«Compared with China’s dominance in world trade, its expanding role in global finance is poorly documented and understood. Over the past decades, China has exported record amounts of capital to the rest of the world. Many of these financial flows are not reported to the IMF, the BIS or the World Bank. “Hidden debts” to China are especially significant for about three dozen developing countries, and distort the risk assessment in both policy surveillance and the market pricing of sovereign debt. We establish the size, destination, and characteristics of China’s overseas lending. We identify three key distinguishing features. First, almost all of China’s lending and investment abroad is official. As a result, the standard “push” and “pull” drivers of private cross-border flows do not play the same role in this case. Second, the documentation of China’s capital exports is (at best) opaque. China does not report on its official lending and there is no comprehensive standardized data on Chinese overseas debt stocks and flows. Third, the type of flows is tailored by recipient. Advanced and higher middle-income countries tend to receive portfolio debt flows, via sovereign bond purchases of the People’s Bank of China. Lower income developing economies mostly receive direct loans from China’s state-owned banks, often at market rates and backed by collateral such as oil. Our new dataset covers a total of 1,974 Chinese loans and 2,947 Chinese grants to 152 countries from 1949 to 2017. We find that about one half of China’s overseas loans to the developing world are “hidden”. ….
Unlike other major economies, almost all of China’s overseas lending and investment is official, meaning that it is undertaken by the Chinese government, state-owned companies or the statecontrolled central bank. Most notable is the fact that the documentation of China’s capital exports is (at best) opaque. ….
China does not divulge data on its official flows with the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System, and it is not part of the OECD Export Credit Group, which provides data on long- and short-term trade credit flows ….
China’s direct loans and trade credits have climbed from almost zero in 1998 to more than 1.6 trillion USD, or close to 2 percent of world GDP in 2018. ….
In total, estimates suggest that the Chinese state now accounts for a quarter of total bank lending to emerging markets ….
This has transformed China into the largest official creditor, easily surpassing the IMF or the World Bank. ….
Overall, we combined details on more than 1,947 loans as well as 2,947 grants extended by the Chinese government and state-owned creditor agencies since 1949, to more than 150 countries worldwide, with total commitments of 530 billion US$. ….
using unpublished data from the World Banks’s Debtor Reporting System and data on BIS reported bank claims, we find that about 50% of China’s lending is “hidden”. Neither the IMF, nor the World Bank, nor credit rating agencies report on these “hidden” debt stocks, which have grown to more than 200 billion USD as of 2016 ….
These practices have a historical analogue. Indeed, China’s overseas loans share many features with French, German and British 19th century foreign lending, which also tended to be market based, partially collateralized by commodity income, and characterized by a close link of political and commercial interests ….
the government of China holds more than five trillion USD of debt towards the rest of the world (6% of world GDP) ….»
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Chiunque abbia una sia pur minima infarinatura dei canoni dell’economia classica capisce al volo cosa stia facendo la Cina: replica quello che fu il comportamento delle potenze occidentali nell’ottocento. Per questo motivo il comportamento cinese resto oscuro a politici ed economisti occidentali, che non riescono neppure a quantizzarne la portata.
A differenza degli occidentali, la Cina intrattiene relazioni economiche indipendentemente dai problemi interni dei paesi e senza voler imporre la condivisione dell’ideologia liberal.
Poi, sarebbe da domandarsi per quale strano motivo i cinesi dovrebbero pubblicare i rendiconti di ciò che stanno facendo: tanto, ne mettono al corrente coloro che reputano debbano esserne aggiornati.
Di fatto, in ogni caso, ha fatto più prestiti la Cina dell’Imf e della World Bank: due organizzazioni destinate a declinare assieme al declino dell’occidente.
La stima di 1.6 trilioni Usd di crediti in essere è molto cautelare: altri istituti li stimano fino al doppio.
La Cina sta legandosi la maggior parte degli stati africani ed asiatici ed una quota rilevante di nazioni del sud America. È una penetrazione finanziaria ed economica strategica, destinata a dare i suoi frutti nel tempo.
L’occidente ha nel corso dei decenni assunto una struttura altamente dispendiosa e poco efficiente, e destina gran parte delle sue risorse al mantenimento di un welfare alla lunga insostenibile. Il confronto con la Cina è perso. Il mondo non ha più bisgno dell’occidente.
According to research recently published by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, there are seven countries in the world whose external loan debt to China surpasses 25 percent of their GDP. Three (Djibouti, Niger and The Republic of the Congo) are located in Africa, while four (Kyrgyztan, Laos, Cambodia and the Maldives) are in Asia.
Yet, the world map of debt to China amassed through direct loans (excluding debt holdings and short-term trade debt) shows that a majority of countries heavily in debt to China are in Africa, but that Central Asia and Latin America follow close behind.
While China’s overseas lending is coordinated by the country’s centralized government, it is often poorly documented, which the researchers of the paper were trying to change. They found that debt by direct loans started to grow immensely only around 2010 and that loans by China often come at higher rates and with shorter grace periods for the receiving country than comparable loans from the OECD or the World Bank. The authors also caution that countries heavily in debt to China are at risk of defaulting. In the 1970s, a lending boom which consisted of similar contracts offered by U.S., European and Japanese banks had led to this outcome for a number of developing countries which were trying to improve their infrastructure, according to the research.
Meanwhile, external debt to China through portfolio holdings is concentrated in developed nations and passes the threshold of 10 percent of GDP for Germany and the Netherlands. It amounts to between 5 and 10 percent of GDP in the U.S., Canada, France, the UK and Australia.