Cina. Un altro arsenale anti – nave. – The Diplomat

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-19.

epa05205466 A handout picture made available on 11 March 2016 by the US Navy shows the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD-4) participating in a joint US South Korea amphibious drill underway in the East Sea, South Korea, 10 March 2016. The ship can carry up to 40 airplanes, including the Osprey, a tiltrotor aircraft that can take off and land vertically. EPA/US NAVY SOUTH KOREA OUT HANDOUT EDITORIAL USE ONLY/NO SALES

«America’s unmanned dominance has been contested by China’ ambitious drive to be the leading force in drone development and distribution»

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«China is increasingly becoming a potent player in the unmanned game. …. China is developing a new generation of UUVs, aimed at pinpointing the location of U.S. submarines in the depths of Pacific waters»

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«In another advance for China, two months ago, news broke that China is aiming to develop a sea-skimming drone, a drone-bomber, or drone “warthog” capable of tearing across the water just half a meter above the surface — well below radar coverage»

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«In addition to its phantom profile, the advanced concept carries with it a 1,000 kilgram payload, packing enough explosive power to significantly damage an entire U.S. flattop»

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«Will this be China’s second, aircraft killer after the Dong-Feng 21? …. China’s new system would be far more economically viable to deploy and operate than the DF-21. …. A U.S. carrier task force could be quickly overwhelmed by an aerial armada of these new deadly weapon units steaming at high speeds directly toward it»

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La storia degli armamenti evidenzia l’alternanza di fasi nelle quali predominano le armi di attacco seguite da fasi nelle quali dominano quelle da difesa.

Un caso classico è stata l’introduzione della mitragliatrice, che ha conferito agli eserciti terrestri un’arma di difesa micidiale, quasi insormontabile. Fino alla fine della prima guerra mondiale la mitragliatrice ha condizionato una situazione di sostanziale stallo tra le forze opposte. Questa fase fu superata con la introduzione del carro armato, strumento bellico contro cui la mitragliatrice svolge al massimo un ruolo psicologico.

Al momento attuale sembrerebbe che le armi di difesa anti – nave stia iniziando a prendere il sopravvento sul potere offensivo, del tutto non indifferente, montato sulle navi da guerra.

Non solo.

Un fattore che trova una sempre maggiore considerazione è quello legato al costo degli armamenti.

Le navi da guerra, specie poi le porterei, sono molto onerose essendo i costi nell’ambito dei miliardi. Al contrario, i sistemi d’arma anti – nave sono economici, si parla di cifre che variano dai 50,000 Usd fino a circa il milione. La disparità dei costi si aggiunge alla efficienza di questi sistemi.

Tutte queste considerazioni trovano però valore sotto la condizione che le telecomunicazioni siano in grado di funzionare anche in zone operative nelle quali operino avversare tecnologicamente avanzati. Un drone teleguidato ha infatti capacità operativa sotto la condizione che il sistema di telecomando funzioni anche quando fosse disturbato dall’avversario.

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→ The Diplomat. 2017-08-04. China’s Drone-Missile Hybrid: The Next Step in Naval Drone Warfare

Is this the next “carrier killer” in China’s arsenal?

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China was dubbed an “emerging force” in drone warfare in and called a “rising drone power” by 2015. In four short years, its status has gone from “new” to “leading” on multiple fronts in the drone domain. One of those fronts is the application of (militarized) drone technology in sea operations. For over a decade, the United States was the undisputed leader in unmanned development and deployment in East Asia. From the Grey Eagles deployed in South Korea to Global Hawks flying from Japan, and more recently tests with the X-47B, the Sea Hunter USV, and a generation of UUVs under development that should enable U.S. attack submarines to discover other potential underwater enemies more quickly than in previous years.

Yet America’s unmanned dominance has been contested by China’ ambitious drive to be the leading force in drone development and distribution. In prior articles, we argued that China is increasingly becoming a potent player in the unmanned game. Recently, in The Diplomat, Steven Stashwick described how China is developing a new generation of UUVs, aimed at pinpointing the location of U.S. submarines in the depths of Pacific waters.

In another advance for China, two months ago, news broke that China is aiming to develop a sea-skimming drone, a drone-bomber, or drone “warthog” capable of tearing across the water just half a meter above the surface — well below radar coverage. In addition to its phantom profile, the advanced concept carries with it a 1,000 kilgram payload, packing enough explosive power to significantly damage an entire U.S. flattop. Will this be China’s second, aircraft killer after the Dong-Feng 21?

