Senior German conservatives facing painful losses in two state elections this month have ruled out forming coalitions with the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party.
“I am very clear about this: not with the AfD,” parliament speaker and former finance minister Wolfgang Schaeuble told mass-selling Bild am Sonntag newspaper.
His comments support Chancellor Angela Merkel’s position to ostracize the anti-Islam party, although other members of her Christian Social Union (CDU) party have expressed willingness to work with the AfD.
The AfD entered the German parliament for the first time in an election last year, buoyed by conservative voters angry with Merkel’s decision in 2015 to welcome almost one million, mainly Muslim, asylum seekers.
The AfD also has lawmakers in all but two of the regional parliaments in Germany’s 16 states. It is expected to enter the assembly in the southern state of Bavaria in an election next Sunday and storm into the parliament in Hesse two weeks later.
CDU officials in the eastern states of Brandenburg and Saxony, which hold elections next year, have expressed readiness to form coalitions with the AfD.
Merkel said last month “I categorically rule this out,” sticking to her position not to work with the party that says Islam is not compatible with the German constitution.
Merkel’s conservatives, which include her CDU and their Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) sister party, have seen support slide since last year’s election.
The conservatives formed a coalition with the centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) as their junior partners in March, after Merkel’s first attempt at forming a government following the September election ended in failure.
Polls indicate the CSU will lose its absolute majority in Bavaria on Oct. 14 as voters in the state are expected to turn to the ecologist Greens and the AfD.
CSU leader and Interior Minister Horst Seehofer has also ruled out a coalition with the AfD in Bavaria.
“There will be no coalition between the Union and the AfD. No, No, No!” he told the Welt am Sonntag newspaper, referring to the CDU/CSU alliance, which is know as the Union.
Under a deal between the two parties the CSU represents the CDU in Bavaria and the CDU runs in the rest of Germany.
Il mese di ottobre che inizia domani sarà cruciale per i destini dell’Occidente.
Negli Stati Uniti stiamo assistendo alle ultime battute sulla nomina di Sua Giustizia Kavanaugh a membro a vita della Suprema Corte: nel caso che, dopo aver approvato la nomina in sede di Commissione Giustizia, il Senato la confermasse con la votazione in aula, per circa trenta anni questa Corta sarebbe a maggioranza repubblicana. Questo evento segnerebbe l’inizio di una fine certa dell’ideologia libera a socialista negli Stati Uniti.
Se poi, come potrebbe essere, il Presidente Trump alle elezioni di midterm, che si terranno ai primi di novembre, conservasse la maggioranza in Senato, avrebbe il via libera alla nomina di 19 giudici nelle corti di appello federali. Tranne due circuiti giudiziari, tutto il sistema dei giudici americani avrebbe matrice culturale repubblicana.
A questo punto, se anche i liberal democratici assassinassero con efferatezza Mr Trump, per più di una generazione il sistema dei giudici statunitensi governerebbe esattamente come se Mr Trump fosse ancora presente ed attivo.
Nessuno intende sovra enfatizzare quanto potrebbe accadere, ma nei fatti è Harmageddon: la battaglia finale.
Liberal e socialisti hanno sempre disprezzato quel ‘popolo bue‘ dal quale si aspettavano di essere sempre votati, essendo essi gli illuminati, le guide naturali dei popoli.
Non hanno voluto prestargli l’orecchio: nessun problema, i Cittadini Elettori adesso li stanno cacciando via a pedate. La società civile è costituita dai Cittadini Elettori, non dagli iscritti alle ngo.
Ma ad ottobre si terranno anche le elezioni regionali e provinciali in Italia, ed anche in questa nazione sembrerebbe ragionevole supporre che i partiti ad ideologia liberal e socialista ne escano ulteriormente ridimensionati: ridotti a percentuali talmente basse da risultare politicamente ininfluenti per un lungo lasso di tempo, se non per sempre.
Si voterà anche in Brasile ed in Lussemburgo. In un Brasile insanguinato dall’attentato fatto dai liberal socialisti per eliminare il loro avversario politico Mr Bolsonaro, in Lussemburgo per decidere quale atteggiamento terrà quel piccolo stato in seno al Consiglio Europeo.
Ma gli occhi degli europei sono focalizzati ora sulla Germania, ove il 14 ottobre si voterà in Baviera ed il 28 in Hessen.
Secondo le previsioni elettorali disponibili Cdu, Csu ed Spd dovrebbero perdere in modo clamoroso.
Negli ultimi due giorni ben sei differenti società di prospezioni elettorali sono concordi: Emnid, Forsa, Forsch’gr Wahlen, Gms, Infratest dimap, ed Insa stimano la Union, Cdu ed Csu, tra il 27% ed il 28% e la Spd al 16%.
Un ulteriore crollo che si attuerebbe dopo la già severa débâcle del 24 settembre dello scorso anno.
Molto verosimilmente la Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel potrebbe dare le dimissioni, aprendo una crisi politica mai vista in Germania. Ma se anche rimanesse al Governo, la sua forza politica in patria e nell’Unione Europea sarebbe semplicemente nulla.
Queste sono le ultime previsioni per la Baviera:
E queste sono le ultime previsioni per l’Hessen:
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Se si è sicuramente certi che le previsioni debbano essere prese sempre con grande circospezione e buon senso, un calo di dieci punti percentuali per i partiti della Union e di 7 – 8 punti percentuali per la Spd dovrebbe essere l’epitaffio da iscriversi sulla tomba politica di questi partiti.
Né ci si dimentichi che a maggio del prossimo anno si terranno le elezioni europee, ove con questi numeri la rappresentanza dei partiti tradizionali tedeschi sarà ridotta a numeri trascurabili.
Tra poco più di tre settimane si andrà a votare in Hessen ed in Baviera: sarà quello il momento della verità.
Ma se tanto da tanto, la ribellione contro Frau Merkel cui abbiamo assistito nei giorni scorsi al Bundestag potrebbe evolversi rapidamente verso la crisi di governo. I partiti tradizionali sembrerebbero essere destinati alla estinzione.
Ma a maggio del prossimo anno si andrà anche a votare per il rinnovo del parlamento europeo: con cifre del genere né Cdu, né Csu, né Spd possono sperare di contare ancora qualcosa. Sempre che, ovviamente, all’epoca esistano ancora.
«In the United States the term “deep state” is used in Republican and conservative political messaging to describe a conspiracy theory of influential decision-making bodies believed to be within government who are relatively permanent and whose policies and long-term plans are unaffected by changing administrations. The term is often used in a critical sense vis-à-vis the general electorate to refer to the lack of influence popular democracy has on these institutions and the decisions they make as a shadow government» [Fonte]
Il quadro riassuntivo pubblicato dal Sonntagsfrage Bundestagswahl sembrerebbe essere eloquente. Quattro scietà di sondaggi, Emnid, Forsa, Infratest dimap ed Insa valutano la Unione, Cdu/Csu al 28% e la Spd attorno al 17%. Nel converso, AfD si collocherebbe tra il 16% ed il 18%.
Ma questi valori assumono vividi connotati quando siano considerati nel loro sviluppo storico: in partiti tradizionale stanno crollando mentre AfD continua imperterrita a crescere.
* * * * * * *
Per anni i partiti tradizionali hanno volutamente ignorato AfD, al punto di non rispondere alle loro interpellanze parlamentari, fatto questo visto e constatato dalla stragrande maggioranza dei tedeschi che seguono la televisione. Fatto di inaudita gravità: AfD siede al Bundestag perché eletta dai Cittadini.
I liberal socialisti hanno caricato AfD di ogni sorta di insultante nequizia, i media si sono scatenati come cani idrofobi, ma nulla ha fermato il loro crollo e la crescita di AfD.
Adesso, di fronte allo spettro delle elezioni in Hessen ed in Baviera, nonché poi di quelle per il rinnovo del parlamento europeo, i liberal socialisti iniziano a pensare a cosa sia andato male.
AfD è l’unico partito di opposizione in Germania, e su di esso confluiscono anche i voti di frange estremiste, che peraltro non trovano albergo nelle strutture del partito.
Lo Spiegel inizia a chiedersi per quale motivazioni tanta gente comune abbia abbandonato i partiti tradizionali per confluire in AfD.
* * *
«is the AfD merely indicative of the very vitality of the German political system?»
«The March Through the Institutions»
«Ten active and former police officers represent the AfD in various parliaments. One of those is former Chief Superintendent Martin Hess. He used to be responsible for training new officers in the town of Böblingen, just southwest of Stuttgart, and today represents the AfD on the Internal Affairs Committee in parliament. Another is Wilko Möller, a member of the federal police who once worked for the Federal Criminal Police Office and for the Chancellery»
«But perhaps the most prominent bridge-builder between the far-right and the police is Rainer Wendt, head of the 94,000-member German Police Union (DPolG), one of two prominent unions for German law-enforcement officers»
«The AfD may also be over-represented in the German military»
«But almost 90 percent of the troops are men, and a higher than average share of them come from eastern German states or are members of the German minority in Russia who have moved to Germany»
«AfD deputy head Georg Pazderski is a retired colonel in the General Staff while the AfD floor leaders in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Rhineland-Palatinate are all former soldiers»
«It’s not surprising, then, that the AfD seeks to present itself as the party of the military, though its expertise on issues pertaining to the military is limited»
«Hohmann had only three questions»
«The first was why the European Union flag stood in the middle of the hall instead of the German flag»
«Then Hohmann criticized the practice of addressing soldiers as “Soldatinnen und Soldaten,” a German-language convention to include both women and men»
«Finally, the AfD member wanted to know if paratroopers were still based in Altenstadt since he had once served there. The answer: Yes, they’re still there.»
