Pubblicato in: Criminalità Organizzata

Racket delle ong. Questo è il titolo del Gatestone Institute.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-09-15.

Mafia 011

«Italy has received almost 100,000 people so far this year»

*

«This summer, even more than in previous years, it has become plain that some of the NGOs working in the Mediterranean are acting as something more than intermediaries»

*

«Many have in fact been acting as facilitators. This makes the NGOs effectively no more than the benign face of the smuggling networks»

*

«Undercover workers have also discovered NGOs handing vessels back to the smugglers’ networks, effectively helping them to continue their criminal enterprise indefinitely»

*

«A group that which seeks to oppose Europe’s current self-destructive insane trajectory can now not even source independent financial support»

*

«Groups, however, that continue to push Europe along its current trajectory continue to get all the official support they need»

*

«In the difference in reaction to these two groups lies a significant part of the story of the ruin of a continent»

* * * * * * *

«Across the EU as a whole, a recent survey found that 76% of the European public think that the European Union’s handling of the whole crisis has been poor.»

*

«A significant amount of the “rescue” part of the migrant crisis (finding boats and transferring those onboard onto safe vessels or guiding their vessels into port) has been done by NGOs»

*

«Organisations such as Save the Children and Médecins sans Frontières have been invited to do this by European government agencies, and many of them receive significant levels of government funding as well as charitable giving from the public»

*

«It may easily be argued, of course, that pro-migration NGOs that are colluding with smuggling gangs and assisting them in their work are “likely to cause loss of life”, if not in the Mediterranean then in encouraging thousands of people to give their money to smuggling gangs and encouraging millions more to set out for a new life in a continent which is increasingly less likely to receive them with warmth»

* * * * * * *

Queste parole suonano come macigni.

«pro-migration NGOs that are colluding with smuggling gangs»

Nulla da stupirsi quindi che la società civile mondiale stia insorgendo contro il potere criminale delle ogn (ngo).

Ong. Tempi durissimi. India avvia inchiesta sulla Bloomberg Philanthropies.

«Following the enquiry, permits of about 8,875 NGOs have been revoked for a variety of reasons ranging from non-filing of returns or non-compliance with Foreign Contribution Regulation Act»

^ ^ ^

More Than 7,000 Foreign NGOs in China: Only 91 Registered So Far

Cina. Una nuova legge sulle Ong (Ngo).

«Many other foreign NGOs, especially those working in political sensitive areas like legal advocacy or political education, are left in legal limbo»

^ ^ ^

«The Russian “foreign agent” law, officially “On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent”, is a law in Russia that requires non-profit organizations that receive foreign donations and engage in “political activity” to register and declare themselves as foreign agents.» [Fonte]

*

NGO Head First Russian Charged Under ‘Foreign Agent’ Law

* * * * * * *

Soros George. Uno stato negli stati. Ecco i suoi principali voivodati.

Nota Importante.

Una società civile ha il suo legale e legittimo governo, stabilito secondo tradizione, che quindi governa secondo le leggi proprie di quella società, di quella nazione, interpretando il sentimento popolare.

È del tutto mezognero che associazioni private, per di più sovvenzionate dall’estero, alle quali aderisce un misero manipolo di persone stipendiate, si arroghino il “diritto” di poter rappresentare la “società civile”, tutta la nazione.

Non rappresentano altro che gli interessi per i quali sono state costituite.


Gatestone Institute. 2017-09-04. New NGO Racket: Smuggling, Inc.

– Although the European Union successfully bribed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last year — inducing him to slow the flow of migrants heading through Turkey into Greece — Italy has received almost 100,000 people so far this year.

– This summer, even more than in previous years, it has become plain that some of the NGOs working in the Mediterranean are acting as something more than intermediaries. Many have in fact been acting as facilitators. This makes the NGOs effectively no more than the benign face of the smuggling networks. Undercover workers have also discovered NGOs handing vessels back to the smugglers’ networks, effectively helping them to continue their criminal enterprise indefinitely.

– A group that which seeks to oppose Europe’s current self-destructive insane trajectory can now not even source independent financial support. Groups, however, that continue to push Europe along its current trajectory continue to get all the official support they need. In the difference in reaction to these two groups lies a significant part of the story of the ruin of a continent.

*

Sometimes it is in the gap between things that the truth emerges.

In recent years Europe has been on the receiving end of one of the most significant migrant crises in history. In 2015, in just a single year, countries such as Germany and Sweden found themselves adding 2% to their respective populations. Although much of the public continue to labour under the misapprehension that those still coming are fleeing the Syrian civil war; in fact, the majority of those now entering Europe are from Africa, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa.

Although the European Union successfully bribed Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last year — inducing him to slow the flow of migrants heading through Turkey into Greece — Italy has received almost 100,000 people so far this year. Spain — which had ducked much of the movement of recent years — now finds itself receiving thousands of people who are sometimes (as in this memorable footage from earlier this month) simply landing on the country’s beaches and running straight into the country. In doing so, they are not only breaking into Europe in a fashion that is illegal, but flouting all the asylum protocols, and other protocols, however inadequate, that are meant to exist.

In reaction to such events, the Spanish authorities have done something extraordinary. They have gone the way of the Italian authorities and made more efforts to intercept boats heading towards the country. Not in order to turn them around or block them, but in order to “rescue” them. In merely one day last week, the Spanish coastguards “rescued” 600 migrants. The purpose of the quotation marks around “rescue” is because its use in this context is highly contestable. Somebody may be rescued from a burning car, or rescued from a sinking boat. But if thousands of people intentionally head across narrow stretches of water, it can hardly be said that each and every one of them has been “rescued’.

What have they been rescued from? They may be rescued from war. Or they may be rescued from poverty. Or slightly less rosy economic prospects than someone born in Spain. Most of these people have simply been rescued from Africa or whatever their country of origin. This situation leads to the questions which European politicians even now refuse to address — which is whether Europe should indeed be “rescuing” anyone who ends up in a boat near Europe.

Whenever they are polled, the public in Europe consistently say that they want the migration to slow down or stop. This is a majority opinion in every European country. Across the EU as a whole, a recent survey found that 76% of the European public think that the European Union’s handling of the whole crisis has been poor. But it is in the gap between the treatment of two actors in this crisis that we can discern a terrible fact about the fate of Europe.

Throughout the crisis of recent years — and especially since the height of the crisis in 2015 — the official vessels operated by the European states have been joined by members of non-governmental organsations (NGOs), either on the vessels or running vessels of their own. A significant amount of the “rescue” part of the migrant crisis (finding boats and transferring those onboard onto safe vessels or guiding their vessels into port) has been done by NGOs. Organisations such as Save the Children and Médecins sans Frontières have been invited to do this by European government agencies, and many of them receive significant levels of government funding as well as charitable giving from the public.

Yet, this summer, even more than in previous years, it has become plain that some of the NGOs working in the Mediterranean are acting as something more than intermediaries. Many have in fact been acting as facilitators. Agents who have infiltrated the NGO groups have found collusion between the NGOs and the smugglers networks, including coordination with these brutal and mercenary organisations. Investigations have found NGOs to have been breaking their own agreed operating rules by coordinating locations to meet and pick up vessels sent out by the smugglers. This makes the NGOs effectively no more than the benign face of the smuggling networks. Undercover workers have also discovered NGOs handing vessels back to the smugglers’ networks, effectively helping them to continue their criminal enterprise indefinitely.

In frontline countries such as Italy, this unlawful activity has been causing growing public anger. Elsewhere in Europe, the notion that these NGOs are not entirely angelic in their operations is taking longer to sink in. But compare the reaction to them — in receipt as they continue to be of large quantities of public and governmental money — with a group that has a different view to that of the NGOs.

At the start of this summer, a group called “Defend Europe” raised money to hire and sail a ship off the coast of Italy. The ship aimed to deter migrants from crossing the Mediterranean. One activist was recorded saying, “We want to get a crew, equip a boat and set sail to the Mediterranean ocean to chase down the enemies of Europe.” Some of the other characters and rhetoric associated with this movement may be equally unsavoury. For some weeks, the “Defend Europe” vessel, with banners prominently displayed, has floated in the Mediterranean and told people in a variety of languages, “No Way. You will not make Europe home” and “Stop human trafficking.”

Now one may abhor this tactic, approve of it, or feel a whole range of emotions in between. The treatment of “Defend Europe’, however, compared to the pro-migration NGOs, is startling. In recent weeks, when the “Defend Europe” vessel had some minor technical problems, it caused undisguised glee in the Western media. The suggestion that a pro-migration NGO vessel might have to rescue it caused even more delight. Now the group has had its sources of funding withdrawn. Not that “Defend Europe” would ever have received government aid. Far from it. But this past week, the US-based crowd-funding website Patreon shut down the group’s profile page, making it impossible for them to raise funds through it. The ostensible cause was that Patreon believed the actions of “Defend Europe” were “likely to cause loss of life.”

It may easily be argued, of course, that pro-migration NGOs that are colluding with smuggling gangs and assisting them in their work are “likely to cause loss of life”, if not in the Mediterranean then in encouraging thousands of people to give their money to smuggling gangs and encouraging millions more to set out for a new life in a continent which is increasingly less likely to receive them with warmth. A group that seeks to oppose Europe’s current self-destructive trajectory can now not even source independent financial support. Groups, however, that continue to push Europe along its current trajectory continue to get all the official support they need. In the difference in reaction to these two groups lies a significant part of the story of the ruin of a continent.

Annunci
Pubblicato in: Commercio, Problemia Energetici

Russia, Cina e Stati Uniti. Venezuela. I venezuelani sono comparse.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-15.

Gufo_022__

Il Venezuela è retto al momento da una dittatura. Come tutte le tirannidi, l’egemone si è circondato di persone fedeli e devote, che traggono consistenti benefici dall’essergli succubi in ogni desiderio, persone che lui ricompensa sia con denaro, sia con posti di potere, sia conferendo loro la totale immunità dei loro atti.

Quasi invariabilmente ci si sofferma sulla dittatura in atto trascurando l’analisi e la ricerca delle responsabilità del pregresso. Costantemente la storia evidenzia come le dittature attecchiscano quasi sempre in contesti caotici, spesso dopo periodi di torbidi con governi deboli e senza valido supporto.

In talune situazioni diventano il male minore. Si pensi solo alla dittatura di Napoleone.

Male minore attuale, ma quasi sempre male ben peggiore con l’andare del tempo.

Tratto caratteristico di ogni dittatura è la demonizzazione del passato, quasi che ciò potesse costituire giustificazione del presente. Manovra anche molto utilitaristica, perché ogni possibile oppositore sarebbe etichettato come “controrivoluzionario“. Nei fatti, la demonizzazione del passato è segno evidente di un regime dittatoriale.

