Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Ecb. Weidmann si prepara a succedere a Mr Draghi.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-02–24.

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Il rinnovo dei vertici della Banca Centrale Europea (Ecb) è un evento particolarmente delicato e complesso.

Sono innumerevoli gli elementi che giocano a rendere difficile le cose.

In primo luogo, i partiti che erano al governo negli stati dell’Unione Europea quando alcuni anni or sono si decise l’avvicendamento al governatorato Ecb non sono stati rinnovati nelle elezioni, e le posizioni dei nuovi governi sono tuttora ben poco chiare.

In secondo luogo, a dispetto della tanto sbandierata autonomia della banca centrale, sia le cariche apicali sono decise politicamente, sia la linea di politica economica è condizionata alle esigenze delle economia principali. Sarebbe fin troppo ingenuo nascondersi questa verità.

In terzo luogo, il contesto mondiale è cambiato drasticamente nel corso degli ultimi due anni. Soprattutto gli Stati Uniti incidono al momento con la loro riduzione delle tasse di 1,500 miliardi, con un piano di investimenti infrastrutturali di 1,600 miliardi e con la svalutazione politica del dollaro. Ciò che più o meno poteva andar bene prima potrebbe benissimo non andar più bene ora e, soprattutto, in un futuro anche prossimo.

In quarto luogo, ad un vicepresidente scelto tra i paesi del sud dovrebbe corrispondere un presidente preso dai paesi del nord. Non a caso il Governatore della Banca Centrale lettone, Mr Ilmars Rimsevics, è stato arrestato con perfetto tempismo: un concorrente di meno.

In quinto luogo, una nomina di tale livello non può essere presa senza aver sentito anche il parere almeno del Governo degli Stati Uniti, del Regno Unito, della Cina, della Russia e dell’India. Sentire il parere non significa certo prenderne ordini: significa soltanto cercare di concertare azioni non divergenti.

In sesto luogo vi è poi lo sguardo sul futuro. La principale incognita sarebbe quelle tedesca. Mentre la socialdemocrazia vede scendere i propri consensi elettorali giorno dopo giorno, nel converso Alternative für Deutschland vede crescere la propria potenzialità politica. Nella Germania Orientale è oramai il secondo partito, distanziato di un solo punto percentuale dalla Cdu. Anche qualora, come sembrerebbe essere verosimile, si possa formare una nuova Große Koalition, essa dovrà ben tenere presente che metà della base elettorale dell’Spd non la voleva, ed AfD potrebbe tollerare anche molto male un Governatore dell’Ecb diverso da Herr Weidmann. Con tutte le conseguenze di una simile scelta.

In settimo luogo vi sono considerazioni di politica economica. Il nuovo Governatore dovrà affrontare problemi non da poco: la fine degli easing, lo smaltimento dei titoli detenuti dall’Ecb, i debiti sovrani, il cambio euro / dollaro, solo per citarne alcuni dei principali.

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Come si vede, è un quadro molto complesso, ove ogni azione che oggi potrebbe anche sembrare essere ottimale in un domani poterebbe rivelarsi essere un fallimento.

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«If Mr. Draghi is a classic dove on monetary policy, then Mr. Weidmann is a hawk. Countries like Greece and Portugal will no doubt ruefully recall the extremely painful austerity measures demanded by former German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaüble during their economic crises.»

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«at the time in 2012, the main opposition to Mr. Draghi’s plan, which probably saved the euro from collapse, came from Mr. Weidmann.»

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«The Bundesbank chief told Der Spiegel magazine that the bond purchases were “too close to state financing via the money printing press for me. The central bank cannot fundamentally solve the problems this way. It runs the risk of creating new problems.”»

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«For that to happen, Germany would have to go along, so there may be a deal in the making to enable Germany’s choice at the ECB and France’s position at the commission.»

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«The process of choosing senior officials at the European Central Bank always has been an intricate kabuki drama, with countries forced to delicately balance their political and financial interests with those of other countries and even regions»

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«The main cause for such optimism was the decision disclosed on Monday that EU countries have coalesced around the Spanish economy minister, Luis de Guindos, to become vice president of the ECB»

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«when the richer northern part of the EU supports a single candidate from the EU’s southern states for the vice president’s job at the ECB, the top job at the central bank is supposed to go to a candidate from a northern country»

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«A bigger issue is likely to be the Bundesbank’s well known hard-money policies: abhorrence of debt, zero interest rates, and quantitative easing –- central bank purchases of bonds – which have been vigorously deployed by Mr. Draghi to pull Europe out of its economic malaise»

* * * * * * *

Segnaliamo infine un’ultima, grande difficoltà.

Oltre alle violente partigianerie, si sommano al tutto alcuni elementi decisamente negativi.

– Molti dei capi di stato europei hanno una preparazione economica miseranda, per essere del tutto benevoli, ed, almeno dalle loro parole, difficilmente riescono a produrre un qualcosa che superi lo slogan elettorale. Ben difficilmente il nuovo Governatore potrà avere con loro colloqui produttivi.

– Stati membri e la stessa Unione Europea stanno attraversando un periodo di chaos politico quale mai si era visto negli ultimi settanta anni. Ciò priva il nuovo Governatore di interlocutori fattivi.

*

Solo la Divina Misericordia può salvare l’Europa“. Non vorremmo che questa frase detta da una eminente personalità dell’Ecb si debba concretizzare.


Handelsblatt. 2018-02-22. Path clear for Germany’s Weidmann to succeed Draghi as head of ECB

A consensus for Spain’s Luis de Guindos to be vice president of the ECB sets stage for the head of the Bundesbank to nab the crucial top job.

*

The process of choosing senior officials at the European Central Bank always has been an intricate kabuki drama, with countries forced to delicately balance their political and financial interests with those of other countries and even regions. The personnel drama has started once again, and officials in Berlin are more optimistic than ever before that when the final curtain comes down, a German banker will be seated as the head of the ECB for the first time.

The main cause for such optimism was the decision disclosed on Monday that EU countries have coalesced around the Spanish economy minister, Luis de Guindos, to become vice president of the ECB. In the process, Ireland’s central bank chief, Philip Lane, dropped out of the running for the deputy job. The term of the current vice president, Portugal’s Vitor Constâncio, ends in May.

The complex process works like this: when the richer northern part of the EU supports a single candidate from the EU’s southern states for the vice president’s job at the ECB, the top job at the central bank is supposed to go to a candidate from a northern country. But filling that job also depends on who becomes the next head of the European Commission, a post now held by Luxembourg’s Jean-Claude Juncker, and the European Council president, a post now occupied by Poland’s Donald Tusk.

—–

“Weidmann has a good chance.” [Guntram Wolff, director, Bruegel think tank]

—–

In addition to Mr. Lane dropping from consideration for the ECB, Mr. De Guindos needed to win the support of Germany and France, leaders of the northern bloc, to get the vice president’s job. That also happened Monday, with Germany’s interim finance minister, Peter Altmaier, saying the Spaniard is “an excellent choice.” A final decision will be made at the summit of EU leaders in March.

German officials now hope that the stage has been set for Jens Weidmann, the current head of the German central bank, the Bundesbank, to succeed ECB president Mario Draghi, whose term ends in October 2019. “The election of De Guindos as vice president is another building block to strengthen Weidmann’s candidacy,” said Daniel Gros, head of the Center for European Policy Studies, a Brussels-based think tank.

Another reason for the optimism is that even though Germany has the largest economy in Europe, a German has never been chosen as ECB president. “Everyone knows that and that’s why Weidmann has a good chance,” said Guntram Wolff, director of the Brussels-based economic think tank, Bruegel.

Still, Mr. Weidmann will have to overcome European doubts on a number of fronts. Germany has never held the job before because there was a reluctance to give Germans so much power after World War II, but those memories have mostly faded and no longer represent much of an obstacle.

A bigger issue is likely to be the Bundesbank’s well known hard-money policies: abhorrence of debt, zero interest rates, and quantitative easing –- central bank purchases of bonds – which have been vigorously deployed by Mr. Draghi to pull Europe out of its economic malaise.

In addition, the ECB is already located in Frankfurt and the bank’s structure was purposely modeled on the Bundesbank, which some critics believe is enough German influence.

If Mr. Draghi is a classic dove on monetary policy, then Mr. Weidmann is a hawk. Countries like Greece and Portugal will no doubt ruefully recall the extremely painful austerity measures demanded by former German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaüble during their economic crises.

For example, would Mr. Weidmann be as willing as Mr. Draghi to announce that the ECB would buy unlimited amounts of sovereign bonds from struggling countries in the European southern tier? In fact, at the time in 2012, the main opposition to Mr. Draghi’s plan, which probably saved the euro from collapse, came from Mr. Weidmann.

The Bundesbank chief told Der Spiegel magazine that the bond purchases were “too close to state financing via the money printing press for me. The central bank cannot fundamentally solve the problems this way. It runs the risk of creating new problems.”

Officials in Brussels believe the final decision on ECB chief may depend on French President Emmanuel Macron. He is said to be keen for France to get the commission president’s job when Mr. Juncker steps down. For that to happen, Germany would have to go along, so there may be a deal in the making to enable Germany’s choice at the ECB and France’s position at the commission.

Annunci
Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Unione Europea

Ecb. Draghi. Il dramma dell’euro forte.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-01-26.