The drone’s speed and below-the-radar-coverage translates into a potentially deadly reduction in reaction time for whatever lies in its sights. The detection-speed metric would probably afford the target vessel less than a minute to defend itself, presenting a looming threat for even the most advanced warships. The U.S. Navy (USN) could still rely on its Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) technology, which can project existing naval sensory ranges through E-2D coordination. The Hawkeye aircraft, operating some 25,000-30,000 above a warship, can act as the task force’s eyes, possibly detecting incoming attackers from a distance of several hundred kilometers. Such coordinated defensive action can put a much-needed cushion of time between the run-up to attack and the prosecution of an assault against America’s naval giants. Yet for other nations, this “warthog” poses a new lethal treat.

With an estimated range of 900 miles, it certainly stretches China’s capabilities to project power from its shores – that’s two to three times the range of a conventional cruise missile or what are colloquially called “sea skimmers.” China’s drone-missile hybrid can be launched from a land-based military installation and dart out to sea. Using its onboard radar technology, the unit would seek out an enemy target and execute a strike much like an advanced cruise missile. However, the hybrid would carry with it a lower price tag than a conventional cruise missile and would therefore by far more expendable than its pure missile counterpart. In this, China’s new system would be far more economically viable to deploy and operate than the DF-21.

Yet most striking in this development is China turning from the development of UAVs for aerial purposes toward unmanned systems aimed at tasks in the maritime realm. With the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF) increasingly becoming main military actors, and the South China Sea, East China Sea, and general naval expansion as centers of military attention, China appears poised to steer its R&D regarding new (unmanned) military systems in the direction of systems that would benefit operations in the naval realm.

A second striking feature is how the development of unmanned systems is slowly moving toward the development of armed, next-generation unmanned systems. Unarmed systems could still be used in the maritime realm, and indeed China has deployed them to its new bases in the South China Sea, but their survivability in any possible conflict will be limited, or even non-existent due to a lack of defense capabilities. The development of sea-skimming drones exemplifies China’s desire to weaponize its current, and especially its next, generation of unmanned systems slated for East Asia waters and the Pacific. Such systems, moreover, would complement China’s larger A2/AD naval strategy, which aims to prevent the U.S. Navy and other allied naval forces from operating safely within the first island chain.

Furthermore, the drone-missile hybrid paves the way for near-future military applications with the basis for building on the concept of drone swarming in a unique unmanned domain. A U.S. carrier task force could be quickly overwhelmed by an aerial armada of these new deadly weapon units steaming at high speeds directly toward it. In expansive waters, the threat level posed through the application of this lethal devise is high enough, but when prosecuted in tight littoral regions such as the Taiwan Strait or waters adjacent South Korea and even Japan, evading the weapons could be tricky business.

Droni. Un business per i tribunali fallimentari.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-01-20.

Parlando di droni è difficile trovare report ragionevolmente obbiettivi.

Da una parte sussistono in gran numero gli entusiasti dello strumento, che spesso sembrerebbero aver dimenticato che a qualcosa dovrebbe pur ben servire, dall’altra, quasi per reazione, vi sono molti che esternano uno scetticismo spesso ingiustificato.

Il tutto potrebbe essere ridotto ad un semplice problema di buon senso.

Droni militari.

Questo è classicamente un settore ove il rapporto prestazioni/costo non influenza in modo severo la produzione.

Se in questo settore è importante la parte meccanica, ben più rilevante è la sicurezza del telecontrollo, la strumentazione da ricognizione (telecamere ottiche ed ad infrarossi, apparecchiature da guerra elettronica, etc.) e l’armamento. La bassa velocità di crociera ed il quasi nullo potere difensivo rendono i droni ad uso militare particolarmente vulnerabili se impiegati contro un esercito tecnologicamente allo stato dell’arte. I riferiti successi nell’uso di droni nella guerra contro ribelli musulmani in Medio Oriente sembrerebbero doversi ascrivere più alla carenza della contraerea che a particolari doti di eccellenza dei droni.

Il discorso fatto per i droni volanti potrebbe facilmente essere esteso a quelli marini o sottomarini. Recentemente la Cina non ha avuto difficoltà alcuna a catturare intatto un drone sommergibile americano. Dovrebbe essere chiaro come l’uso bellico dei droni sia limitato a quell contro forze non allo stato dell’arte.

Droni industriali.

Nella fascia alta, sicuramente la meccanica è rilevante, così come la comodità e la sicurezza di telecomando, ma i sistemi di telerilevamento ed i relativi software di governo giocano un ruolo ancora maggiore. Le strumentazioni che servono per monitorare una coltura di grano differiscono da quelle richieste per vigilare la distribuzione sul territorio di mandrie di vacche.

Qui, a quanto sembrerebbe emergere dai dati di bilancio, i settori di nicchia sarebbe legati principalmente al grado di efficienza delle telecamere e sensori vari, nonché al software gestionale.