Se all’attenzione del pubblico mondiale emergono le figure di spicco, la dittatura trova base consistente in un nugolo di microscopici personaggi senza storia che spadroneggiano impuniti ed impunibili sulla gente. Un caso per tutti: il fiduciario del governo dello stabile abitativo. È quello che può concedere o meno l’appartamento, l’uso di acqua, gas e corrente elettrica, distribuisce le tessere annonarie a piacer suo: una sorta di kapò la cui prima preoccupazione è quella di formarsi e mantenere in efficienza un harem privato e farsi un gruzzolo in valuta.

Mentre all’estero si percepiscono solo fatti eclamptici, quanti vivano sotto il regime dittatoriale conoscono per carne provata questo aspetto del potere. Spesso al punto da illudersi che il dittatore non ne sappia nulla.

Mr Maduro è un dittatore: attribuirgli una etichetta oppure un credo politico sarebbe solo un’operazione estetica, di mera cosmesi.

Innegabilmente, la schiera dei suoi supporter vive bene ed è trattata altrettanto bene: in questa enclave il dittatore è popolare e benvoluto.

* * * * * * *

L’immagine e la percezione di una dittatura all’estero è solo funzione di quanti amici e nemici essa ha fuori dal territorio che governa. Per esempio, la vecchia Unione Sovietica aveva schiere di partiti comunisti locali che la inneggiavano anche contro ogni evidenza. All’epoca, la stampa di ambedue le parti era consistentemente faziosa.

Ad oggi, leggendo i media occidentali, Maduro è identificato con satana in persona. Fuori dall’Occidente però media ed organi di comunicazione di massa sono decisamente più cauti.

Si assiste anche ad una serie di posizioni che definire ipocrite sarebbe financo poco: governi, nazioni, società e privati che a gran voce bollano la dittatura di Maduro e poi, sottobanco, commerciano allegramente con il Venezuela.

Il clou dell’ipocrisia è raggiunto dal debito estero venezuelano, nelle mani di investitori occidentali per la sua quasi interezza. Il fatto è che il Venezuela ha sempre onorato cedole e titoli in modo esemplare: è perfettamente conscio che in questo campo non può permettersi giochi strani.

«Venezuela-Bonds – Große Chance oder Totalausfall?» [Ariva]

* * * * * * *

«Collateral swap

Rosneft is also negotiating to swap its collateral in Citgo — a Venezuelan-owned, U.S.-based refiner — for more Venezuelan oilfield stakes and a fuel supply contract. The proposed deal, now in negotiations, aims to avoid complications from U.S. economic sanctions already in place against Russia and recently threatened against Venezuela.

What is Citgo?

Citgo is a subsidiary of PDVSA and its largest foreign asset. The refiner owns three refineries in Texas, Louisiana and Illinois, a pipeline and a retail fuel distribution network in the United States. Citgo has been solely owned by PDVSA since 1990.

How did Rosneft secure the collateral?

Venezuela pledged 49.9 percent of its shares in Citgo as collateral for a $1.5 billion loan from Rosneft last November.

What will Rosneft get in return?

PDVSA is offering the Russian oil giant ownership interests in two oil-and-gas projects and a lucrative fuel supply contract. The two projects, Mariscal Sucre in the Caribbean Sea and Tilaba in Lake Maracaibo, include three oilfields and two natural gas fields. Rosneft would also take increased management control over all the joint oil projects between the two state-owned firms.»

* * * * * * *

«As Caracas struggles to contain an economic meltdown and violent street protests, Moscow is using its position as Venezuela’s lender of last resort to gain more control over the OPEC nation’s crude reserves, the largest in the world»

*

«Venezuela’s state-owned oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), has been secretly negotiating since at least early this year with Russia’s biggest state-owned oil company, Rosneft, offering ownership interests in up to nine of Venezuela’s most productive petroleum projects, according to a top Venezuelan government official and two industry sources familiar with the talks»

*

«Moscow has substantial leverage in the negotiations: Cash from Russia and Rosneft has been crucial in helping the financially strapped government of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro avoid a sovereign debt default or a political coup»

*

«Rosneft delivered Venezuela’s state-owned firm more than $1 billion in April alone in exchange for a promise of oil shipments later»

*

«On at least two occasions, the Venezuelan government has used Russian cash to avoid imminent defaults on payments to bondholders»

*

«Russia’s growing control over Venezuelan crude gives it a stronger foothold in energy markets across the Americas. Rosneft now resells about 225,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Venezuelan oil – about 13 percent of the nation’s total exports, according to the PDVSA trade reports. That’s about enough to satisfy the daily demand of a country the size of Peru.»

*

«Maduro’s administration has grown increasingly dependent on Moscow in the past two years as China has curtailed credit to Venezuela because of payment delays and the corruption and crime faced by Chinese firms operating there»

*

«Rosneft currently owns substantial portions of five major Venezuelan oil projects. The additional projects PDVSA is now offering the Russian firm include five in the Orinoco – Venezuela’s largest oil producing region – along with three in Maracaibo Lake, its second-largest and oldest producing area, and a shallow-water oil project in the Paria Gulf»

*

«last month, Rosneft would swap its collateral on 49.9 percent of Citgo [PDVSAC.UL] – the Venezuelan owned, U.S.-based refiner – for stakes in three additional PDVSA oil fields, two natural gas fields and a lucrative fuel supply contract»

*

«Rosneft secured the collateral late last year on a loan of $1.5 billion to PDVSA»

* * * * * * *

Il giornalista di Reuters conclude secondo copione:

«russian oil deals undermine democracy»

Ma questa è la versione liberal democratica, tutta americana old fashion.

Guardate un po’ qua cosa riporta il The New York Times:

Goldman Buys $2.8 Billion Worth of Venezuelan Bonds, and an Uproar Begins

«Yet bonds issued by Venezuela’s national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, or Pdvsa, have attracted some of world’s most sophisticated investors. They are betting that the government will use its dwindling supply of dollars to pay bondholders instead of importing food and medicine for its people.»

*

«Goldman Sachs has defended the deal, saying that many other investors, including mutual funds and exchange-traded funds, own the bonds and that its asset management division bought the securities on the secondary market, without interacting with the Venezuelan government»

*

«Citgo is a subsidiary of PDVSA and its largest foreign asset. The refiner owns three refineries in Texas, Louisiana and Illinois, a pipeline and a retail fuel distribution network in the United States. Citgo has been solely owned by PDVSA since 1990»

*

Concludiamo.

Se è ovvio che tutti esercitino la Realpolitik, nessuno si scandalizza della propaganda. Ci si scandalizza quando si lasciano pescare con le mani nella marmellata. Il giornalista di Reuters non può trattarci come babbei.


Reuters. 2017-08-13. Special Report: Vladimir’s Venezuela – Leveraging loans to Caracas, Moscow snaps up oil assets

CARACAS/HOUSTON (Reuters) – Venezuela’s unraveling socialist government is increasingly turning to ally Russia for the cash and credit it needs to survive – and offering prized state-owned oil assets in return, sources familiar with the negotiations told Reuters.

As Caracas struggles to contain an economic meltdown and violent street protests, Moscow is using its position as Venezuela’s lender of last resort to gain more control over the OPEC nation’s crude reserves, the largest in the world.

Venezuela’s state-owned oil firm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), has been secretly negotiating since at least early this year with Russia’s biggest state-owned oil company, Rosneft (ROSN.MM) – offering ownership interests in up to nine of Venezuela’s most productive petroleum projects, according to a top Venezuelan government official and two industry sources familiar with the talks.

Moscow has substantial leverage in the negotiations: Cash from Russia and Rosneft has been crucial in helping the financially strapped government of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro avoid a sovereign debt default or a political coup.

Rosneft delivered Venezuela’s state-owned firm more than $1 billion in April alone in exchange for a promise of oil shipments later. On at least two occasions, the Venezuelan government has used Russian cash to avoid imminent defaults on payments to bondholders, a high-level PDVSA official told Reuters.

Rosneft has also positioned itself as a middleman in sales of Venezuelan oil to customers worldwide. Much of it ends up at refineries in the United States – despite U.S. sanctions against Russia – because it is sold through intermediaries such as oil trading firms, according to internal PDVSA trade reports seen by Reuters and a source at the firm.

PDVSA and the government of Venezuela did not respond to requests for comment.

The Russian government declined to comment and referred questions to the foreign ministry and the ministries of finance and defense, which did not respond to questions from Reuters. Rosneft declined to comment.

Russia’s growing control over Venezuelan crude gives it a stronger foothold in energy markets across the Americas. Rosneft now resells about 225,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Venezuelan oil – about 13 percent of the nation’s total exports, according to the PDVSA trade reports. That’s about enough to satisfy the daily demand of a country the size of Peru.

Venezuela gives Rosneft most of that oil as payment for billions of dollars in cash loans that Maduro’s government has already spent. His administration needs Russia’s money to finance everything from bond payments to imports of food and medicine amid severe national shortages.

For a graphic detailing the decline of Venezuela’s oil industry, see: tmsnrt.rs/2fwsuCV

Venezuela’s opposition lawmakers say Russia is behaving more like a predator than an ally.

“Rosneft is definitely taking advantage of the situation,” said Elias Matta, vice president of the energy commission at Venezuela’s elected National Assembly. “They know this is a weak government; that it’s desperate for cash – and they’re sharks.”

Matta echoed many others in the opposition-majority congress who have blasted corporate deals they say are underpinning Maduro’s efforts to establish a dictatorship.

The Venezuelan government has said previously that Russia’s investment in its oil industry shows confidence in PDVSA’s financial stability and the nation’s business opportunities.

Maduro’s administration has grown increasingly dependent on Moscow in the past two years as China has curtailed credit to Venezuela because of payment delays and the corruption and crime faced by Chinese firms operating there, according to Venezuelan debt analysts and two oil industry sources.

Many multinational firms worldwide, meanwhile, have all but written off their Venezuelan operations amid the nation’s tanking economy and chronic shortages of raw materials.

Rosneft is making the opposite play – using Venezuela’s hard times as a buying opportunity for oil assets with potentially high long-term value.

“The Russians are catching Venezuela at rock bottom,” said one Western diplomat who has worked on issues involving Venezuela’s oil industry in recent years.

As other companies shutter operations here, Rosneft has expanded to an additional floor of its office tower and added staff. The Russian firm has poached PDVSA professionals and brought in more Russian executives, two sources close to Rosneft told Reuters.

The corporate expansion provides a striking contrast to the scene on the streets below these days, in the once-thriving business district of Caracas.

As Rosneft staffers work in swanky offices alongside posters of Russian President Vladimir Putin and a bust of Hugo Chavez – the late Venezuelan leader and socialist icon – crowds of young men outside often throw rocks and Molotov cocktails in escalating protests of Chavez’ successor.