«Slowly but surely, the AfD is also advancing into areas that possess even more powerful weapons than the military: the media and the world of culture»
«As the third-largest group in German parliament, the AfD has access to a number of administrative bodies, from the Holocaust memorial in Berlin to the Stasi Records Agency, which administers the vast number of files kept by the East German secret police on its own citizens»
«For example, for the board of the Magnus Hirschfeld Foundation, which fights for gay rights, the AfD chose Nicole Höchst, who believes that homosexuals have an abnormal inclination to pedophilia.»
«Most important to the AfD, however, would appear to be access to the publicly funded media platforms. It is here, after all, that the party believes its greatest opponents are employed. AfD representatives already sit on the boards of four public broadcasters. They are also represented on six state media boards that monitor programming on private broadcasters»
Volenti o nolenti, AfD è presente ed anche molto vitale.
Larga parte dei corpi dello stato, polizia ed esercito, guardano questo partito politico con malcelata simpatia: anche loro sono convinti che la Germania debba seguire il proprio retaggio religioso, culturale, sociale, politico, abbandonando con disgusto le ideologie liberal e socialiste, che sono contro natura.
Gli aderenti ad AfD ed il loro Elettorato è tutto tranne quello che i liberal cercano di dipingere: sono semplicemente persone che non condividono quelle ideologie e che vogliono mandare in pensione gli attuali governanti. Se ci si pensasse bene, questo altro non sarebbe che l’usuale rinnovamento democratico.
«many “people in the media” support Merkel’s policies. “I would like to expel them from positions of responsibility.”»
«But established political parties must also be willing to accommodate the entire spectrum of opinion in a democracy. Merkel’s refugee policies offended many voters. And because the SPD simply went along with her, the AfD enjoyed increasing levels of support. Indeed, these two establishment parties have made things easy for the AfD.»
Founded only five years ago, the Alternative for Germany has grown from a marginal party to a game-changer in federal and state politics — and become ever more radical. Is it a testament to the strength of German democracy, or a threat to it?
For three hours every month, they set up shop right next to the flower stand. There are only four people, a table and an umbrella from which a blue T-shirt hangs. It’s emblazoned with the party’s logo and the words, “Nobody’s perfect, but Brandenburgers come pretty damn close.” Here, at the weekly farmers market in Woltersdorf, a 40-minute drive by car from Berlin, Kathi Muxel, the district chair of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party for the Oder-Spree region, says: “We’re the only ones who come here, even if there’s no upcoming election. People appreciate that.”
Several times a week, AfD adherents plant their umbrella somewhere in the area. Some take the day off from work, while others are self-employed and can set their own schedule. They wait for the people to show up — and they always do — and then they talk. They bring up their annoyance with expensive street lights in the town of Neuzelle, or the planned move of the recycling center in the Berlin suburb Erkner, or the “federal government’s dishonesty” when it spoke of a mob attack in Chemnitz. After all, they say, there were reports that no mob attacks actually took place at all.
Being ever-present, talking — and not to mention listening — was also part of the AfD strategy during federal elections last September. And it worked. The party scored 22.1 percent of the vote here in the eastern German state of Brandenburg, putting it only slightly behind Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). It’s possible that Alexander Gauland, the candidate for the Oder-Spree electoral district, was responsible for some of that success. But what has been decisive is the proximity to ordinary voters that the AfD has cultivated. And it’s not only here that the far-right populists are firmly rooted, but in many other places around the country as well.
Political upheavals rarely happen overnight. They begin slowly, and then one morning you wake up and find yourself in another country. The small group that gathered on the evening of Feb. 6, 2013, in a Protestant community center in the town of Oberursel near Frankfurt, had no idea that by founding a new political party called the Alternative for Germany they would trigger something bigger. Who would have thought that a retired senior government official, a conservative newspaper columnist and a numbers-loving economics professor would changed the face of German politics?
And who would have thought that the AfD of Alexander Gauland, Konrad Adam and Bernd Lucke would become a big-tent party of its own — at least in parts of eastern Germany — within just a few years? Or that it would win almost a hundred seats in the federal parliament with its pledge to “hunt down” Chancellor Angela Merkel? Or that its party leaders would one day march through the streets of Chemnitz alongside far-right extremists, like they did on Sept. 1, 2018?
The AfD stands for an unprecedented political success, but also for a history of radicalization. Like any new party, breaking taboos is the AfD’s lifeblood, but its shift to the right has continued unabated. And anyone who has stood in the party’s way has gotten steamrolled. First it hit Lucke, the well-behaved co-founder and former party head; he was overthrown by the much more politically shrewd Frauke Petry.
When Petry herself became too powerful, Alexander Gauland pushed her aside. His tweed jackets may lend him an air of amiability and scholarship, but in reality he has few inhibitions about sealing pacts with far-right extremists. In that regard, it’s no coincidence that Gauland is the only person from that founding meeting in Oberursel who still holds sway over the party today.
No other party leader stands as much for the AfD’s split personality as Gauland. A former senior official in the state government in Hesse, in western Germany, Gauland lives in a dignified Potsdam neighborhood filled with mansions. He can speak intelligently about Prussian history — and then, without missing a beat, claim that the Nazi era was but a “speck of bird shit” on German history.
“We’re a thorn in the side of a political system that has become outdated,” Gauland told the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung earlier this month. He wants to drive out anyone who played a role in what he calls the “Merkel System,” including people in the media, and he has called for a “peaceful revolution.”
But a revolution against what?
In January, Harvard professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt published a book titled, “How Democracies Die.” In it, they write that in the decades since the end of the Cold War, liberal systems haven’t been overthrown through force and military coups alone. More than anything else, democracy has been undermined non-violently through the election of anti-democratic politicians.
The book was written in light of Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S., but Germany, too, seems to be on the verge of a turning point. By the end of this year, the AfD is likely to hold seats in every state legislature in Germany. And it has already put forward one of its own — a conspiracy theorist who predicts the imminent collapse of the euro — to chair the budget committee in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, which oversees annual government spending of 350 billion euros ($411 billion).
A Turning Point
The AfD was the strongest party in the eastern state of Saxony in the last Bundestag elections, and across the east, it has now become such a force that the CDU has been compelled to express what would have been unfathomable not too long ago: the possibility of governing together with the far-left Left Party.
The unrest in Chemnitz in August marked a turning point for the AfD. There, the party joined a phalanx of agitators and neo-Nazis, with the AfD’s Thuringia state chapter leader Björn Höcke marching side-by-side with an activist from Pegida — the anti-Islam and anti-immigrant group — who has multiple criminal convictions on his record.
For years, politics in Germany had been shaped by the old polarity between left and right. But those days are over. The question of identity now seems to be more important, which seemingly scrambles the party system. Sahra Wagenknecht of the Left Party is creating a new movement called “Aufstehen,” German for “Stand Up,” that she hopes will be a magnet for voters who would like to see a bigger welfare state and fewer immigrants. The move places additional pressure on the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), which has fluctuated between a culture of welcoming refugees and warnings of a loss of control since the refugee crisis. The business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP), meanwhile, has morphed into a law and order party. And the only thing still holding the CDU and Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, together is the fear of losing power. The only parties that seem to be profiting from the new political complexities are the Greens and the AfD.
So, how to deal with a party that fulminates against the mainstream with such abandon while at the spreading its own tentacles further into the center of society, into government offices, the armed forces, the media and the cultural world?
Should the party be fought as a threat to democracy? Or is the AfD merely indicative of the very vitality of the German political system?
The March Through the Institutions
One of the paradoxes of the AfD is that even though it rails against the establishment like no other party, its members are firmly anchored in that system. Many federal police officers, who felt the most tangible effects of the chaos during the refugee crisis in 2015, are likely to be receptive to the notion that Germany lost control of its borders at the time. Dieter Romann, the president of the Federal Police force, is one of the chancellor’s fiercest critics — and he makes no secret of his opinion.
Ten active and former police officers represent the AfD in various parliaments. One of those is former Chief Superintendent Martin Hess. He used to be responsible for training new officers in the town of Böblingen, just southwest of Stuttgart, and today represents the AfD on the Internal Affairs Committee in parliament. Another is Wilko Möller, a member of the federal police who once worked for the Federal Criminal Police Office and for the Chancellery. He is now in the leadership of the AfD’s state chapter in Brandenburg.
But perhaps the most prominent bridge-builder between the far-right and the police is Rainer Wendt, head of the 94,000-member German Police Union (DPolG), one of two prominent unions for German law-enforcement officers. Wendt isn’t just fond of giving interviews to the right-wing weekly newspaper Junge Freiheit, but he also speaks regularly to the magazine Compact, which is even further out on the extremist fringe.
Another example will be seen at the “Border Protection Conference” to be held by Compact in Munich at the end of September. That event will see Martin Sellner, a leading figure of the far-right extremist Identitarian Movement, take the stage — along with Police Chief Richard Graupner, who is a candidate for the AfD in Bavarian state elections to be held on October 14.
