Cina. Agosto21. Esportazioni salite del 25.6% su agosto20. Per fortuna era ‘male in arnese’.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-09-09.

Così, il sistema economico cinese, dato dai media occidentali come agonizzante, ha segnato in agosto un Export del +25.6% ed un Import del +33.1%, confrontati con i valori rilevati nell’agosto 2020. Il saldo della bilancia commerciale è stato 58.3 miliardi Usd, per un valore annualizzato di 699.6 miliardi Usd.

I media occidentali sono esterrefatti, e si consolano dicendo che ” economic momentum has weakened”.

Ci si dimentica che per esportare occorre prima produrre, e che si importa ciò che poi dovrà essere lavorato.

Eppure, i rialzi dei costi delle materie prime ci sono anche per i cinesi.

* * * * * * *

«China’s August exports growth unexpectedly picks up speed in boost to economy»

«China staged an impressive recovery from a coronavirus-battered slump, but economic momentum has weakened recently due to Covid-19 outbreaks, high raw material prices and slowing exports»

«Shipments from the world’s biggest exporter in August rose at a faster-than-expected rate of 25.6% from a year earlier, from a 19.3.% gain in July»

«Exports from neighboring countries also showed encouraging growth last month, with South Korean shipments accelerating on strong overseas demand»

«Shipments from the world’s biggest exporter in August rose at a faster-than-expected rate of 25.6% from a year earlier, from a 19.3.% gain in July, pointing to some resilience in China’s industrial sector»

«→→ Analysts polled by Reuters had forecast growth of 17.1% ←←»

«August exports showed that despite a higher base for comparison from last year, the ongoing global recovery will not be impeded, and the impact from the resurgence in the Covid-19 pandemic remains limited»

«Export growth of machineries and hi-tech products stayed high»

«Exports from neighboring countries also showed encouraging growth last month, with South Korean shipments accelerating on strong overseas demand»

«China’s exports may sustain its strong growth into the fourth quarter, with overseas demand for Chinese goods over the Christmas season possibly exceeding expectations»

«the main constraint facing China’s exports right now is the very stretched international shipping capacity»

«A global semiconductor shortage has added to the strains on exporters»

«Imports increased 33.1% year-on-year in August»

«China’s trade surplus with the United States rose to $37.68 billion from $35.4 billion in July»

* * * * * * *

Nella foga verbale della guerra economica che gli Stati Uniti hanno intrapreso verso la Cina, accusandola di ogni possibile cosa che sia nefandezza ai loro occhi e sistematicamente sminuendone le capacità del sistema produttivo cinese, alla fine anche i liberal democratici sono obbligati a confrontarsi con numeri impietosi.

Europa. La stagflazione è in casa per rimanervi. Se ne pigli atto.

Europa. Luglio21. PPI, industrial producer prices, +12.2% su Luglio 2020. Inflazione a due cifre.

Usa. Nonfarm Payrolls 253,000. La débâcle economica di Joe Biden.

* * *

Una ultima considerazione.

Quale credibilità potrebbe ancora essere riposta negli ‘economisti’ occidentali che sbagliano in modo così vistoso le previsioni che fanno?

Si sono screditati con le loro stesse mani e con i loro fantasiosi giudizi surreali.

Gran brutto segno clinico il pensiero reso coatto dalla ideologia. Ha prognosi infausta.

*

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China’s August exports growth unexpectedly picks up speed in boost to economy

– China staged an impressive recovery from a coronavirus-battered slump, but economic momentum has weakened recently due to Covid-19 outbreaks, high raw material prices and slowing exports.

– Shipments from the world’s biggest exporter in August rose at a faster-than-expected rate of 25.6% from a year earlier, from a 19.3.% gain in July.

– Exports from neighboring countries also showed encouraging growth last month, with South Korean shipments accelerating on strong overseas demand.

* * *

China’s exports unexpectedly grew at a faster pace in August thanks to solid global demand, helping take some of the pressure off the world’s second-biggest economy as it navigates its way through headwinds from several fronts.

China staged an impressive recovery from a coronavirus-battered slump, but economic momentum has weakened recently due to the delta variant-driven Covid-19 outbreaks, high raw material prices, slowing exports, tighter measures to tame hot property prices and a campaign to reduce carbon emissions.

Shipments from the world’s biggest exporter in August rose at a faster-than-expected rate of 25.6% from a year earlier, from a 19.3.% gain in July, pointing to some resilience in China’s industrial sector.

Analysts polled by Reuters had forecast growth of 17.1%.

“August exports showed that despite a higher base for comparison from last year, the ongoing global recovery will not be impeded, and the impact from the resurgence in the Covid-19 pandemic remains limited,” said Ji Chunhua, Senior Vice President of Research at Zhongtai International.

Export growth of machineries and hi-tech products stayed high in August, Ji said.

