Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Ecb. L’inflazione tedesca è al 33.5% e la produzione industriale al -3.9%. Lagarde aspetta che fallisca.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2022-06-01.

0000-0000__ Germania Tabella Riassuntiva 001

L’allegato prospetto dei macrodati della eurozona e della Germania  evidenzia un processo inflattivo sopra il 30% anno su anno ed un crollo della produzione industriale, che si sta contraendo.

È un quadro degno della repubblica di Weimar, foriero di fosche catastrofi economiche e finanziarie.

Ciò nonostante, Lagarde e von der Leyen assistono inerti come meringhe fritte, incapaci di prendere una qualche decisione.

Nessuno si stupirebbe se alla fine si venisse a sapere che erano agenti del Presidente Putin.

* * * * * * *

«L’inflazione tedesca tocca un nuovo record, mettendo sotto pressione la BCE»

l’inflazione tedesca ha toccato un altro massimo storico, aggiungendo urgenza all’uscita della Banca Centrale Europea dagli stimoli dell’era della crisi, dopo i numeri della Spagna»

«Spinti dall’impennata dei costi energetici e alimentari, i dati pubblicati lunedì hanno mostrato che a maggio i prezzi al consumo nella più grande economia del continente sono aumentati dell’8,7% rispetto a un anno fa»

«Il rapporto arriva solo 10 giorni prima di una riunione cruciale della BCE, in cui i funzionari dovrebbero annunciare la conclusione degli acquisti di asset su larga scala e confermare i piani per aumentare i tassi di interesse a luglio per la prima volta in più di un decennio»

«Il ministro Christian Lindner, lunedì scorso, ha definito la lotta contro l’impennata dei prezzi la “priorità assoluta” e ha auspicato la fine della politica fiscale espansiva»

«L’inflazione è un rischio economico enorme»

«Dobbiamo combatterla per evitare una crisi economica e una spirale in cui l’inflazione si autoalimenta»

«I responsabili politici della BCE, tra cui il presidente Christine Lagarde, hanno espresso preoccupazioni simili, temendo che una crescita dei prezzi ostinatamente elevata rischi di radicarsi e di frenare i consumi»

«I consumatori dovranno fare i conti con ulteriori aumenti dei prezzi perché molti fattori di produzione sono ancora scarsi e i prezzi all’ingrosso continuano ad aumentare drammaticamente»

«I salari negoziati in Germania sono diminuiti dell’1,8% in termini reali nel primo trimestre»

* * * * * * *

In calce riportiamo una traduzione in lingua italiana

* * * * * * *

«German inflation hits fresh record, piling pressure on ECB»

«German inflation hit another all-time high, adding urgency to the European Central Bank’s exit from crisis-era stimulus after numbers from Spain»

«Driven by soaring energy and food costs, data released Monday showed consumer prices in the continent’s biggest economy jumped 8.7% from a year ago in May»

«The report comes just 10 days before a crucial ECB meeting where officials are set to announce the conclusion of large-scale asset purchases and confirm plans to raise interest rates in July for the first time in more than a decade»

«The inflation figures increase pressure on the government as households are further squeezed»

«Minister Christian Lindner earlier Monday called the fight against surging prices the “top priority” while advocating an end to expansive fiscal policy»

«Inflation is an enormous economic risk»

«We must fight it so that no economic crisis results and a spiral takes hold in which inflation feeds off itself»

«ECB policy makers including President Christine Lagarde have expressed similar concerns, fretting that stubbornly high price growth risks becoming entrenched and damping consumption»

«Consumers will have to reckon with further increases in prices because many inputs are still scarce and wholesale prices are still increasing dramatically»

«Negotiated wages in Germany fell by 1.8% in real terms in the first quarter»

* * * * * * *


German Inflation Hits Fresh Record, Piling Pressure on ECB.

– Food and energy costs send consumer prices up 8.7%; est. 8.1%

– Data follow overshoot in Spain, which saw new all-time high

* * * * * * *

German inflation hit another all-time high, adding urgency to the European Central Bank’s exit from crisis-era stimulus after numbers from Spain also topped economists’ estimates.

Driven by soaring energy and food costs, data released Monday showed consumer prices in the continent’s biggest economy jumped 8.7% from a year ago in May. Analysts surveyed by Bloomberg predicted an 8.1% advance.

The report comes just 10 days before a crucial ECB meeting where officials are set to announce the conclusion of large-scale asset purchases and confirm plans to raise interest rates in July for the first time in more than a decade. Some policy makers have even floated the idea of a half-point hike, rather than the quarter-point most of them support.

Money markets wagered on 113 basis points of rate increases by year-end, up three basis points since Friday. German bonds held declines, with benchmark 10-year yields eight basis points higher at 1.05%.

The inflation figures increase pressure on the government as households are further squeezed. Finance Minister Christian Lindner earlier Monday called the fight against surging prices the “top priority” while advocating an end to expansive fiscal policy. 

“Inflation is an enormous economic risk,” Lindner told a news conference in Berlin. “We must fight it so that no economic crisis results and a spiral takes hold in which inflation feeds off itself.”

ECB policy makers including President Christine Lagarde have expressed similar concerns, fretting that stubbornly high price growth risks becoming entrenched and damping consumption at a time when industry is suffering from lingering supply bottlenecks and uncertainty about energy supplies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

                         Household Hurt

While inflation is now near its peak, the squeeze for households is far from over, according to ZEW Economist Friedrich Heinemann.

“Consumers will have to reckon with further increases in prices because many inputs are still scarce and wholesale prices are still increasing dramatically,” he said by email. “Surprisingly good labor-market data also indicate that the dreaded wage-price spiral could soon pick up speed.”

The ECB’s decisions in June will be guided by fresh economic projections that are likely to show price pressures in the euro area as a whole remaining above the 2% target in 2023 and 2024. Data for May from the 19-member currency bloc are due on Tuesday. 

