Pubblicato in: Banche Centrali, Cina, Finanza e Sistema Bancario

Cina. 11 trilioni Usd di bond. 1.3 trilioni in scadenza entro un anno. – Bloomberg.

Giuseppe Sandro Mela.

2018-06-20.

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I mercati finanziari delle grandi potenze economiche ci hanno abituato a trattare cifre da capogiro, che difficilmente mente umana può comprendere appieno.

Il mercato cinese dei bond ammonta ad undici trilioni di dollari americani, e di questi 1.3 trilioni Usd va in scadenza entro dodici mesi.

Nulla da stupirsi se gli investitori stiano domandandosi, alcuni anche in modo accorato, se potranno mai rivedere indietro i soldi impiegati.

Non solo.

Se è vero che a differenza dell’occidente gran parte del debito cinese è stato contratto per finanziare attività produttive, che una volta avviate rendono economicamente, sarebbe altrettanto vero che la guerra sui dazi potrebbe danneggiare almeno alcuni settori, mettendoli in difficoltà con la refusione.

«Given the massive size of the market — now more than $11 trillion, with a further half trillion or so in dollar bonds — it was always going to be a delicate transition»

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«Potential refinancing of $1.3 trillion looms in coming year»

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«China’s efforts to connect the world’s third-biggest bond market with the international financial system are hitting dual headwinds — a climb in global borrowing costs, and the country’s own campaign to reduce financial leverage»

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«The dynamics have contributed to defaults by 12 bond issuers in 2018 through June 4, after 18 for the whole of 2017, according to Fitch Ratings»

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«But with about 8.2 trillion yuan ($1.3 trillion) of domestic corporate and local-government securities due to mature in the coming 12 months, it’s an open question whether China is prepared to let chips fall where they may»

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«Authorities started shifting away from the old model of implicit guarantees for practically all debt securities in 2014, allowing defaults for the first time»

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«Where would the lines be drawn on who goes bust?»

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«As the U.S. Federal Reserve keeps raising interest rates, and China’s monetary overseers pursue a separate campaign to rein in shadow banking, the coming year may prove decisive in shifting investors away from relying on assumptions of state support — instead forcing them to value bonds based on how likely they are to get their money back.»

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«Better differentiation between borrowers based on their risk has been long absent in China»

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«Despite its size, the near-absence of defaults in China’s market until relatively recently was one quirk that kept it out of sync with the rest of the world»

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Se è vero che i default in Cina sono stati eventi del tutto rari, è altrettanto vero che il passato potrebbe non riproporsi nel futuro. Né è detto che la Cina si astenga dall’usare i default come arma finanziaria.

La Fed ha già iniziato, e proseguirà, ad aumentare i tassi di interesse, e questo fatto potrebbe spostare molte risorse finanziarie dallo yuan al dollaro americano.

Poi, che sia in corso una guerra economica e finanziaria dovrebbe essere sotto gli occhi di tutti, ed in guerra diventa lecito utilizzare anche armi altamente distruttive.

Riassumendo, nessuna idea catastrofista, ma un caldo suggerimento ad usare sana prudenza: nella vita non si sa mai.


Bloomberg. 2018-06-10. China’s $11 Trillion Bond Market Tested by Rising Defaults

– Local idiosyncracies challenge global funds eyeing China

– Potential refinancing of $1.3 trillion looms in coming year

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China’s efforts to connect the world’s third-biggest bond market with the international financial system are hitting dual headwinds — a climb in global borrowing costs, and the country’s own campaign to reduce financial leverage.

The dynamics have contributed to defaults by 12 bond issuers in 2018 through June 4, after 18 for the whole of 2017, according to Fitch Ratings. Firms from JPMorgan Chase & Co. to Fidelity International are warning to prepare for more. But with about 8.2 trillion yuan ($1.3 trillion) of domestic corporate and local-government securities due to mature in the coming 12 months, it’s an open question whether China is prepared to let chips fall where they may.

Authorities started shifting away from the old model of implicit guarantees for practically all debt securities in 2014, allowing defaults for the first time. The idea: tap market discipline to punish inefficient companies and encourage a more productive capital allocation. Given the massive size of the market — now more than $11 trillion, with a further half trillion or so in dollar bonds — it was always going to be a delicate transition. Where would the lines be drawn on who goes bust? A global-standard credit-ratings industry could hardly be engineered overnight. And who would staff credit-research teams and risk-control desks? Not to mention creating a derivatives market to hedge risks.

Great Wall of Maturities

A total of 8.2 trillion yuan of bonds are set to mature next 12 months

And with China’s door at its most open yet to overseas investors, the global spotlight is shining like never before on these securities.

“The pace is so much faster today, that’s one of the things that’s missed from many investors” looking at China’s capital markets, said Brendan Ahern, chief investment officer at Krane Funds Advisors, which is expanding its line of fixed income products as China’s bond market opens. “If you have to take your eye off China, it moves so quickly that it’s way ahead of you.”

As the U.S. Federal Reserve keeps raising interest rates, and China’s monetary overseers pursue a separate campaign to rein in shadow banking, the coming year may prove decisive in shifting investors away from relying on assumptions of state support — instead forcing them to value bonds based on how likely they are to get their money back.

And about time too, says Ashley Perrott, the Singapore-based head of pan-Asia fixed income at UBS Asset Management. Better differentiation between borrowers based on their risk has been long absent in China.

“It had to happen if they’re going to become a more mature market,” Perrott said. Despite its size, the near-absence of defaults in China’s market until relatively recently was one quirk that kept it out of sync with the rest of the world. There are many more that have made it idiosyncratic.

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