2017-12-05__ martin-schulz-angela-merkel

«The development makes it harder to exit crisis-era measures»

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«European Central Bank President Mario Draghi voiced concerns Thursday over the surging euro»

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«the single currency of the 19-member eurozone climbed to 1.25 euros against the greenback»

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«The recent volatility in exchange rates represents a source of uncertainty which requires monitoring with regard to its possible implications for the medium-term outlook for price stability»

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«Draghi warned the euro strength was complicating the central bank’s efforts to exit crisis-era stimulus measures»

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«ECB policymakers decided to keep the benchmark interest rate on hold and leave the massive bond-buying program unchanged»

* * * * * * * *

Come solitamente avviene, le notizie importanti sono inframmezzate alle facezie di rito.

Nessuno così potrebbe dire che non siano state dette, ma il loro reperimento resta anche molto ostacolato.

«The development makes it harder to exit crisis-era measures»

*

Siamo franchi: da questa crisi non si esce certo in questa maniera.

Poniamo però una domanda.

Se quel pover’uomo di Draghi avesse bisogno di “parlare con l’Europa”, a chi mai potrebbe telefonare?

«Is Europe’s economy back on track?»

No. Semplicemente no.


Deutsche Welle. 2018-01-25. ECB’s Mario Draghi worried about euro strength

Following a meeting of central bank governors, ECB chief Mario Draghi has voiced concerns about the current strength of the euro area’s single currency. The development makes it harder to exit crisis-era measures.

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European Central Bank President Mario Draghi voiced concerns Thursday over the surging euro. As he talked to reporters following a governors’ policy meeting in Frankfurt, the single currency of the 19-member eurozone climbed to 1.25 euros against the greenback, hitting the highest level since September 2012.

Draghi warned the euro strength was complicating the central bank’s efforts to exit crisis-era stimulus measures.

“The recent volatility in exchange rates represents a source of uncertainty which requires monitoring with regard to its possible implications for the medium-term outlook for price stability,” Draghi said in a statement.

Consumer prices in focus

A stronger euro makes imports cheaper, keeping the lid on consumer prices and putting the ECB’s goal of an inflation rate just below 2.0 percent further out of reach.

It also hurts eurozone exporters whose goods become more expensive, potentially sapping growth in the euro area.

Earlier on Thursday, ECB policymakers decided to keep the benchmark interest rate on hold and leave the massive bond-buying program unchanged.

Draghi insisted that “an ample degree” of stimulus support was still needed despite an increasingly robust economic recovery in the 19-member bloc.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Unione Europea

Ecb dimezza gli acquisti titoli a partire da gennaio.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-10-26.

Debiti 000

«La Bce, …. dimezza gli acquisti di titoli a partire dal prossimo gennaio. Il Quantitative easing dunque passa da 60 a 30 miliardi di acquisti mensili, a partire dal gennaio e almeno fino a settembre, ma anche oltre se necessario. La Bce ha peraltro ribadito che «se le prospettive diverranno meno favorevoli o se le condizioni finanziarie risulteranno incoerenti con ulteriori progressi verso un aggiustamento durevole del profilo dell’inflazione, il consiglio direttivo è pronto a incrementare il programma in termini di entità e o durata».

Ora tutte le attese sono sulla conferenza stampa di Mario Draghi, che spiegherà nel dettaglio le decisioni assunte dal Consiglio.

«Non abbiamo discusso di scenari alternativi. Devo dire – ha commentato Draghi – che c’è stata un’atmosfera molto positiva in cui tutti i governatori hanno sottolineato la forza perdurante dell’economia e i riflessi sul mercato del lavoro dove sono stati creati 7 milioni di posti di lavoro in quattro anni». Tuttavia resta che «per fruire appieno dei benefici derivanti dalle nostre misure di politica monetaria, le altre politiche devono fornire un contributo decisivo al rafforzamento del potenziale di crescita a più lungo termine e alla riduzione delle vulnerabilità».

Draghi ha sottolineato che «l’attuazione delle riforme strutturali va considerevolmente accelerata per consolidare la capacità di tenuta, ridurre la disoccupazione strutturale e rafforzare il potenziale di crescita e la produttività nell’area dell’euro». Per quanto concerne le politiche di bilancio, ha aggiunto Draghi, «a tutti i paesi gioverebbe intensificare gli sforzi per conseguire una composizione delle finanze pubbliche piu’ favorevole alla crescita».» [Sole 24 Ore]

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In sintesi: da gennaio gli easing saranno dimezzati, con tutte le relative conseguenze.

Il Governatore Draghi ha poi ribadito un concetto su cui ritorna da anni, ed in modo sempre più accorato.

«per fruire appieno dei benefici derivanti dalle nostre misure di politica monetaria, le altre politiche devono fornire un contributo decisivo al rafforzamento del potenziale di crescita a più lungo termine e alla riduzione delle vulnerabilità»

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«l’attuazione delle riforme strutturali va considerevolmente accelerata per consolidare la capacità di tenuta, ridurre la disoccupazione strutturale e rafforzare il potenziale di crescita e la produttività nell’area dell’euro»

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Senza riforme strutturali, ossia deburocratizzazione, senza abrogazione di leggi, norme e regolamenti che vincolano il sistema economico, tutte le misure prese dalla Banca Centrale andranno perse.

Questa era la sfida che i precedenti governi europei non hanno né saputo né voluto sfruttare, e che i governi attuali avranno grande difficoltà a recepire.

L’era del socialismo ideologico è finita.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Senza categoria, Unione Europea

Ecb. Mala tempora currunt, atque peiora premunt.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-10-15.

Banche 016. Marinus Van Reymerswaele, Prestatori di denaro, 1542.

La Banca Centrale Europea, Ecb, sta apprestandosi ad invertire politica economica perseguita negli ultimi dieci anni.

Si apre un periodo ove le previsioni sono tutte aleatorie. Solo una considerazione sembrerebbe essere possibile quanto doverosa: la crisi politica che attanaglia l’Europa contribuirà potentemente a rendere ancor più complessa la situazione.

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«European Central Bank officials are considering cutting their monthly bond buying by at least half starting in January and keeping their program active for at least nine months»

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«Reducing quantitative easing to 30 billion euros ($36 billion) a month from the current pace of 60 billion euros is a feasible option, said the officials, who asked not to be identified because the deliberations are private. While the central bank’s governors are split on the need to identify an end date for purchases, a pledge to keep buying bonds until September — with the proviso that it could be extended if needed — may offer grounds for compromise»

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«The tapering of QE by the Federal Reserve and the gradual increase in policy rates seems like a good example to follow. Markets reacted overall rather smoothly, and major turbulences have been avoided, at least so far.»

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«the eurozone situation is a bit more complicated. One of the reasons for concern is that markets do not appear to have a clear understanding of the monetary framework that will prevail once QE is phased out, in particular how the bank would react to a resurgence of financial tensions, a new economic slowdown or recession»

*

«But the ECB has set clear limits to the amount of government bonds it can buy in the markets, defined in terms of proportion of overall public debt (33 per cent) and of each country’s specific debt issue (33 per cent), in relation to the bank’s capital key. These limits were set largely to avoid infringing Maastricht treaty provisions that prohibit the ECB from financing member states»

*

«the central bank should be more active in regaining room for manoeuvre, by ending QE sooner and raising rates earlier than foreseen by markets»

* * * * * * * *

L’emersione del drogato dal coma eroico è una delle peggiori esperienze possibili nella vita umana. Quelle poche ore di euforia avulsa dalla realtà è pagata ad usura nel presente e nel futuro.

La crisi dei subprime non è stata soltanto una crisi finanziaria: è entrato in crisi il sistema politico occidentale, trascinandosi con esso un violento riassestamento del comparto produttivo.

Nell’ottica delle allora imperanti teorie politiche ed economiche, la banche centrali hanno surrogato uno strabiliante vuoto politico e gestionale, ma lo hanno fatto al costo di generare moneta immessa a sostegno dei debiti pubblici che si espandevano a velocità consistente. I debiti sovrani sono l’incubo dell’Occidente, checché ne dicano gli economisti liberal e socialisti.

Ma nulla si genera dal nulla.

Le operazioni perseguite dalla Fed negli Stati Uniti e dall’Ecb nell’Eurozona in pratica compravano a ben caro prezzo tempo che gli stati avrebbero dovuto impiegare per riorganizzarsi strutturalmente, fare le necessarie sia pur dolorose riforme, cosa che non hanno fatto.

Se è vero che nel corso dell’ultimo anno le vecchie dirigenze sono state spazzate vie dalle elezioni, è altrettanto vero che le formazioni politiche di rimpiazzo sono variegate e frammentate, spesso con idee ben poco chiare.

Alla fine si dovrà ben affrontare i due problemi dell’Occidente: quello dei debiti sovrani e quello dei così detti ‘diritti precostituiti’, oramai indifendibili. Questa Stalingrado ideologica sta per arrendersi ed a ben poco valgono gli altisonanti proclami di una impossibile “vittoria finale“.

Negli ultimi tempi della guerra correva una battuta: “godetevi la guerra finché dura, che la pace sarà terribile“.

Bene, gli illusi si godano pure gli ultimi tempi degli interventi della Banca Centrale, che poi avranno un ben duro risveglio.

«the central bank should be more active in regaining room for manoeuvre, by ending QE sooner and raising rates earlier than foreseen by markets»

Interessi in crescita saranno la morte degli stati iperindebitati. Come dovevasi dimostrare.



Bloomberg. 2017-10-13. ECB to Consider Cutting QE Purchases in Half Next Year

– Some officials favor extending QE at EU30b for nine months

– ECB to announce future of bond-buying program on Oct.26

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European Central Bank officials are considering cutting their monthly bond buying by at least half starting in January and keeping their program active for at least nine months, according to officials familiar with the debate.