                         What Bloomberg Economics Says…

“A similar pattern is likely to play out in euro-area inflation data. We expect a record high 7.6% for May, but the German reading points to substantial upside risk for our estimate. This will add to the ECB’s resolve to lift rates.”

Highlighting the persistent dangers, Spain earlier Monday reported an unexpected acceleration in inflation to a record 8.5%, despite government assistance including a fuel subsidy and an increase in the minimum wage. A Belgian measure also quickened.

In Germany, the lower house of parliament has passed a package of relief measures that includes a one-time payment, a child supplement and a reduction in electricity costs. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has signaled further action may be taken if needed to protect households and businesses.

Negotiated wages in Germany fell by 1.8% in real terms in the first quarter, and even though workers in the iron and steel industry are pushing for gains of more than 8%, they’re unlikely to secure gains that fully offsetting the rising cost of living.

* * * * * * *


L’inflazione tedesca tocca un nuovo record, mettendo sotto pressione la BCE.

– I costi di cibo ed energia fanno salire i prezzi al consumo dell’8,7%; stima: 8,1%. 8.1%

– I dati seguono il superamento della Spagna, che ha registrato un nuovo massimo storico.

* * * * * * *

L’inflazione tedesca ha toccato un altro massimo storico, rendendo più urgente l’uscita della Banca Centrale Europea dagli stimoli dell’era della crisi, dopo che anche i dati della Spagna hanno superato le stime degli economisti.

Spinti dall’impennata dei costi energetici e alimentari, i dati pubblicati lunedì hanno mostrato che a maggio i prezzi al consumo nella maggiore economia del continente sono aumentati dell’8,7% rispetto a un anno fa. Gli analisti intervistati da Bloomberg avevano previsto un aumento dell’8,1%.

Il rapporto giunge a soli 10 giorni da una riunione cruciale della BCE in cui i funzionari dovrebbero annunciare la conclusione degli acquisti di asset su larga scala e confermare i piani di rialzo dei tassi di interesse a luglio per la prima volta in più di un decennio. Alcuni responsabili politici hanno addirittura ventilato l’idea di un rialzo di mezzo punto, anziché del quarto di punto che la maggior parte di loro sostiene.

I mercati monetari hanno scommesso su 113 punti base di aumento dei tassi entro la fine dell’anno, con un aumento di tre punti base rispetto a venerdì. Le obbligazioni tedesche hanno mantenuto il ribasso, con il rendimento di riferimento a 10 anni in aumento di otto punti base all’1,05%.

I dati sull’inflazione aumentano la pressione sul governo, in quanto le famiglie sono ulteriormente schiacciate. Lunedì il ministro delle Finanze Christian Lindner ha definito la lotta all’impennata dei prezzi la “priorità assoluta”, auspicando la fine della politica fiscale espansiva.

“L’inflazione è un rischio economico enorme”, ha dichiarato Lindner in una conferenza stampa a Berlino. “Dobbiamo combatterla per evitare una crisi economica e una spirale in cui l’inflazione si autoalimenta”.

I responsabili politici della BCE, tra cui il Presidente Christine Lagarde, hanno espresso preoccupazioni simili, temendo che una crescita dei prezzi ostinatamente elevata rischi di radicarsi e di frenare i consumi in un momento in cui l’industria soffre per le persistenti strozzature nell’approvvigionamento e per l’incertezza sulle forniture energetiche a seguito dell’invasione dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia.

                         Le famiglie danneggiate

Secondo l’economista dello ZEW Friedrich Heinemann, mentre l’inflazione è ormai vicina al suo picco, la stretta per le famiglie è tutt’altro che finita.

“I consumatori dovranno fare i conti con ulteriori aumenti dei prezzi perché molti fattori di produzione sono ancora scarsi e i prezzi all’ingrosso continuano a crescere in modo drammatico”, ha dichiarato via e-mail. “I dati sorprendentemente buoni del mercato del lavoro indicano anche che la temuta spirale salari-prezzi potrebbe presto prendere velocità”.

Le decisioni della BCE a giugno saranno guidate da nuove proiezioni economiche che probabilmente mostreranno che le pressioni sui prezzi nell’area dell’euro nel suo complesso rimarranno al di sopra dell’obiettivo del 2% nel 2023 e nel 2024. I dati di maggio del blocco valutario a 19 membri sono attesi per martedì.

                         Cosa dice Bloomberg Economics.

“È probabile che i dati sull’inflazione dell’area dell’euro presentino uno schema simile. Ci aspettiamo un livello record del 7,6% per maggio, ma la lettura tedesca indica un sostanziale rischio di rialzo per la nostra stima. Ciò rafforzerà la determinazione della BCE a rialzare i tassi”.

Per evidenziare i pericoli persistenti, lunedì la Spagna ha registrato un’accelerazione inaspettata dell’inflazione, che ha raggiunto il livello record dell’8,5%, nonostante gli aiuti governativi, tra cui un sussidio per il carburante e un aumento del salario minimo. Anche il Belgio ha accelerato.

In Germania, la Camera bassa del Parlamento ha approvato un pacchetto di misure di sostegno che comprende un pagamento una tantum, un supplemento per i bambini e una riduzione dei costi dell’elettricità. Il cancelliere Olaf Scholz ha segnalato che, se necessario, potrebbero essere adottate ulteriori misure per proteggere famiglie e imprese.

I salari negoziati in Germania sono scesi dell’1,8% in termini reali nel primo trimestre e, sebbene i lavoratori dell’industria siderurgica stiano spingendo per ottenere aumenti superiori all’8%, è improbabile che riescano a ottenere guadagni tali da compensare completamente l’aumento del costo della vita.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale

Germania. Jan22. Producer prices of industrial products +25.0% on Jan21.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2022-02-23.

2022-02-23__ Destatis 001

                         In sintesi.

