Pubblicato in: Demografia, Devoluzione socialismo, Unione Europea

Spopolamento dell’Europa. Le nazioni sud – orientali.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2019-07-11.

Vincent van Gogh - Vecchio che soffre

Per quanto sia da oltre trenta anni che i demografi mettano in guardia dal fenomeno dello spopolamento e dell’invecchiamento della popolazione, solo negli ultimi tempi la politica inizia a prenderne atto.

Se il problema è drammatico in paesi quali la Germania, è ancor più accentuato nei paesi del sud e dell’est europeo. Qui infatti al basso tasso di nascite ed all’invecchiamento della popolazione si associa un massiccio esodo della popolazione giovanile a causa di una severa stagnazione economica.

«Under current conditions, dramatic population reductions await Romania (-30 percent), Croatia (-30 percent), and Lithuania (-38 percent) among others»

«That decline unfolds over only the next few decades. If internal flows reach an equilibrium, the changes are much less severe: Romania (-14 percent), Hungary (-18 percent), and Lithuania (-20 percent), mostly due to natural decreases from having small families»

«While cohesion funds and remittances support development to varying degrees, they are not a substitute for the human capital – economic and social potential – of a country’s people»

«There may be no ‘ideal’ population size for a given country, but the younger-than-average age of emigrants accelerates population ageing as they leave»

«In 2015, the proportion aged 65+ stood at 19 percent for both the EU’s west and east. By 2060, that percentage will likely inflate at different speeds to 30 percent and 35 percent respectively»

* * * * * * *

L’articolo allegato presenta alcuni spunti da valorizzare ed alcune conclusioni a nostro sommesso avviso molto opinabili.

*

«funds …. are not a substitute for the human capital»

Chi in un deserto sedesse su di venti tonnellate di oro sarebbe sicuramente molto ricco, ma senza un sorso di acqua morirebbe. La ricchezza aiuta potentemente a vivere al meglio, ma non è l’unico elemento da prendere in considerazione.

La vera ricchezza di una nazione risiede nel suo capitale umano. Italia e Giappone sono casi da manuale. Paesi del tutto privi di risorse naturali con il loro ingegno sono riusciti a dare a quanto importato un cospicuo valore aggiunto, esportandolo quindi modificato dalla propria inventiva in modo vantaggioso.

Ma prima di parlare della formazione, dei fondi per lo sviluppo economico, e così via, è mandatorio che il capitale umano ci sia. Senza di quello ogni discorso si risolverebbe in un sofisma.

*

«By 2060, that percentage will likely inflate at different speeds to 30 percent and 35 percent respectively»

Siamo perfettamente di accordo che “no ‘ideal’ population size” esiste a priori.

Notiamo però come la capacità produttiva sia direttamente proporzionale al numero di persone in età lavorativa.

Se è vero che la grande produzione può in parte sopperire con l’automazione delle linee di montaggio, la grande industria è solo una parte ed anche piccola, quasi tutto il restante comparto produttivo necessita di persone fisiche. Si pensi solo a quanti fanno le manutenzioni dalle automobili, agli ascensori ed agli acquedotti.

Il nodo consiste nel rapporto che intercorre tra vecchi e giovani.

Un solo esempio. I giovani lavorano e versano i contributi pensionistici, che l’ente all’uopo istituito usa per pagare le pensioni in essere.

Senza giovani, addio pensioni. E quanti non abbiano prolificato avranno il benservito.

*

Il problema dello spopolamento può essere affrontato sia migliorando la situazione economica, così da ridurre l’espatrio in cerca di lavoro, ma solo generando simultaneamente le condizioni per una ripresa della procreazione.

Generare figli è problema di Weltanschauung non riconducibile alla mera condizione economica.

Ma senza ripresa delle nascite le nazioni si estinguono.

Questa è la bancarotta della visone liberal socialista della famiglia.

