Pubblicato in: Commercio, Devoluzione socialismo

Iran e Venezuela. Accordo petrolifero totalmente incuranti delle sanzioni Usa.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-09-29.

Venezuela 002

Quanto valga il peso politico ed economico di Joe Biden è stato ben dimostrato dalla cooptazione dell’Iran nello Sco.

Dushanbe. Russia e Cina integrano l’Iran nello SCO. Altra débâcle irredimibile di Joe Biden.

Ma che a prendere a schiaffi Joe Biden siano persino il Venezuela e l’Iran è davvero cosa grossa.

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«Under U.S. sanctions, Iran and Venezuela strike oil export deal»

«Venezuela has agreed to a key contract to swap its heavy oil for Iranian condensate that it can use to improve the quality of its tar-like crude, with the first cargoes due this week»

«the deal between state-run firms Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) deepens the cooperation between two of Washington’s foes»

«The deal could be a breach of U.S. sanctions on both nations»

«U.S. sanctions programs not only forbid Americans from doing business with the oil sectors of Iran and Venezuela, but also threaten to impose “secondary sanctions” against any non-U.S. person or entity that carries out transactions with either countries’ oil companies»

«Secondary sanctions can carry a range of penalties against those targeted, including cutting off access to the U.S. financial system, fines or the freezing of U.S. assets»

«U.S. officials are concerned, the source said, that Iranian diluent shipments could help provide President Nicolas Maduro with more of a financial lifeline»

«→→ We will continue to enforce both our Iran and Venezuela-related sanctions ←←»

«U.S. government officials have insisted they do not plan to ease sanctions on Venezuela unless Maduro takes definitive steps toward free and fair elections»

* * * * * * *

«→→ We will continue to enforce both our Iran and Venezuela-related sanctions ←←»

Bene. Benissimo.

Gli Stati Uniti possono decretare le più terribili delle sanzioni, che tanto sia il Venezuela sia l’Iran non se ne curano minimamente.

Questo è il livello cui Joe Biden ha fatto precipitare l’America: quello dei quaraquaquà.

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Exclusive: Under U.S. sanctions, Iran and Venezuela strike oil export deal.

Caracas/Houston/Washington, Sept 25 (Reuters) – Venezuela has agreed to a key contract to swap its heavy oil for Iranian condensate that it can use to improve the quality of its tar-like crude, with the first cargoes due this week, five people close to the deal said.

As the South American country seeks to boost its flagging oil exports in the face of U.S. sanctions, according to the sources, the deal between state-run firms Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) deepens the cooperation between two of Washington’s foes.

One of the people said the swap agreement is planned to last for six months in its first phase, but could be extended. Reuters could not immediately determine other details of the mwpact.

The oil ministries of Venezuela and Iran, and state-run PDVSA and NIOC did not reply to requests for comment.

The deal could be a breach of U.S. sanctions on both nations, according to a Treasury Department email to Reuters which cited U.S. government orders that establish the punitive measures.

U.S. sanctions programs not only forbid Americans from doing business with the oil sectors of Iran and Venezuela, but also threaten to impose “secondary sanctions” against any non-U.S. person or entity that carries out transactions with either countries’ oil companies.

Secondary sanctions can carry a range of penalties against those targeted, including cutting off access to the U.S. financial system, fines or the freezing of U.S. assets.

Any “transactions with NIOC by non-U.S. persons are generally subject to secondary sanctions,” the Treasury Department said in response to a question about the deal. It also said it “retains authority to impose sanctions on any person that is determined to operate in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy,” but did not specifically address whether the current deal is a sanctions breach.

U.S. sanctions are often applied at the discretion of the administration in power. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s government seized Iranian fuel cargoes at sea bound for Venezuela for alleged sanction busting last year, but his successor Joe Biden has made no similar moves.

In Washington, a source familiar with the matter said the swap arrangement between Venezuela and Iran has been on the radar screens of U.S. government officials as a likely sanctions violation in recent months and they want to see how far it will go in practical terms.

U.S. officials are concerned, the source said, that Iranian diluent shipments could help provide President Nicolas Maduro with more of a financial lifeline as he negotiates with the Venezuelan opposition towards elections.

Sanctions on both nations have crimped their oil sales in recent years, spurring NIOC to support Venezuela – including through shipping services and fuel swaps – in allocating exports to Asia.  

In a meeting at the U.N. General Assembly in New York on Wednesday, the foreign ministers of Venezuela and Iran publicly stated their commitment to stronger bilateral trade, despite U.S. attempts to block it.

Trump’s tightening of sanctions contributed last year to a 38% fall in Venezuela’s oil exports – the backbone of its economy – to their lowest level in 77 years and curtailed sources of fuel imports, worsening gasoline shortages in the nation of some 30 million people.

A U.S. Treasury spokesperson said the department was “concerned” about reports of oil deals between Venezuela and Iran, but had not verified details.

“We will continue to enforce both our Iran and Venezuela-related sanctions,” the spokesperson said. Treasury “has demonstrated its willingness” to blacklist entities who support Iranian attempts to evade U.S. sanctions and who “further enable their destabilizing behavior around the world,” the official added.

The swap contract would provide PDVSA with a steady supply of condensate, which it needs to dilute output of extra heavy oil from the Orinoco Belt, its largest producing region, the people said. The bituminous crude requires mixing before it can be transported and exported.

In return, Iran will receive shipments of Venezuelan heavy oil that it can market in Asia, said the people, who declined to be identified as they were not authorized to speak publicly.

                         CARGOES THIS WEEK

PDVSA has boosted oil swaps to minimize cash payments since the U.S. Treasury Department in 2019 blocked the company from using U.S. dollars. Washington has also sanctioned foreign companies for receiving or shipping Venezuelan oil.

Since last year, PDVSA has imported two cargoes of Iranian condensate in one-off swap deals to meet specific needs for diluents, and it has also exchanged Venezuelan jet fuel for Iranian gasoline.

The new contract would help PDVSA secure a source of diluents, stabilizing exports of the Orinoco’s crude blends, while allowing its own lighter oil to be refined in Venezuela to produce badly needed motor fuel, three of the people said.

The first 1.9 million barrel cargo of Venezuela’s Merey heavy crude under the new swap set sail earlier this week from PDVSA’s Jose port on the very large crude carrier (VLCC) Felicity, owned and operated by National Iranian Tanker Co (NITC), according to the three people and monitoring service TankerTrackers.com.

NITC, a unit of NIOC, did not reply to a request for comment.

The vessel was not included in PDVSA’s monthly port schedules for September, which lists planned imports and exports. However, TankerTrackers.com identified it while at Jose this month.

The Venezuelan crude shipment is a partial payment for a cargo of 2 million barrels of Iranian condensate that arrived in Venezuela on Thursday, according to the three sources and one of PDVSA’s port schedules.

                         LITTLE ENFORCEMENT

Last year, the previous Trump administration seized over 1 million barrels of Iranian fuel bound for Venezuela and blacklisted five tanker captains, as part of a “maximum pressure” strategy, but the United States has not interdicted recent Iranian supplies to Venezuela.

The U.S. State Department declined to comment on the deal. A Treasury spokesperson did not respond to a Reuters question on how concerned the government might be that Iran-Venezuela deals would allow PDVSA to step up exports.

U.S. government officials have insisted they do not plan to ease sanctions on Venezuela unless Maduro takes definitive steps toward free and fair elections.

Trump’s curbs on established companies doing business with PDVSA prompted the socialist-ruled nation to turn to swaps with Iran and other countries, while trading with a series of little-known customers.

PDVSA’s new customers and swaps have allowed it to keep exports stable around 650,000 barrels per day (bpd) this year, after they zigzagged in 2020.