– +25.0% on the same month a year earlier

– Energy prices as a whole were up 66.7% compared to January 2021

– strong price increases of natural gas (distribution) which was +119.0% on January 2021

– Electricity prices rose by 66.7%

– increase of metals’ prices which were 36.9% up on January 2021

– Prices of metallic steel and ferro-alloys increased by 51.5%

– price increases of secondary raw materials of paper and paperboard (72.7%)

– fertilisers and nitrogen compounds (+67.4%)

– wooden containers (+65.7%)

– Prices of sawn timber were up 52.8%

– packaging industry increased by 41.9%

– From January 2021 to January 2022 food prices increased by 8.4%

– the price increase of crude vegetable oils (+58.5%)

– Butter prices rose by 61.1%

* * * * * * *

A dicembre il governo tedesco aveva promesso di costruire, vendere e far circolare tredici milioni di automobili elettriche.

Si potrebbe dubitare profondamente che riesca a mantenere quell’obiettivo.

Number of persons employed in manufacturing in December 2021: -0.3% year on year

Con questi prezzi alla produzione l’intero sistema economico tedesco è kaputt.

* * * * * * *


Destatis. Producer prices in January 2022: +25.0% on January 2021

                         Producer prices of industrial products (domestic market), January 2022

+2.2% on the previous month

+25.0% on the same month a year earlier

Wiesbaden – In January 2022, the index of producer prices for industrial products increased by 25.0% compared with January 2021. As reported by the Federal Statistical Office this was the highest increase ever compared to the corresponding month of the preceding year. Compared with the preceding month December 2021 the overall index rose by 2.2% in January 2022.

Mainly responsible for the increase of producer prices compared to January 2021 still was the price increase of energy.

                         Strong increase in prices for all energy sources

Energy prices as a whole were up 66.7% compared to January 2021 and by 1.3% compared to December 2021. Mainly responsible for the high rise of energy prices were the strong price increases of natural gas (distribution) which was +119.0% on January 2021. Electricity prices rose by 66.7% and prices of mineral oil products by 32.9%.
The overall index disregarding energy was 12.0% up on January 2021 (+2.5% compared to December 2021).

                         Significant price increase on intermediate goods, especially regarding metals, secondary raw materials, fertilisers and wood

Prices of intermediate goods increased by 20.7% compared to January 2021. Compared to December 2021 these prices were up 3.1%. The highest impact on the price development of intermediate goods had the increase of metals’ prices, which were 36.9% up on January 2021. Prices of metallic steel and ferro-alloys increased by 51.5%. Prices of non-ferrous metals were up 28.1%.

Especially high were the price increases of secondary raw materials of paper and paperboard (72.7%), of fertilisers and nitrogen compounds (+67.4%) as well as of wooden containers (+65.7%). Prices of sawn timber were up 52.8%. However, these prices fell by 22.6% compared with their maximum in September 2021.

Compared to January 2021 prices of corrugated paper and paperboard, which are important for the packaging industry, increased by 41.9%, prices of paper and paperboard were up 41.3%. Here in particular prices of newsprint paper rose (+66.9%).

                         Growth in prices of non-durable consumer goods mainly due to increasing prices for oils and fat

Prices of non-durable consumer goods increased by 6.7% compared to January 2021 and rose by 2.0% compared to December 2021. From January 2021 to January 2022 food prices increased by 8.4%. Especially high was the price increase of crude vegetable oils (+58.5%). Butter prices rose by 61.1%, coffee prices by 14.7%.

Prices of capital goods rose by 5.3%. This was the highest year-on-year change since December 1982 (+5.4%). The highest impact on the price development of capital goods had the increase of machine prices, which were 6.0% up on January 2021, followed by vehicels’ price development by +3.8%. Parts and accessories of computing machines were up 21.2% and of metal structures and parts of structures 20.1%.

Prices of durable consumer goods increased by 6.2% compared to January 2021, mainly caused by the price development of furniture (+8.5%).

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale

Germania. Feb22. Produzione di carne in calo del 2,4% su Feb21.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2022-02-11.

2022-02-08__ Destatis

La produzione di carne è diminuita di anno in anno dal 2017.

I tedeschi consumano 7.99 animali da pollame ogni anno.

Non è che sia una gran quota: meno di un pollo a testa al mese.

* * * * * * *

Destatis. Meat production down 2.4% in 2021 on the previous year

                         Pressrelease #050 from 7 February 2022

Wiesbaden – Commercial slaughterhouses in Germany produced 7.6 million tonnes of meat in 2021, according to provisional results. The Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) reports that this was a decline of 2.4% on the preceding year. Meat production has decreased year on year since 2017. A total of 56.2 million pigs, cattle, sheep, goats and horses as well as 605.8 million chickens, turkeys and ducks were slaughtered in the slaughterhouses in 2021.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Persona Umana, Scienza & Tecnica, Stati Uniti

Persone di Talento. È in corso una competizione mondiale per reclutarli.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2022-01-02.

2021-12-30__ Talento 001

«I greci ci criticano perché siamo così severi con i nostri figli e così lassi con gli schiavi: non hanno capito che i nostri figli dovranno dominare il mondo»

«When a true genius appears in the world you may know him by this sign; that the dunces are all in confederacy against him»

Il vero tesoro di una nazione è costituito dai suoi uomini di talento. Dopo la fine della guerra mondiale Germania, Giappone ed Italia erano distrutte, prive di risorse, ma avevano conservato con cura le loro persone di talento. Quindici anni dopo si assistette al loro ‘miracolo economico’.

Un Newton oppure una Md Curie fanno una nazione. Un milione di mediocri non fa un genio.

Il problema è identificarli, lasciarli crescere e, sopratutto, non ostacolarli.

* * * * * * *

«Is the U.S. Losing the War for Global Talent?»

«International students, particularly those coming from societies and cultures dramatically different from the US, are still not fully prepared for the vastly different academic culture»

«Students are quite different in how they’re approaching the idea of a foreign credential»

«Should I go to the U.S.? Is that the best return on investment for my family’s money? Or am I going to go to the U.K. or some other country?»