Union leader Wendt has demonstrated no qualms about adopting the rhetoric and ideology of the right wing, saying things like, for example, the macho behavior of young Muslims “is almost one of the genetic cornerstones of this culture.” In 2016, he paid a visit to the AfD group in Saxony state parliament, with AfD lawmakers afterwards crowing: “The DPolG and the AfD are fighting for the same goals on many, many issues.”
The AfD may also be over-represented in the German military. There are no reliable statistics, since the Bundeswehr, as Germany’s armed forces are known, are not permitted to ask troops about their political leanings. But almost 90 percent of the troops are men, and a higher than average share of them come from eastern German states or are members of the German minority in Russia who have moved to Germany. The AfD does particularly well in all three of those groups.
There is another indication for the far-right party’s influence in the Bundeswehr: More than 13 percent of the 219 male AfD lawmakers in state and federal parliaments have a military background. In federal parliament alone, it is almost 20 percent. Either they used to serve as career soldiers or they are reserve officers.
AfD deputy head Georg Pazderski is a retired colonel in the General Staff while the AfD floor leaders in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Rhineland-Palatinate are all former soldiers.
At the official commemoration for German war dead held in the Reichstag on Nov. 19, the country’s official day of mourning, four representatives of the Social Democrats showed up, five from Merkel’s conservatives, one each from the Greens and the Left Party – and 38 from the AfD.
It’s not surprising, then, that the AfD seeks to present itself as the party of the military, though its expertise on issues pertaining to the military is limited. In late May, for instance, the Defense Ministry invited Bundeswehr experts from the Budget Committee to a meeting. Martin Hohmann, who was thrown out of the Christian Democrats in 2004 after delivering a virulently anti-Semitic speech, attended the meeting for the AfD.
Hohmann had only three questions. The first was why the European Union flag stood in the middle of the hall instead of the German flag. Fellow parliamentarian Tobias Lindner of the Green Party gave him a brief speech on the flag regulations applicable in public buildings in Germany. Then Hohmann criticized the practice of addressing soldiers as “Soldatinnen und Soldaten,” a German-language convention to include both women and men. Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen responded: “Mr. Representative, you wouldn’t appreciate being addressed as Ms. Representative Hohmann, would you?”
Finally, the AfD member wanted to know if paratroopers were still based in Altenstadt since he had once served there. The answer: Yes, they’re still there.
After that, Hohmann had no further questions.
Slowly but surely, the AfD is also advancing into areas that possess even more powerful weapons than the military: the media and the world of culture. As the third-largest group in German parliament, the AfD has access to a number of administrative bodies, from the Holocaust memorial in Berlin to the Stasi Records Agency, which administers the vast number of files kept by the East German secret police on its own citizens. When it comes to choosing its representatives for such bodies, the AfD sometimes seems to be intentionally trying to provoke. For example, for the board of the Magnus Hirschfeld Foundation, which fights for gay rights, the AfD chose Nicole Höchst, who believes that homosexuals have an abnormal inclination to pedophilia.
Most important to the AfD, however, would appear to be access to the publicly funded media platforms. It is here, after all, that the party believes its greatest opponents are employed. AfD representatives already sit on the boards of four public broadcasters. They are also represented on six state media boards that monitor programming on private broadcasters.
But the party wants more, as party head Gauland noted last week in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Unfortunately, he told the paper, many “people in the media” support Merkel’s policies. “I would like to expel them from positions of responsibility.”
If you ask Gauland exactly how he plans to implement his plan, he becomes evasive. “I never said journalists should be completely expelled from Germany,” he protests. “And ‘expel’ doesn’t imply the use of violence.” But essentially, he wants to “finally change the imbalance in the media to our advantage” — such that newsrooms are populated by fewer AfD opponents and more Merkel critics.
The AfD’s Two Faces
The AfD had a dazzling character from the very beginning — and it never differentiated between the middle class and the radicals, which is precisely what made it so successful. During the recent protests in Chemnitz, the actual AfD spectrum was in full view for the first time. Members of parliament with the party and top officials led a group of marchers that included not only local Chemnitz residents, but the xenophobic splinter group Pro Chemnitz, as well as hooligans, neo-Nazis and members of the identitarian movement. Two days later, a concert aimed at countering those protests attracted 65,000 people.
“We don’t want extremists and violent criminals within our ranks,” Thuringia AfD leader Höcke had previously posted on Facebook. But they came anyway, and they were even tolerated and assimilated. A repeat offender with multiple convictions was allowed to march right at the front. Meanwhile, Höcke gave a warm welcome to Lutz Bachmann, the frontman for the xenophobic Pegida marches in Dresden, whose logo had also adorned the AfD’s invitation to the rally.
One could say the AfD is a colorful party, but with a brown streak. It attracts classical conservatives and neoliberals as well as ethnonationalist “völkisch” ideologists, extremists and conspiracy theorists. A majority of party members may still dream of a more moderate-conservative Alternative for Germany, but at the fringe, especially in the east, the party is increasingly melding with extremist elements, and this process is in part being tolerated — and at times promoted — at the highest levels of the party.
Moderate members like Hamburg AfD chapter head Jörn Kruse, with an eye to the events in Chemnitz, may lament that it was a “serious mistake” that the party “was very openly doing things together with far-right extremist organizations.” But what good does that do as long as AfD supporters in Hamburg, Kruse’s hometown, regularly attend “Merkel Must Go” protests, where they mingle with members of the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) and the identitarian movement, as they did a few weeks back?
At the protest in the port city, Dennis Augustin, the head of the AfD’s chapter in the eastern state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, welcomed almost 200 demonstrators — from right-wing conservatives to far-right extremists, by saying: “Where are the Nazis supposed to be that everybody’s talking about?” Three men in the crowd raised their index fingers. “Here!” they shouted, laughing.
For the security authorities, the AfD’s recent mingling creates a delicate problem. It’s the job of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the country’s domestic intelligence agency, to investigate whether parties have exceeded the boundaries set in the German constitution and if they are seeking to overthrow the democratic system.
The question is: Does that apply to the AfD?
For the past three years, the same debate flares up after every scandalous statement made by an AfD official over whether the BfV should open an investigation into the party. For example, there was the time in 2015 when the then-head of the party’s youth wing, Markus Frohnmaier, who now has a seat in the Bundestag, announced, “When we get elected, we’re going to clean up, we’re going to clean house, we’re going to make politics about the people again, and only about the people.” Or the time when AfD leader Gauland dismissed the Holocaust as speck of “bird shit.”
In June 2017, at a meeting in Düsseldorf, representatives of five state-level offices for the protection of the constitution concluded that some AfD members “are increasingly adopting far-right extremist language.” A BfV staffer of many years reports that the far-right extremist scene “is in constant contact” with AfD people. “What we’ve been hearing is pretty hardcore.”
The security agencies are viewing the influence of the “Patriotic Platform” (PP), an alliance of far-right extremist forces inside the AfD, with concern. A paper from the North Rhine-Westphalia state Office for the Protection of the Constitution that is also being circulated among other state branches argues that the group should be placed under official observation by security agencies across Germany. The paper states that there are “strong indications of anti-democratic aspirations.” It also states that well-known defectors from other far-right extremist organizations are members of the group’s board. “The purpose of PP is to exert influence on the AfD with its far-right extremist agenda and to thus shape policies,” the paper states.
But domestic intelligence officials agree, a few isolated comments aren’t enough to place the entire AfD under official observation.
In March, the heads of Germany’s state-level spy services decided to pass their findings on the AfD on to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. The information will help decide whether to conduct monitoring nationally. A decisive meeting is scheduled for November.
Some agency heads feel that decision is taking too long. Earlier this month, the eastern state of Thuringia saw its BfV branch become the first in the country to begin a review of the party. The move was spurred by recent events in Chemnitz, where domestic intelligence agencies counted up to 2,500 far-right extremists at so-called “funeral march” protests organized by the AfD in the city after the murder of a 35-year-old resident. The two suspects in the case were migrants. But for agency head Stephan Kramer, the most important reason was the presence of the AfD’s Thuringia state chapter leader, Björn Höcke, at the protests. Höcke is notorious for his ethnonationalist views and statements.
Observers say Höcke has grown increasingly inflammatory during public appearances, even calling on police officers to disobey orders — otherwise, “the people” would hold them accountable after they take power. The review taking place in Thuringia is the preliminary stage before a full-on official observation by the domestic intelligence agency.
In the states of Bremen and Lower Saxony, the party’s youth wing, the Young Alternative (JA) has recently been observed by authorities due to its links to Germany’s identitarian movement, which is already the subject of surveillance. When police recently searched the apartment of Marvin Mergard, the vice president of JA’s Bremen state chapter, they confiscated all kinds of identitarian propaganda.
Interior ministers at the state and federal level from Merkel’s conservative party met on Friday, Sept. 7, to discuss the AfD. For now, officials in Bavaria want to refrain from monitoring the AfD or its subgroups, in part due to the legal risks of doing so. “We don’t want to give members of the AfD a martyr role, but we do want to take a closer look,” says Bavarian Governor Markus Söder. Authorities concede, however, that a number of AfD activists in the “low double-digits” are already being monitored in the state.
State intelligence officials likely feel compelled to push forward unilaterally because a coordinated approach with the federal government has been sluggish. Some state-level officials have even suspected the now-defunct chief of the federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Hans-Georg Maassen, of thwarting the AfD’s possible observation. Maassen was ousted from that position earlier this week and reassigned to the Interior Ministry over controversial comments he made in the wake of the Chemnitz riots. Even when the decision was made to monitor the identitarian movement, there was a feeling that Maassen had to “be hounded,” says one state intelligence head. Maassen has been accused of secretly harboring sympathies for the AfD. Colleagues who have known him for years dispute this.