Exports from neighboring countries also showed encouraging growth last month, with South Korean shipments accelerating on strong overseas demand.

Some of the port gridlock also appears to have cleared in a boost to China’s shippers last month.

The eastern coastal ports have suffered congestion as a terminal at the country’s second biggest container port shut down for two weeks due to a Covid-19 case. That put further pressure on global supply chains already struggling with a shortage of container vessels and high raw material prices.

Zhang Yi, Beijing-based economist at Zhonghai Shengrong Capital Management, said China’s exports may sustain its strong growth into the fourth quarter, with overseas demand for Chinese goods over the Christmas season possibly exceeding expectations.

“We believe the main constraint facing China’s exports right now is the very stretched international shipping capacity.”

However, behind the robust headline figures, businesses are struggling on the ground. Companies faced increasing pressure in August as factory activity expanded at a slower pace while the services sector slumped into contraction. A global semiconductor shortage has added to the strains on exporters.

Imports increased 33.1% year-on-year in August, beating an expected 26.8% gain in the Reuters poll, buoyed by still high prices. That compared with 28.1% growth in the previous month.

China posted a trade surplus of $58.34 billion in August, versus the poll’s forecast for a $51.05 billion surplus and $56.58 billion in July.

Many analysts expect the central bank to deliver a further cut to the amount of cash banks must hold as reserves later this year to lift growth, on top of

July’s cut which released around 1 trillion yuan ($6.47 trillion) in long-term liquidity into the economy.

The country appears to have largely contained the latest coronavirus outbreaks of the more infectious delta variant, but it prompted measures including mass testing for millions of people as well as travel restrictions of varying degrees in August.

China’s trade surplus with the United States rose to $37.68 billion from $35.4 billion in July, Reuters calculations based on the customs data showed.

Afganistan. La débâcle americana è peggio del Vietnam. È devoluzione dell’America.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-08-16.

La decisione di Joe Biden di abbandonare l’Afganistan esula dal fatto contingente: è la constatazione che gli Stati Uniti non sono più, ovvero non vogliono più, essere una grande potenza mondiale politica, economica e militare.

Per decenni hanno creduto di poter gestire le guerre per procura, e che la loro potenza aerea e marittima le consentissero di dominare il mondo.

Questo assunto si è dimostrato essere falso, incominciando dal Vietnam.

In Afganistan aviazione e marina non servono a nulla.

Non è questione il dibattito, sterile, su chi abbia avuto per primo l’idea di lasciare l’Afganistan: fatto sì è che Biden è fuggito da quel paese senza essersi prima assicurato uno stato ed un esercito locale degno di quel nome. La situazione era infatti diventata insostenibile. Il suo esercito femminilizzato ha perso la volontà di combattere ed i problemi economici e sociali in patria sono ingravescenti.

Ma questo è solo l’ultimo degli errori fatti.

Per motivazioni ideologiche hanno tentato di esportare un reggimento democratico in un paese la mentalità del quale gli è aliena: è un paese tribale e mussulmano. Un esperimento destinato a fallire per definizione.

È patognomonico il fatto che i media occidentali riportino non quanto accade in Afganistan dal punto di vista degli afgani, bensì cose ne pensa la loro ideologia: nessuno sforzo per cercare di capire quella mentalità.

* * * * * * *

«The rout of Afghan forces as Taliban fighters take one provincial city after another provides a stark answer to anyone wondering about the success of two decades of U.S.-led efforts to build a local army»

«Despite about $89 billion budgeted for training the Afghan army, it took the Taliban little more than a month to brush it aside»

«They now stand almost at the gates of Kabul»

«But still, there has been shock at the lack of resistance put up by many Afghan army units»

«because they believed defeat was unavoidable»

«Once morale goes, it spreads very quickly»

«American officers have long worried that rampant corruption, well documented in parts of Afghanistan’s military and political leadership, would undermine the resolve of badly paid, ill-fed and erratically supplied front-line soldiers – some of whom have been left for months or even years on end in isolated outposts»

«Would you give your life for leaders who don’t pay you on time and are more interested in their own future?»

«The defeat highlights the failure of the United States to create a fighting force in the image of its own highly professional military with a motivated, well-trained leadership, high-tech weaponry and seamless logistical support»

«But whether it was ever a realistic goal to create a Western-style army in one of the world’s poorest countries, with a literacy rate of 40% and a social and political culture far from the developed sense of nationhood underpinning the U.S. military, is an open question»

* * * * * * *

Gli Stati Uniti stanno lentamente ma implacabilmente devolvendosi.

Certamente sono e rimarranno una grande potenza nucleare, ma il loro esercito rispecchia fedelmente la società americana.

Facciamoci infine una domanda. Chi ha finanziato, addestrato, armato e coperto politicamente il movimento talebano? Ebbene, costoro sono i veri vincitori.