«Until about a decade ago, international students in the U.S. were dominated by those coming to the U.S. to pursue a master’s or Ph.D.»

«Then, with the huge growth in the Chinese middle class, there was this big influx of young Chinese students at the undergraduate level»

«foreign undergraduates, for the most part, have been full-fee paying students»

«Many families are now rethinking whether they have the resources to pay for their children’s education abroad»

«→→ What is it that Americans don’t understand about the experiences of international students? ←←»

«People don’t often appreciate how important international students have been to the post-1960s history of success of the U.S., from technology to academia to medicine»

«in the U.S., we do not want to have a candid conversation about the pathway from higher education to skilled talent and how countries grow their talent pool»

«If we look at the statistics, 70 to 80 percent of international students continue to stay on in the U.S. after their studies»

«More generally, we need to smooth that pathway from being a student to joining the workforce»

«When you’re an international student, everything you do in your program of study is governed by immigration rules»

«The policies in Canada are much friendlier to international students because of that clear understanding that education is a pathway to careers and the workforce»

* * * * * * *

Cina. Di gran lunga i migliori studenti al mondo.

Italia. Un addetto alla scuola ogni 5.57 studenti, sei volte più che in Cina.

Scuola Italiana. Fotocopie di una burocrazia satanica.

Invalsi 2019, l’Italia divisa in due. Quasi la metà dei maturandi «analfabeta» in matematica

Nuova Zelanda. Cresce il numero di studenti con proficiency in Cinese.

Cina. I grandi Atenei inglesi stanno trasferendosi in Cina.

Coronavirus e Cina mettono in dissesto le Università inglesi.

Conoscere e capire la Cina. Test di ammissione in seconda elementare.

* * * * * * *

Università. Rank mondiale. Irrompono le cinesi e declinano le liberal.

«Irrompono a viva forza le università cinesi nelle top 100.

Peking University, 27°, richiama il 16% di studenti stranieri;

Tsinghua University, 30°, richiama il 9% di studenti stranieri;

University of Hong Kong, 40°, richiama il 42% di studenti stranieri;

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 44°, richiama il 31% di studenti stranieri;

Chinese University of Hong Kong, 58°, richiama il 31% di studenti stranieri

* * * * * * *

I dati dei Rank mondiali sono inequivocabili.

Le università cinesi attirano gli studenti molto di più di quelle americane, che una volta erano posto mitico ed ambito ove andare a studiare.

Non è tempo e luogo per una analisi approfondita, ma almeno un elemento salta immediatamente agli occhi.

«in the U.S., we do not want to have a candid conversation».

«Stati Uniti d’America dove un professore viene licenziato per aver detto che “L’uragano Harvey è la risposta del karma al voto repubblicano del Texas”. Il tutto è avvenuto all’Università di Tampa, il nome del professore di sociologia è quello di Kenneth L. Storey»

Privare l’università della possibilità di esprimere liberamente le proprie opinioni la denatura e la rende solo strumento di azione politica, ossia tutto tranne che ‘università’: logico quindi che gli studenti esteri le evitino.

* * * * * * *


Is the U.S. Losing the War for Global Talent?

International students, particularly those coming from societies and cultures dramatically different from the US, are still not fully prepared for the vastly different academic culture.

* * *

This is one of a series of interviews by Bloomberg Opinion columnists on how to solve the world’s most pressing policy challenges. It has been edited for length and clarity.

Virginia Postrel: You came to the U.S. as a graduate student in psychology in 1992 and worked for many years at the Institute of International Education, as well as other jobs in international education. Your new book, “America Calling,” is a memoir of your own experiences and a report on the general state of foreign students in the U.S. How is the experience of current students different today from when you came? 

Rajika Bhandari, author, “America Calling: A Foreign Student in a Country of Possibility”: Students are quite different in how they’re approaching the idea of a foreign credential. They’re seeing it from the perspective of a very savvy consumer. Should I go to the U.S.? Is that the best return on investment for my family’s money? Or am I going to go to the U.K. or some other country? Students are armed with information in a way that they never were before.

However, there’s a lot that hasn’t changed. First and foremost are the enduring challenges around immigration, which rule the existence of an international student’s life in the U.S. in a way that most people who don’t have to experience it will never fully understand.

The other piece that remains the same is that international students, particularly those coming from societies and cultures dramatically different from the U.S., are still not fully prepared for the vastly different academic culture: the idea of a college classroom as a very open, democratic environment; the idea of really being independent in your learning; the idea that you can and should question your professor because you will actually be assessed on how well you’re able to articulate your ideas and to think critically. That can really be a shock for many students coming from highly traditional Asian cultures, where there are strict hierarchies in the classroom — and God forbid you ever question the professor.

VP: What is the current breakdown between graduate and undergraduate international students?

RB: Until about a decade ago, international students in the U.S. were dominated by those coming to the U.S. to pursue a master’s or Ph.D. Then, with the huge growth in the Chinese middle class, there was this big influx of young Chinese students at the undergraduate level. Over the past few years, we’ve seen more undergraduates coming to the U.S. However, according to some of the statistics for this year, it seems like that gap may be narrowing once again.

One reason is that foreign undergraduates, for the most part, have been full-fee paying students. They’re the ones who really fund the bottom line of U.S. institutions. Yet those are also the ones whose families have really been economically impacted by the pandemic. In many countries, the middle class itself has shrunk. Many families are now rethinking whether they have the resources to pay for their children’s education abroad.

VP: What is it that Americans don’t understand about the experiences of international students?

RB: People don’t often appreciate how important international students have been to the post-1960s history of success of the U.S., from technology to academia to medicine. One of the co-founders of Moderna was an international student. The new CEO of Twitter was an international student. Many Americans know that these individuals are immigrants, but what that journey has been — and why education has been a really critical aspect to that journey — is not well understood.