It’s possible these rumors were fueled by meetings between Maassen, in his capacity as acting head of Germany’s domestic spy service, and Frauke Petry, a former leader of the AfD. Maassen, for his part, denies he advised the AfD in any way. Party leader Gauland, meanwhile, was enthused about Maassen’s alleged support. Just a few months ago, rumors had begun to circulate that one of the AfD’s members in parliament was a Russian spy. Maassen got involved — a highly unusual move for an intelligence agency head, though not technically against the rules — and gave the man the all-clear.
High Legal Hurdles
Despite the criticism, there are some entirely reasonable explanations for the deposed BfV president’s reservations. The legal hurdles for placing a democratically elected party under official observation are extremely high, for one. There must be clear evidence that the party’s “overall structure” runs counter to the constitutional order. Far-right extremists must also be proven to have “direct influence” over the party’s trajectory.
Torsten Voss, the head of the city state of Hamburg’s intelligence service, says he has perceived a shift within the party. “If we look at this on a national level, the AfD does appear to be rising toward the threshold for observation, but that hurdle hasn’t been crossed yet.”
The Path to the Top
The AfD’s success is based a mixture of favorable circumstances, happenstance and clever strategy. Most AfD people joined their party without any political background — and they didn’t have any experience writing press releases or position papers, let alone giving interviews.
Media coverage of the party, which initially focused politically on its opposition to the EU common currency, the euro, has been critical from the beginning. This led the party to concentrate on social media and direct contact with its fan base. Facebook live streams and tweets are an integral part of every AfD campaign, and any speech given in parliament is promptly disseminated via YouTube. Any time an AfD parliamentarian grills or attacks a colleague from another party, the confrontations are often immediately posted on social media — regardless of whether they were chided or applauded for their outburst. Many AfD members act civilized during parliamentary sessions, only to turn around and behave boorishly online. “Carefully planned provocations” are part of the party’s strategy, according to a paper issued by the AfD board in 2017. “The more nervously and unfairly the old parties govern, the better.”
The party’s media department in parliament already has 15 employees, including a “research team” that is tasked with “factually preparing” sensitive political topics like the Chemnitz riots, explains Jürgen Braun, a parliamentary secretary in the Bundestag for the AfD. The party’s supporters no longer believe the “mainstream media” are up to the task, making it easy for AfD politicians to dismiss critical reports as false or “inflammatory.”
The AfD’s rise also has to be viewed within the context of the European refugee crisis that unfolded in the fall of 2015. That summer, the AfD was still only polling at 5 percent nationally. The euro crisis that had once lent buoyancy to the party had died down and it seemed the party would become but a footnote in postwar German history, as had happened with the Pirate Party several years ago.
But Merkel then decided to keep the borders open for refugees and justified her decision with a moral imperative for which she hadn’t really been known up until that point. In western Germany, people initially greeted Merkel’s refugee policies and responded with what came to be known as a “welcoming culture,” in which people turned out en masse to volunteer and participate in relief efforts. But in the eastern parts of the country, Merkel encountered fierce resistance to her policies from the very beginning. In that sense, the AfD’s rise was no accident — and while it may be painful to say, it’s also a manifestation of a vibrant democracy. The Green Party rose in the 1980s to become a mainstream party in part because the conservative Christian Democrats and the center-left Social Democrats had ignored the environmental destruction that was happening for too long. And the AfD rose because Merkel swept aside the desire of many for control over Germany’s borders.
At the moment, much is being written about the electoral motives of eastern Germans, but most interpretations are based on psychological rather than political criteria. References are often made to the fact that life in the former East had been cut off from the outside world. It is also often pointed out that there is seeming resentment about developments in the east following reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the same time, there’s also another possible interpretation: Could it be that many eastern Germans are actually voting rationally?
A History of Discomfort
The history of the discomfort with eastern German voting habits can be traced back to the first free vote that took place there in 1990. Polls at the time suggested a win for the Social Democrats. The West German SPD chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt had been extremely popular, and many East German citizens had benefited from their Ostpolitik policies, which promoted detente with East Germany.
But a clear majority of East Germans first voted for the Alliance for Germany in 1990, which was largely comprised of conservative Christian Democrats. Later, they would vote for Helmut Kohl. This caused people on the left of the political spectrum to feel angry and insulted. People haven’t forgotten how, when asked about the reasons for the election results, SPD politician Otto Schily held a banana up to the camera — a disparaging reference to East Germans, who didn’t often get access to exotic fruits during communist times.
At the same time, if you strip away the emotional factor, it was a totally reasonable result. The people of East Germany wanted the deutsche mark as their currency and they wanted German unity. Kohl promised both — and kept his word.
But then the problems with the reconstruction and restructuring of the east began. Unemployment skyrocketed and Kohl soon became a figure of hate.
During the 1998 federal election campaign, Gerhard Schröder recognized his opportunity to win over a large number of voters in the east. His promise to make reconstruction of the east his top priority helped deliver the decisive votes he needed. As did his commitment to creating a foreign policy that had peace as its goal — a nod to the eastern Germans’ pacifist inclinations.
Since then, the SPD has been experiencing a dramatic decline in the east. The enormous voter migrations are usually accompanied by a kind of emotional buildup. The AfD’s clear position on a single issue is what makes it so attractive: Some East Germans see the party as a guarantor against Germany becoming a multicultural society. That’s all they expect from the AfD.
So, what can be done? The degree of helplessness the established parties are having in dealing with the AfD is illustrated by the fact that the various defense strategies they have adopted so far — everything from ignoring the party to co-opting its issues to attacking it — have failed.
The business-friendly Free Democrats (FDP) and the Green Party have had an easier time of it. The former succeeded in re-entering the Bundestag with its moderately-toned critique of Germany’s asylum policies. And the latter are so far removed ideologically from the AfD that they have no need to fear any political competition from the party.
Catch-All Parties at a Loss
The situation is far more difficult for the Social Democrats.
Ex-SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel famously called right-wing demonstrators a “pack,” but at the same time tried to engage in a dialogue with Pegida supporters “as private individuals.” Pegida is the acronym for Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West, an Islamophobic group that holds protests regularly in Dresden. Gabriel criticized the AfD as a party of the disenfranchised and he warned against underestimating people’s longing for identity and a political home in a 2017 interview with DER SPIEGEL.
The conservative Christian Democrats have taken a similar zigzag course — one in which even the basic question of whether the AfD is an opponent or an opportunity has not yet been clarified. The CDU’s own pollster, Matthias Jung, argued the latter case three years ago in an essay. Compared to the AfD, he wrote, Merkel’s CDU can present itself more credibly as a centrist power that is keen to implement political reforms.
But the Christian Democrats’ Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) has always viewed the AfD’s rise as a threat to its single-party rule in that state. Most recently, CSU parliamentary group leader Alexander Dobrindt had the idea of moving his party so far to the right rhetorically that the AfD could no longer outdo it without losing the mainstream, middle class wing of the party. But that plan got lost in the shuffle during the turmoil caused by the asylum dispute between the CSU and the CDU that nearly destroyed their political partnership at the national level.
Now, a general sense of bewilderment is prevailing.
The decisive question in dealing with the AfD is that of whether it will adhere to the rules of democracy in the longer term. The mere fact that the party represents unpleasant competition for the CDU, CSU and SPD does not, on its own, make it inherently detrimental to democracy.
A Threat to Democracy?
Harvard professors Levitsky and Ziblatt have developed a set of indicators they use to identify parties that will run for election, but then seek to disband the democratic order. One indicator is when a party “denies the legitimacy of opponents,” which is a clear feature of the AfD. No other party in parliament demonizes its opponents as aggressively as the AfD. Members of the party seem to have few inhibitions when it comes to their outrageous statements: Angela Merkel is a “dictator” who belongs in a “straitjacket” and wants to “swap out” the ethnic German population with foreigners.
Many examples can also be found in the AfD for the second criterion set by the Harvard researchers: A “readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including the media.” AfD chair Gauland’s interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is only the most recent example here. AfD people are also notorious for their admonitions that journalists must behave “fairly” or risk being “dragged out into the streets” as has happened in other “revolutions we have known.”
But open incitement of violence, the third criterion set by the Harvard researchers, is absent. Instead, AfD members tend to portray themselves as the victims of brute violence from the left. And when the AfD makes its own threats, it often uses convoluted wording, like Gauland’s recent demand that a German-Turkish SPD politician ought to be “disposed of in Anatolia.”
But the fourth indicator is the hardest to fulfill: “Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game.” After all, like other parties, the AfD was elected into federal and state parliaments and is even regarded by many of its supporters as the savior of democracy. One can say the AfD disregards the soft rules of democracy, including fairness in dealing with its opponents, truthfulness in argumentation and tolerance of other views and lifestyles.
So, what’s the verdict?
Levitsky and Ziblatt conclude in their book that autocrats are most successful when proponents of democracy and the democratic institutions don’t defend themselves rigorously enough. The Federal Republic of Germany was conceived as a democracy that should be capable of defending itself — in no small part because of its own difficult history. If the AfD continues to radicalize, it must be placed under official observation and ultimately banned.