Rosneft currently owns substantial portions of five major Venezuelan oil projects. The additional projects PDVSA is now offering the Russian firm include five in the Orinoco – Venezuela’s largest oil producing region – along with three in Maracaibo Lake, its second-largest and oldest producing area, and a shallow-water oil project in the Paria Gulf, the two industry sources told Reuters.

In a separate proposal first reported by Reuters last month, Rosneft would swap its collateral on 49.9 percent of Citgo [PDVSAC.UL] – the Venezuelan owned, U.S.-based refiner – for stakes in three additional PDVSA oil fields, two natural gas fields and a lucrative fuel supply contract, according to two sources with knowledge of the negotiations.

Under the proposal, Rosneft would also take increased management control over all the joint oil projects between the two firms.

Rosneft secured the collateral late last year on a loan of $1.5 billion to PDVSA.

The negotiations over a collateral swap are driven in part by a recent threat from U.S. President Donald Trump to sanction Venezuela’s oil sector as punishment for Maduro’s efforts to undermine the nation’s elected congress.

Rosneft has already been sanctioned by the United States over Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Such actions require U.S. firms to end business relations with sanctioned entities.

RUSSIAN OIL DEALS UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY

Maduro’s need for Russian cash played a key role in a move by his political allies earlier this year that destabilized Venezuela’s already teetering democracy, the top Venezuelan government official told Reuters.

In March, the nation’s Supreme Court – whose members are loyal to Maduro – took over the powers of the opposition-controlled National Assembly. A majority of elected Assembly members opposed any new oil deals with Russia and insisted on retaining power to veto them.

Days later – after fierce national protests against the action – the court returned most powers to the national legislature at Maduro’s public urging. But the court allowed the president to keep the legal authority to cut fresh oil deals with Russia without legislative approval.

The episode was pivotal in escalating daily street protests and clashes with authorities that have since caused more than 120 deaths.

Maduro needed sole authority to cut new oil deals to clear the way for Rosneft’s expansion, the top Venezuelan government official told Reuters.

“Pressure from Russia has played an important role in Nicolas Maduro’s decisions,” the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to make public comments.

Rosneft said this month that it has lent a total of $6 billion to PDVSA. In total, Russia and Rosneft have delivered Venezuela at least $17 billion in loans and credit lines since 2006, according to Reuters calculations based on loans and credit lines announced by the government.

Venezuela does not publish the full details of the debts it owes Russia.

Maduro has sought to limit the power of congress since the opposition won a majority in 2015.

In late July, he created a legislative superbody called the Constituent Assembly in an election that was widely criticized as a sham. Allies of the Socialist Party won all 545 seats in the new assembly, which has the power to rewrite the nation’s constitution, dissolve state institutions – such as the opposition-run Congress – and fire dissident state officials.

SPIRAL OF DEBT, DEPENDENCE

Venezuela’s oil-based economy has collapsed since international prices crashed to a low of $24 per barrel in early 2016 from more than $100 in 2014. Prices now hover at about $50, which hasn’t proven high enough to pull Venezuela out of its tailspin.

Nearly all of the nation’s export revenue comes from oil, so income has fallen sharply and a shortage of petrodollars has left Maduro’s government unable to finance the generous subsidies of food, medicines, fuels, power and other public services instituted by his predecessor, Chavez.

The erosion of subsidies has contributed to rapid inflation, which is forecasted to top 700 percent this year by the International Monetary Fund. Venezuela’s currency, the bolivar, has become nearly worthless.

Government spending cuts have also slashed budgets for maintaining the nation’s oilfields, refineries, ports and tankers, causing Venezuela’s oil output in the first half of 2017 to fall to nearly its lowest level in 27 years.

PDVSA is repaying a growing portion of its mounting debts to Russia with oil, according to internal PDVSA trade data reviewed by Reuters. The oil payments are choking off the cash flow from its petroleum business – thereby creating the need for more loans.

CIRCLING OIL ASSETS

The nation’s downward spiral has put Rosneft in a position to acquire Venezuelan oil assets on the cheap.

Of the package of stakes PDVSA has offered to Rosneft, the most valuable is a 10 percent stake in Petropiar, a multi-billion dollar project to produce and upgrade extra heavy crude in the Orinoco Belt.

The value of the stake is likely between $600 million and $800 million, based on the valuations of similar deals.

The rising volumes of Venezuelan crude that Rosneft receives have made the Russian firm a middleman in sales to refiners that once bought directly from PDVSA. The oil payments have also helped Rosneft grow a major oil trading business to complement its massive production apparatus.

In the process, the Russian firm has appropriated some of PDVSA’s hard-won international supply deals and valuable trading relationships with refiners as far afield as China, the PDVSA documents show.

At today’s prices, the Venezuelan oil exports that flow to Rosneft would be worth about $3.6 billion annually. And the flow of PDVSA crude to Rosneft is expected to keep increasing, according to the internal PDVSA documents.

Most of it is sold into the United States, according to the documents.

Rosneft also will soon start selling Venezuelan crude to India’s refiner Essar, taking PDVSA’s second largest customer in the Asian country.

“Russia is taking everything they have,” said an oil trader who regularly deals with PDVSA.

A DICEY INVESTMENT

The Russian strategy has its risks. Many of the world’s top energy firms took a hit when Chavez nationalized their assets, and an opposition-led government could later reverse or revise any deals Maduro cuts without their blessing.

Venezuela’s bond yields are among the highest in the world because of the nation’s high default risk. The bonds pay nearly 30 percentage points more than benchmark U.S. treasuries.

PDVSA’s many connections to the United States oil industry also raise the specter that the deals now under negotiation could run afoul of U.S. economic sanctions already in place against Russia and threatened against Venezuela.

The Petropiar project, for instance, is 30 percent owned by U.S. oil major Chevron Corp (CVX.N).

Should Rosneft take a stake in the project, it could be complicated for Chevron to ensure it is not violating U.S. sanctions. In the meantime, Chevron has sent guidelines to executives to ensure they comply with sanctions, an employee at Chevron told Reuters.

The guidelines advise staff, for instance, to avoid one-on-one meetings with sanctioned entities or officials, the employee said. In a statement, Chevron said it abides by “a stringent code of business ethics” and complies with applicable laws.

For now, Russia’s status as chief lender to PDVSA has put Rosneft in a position to supercharge its holdings and profits in the region.

If Venezuela’s government defaults on its debt payments – an increasingly likely scenario – Rosneft likely will be one of the entities at the front of the queue as a creditor because of its large collateral stake in U.S.-based Citgo, according to a confidential independent analysis of its debt commissioned by an investment fund and seen by Reuters.

Representatives of Citgo, PDVSA’S largest foreign asset, did not respond to requests for comment.

GUNS FOR OIL

Rosneft’s involvement in Venezuela can be traced back to a $4 billion arms-for-oil deal in 2006 that cemented the bond between the governments of Chavez and Putin. Chavez, a former military officer, signed the deal himself in Moscow.

Shunned by the United States – which since 2006 has refused to supply spare parts for Venezuela’s fleet of U.S.-built F-16 fighter jets – Chavez bought Russian Sukhoi fighter jets, helicopters, tanks and guns from Putin.

Top executives from Rosneft and PDVSA were later involved in negotiations related to the military purchases because Rosneft was the Russian entity receiving the Venezuelan oil cargoes used to pay for a portion of the weapons, the top Venezuelan government official told Reuters.

They included Rosneft President Igor Sechin, a powerful long-time advisor and deputy to Putin. Sechin is a trained linguist who began his career as a military interpreter and has a passion for the history of Latin America’s revolutionaries, according to two people who worked with him.

He had a direct line into Chavez until the former president’s death in 2013, the Venezuelan official told Reuters. Sechin has maintained close ties with Maduro and the two meet regularly, the official said.

Speaking to reporters in at a hydroelectric plant in Russia last week, Sechin called Rosneft’s growing investments in Venezuela an obvious and essential play.

“This is a country with the world’s hydrocarbon reserves,” he said, referring to a central component of oil and natural gas. “Any energy company should aim to work in this country … No one could force us from there.”

Russia was swift to defend Maduro’s government from international criticism after the Supreme Court moved to nullify congress, with Moscow issuing a statement saying foreign governments should not meddle in Venezuelan domestic politics.

Sechin was Maduro’s guest of honor at a ceremony last October to unveil a Russian-made granite statue of Chavez erected in the late president’s hometown of Sabaneta.

In the sweltering heat, a Russian choir dressed in black sang the Venezuelan anthem in heavily accented Spanish before Sechin addressed the crowds of mostly red-shirted Socialist Party supporters.

“Thank you for trusting us,” Sechin told the crowd in Spanish during the speech, broadcast on Venezuelan state television. “Russia and Venezuela, together forever!”

Pubblicato in: Cina, Geopolitica Militare, Geopolitica Mondiale

L’Asean denuncia la militarizzazione cinese del Mare del Sud della Cina.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-10.

2017-08-08__Asean__001 454998

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, right, talks with Australia Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, left, at the start of the 7th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and its dialogue partners as part of the 50th ASEAN Ministerial Meetings in Manila, Philippines, on Monday.


*

Le esondazioni si prevengono costruendo argini degni di tal nome. Una volta che il fiume è straripato, non resta altro da fare che aspettare che le acque si ritirino, e quindi ricostruire quanto distrutto. Sempre poi che ciò sia possibile.

Per far ciò serve avere una chiara visione dell’attuale, in questo caso di un fiume che potrebbe esondare, ed una altrettanto chiara visione del futuro: si tratta infatti di privarsi oggi di una certa quale quota di risorse disponibili per costruire gli argini che proteggeranno nel futuro.

Bene: questa visione è latitata nell’ultimo decennio in tutto l’Occidente ed in molti paesi del sud – est asiatico. Lamentarsi oggi non ha alcun senso: il latte è stato versato.

* * *

Per capire meglio la situazione, guardiamo con attenzione la fotografia. Il Ministro Wang Yi incontra Mrs Julie Bishop. Ma chi sono veramente, al di là della carica?

«Wang Yi  is a Chinese diplomat and politician. He formerly served as China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Ambassador to Japan, and Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office. As of March 2013, he is the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China. ….

After graduating from high school in September 1969, he was sent to Northeast China. He subsequently served in the Northeast Construction Army Corps in Heilongjiang Province for eight years ….

was enrolled in the department of Asian and African Languages of Beijing International Studies University (BISU). He studied the Japanese language at the institution, graduating in February 1982 with a bachelor’s degree. ….

From August 1997 to February 1998, Wang was a visiting scholar at the Institute of Foreign Relations of Georgetown University in the United States. ….