VP:  There’s a kind of pantomime, enacted by everyone involved, which holds that students come to the U.S. to study and then go back to their home countries. That’s what the student visas are based on. When you came, that was your intention as well. In what ways is that model not realistic?

RB: That question really gets at the heart of why I wrote this book. I felt a growing sense of frustration that in the U.S., we do not want to have a candid conversation about the pathway from higher education to skilled talent and how countries grow their talent pool.

In almost every developed country—look at the U.K. Australia, New Zealand, Germany, many others—the pathway from education to immigration has been omnipresent for a very long time. In the U.S., that’s not the case. If we look at the statistics, 70 to 80 percent of international students continue to stay on in the U.S. after their studies. Yet the flow of international students is still viewed within this framework of “exchange,” this pantomime, as you said earlier, of bilateral exchange. But it’s not an exchange. Many more students are coming than going. The number who come on exchange programs, like the flagship Fulbright Program, is very, very small. Most students who are coming here are individually motivated students funding their way.

One of the biggest challenges is that the F-1 international student visa continues to remain what’s called a “single intent visa,” which means that an undergraduate student at the age of 17 has to stand before a consular affairs officer in their home country and say, “Yes, I’m fairly certain that after four years, I’m coming back.” How can you know? We don’t ask 17-year-olds in the U.S. to know exactly what they’re going to decide four years down the line. I think most students are being honest, stating what they think is the right thing for them. It was true for me. But you evolve and change.

VP: So what reforms to the system what would you propose?

RB: First, remove that single-intent requirement of the student visa. Another issue is that currently, the applied work opportunities that international students have after their studies, through the Optional Practical Training Program, are incredibly fraught. The program was not created by legislation. So it’s like a sword hanging over every international student: Will I be able to pursue this one year of work after studies or not? What’s going to happen?

More generally, we need to smooth that pathway from being a student to joining the workforce. The restrictions and backlogs right now are really significant. It’s an issue of looking at the talent that the U.S. is losing — talent that’s been trained in the U.S.

VP: How does the U.S. immigration system shape the experience of international students while they’re here? How do they have a different experience from a similarly situated American student who might be in the same program with them?

RB: There’s this crippling sense of uncertainty that governs your entire time in the U.S. There are so many immigration rules to abide by, for example, in how much coursework you need to take each semester. Most American students are free to take the semester off, particularly graduate students: “I’ll continue to enroll, but I’m going to go work for two years at the World Bank.” None of that freedom exists for international students. When you’re an international student, everything you do in your program of study is governed by immigration rules.

I say sarcastically in the book that many people have the stereotype that “Oh, international students are brilliant, they finish their doctoral degrees in just five or six years, they’re so smart.” It’s not that they’re smart. They don’t have a choice. There is no option but to keep marching along and to meet those requirements, or you immediately fall out of status and have to head back to your country.

This sense of uncertainty hovers over you as you go through that pathway. It’s an endless process of waiting and not knowing. You’re applying for your Optional Practical Training work permit, and then you’re waiting and waiting, because you don’t know when it’ll come through. Then you might apply for an H1-B work permit. And that comes with its own uncertainties. It’s really something that governs an international student’s entire existence in the way that American students don’t even have to ever think about.

VP: How does that compare to say, the experience in Canada?

RB: The policies in Canada are much friendlier to international students because of that clear understanding that education is a pathway to careers and the workforce.

VP: Many people who want to restrict but not eliminate immigration want to skew it toward highly educated individuals who bring lots of human capital. But I worry about some of the potential side effects of that model. Part of the implicit American social contract—which is not always honored—is that we respect each other as individuals, and especially in the context of work. We respect the person who’s doing a job. We don’t look down on them because it’s a lower-paid job or requires less education. The work itself is worthy of respect. Does taking in lots of privileged people from hierarchical societies like India’s risk eroding the egalitarian relationships of everyday American life? Do people who come from the elite of highly hierarchical societies bring that elite view with them and inject it into daily American life?

RB: That is a fabulous question. And I do not put myself above that. I do think that there’s something special about entering a new society as a student, because you’re like a sponge, and you’re at an age where your values and ideas and beliefs are still being shaped. And so the experience can have a profound and transformative impact on a person. And it definitely did on me.

I realize that I came in with a lot of those ideas that you just laid out, from a society that was very rigidly structured across class lines. I had my own biases and beliefs, whether it was about race and skin color, or the dignity of labor. Being in the U.S. really forced me to confront my own biases, and to evolve and change into being more open in my thinking, and hopefully being a better human being.

And so that’s one thing that I’m imparting to students these days, when they ask me, I want to come to the U.S. and study, how can I succeed? One of my challenges to them is really think about making yourself open to how a society can actually transform you.

VP: How did studying and living in the U.S. help you understand India better?

RB: When you leave your home, and you’re away for sufficient enough period of time, it really gives you that sense of objectivity and the feeling of being an outsider looking in — knowing that society really well, but still being one step removed. For me, those learnings were largely around sexism and my place in the world as a young woman: seeing my homeland and my society for what it is and realizing that that’s not what I wanted for myself, that I wanted something different.

VP:  Even though there are certainly negative experiences in the book, it did make me feel good about the country. It was a positive view of America—not a beautiful fairy tale, but if you want to come here and then you end up staying, there must be something good about the country.

RB:  I’m really happy to hear you say that. What draws people to the U.S.? I say in the book that it’s the country that gave the world Indiana Jones. I wasn’t trying to be flippant — but just to say that there’s this idea of freedom embodied in different ways: freedom of thought, the freedom to pursue one’s aspirations, freedom to reinvent yourself.

VP: You have a great example of your surprise at seeing somebody in the U.S. who had braces as an adult. You see it as a sign of reinventing yourself.