But the means available to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution do not go far enough to fully safeguard democracy. Especially given that “no profound revelations can be expected” from the BfV, as former Bundestag President Norbert Lammert put it in his interview with DER SPIEGEL. It’s crucial that people in their everyday lives oppose far-right extremists when they shout their epithets. But established political parties must also be willing to accommodate the entire spectrum of opinion in a democracy. Merkel’s refugee policies offended many voters. And because the SPD simply went along with her, the AfD enjoyed increasing levels of support. Indeed, these two establishment parties have made things easy for the AfD.
In the regional election in October, Rainer Rahn wants to get elected to the state parliament in Hesse. He’s a conservative, retired, gray-haired physician who has nothing in common with demagogues like Höcke. His political path led Rahn from a voter initiative opposing aircraft noise at Germany’s biggest airport to the FDP party in Frankfurt to the AfD, which he joined back when economics professor Bernd Lucke was still formulating thoughtful critiques of the euro. Rahn isn’t a firebrand speaker, either, but he doesn’t need to be one.
“Voter sentiment is on our side,” says Rahn. “We don’t even really need to run an election campaign.”
Alle elezioni del 15 settembre 2013 la Csu aveva conseguito il 47.7%, la Spd il 20.6% ed i Grüne l’8.6%.
Il 15 gennaio 2014 Infratest dimap attribuiva alla Csu il 49% ed ai Grüne il 10%.
Il sondaggio elettorale del 23 agosto 2018 prevedeva per la Csu un 36%, il 13% per la Spd, un 15% per i Grüne ed un 14% per AfD.
Quindi, la Csu perderebbe 11.7 punti percentuali e la Spd 5.6 punti percentuali.
In termini di perdita percentuale, la Csu perderebbe [100 * (47.7 – 36) / 47.7] = 24.53%. mentre la Spd [100 * (20.6 – 13) / 20.6] = 36.89%.
Ottima la performance dei Grüne, che quasi raddoppiano le propensioni di voto.
Il 14 ottobre di questo anno si terranno le elezioni per il Land bavarese.
Sembrerebbe essere molto difficile che nel breve volgere di quaranta giorni Csu ed Spd possano risollevarsi.
Sembrerebbe altrettanto ovvio inferire che la Große Koalition potrebbe averne un severo scossone, che potrebbe anche comportare la crisi di governo e la fine dei cancellierati Merkel.
Ma sembrerebbe essere altrettanto ragionevole prospettare che il quadro elettorale non debba cambiare di qui alle prossime elezioni europee del 2019.
Il partito popolare europeo, cui la Csu afferisce, si troverebbe a perdere un buon numero di eurodeputati, così come il partito socialista europeo, che accuserà anche il colpo del crollo dei socialisti francesi ed il mancato apporto dei laburisti inglesi.
Sembrerebbe essere molto verosimile che si vada incontro a grandiose mutazioni del quadro politico.
«Sources say the German chancellor will surrender the top central bank job promised to Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann to get the more influential commission post»
«Confidant Peter Altmaier is a leading candidate»
«Jens Weidmann, the influential head of Germany’s central bank, may consider himself a master of the universe, but he could soon become a pawn in Angela Merkel’s game of EU chess »
«The German chancellor, top government sources say, has set her sights on getting a German as president of the European Commission and is willing to give up the European Central Bank presidency she promised to Mr. Weidmann»
«In her cold realpolitical way, Ms. Merkel is calculating that Berlin can exert greater influence in the EU with the top job in the bloc’s executive body»
* * * * * * *
Una sempre più sbiadita Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel appena una settimana fa aveva rinunciato ad imporre Herr Weidmann al governatorato della Ecb, la banca centrale europea.
Se Herr Weidmann sarebbe stato tecnicamente parlando un ottimo governatore, la Germania non avrebbe al momento attuale la forza di imporre una scelta così schierata, e verosimilmente in un prossimo futuro potrebbe avere una forza ancora minore.
Di queste giorni altre voci insistenti stanno circolando.
«Chancellor Angela Merkel has decided to back a German candidate for the European Commission’s top post, giving her stamp of approval to a member of her Christian Democratic-led party bloc»
«Manfred Weber, 46, a member of Bavaria’s ruling Christian Social Union and head of the European People’s Party caucus in the European Parliament, is favored by Merkel as the EPP candidate in the race to replace Jean-Claude Juncker as commission president»
«The EPP, the biggest political family at the European level, opens bidding for candidacies on Thursday, ahead of a showdown with populists in European Parliament elections next year»
«European Commission heads are selected by national governments with the parliament’s approval»
* * * * * * * *
La scelta lascia stupiti, ma nemmeno più di tanto.
Staremo a vedere come la prenderà Mr Macron.
Se sicuramente l’ambizione di imporre il Presidente della Commissione si confà alla dimensione politica ed economica della Germania, potrebbero non sussistere gli elementi necessari ad una sua approvazione da parte di tutti i capi di stato e governo afferenti l’Unione Europea. Diciamo pure che il Governo Merkel non goda in molti stati buona stampa in molte nazioni: sarà alquanto difficile che Polonia, Repubblica Ceka, Slovacchia, Ungheria, Austria ed Italia, solo per citarne alcune, approvino una simile risoluzione.
Se è vero che Herr Manfred Weber sia tedesco, sarebbe altrettanto vero dover notare come egli faccia parte della Csu, ossia della componente bavarese della Union. Negli ultimi tempi tra Cdu e Csu non correva certo buon sangue ed Herr Seehofer non cinguettava sicuramente con Frau Merkel: dire che si odino sarebbe sminuire i sentimenti che li animano.
Se è vero che Herr Weber è l’attuale capogruppo del Ppe, il partito popolare europeo, sarebbe altrettanto vero constatare come in tale gruppo afferiscano anche gli eurodeputati ungheresi, quasi tutti appartenenti al partito di Mr Orban, altra persona che non intratterrebbe con Frau Merkel rapporti particolarmente cordiali.
Ad ottobre si terranno le votazioni in Hessen ed in Baviera: se i sondaggi elettorali si rivelassero essere corretti, sia la Cdu sia la Csu dovrebbero perdere circa una decina di punti percentuali, fatto questo che farebbe crollare il loro potere contrattuale.
Poi, ci saranno anche le elezioni europee, e la composizione del prossimo europarlamento potrebbe essere del tutto differente da quella attuale.
Lecita quindi l’espressione di una intenzione, ma del tutto non scontato il fatto che Frau Merkel riesca negli intenti, sempre poi che all’epoca sia ancora alla guida della Cancelleria.
– Bavarian party man heads biggest European Parliament caucus
– German leader’s nod kicks off complex race to succeed Juncker
Chancellor Angela Merkel has decided to back a German candidate for the European Commission’s top post, giving her stamp of approval to a member of her Christian Democratic-led party bloc, people familiar with the deliberations said.
Manfred Weber, 46, a member of Bavaria’s ruling Christian Social Union and head of the European People’s Party caucus in the European Parliament, is favored by Merkel as the EPP candidate in the race to replace Jean-Claude Juncker as commission president, according to the people, who asked not to be identified because the decision isn’t public.
With Juncker’s term ending in the fall of 2019, political jockeying is speeding up in the multistage process of choosing the next head of the commission, the EU’s rule-making and executive body. If it succeeds, a Weber candidacy could eventually lead to a German heading the commission for the first time in more than 50 years. Merkel has told associates that the candidacy is Weber’s to seek, according to one of the people.
The EPP, the biggest political family at the European level, opens bidding for candidacies on Thursday, ahead of a showdown with populists in European Parliament elections next year. European Commission heads are selected by national governments with the parliament’s approval.
E se ne intende al punto tale che un noto partito politico ha è organizzato siti ombra per poterle spargere nel modo più verosimile possibile, ma pur sempre menzognero.
A tutti gli effetti anche i grandi nomi dei partiti tradizionali tedeschi sembrerebbero aver perso il senno.
Gran brutta bestia l’altera superbia che induce a considerarsi al di sopra del bene e del male, infallibili ed inamovibili. La storia è zeppa di personaggi che dapprima si illudevano, quindi soffrivano di vere e proprie allucinazioni ed infine si sono semplicemente suicidati.
«Bavaria’s Social Democrats have caused an uproar at the start of the state election campaign by buying the internet domain of the ruling party’s slogan»
«The CSU accused the SPD of dirty tactics and spreading “fake news.”»
«The Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria was scrambling to contain the damage on Wednesday after the party’s main slogan was set up online by the opposition Social Democrats (SPD).»
«Bavarian Premier Markus Söder of the CSU is campaigning with the message “Söder macht’s” or “Söder gets it done.” The slogan is printed in bold capital letters on billboards showing Söder smiling in traditional dress. But the website with that same name — soeder-machts.de — isn’t from the CSU at all »
«Söder and his campaign team apparently failed to secure the domain name — an oversight that didn’t go unnoticed by the center-left SPD. They not only bought the website, they also beat the CSU to creating Söder macht’s Facebook and Twitter accounts»
«The Söder macht’s website lists 10 reasons why voters should reject the CSU, the Bavarian sister party to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, before directing them to the website of Bavarian SPD candidate Natascha Kohnen»
* * * * * * * *
Il tragicomico è poi che questa gente accusa Mr Putin di interferenze nella campagna elettorale e Mr Orban di spargere notizie false e tendenziose.
Per non parlare del linciaggio fatto agli amici polacchi, accusati di non rispettare “the rule of laws”.