However, a worsening shortage of diluents has recently limited oil exports, placing the Orinoco Belt production in an “emergency”, according to PDVSA documents from August and September related to its output status that were reviewed by Reuters.

PDVSA plans to mix the Iranian condensate with extra heavy oil to produce diluted crude oil, a grade demanded by Asian refiners that it has struggled to export since late 2019 when suppliers halted diluent shipments due to sanctions, the three sources said.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica Mondiale, India, Russia

Dushanbe. Russia e Cina integrano l’Iran nello SCO. Altra débâcle irredimibile di Joe Biden.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-09-27.

2021-09-27__ Iran entra nello SCO 001

Leaders Of Russia, China-Led Security Blocs Meet To Discuss Afghanistan

«Russia and its Central Asian allies have launched two days of talks in the Tajik capital to discuss the situation in Afghanistan a month after Taliban militants entered Kabul and seized power in the war-torn country.

Leaders of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) met for a summit in the Tajik capital on September 16, to be followed a day later by a gathering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes China. ….

Founded in 2001, the SCO initially consisted of China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan before India and Pakistan joined in 2017. ….

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, whose country is an observer member of the SCO and keen to join the grouping, will attend the gathering.»

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Iran to gain Central Asia clout with entry into SCO security club.

«Iran is set to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization led by China and Russia as a full member, a move experts say will give Tehran more influence over Central Asia — including war-torn neighbor Afghanistan.

“Today, we will launch procedures to admit Iran as a member state of the SCO, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar as new dialogue partners,” Chinese President Xi Jinping said via video link on Friday, addressing the SCO Council of Heads of State in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

Xi said he was confident the “growing SCO family” would “be the builders of world peace, contributors to global development and defenders of the international order,” according to an English translation shared by China’s official Xinhua News Agency.»

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Russia. Pakistan, Greater Eurasian Partnership ed Eurasian Economic Union.

«Russia e Cina stanno sviluppando un grandioso progetto strategico per l’erezione di una Greater Eurasian Partnership volta a riunire in una comunità di intenti e di reciproci benefici tutte le popolazioni euroasiatiche, ossia più di quattro miliardi di persone. I loro sono diplomatici dilungo corso, passati attraverso dure selezioni, ben diversi dai ministri degli esteri occidentali, che, tra l’altro, stanno in carica per tempo molto limitato, cambiando di volta in volta l’indirizzo politico.

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Ad oriente prese dapprima campo la Sco, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, nata come meccanismo per favorire la risoluzione di dispute territoriali tra i sei paesi aderenti – Cina, Russia, Kazakistan, Kirghizistan, Tagikistan e Uzbekistan – l’organizzazione è andata progressivamente istituzionalizzandosi, intensificando la cooperazione tra i suoi membri tanto su questioni di sicurezza quanto in ambiti come quello economico, energetico e culturale.

Mesi addietro, senza alcuna tromba trionfante, ha preso corpo il Rcep. …

Adesso sta emergendo il progetto strategico russo della Greater Eurasian Partnership ed Eurasian Economic Union. Come dicono i nomi stessi, sono un piano che si articolerà su decenni, ma che saranno decenni di crescita comune.

“The Greater Eurasian Partnership has two broad economic goals. First, it aims to connect Russia and the EAEU to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its second, lesser goal is to move beyond China and connect the EAEU with Iran, India, and Southeast Asia.”»

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                         In sintesi.

– Stati Uniti ed Europa hanno da lunga pezza annoverato l’Iran tra gli stati canaglia, fomentatori del terrorismo, colpendolo con un totale bando e coprendolo di sanzioni.

– Russia e Cina lo hanno invece ammesso a pieno titolo nello Sco, e di lì nella Greater Eurasian Partnership ed Eurasian Economic Union, una unione politica, militare ed economica, organizzazioni basate sulla non ingerenza negli affari interni e su rapporti paritetici.

– Sono improvvisamente mutati gli equilibri geopolitici mondiali a favore del Blocco Euroasiatico.

– Questa ulteriore débâcle della Harris-Biden Administration evidenzia molto chiaramente quanto poco pesino sia gli Stati Uniti sia l’Unione Europea.

Lasciamo alla arguta penna di Maurizio Blondet la descrizione dettagliata della risposta sinorussa all’Aukus.

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La risposta di Russia e Cina all’AUKUS.

                         Integrano l’Iran

 Il magistrale pezzo di Pepe Escobar che ha seguito l’incontro della Shanghai Cooperation Organization e Dushanbe. Titolo originale:

                         L’Eurasia prende forma: come la SCO ha appena ribaltato l’ordine mondiale

Sotto lo sguardo di un Occidente senza timone, la riunione del ventesimo anniversario dell’Organizzazione per la cooperazione di Shanghai è stata focalizzata su due risultati chiave: dare forma all’Afghanistan e dare il via a un’integrazione eurasiatica a spettro completo.

Pepe Escobar

I due momenti salienti dello storico vertice del 20 ° anniversario dell’Organizzazione per la cooperazione di Shanghai (SCO) a Dushanbe, in Tagikistan, dovevano venire dai discorsi programmatici di – chi altro – i leader del partenariato strategico Russia-Cina.

Xi Jinping: “Oggi avvieremo le procedure per ammettere l’Iran come membro a pieno titolo della SCO”.

Vladimir Putin: “Vorrei sottolineare il Memorandum d’intesa firmato oggi tra il Segretariato della SCO e la Commissione Economica Eurasiatica. È chiaramente progettato per promuovere l’idea della Russia di stabilire un partenariato della Grande Eurasia che copra la SCO, l’EAEU (Unione economica eurasiatica), l’ASEAN (Associazione delle nazioni del sud-est asiatico) e l’iniziativa Belt and Road della Cina (BRI).”

In breve, durante il fine settimana, l’Iran è stato sancito nel suo legittimo ruolo eurasiatico principale e tutti i percorsi di integrazione eurasiatica sono convergenti verso un nuovo paradigma geopolitico e geoeconomico globale,.

(MB – L’Iran ha oggi due alleati veri, che si chiamano Russia e Cina. Sarà più difficile per Israele indurre gli americani a “bomb, bomb, bomb Iran” e fare canagliate come a uno stato-paria e isolato. Anche la speranza di Biden di trattare di nuovo gli accordi sul nucleare iraniano (che Teheran ha adempiuto fedelmente e Trump ha rotto) strappando a Teheran in cambio della levata delle sanzioni, in più, la rinuncia di missili di portata tale da colpire Israele, non è più praticabile. L’Iran con a fianco la Cina, cliente del suo petrolio e largitrice di investimenti, + può resistere a questo genere di ricatti)

“Dushanbe si è rivelato come l’ultimo crossover diplomatico. Il presidente Xi ha rifiutato con fermezza qualsiasi “lezione supponente” e ha sottolineato percorsi di sviluppo e modelli di governance compatibili con le condizioni nazionali. Proprio come Putin, ha sottolineato il focus complementare di BRI e EAEU, e di fatto ha sintetizzato un vero Manifesto multilateralista per il Sud del mondo.

Proprio sul punto, il presidente Kassym-Jomart Tokayev del Kazakistan ha osservato che la SCO dovrebbe promuovere “lo sviluppo di una macroeconomia regionale”. Ciò si riflette nella spinta della SCO a iniziare a utilizzare le valute locali per il commercio, aggirando il dollaro USA.

                         Guarda quel quadrilatero

Dushanbe non è stato solo un letto di rose. L’Emomali Rahmon del Tagikistan, fedele musulmano laico ed ex membro del Partito Comunista dell’URSS – al potere da non meno di 29 anni, rieletto per la quinta volta nel 2020 con il 90% dei voti – ha subito denunciato la “sharia medievale” dei talebani 2.0 e hanno affermato di aver già “abbandonato la loro precedente promessa di formare un governo inclusivo”.