RB:  It’s that freedom, manifested in many different ways, that students also encounter as soon as they arrive here. They are pushed to think in ways they had not experienced before. And I think it’s what really draws people here. It’s still present, despite all of the challenges that the country has had over the past four or five years.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Virginia Postrel is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. She is a visiting fellow at the Smith Institute for Political Economy and Philosophy at Chapman University and the author, most recently, of “The Fabric of Civilization: How Textiles Made the World.”

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale

Germania. 2021Q3, Iacp +6.0%, Autovetture Export -17.2%, Import -29.8%.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

20211-12-04.

2021-12-01__ Germania Iapc annuale 001

                         In sintesi.

– Iapc, Indice Armonizzato dei Prezzi al Consumo, +6.0 anno su anno

– Automobili, export “This was a decrease of 17.2% compared with the same period one year earlier”

– Automobili, import “declined even more on the third quarter of 2020, by 29.8%”

* * * * * * *

Germania – IPP (Indice dei Prezzi di Produzione) (Annuale) +18.4%.

Germania – Indice dei prezzi all’Importazione (Annuale) +21.7%.

Germany Industrial Production MoM -1.1%.

Germania – Vendite al dettaglio (Annuale) -0.9%.

Immatricolazioni auto tedesche annue -34.9%.

* * * * * * *

Tutti questi macrodati sono simili a quelli di Weimar, agli inizi della crisi. Per le automobili non c’è un declino delle vendite: non ne vendono proprio.

Si è curiosi di vedere come il nuovo governo riuscirà a finanziare le sue ambizioni Grüne, sempre che non vada prima in default.

* * * * * * *


Destatis. Exports of passenger cars down 17.2% in the 3rd quarter of 2021 year on year

                         Pressrelease #540 from 29 November 2021

– The lack of chips and delivery bottlenecks reduced German car imports and exports

– Foreign trade in electric cars continued on a high level, declines were recorded mainly for cars with combustion engines

* * * * * * *

Wiesbaden – German exports and imports of passenger cars declined strongly in the 3rd quarter of 2021. The lack of chips in the automotive industry and other delivery bottlenecks are the likely reasons for that development.  According to provisional data from the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), Germany exported passenger cars worth 23.1 billion euros from July to September 2021. This was a decrease of 17.2% compared with the same period one year earlier. Car imports declined even more on the third quarter of 2020, by 29.8% to 11.2 billion euros.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale

Blocco Europeo. Oct21. Immatricolazioni auto a picco. Default in vista – Acea.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-11-19.

2021-11-20__ Blocco Europeo Immatricolazioni 001

La Acea, Associazione europea dei costruttori di automobili, ha rilasciato il consueto report mensile sul numero delle immatricolazioni delle automobili nel blocco europeo.

Questo macrodato risulta essere particolarmente attendibile perché è una semplice conta, che non è trattata da algoritmo alcuno. Per questo motivo è un indicatore particolarmente robusto dello stato economico di una nazione.

Si tenga anche presente che il numero delle immatricolazioni corrisponde, grosso modo, al volume della produzione automobilistica.

* * * * * * *

Alcuni gli elementi da considerare.

In primo luogo, le immatricolazioni automobili sono crollate in tutti i grandi stati del blocco europeo. La crisi del settore è dunque un fenomeno continentale, di competenza dell’Unione Europea.

In secondo luogo, si osservi la profondità del crollo: dal -24.6% del Regno Unito fino al -35.7% dell’Italia.

In terzo luogo, tranne che per il Regno Unito, Francia, Germania ed Italia registrano peggioramenti di quasi dieci punti percentuali rispetto a quelli del mese precedente.

In quarto luogo, si consideri come questi cali delle immatricolazioni generino contrazioni della produzione, da cui ridimensionamento degli addetti e calo del gettito fiscale.

In quinto luogo, da ultimo ma non certo per ultimo, al di sotto di un certo volume di vendite la produzione automobilistica va in perdita, diventando quindi non sostenibile.

* * * * * * *

Mercedes-Benz fa fagotto e si trasferisce in Cina, che chiama ‘nuova Patria’

La situazione attuale è particolarmente severa.

Nella eurozona l’indice dei prezzi alla produzione è stimato essere aumentato del +16.0% anno su anno. E questo costituisce una ulteriore penalizzazione dell’industria automobilistica.

Per la sola Germania, inoltre, l’Indice dei prezzi all’Importazione è salito ad ottobre del +17.7%.

In conclusione, per il settore automobilistico si avvicina rapidamente il momento in cui dovrà uscire dal mercato.

Pubblicato in: Armamenti, Cina

Germania. Le navi da guerra cinesi montano motori tedeschi. Pecunia non olet.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-11-15.

2021-11-13__ Motori tedeschi 001

«Le navi da guerra cinesi sono dotate di motori sviluppati in Germania»

«Nonostante l’embargo europeo sulle armi deciso dall’Ue trentadue anni fa dopo i fatti di piazza Tiananmen, oggi le navi da guerra cinesi montano motori tedeschi»

«il gruppo MTU di Friedrichshafen ha fornito regolarmente i motori per i cacciatorpediniere a missili guidati della classe Luyang-III almeno fino al 2020, attraverso la produzione su licenza in Cina»

«la filiale MAN della VW ha anche fornito motori per navi da guerra cinesi»

«Entrambe le aziende hanno assicurato di aver rispettato tutti i regolamenti»

«Nonostante un embargo sulla fornitura di attrezzature militari alla Repubblica Popolare, una scappatoia nella legge sulle esportazioni dell’UE permette la fornitura di tecnologia che non è stata chiaramente sviluppata per scopi militari»

«Le società chiamate in causa …. sono la MTU e la filiale francese della MAN, società sussidiaria della Wolkswagen»

* * * * * * *

Pecunia non olet.

E bravi i nostri amici tedeschi.

Se non lo avessero già fatto da tempo, venderebbero l’anima al diavolo pur di guadagnare qualcosa. E non si venga a dire che i rispettivi governi non ne sapevano nulla.