Reducing quantitative easing to 30 billion euros ($36 billion) a month from the current pace of 60 billion euros is a feasible option, said the officials, who asked not to be identified because the deliberations are private. While the central bank’s governors are split on the need to identify an end date for purchases, a pledge to keep buying bonds until September — with the proviso that it could be extended if needed — may offer grounds for compromise, they said.

Policy makers led by President Mario Draghi are becoming increasingly confident that ECB policy makers will on Oct. 26 agree to the specifics of how much debt the euro-area’s central banks will buy in the coming year. After more than 2 1/2 years of trying to revive the region’s economy through bond purchases, some governors see the recent period of robust growth as a reason to rein in the support. Others are concerned that inflation remains too weak.

Any changes to the sum and time frame of quantitative easing would still fit into the ECB’s present guidance on monetary policy, which commits the ECB to promise “a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its inflation aim.” It also pledges that if “the outlook becomes less favorable, or if financial conditions become inconsistent with further progress toward a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation, the Governing Council stands ready to increase the program in terms of size and/or duration.”

Council members have yet to officially discuss options. 

An ECB spokesman declined to comment.

The euro strengthened as much as 0.2 percent against the dollar on the news. It was trading at 1.1839 at 8:56 a.m. in Frankfurt on Friday. Euro-area 10-year government bond yields were a basis point or two lower across the core and most periphery markets.

The institution’s chief economist Peter Praet has hinted on several occasions that he would prefer to allow QE to continue at a slower pace for longer if markets stay calm, arguing that a substantial amount of aid is still needed to spur inflation toward the ECB’s goal of running inflation just below 2 percent. He also said this week that officials should consider making public some of the details on how maturing debt bought under QE is reinvested.

“Crucially, the baseline scenario for future inflation remains contingent on easy financing conditions, which, to a large extent, depend on the support of monetary policy,” Praet said at an event in Washington on Thursday. The ECB Governing Council “will recalibrate its instruments accordingly, with a view to delivering the monetary policy impulse that remains necessary to secure a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation.”

In the meantime, Draghi said in Washington that the ECB’s promise that interest rates will remain low “well past” bond-buying is “very, very important.”

The IMF this week predicted the euro area will grow 2.1 percent this year before slowing to 1.9 percent in 2018. It estimated inflation of 1.5 percent this year and 1.4 percent next year.


Financial Times. 2017-10-13. The ECB’s self-imposed limits complicate its QE exit

Markets are worried by the restricted room for manoeuvre on monetary policy.

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The decision by the European Central Bank to phase out, and eventually exit, the asset purchase programme — its version of quantitative easing — which should be taken in the coming weeks, is creating increasing concern in financial markets. Looking at the US experience, these worries seem unjustified. The tapering of QE by the Federal Reserve and the gradual increase in policy rates seems like a good example to follow. Markets reacted overall rather smoothly, and major turbulences have been avoided, at least so far. However, the eurozone situation is a bit more complicated. One of the reasons for concern is that markets do not appear to have a clear understanding of the monetary framework that will prevail once QE is phased out, in particular how the bank would react to a resurgence of financial tensions, a new economic slowdown or recession. For the other central banks that have embarked on QE, like the Fed, the Bank of Japan or the Bank of England, the answer is straightforward. There should be no reason why the respective monetary framework should change after QE is phased out. In the event of a new recession, the central bank could restart its expansionary policies, either by cutting rates or embarking on fresh QE. Increasing its balance sheet again would not represent a major challenge. But the ECB has set clear limits to the amount of government bonds it can buy in the markets, defined in terms of proportion of overall public debt (33 per cent) and of each country’s specific debt issue (33 per cent), in relation to the bank’s capital key. These limits were set largely to avoid infringing Maastricht treaty provisions that prohibit the ECB from financing member states.

The implementation of the asset purchase programme over the last two and a half years has brought the ECB very close to the limits set for the amount of government bonds it can buy from some member states. The remainder of the programme should be implemented over the coming months, depending on the speed of tapering, without major problems. But, given that the assets purchased will remain on the bank’s balance sheet even after the end of QE, and that the proceeds obtained at maturity will be reinvested, room for manoeuvre will be limited over the next few years. It would indeed be very difficult, if not impossible, for the ECB to restart QE if the bloc’s economy experienced a sudden slowdown in the coming years, or a resurgence of financial instability. Unlike the other central banks, the scope for further extending the ECB’s balance sheet may be near the end, unless the rules are changed — but that would risk triggering legal challenges. One way to relax monetary conditions would be to lower interest rates. There is in principle no limit for cutting rates further into negative territory, but the ECB itself recognised that at current levels the undesirable consequences of extra rate cuts for the financial system, and the possible impairment of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, may cancel the possible benefits. The bank could resort to other instruments, such as lending unlimited funds to banks at fixed rates (against collateral). However, such instruments have proved to be ineffective in a slowdown, when demand for credit is weak and interest rates have already hit the zero lower bound. They may be weakened even more if banks’ holdings of government bonds are further restricted or discouraged through higher capital requirements, as suggested in recent Franco-German proposals for eurozone reform. The transmission channel of monetary policy would also be impaired. These limitations may provoke suggestions that the central bank should be more active in regaining room for manoeuvre, by ending QE sooner and raising rates earlier than foreseen by markets. This strategy, which would depart drastically from that of the other central banks, would inject huge instability in the financial system, with inevitable repercussions on the real economy. So, as the implementation of QE approaches the limits set, the constraints on monetary policy as a tool for the eurozone could remain for considerable time. This will add to uncertainty, and is likely to impair markets’ ability properly to price sovereign risk. Self-fulfilling expectations and destabilising market dynamics could develop, exposing the bloc to renewed financial crisis. Monetary policy has for too long been the only option. But without it, the eurozone would again be in serious trouble. Clarifying what impact the exit from QE will have on the future room for manoeuvre on monetary policy would help dispel the fear of such a scenario.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Unione Europea

EurUsd. Le società dell’Eurozona perdono ad oggi il 5% – 8% degli utili.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-02.

2017-07-16__Eurocrati croppedimage530350-great

«L’euro ha guadagnato oltre il 12% da inizio anno e sta viaggiando ai massimi di due anni e mezzo contro dollaro»

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«Per gli strategist di Morgan Stanley una crescita del 10% dell’euro potrebbe far scendere gli utili della zona euro del 5-8% e limare la crescita del Pil dell’area dello 0,7% l’anno prossimo a causa del calo delle esportazioni»

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«Un contesto di questo tipo potrebbe creare dei problemi per le società europee in quanto sostengono una struttura dei costi che si basa a livello domestico per il 54% a fronte del 48% dei ricavi»

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«we Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands» [Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel – NYT]

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«really take our fate into our own hands.» [Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel – NYT]

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«Make our planet great again» [Emmanuel Macron – Cnn]

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«Bisogna smetterla di parlare degli Stati Uniti d’Europa,  la gente non li vuole» [JC Juncker]

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Il silenzio di Frau Merkel e di Mr Macron è davvero assordante.

EurUsd 1.1751. Mr Trump inizia a stritolare Frau Merkel ed i suoi ‘valori’.

Eur/Usd 1.1816. Mr Trump inizia a giocare ben duro.

No Comment.


Reuters. 2017-08-01. Euro forte, Morgan Stanley: pesa su utili società europee, finanziari ben posizionati

L’impatto del forte rialzo dell’euro sugli utili aziendali e sulle valutazioni di borsa delle società europee sta emergendo come uno dei temi cruciali nella stagione delle trimestrali in corso e Morgan Stanley si sta unendo al coro dei grandi broker che lanciano l’allarme sui conti degli esportatori.

Nonostante il rinnovato entusiamo degli investitori per l’azionario europeo da inizio anno, negli ultimi due mesi l’indice sulle borse continentali ha sofferto delle perdite sulla scia del deciso rally dell’euro che ha portato molti investitori ad alleggerire le proprie posizioni.

Per gli strategist di Morgan Stanley una crescita del 10% dell’euro potrebbe far scendere gli utili della zona euro del 5-8% e limare la crescita del Pil dell’area dello 0,7% l’anno prossimo a causa del calo delle esportazioni.

Secondo le stime attuali di Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S gli utili delle società europee del 2017 dovrebbero crescere del 12,4%.

L’euro ha guadagnato oltre il 12% da inizio anno e sta viaggiando ai massimi di due anni e mezzo contro dollaro. Un contesto di questo tipo potrebbe creare dei problemi per le società europee in quanto sostengono una struttura dei costi che si basa a livello domestico per il 54% a fronte del 48% dei ricavi, evidenzia Morgan Stanley.

Le società tecnologiche di hardware, alimentari, bevande e tabacco, e prodotti per la casa potrebbero essere le più colpite in quanto settori più esposti all’estero, mentre banche, real estate e utility potrebbero avere dei benefici poichè, al contrario, hanno la più bassa esposizione verso l’estero, dice Morgan Stanley.

Tra i titoli più vulnerabili, quelli che hanno beneficiato di un euro più debole negli ultimi anni come Infineon, Valeo, Faurecia, Nokian Pneumatici e Tod’s, specifica il broker.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Geopolitica Mondiale, Unione Europea

EurUsd 1.1751. Mr Trump inizia a stritolare Frau Merkel ed i suoi ‘valori’.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-07-30.

Donald Trump photographed at Trump Tower in NYC
Donald Trump photographed at the Trump Tower on 5th Ave. in Manhattan, NYC on Monday, September 21, 2015. (Damon Winter/ The New York Times)

«A pensar male si fa peccato, ma spesso ci si azzecca».