* * * * * * *


EU Observer. 2019-07-05. Cohesion funds alone won’t fix EU ‘brain drain’

Internal movement will cause a radical reshuffling of the EU population by 2060 unless trends moderate.

Using various demographic scenarios, a three-year investigation by the European Commission and scientific institute International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) sheds light onto this slow-moving, but consequential force reshaping the EU.

Under current conditions, dramatic population reductions await Romania (-30 percent), Croatia (-30 percent), and Lithuania (-38 percent) among others.

That decline unfolds over only the next few decades. If internal flows reach an equilibrium, the changes are much less severe: Romania (-14 percent), Hungary (-18 percent), and Lithuania (-20 percent), mostly due to natural decreases from having small families.

Austria receives the largest proportional gains from intra-EU mobility, and Germany’s population would be about stable if not for receiving newcomers from the east and south (+7 percent with vs. -1 percent without).

The scale of these movements, over time, carry important implications.

While cohesion funds and remittances support development to varying degrees, they are not a substitute for the human capital – economic and social potential – of a country’s people.

Population ageing

There may be no ‘ideal’ population size for a given country, but the younger-than-average age of emigrants accelerates population ageing as they leave.

In 2015, the proportion aged 65+ stood at 19 percent for both the EU’s west and east. By 2060, that percentage will likely inflate at different speeds to 30 percent and 35 percent respectively.

Contrary to popular belief, neither migration nor fertility have the power to stop population ageing or its consequences for the EU, as the report tests with scenarios of unrealistically high surges to both.

Specifically, the research team looked at doubling third country migration (flows of 20 million into the EU every five years), or a 50 percent increase in European fertility to 2.6 children per woman.

The strongest result came from increasing fertility, which still permits the EU’s proportion 65+ to climb to 27 percent by 2060.

Migration significantly drives up the total number of people living in the EU, but it does not meaningfully impact the age structure since migrants inevitably get older just as the native population does – adding to both the non-working and working populations in the long-run.

Momentum towards ageing is clear. But unlike population ageing itself, the anticipated negative consequences are avoidable.

Reasons for optimism

Greater labour force participation and a better educated labour force are trends already in motion.

By intensifying these, the EU will have a robust answer to its ageing-related worries.

For example, if EU member states would gradually converge to the level of labour force participation that men and women in Sweden have already achieved, the predicted climb in the ratio of non-workers to workers can be completely halted at 1-to-1.

Even if participation of women moves closer to their male country-counterparts (especially in southern Europe), possible increases in dependency would be significantly subdued.

Second, as younger cohorts enter working-ages and older ones leave, the process of ‘demographic metabolism’ will keep improving the overall education of the labour force.

Upcoming declines in the labour force size come exclusively from fewer workers with a secondary degree or lower.

Post-secondary groups on the other hand are expected to almost double over the next 40 years.

As the report explains, a smaller and better educated labour force may be best suited for adapting to disruptions from artificial intelligence (AI), productivity gains, and more broadly the changing needs of society.

Aside for these EU-wide prescriptions though, the internal dynamic needs attention.

Simply lacking work isn’t the problem in many of the emigrant-sending member states, evidenced by new labour shortages and an uptick in migration from non-EU eastern European countries.

Eastern and southern EU member states are among the world’s countries least able to retain their talent, according to the Global Competitiveness Index.

No wonder, they have to compete for their labour in the same system as economies that are the inheritors of historical hubs of commerce and industry.

Especially for member states with modest budgets, education should be made more directly relevant and integrated with local job markets. The goal being to maximise the chance of getting a return from tax payers’ investments in the human capital of their population.

Reciprocally, the receiving Western member states could support stabilisation mechanisms such as paying associated education costs incurred by the sending countries (in effect ending a subsidy for richer economies’ labour markets) or promoting circular migration for the return of top talent like scientists and doctors.

If EU principles of solidarity and cohesion are taken seriously, the loss of workers among southern and eastern member states deserves recognition and a vision for moderation.

Annunci