* * * * * * *

Taliban surge exposes failure of U.S. efforts to build Afghan army

Aug 15 (Reuters) – The rout of Afghan forces as Taliban fighters take one provincial city after another provides a stark answer to anyone wondering about the success of two decades of U.S.-led efforts to build a local army.

Despite about $89 billion budgeted for training the Afghan army, it took the Taliban little more than a month to brush it aside. Over the last few days, the insurgents have seized every major city in Afghanistan – from Kandahar in the south to Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, Herat in the west to Jalalabad in the east.

They now stand almost at the gates of Kabul.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani praised Afghan security and defense forces in a brief televised address on Saturday, saying they had “a strong spirit to defend their people and country.”

But still, there has been shock at the lack of resistance put up by many Afghan army units. Some abandoned their posts and others reached agreements with the Taliban to stop fighting and hand over their weapons and equipment.

In some instances, U.S. officials say, provincial governors asked security forces to surrender or escape, perhaps in order to avoid further bloodshed because they believed defeat was unavoidable.

Where deals were not cut, Afghan forces still appear to have melted away.

“Once morale goes, it spreads very quickly, and that is at least partly to blame,” a U.S. official said.

American officers have long worried that rampant corruption, well documented in parts of Afghanistan’s military and political leadership, would undermine the resolve of badly paid, ill-fed and erratically supplied front-line soldiers – some of whom have been left for months or even years on end in isolated outposts, where they could be picked off by the Taliban.

Over many years, hundreds of Afghan soldiers were killed each month. But the army fought on, without any of the airborne evacuation of casualties and expert surgical care standard in Western armies, as long as international backing was there. Once that went, their resolve evaporated.

“Would you give your life for leaders who don’t pay you on time and are more interested in their own future?” a second U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, asked.

It is an analysis shared by some in the Taliban movement itself.

One Taliban commander in the central province of Ghazni said the government forces’ collapse started as soon as U.S. forces started withdrawing “as they didn’t have any ideology except fleecing the Americans.”

“The only reason for this unexpected fall of provinces was our commitment and the withdrawal of U.S. troops,” he said.

‘REALISTIC’

The defeat highlights the failure of the United States to create a fighting force in the image of its own highly professional military with a motivated, well-trained leadership, high-tech weaponry and seamless logistical support.

On paper, Afghan security forces numbered around 300,000 soldiers. In reality, the numbers were never that high.

Dependent on a small number of elite Special Forces units that were shunted from province to province as more cities fell to the Taliban, the already high rate of desertion in the regular army soared.

As government forces started to fall apart, hastily recruited local militias, loyal to prominent regional leaders such as Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum in the northern province of Faryab or Ismail Khan in Herat, also rushed in to fight.

Western countries had long been wary of such militias. Though more in line with the realities of traditional Afghan politics where personal, local or ethnic ties outweigh loyalty to the state, they were also open to corruption and abuse and ultimately proved no more effective than conventional forces.

Dostum fled to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced and Khan surrendered to the insurgents.

But whether it was ever a realistic goal to create a Western-style army in one of the world’s poorest countries, with a literacy rate of 40% and a social and political culture far from the developed sense of nationhood underpinning the U.S. military, is an open question.

U.S. army trainers who worked with Afghan forces struggled to teach the basic lesson of military organization that supplies, maintaining equipment and ensuring units get proper support are key to battlefield success.

Jonathan Schroden, an expert at the CNA policy institute, who served as an advisor to U.S. central command CENTCOM and the U.S.-led international force in Afghanistan, said the Afghan army functioned as much as a “jobs program” as a fighting force “because it’s the source of a paycheck in a country where paychecks are hard to come by.”

But the chronic failure of logistical, hardware and manpower support to many units, meant that “even if they want to fight, they run out of the ability to fight in relatively short order.”

Afghan forces have been forced repeatedly to give up after pleas for supplies and reinforcements went unanswered, either because of incompetence or the simple incapacity of the system to deliver.

Even the elite Special Forces units that have borne the brunt of the fighting in recent years have suffered. Last month, at least a dozen commandos were executed by Taliban fighters in the northern province of Faryab after running out of ammunition and being forced to surrender.

Richard Armitage, the former U.S. diplomat who organized a flotilla of South Vietnamese Navy ships to carry some 30,000 refugees out of Saigon before it fell in April 1975, has watched as the threat of a similar disaster unfolds in Kabul.

As deputy Secretary of State under former President George W. Bush when the United States invaded in 2001, he was deeply involved in Afghanistan diplomacy. He said the Afghan army’s collapse pointed to the wider failures of two decades of international efforts.

“I hear people expressing frustration in the press that the Afghan army can’t fight a long fight,” he said. “I can assure you the Afghan army has fought, can fight and if it’s got a trigger and something comes out of the barrel, they can use it.”

“The question is, is this government worth fighting for?” he said.