Rahmon … era già al potere quando i talebani conquistarono Kabul nel 1996. Era obbligato a sostenere pubblicamente i suoi cugini tagiki contro l’”espansione dell’ideologia estremista” in Afghanistan – che di fatto preoccupa tutti i membri della SCO -afferma quando si tratta di distruggere loschi abiti jihadisti di stampo ISIS-K.

La polpa della questione a Dushanbe era nei bilaterali – e un quadrilatero.

Prendi il bilaterale tra il ministro degli Esteri indiano S. Jaishankar e il FM cinese Wang Yi. Jaishankar ha affermato che la Cina non dovrebbe vedere “le sue relazioni con l’India attraverso la lente di un paese terzo” e si è preoccupato di sottolineare che l’India “non sottoscrive alcuna teoria dello scontro di civiltà”.

È stata una vendita piuttosto difficile considerando che il primo vertice Quad si svolge questa settimana a Washington, DC, ospitato da quel “paese terzo” che ora è immerso nel profondo della modalità di scontro di civiltà contro la Cina.

Il primo ministro pakistano Imran Khan è satto in una serie di bilaterali: ha incontrato i presidenti di Iran, Bielorussia, Uzbekistan e Kazakistan. La posizione diplomatica ufficiale del Pakistan è che l’Afghanistan non dovrebbe essere abbandonato, ma impegnato.

Quella posizione aggiungeva sfumature a quanto aveva spiegato l’inviato presidenziale speciale russo per gli affari della SCO Bakhtiyer Khakimov sull’assenza di Kabul al tavolo della SCO: “In questa fase, tutti gli Stati membri hanno capito che non ci sono ragioni per un invito finché non c’è un legittimo, governo generalmente riconosciuto in Afghanistan”.

E questo ci porta all’incontro chiave della SCO: un quadrilatero con i ministri degli Esteri di Russia, Cina, Pakistan e Iran.

Il ministro degli Esteri pakistano Qureshi ha affermato: “Stiamo monitorando se tutti i gruppi sono inclusi o meno nel governo [afgano]”. Il nocciolo della questione è che, d’ora in poi, Islamabad coordinerà la strategia della SCO sull’Afghanistan e farà da intermediario nelle trattative talebane con i leader di spicco tagiki, uzbeki e hazara. Questo alla fine aprirà la strada verso un governo inclusivo riconosciuto a livello regionale dai paesi membri della SCO.

Il presidente iraniano Ebrahim Raisi è stato accolto calorosamente da tutti, specialmente dopo il suo energico discorso programmatico, un classico dell’Asse della Resistenza. Il suo rapporto bilaterale con il presidente bielorusso Aleksandr Lukashenko ruotava attorno a una discussione sul “confronto delle sanzioni”. Secondo Lukashenko: “Se le sanzioni hanno fatto del male alla Bielorussia, all’Iran e ad altri paesi, è stato solo perché ne siamo responsabili noi stessi. Non sempre siamo stati negoziabili, non sempre abbiamo trovato la strada da percorrere sotto la pressione delle sanzioni».

Considerando che Teheran è pienamente informata sul ruolo della SCO di Islamabad in termini di Afghanistan, non ci sarà bisogno di schierare la brigata Fatemiyoun – informalmente conosciuta come Afghan Hezbollah – per difendere gli Hazara sciiti. Fatemiyoun si è formata nel 2012 ed è stata determinante in Siria nella lotta contro Daesh, soprattutto a Palmyra. Ma se ISIS-K non scompare, questa è una storia completamente diversa.

Particolarmente importante per i membri della SCO Iran e India sarà il futuro del porto di Chabahar. Questa rimane la mossa cripto-Via della seta dell’India per collegarla all’Afghanistan e all’Asia centrale. Il successo geoeconomico di Chabahar dipende più che mai da un Afghanistan stabile – ed è qui che gli interessi di Teheran convergono pienamente con la spinta SCO di Russia-Cina.

Ciò che la Dichiarazione SCO di Dushanbe del 2021 ha enunciato sull’Afghanistan è rivelatore:

L’Afghanistan dovrebbe essere uno stato indipendente, neutrale, unito, democratico e pacifico, libero da terrorismo, guerra e droga.

È fondamentale avere un governo inclusivo in Afghanistan, con rappresentanti di tutti i gruppi etnici, religiosi e politici della società afgana.

Gli Stati membri della SCO, sottolineando l’importanza dei molti anni di ospitalità e assistenza efficace forniti dai paesi regionali e vicini ai rifugiati afghani, considerano importante che la comunità internazionale si impegni attivamente per facilitare il loro ritorno dignitoso, sicuro e sostenibile al loro patria.

Per quanto possa sembrare un sogno impossibile, questo è il messaggio unificato di Russia, Cina, Iran, India, Pakistan e i vari ‘stan’ dell’Asia centrale. Si spera che il primo ministro pakistano Imran Khan sia all’altezza del compito e pronto per il suo primo piano della SCO.

                         Quella tormentata penisola occidentale

Le Nuove Vie della Seta sono state lanciate ufficialmente otto anni fa da Xi Jinping, prima ad Astana – ora Nur-Sultan – e poi a Giacarta.

Questo è il modo in cui l’ho segnalato all’epoca.

L’annuncio è arrivato vicino a un vertice della SCO, poi a Bishkek. La SCO, ampiamente liquidata a Washington e Bruxelles come un semplice talk shop, stava già superando il suo mandato originale di combattere le “tre forze del male” – terrorismo, separatismo ed estremismo – e comprendeva la politica e la geoeconomia.

Nel 2013 c’è stata una trilaterale Xi-Putin-Rouhani. Pechino ha espresso pieno sostegno al programma nucleare pacifico dell’Iran (ricordate, questo è stato due anni prima della firma del Piano d’azione congiunto globale, noto anche come JCPOA).

Nonostante molti esperti all’epoca lo negassero, c’era davvero un fronte comune Cina-Russia-Iran in Siria (Asse di Resistenza in azione). Lo Xinjiang veniva promosso come snodo chiave per l’Eurasian Land Bridge. Il gasdotto è stato al centro della strategia cinese, dal petrolio del Kazakistan al gas del Turkmenistan. Alcune persone potrebbero persino ricordare quando Hillary Clinton, in qualità di Segretario di Stato, si è pronunciata in modo lirico su una Nuova Via della Seta a propulsione americana.

Ora confrontare il Manifesto del Multilateralismo di Xi a Dushanbe otto anni dopo, e ricordare come la SCO “ha dimostrato di essere un ottimo esempio di multilateralismo nel 21 ° secolo”, e “ha svolto un ruolo importante nel migliorare la voce dei paesi in via di sviluppo. ”

L’importanza strategica di questo vertice SCO che si terrà subito dopo l’Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) a Vladivostok non può essere sopravvalutata abbastanza. L’EEF si concentra, ovviamente, sull’Estremo Oriente russo e sostanzialmente promuove l’interconnessione tra Russia e Asia. È un fulcro assolutamente chiave del partenariato eurasiatico della Russia.

Una cornucopia di accordi è all’orizzonte: l’espansione dall’Estremo Oriente all’Artico e lo sviluppo della rotta del Mare del Nord, e coinvolgendo tutto, dai metalli preziosi e l’energia verde alla sovranità digitale che scorre attraverso i corridoi logistici tra Asia ed Europa attraverso la Russia.