* * * * * * *


Deutsche Firmen lieferten Motoren für chinesische Kriegsschiffe.

Chinesische Kriegsschiffe werden mit Motoren ausgerüstet, die in Deutschland entwickelt wurden. Recherchen von WELT AM SONNTAG und „Report München“ zufolge lieferte etwa der Konzern MTU in Friedrichshafen bis mindestens 2020 regelmäßig Motoren für Lenkwaffenzerstörer der Klasse Luyang-III, auf dem Umweg über eine Lizenzproduktion in China. Entsprechende Angaben in der öffentlich einsehbaren Datenbank des Friedensforschungsinstituts Sipri in Stockholm wurden von MTU nicht bestritten. Zumindest in der Vergangenheit lieferte nach eigenen Angaben auch die VW-Tochter MAN Antriebe für chinesische Kriegsschiffe.

Beide Unternehmen versicherten, alle Bestimmungen eingehalten zu haben. Trotz eines Lieferembargos für Rüstungsgüter für die Volksrepublik darf aufgrund einer Lücke im EU-Ausfuhrrecht Technik geliefert werden, die nicht eindeutig für Rüstungszwecke entwickelt wurde. MTU versicherte auf Anfrage, es habe nie selbst „Verträge mit dem chinesischen Verteidigungsministerium oder den Streitkräften“ geschlossen. Dies taten demnach offenbar Partner oder Lizenznehmer.

                         Traduzione.

Le navi da guerra cinesi sono dotate di motori sviluppati in Germania. Secondo una ricerca di WELT AM SONNTAG e “Report München”, il gruppo MTU di Friedrichshafen ha fornito regolarmente i motori per i cacciatorpediniere a missili guidati della classe Luyang-III almeno fino al 2020, attraverso la produzione su licenza in Cina. MTU non ha contestato le informazioni corrispondenti nel database accessibile al pubblico dell’istituto di ricerca sulla pace Sipri di Stoccolma. Almeno in passato, secondo le sue stesse informazioni, la filiale MAN della VW ha anche fornito motori per navi da guerra cinesi.

Entrambe le aziende hanno assicurato di aver rispettato tutti i regolamenti. Nonostante un embargo sulla fornitura di attrezzature militari alla Repubblica Popolare, una scappatoia nella legge sulle esportazioni dell’UE permette la fornitura di tecnologia che non è stata chiaramente sviluppata per scopi militari. MTU ha assicurato su richiesta di non aver mai concluso “contratti con il ministero della difesa cinese o le forze armate”. Questo era apparentemente fatto da partner o licenziatari.

* * * * * * *


Le navi da guerra cinesi montano motori tedeschi.

A rivelarlo è uno scoop di Die Welt e Ard. Ma le forniture sarebbero regolari nonostante l’embargo europeo sulle armi verso Pechino.

Nonostante l’embargo europeo sulle armi deciso dall’Ue trentadue anni fa dopo i fatti di piazza Tiananmen, oggi le navi da guerra cinesi montano motori tedeschi.

Lo rivela uno scoop del quotidiano tedesco Die Welt, dopo un’inchiesta condotta in collaborazione con l’emittente pubblica Ard. Ma le forniture sarebbero regolari.

A spiegare il perché è Sebastian Rossier, avvocato di Colonia ed esperto di export, che ai microfoni della tv tedesca ha chiarito che l’embargo sulle armi nei confronti della Cina “non è stato deciso formalmente in accordo con i trattati europei” e quindi “alcune esportazioni di motori per le navi possono essere permessi anche per la marina cinese”.

Le società chiamate in causa, come si legge sulla Deutsche Welle, sono due: la MTU e la filiale francese della MAN, società sussidiaria della Wolkswagen. Entrambe le compagnie hanno spiegato che le forniture sono pubbliche e in linea con la legislazione sull’export.

Secondo lo Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri) la MTU avrebbe fornito regolarmente i motori per i cacciatorpediniere classe Luyang III attraverso una fabbrica dislocata in Cina fino almeno al 2020.

I motori venivano utilizzati anche per i sottomarini di classe Song, ma la società ha chiarito che le forniture per questo tipo di mezzi sono state “interrotte definitivamente”.

Inoltre, ha proseguito l’azienda non esisterebbe alcun contratto di fornitura stipulato direttamente con il ministero della Difesa cinese o con le forze armate.

Secondo l’inchiesta, a fornire i motori, in effetti, sarebbe stata una joint venture creata in Cina nel 2010.

Anche la SEMT Pielstick, che fa parte del gruppo MAN, controllato dalla Volkswagen, nel 2002 consegnò una serie di motori PA6 che dovevano servire a far muovere le fregate cinesi equipaggiate con missili terra aria e cruise.

Tutto fatto secondo le regole, visto che i motori destinati alla flotta di Pechino, che il governo cinese ha intenzione di ampliare ulteriormente nei prossimi mesi, utilizzano una tecnologia dual-use, che non ha bisogno di licenze per essere esportata.

Pubblicato in: Devoluzione socialismo, Economia e Produzione Industriale

Germania. Agosto21. Produzione Industriale -4.0% MoM, -9.0% su dicembre19.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-10-08.

Fallimento__1011

«Supply shortages, high energy prices and production stoppages:

a toxic brew that already smells faintly of stagflation»

                         In sintesi.

– -4.0% on the previous month (price, seasonally and calendar adjusted).

– -9.0% below pre-crisis level.

– manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers dropped by 17.5%

– production in industry excluding energy and construction was down by 4.7%.

– production of capital goods showed a decrease of 7.8%.

* * * * * * *


Ricordiamo il precedente Report Manufacturing in August 2021: new orders down 7.7% on the previous month

* * * * * * *


Destatis. Production in August 2021: -4.0% on the previous month. Production 9.0% below pre-crisis level.

