclusion. Growing global connectivity amid weak growth will increase tensions within and between societies. Populism will increase on the right and the left, threatening liberalism. Some leaders will use nationalism to shore up control. Religious influence will be increasingly consequential and more authoritative than many governments. Nearly all countries will see economic forces boost women’s status and leadership roles, but backlash also will occur.

Governing is getting harder. Publics will demand governments deliver security and prosperity, but flat revenues, distrust, polarization, and a growing list of emerging issues will hamper government performance. Technology will expand the range of players who can block or circumvent political action. Managing global issues will become harder as actors multiply—to include NGOs, corporations, and empowered individuals—resulting in more ad hoc, fewer encompassing efforts.

The nature of conflict is changing. The risk of conflict will increase due to diverging interests among major powers,

an expanding terror threat, continued instability in weak states, and the spread of lethal, disruptive technologies. Disrupting societies will become more common, with long-range precision weapons, cyber, and robotic systems to target infrastructure from afar, and more accessible technology to create weapons of mass destruction.

Climate change, environment, and health issues will demand attention. A range of global hazards pose imminent and longer-term threats that will require collective action to address—even as cooperation becomes harder. More extreme weather, water and soil stress, and food insecurity will disrupt societies. Sea-level rise, ocean acidification, glacial melt, and pollution will change living patterns. Tensions over climate change will grow. Increased travel and poor health infrastructure will make infectious diseases harder to manage.

The Bottomline

These trends will converge at an unprecedented pace to make governing and cooperation harder and to change the nature of power—fundamentally altering the global landscape. Economic, technological and security trends, especially, will expand the number of states, organizations, and individuals able to act in consequential ways. Within states, political order will remain elusive and tensions high until societies and governments renegotiate their expectations of one another. Between states, the post-Cold War, unipolar moment has passed and the post-1945 rules based international order may be fading too. Some major powers and regional aggressors will seek to assert interests through force but will find results fleeting as they discover traditional, material forms of power less able to secure and sustain outcomes in a context of proliferating veto players.»

* * * * * * *


Occhio della Guerra. 2017-12-10. Ecco come sarà il mondo nel 2035 secondo l’intelligence americana.

L’intelligence USA ha delineato come potrebbe essere il mondo nel 2035. Diciotto anni possono sembrare un lasso di tempo molto breve per poter osservare dei cambiamenti radicali. Eppure molti osservatori sono concordi nel ritenere i prossimi venti/trent’anni come i più rivoluzionari di tutta la storia del genere umano. Inoltre basta guardarsi alle spalle e osservare i cambiamenti avvenuti nei vent’anni precedenti, per verificare come tale lasso di tempo sia più che sufficiente per dei mutamenti radicali. Diciotto anni fa il mondo doveva ancora assistere al crollo delle Torri Gemelle, alla conseguente guerra al Terrore, agli interventi militari in Afghanistan, Iraq e Libia, nonché alla crisi finanziaria del 2008. Insomma cambiamenti sconvolgenti.

Il paradosso del progresso

Ci ha pensato ora il National Intelligence Council USA, organo strategico dell’intelligence USA, a mettere nero su bianco quello che potrebbe essere il mondo fra diciotto anni. Il documento, chiamato “Paradox of Progress” fa parte del più ampio progetto “Global Trends” che ogni cinque anni cerca di dare un’idea del futuro più prossimo. Il documento serve così al presidente americano di turno, all’inizio del suo mandato (o al rinnovamento di esso), per farsi un’idea migliore delle sfide che lo attendono.

Per la sua redazione l’analisi si è servita di una dettagliata raccolta dati e di proiezioni basate sull’osservazione dell’evoluzione economica, sociale e tecnologica su scala planetaria degli ultimi anni. Un approccio scientifico per quanto la previsione del futuro non possa essere materia di scienza esatta. Tuttavia lo studio fatto dall’intelligence USA arriva addirittura al punto di prevedere quelli che potrebbero essere titoli di giornale in specifiche date.

La Cina si espanderà fino al largo delle Hawaii.

Ecco che il 3 febbraio del 2019 alcuni giornali scriveranno: “La Cina compra un’isola disabitata dell’arcipelago Fiji per costruire una base militare a 3.150 miglia dalle Hawaii per 850 milioni di dollari”. Pechino, secondo il report, è destinata, insieme alla Russia, a scalzare definitivamente gli Stati Uniti dal ruolo di unica superpotenza mondiale. In quest’ottica anche l’Europa uscirebbe dalla sfera d’influenza americana per entrare in quella euroasiatica.

Droni assassini e lavoratori sempre più flessibili.

Il 13 marzo del 2019 invece si titola che “Il Messico mette al bando i droni per uso privato dopo l’ultimo tentativo di assassinio”. La tecnologia, secondo il report, ha dunque preso il sopravvento e l’utilizzo dei droni diventerà nei prossimi anni disponibile al grande pubblico. Il report denuncia in particolare come tali droni diventeranno facilmente reperibili anche per la criminalità organizzata, che potrà usare queste silenziose zanzare meccaniche al posto dei più riconoscibili sicari. Se saranno i droni a “sporcarsi le mani”, il lavoro delle forze di sicurezza del futuro diventerà sempre più impegnativo e difficile.

Il 17 settembre del 2021 è invece il turno della “rivolta dei gig workers a Londra”. I “gig workers” sono i lavoratori della cosiddetta “gig economy”. Si tratta di lavoratori senza stipendio fisso che lavorano solo “su richiesta (on demand)”. Lavoratori in proprio che svolgono attività temporanee. Secondo l’intelligence USA, infatti, lo sviluppo tecnologico creerà un ulteriore disequilibrio economico, modificando radicalmente la piramide lavorativa conosciuta dopo la Prima Rivoluzione Industriale. Così lo sviluppo progressivo di Intelligenza Artificiale andrà a sostituire il capitale umano in numerosi comparti, contribuendo allo sviluppo appunto della figura del lavoratore “su richiesta”.

C’è ottimismo per il futuro dell’Africa.

Se il futuro dei lavoratori dipendenti sembra a tinte fosche, pare invece che il 2035 rappresenti per il Terzo Mondo  un’opportunità di rivalsa. Nel documento redatto dall’intelligence USA si fa riferimento infatti a una rivoluzione energetica dell’Africa, che porterà il Continente ad una progressiva autosufficienza. Un traguardo raggiunto grazie allo sviluppo di pannelli solari e batterie fatte in casa facilmente reperibili a basso prezzo. A ciò si aggiunge poi la diffusione della tecnologia di desalinizzazione dell’acqua che contribuirà a stabilizzare la produzione alimentare africana.

Conflitti per acqua e cibo.

Per il resto del mondo invece i problemi legati all’acqua e allo sfruttamento del suolo diventeranno di primaria importanza. Ben 21 delle 37 sorgenti d’acqua più grandi al mondo sono attualmente sfruttate in maniera “insostenibile” e se la tecnologia non porterà un miglioramento a questo, secondo l’ intelligence USA, vi sarà un crescendo di conflitti. Stesso discorso vale per la terra, sfruttata oggi ad un ritmo quaranta volte più veloce rispetto alla naturale rigenerazione del suolo. Quest’analisi lucida arriva da una fonte più che autorevole e mette in guardia l’attuale presidenza americana rispetto ai rischi maggiori per la società contemporanea. Starà ora alla Casa Bianca interpretare al meglio gli avvertimenti lanciati dalla propria intelligence. 

Annunci