Come ha suggerito Putin nel suo discorso programmatico, questo è ciò che riguarda la Greater Eurasia Partnership: l’Unione economica dell’Eurasia (EAEU), la BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), l’iniziativa dell’India, l’ASEAN e ora la SCO, che si sviluppa in una rete armonizzata, gestita in modo cruciale da “sovrano centri decisionali”.

                         Grande Asia di sovrani ed eguali

Quindi, se la BRI propone una “comunità di futuro condiviso per il genere umano” molto taoista, il progetto russo, concettualmente, propone un dialogo di civiltà (già evocato dagli anni di Khatami in Iran) e progetti economico-politici sovrani. Sono, infatti, complementari.

Glenn Diesen, professore all’Università della Norvegia sudorientale e redattore della rivista Russia in Global Affairs, è tra i pochissimi studiosi di spicco che stanno analizzando in profondità questo processo. Il suo ultimo libro racconta in modo straordinario l’intera storia nel suo titolo: L’ Europa come la penisola occidentale della Grande Eurasia: regioni geoeconomiche in un mondo multipolare .

Non è chiaro se gli eurocrati di Bruxelles – schiavi dell’atlantismo e incapaci di cogliere le potenzialità della Grande Eurasia – finiranno per esercitare una reale autonomia strategica.

Diesen evoca in dettaglio i paralleli tra la strategia russa e quella cinese. Fa notare come la Cina “sta perseguendo un’iniziativa geoeconomica a tre pilastri sviluppando la leadership tecnologica attraverso il suo piano China 2025, nuovi corridoi di trasporto attraverso la sua Belt and Road Initiative da trilioni di dollari e stabilendo nuovi strumenti finanziari come banche, sistemi di pagamento e internazionalizzazione. dello yuan. Allo stesso modo, la Russia sta perseguendo la sovranità tecnologica, sia nella sfera digitale che oltre, così come nuovi corridoi di trasporto come la rotta del Mare del Nord attraverso l’Artico e, soprattutto, nuovi strumenti finanziari”.

L’intero Sud del mondo, stordito dal crollo accelerato dell’Impero occidentale e dal suo ordine unilaterale basato su regole, sembra ora pronto ad abbracciare il nuovo solco, pienamente mostrato a Dushanbe: una Grande Eurasia multipolare di sovrani eguali.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Commercio, Geopolitica Mondiale

Cina – Europa. Gennaio. Da Manzhouli sono partiti 331 treni, +59.9% anno su anno.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-02-21.

Cina Manzhouli 001

«Manzhouli, China’s largest land port, handled a growing number of China-Europe freight trains in January»

«A total of 331 cross-border freight trains went through the port in January, up 59.9 percent year on year, marking growth for 11 consecutive months»

«Of the total, the port handled 157 outbound trains, an increase of 27.6 percent year on year, while the number of inbound trains soared by 107.1 percent year on year to 174»

«The outbound China-Europe freight trains through Manzhouli can reach 13 European countries»

«The imported and exported goods mainly include daily necessities, electrical products, industrial machinery, metals and agricultural products»

«short freight time, low price and high efficiency, have played an important role in ensuring smooth logistics and stable material supply in China and European countries»

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Ferrovia Cina – Europa. 2020. 12,400 treni, +50% anno su anno.

Ferrovia Cina, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran, Afganistan, più Uzbekistan e Turkmenistan.

Nepal. Belt and Road. Progetto di collegamento ferroviario moderno con la Cina.

Rep Ceka e Cina. Attiva la ferrovia Praga – Yiwu.

Kenya. Nuova linea ferroviaria Nairobi – Mombasa finanziata dalla Cina.

Cina. Xi Jinping si meriterebbe il Premio Nobel per l’economia.

Ferrovia Yiwu-Xinjiang-Europe. 11,920 km in dieci giorni. 1,033 convogli al mese.

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La costruzione di interporti ferroviari, ed il loro collegamento alla rete ferroviaria, permette alla Cina di portare lavoro produttivo nelle sue zone periferiche, sottosviluppate. Non elargizione di sussidi, bensì allestimento di infrastrutture.

Questo discorso vale anche per l’interporto di Manzhouli, che ha generato quasi trentamila posti di lavoro degni di quel nome, per non parlare dell’indotto.

Ma la direttrice verso l’Europa non è certamente l’unica.

Cina. New Silk Road. Qualche difficoltà nel sud-est asiatico.

Cina. La diplomazia ferroviaria.

Al contrario degli Stati Uniti e dell’Occidente in genere, massimamente le Nazioni Unite, la Cina non vincola i propri investimenti alla soddisfazione di propri modi di vedere e sentire i problemi etici e morali. Accetta le altre realtà così come esse siano e richiede solo rapporti paritetici. La Cina investe in Africa ed Asia soprattutto in progetti infrastrutturali, quali ferrovie e strade.

Il conseguente indotto alimenta quindi il perfezionamento dei rapporti politici.

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Xinhua. China’s largest land port sees rising number of China-Europe freight trains

HOHHOT, Feb. 7 (Xinhua) — Manzhouli, China’s largest land port, handled a growing number of China-Europe freight trains in January, local authorities said.

A total of 331 cross-border freight trains went through the port in January, up 59.9 percent year on year, marking growth for 11 consecutive months, said the Manzhouli station under China Railway Harbin Group.

Of the total, the port handled 157 outbound trains, an increase of 27.6 percent year on year, while the number of inbound trains soared by 107.1 percent year on year to 174.

The outbound China-Europe freight trains through Manzhouli can reach 13 European countries. The imported and exported goods mainly include daily necessities, electrical products, industrial machinery, metals and agricultural products.

The global sea and air transport capacity has been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, while the China-Europe freight trains, due to advantages such as short freight time, low price and high efficiency, have played an important role in ensuring smooth logistics and stable material supply in China and European countries.

Pubblicato in: Armamenti, Diplomazia, Geopolitica Asiatica

Paesi del Golfo. Normalizzazione non significa ‘Unità Araba’.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-01-19.

Golfo Persico 001

Da quasi un secolo i paesi del Golfo Arabo pongono seri problemi alla stabilità politica e militare di questo scacchiere geopolitico, e con esso, al mondo intero.

Per profonde differenze religiose, con Turkia ed Iran i paesi del Golfo hanno rapporti travagliati, ma a queste anteticità si sovrappongono conflittuali esigenze politiche.

Ma a questo si dovrebbe aggiungere, e non certo per far solo buon peso, il fatto che anche alloro interno i Paesi del Golfo non vanno per nulla di accordo.

Ciliegina sulla torta, le grandi potenze politiche e militari mondiali si combattono per interposte forze.

Sotto questa luce, i recenti, timidi, tentativi di normalizzazione no possono essere considerati altro che dei primi passi, ma di lì alla ‘Unità Araba’ ce e corre, ed anche molto.

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«While Saudia Arabia/UAE and Qatar have been successful in bringing their more than 3 years old diplomatic stand-off to an end, and the moment has been called a “big breakthrough”, there is no gainsaying that the ground realities of the Gulf have already changed to an extent where a mere normalization wouldn’t automatically produce the so-called “Arab Unity.”»