Profonda frase del grande Andreotti.

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Frau Merkel non è la Germania.

La Germania non è l’Unione Europea.

L’Unione Europea non è la Banca Centrale Europea.

La Banca Centrale Europea sembrerebbe non mettercela mica tutta per tenere basse le quotazioni dell’euro.

2017-07-29__EurUsd__001

Si constata come il tre marzo il rapporto Eur/Usd valesse 1.05 mentre il 28 luglio valeva 1.1751. In cinque mesi questo rapporto ha subito sostanziali variazioni e questo trend sembrerebbe dover durare nel tempo. Sotto la condizione che non varino le situazioni al contorno, se questo andamento si riconfermasse, a fine anno il rapporto Eur/Usd potrebbe toccare il valore di 1.30.

Sarebbe ben difficile non vedere dietro a codesta manovra la sapiente mano della Yellen, che è riuscita a deprezzare il dollaro pur lasciando aumentare i tassi di interesse. Così come sarebbe ben difficile non vedere dietro questa manovra un preciso piano politico americano. Volente o nolente, il quadro dirigenziale europeo alla fine sarà obbligato a razionalizzare che con gli Stati Uniti deve collaborare, non fare la fronda.

L’Eurozona non è forte a sufficienza da poter svolgere una politica monetaria indipendente. Più in generale, le sue ambizioni di indipendenza ed opposizione agli Stati Uniti sono mere utopie.  Mr Juncker e Frau Merkel alla fine saranno obbligati dai fatti a comprendere come sia impossibile risolvere i problemi senza tener conto del contesto generale.

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«Germany, the eurozone’s largest economy, wants to see a tighter policy, which is a better fit for the robust economy. Clearly however, the ECB under Draghi’s stewardship has no intentions of altering current policy until inflation moves closer to the ECB’s target of 2 percent» [Fonte]

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«At the same time, the euro, which has significantly strengthened recently on expectations of the fast curtailment of the QE program in the Eurozone, has a negative impact on inflation expectations. This will make it more difficult for the ECB to make decisions regarding monetary policy. The ECB has repeatedly stressed that to begin the reduction of the program to stimulate the economy of the Eurozone, stable signals of inflation growth in the region are needed. The rate of price growth in the Eurozone last month slowed to 1.3% per annum, being significantly below the target level of the ECB, which is just under 2%. And, according to the leaders of the ECB, the economy of the Eurozone still needs “very significant” incentive measures because of low inflation» [Fonte]

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«According to the OECD’s calculations, fair value for EUR/USD as defined by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) currently lies at 1.34.  Not all methods suggest that fair value is quite so high.  However, the Bloomberg calculated PPPs based on CPI inflation, PPI inflation and the Big Mac method all suggest that EUR/USD is currently between 0.02% and 18.5% undervalued» [Fonte]

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The German economy and the dollar-euro exchange rate

«To clarify why Germany has not recorded an upswing in GDP growth recently despite last year’s marked depreciation of the euro against most other world currencies, which – according to economic intuition – should have stimulated the export-oriented German economy.»

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Già.

«According to economic intuition», una valuta deprezzata dovrebbe favorire le esportazioni. Al contrario, una valuta forte dovrebbe deprimere le esportazioni.

A quanto potrebbe sembrare, la Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel non è poi così forte da poter imporre a tutti gli altri, a tutto il mondo, la condivisione della sua scala valoriale e dei suoi desiderata.


Bloomberg. 2017-07-28. Dollar Drops for Third Week as Data Underscore Fed Dilemma

– Greenback falls as GDP, ECI miss ests., health care shelved

– Swiss franc and yen extend declines on policy comparisons

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The dollar was headed for a third straight week of losses as data reinforcing the notion that U.S. inflation pressures are subdued kept the greenback close to a 14-month low.

U.S. economic growth and the employment cost index both missed estimates, while inflation expectations remained muted as the University of Michigan consumer sentiment reading improved in July. The dollar fell further after North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile, extending losses seen after the GDP data and after Republican efforts to repeal Obamacare failed.

– The Bloomberg dollar index is lower by ~0.3% for the day amid month-end selling pressure and is on track for a weekly decline of a similar magnitude. The dollar is trading close to levels from early May 2016. Flows are muted after a hectic week that saw the euro gain about 0.7% vs the greenback and more than 3% vs the Swiss franc

– Investors continue to adjust positions amid shifting expectations for monetary-policy trajectories among the major central banks. Data Friday showed robust economic growth in some European economies and stronger inflation pressure in Germany. The reports underscored ECB President Draghi’s assertion that the regional economy is on a firm footing with reduced downside risk that should enable policy makers to begin discussions soon on tapering asset purchases

– In the U.S., the data amplified the Fed’s decision Wednesday to acknowledge the persistence of subdued inflation pressures, even as employment continues to climb. While the Fed has raised rates twice this year, markets assign less than 50% odds of a third hike for 2017. In contrast, both the SNB and the BOJ have signaled that their policies will remain on hold for the foreseeable future, the SNB also emphasizing that its currency remains overvalued. As a result, the Swiss franc tumbled vs its G-10 peers on the week; the yen dropped by a smaller amount vs most while gaining against the CHF and the USD

– In Friday trading, EUR/USD was trading ~1.1748 vs a high of 1.1764. It was still below the more-than-two-year peak at 1.1777 reached Thursday that offers nearby technical resistance

– USD/JPY was trading ~110.79 after dropping to a fresh low for the day at 110.67 following the North Korea missile launch. The pair tested technical support in the zone below 110.80 that cushioned during the week as the dollar fell with Treasury yields. The 233-DMA at 110.78 also cushioned the pair in recent sessions and may have added to support Friday, one trader said

– Adding to the greenback’s woes, USD/CAD saw its biggest drop in two weeks to a low of 1.2420, after oil gained and Canadian GDP beat all estimates. The data reinforced expectations that the Bank of Canada will hike again in October after raising rates 25bps on July 12

– The Swiss franc extended its weekly drop versus the euro and the dollar, with EUR/CHF rising above 1.1400 in late afternoon. Traders speculate that some M&A-related CHF selling may have exacerbated the drop in the Swiss currency in recent sessions

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Unione Europea

Redde Rationem. Draghi chiederà lunedì cosa dover fare dei QE.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-02-06.

draghi-001

Questo lunedì Mario Draghi parlerà all’Europarlamento e risponderà alle relative domande.

Il tema centrale sarebbe quello di cercare ci capire cosa intendano decidere di fare gli eurodeputati.

Ma al momento attuale l’Europarlamento sembrerebbe non avere alcuna idea in proposito.

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«ECB president will testify at European Parliament on Monday»

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«Critics seek clarity on stimulus end after inflation jump»

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«Mario Draghi will face European lawmakers on Monday knowing he can’t please them all.»

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«The European Central Bank president can cite accelerating inflation, declining unemployment and 15 quarters of expansion as evidence that his stimulus policies are working»

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«U.S. President Donald Trump is threatening to tear up trade agreements, and European elections this year have seen the rise of extremist parties»

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«Draghi’s testimony at the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee starts at 3 p.m. local time with a statement, following which he’ll answer questions from legislators»

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«After recently flirting with deflation, the ECB now has a euro-area inflation rate of 1.8 percent that could rise still higher»

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«Even though the central bank’s goal is just under 2 percent, it intends to keep its bond-buying program running until at least the end of the year. It expects to keep interest rates at record-low levels for even longer.»

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«that inflation must be near its goal “in the medium term”»

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«the inflation pickup must be durable»

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«price growth must remain stable even if extraordinary stimulus is withdrawn»

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«There’s also a risk that the latest inflation surge is just a blip»

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Il vuoto politico in seno alla Commissione Europea ed all’Europarlamento è impressionante.

Nessuno che debba, nessuno che possa, nessuno che voglia assumersi una sia pur minima responsabilità operativa.

Tutti vorrebbero un miracolo, ma, non credendo in Dio, constatano che loro non sono in grado di farli.

Tutti vorrebbero che Mario Draghi risolvesse problemi strutturali ed economici con i soli mezzi monetari e finanziari, cosa semplicemente impossibile.

Così come è pia illusione, per non dire delirio schizofrenico, ritenere che la Banca centrale possa impunemente stampare carta moneta senza fine.

Tutti i politici della élite dirigenziale europea stanno con il fiato sospeso ad attendere i risultati delle elezioni olandesi e francesi.

Saranno grandi amarezze. Comunque esitino, nel migliore dei casi si assisterà ad un chaos sistematizzato, e nulla è peggio in politica del chaos.

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E sullo sfondo c’è il convitato di pietra: nessuno vuole parlarne, ma questo c’è lo stesso.

Nella attuale situazione mondiale potrebbe irrompere prepotentemente l’inflazione, ed allora saranno davvero lacrime e sangue. Ma almeno l’inflazione la pagherebbero tutti.


Bloomberg. 2017-02-06. Draghi Takes QE Case to Brussels as Politics Keeps Risk High

– ECB president will testify at European Parliament on Monday

– Critics seek clarity on stimulus end after inflation jump

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Mario Draghi will face European lawmakers on Monday knowing he can’t please them all.

The European Central Bank president can cite accelerating inflation, declining unemployment and 15 quarters of expansion as evidence that his stimulus policies are working. To face down calls to withdraw that support and let the euro-area economy stand on its own, he’ll probably also have to point to weak underlying price growth and a turbulent political environment.

Surging inflation is stoking frustration in some countries — notably Germany — while the slow exit from the financial crisis is fueling a backlash against deeper European integration. Although that’s a concern for Draghi, he also has to acknowledge that there are plenty of ways the recovery could falter. U.S. President Donald Trump is threatening to tear up trade agreements, and European elections this year have seen the rise of extremist parties.