From September 1999, Wang studied international relations at China Foreign Affairs University and obtained a master’s degree. In February 2001» [Fonte]

Ricapitolando. Mr Wang Yi  ha alle spalle una formazione culturale di tutto rilievo, come attestano i titoli accademici conseguiti. Parla fluentemente giapponese ed inglese per essere vissuto in tali nazioni, più altre lingue asiatiche minori. Ha vissuto lunghi periodi all’estero. Ha un curriculum dedicato alla politica estera di tutto rilievo. In altri termini: è uno che conosce il proprio mestiere.

*

«Julie Isabel Bishop (born 17 July 1956) is an Australian politician, serving as the Minister for Foreign Affairs since 2013, and the Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party since 2007. ….

She was educated at St Peter’s Collegiate Girls’ School and later at the University of Adelaide, where she studied law, graduating in 1978 ….

she attended Harvard Business School for eight weeks to complete an Advanced Management Program for Senior Managers ….

Bishop was appointed Minister for Ageing in 2003. She was later promoted to Minister for Education, Science and Training and Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Women’s Issues» [Fonte]

Mrs Bishop parla unicamente inglese, non ha mai vissuto nei paesi del sud – est asiatico, ha un curriculum accademico scarno, non si era mai interessata di problemi di politica estera, ignora totalmente quelli militari. È diventata ministro degli esteri per il solo merito di essere nata femmina. Un po’ pochino per superare una selezione meritocratica e per poter parlare alla pari con Mr Wang Yi.

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Il confronto tra Mr Wang Yi  e Mrs Julie Bishop è il miglior modo per comprendere perché la Cina adesso domini in modo totale il Mare Cinese del Sud.

«China claims nearly all of the sea, through which $5 trillion in annual shipping trade passes and which is believed to sit atop vast oil and gas deposits»

Se l’Asean affida a Mrs Bishop le trattative per un problema da cinque trilioni di dollari dimostra in modo lampante la propria incompetenza.

*

Non solo.

«The United States, Australia and Japan on Monday denounced Beijing’s island-building and militarization of the South China Sea, in contrast to the increasingly tepid response from Southeast Asian nations over the festering issue.»

Le Filippine sono il grande assente, eppure hanno una posizione altamente strategica.

«The Philippines had been one of the most vocal critics of China and filed a case before a UN-backed tribunal.

But after the election of President Rodrigo Duterte last year, Manila has played down the verdict in favor of pursuing warmer ties with Beijing, a move that led to offers of billions of dollars in investments or aid from China»

Ma le sentenze dei tribunali trovano valore solo ed esclusivamente se hanno un supporto politico: senza valgono come la carta straccia.

Stati Uniti ed Asean si sono giocati l’amicizia delle Filippine nel tentativo utopico di voler loro imporre le proprie concezioni ideologiche, mentre la Cina ha guardato con spietato realismo la cartina geografica.

L’Occidente liberal e femminista si sta avviando mestamente sul viale del tramonto: si sta suicidando. Senza meritocrazia le società implodono.


Saudi Gazette. 2017-08-08. US, allies denounce Beijing’s militarization of S. China Sea

MANILA — The United States, Australia and Japan on Monday denounced Beijing’s island-building and militarization of the South China Sea, in contrast to the increasingly tepid response from Southeast Asian nations over the festering issue.
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China claims nearly all of the sea, through which $5 trillion in annual shipping trade passes and which is believed to sit atop vast oil and gas deposits.

Its sweeping claims overlap with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei — all members of the 10-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc — as well as Taiwan.

But in recent years Beijing has managed to weaken regional resistance by courting some ASEAN members.

On Sunday Beijing scored a coup when ASEAN ministers issued a diluted statement on the dispute and agreed to Beijing’s terms on talks during a security forum which the bloc is hosting in Manila.

China insists that a much-delayed code of conduct between it and ASEAN members over the disputed sea must not be legally binding, a demand to which Southeast Asian countries have so far acquiesced.

But in a joint statement after their foreign ministers met on the sidelines of the same gathering, the US, Japan and Australia delivered a noticeably sterner rebuke to Beijing.

Criticizing ongoing “land reclamation, construction of outposts, militarization of disputed features” in the disputed sea, the trio said any code of conduct must be “legally binding, meaningful and effective,” a demand noticeably absent from the ASEAN statement.

The three nations also called on China and the Philippines to respect last year’s international arbitration ruling which dismissed much of Beijing’s claim in the sea.

The Philippines had been one of the most vocal critics of China and filed a case before a UN-backed tribunal.

But after the election of President Rodrigo Duterte last year, Manila has played down the verdict in favor of pursuing warmer ties with Beijing, a move that led to offers of billions of dollars in investments or aid from China.

Critics of China have accused it of assiduously dividing ASEAN, which operates on a consensus basis, with strong-arm

 tactics and checkbook diplomacy, enticing smaller countries in the bloc such as Cambodia and Laos to support it.

Vietnam, which had been pushing for stronger language in Manila, has been largely left to fend for itself since Duterte’s China rapprochement.

The US, Australia and Japan oppose Beijing building giant artificial islands that could be used as military bases, fearing it will eventually establish de facto control over the waters.

China insists the three countries should stay out of what it says are purely bilateral disputes with its neighbors.

On Sunday Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned any interference from “outside parties” could jeopardize negotiations over the code of conduct.

Pubblicato in: Commercio, Geopolitica Mondiale

Rep Ceka e Cina. Attiva la ferrovia Praga – Yiwu.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-08-08.

Gufo_022__

Quando giunse la notizia che Cristoforo Colombo aveva scoperto l’America navigando per conto degli spagnoli, il senato di Genova si radunò in seduta plenaria nella sala del Gran Consiglio.

Constatarono che nulla potevano fare e che sarebbe stata spesa inutile allestire una flotta di altura, vista la collocazione geografica della Repubblica. Prese però una decisione e si somma importanza: la Repubblica avrebbe dovuto favorire lo sviluppo del sistema bancario genovese, peraltro già florido.

Pochi anni dopo, agli inizi del ‘500, si ripeté la scena: Vasco da Gama aveva aperto la via marittima per le Indie ed era tornato con la nave stracarica di spezie comprate a prezzi irrisori. Questo evento segnò la fine del commercio terrestre delle spezie fatto dagli arabi fino al Mediterraneo, e dì li smistato da Genovesi e Veneziani all’Occidente. Il Senato constatò che era terminata una lunga fase commerciale, e si riconfermò nelle decisioni già prese.

Grazie al loro buon senso iniziava quello che fu poi denominato il Siglo de Oro.

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Gli elementi del successo genovese sono molteplici, ma due spiccano: il saper prendere atto di una realtà attuale e dei suoi sviluppi futuri, anche se agli inizi quella realtà era di minima portata, ed in secondo luogo il saper riciclare nell’unica attività che loro si poteva offrire: l’avventura finanziaria per cui i genovesi divennero i banchieri dei regni, in diretta concorrenza con i Fugger di Augusta.

* * * * * * *

Questo lungo preambolo non è stato messo a caso: serve per aiutare a capire a fondo quanto è accaduto in questi giorni.

«The freight train X8074 from Prague arrives in Yiwu, east China’s Zhejiang Province, Aug. 4, 2017. The first freight train from Prague, the Czech Republic to Yiwu arrived at Yiwu west freight station at about 11:00 a.m. Friday after a 16-day journey»

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«The train carried 82 containers of crystal products, automobile accessories, beer and some other Czech products, with total value of about five million U.S. dollars»

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«opened up a safe, fast, economic, green railway international logistics channel»

*

«As of the end of July 2017, Yiwu West freight station has been set up in the Central and European countries 214 times, a total of 17204 TEU delivery. Currently, from Spain, Spain, London, Czech Republic, Czech Republic, Prague back to Yiwu, China and Europe have achieved weekly»

* * * * * * *

Questa linea ferroviaria è stata progettata per regger fino a 500 convogli al giorno, 40,000 container al dì, circa duecento milioni di dollari. In un prossimo futuro si dipanerà fino alla Polonia a nord, Belgrado ed il Pireo, che è già cinese, a sud. Ma nulla vieta di pensare a linee raddoppiate oppure triplicate, operazioni rese ben più facili dall’avere già una linea attiva in essere.

Inoltre, il Kazakhstan, quel paese interno dell’Asia che confina a nord con la Russia, ad ovest con il Mar Caspio ed ad est con la Cina, si conquista una via di comunicazione eccellente, sia verso est sia verso ovest. Nessuno in Cina, principale finanziatrice dell’opera, si è mai posto problemi sul governo di Mr Nursultan Äbişulı Nazarbaev, il quale non rientra certo nei canoni valoriali di Frau Merkel, che infatti ha fatto il suo possibile per boicottare questa iniziativa, ma non essendo onnipotente, con ben scarsi risultati, tranne quello di rendersi molto poco popolare.

Se si è perfettamente consci che questo sia stato il primo convoglio, si è altrettanto consci che gli sviluppi dovrebbe ripagare pienamente questo cospicuo investimento.

La carta geografica è utile per capire il problema logistico dei paesi centro europei, del Visegrad, mentre il mappamondo lo sarebbe per captare visivamente l’importanza strategica.

La distanza in linea d’aria tra Praga e Pekino è circa 8,500 kilometri, ma lo sviluppo ferroviario è circa 13,000 kilometri. Al moment coperti in sedici giorni, ivi comprese le tappe, ma a regime percorribili in circa una settimana, contro i sessanta – ottanta giorni richiesti dal’invio via mare.

Ma la rotta marittima prevede il passaggio del Kattegat e dello Skagerrak, quindi dello stretto di Gibilterra, del canale di Suez, dello stretto di Aden ed infine di quello della Malacca. Tutti punti facilmente rendibili interdetti. Se è vero che l’accesso al Mediterraneo tramite il porto del Pireo è pur sempre bloccabile a Suez ed a Gibilterra, è anche vero che bypassa la capricciosa Turkia che governa i Dardanelli.

Senza uno sbocco al mare, i Paesi del Visegrad dipendono strettamente dalla loro capacità di mantenere buoni rapporti con i paesi viciniori che consentono, spesso riluttanti, il transito delle merci sui loro territori. Sono spesso contratti capestro: sia in termini di costi diretti, sia in termini di obbligo a servirsi di determinati servizi, per esempio, quelli di trasporto marittimo. Il trasporto diretto su strada ferrata da e verso la Cina abbatte i costi totali, ivi compresi i signoraggi, di quasi dieci volte. Ma non è solo un problema di risparmio economico: questa linea di comunicazione appare sicura. Politicamente e militarmente.

Il quadro strategico sarebbe però incompleto, almeno nelle sue grandi linee, se non si menzionassero gli attriti in corso tra i paesi del Visegrad e l’Unione Europea.