«Past three years have seen Qatar developing meaningful ties with Iran and Turkey. Qatar has also strengthened its military power and it remains a patron of Muslim Brotherhood»

«Elsewhere in Yemen, Qatari backed Islah Party remains opposed to the UAE backed Southern Transnational Council (STC). While Saudi Arabia has been supporting Islah party, a group affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood, their alliance recently seemed to have fallen apart due to Saudia’s blatant criticism of the Brotherhood»

«The recent détente between Saudia/UAE and Qatar is, therefore, not a result of a sudden convergence of mutual interests or a realization that Saudia led blockade of Qatar was benefiting Iran and Turkey, it is an outcome of Saudi/Emirati inability to force the smallest Gulf state with second highest gas reserves in the world into political submission»

«This is evident from the fact that Saudia/UAE decided to end blockade without Qatar fulfilling any of the 13 demands that the former had presented as a pre-condition to end the blockade»

«While these demands included clauses about severing all ties to “terrorist organizations”, “shutting down Al-Jazeera”, “terminating Turkish military presence in Qatar”, and “curbing diplomatic ties with Iran”, the latest agreement mentions none of these»

«Soon after the agreement, Qatar was quick to announce that its relations with Iran would remain unchanged»

«this agreement is not an automatic transition to full normalization»

«It is obvious that the agreement does not have enough substance to raise trust level»

«Qatar, as it stands, is no longer a small military power that it was three and a half years ago. Past three years have seen the tiny Gulf state spending a lot of money on its military modernization, which means that it has already amassed enough resource to exert itself even more powerfully in the geo-politics of the Gulf and Arab world as a power contender»

«During past three years, Qatar’s air force has increased its fleet from 12 to 96 jets, including French Rafael jets. Apart from its deal with France to buy 36 more Rafael jets, in 2017 it signed a $12bn deal with US manufacturer Boeing for 36 advanced F-15QA fighter jets. And, in 2018 the Gulf state successfully negotiated a deal with the UK to buy 24 Eurofighter Typhoon Jets»

«Qatar recently bought and received 62 highly advanced German Leopard 2A7 …. there is also an order for 100 Turkish Altay main battle tanks»

«The fact that Qatar continues to host Turkish military base also adds to its powers»

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Occorre essere pratici. Il poco è sempre meglio del nulla. E tutto richiede i suoi tempi.

Notiamo soltanto come Francia e Germania continuino imperterriti ad esportare armamenti sofisticati nel settore, alla faccia dei loro ‘diritti umani’.

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Gulf Normalisation is not “Arab Unity”

While Saudia Arabia/UAE and Qatar have been successful in bringing their more than 3 years old diplomatic stand-off to an end, and the moment has been called a “big breakthrough”, there is no gainsaying that the ground realities of the Gulf have already changed to an extent where a mere normalization wouldn’t automatically produce the so-called “Arab Unity.” Past three years have seen Qatar developing meaningful ties with Iran and Turkey. Qatar has also strengthened its military power and it remains a patron of Muslim Brotherhood. Elsewhere in Yemen, Qatari backed Islah Party remains opposed to the UAE backed Southern Transnational Council (STC). While Saudi Arabia has been supporting Islah party, a group affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood, their alliance recently seemed to have fallen apart due to Saudia’s blatant criticism of the Brotherhood.

The recent détente between Saudia/UAE and Qatar is, therefore, not a result of a sudden convergence of mutual interests or a realization that Saudia led blockade of Qatar was benefiting Iran and Turkey, it is an outcome of Saudi/Emirati inability to force the smallest Gulf state with second highest gas reserves in the world into political submission. This is evident from the fact that Saudia/UAE decided to end blockade without Qatar fulfilling any of the 13 demands that the former had presented as a pre-condition to end the blockade.

While these demands included clauses about severing all ties to “terrorist organizations”, “shutting down Al-Jazeera”, “terminating Turkish military presence in Qatar”, and “curbing diplomatic ties with Iran”, the latest agreement mentions none of these. Instead, the agreement postulates and end of Saudi blockade of Qatar, with Doha agreeing to drop all legal actions against Saudia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain, and both sides stopping media campaigns against each other.

Soon after the agreement, Qatar was quick to announce that its relations with Iran would remain unchanged. For the UAE as well, this agreement is not an automatic transition to full normalization.

Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs, said while his country was “extremely supportive” of the agreement, “One of the big things will be the geostrategic dimensions, how do we see regional threats, how do we see the Turkish presence?…. “The issue comes to the same fundamental questions…..how is Qatar going to deal [with] vis-à-vis interfering in our affairs through support of political Islam? Is Turkey’s presence in the Gulf going to be permanent?”

It is obvious that the agreement does not have enough substance to raise trust level. This mistrust is also evident from the agreement itself, which does not specify what outcomes will follow and when to expect them. There in, therefore, lies considerable risk for disappointment if progress toward the vaguely stated objectives of the summit declaration aren’t fulfilled or policy disagreements over contentious issues, including the questions of Qatar’s relations with Iran and Turley, resurface. Qatar’s own changed position adds to the exiting risks.

Qatar, as it stands, is no longer a small military power that it was three and a half years ago. Past three years have seen the tiny Gulf state spending a lot of money on its military modernization, which means that it has already amassed enough resource to exert itself even more powerfully in the geo-politics of the Gulf and Arab world as a power contender. The fact that it has been able to ward off all 13 demands of Saudia/UAE means that Qatar today is far better positioned vis-à-vis the leading Gulf states than it was four years ago.

During past three years, Qatar’s air force has increased its fleet from 12 to 96 jets, including French Rafael jets. Apart from its deal with France to buy 36 more Rafael jets, in 2017 it signed a $12bn deal with US manufacturer Boeing for 36 advanced F-15QA fighter jets. And, in 2018 the Gulf state successfully negotiated a deal with the UK to buy 24 Eurofighter Typhoon Jets.

As far as its ground force capability is concerned, Qatar recently bought and received 62 highly advanced German Leopard 2A7. These have been adapted to fight specifically in high temperatures and the sandy terrain of the desert. In addition, there is also an order for 100 Turkish Altay main battle tanks.

The fact that Qatar continues to host Turkish military base also adds to its powers. Speaking recently to Turkish military personnel in Baku in Azerbaijan, Erdogan said that the Turkish military “with a past full of glory and honour, will continue to fulfil… the task assigned to them in our country and all over the world… I wish our soldiers success, who fight to preserve peace, calm and stability in many places from Syria to Libya, from Somalia to Kosovo, from Afghanistan to Qatar.”

Qatar’s military modernization and expansion of direct military ties has its roots in the fear of being militarily overrun by the Saudis and the Emiratis. Qatari leadership has calculated that they face a perennial threat from Saudi and Emirati leaders who were/are deeply interested in Qatar’s marvelous gas wealth.

There is, therefore, no way Qatar’s leadership would become unmindful of these threats in the wake of the so-called “return to full diplomatic” ties with Saudia and the UAE; for, the fact remans that it is the tiny state of Qatar that has emerged from the crisis unscathed, defeating the combined power and pressure of four major states: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain.

It also means that the underlying purpose of the blockade remains unfulfilled, which further means that a return to full scale normalization is neither possible, nor the possibility of a return to antagonism completely far-fetched. In other words, while there is no blockade, the underlying tensions remain and can resurface over any small to major policy disagreement.

Pubblicato in: Cina

Ferrovia Cina, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran, Afganistan, più Uzbekistan e Turkmenistan.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-12-23.

2020-12-18__ Iran Railway 013

La nuova ferrovia che unisce l’Iran alla Cina può essere valutata da molti punti di vista complementari.

La Cina si è collegata all’Oceano Indiano

– L’Iran si è collegato con l’Asia Centrale

– Stati prima emarginati, quali Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afganistan, Uzbekistan e Turkmenistan sono adesso collegati con il resto del continente asiatico e con l’Oceano Indiano.