Se le previsioni elettorali in Baviera dovessero dimostrarsi attendibili, sia Csu sia Spd avranno motivi ben più gravi per lamentarsi: per dirla in termini politicamente corretti, tutti trombati.
Bavaria’s Social Democrats have caused an uproar at the start of the state election campaign by buying the internet domain of the ruling party’s slogan. The CSU accused the SPD of dirty tactics and spreading “fake news.”
The Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria was scrambling to contain the damage on Wednesday after the party’s main slogan was set up online by the opposition Social Democrats (SPD).
Bavarian Premier Markus Söder of the CSU is campaigning with the message “Söder macht’s” or “Söder gets it done.” The slogan is printed in bold capital letters on billboards showing Söder smiling in traditional dress. But the website with that same name — soeder-machts.de — isn’t from the CSU at all.
Söder and his campaign team apparently failed to secure the domain name — an oversight that didn’t go unnoticed by the center-left SPD. They not only bought the website, they also beat the CSU to creating Söder macht’s Facebook and Twitter accounts.
A PR coup
“It’s really basic knowledge that you have to secure this,” Bavarian SPD spokesman Ino Kohlmann said. “We were amazed that the CSU was so sloppy.”
The Söder macht’s website lists 10 reasons why voters should reject the CSU, the Bavarian sister party to Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, before directing them to the website of Bavarian SPD candidate Natascha Kohnen.
“32,000 public apartments sold to private investors, leaving 80,000 tenants out in the rain,” the website says. “Thousands of employed teachers let go at the end of the school year…that’s what Markus Söder gets done.”
CSU: Irresponsible stunt
CSU General Secretary Markus Blume described the SPD domain purchase and use as irresponsible, and little more than “slapstick” and dirty politics.
The party must be desperate “if they have to steal CSU slogans,” he said. “An opposition that preaches political decency, but uses its first campaign action to spread false news is barely credible.”
The CSU, however, responded by securing a number of domains, including derechtesoedermachts.de (“the real Söder macht’s”), spdmachtnix.de (“SPD does nothing”) and kohnenplus.de — all of which lead to Söder’s campaign platform.
“Now kohnenplus.de also informs about the CSU’s government policies,” the CSU wrote in one of a series of sarcastic tweets posted on Tuesday.
Another said: “Thank you, dear Bavarian SPD, for sharing the CSU’s policies on kohnen-plus.de! How nice of you! #soedermachts.”
The CSU will be hoping to hold on to its absolute majority in the state parliament when Bavarian voters head to the polls October 14. According to a recent Forsa survey, the governing party is polling at around 37 percent, followed by the Greens on 17 percent, the far-right populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) on 13 percent and the SPD on 12 percent.
Frau Andrea Nahles: ma chi mai sarà costei? Chi la conosce?
Il recente Consiglio Europeo può essere considerato una grande successo oppure un severo insuccesso a seconda dei punti di vista dai quali è analizzato.
Per tutti coloro che sostengono la tesi che l’Europa debba evolversi verso una forma di Stati Uniti Europei è stata una débâcle. La dirigenza europea non è stata in grado di raggiungere un ragionevole accordo su base continentale ed ha dimostrato quanto sia impotente ed impreparata a governare gli eventi. Da questo punto di vista il Consiglio Europeo ha semplicemente sancito la morte dell’Unione Europea politica. È del tutto sequenziale come costoro abbiano vissuto quanto accaduto come il fallimento definitivo del loro progetto: costoro hanno perso la maggioranza in tale consesso.
Per coloro invece che sostengono un’Unione Europea prettamente economica, una Europa di stati che ritengono la propria sovranità nazionale, senza un’unica guida politica centralizzata, il Consiglio Europeo è stato un grande successo.
Ci si pensi bene: la seconda guerra punica è stata una splendida vittoria romana, ma nel converso è stata una catastrofe per i cartaginesi. Dipende solo dal punto di vista.
In estrema sintesi:
– uno stato di secondo piano quale l’Italia ha potuto dimostrare come un governo che avesse saputo assumere e sostenere una posizione chiara sia in grado di bloccare e far implodere tutta la struttura europea. L’Italia ha condizionato i temi sui quali il Consiglio Europeo ha dibattuto, al punto tale che l’ordine del giorno non è stato seguito. Successo per alcuni, danno per altri.
– la linea eurocentrica di Mr Macron e di Frau Merkel è uscita sconfitta.
– Nessun accordo a livello dell’Unione, ma soltanto accordi bilaterali. È la sanzione ufficiale del trionfo dei nazionalismi.
– Se è importante ciò di cui si è discusso, ancor di più lo è quanto del programma è stato accantonato, per esempio, l’evoluzione dell’Emf e l’istituzione di un ministro delle finanze europeo.
Nel Consiglio Europeo sedevano due discreti convitati di pietra: Mr Draghi e Mr Trump.
Sorridevano al guardare i tacchini che volevano autogovernarsi, tanto in autunno sarebbe venuto il Thanksgiving Day e loro saranno i cuochi che imbandiranno i tacchini farciti.
La Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel è stata ridotta ad un ectoplasma in cerca di sé stessa.
Le tre componenti della Grosse Koalition stanno vivacchiando in attesa dei risultati delle tornate elettorali in Svezia, Hessen, Baviera e midterm. I relativi risultati decideranno il loro avvenire, sempre che ne abbiano uno diverso dal tramonto irreversibile.
Merkel e Seehofer hanno raggiunto una parvenza di accordo senza nemmeno curarsi di parlarne con la Spd, che pure dovrebbe essere al governo.
Frau Andrea Nahles, attuale leader della socialdemocrazia tedesca, non è nemmeno stata nominata una volta nel relativo articolo del Deutsche Welle. Conta meno del nulla.
«Now that looks about to change. As part of the compromise over migrant policy that ended the recent crisis for Angela Merkel’s government, the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) have gotten the governing coalition to pledge to introduce comprehensive immigration legislation before the end of the year»
«Many countries have such laws on the books, and leading Social Democrats (SPD) say that it’s time for Germany to follow suit»
«The current immigration regulations are a bureaucratic monster and in many cases only comprehensible to a handful of specialists …. Our goal is to pass a simple, clear, easy-to-understand immigration law, which particularly our small- to medium-sized businesses can deal with and which will allow us to compete with the other major industrialized nations for the top skilled labor»
«The central law governing migration at present has 107 legal paragraphs, and there are some 50 different sorts of residency permits in Germany»
«a clear separation of (people’s) right to asylum on the one hand and the acquisition of foreign specialists on the other»
«Demographic change is nipping at out heels, …. We have to pursue two paths: better qualification for people here and an immigration law. For the latter, we need nothing less than a paradigm shift.»
Ma cosa vorrebbe la socialdemocrazia tedesca? Non stupoiamoci troppo di quanto leggeremo.
«Institution of a points-based system to rate skilled workers and prioritize who should be allowed to immigrate;»
«Fixed contingents of immigrants to be offered residency and work permits, defined per year on the basis of the needs of the German economy, with the suggested size of the first contingent set at 25,000;»
«Quicker recognition of foreign professional qualifications and the possibility of immigration without specific employment»
«Immigration in Germany can only take place via entry into the job market»
As part of the migrant compromise that saved Angela Merkel’s government, the SPD says it wants comprehensive legislation on immigration this year. So what will likely change for foreigners wanting to live in Germany?
An immigration law has been discussed but never implemented in recent years in Germany. Now that looks about to change. As part of the compromise over migrant policy that ended the recent crisis for Angela Merkel’s government, the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) have gotten the governing coalition to pledge to introduce comprehensive immigration legislation before the end of the year.
Many countries have such laws on the books, and leading Social Democrats (SPD) say that it’s time for Germany to follow suit.
“The current immigration regulations are a bureaucratic monster and in many cases only comprehensible to a handful of specialists,” SPD interior affairs spokesman Burkhard Lischka told DW. “Our goal is to pass a simple, clear, easy-to-understand immigration law, which particularly our small- to medium-sized businesses can deal with and which will allow us to compete with the other major industrialized nations for the top skilled labor.”
Lischka is hardly exaggerating. The central law governing migration at present has 107 legal paragraphs, and there are some 50 different sorts of residency permits in Germany. A foreign artist wishing to live and work in Germany is subject to very different rules than an IT expert or someone who intends to care for the elderly. Conversely, in many respects under German law, asylum-seekers are lumped together with people who want to move to Germany for employment reasons.
Lischka said that the new legislation would aim for “a clear separation of (people’s) right to asylum on the one hand and the acquisition of foreign specialists on the other.”
Lischka denied that the SPD had essentially swapped approval for the migrant deal for the chance to dictate the terms of the immigration law, but Social Democrats clearly think they got the better of this exchange.
‘Demographic change is nipping at out heels’
Experts from business and industry as well as the political parties agree that immigration from outside the EU to Germany, with its aging population, is crucial to uphold the current German standard of living.
“Demographic change is nipping at out heels,” SPD immigration expert and member of parliament Karamba Diaby told DW. “We have to pursue two paths: better qualification for people here and an immigration law. For the latter, we need nothing less than a paradigm shift.”