Questo settore è redditizio, ma esposto sia ad una grande ed accanita concorrenza: spesso ditte concorrenti hanno la possibilità di studiare a fondo un prodotto ed imitarlo a prezzi del tutto concorrenziali.

Molto poi dipende, ovviamente, dai volumi di vendita.

Droni ludici.

Questo settore è caratterizzato dall’uso di tecnologie scarne e prestazioni minimali, ma adatte a garantire un buon livello di divertimento. Tuttavia è un settore ad elevatissima concorrenza e le ditte sul mercato riescono a reggere esclusivamente se i volumi di vendita superano l’ambito locale e nazionale. Se all’introduzione dei droni erano corrisposti adeguati guadagni, al momento attuale questi sono risicati.

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«Venture capital funding to drone start-ups slowed last year»

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«Dozens of cookie-cutter drone-makers have also popped up in Asia, further driving prices down»

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«Smaller Chinese player Zerotech fired a quarter of its workers in December.»

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«Third-placed 3D Robotics Inc. laid people off and decided to stop making drones»

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«France’s Parrot SA, the second-largest maker of non-military drones, is laying off a third of its staff because margins on its consumer drones were “insufficient to deliver profitable growth”»

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«the competitive onslaught from China’s SZ DJI Technology Co., the undisputed king of non-military drones. DJI makes higher-end models pitched at hobbyists and businesses, which use them for everything from crop inspection to construction. The venture-backed company controls the entire process from design to manufacturing, making it more efficient than outsourcing rivals, and with better products»

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Se è vero che il mercato dei droni commerciali è ritenuto essere in espansione, si parlerebbe anche di un +30% annuo, è altrettanto vero che esso sembrerebbe avviarsi ad una certa quale maturità, cui consegue la sopravvivenza di poche marche che dominano il mercato mondiale.

Da ultimo, ma non certo per ultimo, si noti come ancora una volta la industria manifatturiera cinese surclassi quella occidentale. Situazione questa che non lascerebbe serenità per il futuro.

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→ Bloomberg. 2017-01-14. The Drone Industry Crashes to Earth

Attendees at the Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas last week could play around with a dizzying array of unmanned aerial vehicles. Drones that take selfies. Drones equipped with thermal imaging cameras to see at night. Drones that help fishermen chase their prey.

No use is too niche as drone-makers chase a market that’s forecast to grow an average 32 percent annually over the next decade to reach $30 billion, according to ABI Research. But away from the showroom floor, a chill has settled on a once-hyped market.

France’s Parrot SA, the second-largest maker of non-military drones, is laying off a third of its staff because margins on its consumer drones were “insufficient to deliver profitable growth”. That’s a remarkable statement from the company that pioneered cheap consumer drones in 2009 and now focuses on those priced between $100 and $500. You may have seen them on shelves of Apple Inc. stores in the U.S. and Europe. Almost 60 percent of Parrot’s revenue is from drones.

Repeat After Me

There are two reasons for Parrot’s woes. First, it’s withering under the competitive onslaught from China’s SZ DJI Technology Co., the undisputed king of non-military drones. DJI makes higher-end models pitched at hobbyists and businesses, which use them for everything from crop inspection to construction. The venture-backed company controls the entire process from design to manufacturing, making it more efficient than outsourcing rivals, and with better products. Lately DJI has gotten more aggressive on price, competitors say.

Dozens of cookie-cutter drone-makers have also popped up in Asia, further driving prices down. Even camera-makers such as U.S.-based GoPro Inc. tried their hand only to find the business harder than it looked. GoPro’s Karma drone suffered power outages that made some fall out of the sky.

The sector’s following a familiar script for hardware. Commoditization comes fast, even when a segment is growing rapidly. Scale becomes more important than brand. Profit margins can be thin: just ask makers of flat-screen TVs or smartphone makers other than Apple and Samsung.

The shake-out is just coming quicker than investors expected. As recently as 2015, venture capitalists were throwing money at startups. Now layoffs are more common than big fund-raising rounds. 

Losing Altitude.

Venture capital funding to drone start-ups slowed last year.

Smaller Chinese player Zerotech fired a quarter of its workers in December. Third-placed 3D Robotics Inc. laid people off and decided to stop making drones altogether last year, citing DJI price cuts of 70 percent. It’s now focusing on making software to power drones and offering services to companies.

This rough patch might not be such a bad thing. Drones have the potential to improve many industries when they’re deployed to the real world. But if they’re to be more than a fad, we don’t need dozens of makers of whizzy drones that delight consumer geeks, but don’t really improve the usefulness and safety of the tech.

VCs are switching their affections to companies more attuned to the enterprise market, including those such as Airware of the U.S. which offer services. That seems a rational way of trying to avoid a profit-less, as well as a pilot-less, future.