Al crollo dell’Unione Sovietica i paesi del Visegrad entrarono nella Nato. Loro mettevano a disposizione il loro territorio in cambio della ovvia protezione termonucleare e di aiuti economici straordinari, che avrebbero dovuto essere a carico dell’allora Unione Europea, che alla fine consentì loro di entrare. Saggiamente i paesi del Visegrad non aderirono all’euro ed all’Eurozona.

Con l’avvento della cancelleria Merkel e, poi, con la Amministrazione Obama, la Germania iniziò a nutrire forti ambizioni egemoni sull’Europa, cui voleva imporre la propria ideologia valoriale: in poche parole, voleva perseguire un’unione politica de facto sotto il proprio controllo. I paesi del Visegrad si ribellarono: nelle elezioni i partiti pro-Unione Europea furono severamente penalizzati ed i partiti vincenti vollero riappropriarsi del proprio retaggio religioso, storico, culturale e sociale. Gli attriti salirono rapidamente al calor rovente, specie con Polonia ed Ungheria.

Sembrerebbe del tutto ragionevole che attriti di questo tipo proseguano fino a tanto che Frau Merkel, volente o nolente, non cambi comportamento.

Sotto questa ottica, il Visegrad si trova ora in mano una carta di portata strategica: in un prossimo futuro potrebbe dipendere molto poco dall’Unione Europea, sempre poi che questa riesca a sopravvivere abbastanza a lungo, cosa su cui molti iniziano a nutrire dei dubbi seri.

* * * * * * *

Quando la São Gabriel, la São Rafael e la Santa Fé attraccarono a Lisbona il 9 settembre 1499 i portoghesi fecero gran festa. Gli equipaggi si arricchirono vendendo le spezie con ricavi di mille ad uno. Tutti si rendevano conto della portata storica dell’evento e non vedevano l’ora di imbarcarsi per il viaggio della ricchezza. Eppure erano tre ‘navi’ da cento tonnellate l’una. Tuttavia i loro sogni si dimostrarono essere di gran lunga inferiori alla realtà futura.


Xinhua. 2017-08-05. First freight train from Czech’s Prague to E China’s Yiwu

The freight train X8074 from Prague arrives in Yiwu, east China’s Zhejiang Province, Aug. 4, 2017. The first freight train from Prague, the Czech Republic to Yiwu arrived at Yiwu west freight station at about 11:00 a.m. Friday after a 16-day journey. The train carried 82 containers of crystal products, automobile accessories, beer and some other Czech products, with total value of about five million U.S. dollars.


Top News. 2017-08-05. The first trip from the Czech Republic, Prague opened in the EU-China arrived in Zhejiang Yiwu

Yiwu August 4 (Reporter Xi Jinyan) at 11:18 on August 4, loaded with 82 pieces of Czech goods standard container X8074 times in Central Europe (Prague – Yiwu) to reach the railway Yiwu West freight station. With the railway Yiwu West freight station to open the EU-China international freight line, in more than two years from a rapid increase to the ninth, but also opened up a safe, fast, economic, green railway international logistics channel, but also signs With the return of Yiwu, China and the EU are becoming more and more normal, accelerating the economic and trade exchanges between Yiwu and Central Europe and interconnection.

It is reported that this is the Shanghai Railway Bureau Jinhua Cargo Center, China Railway Container Company Shanghai Branch and other railway departments and the relevant departments of Yiwu municipal government, Yiwu customs, commodity inspection, Yiwu Tianyuan company, Yiwu railway port and other road cooperation crystallization.

(Prague – Yiwu), the main goods for the crystal products, auto parts, beer and other Czech special products, the total value of about 5 million US dollars, the class run time lasted 16 days, the first batch of goods from the Czech capital Prague, Way Poland, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, the final smooth arrival of Yiwu railway port.

China and the EU (Prague – Yiwu) is an important carrier for the construction of the Czech station in Zhejiang Province. It is a new bridge for the trade between China and Czech Republic. The trip from Prague is the first since the opening of the China-Europe The first departure from the European routes, but also Yiwu West freight station following the trip to Spain Madrid, the United Kingdom London, Russia, Belarus, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and other countries (regions) after the ninth China-EU international freight class (Prague – Yiwu) to open the line for the Silk Road into the fresh blood, as ‘one way along the way’ to build a new hub for the Czech Republic trade opened up a new channel.

As of the end of July 2017, Yiwu West freight station has been set up in the Central and European countries 214 times, a total of 17204 TEU delivery. Currently, from Spain, Spain, London, Czech Republic, Czech Republic, Prague back to Yiwu, China and Europe have achieved weekly (The end of the day).


Visegrad Post. 2017-08-05. China Sold High-Speed Trains to Czechia

Czech Republic – China has signed a contract to sell three high-speed train trains to Czechia. This is the first Chinese contract for high-speed trains with a country of the European Union.

On December 21, the CRRC Zhuzhou Locomotive group signed a contract worth 20 million euros with the Czech railway company Leo Express, according to the China News Service. According to the agency, trains will run at a speed of 160 km/h and will also be compatible with the Polish and Slovak railway networks. The first train is due to mid 2018.

In 2015, the same Chinese group delivered the same type of train to Macedonia, which is on the road linking the port of Piraeus in Greece, of which China is now majority shareholder, to Belgrade.

As for the high-speed railway linking Belgrade to Budapest, it is planned for the end of 2017 and is financed at 85% by Chinese credits.

Cooperation with China is increasing in Central Europe

This contract is in line with the Chinese project of the New Silk Road. In March 2016, Czech President Zeman had received his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping to talk about the canal project linking the Danube, the Oder and the Elbe.

In June, the President of China visited Poland, where railway projects were also at the center of discussions.

The New Silk Road project is a long-term investment by China, which involves considerably Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Balkans. As a means of developing missing infrastructure in the region, the heads of states of the CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries) support this cooperation, which is growing every year.


The Telegraph. 2017-06-29. Co-operation between China and Europe runs through Kazakhstan

The Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union are hoping to reap the important economic benefits of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) summit in Kazakhstan took place on 8-9 June. The next day, the 2017 Astana Expo, which is scheduled to last for three months, got under way. These two events are indicative of Kazakhstan’s – and Central Asia’s – growing geopolitical and geoeconomic importance.

China and Russia are the biggest nations that are currently members of the SCO. The other four are all Central Asian states: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

Thus, due to its membership, the focus so far of the SCO is undoubtedly on Central Asia. This is also a vital region for the Silk Road Economic Belt, which is half of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

The Silk Road Economic Belt’s overland route to Europe passes through Central Asia. Rail links are undoubtedly the most important aspect of this route. Up to now the performance of these railways has been steady but relatively unspectacular. However, that is set to change as China puts an increasing emphasis on connectivity across the Eurasian landmass.

At a recent conference in Poland, scholars from Sichuan University in Chengdu emphasised how much the China-Europe rail connection has progressed in recent months. In May, for the first time, Polish apples were delivered to Chengdu’s markets by train, they said – and several weeks faster than via the maritime route, demonstrating what can be achieved.

Apples may seem like an insignificant trade item, but in terms of Sino-European co-operation via the Central Asian route, their delivery represents more than a symbolic step forward.

While the number of trains between China and Europe has been increasing rapidly, most of the wagons sent from China have been coming back empty up to now. The fact that Europeans are beginning to see the possibilities for exporting goods to China by rail brings a new dimension to the emerging land route across Russia and Kazakhstan.

The Sichuan University academics pointed out that the city of Chengdu is building a huge railway port to deal with trade to and from Europe.

Next to the port there is a market, some sections of which are set up to sell European luxury goods and other items. The railway through Central Asia is clearly assuming ever greater significance for landlocked Sichuan.

They said that the next step is to persuade European companies that the new trade route can be profitable, and that there are Chinese customers who wish to buy their products. If that happens, the Silk Road Economic Belt will really begin to take off as momentum gathers and more entrepreneurs begin to understand the route’s potential.

As far as Central Asia is concerned, growing Sino-European trade would only be good news. As the route crosses their territories, Central Asians can also cash in, receiving a percentage of the proceeds generated and boosting their economies.

Encouraging increasing economic interdependence between countries is one of the main aims of the Belt and Road Initiative. Improving infrastructure and transport links between countries along the new Silk Road is key to the success of China’s initiative.

At the same time, it is important to remember that the Silk Road Economic Belt is based not on unrealistic dreams but on sound economic principles of supply and demand.

As new markets are created, there is money to be made by anybody who gets involved. This is the reason why President Xi Jinping, who visited Kazakhstan for the SCO summit and the opening of the Astana Expo, continually stresses that the Belt and Road Initiative is intended to create win-win synergies across the more than 60 nations included.

As a facilitating body, the SCO is also key to the success of the new Silk Road’s land route. By providing a forum in which the interested parties can exchange ideas and information, it helps to smooth possible tensions and create an atmosphere of trust, most notably between China and Russia.

Central Asians, who have historical ties to Russia, understand the importance of maintaining a working relationship with their massive northern neighbour. Finding synergies between the SCO and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union is therefore crucial to the success of the Belt and Road as far as all involved parties are concerned.

Europeans also should realise that it is in their interests to hope for positive outcomes from the SCO summit, and improved links with China via Central Asia and Russia. The world evolves through accepting change rather than resisting it.

Exploring ways to integrate European markets with Asian ones will benefit Europeans, too. The route to China, which passes through Kazakhstan and Central Asia, is therefore likely to turn out to be a vital one as European and Asian markets continue to become economically interdependent during the remainder of the 21st century.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Economia e Produzione Industriale, Geopolitica Africa

Kenya. Nuova linea ferroviaria Nairobi – Mombasa finanziata dalla Cina.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-06-11.

2017-06-09__Kenya__001

«Kenya’s new railway at a glance:

– Cost $3.2bn (£2.5bn)

– Funding for the 472km (293 mile) project was provided by China

– It took three-and-a-half years to build, using Chinese track-laying technology

– The line is supposed to eventually connect land-locked South Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Ethiopia to the Indian Ocean

– It cuts the journey time between Mombasa and Nairobi to four-and-a-half hours, compared with nine hours by bus or 12 hours on the previous railway

– An economy class ticket costs 900 Kenyan shillings ($9; £7), slightly cheaper than a bus ticket. A business class ticket is $30» [Fonte]

2017-06-09__Kenya__002

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La differenza è lampante.

Obama lectures Kenyan president on gay rights [Cnn]

«President Barack Obama on Saturday lectured Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta about his country’s gay rights record.

“When you start treating people differently not because of any harm they are doing to anybody, but because they are different, that’s the path whereby freedoms begin to erode,” Obama said at a joint press conference with the Kenyan leader in Nairobi. “And bad things happen. …. Obama equated legalized discrimination of gays to legalized racism in America”»

bad things happen“: se il Kenya non accetta la teoria del gender non avrà nessun aiuto economico dall’Occidente. Ed ecco che il Kenya è stato gettato a viva forza nel’orbita politica ed economica cinese.