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«The United States and other Western countries have worked long and hard to marginalize Iran as punishment for its transgressions on the international stage»

«Nevertheless, Iran’s neighbors as well as states further out, including Russia, China and the Central Asian republics, understand that their plans to establish strategically important north-south and east-west regional transportation routes will depend on the development of Iranian railways and the integration of its domestic rail system with bordering countries»

«In that light, a series of new Iranian expert opinions is especially noteworthy»

«In fact, prompted by the recent opening of a railway linking Haf, in northeastern Iran, to Herat, in western Afghanistan»

«that development opens up new “strategic prospects” for Iran far beyond only Afghanistan»

«The line, thus, plays an important role not only in the development of Afghanistan but also in the development of the railroad network for the transit of goods from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, and it also marks the beginning of the creation of both the East-West and North-South international trade corridors” (IRNA, December 10)»

«this Iranian link will allow the land-locked countries of Central Asia to reach the broader world and do so on international-standard tracks with modern computer management»

«Tehran hopes to work with Moscow, which also has an interest in reaching the Indian Ocean for trade, and with Beijing, as part of the latter’s “One Belt, One Road” vision of linking the Asia-Pacific and Europe»

«Tehran is continuing to work toward integrating Iranian railroads with railway networks in the South Caucasus»

«Iran sought to expand its rail network to the Caspian Sea port at Enzeli, to serve as an intermodal transportation hub along trade corridors connecting with Russia and the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia (IRNA, December 2, 2018; Casp-geo.ru, December 7, 2018)»

«In the current environment, the outcome of that competition may depend first and foremost on the construction of regional railways, which, for landlocked states, are typically the most important links to the outside world»

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Dovunque arrivino e stipulino rapporti politici ed economici, i cinesi costruiscono strade, autostrade, ferrovie, acquedotti, reti nere, centrali elettriche e relativa rete distributiva.

Il governo cinese si è assunto il ruolo di generatore di infrastrutture, tramite le quali lega a sé ed al suo sistema economico. Non elargisce sussidi, se non in casi di assoluta emergenza, ma le infrastrutture sono propedeutiche alla generazione di posti di lavoro.

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Eurasia Daily Monitor. Iran Rapidly Expanding Rail Links With Central Asia and Caucasus

The United States and other Western countries have worked long and hard to marginalize Iran as punishment for its transgressions on the international stage. Nevertheless, Iran’s neighbors as well as states further out, including Russia, China and the Central Asian republics, understand that their plans to establish strategically important north-south and east-west regional transportation routes will depend on the development of Iranian railways and the integration of its domestic rail system with bordering countries. Tehran and its supporters are also aware of that fact, and they are increasingly moving below the West’s radar to change the map of the region (see EDM, February 20). In that light, a series of new Iranian expert opinions is especially noteworthy.

Those aforementioned remarks by Iranian analysts were, in fact, prompted by the recent opening of a railway linking Haf, in northeastern Iran, to Herat, in western Afghanistan. According to several Tehran-based scholars, that development opens up new “strategic prospects” for Iran far beyond only Afghanistan. Indeed, they insist, the new railway “is one of the most important national and international projects, which not only increases the economic and transportation ties between Iran and Afghanistan but also increases stability and security, creates possibilities for job creation, and improves the economic situation of the entire region.” Some even suggest the rail link can eventually enable the rise of a new, Iranian-led cultural community in this part of the world (IRNA, December 10).

“The Haf–Herat line revives the Silk Road as far as railways are concerned and unites the Chinese railroad with Iran through Afghanistan,” declared analysts for Tehran’s government news agency IRNA. “The line, thus, plays an important role not only in the development of Afghanistan but also in the development of the railroad network for the transit of goods from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, and it also marks the beginning of the creation of both the East-West and North-South international trade corridors” (IRNA, December 10).

Such seemingly bombastic claims by Iran’s news agency are backed up by a more scholarly analysis offered in a detailed, 5,000-word article by Erbrakhimbay Sadami, a specialist on transportation networks at the University of Tehran (Iess.ir, December 6; Casp-geo.ru, December 12). Sadami notes that this Iranian link will allow the land-locked countries of Central Asia to reach the broader world and do so on international-standard tracks with modern computer management. The connection to Iran will have the effect of reducing their integration with and dependence on the Russian-gauge railway system left over from Soviet times.

The Tehran scholar writes that the Haf–Herat line is only the first part of a larger effort to build railways in eastern Iran and to adjoining countries—projects the Islamic Republic sees as critical to its own economic development and national security as well as conducive to overcoming sanctions by integrating itself into the wider world. In this, he continues, Tehran hopes to work with Moscow, which also has an interest in reaching the Indian Ocean for trade, and with Beijing, as part of the latter’s “One Belt, One Road” vision of linking the Asia-Pacific and Europe. Russia and China have already invested in Iranian railway projects; and Sadami clearly expects them to do more, especially if Moscow and Beijing remain at odds with the West as well (Iess.ir, December 6; Casp-geo.ru, December 12).

Iran’s railway ambitions, however, are hardly exhausted by its moves into Afghanistan (including via Turkmenistan). Additionally, Tehran is continuing to work toward integrating Iranian railroads with railway networks in the South Caucasus. The latter goal, in particular, was given new impetus by the November 9 trilateral ceasefire accord, signed in Moscow, that ended the latest round of intense fighting in Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But most importantly, from Iran’s perspective, the document unblocked undeveloped or abandoned regional transportation networks in the north-south as well as east-west directions (see EDM, December 3; News.day.az, November 23; Casp-geo.ru, December 7). Even before that happened, Iran sought to expand its rail network to the Caspian Sea port at Enzeli, to serve as an intermodal transportation hub along trade corridors connecting with Russia and the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia (IRNA, December 2, 2018; Casp-geo.ru, December 7, 2018).

Iran’s hopes for this network are enormous, but in both the east and the north, Tehran faces stiff competition from other players who may not want to see it succeed. In the east, as Sadami suggests, Pakistan has its own agenda and a long history of interest in building railways northward and westward. If Tehran does not finish its network, it may find Pakistan in a position to play the transit role Iran hoped to embody vis-à-vis Afghanistan, Central Asia and, possibly, China as well. And of course, it faces challenges in the north as well. Europe and the United States have long sought to promote the development of rail lines in the South Caucasus to bypass Iran and Russia; and now Turkey, with the opening of the Zengezur corridor (across southern Armenia), has announced plans to build a railway eastward to the border of Azerbaijani Nakhchivan and, ultimately, all the way to Baku (Anadolu Agency, RBC, November 12).

At a minimum, that puts Iran on a collision course with Turkey, its longstanding geopolitical enemy, as well as the West. In the current environment, the outcome of that competition may depend first and foremost on the construction of regional railways, which, for landlocked states, are typically the most important links to the outside world. If Iran remains at odds with the West, the West may back Turkey more heavily. Nonetheless, Tehran is demonstrating by its progress in building a cross-border railroad into Afghanistan that, even under sanctions, it is ready and able to act—at least as long as it secures support from Moscow and Beijing.

Pubblicato in: Medio Oriente, Stati Uniti

Iran. Missili su al-Asad.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-08.

2020-01-08__Al-Asad 001

«Da Teheran il corpo delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie Iraniane ha annunciato come “la feroce vendetta” per l’uccisione del generale Soleimani è iniziata e ha affermato che l’operazione iniziale si è conclusa con successo e che la base di al-Asad, contro cui sarebbero stati lanciati almeno 35 missili, “è stata completamente distrutta”.»

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Iran lancia l’attacco agli Usa, colpite due basi in Iraq. Primo bilancio, almeno 80 morti

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Non sono ancora disponibili informazioni sicure: alcuni menzionano 80 morti, altre nessun caduto.

A quanto potrebbe sembrare:

– l’Iran dispone di missili in grado di colpire almeno le basi americane in Medio Oriente;

– non sappiamo se gli americani abbiano o meno cercato di intercettare tali missili: sappiamo solo che li hanno individuati quasi al decollo con i radar;

– «gli uomini si sarebbero rifugiati in appositi bunker»: questo è un segno che l’allarme è stato dato con sufficiente preavviso e che i missili iraniani non viaggiavano a velocità elevate.