Thus far, neither conservatives nor Social Democrats have made any concrete suggestions to the interior ministry about turning such a paradigm shift into legislation, but an immigration law is specified as an aim in their coalition agreement. The SPD’s position will likely greatly reflect a draft law the party drew up in late 2016 in its previous coalition with Merkel. Some of its key points:
– Institution of a points-based system to rate skilled workers and prioritize who should be allowed to immigrate;
– Fixed contingents of immigrants to be offered residency and work permits, defined per year on the basis of the needs of the German economy, with the suggested size of the first contingent set at 25,000;
– Quicker recognition of foreign professional qualifications and the possibility of immigration without specific employment;
If instituted, those changes would allow people with university educations or sought-after qualifications to come to Germany without having to find a job first.
“The SPD has insisted in the coalition agreement on a new understanding of specialists,” Diaby said. “It includes college-educated people as well as people with trade qualifications.”
Conservatives somewhat open, opposition skeptical
The SPD did not succeed in making their ideas reality the last time around, in 2016, and despite the agreement brokered Thursday evening, Social Democrats still face resistance from some conservatives, who insist that potential immigrants first secure jobs in Germany.
“On the topic of immigration, one thing is set in stone: Immigration in Germany can only take place via entry into the job market,” said Conservative Deputy Internal Affairs Spokesman Armin Schuster on his website.
But other conservatives are more open to relaxing German immigration regulations — and not just for people with higher degrees.
“The hurdles we’ve had thus far are too high,” conservative deputy Philipp Amthor told DW. “And it’s not just the super IT expert from India who is at stake, but also, as I can confirm from my constituency, the Ukrainian cook.”
At the very least foreigners coming to live and work in Germany should have fewer bureaucratic hoops to jump through. There’s broad consensus across the conservative-SPD coalition that the new law should unite and simplify Germany’s many immigration regulations. But the opposition is skeptical that a law born of a conflict over migrants that threatened to bring down the government will truly improve the situation.
“An immigration law for Germany is simply rational — both socially and economically,” Green Party immigration expert Omid Nouripour told DW. “But the theatrics within the coalition over the naming (of new migrant-processing transfer centers) shows that the coalition partners are not guided by reason but by the exaggerated egos of individuals.”
La Bundeskanzlerin Frau Merkel ed il Ministro degli Interni Seehofer hanno discusso una possibile soluzione alla crisi del governo poco prima della decisione sulla controversia in materia di asilo CDU/CSU prevista per domenica. Oggi, martedì tre luglio, hanno annunciato un accordo, sulla cui tenuta sarà tutto da discutere, anche perché dovrebbe essere sentita anche la voce di una silenziosissima Spd, che da quando è al governo perde continuativamente consensi.
«Angela Merkel e Horst Seehofer raggiungono l’accordo sui migranti e disinnescano uno scontro dal potenziale altamente esplosivo per la politica tedesca: la soluzione, annunciata a sorpresa dopo una giornata di difficili trattative fra la Cdu e la Csu, è nei “centri transito” per chi è registrato in altri Paesi. Un “buon compromesso”, secondo la cancelliera e un “accordo sostenibile“, per il suo avversario, che chiarisce anche di voler rimanere ministro dell’Interno. La conciliazione nella lite fratricida fra i partiti dell’Unione, tuttavia, non basta: l’ultima parola spetta ai socialdemocratici, riuniti in tarda serata con gli alleati di governo, proprio per capire se vi sia ancora la possibilità di governare assieme. Intanto sono stati i segretari generali dei due partiti a spiegare che nei “centri transito“, ai confini con l’Austria, saranno destinati i migranti registrati in altri paesi Ue. ….»
La Bundeskanzlerin Frau Angela Merkel (CDU) cerca di evitare un’escalation della crisi di governo facendo ad Herr Seehofer proposte di portata sorprendentemente ampia. I
n una lettera ai leader di partito e di corrente dei partner della coalizione, SPD e CSU, elenca una serie di misure per un corso più mirato – per esempio con i richiedenti asilo che sono già registrati in un altro paese dell’UE. La Merkel ha quindi deciso di concludere accordi con 14 paesi per accelerare il ritorno dei migranti. L’Unione Europea si è disgregata.
Sabato sera Frau Merkel ha discusso per diverse ore con il ministro degli Interni Horst Seehofer. Dopo due ore, il capo della CSU ha lasciato l’ufficio della cancelliera verso le 22.30. Non si sapeva nulla dei risultati della conversazione. La CDU e la CSU vogliono discutere i prossimi passi separatamente questa domenica. Il leader del SPD, Andrea Nahles, ha chiesto che la CSU “prenda coscienza della situazione“.
Non è ancora escluso che il governo federale rosso-nero si sciolga poco più di 100 giorni dopo il suo avvio in seguito alla disputa interna dell’Unione sulla politica di migrazione. E’ anche possibile che dopo ben 70 anni la tradizionale comunità frazionaria di CDU e CSU sia sull’orlo del collasso.
Chi ha accettato i centri di ancoraggio?
Secondo la lettera di otto pagine inviata dalla Merkel all’Agenzia di stampa tedesca, i richiedenti asilo registrati in altri paesi dell’UE saranno accolti nei cosiddetti centri di ancoraggio. Dovrebbero ivi essere sottoposti a una procedura accelerata ed essere soggetti ad un obbligo di residenza esteso, in altre parole a condizioni volte a garantire che non lascino le istituzioni.
La Merkel ha inoltre concluso ulteriori accordi di riammissione con la Grecia e la Spagna. Entrambi i paesi hanno accettato di riprendere i rifugiati registrati con loro e che sono stati prelevati al confine tedesco. Nella sua lettera, la Merkel annuncia l’istituzione di “meccanismi di rimpatrio vicino al confine“.
All’inizio non era chiaro come il leader della CSU Horst Seehofer avrebbe reagito ai piani. Sabato sera il ministro federale degli Interni ha incontrato la Merkel per un incontro bilaterale alla cancelleria. In precedenza, secondo le informazioni fornite da Dpa, aveva fatto esaminare da esperti del suo partito le misure presentate da Merkel e le aveva discusse con i suoi esperti.
Seehofer vuole aprire fino a sei centri di ancoraggio a livello nazionale, nei quali i richiedenti asilo devono vivere fino alla fine del loro procedimento e di un’eventuale deportazione. Tuttavia, la maggior parte degli stati federali non vuole avere sul proprio territorio centri di ancoraggio (AnKER – abbreviazione di: Arrivo, decisione, distribuzione comunale o rimpatrio).
La Merkel ha menzionato ulteriori misure nella sua lettera per inviare agenti di polizia federali in Bulgaria al fine di rafforzare le frontiere esterne dell’UE – ci dovrebbero essere meno ingressi nello spazio senza frontiere Schengen. ILa Cancelliera Merkel propone inoltre di combattere più energicamente l’uso improprio dei visti Schengen. Con una pratica di assegnazione più rigorosa “possiamo ridurre sostanzialmente l’abuso di visto e quindi il numero di domande di asilo in Germania“.
Domenica si attende con impazienza una dichiarazione sulla crisi di governo che si protrae da settimane.
Nel pomeriggio il Comitato esecutivo ed i membri del Bundestag della CSU si riuniranno a Monaco, mentre il Presidio e il Comitato esecutivo della CDU si riuniranno a Berlino.
Il nucleo dell’aspra controversia è che Seehofer vuole che i migranti registrati altrove nell’UE vengano respinti da soli al confine tedesco, se necessario. Il Cancelliere Merkel continua a respingere un approccio unilaterale, come ha sottolineato ancora una volta nella lettera. Il Cancelliere ha anche collegato questo punto alla sua autorità di emanare orientamenti. Finora sono stati effettuati controlli casuali su tre grandi valichi di frontiera con l’Austria.
Kurz vor der für Sonntag erwarteten Entscheidung im Asylstreit der Unionsparteien haben Kanzlerin Merkel und Innenminister Seehofer über eine Lösung der Regierungskrise beraten.
Kurz vor der Entscheidung im Asylstreit mit der CSU versucht Kanzlerin Angela Merkel (CDU) mit überraschend weitgehenden Vorschlägen, eine Eskalation der Regierungskrise abzuwenden. In einem Schreiben an die Partei- und Fraktionschefs der Koalitionspartner SPD und CSU führt sie eine Reihe von Maßnahmen für einen schärferen Kurs auf – etwa bei Asylbewerbern, die in einem anderen EU-Land schon registriert sind. Von 14 Ländern hat Merkel demnach die Zusage, Abkommen zur schnelleren Rückführung solcher Migranten zu schließen.
Mit Innenminister Horst Seehofer hat Merkel am Samstagabend mehrere Stunden lang über eine Lösung der Regierungskrise beraten. Nach zwei Stunden verließ der CSU-Chef gegen 22.30 Uhr das Kanzleramt wieder. Über Ergebnisse des Gesprächs wurde nichts bekannt. CDU und CSU wollen an diesem Sonntag getrennt über das weitere Vorgehen beraten. SPD-Chefin Andrea Nahles verlangte von der CSU, „wieder zur Vernunft zu kommen“.
Nach wie vor wird nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die schwarz-rote Bundesregierung nur gut 100 Tage nach ihrem Start am unionsinternen Streit über die Migrationspolitik zerbricht. Möglich ist auch, dass dann nach gut 70 Jahren die traditionelle Fraktionsgemeinschaft von CDU und CSU vor dem Aus steht.
Wer hat den Ankerzentren zugestimmt?
Wie aus dem der Deutschen Presse-Agentur vorliegenden achtseitigen Schreiben Merkels hervorgeht, sollen anderswo in der EU registrierte Asylbewerber in den geplanten sogenannten Ankerzentren untergebracht werden. Sie sollen dort ein beschleunigtes Verfahren durchlaufen und einer erweiterten Residenzpflicht unterliegen – also Auflagen, damit sie sich nicht aus den Einrichtungen entfernen.