Draghi’s testimony at the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee starts at 3 p.m. local time with a statement, following which he’ll answer questions from legislators. He may also be asked about the region’s bank woes and on the pledges from populist parties to leave the euro if they seize power.

To watch Draghi’s testimony at 3 p.m. in Brussels, click here

After recently flirting with deflation, the ECB now has a euro-area inflation rate of 1.8 percent that could rise still higher. Even though the central bank’s goal is just under 2 percent, it intends to keep its bond-buying program running until at least the end of the year. It expects to keep interest rates at record-low levels for even longer.

The outlook for the region’s economy isn’t gloomy. Business confidence in the first quarter rose to the highest level in one and a half years, a report by the Ifo institute showed on Monday. Most of the experts polled expect higher long-term interest rates over the next 6 months.

Still, Draghi said in a press conference on Jan. 19 that too much inflation would be a “high-class problem” and that tapering bond buying wasn’t even discussed by the Governing Council. He gave four criteria that must be met before winding down stimulus.

On the first — that inflation must be near its goal “in the medium term” — the latest ECB projections show progress.

The next requirement — that the inflation pickup must be durable — is more difficult to judge. Core inflation and other gauges that try to discern underlying dynamics from energy costs show that price pressures remain essentially weak.

That strong inflation is still a long way off was confirmed by data on German salaries on Monday. Real wages rose 1.8 percent in 2016, the slowest pace in three years, despite unemployment falling to the lowest level on record.

Draghi also said price growth must remain stable even if extraordinary stimulus is withdrawn. The ECB’s own calculations show that the effect of monetary support will be significant for a while to come.

Draghi noted that the ECB is focused on inflation for the euro area as a whole, not for individual countries. German complaints that its stronger economy needs tighter policy won’t sway policy makers if the rest of the currency bloc is too far behind. The ECB’s forecasts suggest that the divergences seen since the region’s debt crisis are narrowing, but there’s still a way to go.

That progress could fade away in the face of geopolitical risks, and one of the highest profile concerns right now is the direction of U.S. policy. There’s also a risk that the latest inflation surge is just a blip.

It’s all likely to keep Draghi — and investors — cautious. The euro was down 0.4 percent at $1.0737 at 11:18 a.m. Frankfurt time. The spread between French and German bond yields widened and gold rose.

“We do not react to short-term fluctuations, particularly those caused by energy and other commodity prices,” Executive Board member Benoit Coeure said in a speech in Paris on Thursday. “The core of our analysis will be ‘is this higher inflation sustainable?’ The conclusion today is: no.”


Reuters. 2017-02-06. Euro fades in face of French election risks

The euro fell around half a percent on Monday as concerns over French politics ahead of presidential elections set for April and May drew investors’ focus back to a year of political risks to Europe’s established order.

The dollar was broadly steadier after a poor set of wages data on Friday quashed speculation of a near-term rise in U.S. interest rates and sealed the currency’s fourth straight weekly fall, its worst start to a year in three decades.

In a relatively slow start to the week, the Aussie dollar was the other biggest mover among the G10 group of major currencies, down almost half a percent after a weaker batch of retail sales numbers.

The euro ground lower in the European morning to trade as weak as $1.0734 EUR=, compared with two month highs above $1.08 hit last week.

That came as bond market investors swapped French debt for the perceived safety of Germany and in spite of a strong batch of German industrial data which added to signs of an improving euro zone economy.

“I think there was just a load of position adjustment this morning,” said Jane Foley, a strategist with Rabobank in London.

“There has been a lot of talk about the strong data in Europe but the other backdrop is the politics. A few weeks ago, the market was convinced (conservative presidential candidate Francois) Fillon would win and that certainty has evaporated.”

A source close to Fillon said he would launch a fightback later on Monday against the fake-job scandal that has threatened to engulf his campaign.

Polls show the 62 year-old former prime minister has lost his status as favourite to win the presidency to centrist Emmanuel Macron, and that far-right leader Marine Le Pen – the chief risk for markets – has also gained ground.

PRESSURES ON DOLLAR

Equity markets, and the overall strength of U.S. economic data, continue to back the bullish dollar calls that dominated at the end of last year.

But a lack of detail on expected pro-dollar tax and spending initiatives, combined with concern over the Trump White House’s attitude to the dollar and global trade and security, has kept the currency retreating.

“I’d like to hope that we naturally go back to buying the dollar, that seems the logical argument underneath it all,” said Richard Benson, co-head of portfolio management with currency fund Millennium Global in London.

“At some point, equities in the U.S. should drag yields higher. The market is really just looking for another story.”

Signs of more inflation and better growth in Europe have helped to cool any further selling of the euro, although against that there are the worries of populist challenges in a series of elections this year.

On Sunday Le Pen began her bid to be elected president in May, promising she alone could protect the French against Islamist militants and globalisation.

German industrial orders saw the biggest monthly increase in around 2 1/2 years in December, data on Monday showed.

Speculators trimmed their bullish dollar bets for a fourth straight week through Jan. 31, with net long positions falling to their lowest since late October, according to data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission released on Friday and calculations by Reuters.

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali

Ecb. Sistema, stabilità e prospettive. Una novità indigesta.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-02-02.

eurotower-002

Oggi si è verificata una concomitanza:

– Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at the joint ECB and Banka Slovenije conference on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the euro, Ljubljana, 2 February 2017

– Pubblicazione del Bollettino economico dell’Ecb.

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Nota Introduttiva.

Sia ECB sia il suo Governatore usano un linguaggio sussurrato e smussato, senza mai alzare i toni od usare parole improprie od oltre le righe. Si leggano i testi avendo ben presente codesti principi.

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«Le decisioni di politica monetaria assunte nel dicembre 2016 hanno conseguito lo scopo di preservare condizioni finanziarie molto favorevoli necessarie ad assicurare una convergenza durevole dei tassi di inflazione verso livelli inferiori ma prossimi al 2 per cento nel medio termine»

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«Gli indicatori dell’economia mondiale disponibili segnalano il protrarsi di un moderato recupero della crescita dell’attività economica e del commercio a livello mondiale verso la fine del 2016»

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«I rischi per le prospettive dell’attività mondiale restano orientati verso il basso e sono connessi principalmente alle incertezze sul piano delle politiche e agli squilibri finanziari.»

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«Nell’area dell’euro l’espansione economica prosegue e si rafforza, trainata principalmente dalla domanda interna. In prospettiva, è atteso un suo ulteriore consolidamento»

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«Tuttavia, la crescita economica dell’area dell’euro sarebbe frenata dalla lenta attuazione delle riforme strutturali e dagli ulteriori aggiustamenti dei bilanci in diversi settori»

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«le misure di politica monetaria messe in atto da giugno 2014 forniscono al momento un significativo sostegno alle condizioni di prestito per imprese e famiglie e quindi ai flussi di credito nell’intera area dell’euro»

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«si stima che il costo nominale complessivo del finanziamento esterno delle società non finanziarie si sia lievemente ridotto a dicembre»

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«il Consiglio direttivo ha deciso di lasciare invariati i tassi di interesse di riferimento della BCE.»

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«il Consiglio direttivo intende proseguire gli acquisti netti di attività a un ritmo mensile di 60 miliardi di euro sino alla fine di dicembre 2017 o anche oltre se necessario»

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«Contestualmente agli acquisti netti sarà reinvestito il capitale rimborsato sui titoli giunti a scadenza acquistati nel quadro del programma di acquisto di attività.»

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Due frasi pesano severamente.

«Tuttavia, la crescita economica dell’area dell’euro sarebbe frenata dalla lenta attuazione delle riforme strutturali e dagli ulteriori aggiustamenti dei bilanci in diversi settori»

È elemento costante degli interventi dell’ECB e di Mario Draghi ricordare come le manovre monetarie e finanziarie a nulla servano senza concomitanti operazioni politiche di riforme strutturali. E per tali si deve intendere un progressivo smantellamento degli apparati burocratici con conseguente snellimento degli iter economici. Si noti anche la menzione della ‘crescita economica‘ senza menzione alcuna di quella finanziaria.

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«Contestualmente agli acquisti netti sarà reinvestito il capitale rimborsato sui titoli giunti a scadenza acquistati nel quadro del programma di acquisto di attività.»

Questo è un elemento relativamente nuovo che mal suona nelle orecchie dei politici. I titoli in scadenza dovranno essere rimborsati. Poi, il ricavato sarà nuovamente investito, certamente. Ma ciò non è sinonimo di rinnovo incondizionato ed immediato del titolo scaduto ovvero in titoli dello stesso stato emittente.

I Governi sono stati avvisati.


European Central Bank. 2017-02-02. Bollettino economico BCE, n. 1 – 2017

Le decisioni di politica monetaria assunte nel dicembre 2016 hanno conseguito lo scopo di preservare condizioni finanziarie molto favorevoli necessarie ad assicurare una convergenza durevole dei tassi di inflazione verso livelli inferiori ma prossimi al 2 per cento nel medio termine. Le condizioni di prestito per famiglie e imprese seguitano a beneficiare dell’impatto delle misure della BCE. Come atteso, di recente l’inflazione complessiva è aumentata, in larga misura sulla scorta di effetti base dei prezzi dell’energia, ma le pressioni sull’inflazione di fondo restano contenute. Il Consiglio direttivo continuerà a guardare oltre le variazioni dell’inflazione misurata sullo IAPC qualora siano valutate temporanee e senza implicazioni per le prospettive per la stabilità dei prezzi nel medio termine.