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Cina ed Africa. Una politica di rapporti internazionali paritetici.

Cina. Consolida il suo impero in Africa.

Belt and Road Forum. L’alternativa a Davos ed al G20.

Cina. Una diplomazia alla conquista del mondo.

Cina. La diplomazia ferroviaria.

Cina – Pakistan. Inaugurata la strada Gwadar – Kashgar.

Prosegue e si allarga la rivolta all’impèrio mondiale. Gambia.

Kenyatta: Gay rights is a non-issue for Kenya

Rifugiati. Uganda un milione in un anno, e tutti zitti.

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Al contrario degli Stati Uniti e dell’Occidente in genere, massimamente le Nazioni Unite, la Cina non vincola i propri investimenti alla soddisfazione di propri modi di vedere e sentire i problemi etici e morali. Accetta le altre realtà così come esse siano e richiede solo rapporti paritetici. La Cina investa in Africa ed Asia soprattutto in progetti infrastrutturali, quali ferrovie e strade.

Il solo progetto Belt and Road è dotato di un budget di 124 miliardi di Usd.

«China has touted what it formally calls the Belt and Road initiative as a new way to boost global development since Xi unveiled the plan in 2013, aiming to expand links between Asia, Africa, Europe and beyond underpinned by billions of dollars in infrastructure investment.»

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Nulla da stupirsi quindi che la Cina stia intrattenendo rapporti cordiali con la totalità dei paese africani e moltissimi asiatici: le infrastrutture rimangono ed alla fine producono indotto e prosperità.

Gli africani hanno bisogno di poter vivere in pace, poter mobilizzare le proprie risorse, potersi guadagnare quello che loro occorre per vivere, essere trattati da esseri umani.

Dovrebbero essere ben chiari i motivi dei fallimenti delle politiche occidentali in Africa.

Senza Realpolitik si fanno solo guai.


Bbc. 2017-06-08. Will Kenya get value for money from its new railway?

The first major new railway line in Kenya for more than a century, running between the capital Nairobi and the coastal city of Mombasa, faces an immediate challenge of justifying its relatively high cost.

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At $5.6m per kilometre for the track alone, Kenya’s line cost close to three times the international standard and four times the original estimate.

So it is perhaps not surprising that Kenyans have been asking why they seem to have paid so much.

Kenya’s new 472km (293 mile) railway is the country’s biggest infrastructure investment since its independence in 1963. Built to a modern “standard gauge”, it runs parallel to the now-dilapidated metre gauge railway line from the colonial era.

While everyone agrees that Kenya desperately needs more infrastructure, not everyone agrees that this was the most economically sensible solution.

Cost comparisons have been made between this line and Ethiopia’s 756km Addis Ababa-Djibouti line launched last year.

Both are Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) projects financed by Chinese loans, costing $3.4bn (£2.6bn) for Ethiopia and $3.2bn for Kenya.

Ethiopia’s line is more than 250km longer and is electrified, which is typically more expensive; trains running on Kenya’s line will be diesel-powered.

The Kenyan government has said the reasons for this high cost include the terrain that required many bridges and tunnels, land compensation and a need for specifications that would handle greater cargo volumes than Ethiopia’s line.

Therefore, it says, the two projects are not directly comparable.

About 80% of the money for the new railway came through loans from China.

The loans are the country’s biggest yet – amounting to roughly 6% of Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP), which is a measure of a country’s economic activity, including all the services and goods produced in a year.

Before Kenya started building the railway, government advisers Canadian Pacific Consulting Services (CPSC) challenged its economic viability in a 2009 study.

It concluded that the benefit of building a new standard gauge railway would be marginal. It was considered “cost prohibitive” using “even the most optimistic” traffic and income projections, it said.

But Transport Minister James Macharia has said the Kenyan government expects the new line to boost GDP by 1.5%, allowing the Chinese loans to be paid back “in about four years”.

That projection runs counter to recent fears that Kenya may soon become unable to pay the large amounts owing on existing loans.

Heavy borrowing has seen public debt rise to more than half of GDP in the last four years, yet there has been no corresponding growth in revenue.

Most of the railway’s revenue is expected to come from transporting cargo. Only 5% of cargo is currently being transported on the old railway line while 95% goes by road, but Kenya Railways is aiming to push its share to 40% by 2025 with the new track.

It is possible that a law will be passed requiring certain goods to be transported by rail to ensure a massive transfer of freight away from the roads.

The new railway also faces a regional contest. Tanzania and Kenya compete to serve the transit trade of landlocked Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

A 2013 World Bank study predicted that freight traffic on the entire East Africa Community rail network would grow to approximately 14.4 million tonnes per year by 2030.

The same study found that investment in a standard gauge railway appeared “only to be justified if the new infrastructure could attract additional rail freight in the order of 20-55 million tonnes per year”.

By that measure, the railway would need to win all of the freight currently trucked to and from Mombasa – and more. According to the Kenya Ports Authority, Mombasa port handled a total of just over 26 million tonnes of cargo in 2015.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Militare, Trump

Thaad. Un nome con cui ci si dovrebbe familiarizzare.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-03-10.

Statua_Libertà__

Il Thaad è un sistema di missili-anti-missili di ultima generazione in grado di contrastare efficacemente attacchi di missili non Icbm. Una sua peculiare caratteristica consiste nel fatto che non dispone di una carica esplosiva, ma è come un proiettile, che distrugge l’obiettivo urtandolo direttamente. Questa caratteristica ne esalta la funzionalità come esclusiva arma di difesa. La Cina non teme il sistema come missili di difesa, quanto piuttosto per il sofisticato sistema radar che lo governa, e che potrebbe essere impiegato come raffinato strumento di intelligence.

«Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (in sigla: THAAD, in italiano: Difesa d’area terminale ad alta quota), ex Theater High Altitude Area Defense, è un sistema antimissile dell’esercito statunitense per colpire missili balistici a medio e corto raggio. Il missile non trasporta nessuna testata ma si basa sull’energia cinetica dell’impatto. Il THAAD fu progettato per colpire missili Scud e similari, ma ha una capacità limitata contro gli ICBM come fu dimostrato il 24 ottobre 2012.

Il sistema THAAD è stato progettato, costruito ed integrato da Lockheed Martin Space Systems. Subappalti sono stati assegnati a Raytheon, Boeing, Aerojet, Rocketdyne, Honeywell, BAE Systems, MiltonCAT, e Oliver Capital Consortium. Un singolo sistema THAAD costa 800 milioni di dollari statunitensi. Il suo primo dispiegamento è cominciato a maggio 2008, nonostante fosse pensato per il 2012.» [Fonte]

Qui possono essere trovati alcuni dettagli tecnici.

Lockheed Martin THAAD Website, lockheedmartin.com.

Details of the project, defenselink.mil.

Army Project Page, army-technology.com.

MDA Project Page, mda.mil.

Program History, designation-systems.net.

THAAD Missile description on www.army-technology.com, army-technology.com.


Bloomberg. 2017-03-06. Explaining Thaad, and Why It So Bothers China: QuickTake Q&A

A U.S. missile defense system being deployed in South Korea to counter North Korea is rubbing China the wrong way. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, known as Thaad, is supposed to help South Korea protect itself from a North Korean military attack. But China sees Thaad as a threat that will break “the strategic equilibrium in the region.” This debate is taking place in a volatile corner of the world. North Korea has threatened to obliterate South Korean cities in rains of fire, conducted dozens of ballistic missile tests (including some this week) and vowed to advance its well-documented nuclear weapons capabilities.

  1. How does Thaad work?

The system, made by Lockheed Martin Corp., is designed to destroy short-and-medium-ranged ballistic missiles at high altitudes in their “terminal” phase, as they descend. It’s different from conventional defense missiles, which are designed to get close to a target and self-detonate to damage or deflect the threat. According to Lockheed Martin, Thaad is more like hitting a bullet with a bullet: the missiles rely on infra-red seeker technology to locate and hit the target head on, completely destroying it, Lockheed says.

  1. Could Thaad really save South Korea from an attack?

The Pentagon, in announcing the planned deployment last July, said the system would “contribute to a layered missile defense that will enhance the alliance’s existing missile defense capabilities against North Korean missile threats.” Some of China’s military experts question Thaad’s ability to take out North Korea’s short-range missiles and artillery shells because the system is designed for high-altitude (the “ha” in Thaad) intercepts on either side of the earth’s atmosphere. However, independent test results collected by a Cornell University scholar show that the bulk of Thaad’s testing has been against short-range targets, according to Rod Lyon, a fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra.

  1. Does it pose an offensive threat?

No. Thaad missiles don’t carry warheads.

  1. Could it knock down missiles launched by China at the U.S.?

Not really. China’s longer range intercontinental ballistic missiles targeting the continental U.S. would still be in their ascent phase when they pass by Thaad installations in South Korea. The same would be true if North Korea acquires an operational ICBM.

  1. So what is China worried about?

It’s concerned that Thaad’s surveillance capabilities might be able to offer early tracking data to parts of the American ballistic missile defense system, eroding China’s ability to target the U.S. in the event of war, Lyon said. The Global Times, a Communist Party-affiliated newspaper, accused Seoul of “tying itself to the U.S. chariot and turning into an arrogant pawn of Washington in the latter’s military containment against China.”

  1. So Thaad could give the U.S. an advantage against China?

Perhaps. The U.S. already has a Thaad battery deployed in Guam, two radars in Japan, space assets, plus a range of ship-borne radars and larger land based radars in other parts of the Pacific, according to Lyon. Thaad would perhaps improve early tracking of some Chinese missiles but might not make interception of the missiles much easier.

  1. How is China responding?

So far, it’s ordered travel agencies to stop selling tour packages to South Korea and taken steps against Lotte Group, one of South Korea’s largest family-run conglomerates (or chaebol), which offered up the land that will host Thaad’s missile battery. “Lotte Group’s development in the Chinese market should come to an end,” the Global Times wrote in an editorial after the decision. South Korea media has reported that Chinese hacks rendered some of Lotte’s websites inoperable. South Korea responded by saying it would ensure Korean companies don’t face unfair trade measures in China.

  1. What do experts say?

Beijing has tried to woo South Korea away from the U.S. orbit, an effort that will have failed if Thaad gets deployed, says Zhang Baohui, director of the Center for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. Robert Kelly, a political science associate professor at South Korea’s Pusan National University, wrote that Beijing “is essentially demanding that South Korea remain defenseless — roofless — in the face of a spiraling nuclear missile threat on its doorstep. That is an astonishing ultimatum: to effectively surrender South Korean national security over an existential threat to demands of a foreign power.”

The Reference Shelf

– A QuickTake explainer on North Korea’s nuclear program.

– North Korea’s threat offers an opportunity for U.S.-China cooperation, says Junheng Li, founder of JL Warren Capital LLC.