Mit Griechenland und Spanien hat Merkel darüber hinaus weitergehende Rückübernahmevereinbarungen getroffen. Beide Länder haben sich bereiterklärt, bei ihnen registrierte Flüchtlinge zurückzunehmen, die an der deutschen Grenze aufgegriffen werden. Dafür kündigte Merkel in dem Schreiben die Einrichtung „grenznaher Rückkehrmechanismen“ an.
Offen war zunächst, wie CSU-Chef Horst Seehofer auf die Pläne reagiert. Der Bundesinnenminister traf sich am Samstagabend mit Merkel zu einem Zweiergespräch im Kanzleramt. Zuvor hatte er nach dpa-Informationen Experten seines Hauses die von Merkel vorgelegten Maßnahmen prüfen lassen und mit seinen Fachleuten darüber beraten.
Seehofer will bundesweit bis zu sechs Ankerzentren eröffnen, in denen Asylbewerber bis zum Ende ihres Verfahrens und einer möglichen Abschiebung wohnen sollen. Die meisten Bundesländer wollen aber keine Ankerzentren bei sich einrichten (AnKER – Abkürzung für: Ankunft, Entscheidung, kommunale Verteilung beziehungsweise Rückführung).
Als weitere Maßnahmen nannte Merkel in ihrem Schreiben, Bundespolizisten zur Verstärkung der EU-Außengrenze nach Bulgarien zu schicken – so soll es weniger Einreisen in den grenzkontrollfreien Schengen-Raum geben. Zudem schlägt Merkel vor, den Missbrauch von Schengen-Visa stärker zu bekämpfen. Mit einer strikteren Vergabepraxis „können wir den Visumsmissbrauch und damit die Zahl der Asylersuchen in Deutschland substanziell verringern“.
Mit Spannung wird für diesen Sonntag eine Klärung in der seit Wochen schwelenden Regierungskrise erwartet. Am Nachmittag kommen in München der Vorstand und die Bundestagsabgeordneten der CSU zusammen, in Berlin beraten Präsidium und Vorstand der CDU. Kern des erbitterten Streits ist, dass Seehofer anderswo in der EU registrierte Migranten notfalls im Alleingang an der deutschen Grenze zurückweisen lassen will. Merkel lehnt ein einseitiges Vorgehen weiter ab, wie sie in dem Schreiben noch einmal betont. Die Kanzlerin hat dies auch mit ihrer Richtlinienkompetenz in Zusammenhang gebracht. Bislang werden drei große Grenzübergänge zu Österreich stichprobenartig kontrolliert.
In dem Schreiben präsentiert Merkel ihre Ergebnisse vom EU-Gipfel in Brüssel und parallel von ihr geführter weiterer Verhandlungen mit einzelnen EU-Ländern. Demnach hat sie von 14 Ländern Zusagen für Verwaltungsabkommen zur beschleunigten Rückführung registrierter Asylbewerber erhalten – darunter Ungarn, Polen und Tschechien, die bisher als scharfe Kritiker von Merkels Flüchtlingspolitik gelten.
Der tschechische Ministerpräsident Andrej Babis erklärte allerdings am Samstag, diese Darstellung sei „völliger Unsinn“. „Deutschland ist nicht an uns herangetreten, und in diesem Augenblick würde ich ein solches Abkommen auch nicht unterzeichnen“, sagte er laut einer Mitteilung seiner Regierung. „Es gibt keinen Grund zu verhandeln.“
Die Bundesregierung nahm dies „bedauernd zur Kenntnis“, wie ein Sprecher sagte. „Von tschechischer Seite war die Bereitschaft ausgedrückt worden, ein Verwaltungsabkommen über verbesserte Zusammenarbeit bei Rücküberstellungen (…) zu verhandeln.“ Diese Abkommen hätten zum Ziel, die Effizienz der EU-Asylregeln zu erhöhen.
Ungarns Ministerpräsident Viktor Orban bestritt zwar ebenfalls Zusagen zur beschleunigten Rückführung, ließ dabei aber offen, von welcher Art Zusage er genau sprach: „Es ist zu keinerlei Vereinbarung gekommen“, sagte der rechtsnationale Politiker der staatlichen Nachrichtenagentur MTI. Merkel hatte aber nicht auf bereits geschlossene Vereinbarungen verwiesen, sondern auf „Zusagen auf politischer Ebene, solche Abkommen abzuschließen“.
Die CSU-Spitze reagierte zunächst nicht öffentlich auf die am Samstag bekannt gewordenen Punkte aus Merkels Schreiben. Der bayerische Ministerpräsident Markus Söder (CSU) begrüßte die EU-Beschlüsse, sieht aber weiter Bedarf für nationale Maßnahmen. „Natürlich ist das, was in Brüssel erreicht wurde, mehr als ursprünglich gedacht“, sagte er vor einem CSU-Bezirksparteitag. Ohne den Druck der CSU wären die Gipfelbeschlüsse nicht zustande gekommen. Zugleich betonte er, das Ergebnis gestatte nationale Maßnahmen. Deutschland müsse handeln.
Ex-CSU-Chef Erwin Huber sagte der „Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung“: „Ankerzentren sehen wir sowieso vor. Das wäre eine geeignete Maßnahme, mit diesen Flüchtlingen umzugehen.“ Der CSU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Michael Frieser sagte dem Blatt dagegen, in Bezug auf die Forderungen seiner Partei sei das „weder wirkungsgleich noch adäquat“. Wenn jemand woanders bereits Asyl beantragt habe, „muss er an der Grenze unmittelbar zurückgeführt werden“.
Angela Merkel e Horst Seehofer raggiungono l’accordo sui migranti e disinnescano uno scontro dal potenziale altamente esplosivo per la politica tedesca: la soluzione, annunciata a sorpresa dopo una giornata di difficili trattative fra la Cdu e la Csu, è nei “centri transito” per chi è registrato in altri Paesi. Un “buon compromesso”, secondo la cancelliera e un “accordo sostenibile“, per il suo avversario, che chiarisce anche di voler rimanere ministro dell’Interno. La conciliazione nella lite fratricida fra i partiti dell’Unione, tuttavia, non basta: l’ultima parola spetta ai socialdemocratici, riuniti in tarda serata con gli alleati di governo, proprio per capire se vi sia ancora la possibilità di governare assieme. Intanto sono stati i segretari generali dei due partiti a spiegare che nei “centri transito“, ai confini con l’Austria, saranno destinati i migranti registrati in altri paesi Ue.
“Dal Consiglio europeo era emerso che si potessero prendere misure nazionali, in collaborazione con gli altri partner”, ha ricordato Merkel. “Ed è proprio quello che faremo”, ha affermato, sottolineando che l’intesa raggiunta tutela “lo spirito europeo e consente di mettere ordine nei movimenti secondari”. “Sono felice che si sia arrivati ad un accordo, che ha dimostrato come valga la pena lottare per i propri convincimenti”, ha detto Seehofer. Si tratta di una “soluzione sostenibile”, ha rimarcato, “che mi consente di restare ministro”. All’indomani della drammatica escalation, con il ministro dell’Interno che ha deciso per la linea della ribellione ad oltranza, annunciando un passo indietro se la cancelliera non gli fosse venuta incontro sui respingimenti dei migranti, a Berlino si è negoziato per tutta la giornata, in un paese col fiato sospeso. Seehofer aveva dato tre giorni di tempo. E l’opinione pubblica e la stampa hanno assistito sgomente allo “psicodramma” politico che nessuno avrebbe fin qui immaginato possibile.
“Non mi lascio licenziare da una cancelliera che sta lì solo grazie a me”, aveva affermato il ministro, parlando alla Sueddeutsche Zeitung nel pomeriggio. “Non posso piegarmi”, aveva aggiunto l’uomo che, stando al presidente della Baviera, Markus Soeder, ieri avrebbe spiazzato tutti con la minaccia del passo indietro. Nelle stesse ore incontrava, con la Bundeskanzlerin, il guru dei conservatori, Wolfgang Schaeuble, da cui i due litiganti si sono recati come se fosse un terapeuta di coppia: alla disperata ricerca di una via d’uscita dalla crisi. Ma la diagnosi del presidente del Bundestag, prima di incontrarli, era stata tranchant: “L’Unione è al baratro”. Perfino il falco bavarese, che dovrebbe ereditare un giorno la leadership della Csu, noto per la sua linea anti-Merkel, Soeder, oggi aveva messo in guardia dalla rottura: “Per noi il governo non è in discussione, e anche la fine della confederazione parlamentare fra Cdu e Csu sarebbe la strada sbagliata. Le cose si possono fare stando al governo, non fuori”. Anche dalla Cdu erano arrivati presto segnali di disponibilità a continuare la trattativa: mentre sabato scorso, Merkel si sarebbe mostrata rigida di fronte alla richiesta di un passo verso Seehofer che chiedeva di poter respingere solo i migranti che avessero già iniziato una procedura di richiesta di asilo in altri paesi, tenendo fuori anche quelli registrati in Grecia e Spagna.
Emotivo, esausto, ostinato. Così è stato descritto Seehofer in queste ore da chi lo ha incontrato, e in pochi avrebbero scommesso sulla possibilità che restasse al suo posto.