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Iran lancia la rappresaglia contro gli Usa, attaccate base in Iraq

L’Iran ha lanciato l’operazione ‘Soleimani Martire’ sferrando un attacco missilistico in Iraq contro due basi che ospitano le truppe americane e quelle della coalizione, tra cui militari italiani. Una pioggia di cruise e di missili balistici a corto raggio partita dal territorio iraniano e che si è abbattuta contro la base di al-Asad e contro quella di Erbil, come prima rappresaglia per l’uccisione del generale Qassem Soleimani da parte degli Usa.

Secondo la tv di Stato iraniana, ci sarebbe stata anche una seconda ondata di attacchi. Al momento non si hanno notizie di vittime, feriti o danni. Il personale del contingente militare italiano ad Erbil si è radunato in un’area di sicurezza – secondo quanto appreso dall’ANSA – e gli uomini si sarebbero rifugiati in appositi bunker. Risultano tutti illesi.

Il Pentagono, in una nota, ha affermato che dopo aver messo al corrente dei fatti il presidente americano Donald Trump sta ancora valutando le conseguenze dell’offensiva. Intanto a Washington si è riunito il consiglio per la sicurezza nazionale alla presenza del segretario di Stato Mike Pompeo e del numero uno del Pentagono Mark Esper.

Da Teheran il corpo delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie Iraniane ha annunciato come “la feroce vendetta” per l’uccisione del generale Soleimani è iniziata e ha affermato che l’operazione iniziale si è conclusa con successo e che la base di al-Asad, contro cui sarebbero stati lanciati almeno 35 missili, “è stata completamente distrutta”.

L’Iran minaccia quindi “azioni ancor più devastanti” se gli Usa dovessero decidere di rispondere. “Se l’Iran dovesse essere attaccato sul suo territorio – avvertono le Guardie Rivoluzionarie – Dubai, Haifa e Tel Aviv verranno colpite in un terzo round di attacchi da parte dell’Iran”. Intanto volano le quotazioni del petrolio, balzato del 3,4% a 65 dollari, e dell’oro, a quota 1.600 dollari l’oncia ai massimi dal 2013.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Diplomazia, Medio Oriente

Oro. Schizzato a 1,553.25. Più che paura sembrerebbe terrore.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2020-01-03. h 16:30.

2020-01-03__Gold 001

Nel gennaio 2019 l’oro era quotato attorno ai 1,200 euro l’oncia.

A giugno le quotazioni erano salite a 1,330.

Oggi sono schizzate da 1,513.38 fino a 1,553.25.

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Nessuno intende generalizzare alcunché: tuttavia questo è un chiaro segno di quanta tensione vi sia sui mercati a seguito degli eventi politici, i sbocchi dei quali sembrerebbero essere impredicibili.

Di certo, senza forze armate efficienti è impossibile fare la minima politica estera.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Medio Oriente, Problemia Energetici

Petrolio. Potrebbe salire a prezzi inimmaginabili. – Mohammed bin Salman.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-10-01.

2016-04-04__Attenti a Moḥammad bin Salmān.__002

Sulla scacchiera sono schierate da una parte l’Arabia Saudita e dall’altra l’Iran. I primi sono wahabiti ed i secondi sono sciiti: si odiano vicendevolmente da millequattrocento anni.

Ambedue sono ricchi in petrolio, ma l’Iran è vicino a disporre di armamenti atomici, sempre che già non li abbia.

Ma questo sarebbe nulla, se con fosse che dietro l’Arabia Saudita di sono gli americani e dietro l’Iran ci sono i russi e, ben defilati ma presenti, i cinesi.

Lo scontro è quindi tra le superpotenze: Arabia Saudita ed Iran sono solo le comparse sul palcoscenico.

«Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has called for global action against Iran, warning of “unimaginably high” oil prices otherwise»

«Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called for global action against Iran and warned that oil prices could otherwise rise astronomically»

«If the world does not take a strong and firm action to deter Iran, we will see further escalations that will threaten world interests»

«Oil supplies will be disrupted and oil prices will jump to unimaginably high numbers that we haven’t seen in our lifetimes»

«The crown prince said he would prefer a political rather than a military response to Iran, as a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran would collapse the global economy»

* * * * * * *

Herr Otto von Bismarck diceva che non si dovrebbe mai portare l’avversario alla disperazione. Ma cerchiamo di metterci nei panni dei sauditi che si son visti bombardare i propri impianti petroliferi.

Il mondo avrebbe una enorme necessità di quiete politica ed economica, ma un nuova crisi petrolifera di ampia portata potrebbe innescare una serie di reazioni a catena del tutto incontrollate ed incontrollabili.

Resta solo una ultima domanda senza risposta.

Quale è la posizione dell’Unione Europea?

Ha cercato di mantenere i piedi in dodici scarpe, ma né Mr Juncker, né Mr Tusk, né Frau Merkel, né tanto meno Mr Macron, hanno la stoffa di Talleyrand-Périgord.

L’unica cosa certa è che una crisi petrolifera travolgerebbe un’Unione Europea in piena rcessione.

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Saudi prince warns of ‘unimaginable’ oil prices

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has called for global action against Iran, warning of “unimaginably high” oil prices otherwise. He also described the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi as “a mistake.”

In a television interview, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called for global action against Iran and warned that oil prices could otherwise rise astronomically.

Bin Salman blamed Iran for the September 14 attack on Saudi oil facilities that cut its production by half and led to a spike in oil prices.

“If the world does not take a strong and firm action to deter Iran, we will see further escalations that will threaten world interests,” he told CBS program 60 Minutes.

“Oil supplies will be disrupted and oil prices will jump to unimaginably high numbers that we haven’t seen in our lifetimes,” he said in the program aired late on Sunday.

The US, France, Germany and Britain have backed Saudi assertions that Iran was behind the attack, as opposed to the Houthi rebel group that has claimed responsibility.

The crown prince said he would prefer a political rather than a military response to Iran, as a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran would collapse the global economy.

In the same interview, bin Salman — also known by his initials MBS — also denied ordering the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey, but said that as leader of the country he bore responsibility.

“This was a heinous crime,” he told the program. “But I take full responsibility as a leader in Saudi Arabia, especially since it was committed by individuals working for the Saudi government.” Prince Mohammed said he was “absolutely not” behind the killing, calling it “a mistake.”

Khashoggi’s murder in October 2018 triggered an international backlash against Saudi Arabia, with the US Congress blaming the crown prince for the killing, and the United Nations calling for an investigation into his role in the slaying.

Pubblicato in: Armamenti, Stati Uniti

RQ-4A abbattuto. L’America si interroga sulla crescita degli avversari.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-06-28.

Iran 001

Negli arsenali bellici convivono armi da attacco e da difesa. Si alternano periodi nei quali un sistema di difesa sia più potente di quelli da attacco, e viceversa.

Nella prima metà dell’ottocento, il cannone caricato a mitraglia era un’arma di attacco, ma anche di difesa, ovviamente, che imperava sovrano. Con la seconda metà dell’ottocento comparvero i fucili a retrocarica e le prime mitragliatrici.

I diari e le relazioni dell’allora capitano Hofmann dal fronte nippo-russo nel 1905 furono sottostimati dallo stato maggiore tedesco: descrivevano gli effetti devastanti ottenuti da nidi di mitragliatrici con gli assalti della fanteria. La Germania entrò in guerra, WW1, con 12,000 mitragliatrici, portate in poco meno di sei mesi ad oltre 100,000: avevano imparato rapidamente. Nessuna fanteria era in grado di superare gli sbarramenti delle mitragliatrici.