Gli indicatori dell’economia mondiale disponibili segnalano il protrarsi di un moderato recupero della crescita dell’attività economica e del commercio a livello mondiale verso la fine del 2016. Nel contempo le condizioni finanziarie sono divenute più tese su scala internazionale e le economie di mercato emergenti si sono confrontate con deflussi di capitale. L’inflazione complessiva a livello mondiale è aumentata con il venir meno dei contributi negativi dei corsi dell’energia. I rischi per le prospettive dell’attività mondiale restano orientati verso il basso e sono connessi principalmente alle incertezze sul piano delle politiche e agli squilibri finanziari.

Dopo la riunione del Consiglio direttivo dell’8 dicembre 2016, i rendimenti delle obbligazioni sovrane sono lievemente diminuiti nell’area dell’euro e la curva a termine dell’EONIA si è spostata verso il basso per le scadenze di medio periodo. I prezzi delle azioni delle società non finanziarie sono aumentati, mentre i differenziali di rendimento sul debito societario hanno registrato un calo. Il tasso di cambio dell’euro si è mantenuto sostanzialmente stabile su base ponderata per l’interscambio.

Nell’area dell’euro l’espansione economica prosegue e si rafforza, trainata principalmente dalla domanda interna. In prospettiva, è atteso un suo ulteriore consolidamento. La trasmissione delle misure di politica monetaria della BCE sostiene la domanda interna e facilita il processo di riduzione della leva finanziaria in atto. Le condizioni finanziarie molto favorevoli e il miglioramento della redditività delle imprese continuano a promuovere la ripresa degli investimenti. In aggiunta, i durevoli incrementi dell’occupazione, che beneficiano anche delle passate riforme strutturali, forniscono sostegno ai consumi privati attraverso l’aumento del reddito disponibile reale delle famiglie. Al tempo stesso, vi sono segnali di un certo rafforzamento della ripresa mondiale. Tuttavia, la crescita economica dell’area dell’euro sarebbe frenata dalla lenta attuazione delle riforme strutturali e dagli ulteriori aggiustamenti dei bilanci in diversi settori. I rischi per le prospettive di crescita nell’area restano orientati al ribasso e sono connessi principalmente a fattori mondiali.

Secondo l’Eurostat, nell’area dell’euro l’inflazione sui dodici mesi misurata sullo IAPC è salita all’1,1 per cento a dicembre 2016, rispetto allo 0,6 per cento di novembre. Questa evoluzione riflette soprattutto un forte incremento sui dodici mesi della componente relativa ai beni energetici, mentre non vi sono ancora segnali convincenti di una tendenza al rialzo dell’inflazione di fondo. In prospettiva, sulla base delle quotazioni correnti dei contratti future sul petrolio, è probabile che l’inflazione complessiva aumenti ulteriormente nel breve periodo, riflettendo in gran parte movimenti del tasso di variazione sui dodici mesi dei prezzi dell’energia. Tuttavia, le misure dell’inflazione di fondo dovrebbero mostrare un incremento più graduale nel medio termine, sostenute dalle misure di politica monetaria della BCE, dall’attesa ripresa economica e dalla corrispondente graduale riduzione della capacità produttiva inutilizzata.

Sebbene gli andamenti del credito bancario continuino a riflettere, con il consueto scarto temporale, la sua relazione con il ciclo economico, nonché il rischio di credito e gli aggiustamenti in atto nei bilanci dei settori finanziario e non finanziario, le misure di politica monetaria messe in atto da giugno 2014 forniscono al momento un significativo sostegno alle condizioni di prestito per imprese e famiglie e quindi ai flussi di credito nell’intera area dell’euro. I risultati dell’indagine sul credito bancario nell’area dell’euro per il quarto trimestre del 2016 indicano una sostanziale stabilizzazione dei criteri di erogazione dei prestiti alle imprese, mentre la domanda di prestiti ha continuato ad aumentare a un ritmo vigoroso per tutte le categorie. La crescita dei prestiti al settore privato ha quindi proseguito la sua graduale ripresa. Inoltre, si stima che il costo nominale complessivo del finanziamento esterno delle società non finanziarie si sia lievemente ridotto a dicembre.

Nella riunione del 19 gennaio 2017, sulla base della consueta analisi economica e monetaria, il Consiglio direttivo ha deciso di lasciare invariati i tassi di interesse di riferimento della BCE. Esso continua ad attendersi che tali tassi si mantengano su un livello pari o inferiore a quello attuale per un prolungato periodo di tempo e ben oltre l’orizzonte degli acquisti netti di attività. Quanto alle misure non convenzionali di politica monetaria, il Consiglio direttivo ha confermato che l’Eurosistema continuerà a condurre acquisti nell’ambito del programma di acquisto di attività all’attuale ritmo mensile di 80 miliardi di euro sino alla fine di marzo 2017; inoltre, da aprile 2017, il Consiglio direttivo intende proseguire gli acquisti netti di attività a un ritmo mensile di 60 miliardi di euro sino alla fine di dicembre 2017 o anche oltre se necessario, e in ogni caso finché non riscontrerà un aggiustamento durevole dell’evoluzione dei prezzi, coerente con il proprio obiettivo di inflazione. Contestualmente agli acquisti netti sarà reinvestito il capitale rimborsato sui titoli giunti a scadenza acquistati nel quadro del programma di acquisto di attività.

In prospettiva, il Consiglio direttivo ha confermato la necessità di un grado molto elevato di accomodamento monetario per consentire l’accumularsi di pressioni sui prezzi nell’area dell’euro e sostenere l’inflazione complessiva nel medio periodo. Se necessario per il conseguimento del suo obiettivo, esso agirà ricorrendo a tutti gli strumenti disponibili nell’ambito del suo mandato. In particolare, se le prospettive diverranno meno favorevoli o se le condizioni finanziarie risulteranno incoerenti con ulteriori progressi verso un aggiustamento durevole del profilo dell’inflazione, il Consiglio direttivo è pronto a incrementare il programma di acquisto di attività in termini di entità e/o durata.


European Central Bank. 2017-02-02. Security through unity: making integration work for Europe

It is my pleasure to be here with you today to celebrate this milestone in the history of your country and of our Union.

Though recent years have been difficult for Slovenia, as they have for the rest of Europe, you can look back with pride on what your nation has achieved. After only two years of EU membership you were able to join the euro – the first of the “new Member States” to do so. And since then Slovenia has become deeply integrated into our monetary union. Even today 85% of Slovenes are in favour of the euro, reflecting the strength of our common bond.[1]

But as we celebrate the 10th anniversary of the introduction of the euro in Slovenia, we can likewise celebrate other anniversaries in the recent history of Europe: 60 years since the Rome Treaty, which created the common market; more or less a quarter of a century since the Maastricht Treaty, which launched Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); 20 years since the Amsterdam Treaty, which enacted a common foreign and security policy.

There are those who would like to see such events as part of distinct histories, one of the economic integration of Europe, one of its monetary union, and one of its military and political alliance. But those histories are not distinct.

They have all been part of the same impetus, which is the desire of the people of Europe to ensure their security in the face of common threats: the threat of continental war evoked time and again in our history; and the global threats created by evolving technology, geopolitical risks, and upheavals in our natural environment.

The strength of this impetus has meant that, for most of the period since 1945, the course of European integration has been clear. Though the different strands of integration have advanced at different speeds, the direction has always been forwards. It was hardly disputed that, in the long run, coming together as a Union was the best response to the common challenges we faced. Deeper integration was a question of when, not if.

Yet, today, perceptions of insecurity are on the rise. And to some, it is no longer self-evident that closer union provides the answer. Integration is viewed in some quarters as a source of insecurity rather than a bulwark against it. One country has even decided that it is better to reverse that process than continue it.

This insecurity in part reflects common factors emerging across Western democracies, such as fears about immigration, globalisation and social change. But in Europe there are also unique forces at play. In particular, the severity of the euro crisis has weakened faith in the EU as a foundation of economic security.

So Europe, and even more so the euro area, faces a moment of decision. We need answers to the questions that citizens are asking. But those answers also need to be balanced: there are things that need to change in Europe, but there is much we can be proud of as well.

European integration has produced many achievements and we should not let our current difficulties diminish them. On the contrary, we need to be confident in the progress we have made – and clear that we would be worse off without it.

But where things evidently need to be better, we need to make them so. Most importantly, that means making the changes in our monetary union that all can see are necessary.

The significance of the single market

Since its formation in 1957, the European project has been built, above all, on a commitment to openness, epitomised by the establishment of a single market among its Member States. This commitment was idealistic, but it was also eminently pragmatic. The founders of the EU had witnessed the damage caused by the inwardness and protectionism of the interwar years. They understood that sustaining economic growth was vital to drain support for divisive nationalism, and the best way to achieve this was through open markets.

Though the last decade has been difficult, over the long sweep of post-war history their vision has been proved right. Since 1960 cumulative growth in GDP per capita has been one-third higher in the EU15 than in the United States. Private wealth, which had been twice wiped out by the wars of the twentieth century, has also doubled as a percentage of national income. This was of course partly driven by the natural catching-up process after the Second World War. But there is plenty of evidence that growth has been accelerated by integration.

According to one estimate, the EU’s GDP per capita would be as much as one-fifth lower today if no integration had taken place since the war. [2] Another estimate looking at the effects of integration since the 1980s – so after postwar catching-up had run its course –finds a gain in per capita GDP of around 12% relative to the non-membership scenario.[3]

And the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, such as Slovenia, have also shared in those gains. The increase in GDP produced by EU membership may turn out to be as high as 40% for the 12 new members,[4] which would not be surprising, since the EU is by far the main trading partner for countries in central and eastern Europe and the main source of FDI.