                         Production in industry

                         August 2021 (provisional):

-4.0% on the previous month (price, seasonally and calendar adjusted)

+1.7% on the same month a year earlier (price and calendar adjusted)

                         July 2021 (revised):

+1.3% on the previous month (price, seasonally and calendar adjusted)

+6.0% on the same month a year earlier (price and calendar adjusted)

* * * * * * *

Wiesbaden – In August 2021, production in industry was down by 4.0% on the previous month on a price, seasonally and calendar adjusted basis according to provisional data of the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis). Compared with August 2020, the increase in calendar adjusted production in industry amounted to 1.7%. Compared with February 2020, the month before restrictions were imposed due to the corona pandemic in Germany, production in August 2021 was 9.0% lower in seasonally and calendar adjusted terms.

In August 2021, production in industry excluding energy and construction was down by 4.7%. Producers continue to report about the production being constrained by a shortage of supply of intermediate products. Within industry, the production of capital goods showed a decrease of 7.8%.

The manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers dropped by 17.5% in August on July, the manufacture of machinery and equipment was down 6.3% on a month earlier. The production of consumer goods declined by 2.6% and that of intermediate goods by 2.4%.

Outside industry, energy production was up by 4.1% in July 2021 and the production in construction decreased by 3.1%.

In July 2021, the corrected figure on the production in industry showed an increase of 1.3% (provisional: +1.0%) from June 2021.

The rates of change refer to the production index for industry (2015 = 100). Seasonal and calendar adjustment was made using the X-13 JDemetra+ method.

Basic data and long time series on the production index in industry are also available in the table “Index of production in manufacturing” (42153-0001) in the GENESIS-Online database.

* * * * * * *


German industrial production slumps on supply chain disruption

– Output falls 4.0% m/m, steepest drop since April 2020

– Production of cars and car parts down 17.5%

– Economists see strong upturn if bottlenecks clear

* * *

BERLIN, Oct 7 (Reuters) – German industrial output suffered its steepest drop in August since April last year, due to supply chain disruptions that are holding back growth in Europe’s biggest economy and hitting the auto sector particularly hard, official data showed on Thursday.

The Federal Statistics Office said industrial output fell by 4.0% on the month after an increase of 1.3% in July. A Reuters poll had pointed to a decline in August of 0.4%.

“Manufacturers continue to report production constraints due to supply shortages of intermediate products,” the office said in a statement.

Production of cars and car parts fell by 17.5% on the month.

German car companies are struggling to meet a post-pandemic surge in demand since the start of the year, due to a lack of microchips and other intermediate products.

Carmaker BMW  said its group deliveries were down 12.2% in the third quarter, hit by the microchip crunch.

On Tuesday, Daimler truck boss Martin Daum said he expected the global chip shortage to continue to affect production next year.

“We will definitely deliver less than we could have sold, and that also applies to next year,” he said, adding that it was impossible to say how big the shortfalls would be.

“It’s a fight for every chip,” he added.

Official data released on Wednesday showed German industrial orders fell more than expected in August on weaker demand from abroad following two months of unusually strong gains due to major contracts.

However, the Munich-based Ifo economic institute said separately that its survey of production expectations rose in September.

“Order books are still full, only materials bottlenecks are causing problems at the moment and dampening production plans somewhat,” Ifo economist Klaus Wohlrabe said.

Thomas Gitzel, economist at VP Bank, said “if the flow of materials gets going again, the conditions are in place for a strong upturn in industrial activity.”

Carsten Brzeski, at ING, said that for now it looked like that upturn would “come rather later than sooner.”

Separately, prices for newly built residential buildings rose by 12.6% on the year in August, their biggest rise since November 1970. German consumer prices rose by rose by 4.1% year-on-year last month.

Jens-Oliver Niklasch, economist at LBBW, commented: “Supply shortages, high energy prices and production stoppages: a toxic brew that already smells faintly of stagflation.”

Pubblicato in: Commercio, Devoluzione socialismo

Germania. Agosto21. Prezzi all’importazione +16.5% rispetto ad agosto20.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2021-10-02.

2021-01-30__ Germania Import 001

                         In sintesi.

– Import prices +16.5% on the same month a year earlier

– Export prices +7.2% on the same month a year earlier

– In August 2021 energy imports were 93.6% more expensive than in August 2020.

– The largest influence on the year-on-year rate of energy price increase in August 2021 had natural gas with a plus of 177.5% and crude oil with a plus of 63.6%.

* * * * * * *

Destatis ha rilasciato il Report Import prices in August 2021: +16.5% on August 2020.

Pressrelease #457 from 29 September 2021

                         Import prices, August 2021

+1.4% on the previous month

+16.5% on the same month a year earlier

                         Export prices, August 2021

+0.7% on the previous month

+7.2% on the same month a year earlier

* * * * * * *


Wiesbaden – As reported by the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), the index of import prices increased by 16.5% in August 2021 compared with the corresponding month of the preceding year. This has been the highest year-on-year change since September 1981 (+17.4% on September 1980). In July 2021 and in June 2021 the annual rates of change were +15.0% and +12.9%, respectively. From July 2021 to August 2021 the index rose by 1.4%.

                         High price increase mainly caused by energy price development

In August 2021 energy imports were 93.6% more expensive than in August 2020. The largest influence on the year-on-year rate of energy price increase in August 2021 had natural gas with a plus of 177.5% and crude oil with a plus of 63.6%.

The index of import prices, excluding crude oil and mineral oil products, increased by 13.8% in August 2021 compared with August 2020 and in comparison with July 2021 it rose by 1.6%.

The index of export prices increased by 7.2% in August 2021 compared with the corresponding month of the preceding year. This has been the highest year-on-year-change since September 1981 (+7.3% on September 1980). In July 2021 and in June 2021 the annual rates of change were +6.3% and +5.0%, respectively. From July 2021 to August 2021 the index rose by 0.7%.