– China’s crackdown on travel to South Korea had a swift impact on stocks.

Pubblicato in: Cina, Persona Umana, Politica Mondiale

Cina. Durissima risposta al report Usa sui ‘diritti umani’.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2017-03-07.

Pechino-Città-Proibita-da-Piazza-Tiananmen

Ad ogni azione corrisponde una reazione eguale e contraria.

Questo è un principio della fisica che si applica alla perfezione anche ai rapporti umani.

*

Da otto anni l’Amministrazione Obama aveva assunto l’iniziativa di redigere un report pubblicato a cadenza annuale, il Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, cui dare risonanza mondiale.

Questo report dettagliava quanto ciascuno degli stati esistenti fosse o meno coerente con ciò che l’Amministrazione Obama definiva essere i “diritti umani“. Erano, e sono tuttora, giudizi tranchant, emessi per di più senza possibilità di contraddittorio.

*

Da un punto di vista teoria e logico formale, etica e morale sono materia oggettiva, non soggettiva. Se infatti potessero esistere più etiche o più morali, essere sarebbero in contraddizione vicendevole, e la contraddizione è segno evidente di falsità. Di conseguenza, non può esiste che una ed una sola etica, una ed una sola morale.

Questo semplice ragionamento evidenzia la fallacia di ciò che i liberals democratici americani considerano essere i “diritti umani“, da loro ritenuti essere soggettivi. Essi infatti includono in tale categoria logica tutta una serie di asserzioni da loro ritenute essere indimostrati ed indimostrabili “diritti umani“. È una loro visione squisitamente soggettiva, che vale allora tanto quanto una che la contraddicesse in toto.

Anche se gli esempi dovrebbero essere alieni dai ragionamenti teorici, potremmo ricordare come, per esempio, la democrazia intesa come suffragio universale sia nella storia solo uno dei tanti modi eticamente corretti di reggere i popoli. Un altro chiaro esempio inerisce l’etica e la morale sessuale, nell’ambito delle quali i liberals postulano l’esistenza di assiomi da loro ritenuti essere di carattere generale, ma che sono invece contraddittori e conflittuali. E la loro principale contraddizione è la negazione del diritto alla vita. Ma senza vita, non esiste altro che il ricordo, se mai riuscise a sussistere nel tempo.

In poche parole, i così detti “diritti umani” esistono solo nella mente dei liberals e sono praticati solo dove essi siano direttamente od indirettamente al governo. Per esempio, l’Amministrazione Trump non li condivide affatto, e con lei la maggioranza del popolo sovrano che la ha eletta. Infine, non esistono diritti senza i relativi doveri: anzi, è l’adempimento di un dovere che conferisce un diritto.

Per esempio: prima si versino i conributi pensionistici e poi, dopo e solo dopo ciò, si acquisisce il diritto a percepire la pensione pattuita.

*

Da un mero punto di rapporti di forza, gli Stati Uniti rendono conto di circa un ventesimo della popolazione mondiale. Con 18.6 trilioni di Usd di pil, rendono conto del 24.6% di quello mondiale, fatto che li pone come primaria potenza economica, ma molto ben lontana da quando agli inizi degli anni sessanta gli Usa costituivano il 70% del pil mondiale. Dal punto di vista militare, gli Stati Uniti sono una delle due superpotenze atomiche, ma anche una delle tante nazioni dotate di tali armi. Ma, a partire dalla guerra del Vietnam, hanno sicuramente vinto molte battaglie, ma alla fine hanno perso militarmente e politicamente le guerre. Trenta anni or sono il Mare Cinese del Sud era un loro lago personale, dal quale sono oggi praticamente banditi.

In poche parole di riassunto, non hanno più la forza di imporre i propri voleri.

*

In questo contesto il Country Reports on Human Rights Practices si pone come eticamente e moralmente inconsistente e, per di più, politicamente molto inopportuno.

«La Segreteria di Stato degli Stati Uniti d’America si occupa, o dovrebbe occuparsi, della conduzione della politica estera della nazione. Un report che esprima considerazioni su nazioni sovrane è un evento di politica estera a carattere unilaterale: la sua pubblicazione potrebbe anche produrre reazioni avverse, sempre che agli Stati Uniti competa il compito di giudicare il mondo.

Già: chi mai avrebbe dato agli Stati Uniti il diritto di giudicare? E sono molte le nazioni che si pongono questo quesito, esattamente come si pongono la domanda se poi l’Occidente rispetti i diritti fondamentali dell’uomo. Infatti, gran parte del resto del mondo la pensa in modo opposto a come la sta pensando l’Occidente.» [Fonte]

*

I liberals democratici, sparuta minoranza politica ancorché ancora occupante alcuni importanti centri di potere, ha reagito con grande clangore al fatto che il Segretario di Stato, Mr Tillerson, non abbia presentato i Report in prima persona e con enfasi.

«Rex Tillerson said he wanted to see facts before criticizing countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Philippines».

Invero, non sembrerebbe destituita di sano buon senso la posizione assunta dal Segretario di Stato di voler prima esaminare i fatti e poi, dopo adeguata analisi e ripensamento, esprimere giudizio, se mai fosse da esprimersi.

*

Il risultato in ogni caso è stato immediato, e le critiche piovute sul Report pienamente giustificate.

«China on Monday questioned the findings of a United States human rights report and cautioned against using the issue of human rights to interfere in China’s internal affairs»

*

«The U.S. State Department released an annual report on global human rights Friday, which pointed a finger at China and some other countries»

*

«Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang voiced firm opposition to the “2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” which he said was full of unfounded accusations and prejudice»

*

«China holds that countries should have dialogue and exchanges with one another on human rights on the basis of equality and mutual respect»

*

«Geng dismissed the false accusations and stressed that the United States has no right to intervene in the internal affairs of China»

* * * * * * * *

Non sarà sfuggito a nessuno il fatto che il Ministero degli Esteri cinese abbia risposto non per voce del Ministro, bensì tramite un semplice portavoce: da un punto di vista diplomatico un ceffone a piena mano. Né sarà sfuggito che nomina il U.S. State Department , non certamente Mr Tillerson. Una sottigliezza per il volgo, un oceano di differenza in diplomazia.

Poniamoci allora una domanda.

Ha poi così grande importanza andare a cercarsi inimicizie per nulla?

Tanto poi, alla fine, ci si deve ben sedere attorno ad un tavolino e trattare, con reciproco beneficio ed accordo. Come dicono i cinesi: «on the basis of equality and mutual respect».


China Org. 2017-03-07. China rejects US criticism on human rights

China on Monday questioned the findings of a United States human rights report and cautioned against using the issue of human rights to interfere in China’s internal affairs.

The U.S. State Department released an annual report on global human rights Friday, which pointed a finger at China and some other countries.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang voiced firm opposition to the “2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” which he said was full of unfounded accusations and prejudice.

China has lodged solemn representations with the U.S. side, Geng said at a regular press conference.

He said anyone free of political bias about China’s human rights situation would not deny the remarkable improvements since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

China holds that countries should have dialogue and exchanges with one another on human rights on the basis of equality and mutual respect, Geng said.

He urged the United States to view China’s human rights situation in an objective and fair manner and stop using the issue to interfere in China’s internal affairs.

Regarding the report’s accusations about the human rights situation in the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions, Geng dismissed the false accusations and stressed that the United States has no right to intervene in the internal affairs of China.

Since the return of Hong Kong and Macao, the “One Country, Two Systems” policy and the Basic Law have been implemented comprehensively, and Hong Kong and Macao residents enjoy full rights and freedom in accordance with the law, said Geng.

These are well-established facts and cannot be called into question, he added.

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Mondiale

La Cina rifiuta l’accredito al G20 ai giornalisti del Deutsche Welle.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2016-09-04.

 2016-09-04__Deutsche_Welle__001

Non tutti sono tenuti a sapere chi e cosa sia il Deutsche Welle.

«Deutsche Welle at a glance

Who we are

Deutsche Welle (DW) is Germany’s international broadcaster. Peter Limbourg has been Director General since 2013. Around 3,000 employees and freelancers from 60 countries work in DW’s headquarters in Bonn and main studio in Berlin.

Mission
DW conveys Germany as a nation rooted in European culture and as a liberal, democratic state based on the rule of law. DW is known for its in-depth, reliable news and information and promotes exchange and understanding between the world’s cultures and people. Deutsche Welle also provides access to the German language.

Media
DW has developed regional television lineups in English, German, Spanish and Arabic, with radio and online content available in 30 different languages. DW’s television lineup offers news, features and documentaries covering everything from business, science and politics to arts, culture and sports.

Audiences
We reach out especially to international decision makers and opinion leaders. In authoritarian states, this applies to those who actively stand up for democracy, human rights and civil society. We also ensure that those who speak or want to learn German will have access to content that will help them do so. DW reaches more than 118 million people weekly worldwide.

Distribution
We rely on a global satellite network, partner stations and online services to make tuning in as easy as possible. DW also utilizes other means of distribution like apps, podcasting, live-streaming, on-demand and mobile services.

DW Akademie

DW Akademie offers media professionals a broad range of training and consulting services. DW Akademie also provides cross-media traineeships, a bilingual master’s degree, as well as media training for executives of organizations and companies working internationally.»

*

«Deutsche Welle o DW è la compagnia tedesca di informazione internazionale membro della ARD. Trasmette via satellite (in inglese, tedesco e spagnolo in un canale, ed arabo in un altro), radio e internet in 30 lingue (tra cui non figura l’italiano). Il nome dell’emittente significa Onda Tedesca, è simile a BBC World Service, Voice of America, e Radio France Internationale.  ….

A Deutsche Welle appartengono il canale radiofonico DW Radio, quello televisivo DW-TV ed il portale internet in 30 lingue DW.de. ….

Deutsche Welle prosegue la tradizione della prima emittente radio tedesca, la Weltrundfunksender della Repubblica di Weimar che nel 1933 fu trasformata in Deutscher Kurzwellensender dai nazisti.  ….

Il compito istituzionale di DW, previsto al paragrafo 4 della legge sulla Deutsche Welle (Deutsche-Welle-Gesetz) è quello di far conoscere la Germania come stato di cultura europea organizzato nella forma di un libero e democratico stato di diritto, e di promuovere la comprensione e lo scambio tra i popoli e le culture. Quindi è uno strumento per la politica culturale estera della Repubblica Federale di Germania. ….

Deutsche Welle, emittente radiofonica di diritto federale, è un’istituzione pubblica non-profit ed in quanto tale soggiace al controllo del governo federale.  ….