Today, some are questioning whether openness remains the best way to ensure our economic security. But we need to ask where we would be today if we had not had such a long phase of integration on our continent. And the likely answer is: much poorer.

What is more, the single market has not only provided a foundation for growth, but also for sustaining open markets. As we are seeing today at the global level, markets cannot stay open for long if not all participants are perceived to be playing by the same rules, or if the benefits are seen to be shared unfairly. The single market has survived, in large part, because Europe has built a unique model for managing those challenges.

Deepening the market in Europe has entailed building common institutions to protect citizens from unfair competition or discrimination from abroad – namely the common regulatory framework enforced by the European Court of Justice. Safeguards central to the European social model have been progressively embedded in European law, notably the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to provide protection for the most vulnerable.

And Europe has forged the first redistribution system across countries to help prevent persistent regional inequalities. As early as the mid-1970s, European funds were being used to support less developed regions or those threatened with industrial decline. From 2007-13, €350 billion was allocated in the EU budget to structural and investment funds. And let me add that Slovenia was a net recipient of those funds, with annual investment financing amounting to, on average, one-fifth of what the Slovenian government spent on public investment.

No one would claim this system of rules, safeguards and redistribution has been perfect. We know that some feel it improves their lives too little, and others that it intrudes into their lives too much. But what we have built in Europe is a model for sustainable openness – one that can reap its gains while mitigating its unwanted effects. So if we see problems, our challenge is to nurture and improve that model, not to turn it back.

Because that would not only mean less wealth for our continent. It would also mean less political security for our citizens. We should not forget that besides being an engine for growth, the single market has brought vital political benefits as well.

The first is that it has provided a motor for binding political integration among the states of Europe.

As I just described, a single market can only be sustained if there is a common system of laws overseen by a common judiciary – the ECJ. And if there is a judiciary, there must be a legislature to write the law, which in Europe is provided by the EU Council and the European Parliament. And there must be an executive to enforce the decisions of the legislature and judiciary, which in our case is the role of the European Commission. The single market, in other words, creates by its very nature a closer political union.

This is a dynamic we have also seen in the US as its own internal market has developed. As is well-known, the short “Commerce Clause” of the US constitution – which grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states – has led over time to a substantial expansion of the role of the federal government in economic affairs.

The second political benefit has been to enhance Europe’s influence in the world.

Trade policy decided in common gives Europe real sway in global negotiations, both in the deals it can extract bilaterally, and in the setting of multilateral rules in the WTO. A large market has leverage over large multinational firms, allowing Europe to protect what it deems important, such as privacy on the internet. It also permits Europe to use trade sanctions to counter hostility from unfriendly countries, and thereby enhances military security too. And if Europe wants now to integrate further in other areas – such as defence and foreign policy – it will need the economic foundation the single market provides.

Thus for all these reasons, we should be proud of what we have gained from integration. That does not mean we should be blind to its challenges, nor to the disappointing performance of recent years. We need to restart the single market as a growth agent and do better in compensating the losers it creates. But we should also be clear: we would be worse off today, both economically and politically, if we had not followed this path.

From the single market to the euro

But the single market also had a further effect: it led directly to the euro. Once Europe decided to embark towards a fully integrated market, a single currency was desirable, if not essential. Hence the euro was set in motion at the Hanover summit in 1988, immediately in the wake of the decision to achieve a true single market.

Today some people question this link between market and currency, and ask whether retaining national currencies might have been better for Europe. But one has to remember that the single currency did not appear out of thin air. It was rather a consequence of Europe’s long and unsatisfactory experience with different exchange rate regimes since the war. It was also, in other words, both an idealistic and a pragmatic decision.

Europeans had always been sceptical of fully floating exchange rates, seeing currency volatility as inimical to trade integration. That is why, as soon as the Bretton Woods system broke down, they sought to restore fixed exchange rates, first through “the snake in the tunnel”, and later through various iterations of the European Monetary System. The prevailing thinking was well-captured by Nobel laureate Robert Mundell, who developed his theory on optimum currency areas in the belief that, and I quote,

“I could not see why countries that were in the process of forming a common market should saddle themselves with a new barrier to trade in the form of uncertainty about exchange rates.”[5]

Hence, it was inevitable that the single market would be buttressed by some form of fixed exchange rate regime. The question was what form. And Europe had experienced the costs of fixed exchange rate regimes that fell short of a single currency.

Countries were vulnerable to speculative attacks and currency crises, most painfully demonstrated by the ERM crisis in 1992-3, and that was in a world where capital was less mobile than it is today. Most members had little monetary policy autonomy, since they were required to effectively import the monetary policy of the anchor currency. And when countries did devalue, it did not always prove an effective adjustment mechanism for nominal shocks, provoking instead higher inflation and the need for further devaluations.

Moreover, the fear was that, without a single currency, repeated cycles of devaluations would distort the conditions for fair competition and undermine the single market in the long run. An economy that increased productivity and competitiveness could be deprived of the benefits it should enjoy, in terms of increased market share, because of currency depreciation in competing countries. And if some countries were prepared to practice such “beggar thy neighbour” behaviour, why should others permanently open their borders to them?

The point was not that the single market could not tolerate small exchange rate adjustments among a few of its members. It was that major currency volatility, of the type we had seen in the 1980s, would severely test the willingness of all to keep their markets open. And we can only imagine how, without the euro, currency markets would have reacted to shocks we have seen since its launch – the dotcom crash, the Lehman bankruptcy, the sovereign debt crisis.

The conditions for success in EMU

However, the case for the euro was always based on a trade-off. By reinforcing the single market in this way, it would lock-in the gains of economic integration and thereby benefit the whole Union. But it would also deprive individual countries of adjustment tools for short-term shocks, notably their own exchange rate. Thus for the trade-off to be beneficial, it was essential that those short-term costs were reduced as much as possible.

This depended on certain conditions being fulfilled, which were established by Mundell and later authors as part of the theory of optimum currency areas. They included: trade integration, to reduce the incidence of asymmetric shocks; factor mobility and wage and price flexibility, to accelerate adjustment when shocks did hit; and a system of risk-sharing, to reduce the costs of that adjustment process for individual members. But, in the euro area, it was clear that the importance attached to each of those conditions would not be the same.

Large-scale labour mobility was always unlikely, given cultural and linguistic barriers. It was also improbable that fiscal risk-sharing would reach U.S. levels, not least owing to the relatively larger role for national budgets as fiscal stabilisers. Hence it was essential that euro area countries substituted for lower integration in these areas with stronger commitments in others. This meant four things in particular.

The first was avoiding policy mistakes, such as boom-bust cycles emanating from weak prudential supervision. The second was building resilience to shocks through structural reforms and the continued deepening of the single market. The third was sound fiscal policies to provide sufficient fiscal buffers over the cycle. And the fourth was a strong financial union, with diversified asset holdings and hence real private risk-sharing.

In this way, countries would be able to reduce the severity of local slumps, since asymmetric shocks would be tempered by trade linkages and sound financial policies. When shocks did occur, wages and prices would be able to adjust more quickly, and resources would reallocate faster in response, limiting the employment cost of adjustment. Fiscal policies would be available at the national level to stabilise the economy during the transition. And losses would be shared across the Union through integrated financial markets.

There was no secret about this. It was known to all in 1999 that these were the conditions for success. This was why we agreed the Stability and Growth Pact for fiscal policies. It is why there was an “E” in EMU: it was clear that structural convergence had to occur. And it is why there has always been a strong emphasis on the need for sustainable financial integration.

We know the history that followed: the slowing down of structural reforms, the watering-down of the Pact, the fragility of financial integration, and the underlying divergence between countries that ensued. But we need to be very clear that it was not the euro as a currency that was to blame for this. National authorities knew what they had to do. The currency could not protect them from their own policy decisions.

Indeed, it is worth emphasising that, when countries do pursue the right policies, the euro is no hindrance to success. Germany, for example, did not experience a boom-bust financial cycle, ran relatively sound fiscal policies, and passed a series of labour market reforms in the early 2000s. Its unemployment has fallen from close to 11% in 2005 to under 4% today, and that was during the worst recession since the 1930s.

And even in the presence of policy mistakes, countries that meet the necessary conditions in other areas are able to adjust adequately within the single currency. Consider Ireland, which suffered acutely from the financial crisis. Yet it has seen its unemployment fall from more than 15% in 2012 to 7% today, not least because of its flexible labour market and successful industrial strategy aimed at attracting FDI.

There are some today who believe that Europe would be better off if we did not have the single currency and could devalue our exchange rates instead. But as we have seen, countries that have implemented reforms do not depend on a flexible exchange rate to achieve sustainable growth. And for those that have not reformed, one has to ask how beneficial a flexible exchange rate would really be. After all, if a country has low productivity growth because of deep-rooted structural problems, the exchange rate cannot be the answer.

Still, it is important to ask, if some governments did not follow the right policies to succeed in EMU, why did they not? The euro area relied heavily on the notion that the integration process would itself create the incentives for sound policies. Faced with stronger competition through the single market and an inability to devalue, governments would be forced to address long-term structural problems and ensure fiscal sustainability.

That this did not happen was in part because the single market process stalled. But it was also because we lacked some key institutions at the euro area level. We did not have a common system of banking oversight to monitor financial flows, which in some countries allowed mounting competitiveness losses to be masked by unsustainable finance-driven growth. And we had only weak common decision-making for fiscal and economic policies.