Dobbiamo alla energia di sir Winston Churchill, l’aver patrocinato lo sviluppo del carro armato inglese, che segnalò le sue potenzialità alla battaglia di Cambrai nel dicembre 1917. Nel 1918 fu l’elemento che consentì lo sfondamento dell’8 agosto.

La seconda guerra mondiale segnò in campo navale il tramonto delle corazzate a favore delle portaerei, mentre l’aviazione divenne arma sovrana.

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Dotata di portaerei, nel tempo a propulsione nucleare, gli Stati Uniti divennero militarmente egemoni a livello globale.

Negli ultimi due decenni molte nazioni iniziarono a progettare e costruire sistemi missilistici capaci di identificare ed abbattere gli aeroplani, individuare, colpire ed affondare le portaerei.

Marchingegni molto costosi, quali gli aerei da caccia oppure le portaerei potevano essere neutralizzati da un razzetto del costo di poche decine di migliaia di dollari.

Aerei e navi furono dotate di armamenti anti – missile, ma almeno al momento attuale non sono in grado di bloccare un attacco ben coordinato.

La progettazione e la costruzione di missili antiaerei ed antinave richiede personale altamente qualificato ed un know-how per nulla improvvisabile. Le tre superpotenze ne hanno pieni gli arsenali.

Tuttavia anche nazioni piccole e non particolarmente ricche hanno cercato di dotarsi di sofisticate armi anti-aeree, sia acquistando quelle che le superpotenze erano disposte a vendere, sia progettandole e costruendole in proprio.

L’Iran è una di queste e, si direbbe, ha lavorato particolarmente bene.

«Once the dust cleared, it turned out that one of the enduring lessons from the past week occurred at about 22,000 feet»

«The Iranian downing of an RQ-4A Global Hawk on Thursday is thought to have been the first time one of the Pentagon’s surveillance workhorses has been shot out of the sky. Aside from the fact the incident nearly risked taking the United States and Iran to war for a few hours, it was also stark evidence of an escalation in Tehran’s military capabilities»

«They work …. The incident highlights that when the Iranians really make investment, it can really count …. We knew that with ballistic missiles, but it appears the case with air defenses too»

«The RQ-4A isn’t a clay pigeon. At $110 million each, the Global Hawk needs three people to remotely pilot it and its sensors. Wider in wingspan than a Boeing 737, it has a Rolls Royce engine moving it along at around 500 miles per hour as it hoovers up signals and images normally at 65,000 feet to keep out of the way of surface-to-air missiles. Even if they get too close, it has a radar-warning receiver, a jamming system and releases a decoy, towed behind it»

«But its destruction is a sign of Iran’s quiet focus»

«A few years ago this would have been a surprise, but now their new air defense gear looks a lot more impressive

«The IRGC said it used a “3rd of Khordad” surface-to-air missile system, images of which have been circulating now on social media as a symbol of Iranian prowess against the staggering unmanned technology the Americans unleash in the stratosphere every day»

«The Khordad 3 was first unveiled in 2014, has a range of up to 75 kilometers, and can hit as far up as 30 kilometers»

* * * * * * *

L’epoca in cui i droni da 100 milioni potevano volare sicuri è finita.

Ma non ci si faccia soverchie illusioni. Lo stesso ragionamento vale anche per aerei da caccia e cacciabombardieri.

L’America è adesso di fronte ad un dilemma: contro stati quali l’Iran potrebbe sicuramente vincere una guerra nucleare, ma da un conflitto combattuto con armi locoregionali avrebbe un gran filo da torcere.

È cambiata un’poca e la storia ha voltato pagina.


Cnn. 2019-06-25. What shooting down a $110M US drone tells us about Iran

Once the dust cleared, it turned out that one of the enduring lessons from the past week occurred at about 22,000 feet.

The Iranian downing of an RQ-4A Global Hawk on Thursday is thought to have been the first time one of the Pentagon’s surveillance workhorses has been shot out of the sky. Aside from the fact the incident nearly risked taking the United States and Iran to war for a few hours, it was also stark evidence of an escalation in Tehran’s military capabilities.

“They work,” said Jeremy Binnie, Middle East and North Africa editor at Jane’s Defence Weekly, of Iran’s air defenses. The incident “highlights that when the Iranians really make investment, it can really count,” he told CNN.

“We knew that with ballistic missiles, but it appears the case with air defenses too.”

This image released by the U.S. military’s Central Command shows what it describes as the flight path and the site where Iran shot down a US drone in the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday, June 20, 2019.

The RQ-4A isn’t a clay pigeon. At $110 million each, the Global Hawk needs three people to remotely pilot it and its sensors. Wider in wingspan than a Boeing 737, it has a Rolls Royce engine moving it along at around 500 miles per hour as it hoovers up signals and images normally at 65,000 feet to keep out of the way of surface-to-air missiles. Even if they get too close, it has a radar-warning receiver, a jamming system and releases a decoy, towed behind it.

But its destruction is a sign of Iran’s quiet focus. Binnie pointed out the size of the aircraft makes it “not a tough target in that respect”, he said. “A few years ago this would have been a surprise, but now their new air defense gear looks a lot more impressive.”

While America’s military is by no means threatened in the long term by Iran, instances like the downing of the drone show that Tehran can sometimes have an outsized effect with narrowly-focused efforts, and is an adversary certainly capable of keeping its opponents off balance. The US would win any conventional conflict in the short term, but should be wary that Iranian ingenuity (or deviousness, if you’re in Washington) will stop any conflict from being a “cakewalk.”

Despite the dispute over precisely where it happened, there’s no doubt the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps managed to destroy one at 4:05 a.m. on June 19. The US military has released video to support its claim that it happened 34 kilometers from the nearest Iranian land mass, and showed a flight path that suggests the spy drone never entered Iranian territory. Conversely, Iranian Foreign Minister Javid Zarif tweeted coordinates for the attack that put it well inside Iranian territory — near the city of Kouh-e Mobarak.

The IRGC said it used a “3rd of Khordad” surface-to-air missile system, images of which have been circulating now on social media as a symbol of Iranian prowess against the staggering unmanned technology the Americans unleash in the stratosphere every day.

The Khordad 3 was first unveiled in 2014, has a range of up to 75 kilometers, and can hit as far up as 30 kilometers, Iranian state-backed media has said. Janes concluded the strike was likely from a mobile vehicle, given the US contention the missile was launched from 70 kilometers away, and there is no Iranian facility matching that location. In short: Tehran took out a US spy drone from the back of a fancy truck.

While the US has massively improved its drone fleet since the Global Hawk first came to the Navy 13 years ago, with the MQ-4C Triton about to join service, Iran also has more advanced missiles than the one that took down the drone last week.

Ten days before the incident, Iran unveiled an upgrade which has nearly double the range and is also homegrown — the product of a series of reverse-engineering feats and technology purloined over the years by the sanctions-strapped country.

Binnie said the Iranians had either bought or developed radar technology that had helped them improve targeting at a distance. “We do not really understand how these guidance systems are working,” he said.

The MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft system completes its inaugural cross-country ferry flight at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland.

Binnie added that the angle of attack of the missile seemed to suggest it had approached the drone from the west, rather than chasing it from behind, suggesting it may have been relatively efficiently guided towards the drone by its launcher.

This isn’t the first time Iran has hit US technology. It took down a RQ-170 stealth drone in 2011 and reportedly reverse-engineered it to create its own variants from the wreckage.

There didn’t appear to be much left of the RQ-4A to pore over, but the interception at 22,000 feet belies a nation, in the words of President Trump, “going through hell.”

It was just one very expensive pilotless drone, but its downing nearly took the US to war in the region yet again, exposing just how important these flashes of the unexpected are.