Anche se DW, come le altre emittenti pubbliche, è un’istituzione di diritto pubblico, essa non incassa alcun canone. Il finanziamento è garantito principalmente da una concessione dalle entrate fiscali del bilancio federale. Deutsche Welle riceve questo contributo per il tramite del Ministero della Cultura e della Comunicazione, che a sua volta è inserito nella sezione di bilancio della cancelleria federale.» [Fonte]

*

The Broadcasting Board.

Administrative Board.

«The Administrative Board consists of one member from the Bundestag (German lower house), Bundesrat (German upper house), Bundesregierung (Federal government) and four further members, which are elected by the Broadcasting Board. The current tenure of this body (introduced below) began with its constituent session on 5 May, 2014.»

* * * * * * *

Il Fatto.

A giorni si terrà un critico G20 a Hangzhou. Ne abbiamo fatta ampia relazione già due settimane or sono.

Orbene, le Autorità cinesi hanno rifiutato di accreditare i giornalisti del DW:

«China authorities have refused Deutsche Welle accreditation to report on the G20 Summit that starts Sunday in Hangzhou»

*

«The team from DW, using the visas, was able to enter without difficulty. However, despite efforts of the German Foreign Office and the German Embassy in Beijing, accreditation was further refused. As a result, it is impossible for DW to access the conference venue and to report from the G20 Summit»

*

«The behavior of the Chinese side is absolutely not tolerable. Whether this represents a “punishment” for critical reporting, or whatever motivation led to this situation, is not the deciding matter»

* * * * * * *

Deutsche Welle è la testata portavoce del Governo tedesco. Ne pubblica le veline, ne incensa l’operato, deride e schernisce quanti non la pensassero come il Governo: sono nazisti, fascisti, negazioniti, populisti, xenofobi, razzisti, e financo omofobi ed anti-femministi.

Per una di quelle ripartizione del potere tipiche delle alleanze governative il Deutsche Welle è appannaggio della socialdemocrazia che vi ha allocato amministratori e giornalisti di specchiata fede ideologica.

Tutti socialisti old-fashion, ma, soprattutto, gente devota ad Herr Gabriel, boss indiscusso (almeno finora) dell’Spd. Gente che non può far altro che annuire, perché senza appoggio politico conterebbero quasi nulla.

Come risultato, il Deutsche Welle è la fotocopia del Völkischer Beobachter di vecchia memoria oppure della Pravda dei tempi di Stalin.

Resta alle volte difficile distinguere se un articolo particolarmente schierato sia velina governativa oppure iniziativa di un giornalista desideroso di encomi.

Senza Nubi cita spesso il Deutsche Welle per riportare anche le visioni diametralmente opposte alle proprie e soprattutto perché i giornalisti socialisti si imbarcano spesso a sostenere situazioni insostenibili, facendoci figure barbine: il ridicolo è spesso un’arma micidiale.

Come da direttive di partito, il Deutsche Welle è palesemente anticinese in tutto. Nulla della Cina è loro congegnale, ogni certo quale numero di mesi ne annunciano la prossima morte.

Per decenni i cinesi hanno sopportato molto pazientemente: con la pazienza di Giobbe.

Adesso che il voivodato di Frau Merkel scricchiola vistosamente ed il khanato di Herr Gabriel pare seduto su di un cumulo di tritolo, i cinesi si sono tolti un sassolino dalla scarpa.

Lo hanno fatto con il classico stile orientale, con classe.

Nessuno si stupirebbe se alla fine ammettessero quei giornalisti al G-20: tanto, che ci siano o non ci siano, il mondo non farebbe una piega.

Ma il ceffone è urente. Per il Deutsche Welle e per il Governo tedesco.

*

Però è uno dei tanti segni di come siano mutati i tempi.

La Cina è in grado ora di dire dei brucianti no anche a paesi occidentali che in passato furono grandi.

E magari, in futuro, potrebbe anche non gradire il Cancelliere tedesco…


Deutsche Welle. 2016-09-03. Deutsche Welle: China refuses accreditations for G20 Summit

China authorities have refused Deutsche Welle accreditation to report on the G20 Summit that starts Sunday in Hangzhou. DW Director General Peter Limbourg has urged the hosts of the G20 Summit to reconsider.

*

The news section of DW had applied for visas and accreditation for three employees for reportage on the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China. Prior to the issuing of visas, the Chinese consular department in Berlin had stated that granting of accreditation was a prerequisite. The visas were issued around two weeks ago.

On the day of departure, there was still no confirmation of the accreditation, so, at the request of DW, the German embassy in Beijing queried Chinese authorities. The reply was that no accreditation existed for DW and “that the journalists already knew, why not,” according to a employee of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

The team from DW, using the visas, was able to enter without difficulty. However, despite efforts of the German Foreign Office and the German Embassy in Beijing, accreditation was further refused. As a result, it is impossible for DW to access the conference venue and to report from the G20 Summit.

DW Director General Peter Limbourg urged the hosts of the G20 Summit to make reporting by DW possible. “The behavior of the Chinese side is absolutely not tolerable. Whether this represents a “punishment” for critical reporting, or whatever motivation led to this situation, is not the deciding matter. Whoever tries through such methods to hinder free reporting about an international event, at which the German Federal Chancellor is participating, is a poor host. I call on the Chinese authorities urgently to immediately grant complete accreditation to our team for the G20 Summit.”


N-TV. 2016-09-03. China brüskiert Deutsche Welle

Die Deutsche Welle darf nicht vom G20-Gipfel im chinesischen Hangzhou berichten. China hätte dem deutschen Auslandssender die Akkreditierung verweigert, heißt es – mit einer schnippischen Begründung.

*

China hat Journalisten der Deutschen Welle (DW) die Zulassung für den G20-Gipfel verweigert. Zur Berichterstattung von dem Treffen der führenden Industrie- und Schwellenländer im ostchinesischen Hangzhou hatte der deutsche Auslandssender nach eigenen Angaben für drei Mitarbeiter die Visa und Akkreditierungen beantragt. Zwar seien Visa für China ausgestellt worden, doch habe es keine Akkreditierung gegeben.

Die Regierung in Peking hatte sich in der Vergangenheit wiederholt verärgert über das chinesische Programm der Deutschen Welle gezeigt und blockiert bis heute deren Website. 2015 war die DW-Mitarbeiterin Gao Yu wegen angeblichen Verrats von Staatsgeheimnissen zu sieben Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt worden. Die 72-Jährige wurde im November aus gesundheitlichen Gründen aus der Haft entlassen.

Im Fall der verweigerten G20-Zulassung teilte der Sender mit, ein Mitarbeiter des Außenministeriums habe der deutschen Botschaft in Peking auf Nachfrage geantwortet, dass für die Deutsche Welle keine Akkreditierungen vorlägen. Die Journalisten wüssten schon warum, habe es geheißen. Das Team habe mit den Visa dennoch ohne Probleme einreisen können. Trotz Bemühungen von Auswärtigem Amt und deutscher Botschaft werde aber weiter die Akkreditierung verweigert. So könnten die Journalisten nicht zum Konferenzort und von dort berichten.

“Das Verhalten der chinesischen Seite ist absolut nicht hinnehmbar”, sagte DW-Intendant Peter Limbourg. “Ob dies eine “Strafe” für kritische Berichterstattung darstellt, oder welche Motive auch immer zu dieser Situation geführt haben, ist nicht entscheidend.” Wer durch solche Methoden versuche, die freie Berichterstattung über ein Ereignis zu behindern, an dem auch Kanzlerin Angela Merkel teilnehme, “ist ein schlechter Gastgeber”.

 

Pubblicato in: Geopolitica Mondiale

Cina dichiara Mr. Michael Brand ‘non gradito’.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2016-05-14.

 Das Brandenburger Tor in Berlin

 

«Michael Brand, chairman of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid of the German Bundestag, is not welcome to China».

Ma chi mai sarà codesto Herr Michael Brand?

«Michael Brand (born 19 November 1973 in Fulda, Hesse) is a German politician and member of the CDU.

A former election observer at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Brand has been a directly elected member of the Bundestag since 2005, representing Fulda.

Between 2005 and 2013, Brand was a member of the Committee on the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, where he served as the CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s rapporteur on recycling and waste regulations. From 2009, he also served on the Defence Committee and on the Sub-Committee for Civilian Crisis Prevention.

Since the 2009 federal elections, Brand has been serving on the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid; he has been the committee’s chairman since 2014. In addition, he serves as deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Friendship Group for Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and as member of the Parliamentary Friendship Group for Relations with the States of South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia).

In April 2015, Brand vigorously criticized German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier for refusing to use the word “genocide” to describe the mass killing of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire, arguing that “the German foreign minister is expected on a national and international level to recognize and name a genocide; […] especially because of the Holocaust a genocide must not be by-passed or withheld due to cowardice.”» [Fonte]

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Tuttavia emergerebbe anche un’altro aspetto di Herr Michael Brand.

Assieme a Kerstin Griese, Spd, aveva presentato e fatto approvare dal Bundestag nell’aprile 2015 la legge Griese/Brand sul bando del suicidio assistito.

Fin qui nulla da eccepire, tranne che questo tema sarebbe stato a cuore della dirigenza della Chiesa Luterana e, sembrerebbe, Brand sarebbe incardinato nella Luther Connection, lobby che si interessa di moltissimi argomenti e solo marginalmente di aspetti etici.

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Essere poi membro del Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Friendship Group for Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina e member of the Parliamentary Friendship Group for Relations with the States of South-Eastern Europe non sembrerebbe avergli garantito le simpatie cinesi.

Le sue attività poi a favore di un’indipendenza del Tibet avrebbero consolidato la decisione di dichiararlo “persona non gradita”.

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Il fatto si propone ad molte interpretazioni differenti, mettendo ciascuna di esse in evidenza un particolare aspetto.

Tra queste, una ci sembrerebbe pregnante.

Che la Cina non avrebbe potuto gradire né Herr Michael Brand né ciò che rappresenta non era poi un mistero. Ciò che lascia stupiti e perplessi che il Bundestag lo abbia proposto per una missione in Cina.

 

Xinhua News. 2016-05-13. German legislator unwelcome in China for backing ‘Tibetan independence’

A Foreign Ministry spokesman said on Thursday that China had refused to allow a German legislator to visit the country for his pro-Tibetan independence position.

Michael Brand, chairman of the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid of the German Bundestag, is not welcome to China, spokesman Lu Kang said at a routine press briefing.

Lu said Brand’s position of backing “Tibetan independence” is against Germany’s one-China policy.

Brand was denied permission to visit China purely because of his position on Tibet, not for his comments on the human rights situation in China, stressed Lu.

China attaches importance to exchanges and cooperation with the German Bundestag as well as its committees, including the Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid, Lu said.

The Chinese side has made extensive preparations for the upcoming visit of the Committee members, said Lu, adding that dialogue and exchange must be based on mutual respect.

It would be very unwise for the committee to issue a statement criticizing China’s decision, said the spokesman.