Several important steps have now been taken to address these issues, most notably the establishment of Banking Union. But that project is still unfinished. And as has been laid out in the Five Presidents’ report, we still remain some way short of a complete monetary union – which is to say, one where countries take collective responsibility for the euro area within common institutions. 

Conclusion

So it is clear what the way ahead is for our union. Not to turn away from what has worked: our model of economic openness reinforced by our single currency. But to put right the mistakes that have prevented it from working as well as it should.

For national governments this means fulfilling the conditions that we have always known are necessary to prosper in our monetary union. And for the euro area as a whole, it means constructing an institutional architecture that sets the right incentives for those policies, and that make us more resilient in the face of common shocks.

But it is also clear that, to reach this point, the sequence has to be right. What is preventing us from moving ahead today is, in part, the legacy of those past failures, which creates a lack of trust among countries to enter into such a new stage of integration.

Trust that all countries will comply with the rules that they have set for themselves, so as to reduce their mutual vulnerability. And trust that all will enact the necessary reforms to ensure structural convergence, so that complying with those rules becomes easier, and sharing risks does not create permanent transfers between countries. Compliance and convergence, and through it growth, are the keys today to give to the integration process new impetus.

And that impetus we must find, because we cannot stay where we are. We have to make our Union more stable and prosperous to deliver the security our citizens crave. And by doing so we will put ourselves in a stronger position to confront the new challenges we face today: the rise of political extremism, insecurity on our borders and an ever more uncertain global order.

So we must rediscover the spirit that has carried our Union this far. The spirit that has led generations of Europeans to work together to secure themselves against common threats. That has yielded tangible improvements for our citizens, such as the freedom to work and trade across our continent and transact in a single currency. And the spirit that, if channelled once more into common action, can overcome the new threats we face today.

Unity is the key to security for our continent – today as it always has been.

 

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

ECB. Draghi potrebbe ridurre (interrompere) da subito gli stimoli.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-01-25.

eurotower-002

«The European Central Bank should soon be in a position to reduce its extraordinary monetary support to the eurozone economy»

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«the situation seems to be improving in the euro area»

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«The ECB introduced unprecedented ultra-loose monetary policy in the wake of the financial crisis, hoping to drive economic growth and encourage inflation towards its objective of just below 2.0 percent»

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«Interest rates are at historic lows, while the bank buys tens of billions of euros of government and corporate bonds each month»

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«It’s important to stop taking the medicine as soon as possible, but not too early either. Otherwise, we risk having a relapse»

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Per grazie divina l’elezione del presidente Trump ha folgorato l’Ecb come Paolo sulla via di Damasco.

Improvvisamente Mr Mario Draghi vede la luce, e ne tira le conseguenze.

L’economia europea sta andando a gonfie vele, l’inflazione sta salendo in modo impressionante, ogni ulteriore azione dell’Ecb potrebbe financo essere dannosa.

«It’s important to stop taking the medicine as soon as possible»

Nessuno poi si stupisca se dopo che saranno noti i risultati delle elezioni olandesi e francesi l’Ecb chiuda per sempre i rubinetti. E magari rivoglia indietro i soldi che ha speso.

In quel momento arriverà il redde rationem per gli stati altamente indebitati. Il ‘si salvi chi può’!


France 24. 2017-1-25. ECB could ‘soon’ exit monetary stimulus: board member

FRANKFURT AM MAIN (AFP) – 

The European Central Bank should soon be in a position to reduce its extraordinary monetary support to the eurozone economy, board member Sabine Lautenschlaeger has said.

“I am optimistic that we can soon turn to the question of an exit,” the German economist said in a speech in Hamburg late Tuesday.

With rising consumer confidence and unemployment at a seven-year low, “the situation seems to be improving in the euro area,” she noted.

“A broad-based recovery is under way,” Lautenschlaeger went on. “At the same time, inflation in the euro area rose signficantly” in December.

The ECB introduced unprecedented ultra-loose monetary policy in the wake of the financial crisis, hoping to drive economic growth and encourage inflation towards its objective of just below 2.0 percent.

Interest rates are at historic lows, while the bank buys tens of billions of euros of government and corporate bonds each month and offers banks cheap loans in a bid to pump cash into the economy via the financial system.

Calls for an end to the ECB’s extraordinary measures have grown after monthly data showed that inflation nearly doubled to reach 1.1 percent across the eurozone in December — and 1.7 percent in its largest economy, Germany.

ECB president Mario Draghi countered at a press conference last week that the December rise in inflation was mostly driven by volatile energy prices, and that underlying inflation remains weak.

Draghi said the time would come when the bank would start scaling back its stimulus measures, “but we are not there”.

Nevertheless, Lautenschlaeger said, “all preconditions for a stable rise in inflation exist.”

“We need to be ready to act when the time comes,” she went on. “It’s important to stop taking the medicine as soon as possible, but not too early either. Otherwise, we risk having a relapse.”

Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Finanza e Sistema Bancario, Unione Europea

ECB. Draghi. Allarme arancio, che presto potrebbe diventare rosso.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2016-12-16.

 leonardo3-leonardo-da-vinci-anghiari-discover-the-real-secrets-indizio-in-scala-ridisegnato-mario-taddei

Battaglia di Anghiari, studio dei volti, Leonardo da Vinci


Quello che si sussurrava nei corridoi era vero. Ne possiamo adesso parlare perché reso pubblico da un articolo di Bloomberg. Articolo che peraltro è molto prudente e cauto: le cose sembrerebbero essersi svolte in modo molto, ma molto, più burrascoso.

Nella riunione di ieri con i capi di governo Draghi ha parlato con inusitata chiarezza.

Ha detto cose che grondano buon senso e che si gridano a gran voce da tempo.

Senza riforme politiche il sistema corre il pericolo di ritrovarsi in una crisi come quella del 2010.

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«Mario Draghi warned European leaders that the combination of rising global interest rates and explosive politics could expose the euro area’s underlying weaknesses, even as he painted an upbeat picture of the region’s recovery.»

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«The European Central Bank president highlighted the votes next year, a slowdown in reforms and some countries’ lack of compliance with budget rules as factors that could threaten the return of conditions reminiscent of the turbulent years from 2010»

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«Draghi briefed EU leaders about the economy at a meeting of heads of state and government on Thursday in Brussels, and argued higher rates could leave countries that have failed to trim deficits with more to pay»

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«Draghi said 2017 was fraught with risk as the full impact of Brexit and of Donald Trump’s election in the U.S. is yet to show.»

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«A rise in interest rates could put renewed pressure on countries with high debt that have failed to consolidate their budgets»

* * * * * * *

I banchieri centrali usualmente parlano un linguaggio diplomatico sussurrato.

Questa volta a quanto sembra Draghi avrebbe urlato.

«the votes next year, a slowdown in reforms and some countries’ lack of compliance with budget rules as factors that could threaten the return of conditions reminiscent of the turbulent years from 2010»

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«the combination of rising global interest rates and explosive politics could expose the euro area’s underlying weaknesses»

* * * * * * *

L’aumento dei tassi di interesse strozzerà tutti i paesi che non hanno saputo o voluto approfittare di questo lasso di tempo per ristrutturare i sistemi statali e ridurre deficit e debiti. I loro debiti sovrani, già oggi orrificanti macigni, diverranno in brevissimo tempo insopportabili prima, insostenibili dopo. Ed in fondo c’è una crisi che si preannuncia ben peggiore di quella del 2010, quando c’erano ancora risorse disponibili.

Lo hanno capito anche i basidiomiceti: non lo hanno capito i nostri governanti. ed i nostri economisti d’assalto, quelli patrocinantori delle rotative.

L’Unione Europea creperà sotto il peso dei debiti sovrani, e noi che lei.

 


Bloomberg. 2016-12-16. Draghi Said to Warn EU Rising Global Rates Pose Crisis Risk

– ECB President briefed European heads of state and government

– Lack of reform and fiscal discipline seen as risks in 2017

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Mario Draghi warned European leaders that the combination of rising global interest rates and explosive politics could expose the euro area’s underlying weaknesses, even as he painted an upbeat picture of the region’s recovery.

The European Central Bank president highlighted the votes next year, a slowdown in reforms and some countries’ lack of compliance with budget rules as factors that could threaten the return of conditions reminiscent of the turbulent years from 2010, according to a European Union official familiar with the meeting who asked not to be named because the discussions aren’t public.

Draghi briefed EU leaders about the economy at a meeting of heads of state and government on Thursday in Brussels, and argued higher rates could leave countries that have failed to trim deficits with more to pay. On the broader outlook, he said conditions have improved everywhere in the region compared to the beginning of 2016, with a pick-up in investment and consumption supported by the ECB’s monetary policy.

An ECB spokesman declined to comment on the remarks.

“Draghi is the one, and has always been the one, keeping the wolf from the door,” said Richard Barwell, an economist at BNP Paribas Investment Partners in London. But “even Draghi can’t insulate governments forever. Global factors can drive bond yields higher.”

Draghi said 2017 was fraught with risk as the full impact of Brexit and of Donald Trump’s election in the U.S. is yet to show. A rise in interest rates could put renewed pressure on countries with high debt that have failed to consolidate their budgets, he said. This stress could spread to the whole region as economic differences across countries have increased and structural reforms have ground to a halt.

While noting that price growth will accelerate significantly in coming months on the back of higher oil prices, Draghi stressed that underlying inflation still isn’t accelerating, prompting the ECB to prolong its stimulus while reducing the pace of monthly asset purchases to 60 billion euros ($63 billion).